Ramadan Ends, Here Come the Pirates!

There are several private advisories of attacks off Somalia this morning suggesting several small boats are armed off the Horn of Africa. So far, no details have hit the news, except this one.

Iranian warships opened fire on suspected pirate boats in the Gulf of Aden to prevent an attempted hijack of three Iranian commercial vessels, a navy commander said on Saturday.

"After the boats ignored warnings, the pirates were sent fleeing by our shooting and they left the area," state radio quoted Fariborz Qaderpanah as saying. He said the incident took place on Friday.

The international naval forces are expecting a busy weekend. The alerts and warnings are coming from just about everywhere, suggesting coalition observation assets are doing their job offering early warning.

I spoke with Rear Adm. Scott Sanders, vice commander for U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, and British Royal Navy Capt. Keith Blount, the task force’s chief of staff, during a bloggers roundtable back on September 11th. Talking to the CTF-151 folks, it is impossible to measure the international coalitions influence in curbing piracy. They are clearly doing good things intercepting armed boats and donating the guns and grenades to the Indian Ocean deep, but they don't give any statistics for comparison regarding frequency of intercepts that would allow an observer to compare to the number of attacking vessels there were this time last year.

Still, I came away from that conversation very encouraged. There is evidence that coordination, trust, and cooperation is building among the international naval forces on station. That confidence and trust in each other can't be surged, as CS-21 notes, it is developed over time. In that regard, the Navy strategy is unquestionably working.

Did the vast majority of pirates take Ramadan off from pirate activity? Hard to tell, the weather before Ramadan prevented pirates from operating in their small vessels. The surge in attacks this morning off Somalia would suggest the pirates simply waited until the first morning after Ramadan to return to business as usual. Will a pattern develop, and will the international community successfully prevent hijackings? Time will tell, and this is when all of the efforts of the last several months by all the international partners gets tested.

Look for the news reports to break over the next few hours with details of the attacks.

Thoughts on the MV Win Far Shooting

This is the official Navy news story regarding the SH-60B Seahawk that was fired upon by Somali pirates.

At approximately 8:00 a.m. local time, Aug. 26, Somali Pirates aboard Motor Vessel (M/V) Win Far, fired what appeared to be a large caliber weapon at a U.S. Navy SH-60B Helicopter from Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light (HSL) 49, embarked aboard USS Chancellorsville (CG 62).

No rounds of ammunition struck the SH-60B. The SH-60 crew did not return fire. No personnel injuries resulted from the incident.

Win Far is a Taiwanese-flagged vessel that was pirated April 6. During the past 135 days it has been used as a "mother ship" to conduct other known pirate attacks, most notably the U.S. flagged Maersk-Alabama in April.

The helicopter was conducting a routine surveillance flight of M/V Win Far currently held at anchorage by Somali pirates south of Garacad, Somalia, when the incident occurred.

During the flight, aircrew observed activity but could not ascertain they were fired upon until their return to Chancellorsville and review of Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) video, which recorded the incident. The helicopter was approximately 3,000 yards from Win Far when it was fired upon.

Two images of the incident are given (see here and here), and a short video of the incident was posted on Flickr here. I am undecided what I think of this. Given the apparent inaccuracy over the last few years of Somali pirates when operating any weapons, I am not sure a Somali pirate could hit the broad side of a barn standing still in an open field at 3,000 yards with a full magazine. It is therefore hardly surprising that a Somali pirate couldn't shoot a moving helicopter from a ship at sea from 3,000 yards. It is also unclear (to me) what kind of weapon was used, although it looks like a rifle of some kind, that appears to not have the range to hit the helicopter when aiming directly at it at an incline. Lets keep in mind when viewing the imagery, the FLIR gives us a good picture, but objects are not as close as they may appear.

With the exception of a MANPAD, I am unable to think of a weapon I would be too concerned about from a Somali pirate at 3,000 yards, and last I heard pirates don't have MANPADs. I am also not familiar with a weapon system on a SH-60B that can kill a single pirate without causing collateral damage from 3,000 yards, so the suggestion that the Navy needs to shoot back under this scenario also seems a bit unrealistic.

So other than identifying a Somali pirate who has clearly had no professional training with his weapon, thus is nothing more than a hired idiot with a rifle (literally), did we really learn anything? In a way, we did learn one thing. Pirates will be aggressive once they take a ship and have hostages. All that does is, based on the way the pirates shot at US Navy assets during the Maersk Alabama incident, confirm what we already know.

As far as pirate tactical evolutions I have stated I am concerned about, I do not see this incident as representative of those concerns. The only detail that surprised me was to learn this is the first time pirates have shot at our helicopters. I would have guessed they did it all the time, although based on previous comments by US naval leaders in the area, it doesn't sound like we get very close to the pirates who have already hijacked a ship that often, so previous opportunities to shoot at US forces would have been scarce.

The Debate to Arm Merchant Ships

The AP has an article discussing the debate to arm merchant ships. It begins by noting that France has put soldiers on Tuna boats in the Indian Ocean, and Belgium is offering soldiers for its ships moving through the Horn of Africa region. There is already some concern that these moves will increase the level of violence off the Horn of Africa, which is a legitimate debate. While piracy is at the highest point in recorded 'modern' history off the coast of Somalia, very few people are killed by the actions of pirates. Given all the ammo used against merchant ships before pirates actually get on board a ship, it is hard to tell if this is in large part due to sheer luck or not. After all, it isn't like one can pretend a bridge that has been shot, of which several merchant ships have had, is done in hopes no one is hurt. There are also several injuries and deaths associated with piracy, and can never be claimed to be nonviolent.

Following Maersk Alabama, Congress is trying to take action but there are still several concerns what to do. First the AP report.

In June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an amendment that would require the Department of Defense to put armed teams on U.S.-flagged ships passing through high-risk waters, specifically around the Horn of Africa where Somali pirates have become a scourge of world shipping.

The amendment now goes to the Senate. A separate bill introduced last month would grant immunity from prosecution in American courts to any "owner, operator, time charterer, master, or mariner who uses force, or authorizes the use of force, to defend a vessel of the United States against an act of piracy."

Both measures face tough debate — U.S. military resources are spread thin and onboard weapons, especially in the hands of civilian crew, are seen as an extreme option.

Last month I had the pleasure of chatting with Captain Gordan Van Hook, U.S. Navy (Retired), who now works with Maersk Line, and several Navy officers who are involved in the discussions surrounding these various concepts in Congress. The only thing that emerges in discussing the issues involved with the various people involved is that there is no clear consensus.

Of all the various issues though, what strikes me as wrong headed thinking is that the Navy is trying to disconnect themselves from the responsibility of putting their people on merchant ships in the guardian role. Of all the various possibilities that could result from the debate, that the Navy doesn't want their people engaged seems first and foremost, wrong headed.

