Five Points

The National Security Discussion has entered a political phase as the election approaches, and both parties are attempting to make political points about National Security in the context of a policy discussion that appeals to their respective voter bases. The lack of detail distorts these discussions almost as much as the absence of context, and very few politicians know how to educate voters with their public speech talking points - particularly in the context of national security. Below are 5 7points of thought I believe are important to keep in mind while observing the political rhetoric related to National Security for the duration of the election season.

1) A bigger Army is not necessarily a better Army. The same theory of overwhelming force used in the 1991 Gulf War was remarkably effective the last decade of the 20th century, but the United States had evolved beyond that theory of warfare by 2001 when it took ~1/1000 the number of troops to overwhelm Afghanistan and 1/5 as many troops just 12 years later to defeat the entire organized Iraqi military in 2003. Over the last two decades the Joint Force of the US military has rediscovered that it takes fewer military personnel to be lethal and effectively destroy an enemy in war, but it takes significantly more resources to stabilize territory towards peace. This isn't some new theory of war, but the disparity gap between the resources necessary to kill and destroy with conventional military power and to stabilize the territory of a defeated enemy after using such power has expanded considerably over historical norms, and this gap has yet to be rationally demonstrated in a US Army force structure policy plan. The bottom line is this - to defeat enemies of the United States, a larger Army is not needed - indeed the US Army could afford to shrink in terms of manpower quite a bit and actually become a far more lethal military service. With that said, if the US Army will be called upon to occupy territory outside the United States after fighting the next war, a larger US Army is indeed needed. The future is hard to predict, but circumstances that will require occupational Armies can be predicted, and it is time to start discussing those circumstances in theory to forward a legitimate discussion for the Army regarding what we - as a superpower - want the US Army to be capable of doing, thus be.

2) The Pivot to Asia is not about shifting military power to Asia as many falsely describe it, rather the Pivot to Asia is actually about the modernization of military infrastructure capabilities in the vast Pacific region. Despite what very vocal critics like Thomas Barnett claim in various articles, there is no evidence at all of any significant military shift outside the CONUS to the Pacific region, unless those critics are now somehow suggesting that the replacement of minesweepers and old frigates with the Littoral Combat Ship is a major military power shift, or replacing existing older aircraft with new aircraft is a surge. The strategic pivot can be described as a move away from concentration of force towards geographical distribution of force, but the increases to the Pacific region represent little more than an expansion of infrastructure, not an increase in total force. I tend to think the Pivot to Asia is one of the most hollow, hyped political Foreign Policy slogans we have seen since the cold war, because there simply isn't anything specific one can point to from the DoD that suggests a significant increase in capabilities - as every migration of military force to the region is simply a replacement for a retiring infrastructure or system. To quote another slogan, where is the beef? The lack of specific details regarding the Pivot to Asia is intentional, because the power in the policy is only truly increased via political diplomatic rhetoric - not substance represented in force. In many ways, because the policy is rhetoric and not substance, the Pivot to Asia is evidence of effective Strategic Communications - which makes the Pivot to Asia more about diplomatic shifts rather than military shifts. It surprises me folks like Thomas Barnett have failed to recognize the distinction between rhetoric and reality when it comes to this over hyped political policy, but at some point during this election my sense is folks will reset Pivot to Asia in a more diplomatic context.

3) The Pivot towards Persia in 2012 is the most under reported major military buildups in modern media history, which is ironic considering the amount of hype in the media regarding Iran every day. The media has gone out of their way not to cover with any real attention the significant US and European military forces operating in the Persian Gulf region. The US Navy is now forward operating between 50-66% of all deployed aircraft carriers in the Gulf region. The US Navy is currently operating 66% of all US Navy minesweepers in the Persian Gulf. The US Air Force is now continuously rotating several of the most advanced aircraft squadrons in their inventory, including the F-22, to the Persian Gulf region. Nearly the entire training, workup, and deployment routine of every single East Coast Aircraft Carrier, Cruiser, Destroyer, Submarine, and Amphibious Ship is specifically tailored towards operating around the Middle East. Nearly all of the major defense budget adjustment increases for FY12 to date for the Air Force, Navy and SOCOM involve increasing capabilities or sustaining infrastructure in the USCENTCOM AOR. At the same time, the Europeans are reducing deployments to the Pacific and Western Hemisphere to focus naval forces for deployment to the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East regions. Despite the rhetoric that suggests there are numerous National Security issues facing the United States, there is only one national security question facing voters in 2012, and it is who they want their President to be during the hot and likely costly, bloody war between Israel and Iran that every measurable indicator one can use observing military force movements by European countries and the United States suggests is coming very soon.

And because predictions sure to go wrong can be entertaining thought exercises for bloggers, I'd wager a high quality Belgium wheat beer pint that if Israel attacks Iran before the election, with a 2 day margin of error I would say the date is October 13th.