It seems to me that if you start from the position the US Navy assumes the responsibility of protecting ships, then it becomes much easier to articulate the level of legal protection necessary to be articulated by Congress in laws passed. Just as Congress has had to manage legal issues surrounding Air Marshall's, it seems to me that Congress should also be able to manage the legal framework for Sea Marshall's.

But the real reason I believe the US Navy should get involved, probably in conjuction with the other maritime services, is because I see this as an opportunity to collect intelligence and expand the picture of the operating environment. Interestingly enough, Captain Gordan Van Hook, U.S. Navy (Retired) discusses one such possibility in the latest issue of Proceedings.

The Department of Transportation's Volpe Center, a developer of marine traffic management systems, saw the potential for AIS to comply with recent U.S. government direction to achieve maritime domain awareness. Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe (CNE) had been linking the surveillance systems of NATO allies to provide an unclassified common operational picture of the Mediterranean Sea. Using AIS to complete this picture, CNE and Volpe developed an unclassified network to share AIS data, known as the Maritime Safety and Security Information System that quickly enhanced awareness for maritime security forces. However, AIS has limitations, as it can be easily spoofed or altered or can malfunction to provide erroneous information. Professional mariners treat AIS as only one fallible piece of data, and they constantly scan the horizon visually and electronically to confirm their surface picture.

What if maritime security forces could access this correlation and comparison of a ship's AIS with shipboard sensors? Recent experiments by Maersk Line, Limited and Lockheed Martin used a prototype AIS and radar correlator known as "Neptune" that sent data via satellite to a network that could conceivably be used by a maritime operations center. This system revealed thousands of contacts outside the range of shore-based AIS, as well as anomalies that did not match AIS. Such information could greatly enhance regional maritime awareness for commercial vessels and maritime security forces in unstable regions.

These systems could gain widest acceptance if they become available with minimal technical and financial investment. Built on IMO-sanctioned standards, they should not be considered intelligence or surveillance systems, but rather safety systems providing vital situational awareness, greater coordination of efforts, reduced risk of collisions, and identification of high-traffic and congestion solutions through analysis and simulation.

Maersk seems to be a great place to start, and by putting some sailors on the ship, the US Navy can help develop this type of system in real world operations off the coast of Somalia with people to test, manage, verify, and maintain as necessary the new system and integrate it into CTF 151. Even better, we secure the system by placing armed naval personnel on the ship to do exactly that. This type of system, in theory, would allow every US flagged ship (beginning with the Maersk Line ships) be a connected node of the MDA network off Somalia.

The idea that the US Navy is against using US Navy personnel to protect US flagged ships screams wasted opportunity, and quite honestly suggests the US Navy does not take its role for the protection of US shipping very seriously. A US flagged ship with US Navy personnel on board represents an opportunity, and quite frankly I have a hard time believing Maersk Line would be against the US Navy adding not only this type of AIS network, but also allowing the Navy to use UAV systems to give better maritime domain awareness to their ships. It doesn't have to be a big UAV like a ScanEagle, although the way Boeing has touted the latest ScanEagle launch and recovery system as lightweight and mobile, there is no reason it couldn't be either.

When the US Navy is, with its right hand, using the argument they don't have enough ships to effectively manage the piracy problem off Somalia, then with the left hand refuse to provide any additional operational support to protect US ships from piracy except deploying their biggest or newest ships, I think it can legitimately be claimed the problem is attitude, not capability.

The political support to protect US shipping should be, from the US Navy perspective, seized as an opportunity, but I don't see the US Navy trying to exploit this opportunity at all. Part of the suggestion may leave the impression that Congress is trying to militarize US shipping, but the analogy is like saying the Mayor of Chicago should not support the Chicago Police Dept. We know piracy is active in that region, the insurance premiums for shipping through that region reflects that reality, so why not add protection.

And if the US taxpayer is going to add protection, why not explore as per Captain Van Hook's suggestion adding capabilities to that protection that assist US Navy operations instead of just being a burden on resources? I think there is opportunity here just waiting for some clear eyed and resourceful Navy officer to commit some intellectual rigor towards, because I think once that starts... good things will happen.

Regardless, tactical evolution from the other side is just weeks away, the Monsoon season is about to end. I hope our tactical evolutions are ready too...

Coast Guard remarks on piracy

RADM Salerno appeared before a Senate subcommittee yesterday to discuss piracy. He covered a lot of ground and a lot of what he said meshes well with the administration's approach to piracy. Out of the gate he stressed the breadth of the CG's international agreements and this is probably going to be their biggest contribution to the fight.

These agreements underpin a wide range of Coast Guard operations including counter-drug, migrant interdiction, fisheries enforcement, and Proliferation Security Initiative missions. The Coast Guard understands the domestic and international legal frameworks and the associated boarding and enforcement requirements necessary to ensure the successful negotiation and implementation of agreements to facilitate counter-piracy operations on the water and the delivery of legal consequences to the pirates ashore.

Since the administration favors the law-enforcement tack, these agreements can offer a starting point to begin accomplishing something in the legal realm with respect to piracy. After so many pirates have been released because of jurisdictional issues, it's important that we start building the multilateral agreements necessary to successfully prosecute them. This is an explicit benefit of the CG's dual role as military and law-enforcement.

While the Navy has the statutory authority to go after pirates and more than capable when it comes to assault, the CG teams detached to these ships in CTF 151 and elsewhere have the procedural experience when it comes to international crime that is going to be really important when these guys are tried in a Western democracy. Salerno rightly says a lot about the strength and importance of this particular partnership.

He also touched on something else that has been popping up in ADM Allen's remarks recently about the threat small vessels represent.

Small vessels are the vehicle of choice for pirates to conduct their attacks. These vessels are fast, readily available, relatively inexpensive, and blend in well with other small vessels commonly operating in the area.

Smaller vessels have been the vehicle for pretty much all maritime mayhem in recent memory including the bombing of the Cole, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard incident last year and you could even include the Chineese fishing boats recently. Small boats also represent the largest maritime threat on the domestic front too. When I heard Allen point this out for the first time I was dumbfounded how simple the connection was. Simple as it may be, there is no comprehensive solution to this threat here, in Somalia or anywhere and they know it.

As the piracy cases off Somalia have illustrated, there is a continuing need for maritime domain awareness - the ability to detect, classify,, and identify vessels at sea. We need greater awareness of maritime activities around the world, as well as along our coastlines, for both safety and security purposes.

There are some tools available that I'll discuss in a later post but as it stands now it's a vulnerability we have to live with for the foreseeable future. The law enforcement approach to piracy might be appropriate now but it won't do anything to remedy the larger threat in the long run. That's going to take a sizable coalition and they're smart to start floating this idea and get the discussion started even though they don't have the answer.

CTF-151 Goes International

The US Navy likes to share the responsibility with others. Combined Task Force 151, the task force formed to deal with Somali piracy, is a perfect example. It is not very well publicized who is and is not participating, although we know Great Britain, Singapore, Denmark, South Korea, and Turkey either are or have participated.

Now Turkey is going to lead CTF-151 beginning in May.

"The US Navy will transfer command of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 to the Turkish Navy on Sunday May 3, 2009," Lieutenant Nathan Christensen of the Bahrain-based US Fifth Fleet said in a statement.

Rear Admiral Michelle Howard will hand over control of the task force to Turkish Rear Admiral Caner Bener in a ceremony aboard the Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, the Navy said.

"Turkey will be the second nation to command the counter-piracy task force. This also marks the first time Turkey will command a Combined Maritime Forces Task Force," the statement said.

By rotating leadership of the international task forces, the US Navy shares the burden of responsibility with international partners. It should also be noted that this is great for cooperation purposes, and over time could be a way the US Navy entices larger navies looking to form better integration of their forces with other international naval forces.

I'm thinking specifically of China and India. Russia has been working with the EU force, although the nice thing about CTF-151 is that when the EU finishes its first year long tour, the Europeans can either choose to do it again themselves another year, or choose to participate with CTF-151.

I think the EU will go with CTF-151, because it isn't about sharing the credit when it comes to Somali piracy, it is about sharing the blame. Getting every nation under a single command will improve the international response though, and getting that command under a UN flag could, potentially, provide legal and political coverage to nations who know that more needs to be done to curb piracy.

Observing the Obama Administration Somali Piracy Policy

I had the day off Thursday, so I watched some TV and listened to the radio as the topic of piracy continued to come up. I think I would have killed fewer brain cells if I was to down a keg of Shock Top solo. I am convinced that this blue guy is smarter on the Somalia issue than most of the experts I've heard on talk radio over the last 24 hours. TV producers should do their show a favor and interview real experts like David Axe.

As I am following the discussions regarding Somali piracy, what bothers me right now is the shortage of real intellectual inputs that explains the current policy, never mind a conversation about piracy that promotes a realistic policy.

President Bush essentially punted the Somali piracy problem to Barack Obama. The only action related to Somalia piracy implemented under the Bush administration was the standing up of Combined Task Force 151 less than a week before Obama's Inauguration Day. It is unclear if the establishment of this organizational framework for the Navy was directed by the Bush Administration, or simply an effort by the Navy in preparation for the Obama administration policy.

The Obama administration implemented the first policy relating to Somali piracy with the announcement in late January that Kenya and the United States had signed a memorandum of understanding that will allow pirates captured in the region to be tried in Kenyan courts. This legal framework is the rule set the Obama administration developed the law enforcement centric policy for dealing with Somali pirates. This policy instructs the United States Navy to capture pirates and deliver them, and the associated collected evidence, to Kenya for legal prosecution. Since that policy went into effect, when evidence was collected pirates have been turned over to Kenyan authorities. When there was not enough evidence to link armed Somali's matching the description of pirates reported to be attacking commercial ships off the coast of Somalia, those detained would be released.

The current policy for addressing Somali piracy was the first major foreign policy decision implemented by the Obama administration and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton after Obama became president. As a new policy, it is fluid and must be assessed at each step. I contend that when a US flagged ship is hijacked by pirates for the first time in 200 years while our naval forces are struggling under the law enforcement policy to produce successful prosecutions, thus deterrence, the Obama pirate policy is not working.

The current Obama policy is not aligned well with the US Navy's capabilities at sea. The Obama administration maritime law enforcement policy forces the great United States Navy to operate like an inept United Nations coast guard against Somali pirates. Tough choices will need to be made to align the Obama administrations law enforcement policy with our national capabilities at sea, and these choices are a lot tougher than the political rhetoric on the piracy issue is articulating.

John Kerry has called for hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to address the growing problem of Somali piracy. He is correct that a rigorous policy debate "is long overdue."

"When Americans, including at least one from Massachusetts, are endangered, you’ve got a complicated and dangerous international situation brewing, and that includes questions about a hot pursuit policy on Somalia’s coastline."

I only hope that Senator Kerry is thinking clearly regarding the type of experts to invite for the discussion. Somali piracy is a very complex issue. The Senate needs new ideas to promote a better policy, because the Navy needs a better policy framework in order to develop a more effective strategy. Somali piracy is not a serious strategic threat to the United States, although it can become one if it continues at the current rate. Something does not have to be a strategic threat to represent a very serious issue that can have unintended consequences of grave strategic concern to our nation.

It is my observation that as the issues get more complex, the political rhetoric informing the public becomes less informed through the forwarding of simplistic perspectives. The right side of politics in America has been discussing piracy akin to terrorism, as if political motivated violence and economically motivated criminal activity is the same thing. The left side of politics continues to embrace the idea that every Somali pirate is a victim of western exploitation, which would make sense if the commercial ships being hijacked were part of the 800 or so fishing vessels annually illegally fishing yellowfin tuna, shark, and other rare fish off Somalia. The conditions that led to the growth of piracy in Somalia are no longer the conditions driving piracy today. Hopefully John Kerry can successfully move the piracy discussion down the political football field with his hearing.

The Obama administration wouldn't be the first president who enters office with a domestic political agenda focus and becomes dogged by foreign policy issues. The political risk the Obama administration is facing with the choices ahead for Somalia are not insignificant. The maritime shipping industry touches $7.8 trillion in global commerce annually. When Barack Obama refused to answer the question about the current incident, I got the impression he hasn't been briefed on the first and second effects of Somalia piracy, never mind the 3rd and 4th effects that trickle down as a result from the activity of the last week where 6 ships were hijacked. Essentially, I was left with the impression he doesn't think piracy is important.

The current approach taken by the worlds Navy's, due primarily to a highly restrictive Rules of Engagement driven by a law enforcement political policy, has been to use limited available naval resources to consolidate the area to protect as a safe shipping lane and utilize convoy systems when available. This is an effective approach with limited resources, but the problem with this approach is that it doesn't change the security conditions, so the strategy does not have a real goal or achievement to work towards. Understanding the ultimate solution is solved on land, it is also important for the Navy to recognize that long term maritime security means there is work that needs to also be done at sea. The Navy needs to be prepared to discuss options.

Is it time to make pirates walk the plank? Mackubin Thomas Owens, a Professor at the Naval War College, suggests it is. Guided by history he makes his case.

We need to return to an important distinction first made by the Romans and subsequently incorporated into international law by way of medieval and early modern European jurisprudence, e.g. Grotius and Vattel. The Romans distinguished between bellum, war against legitimus hostis, a legitimate enemy, and guerra, war against latrunculi — pirates, robbers, brigands, and outlaws — "the common enemies of mankind."