4) The single most important element of United States national power related to National Security in need of increasing in both size and capability lies not in the Department of Defense, nor in the Department of State, but in the US Coast Guard. China is fighting a cold war in the South China Sea using their civilian agency maritime security forces backed by the implied support of military power. Unless the US intends to get asymmetrical in dealing with these tough diplomatic issues - which is sure to create unnecessary tension in the region; the appropriate symmetrical response would be to increase the presence of the US Coast Guard around the world to engage and assist towards the quality improvement of the regional maritime security forces. Whether one looks at Africa, South America (including the US coast), or Asia - the national security solution to most state diplomatic challenges and nearly all non-state security challenges facing the global economy lies at sea, but these are not solely a naval centric challenge. If we really believe the 21st century is going to be a maritime century - and I believe this 100% - the first step is to increase the size of the Coast Guard, and that starts with doubling the size of the large, deployable National Security Cutter fleet that can be sent forward to engage with civilian agencies globally and help improve the capabilities of our partners in Africa, Asia, and South America. I am not opposed to reducing the budget of the DoD, but it only makes sense as long as the civilian agencies needed for peacetime maintenance are funded to increase their capabilities to actually maintain the peace - and that beings with expanding the US Coast Guard. The peacetime Global Fleet Station of the 21st century might be a US Navy amphibious ship in certain situations, but it should also be the National Security Cutter. The maintenance of peace is a manpower intensive, thankless security role that ALSO belongs to the civilian security agencies, not solely the DoD. It is past time the US government forwards national security of this country by recognizing this reality, and balances the reduction of DoD capabilities with an increase in US Coast Guard capabilities for the offshore engagement role the US Coast Guard has a long history of performing. This needs to start now - not later - because while today's challenges might be piracy and illegal oil bunkering off Africa, territory disputes in the Pacific region, the global narcotics trade that is creating significant challenges off our own southern border, or the polar regions of this planet - there are several regions that are going to get more competitive sooner than later, and the offshore economy is expanding at a pace far greater than maritime security forces globally are adapting. While Mitt Romney wants to reconstitute the US Army by 100,000 and grow the US Navy, President Obama would be wise to counter by expanding the US Coast Guard - because the lesson of 10 years of war has taught us that if the objective is peace, the nation needs strong civilian security capabilities. It is time to apply the lessons of the last war towards the future being shaped.

5) It is often suggested that the US needs to help foster some sort of alliance in the Pacific similar to NATO, but it is my hope that long before that rhetoric is explored towards some reality the US gets more deeply engaged and serious with South America. In a global economy, the Monroe Doctrine doesn't work for us anymore for the same reason the Monroe Doctrine with Chinese characteristics is failing China in the Pacific - there are too many interconnected economic relationships in today's global economy for security interests to be conceded by great powers. China, among others, is coming to South America as we speak, indeed I fully expect China's first carrier deployment to be to South America in early spring of 2016 - namely Brazil, not the Middle East as is commonly speculated. Brazil, India, China, and Russia are all poised for difficult, but productive decades ahead. The rise of the BRIC nations combined with an impending era defined by energy and resources - including water - of the next two decades will change the national security landscape globally. Unfortunately, every Powerpoint I have seen produced by the DoD fails to reflect what that change means to force posture, and ignores the key role South America is going to play regarding the national security landscape of the mid-term future. The time is now to start thinking about the BI in BRIC, and what they truly mean to national security for the United States in the 21st century.

Canary in the Coal Mine

This post at AOL Defense by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. is worth reading in full, but I want to quote this specific section. To me, this is very well written, and right on point.

"We intercept about 33 percent of what we know is out there, and that's just a limitation on the number of assets," said Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser, chief of the U.S. Southern Command, at a breakfast with reporters this morning. And, Fraser admitted, that percentage is "going down... More is getting through."

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and, after 2014, Afghanistan may free up some aircraft and boats for drug interdiction, Fraser said. But the limitations on what some partner nations can do are more intractable - and any improvement in American capabilities is at the mercy of increasingly tight budgets and a possible sequester.

At sea, Fraser explained, the U.S. Navy is retiring the smaller ships that have traditionally been the mainstay of drug interdiction patrols, the aging and increasingly expensive to operate Perry-class frigates, while their much-delayed replacement, the Littoral Combat Ships, is just beginning to enter service. "We 'll see a gap in the numbers of those types of ships," Fraser said. "So we're working with the Navy to see what other types of vessels and capability that's coming back from Iraq might be available," particularly small craft that have been used for river patrol and offshore patrol in the Gulf. Such boats could boost the U.S. fleet's own interception capability but also, and perhaps more importantly, some could be transferred to friendly countries that are currently short on assets to intercept drug boats moving through their own territorial waters. (Fraser focused on Navy vessels and did not specifically address the Coast Guard, which does contribute some ships to Southern Command operations).

The shipbuilding budget has seen a lot of discussion, some here, but mostly elsewhere since the beginning of the year. I think so far Congress is handling this right - focus on sequestion, the rest is what it is. I think the FY13 budget is simply a reflection of the Obama administration - it avoids every difficult decision the DoD supposedly faced - including sequestion - and the budget fails to lay out any guidance for future difficult choices. That is a purely political move by the SECDEF and President, which is absolutely fine and valid, but let no one pretend the DoD FY13 budget is anything but a politically focused budget specific for an election year.