The former, bellum, became the standard for interstate conflict, and it is here that the Geneva Conventions and other legal protections were meant to apply. They do not apply to the latter, guerra — indeed, punishment for latrunculi traditionally has been summary execution. Until recently, no international code has extended legal protection to pirates.

So first, we should revive that distinction. When they are caught, they should be hanged. Second, I'm not the first to suggest that we should use force to wipe out the pirate lairs. Under the old understanding of international law, a sovereign state has the right to strike the territory of another if that state is not able to curtail the activities of latrunculi.

Leveraging history, he goes on to note that the founding fathers understood this. The problem is, this approach is a clear escalation of violence, and the risks are not trivial. The escalation of lethal action against pirates may change the behavior of pirates, and they may escalate the level of violence on commercial ships and begin killing merchant mariners as a response. While there is no question merchant mariners face many serious dangers under current conditions, if escalation with lethal violence results in the death of civilian mariners consistently, the United States will be forced into a situation where we must escalate stability efforts, which tends to become a nation building exercise. If we break it, we will own it.

Ultimately, while this approach may well be aligned with history, it comes with significant risks for blow back and unintended consequences, and without the political will and support from the larger international community, the United States will find ourselves bogged down in a third war front trying to promote security conditions back to the point they are today.

The only way that plan works is if we can sink every boat pirates use on the entire Somali coast. Unfortunately, that would almost certainly result in the elimination of the existing fishing fleet current feeding many, many thousands in a failed state where the people are starving to death. I do not have any confidence in Professor Owners solution, and oppose the call for unilateral escalation to use lethal force on ground.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, a professor of national-security studies at the U.S. Naval War College, agrees with me that the status quo is no longer tenable, and also believes it is time to start thinking about more proactive measures. I think we need more innovative ideas like this.

One [idea] would be to shift the mission of the naval forces currently on station off the Somali coast. Instead of patrolling shipping lanes, the flotillas could enforce an exclusion zone around Somalia, attempting to blockade the main ports and pirate centers to make it much more difficult for ships to leave, or for captured vessels to be brought back to sanctuaries such as Eyl. Given the length of the coastline, no blockade would be foolproof, but it would certainly raise costs for the pirates.

Another [idea] is to examine whether the “sons of Iraq” model might be applicable to Somalia. Piracy flourishes because it is successful in bringing in income. Pirates perform a Somali version of trickle-down economics because ransoms that are paid for hijacked ships provide an income stream not only in terms of donations to clans and religious leaders, but also supporting the entire infrastructure for piracy, down to paying the families of those who guard, feed and house captured sailors. If clans, however, could be paid (in cash and services) for serving as “coast guard auxiliaries”—with a clear understanding that payments would continue only if there was a corresponding drop in the number of pirate attacks—this might help to undermine the economic rationale for piracy.

I don't endorse either idea automatically, but I appreciate that both are moving in the direction of new ideas short of a unilateral escalation of violence. Both of these ideas carry economic costs and long term commitments though, so they are not easy choices. The first idea sounds very similar to an Operation Market Time type of commitment with international naval forces.

The second idea is a broader policy question that I believe needs to be asked and answered at the Senate hearing John Kerry will hold. The global coast guard generally sucks where it exists in the 3rd world, and in the case of Somalia it doesn't exist. One question that the Obama administration needs to ask is whether the United States, with the international community, will spend money and help stand up a regional Coast Guard in those seas to fight Somali piracy. This means building capacity and committing to a long term partnership providing cooperative training and equipment for Kenya, Yemen, Djibouti, and potentially even the government of Somalia, or even to the level of the autonomous regions of Somalia.

The policy question whether to commit to developing a Coast Guard for regional maritime security would need to be answered before how such a Coast Guard would be created. Professor Gvosdev's idea would be one such option, essentially a "Sons of Somalia" model that in a way, sounds a lot like a 21st century version of a letter of marque, except instead of hiring western private contractors, indigenous security forces would be hired instead. Clearly to be effective a cooperative training role would exist, and potentially the necessity to provide some technologies to help integrate any indigenous Somali Coast Guard into the broader international coalition efforts.

Regardless of how the Maersk Alabama incident turns out, if the naval power fighting Somali piracy does not respond positively to the activity of the last week, maritime insurance rates are going to go up, likely way up. For an industry currently struggling due to global economic conditions, the trickle down effect can have consequences ranging from increasing consumer prices to determining what type of ships China is building in their shipyards next year should orders for commercial vessels slow down due to rising costs of trade at sea.

For its part, the US Navy cannot wait for the politics to change the current policy, the necessity to improve the current pirate fighting strategy exists now. The shipping companies only have the option for escort through the Gulf of Aden, there are no options around the east or southeast of Somalia. Expanding the convoy system to include the southern shipping lanes looks to be an important step that needs immediate attention.

Pirate Tactics Evolve Off Somalia

EagleOne has an interesting map noting how the pirate attacks appear to be shifting to the south and east, although there is still plenty of evidence that attacks are occurring frequently in the north as well. IMB has seen the pattern developing as well, and is calling for the coalition to extend its coverage area.

A maritime watchdog Tuesday urged an international naval coalition patrolling the waters off northern Somalia to extend its watch to the country's eastern and southern coasts.

The warning came amid a spike in attacks in the area. The latest attack occurred late Monday, when pirates fired rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns at a South Korean bulk carrier off eastern Somalia. The vessel managed to escape after carrying out evasive maneuvers, the International Maritime Bureau's piracy reporting center said.

Since March 22, pirates have attacked 10 ships off eastern and southern Somalia, hijacking two of them, said Noel Choong of the piracy center in Kuala Lumpur. In contrast, he said, there was only one reported attack in the Gulf of Aden, to the north of Somalia, because of the international anti-piracy task force protecting those waters.

The problem is, there are no more ships. The international community has been able to limit the number of hijackings by creating transit lanes for convoys and organizing the shipping community.

This problem will only be solved on land.

Somali Pirate Update

Trying to keep track of events taking place off the seas of Somalia is turning into a full time job, but one thing is clear, the naval buildup is just beginning. One could look at the large international warship armada in the area and think there are enough ships to handle the problem. Think again.

Ships Released

We start by noting two high profile releases and a third apparently coming soon. The release getting the most attention is the MV Faina, which was carrying 33 T-72 tanks supposedly bound for Kenya. Kenya has dispatched one of its largest warships to take over escorting the ship from the US Navy, but the rumors surrounding this ship raise a number of unanswered questions. The Sunday Herald speculates a bit with the details.

The big question is: where will the Faina head next? Registered in Belize and owned by a notorious Israeli billionaire arms dealer, Vadim Alperin, the Faina and its cargo of 33 Russian-made T-72 battle tanks, which Israel specialises in upgrading, 150 rocket grenade launchers, six anti-aircraft guns and thousands of tonnes of small arms and ammunition, was reported to be heading for Mombasa. The Kenyan government claimed the weaponry was for its army, but US Navy spokesmen said the tanks and other arms were for delivery to South Sudan, on Kenya's northern border. Russian media reports said the arms consignment had been paid for by the US. Kenyan newspapers produced delivery documents showing the tanks were destined for the government of South Sudan and Kenyan officials have been unable to produce the end-user certificate that would prove their country's rightful ownership.

The Faina saga is embarrassing for Kenya, whose army is equipped with and trained on 76 British-made Vickers Mark-3 tanks and other British equipment, because the 33 T-72s are widely believed to be in addition to the earlier delivery of about 100 T-72s to South Sudan. So the pirates who hijacked the Faina unwittingly did the world's citizens a favour. Without their intervention, the murky, clandestine and conspiratorial role of various players in fuelling a potentially calamitous conflict would be unknown.

Just remember, Kenya is helping the US with piracy by taking the captured pirates and conducting trials, so even if they supply the Sudan the chances of the Obama administration being critical of the effort, much less enforcing the UN ban on weapons are slightly south of nil. Why isn't our pirate prosecution deal with Kenya a form of rendition? Just asking, because the time honored tradition of forcing pirates to walk the plank works too, and unlike rendition, on the spot execution of pirates is LEGAL.

Another somewhat noteworthy release this week was the release of Tianyu No 8 this weekend, a Chinese fishing ship. Is this good news? Consider the AP report.

It said the crew, which included 15 mainland Chinese and one Taiwanese sailor, were in the care of the Chinese navy and were undergoing health checks.

The ministry did not give the nationalities of the other eight crew members, but previous media reports had said there were four Vietnamese, three Filipinos and one Japanese on board.

The pirates had previously claimed they seized the Chinese vessel 30 miles (48 kilometres) off Somalia's southern port of Kismayu because it was fishing in Somali territorial waters, according to China's official Xinhua news agency. They said the crew would be "put before the law and punished accordingly."

I'd be curious which is ultimately more humane, being the prisoner of a Somali pirate or being "punished accordingly" by the Chinese government for 'being caught' illegally fishing off the coast of Somalia. Honestly, I have no sympathy for the fishermen, illegally fishing off the coast of Somalia is a major part of this problem, so good for the Chinese government in my opinion, but the original question regarding humane treatment is still valid.

Sea Sentinel reported this week the Egyption fertiliser ship Blue Star is set to be released next. The BBC reported a ransom of $3M has been paid and the ship should be released soon. Something to keep an eye on.

Deploying Naval Power

A number of nations are sending their naval vessels to Somalia, and this week we learned details of several of these upcoming deployments.w Seden announced this week they will be sending their International Corvette Force to operate off the coast of Somalia later this year. The agreement is to send 2 corvettes and one support ship, which contradicts earlier reporting they would be sending 3 corvettes and a support ship. The original report suggested HMS Stockholm (K11). HMS Malmo (K12), HMS Visby (K31), and HMS Trossö (A264) would be sent. It is anyones guess which ships will ultimately be sent, but I hope they send HMS Visby (K31) so the US Navy can get a really good look at her doing what modern corvettes can do.

We also learned something very interesting from the Russian press, and while it may be old news, it was news to me to learn the Russian Navy is operating as part of EU NAVFOR.

Why is that interesting? Because apparently Turkey is sending TCG Giresun (F 491) to fight pirates off Somalia, and that ship is likely to work with CTF-151, not EU NAVFOR. Russia will work with Europe, but Turkey will be working with the US Navy? I think it is noteworthy all of the eastern naval powers, including ALL of the Islamic countries, are trending their cooperative efforts into CTF-151. Check out the Bosphorus Naval News blog for good background why Turkey may not be part of EU NAVFOR, and the details of the upcoming deployment.

South Korea will soon be deploying the KDX-II class destroyer ROKS Munmu the Great (DDH 976) to fight piracy. It is unclear when exactly that deployment will take place, but latest reports suggest sooner rather than later. In March, the Japanese will also be sending ships, specifically JDS Sazanami (DD-113) and JDS Samidare (DD 106) to fight piracy. It is still unclear how this will effect JDS Ariake (DD 109) and JDS Towada (AOE 422) already in the region supporting the Japanese refueling mission to the region.

Finally, India is sending INS Tabar (F44) back to Somalia to reinforce INS Beas (F24) still operating in the area. If you remember, INS Tabar (F44) was in the region fighting pirates late last year, when it blew up a ship that may or may not have been a pirate mothership.

It is also worth noting that over the next few months we expect the Royal Navy Taurus 09 amphibious task force to enter the Indian Ocean region, as well as SNMG1, both of which represent major international task forces that will be heading all the way over to Strait of Malacca and beyond over the next few months. Together those two groups represent at least 15 or more warships that will be moving through the Indian Ocean soon.

The Pirate Fight

The combination of naval forces and convoy escorts has severely limited the options of Somali pirates attempting to capture ships, but the results still tell a scary story. According to the 2008 piracy summary NATO has available on their shipping center website, 2009 is already exceeding 2008 in piracy. In January 3 ships were hijacked: MV BLUE STAR, MV SEA PRINCESS II, and MV LONGCHAMP. The details of the hijacking of MV LONGCHAMP are in dispute, but there does appear to be some tactical evolution taking place to counter the presence of coalition naval vessels.

Regardless, while three ships so far into 2009 is much fewer than the number of ships hijacked in the last months of 2008, it still represents an increase, not decrease in piracy. In January of 2008 there were 0 ships hijacked, and in February of 2008 there was only 1. There were also 0 in March of 2008, and only one in April. Indeed there are already more hijackings this year off the coast of Somalia than there were in the first 4 months of 2008, and we are still a long way to May. One of the reasons there are fewer hijackings this time of year is due to higher winds and high sea states.

Which means mother nature appears to be the biggest factor here, like it is this time of year every year. This gives the various naval forces time to be ready for when the weather changes.

Barack Obama's First Act: Send the Navy to War

I was disappointed when I read Thomas Ricks strategic assessment regarding the Navy's approach to piracy.

Tom Ricks is an astute observer of military strategy, and if he sees the pirate situation off Somalia as simply a way to take a cheap shot at the disaster called naval shipbuilding strategy, then I'm afraid nobody in the media may understand what is and has happened. I'd like to welcome Thomas Ricks to the blogosphere by suggesting that when it comes to maritime strategy as it relates to the issue of Somali piracy, he doesn't appear to know what he is talking about. Thomas Ricks writes:

Better late that never to be going after the Somalia pirates. To me, this is a strategic issue. Keeping the sea lanes open, especially for oil, should be a top priority for the U.S. military. Instead we seemed to defer to the Indians, Chinese and others, letting them take the lead. The Navy may feel that all its special operators -- the guys trained to board and take over ships -- are busy in Iraq and Afghanistan. So, admiral, does that tell you that you probably need more ship boarders, and maybe fewer aircraft carriers or anti-missile systems? You think maybe?