If someone wants to jump on the issue of the Navy needing more ships, I'm all for it, but I think it is important to highlight that no one in the Navy is making that case... so in many ways I'm not too swayed by others who try to make the case for more Navy ships. For example, Ray Mabus got blasted in Congress by Representative Forbes on Green Energy (YouTube). Legitimate? Politically - Yes, but the sin Secretary Ray Mabus has committed in the eyes of folks like Randy Forbes is one of omission not commission - the SECNAV has failed to focus on Navy specific issues and has instead focused on what every one rightfully sees as 'other crap.'

But the ugly truth is, 4 star Navy Admirals are not beating the table for more ships, so why are folks so upset that the SECNAV doesn't pound sand for that cause as well? The Navy uniformed leadership has publicly consented to the DoD on virtually all the big issues so that the DoD can take a haircut (or trim across the top everywhere) in an election year instead of get a new hair style (legitimate maritime focus for Pacific shift). Does that mean big changes are coming next year? Maybe, probably not, but it doesn't really matter... because without someone in political leadership setting legitimate national defense policy, the annual Navy budget has become a rock drill in contingency planning - not an exercise in short or long term planning - meaning for this CNO the budget planning process will be primarily be about hitting targets within existing margins instead drawing new lines as new margins.

With all due respect to the Obama Administration, you have not given anyone a legitimate national defense policy. This is handful of used toilet paper (PDF) that is embarrassing to label strategic in any context. How does anyone make a strategic choice from that? Where would one even begin making strategic choices with something like that? That is a very sad document, and pretty much sums up the last decade of strategic thinking from the DoD as a nice little bow tied turd.

It is the random disparity of priorities from services and COCOMs that makes comments by Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser very interesting to me. Am I wrong in suggesting that Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser has made a stronger argument than Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert for more Navy ships so far in 2012? I think the question is legitimate, even if General Fraser's argument isn't really that good.

In truth, the reporter is more accurate - Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser is basically saying he needs more Coast Guard Cutters with his argument regarding this specific problem and solution. Janet Napolitano disagrees, but there is little evidence she takes serious the drug problems taking place south of the United States, so her credibility due to simple trend lines, statistics, and facts on the issue of narcotics and drug related violence is already strained.

But again, I have watched the Coast Guard's leadership so far in FY13 and I have not seen Admiral Papp making a serious case for more Coast Guard Cutters, except perhaps the need for more ice breakers in the future. Unfortunately the Coast Guard is simply struggling to keep what they have in existing plans, instead of trying to build political momentum towards a future.

In conclusion, here is what I see. Combatant Commanders not named PACOM have needs in the maritime domain that a smaller sized Navy cannot meet, but the assets those Combatant Commanders tend to need are not aircraft carriers, ballistic missile destroyers, fighter squadrons, or attack submarines so their priorities don't matter as much to the Navy. Basically the Navy is going to have enough of the 'right kind of ships' despite hell or high water, and everything else will suffer - including priorities that are low on the Navy's internal totem poll like narcotics. As long as the Navy is going to have enough of the 'right kind of ships' then the Navy sees itself as OK, and not necessarily in need or more ships. That is what it is, maritime strategy can be tailored later to meet this objective.

According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, The Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use
on American Society (PDF) is now around $193 billion annually. The Coast Guard doesn't even spend 1% of that total annually building Coast Guard Cutters to address the problem, and the entire annual procurement budget for the entire Coast Guard for everything ships and aircraft is about 5.5% of that figure. I believe there are several ways to read Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser's comments, but the way I read them is simply - the United States Coast Guard is neither sized nor capable of meeting the national security and homeland defense responsibilities with which it is tasked, and on the narcotics issue the US Coast Guard today is only capable of meeting 1/3 of the requirement. While not a scientifically drawn number, it is statistically sound - which is more than most political arguments for money on Capitol Hill.

So here is my concern. If the Coast Guard is so underfunded it is only able to meet about 1/3 of it's mission requirements, and we know the future Navy is going to be too small to fill in gaps for the Coast Guard, which organization is actually capable of being a reserve for the other? It makes a lot of sense to cut the Navy at the low end if the Coast Guard is being sized/shaped to potentially fill in those gaps, or it might actually make sense to cut the Coast Guard if the Navy is going to be filling in gaps in their capabilities. How does the United States reconcile a true national defense strategy when the gaps created by cuts in both the Coast Guard and the Navy directly impact specific, credible, legitimately cited and fiscally accounted threats to the homeland in any context from social to economic to security?

Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser sounds a lot to me like a canary in the coal mine. When people who should know better hear the canary as just a narcotics problem, rather than what it represents as also a smuggling and violence problem, the sound of the canary gets ignored.

Happy New Year

I'm usually not a fan of polls and popularity contests on the internet, that just isn't my thing, but in this case I am making an exception. The US Coast Guard is posting their top 10 videos from 2011, and is asking the community to vote on their favorite video. All of the videos are expected to be released by the end of the year, and voting on the videos will continue until mid-January. So far, the video of the airplane landing in the water is my favorite, but all of the videos are impressive.