I noted that Yankee Sailor left a comment on the thread. I'm betting Thomas Ricks has no idea who Yankee Sailor is, nor why Yankee Sailor's opinion is more informed. We know better. I have a lot of problems with the assessment Tom is making here, starting with what the top priority for the US military should be. If the top priority of the US military, including the Navy, isn't winning the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, then something is wrong. There is a reason why there are more sailors deployed on land in the CENTCOM area of operations than at sea, and that reason is absolutely valid.

This is a strategic issue as Tom contends, but with the assertion of "better late than never" and the suggestion that "Indians, Chinese and others" taking leadership roles is somehow representative of a failure of maritime strategy, Tom Ricks is essentially admitting to me that he has never actually read the US Navy's maritime strategy.

I couldn't agree more with Thomas Ricks regarding his implied assessment of naval shipbuilding, as I have stated in the past, in no case can we exercise control of the sea with battleships alone. Our collective opinions regarding force structure however do not translate into analysis whether the Navy has the right equipment to address piracy, nor does it hold any bearing on whether the strategic approach the Navy, indeed the nation, has taken to address piracy off the coast of Somalia has been effective. By turning his assessment of the US strategy towards the Somali piracy issue into a force structure debate, Tom Ricks is making an apples and oranges comparison.

But when it comes to naval forces and the US Navy's approach to Somalia, I'd suggest that even on this specific point Tom is inaccurate. I see the use of the LPD-17 platform as an afloat forward staging base (AFSB) as a brilliant approach to addressing irregular littoral challenges like piracy. While no one is suggesting the LPD-17 is the only solution towards a challenge that requires a network of naval vessels, the LPD-17 platform represents a central node in that network in a lot of the analysis I've read on the subject. It isn't an accident the Navy is using the USS San Antonio (LPD-17) as a command ship for CTF-151, and don't be surprised when the USS New Orleans (LPD-18) becomes the next command ship for CTF-151. In this regard, I see the analysis of Thomas Ricks regarding what means to use to execute maritime strategy off Somalia as flawed as well.

Tom's point raises the question whether the US Navy needs to retool long term for fighting challenges like piracy. I would contend that Somali piracy is indeed a test case that answers those kinds of questions.

All strategies have an expiration date, because with any new policy comes a new strategy. As signaled by Admiral Gortney last week in the Pentagon press conference, all indications are that a new policy is soon to emerge, meaning the current strategy for addressing Somali piracy is about to expire. With that the case, we can now evaluate whether the current strategy to date has been successful or not.

What has been the Navy's strategy? The ends of strategy has been two fold. First, to build an international approach towards the shared international security problem of Somali piracy. Second, to develop the political and legal framework to enable action against Somali piracy. If we judge the success or failure of strategy by whether the ends of strategy are achieved, then I would suggest the Navy has done a brilliant job.

Even a casual reading of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower notes that by placing emphasis on taking cooperative approaches to shared problems, the Navy will always be taking a "diplomacy first" approach in executing maritime strategy. Building coalitions is by definition political, and using the time frame discussed by Admiral Gortney in the press conference, comparing the situation in the region in August to the situation today, clearly the conditions have been shaped towards the ends of strategy in terms of building international participation. Could the US Navy have taken ownership or leadership in the fight against piracy? Absolutely, but they wisely, intentionally avoided doing so, because the absence of the US Navy was the enabling condition that built the international military response to date, and allowed the political process led by the European and Asian economic powers in the United Nations to develop towards our strategic goals.

The conditions for using military power today are not the same as they have been in the past. Those conditions are influenced heavily by how previous military actions taken by the Bush administration have been seen globally. Dealing with this condition change has, in the specific case of Somali piracy, required the US Navy to do nothing about piracy off Somalia in order to build an international diplomatic and military response. For those who seek more clarification regarding the strategic environment we will build strategies in after Bush, I encourage you to read Great Powers: America and the World After Bush by Thomas Barnett set to be released on February 5, 2009.

Admiral Gortney told the media in the press conference that sometime in the next week the State Dept would finalize an agreement with one of the nations in the region to prosecute pirates, and once that happens there will be a change in the Navy's rules of engagement. The implication is, because all strategies expire with policy change, a new strategy in regards to Somali piracy is soon to emerge with a new proactive policy, and the implications of a new policy are historic in regards to the timing.

The nations maritime strategy towards Somali piracy, by emphasizing a diplomacy first approach, has resulted in 1) a United Nations driven mandate for military action (still evolving as recently as today towards a multinational land action btw) 2) built on international consensus 3) to address a complex international security problem resulting 4) in the largest collection of international warships off the coast of Africa since WWII with 5) a legal framework to take action. By taking a patient approach, largely consisting of military inaction while implementing a diplomacy first solution with allies towards building this large international presence, the diplomats have developed the desired international legal framework necessary for the Navy to take action, and do so in the exact conditions desired and expressed in the Navy's own maritime strategy.

The execution of maritime strategy to date has been brilliant in my opinion. The timing isn't "too late" as Tom Ricks contends, the timing is perfect.

When was the last time a President of the United States, acting as Commander in Chief, has entered office and on the first week has instructed the US Navy to take military action? In the history of our country, this has never happened, ever! And yet the strategy towards Somali piracy has been executed so well that Barack Obama will enter office this week, and one of his very first acts as Commander in Chief will be to send the US Navy to war against pirates off the coast of Somalia.

With all due respect to Thomas Ricks, he may need to write a new book to adequately explore the dynamics of just how successful the US diplomatic and maritime strategy for dealing with Somali piracy has been. When a strategy is implemented so masterfully that both the media and all the partisans in the US completely miss that Barack Obama's first act as Commander in Chief will be to go to war on a third front, and by taking this action, the international community is excited that one of the first actions by the President replacing George Bush is to commit military power in the Middle East region...

...clearly someone, somewhere, is doing something right.

It will be interesting to see what strategy emerges to carry out the upcoming policy change in regards to Somali piracy. Everyone knows the solution to piracy is on land. It is also noteworthy that the symptoms of Somali piracy are the same as the symptoms creating the terrorism issues that have long driven US policy towards Somalia under the Bush administration. The challenge is now that the US has found a way to align the strategic interests of the international community with US strategic interests in Somalia, can the political process develop an international solution to both problems? I don't know, but I bet the success of that process will be diplomatic, not military, and may even require naval forces to fail to stop piracy at sea to be achieved.

cross-posted at the United States Naval Institute Blog

As Piracy Slows in Somalia, EagleOne Notes Why

The frequency of piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa appears to be down in January 2009, and while governments may be tempted to suggest the attacks are down due to a growing international naval presence in the region, EagleOne is noting a more realistic set of circumstances that can explain unfolding events, by noting the weather.