The Navy can't do a top 10 video, but we all know if there was such a thing, a US Navy SEAL shooting Osama bin Laden in the face would almost certainly be number ONE. US Navy videos of live action represent - for the most part - documentation of political statements by other means. US Coast Guard videos on the other hand are acts of valor in the line of duty with no tie to politics, and watching the videos is a reminder why Coast Guard Alaska on the Weather Channel has been one of the most interesting television shows this year. The people in the US Coast Guard are INCREDIBLE.

You can follow the countdown of videos on the Coast Guard Compass blog.

I continue to be out of pocket, with my wife due to deliver our third child, our first boy... today, and likely to bust open any second. My tax return is screaming delivery before midnight Saturday night, but my karma is likely shouting otherwise. Either way, I intend to get a better feel for the new schedule before picking back up here, as time organization is very much a big part of the process for content on the blog. It isn't so much the writing that consumes time... it's all the reading!

I want to thank the authors of the blog for picking up the slack in my absence, and I send my best wishes to all the folks who have made Information Dissemination a part of their daily routine. It is our hope ID is an interesting way to follow maritime issues that impact our nation and the world at large.

To all the members of the maritime services, thank you for your service to our nation. I wish you and your families a happy, safe New Year.

Coast Guard as a Means of National Power

I received many great comments and e-mails, in response to my post a few weeks ago looking for thoughts as to ways the USCG was a national instrument of power and how best to articulate that value to the public.  A standard method at looking at the various elements of national power is to group them in one of four general areas, Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic.  This is the DIME model (as one commenter pointed out, there is a body of opinion that DIME is an outdated model in that other kinds of power elements may also be found.  I recognize this perspective, but personally prefer DIME, so I will use it here).

The thoughts on "how" were generally similar to my own:

The USCG is able to project US power and influence through when, where and over whom it exercises law enforcement jurisdiction, those with whom it works, trains, exercises, deploys, and when it is able to respond to a contingency, especially when already deployed.

All of this works well within the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which is a great expression of how the efforts of the three sea services should fit together.

Across the USCG's 11 missions, I find six, Drug interdiction, Living marine resources, Defense readiness, Migrant interdiction, Ice operations, and Other law enforcement, that regularly fit within my definition.  My list is somewhat flexible as there are certainly times when the other five missions (Ports, waterways, and coastal security, Aids to navigation, Search and rescue, Marine safety, and Marine environmental protection) can also be flexed.  I am attempting to parse out missions that regularly reflect elements of power, rather than simply may appear on an international stage.  Feel free to fire away in comments.


The USCG's work in these six missions won't always be an exercise of power, but, looking at the elements of DIME, many of the activities undertaken in these missions do fit in at least one of the elements of power.


I will build on some of the specifics in my next several posts.

The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard. Nor should they be construed as official or reflecting the views of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

Daunting Question

Well, the compressed first course at National War College has come to a close. In just a few short weeks, we have heard from the EUCOM Commander, the Secretaries of State and Defense, several former ambassadors, and a variety of faculty and guest lecturers. It has been something of a whirlwind, but has given me much to think about.

Unfortunately, the busyness also allowed me to avoid addressing a common challenge to new authors: What to write about? Taking the third item of Admiral Stavridis' advice, "Read, Think, Write", here I go: I plan to start a broader discussion of the Coast Guard role beyond American shores with two rhetorical questions at the bottom of the post. Before I get to those, I will explain my concern.

I believe that the public has little awareness of the work of the Coast Guard beyond our shores, nor that the Coast Guard, analysts, bloggers, pundits, etc (I include myself in this grouping) do a very effective job of changing that. In the looming fiscal tightening, questions of value and return on investment should rightly be asked. Those who see value in various missions of the Coast Guard, as well as the Coast Guard itself, have a responsibility to make that value, tangible and intangible, known; not to overstate or exaggerate the case, but to get the case out there. It strikes me that we all talk to each other, in various forums, but rarely is the point made to the broader public.

Limited public awareness of what Coast Guard ships, aircraft, and people do worldwide undermines the competitiveness of the capital projects that enable those missions. I suspect that, for ID readers, this is an easy case, and that I will even receive some suggestions on how to improve my points. My concern, however, is that in agreeing with each other (at least to some extent), we have neglected to tell anyone else.

So now to my rhetorical question, followed by a challenge to us all:

In the foreign policy context, How is the Coast Guard an instrument of national power?

The challenge question to all of you who believe you have an answer to the first (including me): What can we do to better pass that word to the broader public?

I leave both of these as open questions until my next post, which should be two weeks or so. Please share your thoughts on this point by comments (preferred) or e-mail.

The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard. Nor should they be construed as official or reflecting the views of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

Study Material

Several different posts have gone up in topic areas of interest. As I am still working out my posting (and overall) schedule, I am going to link to them by general topic here. Read at your leisure if interested., and comment, please. I will get back to these items as I am able over the next several posts.

Piracy

Courtesy of GCaptain.com, the International Sailing Federation (ISAF) has some strong advice (Here):

"Do not sail in the western Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden. ISAF robustly endorses this position. It considers that sailing in these waters is highly irresponsible"

Arctic Policy

EagleSpeak discusses the USCG Commandant's recent testimony on Capitol Hill regarding USCG Arctic preparedness. A quote,:

"Our current Arctic capabilities are very limited. We have only one operational ice breaker. We do not have any coastal or shoreside infrastructure."