I could be wrong, but the way I read that chart above is that the sea winds in the Gulf of Aden are running 10 -25 knots - a little steep, I would think, for the small boats operated by the pirates. I don't think I'll be drinking any champagne over the success of the counter pirate operations just yet . . .

Eagleone posts a chart of wind patterns to go along with his analysis, check it out. In the comments, Mr. Michael Murrell, Director of Operations, Training and Deployment for International Ships Support Group (ISSG), a maritime security company that provides security services to insure best practices for protection for shipping companies, notes another valid reason. There have been a number of ships released by pirates over the last several days.

Both points in conjunction explain a lot. Weather, in particular wind and sea state, make it very difficult for pirates to get in position to hijack a ship, as control of the attacking vessel is critical to the tactics of scaling a ship. Eagleone cites information from an ONI report from October that further discusses the influence of weather on pirate operations.

But Mr. Michael Murrell's point is also important, and he is observing patterns in motion. We have seen a pattern in the past that upon the release of ships a downtime period occurs followed by a surge in attacks. It is speculation as to why the downtime occurs, but some have speculated the reasons range from a 'lessons learned' period where pirates actually share lessons with one another to develop better tactics, while others have noted the downtime is assoicated with a spending period where pirates seek out ways to spend their new cash, sometimes in the black market in Somalia for better equipment to execute their pirate trade.

The combination of poor weather conditions off the Horn of Africa and a number of ships being released better explain why there is a small lull in pirate activity off Somalia. The increase in naval force does not explain it, there have been very few instances where naval activity has resulted in either an action that uses lethal force or capture of pirates that would deter pirate activities, so until pirates are either being killed or captured, it is difficult to suggest the coalition naval forces are having impact... yet.

It would appear there is a Reuters reporter reading Eagleone, because the analysis today notes weather being a factor even as the article does not explain why or how they came to that conclusion. The article isn't a loss though, it notes that the pirates in the Central region have grown from six companies to nine companies, and suggests they have scouts out monitoring coalition warships as they develop tactics. This is interesting, because in last weeks Pentigon press briefing from 5th Fleet, Admiral Gortney noted the expanding capabilities of the pirates in Northern Somalia as being primarily responsible for the increase in attacks. If both Reuters and Admiral Gortney are discussing two different groups of pirates, which appears to be the case, we are soon to see an expansion of pirate attacks to coincide with the next surge, meaning it is about to get ugly out there.

When one observes the timing of the various events taking place, I think we potentially on the verge of major naval operations off the coast of Somalia, and it will be interesting to see how long CTF-151 consists of only 3 ships. I would expect that number to grow, not only in the form of coalition ships but in the number of US Navy ships as well.

Empowering Segregationist Attitudes

Yesterday the PLAN destroyer Wuhan (D169) escorted four ships through the pirate threatened area in the Gulf of Aden; two ships from Shanghai, one ship from the Philippines, and one ship from Taiwan. This made rather big news in both China and Taiwan, indeed the western press has also covered the story. One would think this is a productive form of security cooperation that would be celebrated, but there is too much paranoia in politics for such rational considerations. Observe the news from today.

Taiwan on Tuesday reiterated its ban on Taiwanese cargo ships' seeking help from Chinese warships when passing through the Gulf of Aden, one day after Chinese navy ships escorted a Taiwan ship off Somalia. Commenting on an issue sensitive to Taiwan's sovereignty, Chao Chien-ming, vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, said Taipei has not requested that Beijing allow its warships to escort Taiwan vessels through the Gulf of Aden, so Taiwan cargo ships should not seek help from Chinese warships themselves.

Transport Minister You Fang-lai, meanwhile, said Taiwan has long-term anti-terrorism cooperation with the United States and European nations.

"So if there is an emergency, they should seek help from US and European patrol ships," he told reporters.

Do we empower this segregationist attitude from Taiwan? If perception is reality, then yes we do. What impression do you get from the various news reports suggests we have engaged the discussion in this mess.

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) issued a statement Tuesday saying it has discussed with Taiwan the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

The AIT statement also said the U.S. Navy has a responsibility to render assistance to any vessel in distress anywhere in the world that requests its assistance.

The AIT is the de facto U.S. embassy in Taipei in the absence of formal diplomatic ties.

The AIT statement drew attention as it came a day after China's official Xinhua news agency reported that Chinese naval vessels escorted four merchant ships, including an oil tanker owned by a Taiwanese company, in the Gulf of Aden off Somalia in a special operation against pirate attacks.

The Cabinet-level Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) clarified Tuesday that the Taiwanese tanker escorted by the Chinese naval fleet was in fact a Liberia-registered ship rented out to a South Korean company. The ship, named FormosaProduct Cosmos, is owned by Taiwan's Formosa Plastics Group.

I looked around the American Institute of Taiwan website and couldn't find a statement, so without the details all I can do is hope we are being very smart about this. It bothers me just a little that we set up CTF-151 and someone in Taiwan thinks we should use this force to help out Taiwan for the intent of allowing them to avoid getting help from the Chinese. Seriously, are we actually participating in this political discussion? Are we building competition here, or cooperation? The Navy looks to me to be stuck in the middle of a diplomatic agenda towards empowering segregationist attitudes imminating from the AIT.

If it was me, I would have suggested the obvious, that the PLA Navy is escorting a Taiwanese ship because Taiwan doesn't have a warship deployed to do it themselves. China is clearly trying to generate populist propaganda within Taiwan by taking such action, so do something about it.

Most people may not realize this, but the Royal Navy today has 22 warships classified as destroyers and frigates in service. Taiwan has 4 Kidd class destroyers, which by my rating system qualify as 3rd rate battleships, but they also have 22 frigates (8 Perry, 8 Knox, and 6 La Fayette). Taiwan has more surface combatants than the Royal Navy does, and they have the Wu Yi fleet oiler they can use to deploy to Somalia. Why are we empowering their segregationist attitude against the PLAN off the Horn of Africa?

Just tell the good folks running the show in the Republic of China that if the PLA Navy isn't going to be allowed to escort your ships, then send your own warship to escort your ships. Whatever we do, we should not allow the diplomatic class in Taiwan to leverage CTF-151 as an alternative, read competitor, to the PLAN. After all, if CTF-151 isn't about building a relationship with China, India, and regional nations with a maritime security intent, why do it at all?