Then there is this port visit press release from the two days later, where the only mention of the state of the USCG icebreaker fleet is:

"The nation’s largest ice breaker, Coast Guard Cutter Healy"

From Dark Roasted Blend, some photos of the Russian Icebreaker fleet in action

Cutter Fleet

Chuck Hill over at CGBlog.org, discusses an item that I have followed closely, the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program.

CGBlog also discusses how strategic communication (or lack thereof) can impact the future cutter fleet. This well-written piece also ponders how could USN and USCG fleet construction efforts be better coordinated (this overall discussion is also relevant to Arctic policy)

Maritime Interdiction

Chuck Hill also discusses how the Israeli Navy applied lessons learned in a high profile interdiction effort.

Please take a look at these links. We'll discuss these and other topics in the near future.


The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard.

Introduction

Hello to you all. My name is Edward Westfall. Gahlren and the team here at ID have been kind enough to invite me to join the team as a part-time contributor. To regular readers, you may have seen me mentioned incidentally in some posts discussing the Coast Guard and strategic communications. I have been an author on an official unit blog in the past.

My posts here are done in an unofficial capacity. I am an active duty officer in the Coast Guard with over 26 years of enlisted and officer experience. I have served at sea for over 17 years and have commanded four cutters in that time. I have been stationed in a variety of locations in the United States, as well as at the US Embassy in Mexico City. I will be starting my JPME II at the National War College in the next few weeks.

For those that wonder, the Coast Guard is very supportive of unofficial social and print media authorship in both policy and practice (You can see the Coast Guard policy guidance starting on page 10-8, Online Self-Publishing, in the Public Affairs Manual here). Of course, I am required to place a standard disclaimer in any post that reiterates the unofficial nature of the post, so here it is:

The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard.

I am proud of my experience and certainly have thoughts and opinions regarding topics relevant to ID. That being said, I also recognize that expertise is relative and that my perspective on issues is likely not the only one. I plan on focusing my posts on topics such as strategic communications, social media at the field level, joint and multilateral operations, leadership and command climate, organizational planning and development, illicit trafficking interdiction, and Coast Guard familiarization. I also ask that you pass along any questions or topic ideas through comments or the e-mail link to the right.

Thanks for your interest. I appreciate the opportunity to tell the stories of the hard-working Coast Guardsmen I have had the good fortune to serve with, as well as provide whatever insights that I can. I look forward to your thoughts and comments as well.

Best regards,

Edward Westfall

On Command and Crew

My greatest reward for blogging is meeting the people of the maritime services; the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. It is why I write, why I travel, and I strongly believe people are the most important element to success for all three maritime services. Yes, I discuss stuff a lot on the blog, but the human aspect of the maritime services is where the power is in American Seapower.

At any given moment I am blessed to have an opportunity to ride along with those deployed by getting personal correspondence and trading ideas with folks who are out at sea. In many cases these family and friends update emails are insightful, but have almost nothing to with content discussed on the blog. In other cases, the correspondence with folks at sea might be specific to a topic discussed on the blog, although often the correspondence arrives several days or even weeks later than the topic was published here. In all cases the activity serves as something of a virtual window for me into the lives of those who work long hours during long deployments, and while the medium may be online - these private messages have a very real impact on me personally.

One of the individuals I have had great pleasure following on deployment the last few years is Commander Edward A. Westfall, United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is remarkable, probably the best organization in all of the US government and absolutely the most underrated government organization in the United States. We take young men and women and divide them into small crews, send them out on small ships, and then ask their leaders to hold long command tours with multiple deployments both near and far from home in what usually ends up being some of the most dangerous situations at sea in the world today. The Coast Guard is doing something right when it comes to Command at sea, because this small crew, small ship, long command tour organizational model has somehow allowed most of those old white war horse cutters to apparently serve the nation forever.

Commander Edward A. Westfall's change of command ceremony was today at 10:00am in Boston. Up until as recently as two weeks ago, I had every intention of attending that ceremony in Boston - indeed I was going to take my teenage daughter so we could both tour the USS Constitution museum together for the first time. Alas, my attendance was not to be for personal reasons. Luckily, Commander Westfall sent me the remarks he intended to share today, and with his permission - I share them with you.

Admiral Parker, Ambassador Eagen, Representative Mitchell, Admiral Neptun, Colonel Reynolds, Colonel Davis, Captain’s Sinnett, McPherson, Throup, and Bert, distinguished guests, ESCANABA officers and crew, family and friends, thank you for being here today. First, I must recognize the absence of a key member of the command: the ship itself. The ESCANABA hull is not here today as she is currently beginning an eleven month Mission Effectiveness Project at the Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore, known as MEP. MEP will upgrade and improve many of the ship’s systems, and provide the opportunity for completing other work. The ESCANABA crew is now here in Boston. During MEP, they are balancing their time between cross-decking with sister cutters and taking advantage of training, qualification and leave opportunities. It is admittedly a little odd to have a cutter’s change of command with the hull itself hundreds of miles away, but this is a unique circumstance.