Observing The Establishment of Combined Task Force 151

As The Custodian noted on Thursday, the US Navy has established a multinational task force focused solely on counter-piracy operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The name of this new task force is Combined Task Force 151 (CF-151). Despite the previous rhetoric otherwise from 5th Fleet and the political forces in Washington, including Condoleeza Rice at the United Nations, this is the first tangible action taken by the United States Navy to address the piracy problems emanating from Somalia. Previous efforts have consisted solely in information sharing and assistance response to mariners under threat. These are my observations of the political, tactical, and strategic thinking behind this action by the US Navy.

Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) will operate from the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) which will act as a command ship, and initially will be supported by two unnamed warships. It will be interesting to see what kind of helicopters we see flying off the USS San Antonio (LPD 17), we have recently seen AH-1s and UH-1s on the flight deck (click image above and look at it in hi-res), and it will be interesting to see if it becomes Marine airmen who become the sharp end of the spear. I also noted the announcement that the Boxer ESG will deploy Friday, which includes both the USS New Orleans (LPD 18) and the new UH-1Y Huey's. Go back and read my conversation with Expeditionary Strike Group 5 leadership, including the transcript of the whole conversation. The announcement today puts a lot of that conversation in context, making me think they kind of knew this was coming. As a consistent vocal fan of the San Antonio class, this is exactly the scenario that I have so often discussed this ship... as the flexible sea-air-land nGW maritime domain command ship (mothership). It will be interesting to observe whether reality confirms or discredits my theories through this implementation.

One final note on this, the Boxer ESG only has 2 warships and 1 Coast Guard Cutter. If this ESG replaces the Iwo Jima ESG in the 5th Fleet operating theater, the net effect is a reduction of one warship. It is interesting we are setting up a new command to be resourced by ships at a time the Navy appears to be gradually reducing the number of ships in the region. This could be telling us something about the Navy's obligations being reduced as it relates to the Iraq war theater.

Depending upon your point of view, or world view, the reasons regarding why the US Navy is developing CTF-151 may very. The Europeans, in particular the Germans, believe this is a reaction to the German Navy taking over command of Task Force 150 next week. The German Navy has a very specific mandate in the region regarding action against piracy, and German command over Task Force 150 coalition forces that take proactive steps to curb piracy could create political problems, and disrupt what has been a very successful coalition effort dealing with other security issues maritime forces are operating to address in the region.

While it is an interesting theory, that would not explain why the US Navy's commitment to date fighting piracy has been lackluster at best, so it wouldn't explain why the US Navy decided to all of a sudden take a more proactive approach against piracy simply because Germany is taking command of Task Force 150. The fundamental change here has nothing to do with the Germans, the fundamental change is a shift in strategy towards piracy. Without the decision to adjust the Navy's fundamental strategic approach to fighting piracy, the US Navy would be quite content operating in Task Force 150 under German command.

I also think CDR Salamander couldn't be more off the mark with his analysis that this represents the US Navy going it alone in theater. The US Navy has talked tough about piracy and has intentionally NOT done the job of the Europeans in protecting their trade for a long time now. In my opinion, the result of the pirate problem is that pirates have become the solution to developing a multinational approach to solving the difficult challenges in Somalia, and has built the largest collection of warships in the 21st century dedicated to the single purpose of curbing piracy against global trade in a concentrated region. There are 3 Saudi frigates and 3 Chinese ships missing from my last Order of Battle for the 5th Fleet. I'm stunned that the CDR believes as we observe another prerequisite for the framework required in developing a Global Maritime Partnership, he sees it as a sign the US Navy is abandoning the maritime strategy that has so brilliantly shaped these conditions? The patience that has been demonstrated, particularly given the incredibly harsh criticism of the US Navy by so many people on both the CDRs blog and mine, has been extraordinary, and the results in the form of a shared international responsibility against the difficult challenge of piracy has been well worth the wait.

CTF-151 will have a one-star Admiral in command, Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, which I think is exactly the right approach towards building this force for the long haul. After all, I suggested it would be the right approach towards coalition building for a multinational approach to piracy back in December after the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1846.

My only concern by the pick of Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is that I am surprised the Navy picked an Admiral from the Atlantic Fleet. Expeditionary Strike Group 2, last I heard, was associated with the USS Bataan (LHD 5). I am sure Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is capable, but I was just expecting leadership to come from the Pacific Fleet. Put another way, I expected the Navy to pick someone with experience and familiarity dealing with the PLA Navy.

There is another reason the Navy may be forming CTF-151 besides taking a unilateral approach or because the Germans are taking Command of Task Force 150. This week the PLA Navy entered the action curbing piracy against regional commerce off the coast of Somalia. While the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 might represent the tactical development of an infrastructure to fight the pirate problem originating from Somalia, a problem everyone agrees is on land more than sea; the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 also represents a long term strategy towards the ends of linking the national security strategies of CENTCOM and PACOM looking into the future. Consider for a moment what CTF-151 looks like in the context of an image posted by EagleOne the other day, what I'm calling in the spirit of Thomas Barnett, the Navy's New Map in the first term of the Obama administration.

The tactical purpose of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) might be to establish "a multinational task force focused solely on counter-piracy operations," but the strategic purpose has larger ends. Combined Task Force 150 represents a mostly Western approach to nGW in the maritime domain in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The nations that contribute to Task Force 150 are European and North American, but also made up of regional partners including Pakistan. If there is any vision behind Combined Task Force 151, the number one priority of Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is to build an Eastern approach to nGW in the maritime domain in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Essentially, Rear Adm. Terry McKnight priority from day 1 should be to recruit China, Russia, India, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia into CTF-151, all of whom have already committed ships with the intent to fight piracy. If or when Japan and South Korea send ships, recruit them as well.

The US Navy has absolutely nothing to gain in creating maritime competitions in fighting piracy, indeed the Maritime Strategy is about creating maritime coalitions in dealing with maritime challenges. With the creation of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) the US Navy continues to evolve at the pace of the international community towards the development of a cooperative approach to dealing with the problems in Somalia. The strategy here has been absolutely brilliant in my opinion. By not solving the piracy problem for others, a problem that has no economic impact whatsoever to the United States; by encouraging and assisting coalition partners with existing resources; and by remaining patient but engaged in the slowly evolving political process (UNSCR 1846) the United States Navy now finds itself with the internal infrastructure, regional participants, enabled by evolving international political and legal frameworks, and the right tactical resources to address a maritime nGW problem with an international, coalition approach.

For better or worse, the US Navy's Maritime Strategy has put the US Navy exactly in the position the maritime strategy states it is designed to do. It is now up to our national leadership, both political and inside the Navy, to close the deal with the opportunities at hand. In this bloggers opinion, there is some irony the success in developing a coalition approach to deal with Somalia will fall to the new Secretary of State, one Hillary Clinton. She, more than anyone, understands the challenges of military activities in Somalia. The question is whether that is an advantage, or a burden in the process. Time will tell.

cross-posted at the United States Naval Institute Blog