The process has, for me, underlined how much a crew, THE crew, is the soul of a ship. The ESCANABA hull without her crew is but a hollow shell. Those of us who were aboard in Baltimore after everyone had left can attest to that. The ESCANABA crew without the hull, however, is still a force to be reckoned with. Chris, welcome and congratulations on assuming command. Undoubtedly this will be a challenging time as you command both separately. I know that you look forward to the day when the ESCANABA hull and crew are reunited.

The change of command ceremony is, conceptually, a simple process. In language used every four hours aboard a naval ship at sea, the new Captain relieves the old, marking the seamless transition from one to another. The crew is assembled here to bear witness to this simple yet profound event. Any guests that are present are merely observers of this elegantly simple yet significant event between Captain and crew.

Thank you, each and every one. Everything for which I was just recognized is due of you. I am proud of my role in steering, guiding, and leading (and, as often as not, vice versa) over the past two years, but a captain without a crew is merely someone alone on the water. All of the concepts, insights, plans, decisions, and such that are the daily details of leading are nothing more than daydreams without all of you to make them real. You are the finest crew that I know of in the fleet, and I am proud to have been your shipmate and captain.

Without a doubt, your next year will be challenging. While tracking the work being performed on the ESCANABA hull, you will travel far and wide, work separately and together, even take two different sister ships, SPENCER and SENECA, out for a deployment or two. This will test your resilience as individuals and as a team. It will be your new Captain’s task to lead you through this, but I do have some thoughts on how you have succeeded for me. I believe that you can apply this to succeed in the future.

To me, the timeline for gauging MEP success has never been turning the hull in or even picking it up a year from now. The real measure of success will be how well you prepare and execute your first deployment reunited with the ESCANABA hull more than a year from now. Working with that as your time horizon will be a challenge. I am confident that you will not only rise to meet that challenge, but, in true ESCANABA fashion, you will redefine the organizational understanding of how it is done. You will do this because it is what you have done, can do and it is what you expect of yourselves. You will also do it because of your strong sense of mission.

Mission focus and understanding is far more than the concept of a certain deployment or action. Mission is more than just “what”. Mission includes an understanding of why. Missions have time horizons, from immediate to long-term, and we often are responsible for multiple missions with competing interests: do we remain at a heightened state of readiness, waiting for a smuggler expected at some unknown future time, or do we stand down to ensure adequate rest? Do we work long hours immediately after a lengthy deployment or stand down and run the risk of having to scramble to prepare for the next big thing? Ultimately, determining priority comes down to me, but the way in which the long and short term mission can interplay is something important that all of you understand. The greatest risk in balancing missions is in emphasizing short-term gain at the cost of a long-term mission without good reason; many times, the immediate mission IS the most critical, but this is not always the case. As you move forward over this next year, bear that in mind.

Understanding why we are doing something and how it affects unit, service and national goals matters. I give your intelligence and curiosity the credit I believe it deserves and work to provide context as to why we are doing something. Whether deploying to the South Atlantic, racing to get to a search and rescue case before dark, or slowing to ensure we arrive at first light for a boarding, understanding why it matters provides each of you with the power to improve what we do. As I’ve said before, it is your individual actions that make our mission’s succeed. Current and future leaders, take note: Better informed not only motivates, it also improves the final product.

You are all professionals. You have regularly distinguished yourselves by executing missions and tasks, some as straightforward as navigating the harbor, to those as complex as preparing and delivering the cutter to MEP, or coordinating an all-night pursuit of a smuggler that included surface and air units from partner services, agencies and countries.

In every case, you have shown that you know your trade, are dedicated to doing things correctly, and improved things for the fleet when that is what is needed. This approach is not always the easy option, and it often requires extra work; doing less can become a too frequent choice. Choosing to do things the right way is a hallmark of professionalism and is what all of you have done repeatedly.

Doing things the right way requires a hard-won ability to self-assess. None of us, as individuals, departments, teams, ships, or what have you, are perfect. We should all strive to be our toughest critics, understanding that perfection should be pursued, but also knowing it is rarely, if ever, achieved. The pursuit of improvement is what drives us to challenge ourselves. It is what leads us to continue to train and to learn. It is what drives us to plan as far out and to the best detail we can, all the while understanding that few if any plans survive their first use. These are the things professionals do.

Finally, I remind all of you to take care of yourselves mentally, physically and emotionally. Life at sea in the service of your country is immensely rewarding, but also challenging, demanding and dangerous. At times we, by design or circumstance, must perform flawlessly at the edge of our capacity and capability. This is the nature of the service we have committed ourselves to, and is, quite simply, what we do.

When a go-fast chase erupts in gunfire, migrants must be removed to safety before darkness and foul weather set in, or we prepare the ship for MEP, your shipmates and I, and the public we serve, need you to be able to surge to meet the demands of a situation. We don’t maintain that capacity by accident, but through deliberately managing how we work, stand watch, and enjoy our down-time. There are times when the mission and our service demand that we give all we have and more; as your Captain, I have been acutely aware of how much that truly could be. With planning, good leadership, and a willingness to challenge the norm, those times are not that frequent. We can use technologies and policies to reduce how many people we throw at a routine or planned event. We have the responsibility to ensure that no individual is indispensible at a given time so that they may take leave when needed. We have the tools and ability to stand ourselves down when the mission allows and the situation demands. We can shift our routine to suit the particular mission or threat we face. These are the practices we have employed, these are the practices that have made us resilient, and these are the practices that foster success.

Thank you again for being my shipmates and for making this an outstanding two years. I look forward to hearing of the continued achievements of ESCANABA, and it would be my distinct pleasure to serve with each of you in the future. Perhaps we will be shipmates, or I will see you as a leader at a different unit. In any event, I value the time we have served together here. Best of luck to you all.

A little blogger trivia... of all the Americans (I won't speak for foreigners) who will attend NDU this year, I would be shocked if there is any other student with as much time at sea or with as much experience in Command at sea as CDR Westfall, USCG - in fact I would be surprised if it is even close by years. CDR Westfall is truly one amazing American sailor, and the USCG and the country is blessed to have such men in service to our country.

Good luck on your next assignment sir.

Criminal Challenges and Military Capabilities

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits Guatemala on Wednesday, and among the topics to be discussed is the challenge of dealing with narcotic trafficking in the region.

The chief US diplomat, aides said Monday, will visit Guatemala City to discuss a counter-narcotics strategy with the leaders of Guatemala, Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama.

President Laura Chinchilla will join the other Central American leaders in Guatemala's capital to discuss how the region can better combat organized crime and drug trafficking.

The leaders will discuss implementing strategies for crime prevention, rehabilitation and prison security and specific visions for each country. In addition, the presidents will be looking for ways to finance these plans through other countries, international organizations and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE).

"This meeting will be an opportunity for other countries to turn their eyes with more determined efforts toward the countries of Central America in the fight against narcotrafficking," Chinchilla said in a press release. The president will be accompanied by Costa Rica's foreign minister, public security minister, the vice minister of the interior and the head of the country's anti-drugs commission.

Other leaders or top officials attending the talks will represent Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Spain and the European Union, they added.

This issue is becoming more and more important to the United States as it is the fuel to the violence just off the southern United States border. In politics the border is too often discussed in the context of immigration, but if you ask me the real challenge of the US-Mexico border today has almost everything to do with narcotics trafficking. It was disheartening when CNN celebrated the 40th anniversary of the war on drugs in America, and the chart on the TV showed that for the trillion dollars spent over that 40 years - all the trends related to usage and violence were heading in the wrong direction.

I am one of those folks who does not see a future war scenario between the US and China, although similar to the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States during the cold war, I do believe there will be considerable stress and tension in the US-China relationship before any genuine cooperation or partnership is achieved - if it is ever achieved.

The other end of the military spectrum is where I see the most common threats facing military forces in the near-to-long term future - specifically in the emerging shadow zones throughout Africa and South America that blur the lines between criminal activity and military capabilities as non-government organizations leverage the advances made in technology faster than government law enforcement can adapt. I strongly believe that in the future - and potentially continuing next month in southern Sudan, US military forces are going to continue to be asked to undertake roles that address stabilization and security in troubled regions.

At sea, that means the US Navy must find ways to continue and leverage the partnership with the US Coast Guard to become more effective - indeed more proactive - in addressing challenges like narcotics submarines. This problem isn't getting smaller, and like piracy it pays enough to sustain growth trends that lead to uncomfortable levels down the road if real solutions aren't found. We are already seeing another evolution in the narcotics submarine efforts as they transition from being capable of crossing seas in the Gulf of Mexico and littoral Pacific towards being able to cross oceans - like the Atlantic.

Latin American cocaine traffickers may be using submarines to move the Europe-bound drugs across the Atlantic Ocean, a top official said Monday during a conference aimed at stemming the flow of the drugs through Africa.

Alexandre Schmidt, the head of the West African branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, said drug cartels are known to have already used submarines off the South American and Caribbean coast. Even though no submarines have been seized in West African waters, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest they are in use there as well, he said.

"We are not talking about military vessels here, but rather smaller ones which can be bought freely on the international market by anybody who has a couple of million dollars to spare," said Schmidt, who spoke during the inaugural session of a policy committee, dubbed the West Africa Coast Initiative.

Enforcement of narcotics smuggling through traditional methods like small aircraft and small boats from South America to Africa has improved over the last few years (although corruption is still a major problem), but seizures are down while cocaine use is up. That suggests narcotics are now being moved by different means, and submarine technologies are one possibility. It makes sense, because in the big picture capabilities for finding low observable simisubmersibles - much less a fully submerged capability - simply do not exist in sufficient numbers among West African nations to be even marginally effective.

The street value for 1 kilogram of cocaine in the United States can be averaged at $20,000. These simisubmersibles can transport between 3 and 7 tons of cocaine, and one short ton contains about 907 kilograms. That puts the street value of one simisubmersible full of 3 tons of cocaine at just over $54 million. At $54 million the transport costs using simisubmersibles with a 3 ton payload from South America to the United States is below 1% of the total street value. Similar cost estimates can be scaled to Europe.

Over the last decade in both narcotics smuggling and piracy we have seen remarkable adaptation and use in technology that has significantly increased the challenges for what have traditionally been law enforcement problems. Obviously technologies in narcotics smuggling has advanced pretty far when full blown submarines are now in use, but technologies being leveraged by Somali pirates are just as remarkable when one considers how many millions are being made leveraging five guys with AK-47s and old fishing boats with an outboard motor. Will there ever be a shortage of guys, guns, and outboard motors? If not, it's time to adapt.

The budget for the Coast Guard is just as strained as the Navy, indeed perhaps more strained given the cost problems that so many Coast Guard acquisition programs currently have. Without political leadership first, supported by both services and a great deal of investment in innovation by everyone involved; the challenges already found in the maritime shadow zones today will continue to outpace responses, and left unaddressed the problems will simply continue to grow.

Coast Guard Responds to GAO, "What Floor? You're Standing On it!"

John Sutton is a smart guy, and in the GAO report COAST GUARD Observations on Acquisition Management and Efforts to Reassess the Deepwater Program Statement of John P. Hutton, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, he did a remarkable job withholding any sign of emotion when covering this topic.

Coast Guard Has Not Completed a Comprehensive Trade-off Analysis for the Deepwater Assets

To support its role as systems integrator, the Coast Guard planned to complete a fleet mix analysis in July 2009 to eliminate uncertainty surrounding future mission performance and to produce a baseline for the Deepwater acquisition. We previously reported that the Coast Guard expected this analysis to serve as one tool, among many, in making future capability requirements determinations, including future fleet mix decisions.14 The analysis, which began in October 2008 and is now termed fleet mix analysis phase 1, was led by the Coast Guard directorate responsible for identifying and providing capabilities. In July 2010, we reported that while the Coast Guard had not yet released the results, officials told us that the analysis considered the 2007 Deepwater baseline to be the “floor” for asset capabilities and quantities and did not impose financial constraints on the outcome.15 The Coast Guard initiated a second phase of the analysis to impose cost constraints. We recommended in our July 2010 report that since the 2007 DHS-approved baseline of $24.2 billion was no longer feasible because of cost growth, the Coast Guard should conduct a comprehensive review of Deepwater cost, schedule, quantities, and mix of assets needed to meet mission needs, identify trade-offs given fiscal constraints, and report the results to Congress.16 The Coast Guard’s efforts to date have not addressed this recommendation.

We recently obtained and analyzed the phase 1 fleet mix analysis. We found that to conduct this analysis, the Coast Guard assessed asset capabilities and mission demands to identify a fleet mix—referred to as the objective fleet mix—that would meet long-term strategic goals. Given the significant increase in the number of assets needed for this objective fleet mix from the approved Deepwater program of record—the $24.2 billion baseline—the Coast Guard developed, based on risk metrics, incremental fleet mixes to bridge the two.17 Table 1 shows the quantities of assets for each incremental mix, according to the Coast Guard’s analysis.

Phase 1 also analyzed the performance of these fleet mixes to gain insight into mission performance gaps. However, the analysis was not cost constrained, as noted above. For instance, the Coast Guard estimated that the costs associated with the objective fleet mix could be as much as $65 billion. This is approximately $40 billion higher than the DHS-approved $24.2 billion baseline. As a result, as we reported last year, Coast Guard officials stated that they do not consider the results to be feasible because of cost and do not plan to use them to provide recommendations on a baseline for fleet mix decisions.

In May 2010, the Coast Guard undertook phase 2, a cost-constrained fleet mix analysis. Officials responsible for the analysis explained that it will primarily assess the rate at which the Coast Guard could acquire the Deepwater program of record within a high and low bound of annual acquisition cost constraints. They told us that the lower- and upper- bound constraints are, respectively, $1.2 billion and $1.7 billion annually; however, the basis for selecting these cost constraints is not documented. Based on our review of recent budget data, this upper bound for Deepwater is more than Congress has appropriated for the Coast Guard’s entire acquisition portfolio in recent years. Moreover, the Coast Guard officials stated that this analysis will not reassess whether the current program of record is the appropriate mix of assets to pursue and will not assess any mixes smaller than the current program of record. Alternative fleet mixes will be assessed, but these mixes are based on purchasing additional assets after the program of record is acquired, if funding remains within the yearly cost constraints. Coast Guard officials stated that they are only analyzing the program of record or a larger fleet mix because they found that the first phase of the analysis validated pursuing, at the minimum, the program of record. The Coast Guard expects to complete its phase 2 analysis in the summer of 2011. Because fleet mix analysis phase 2 will not assess options lower than the program of record, it will not prepare the Coast Guard to make the trade-offs that will likely be needed in the current fiscal climate.

The Coast Guard is convinced that the existing Deepwater plans represents the absolute floor for what is required, and is basically not tolerating any suggestions they can drop below current plans. It is quite smart actually, because when asked to conduct analysis of alternatives, every analysis was apparently a study to see what the USCG could do with more money, not less.

As a result there will never be official analysis by the Coast Guard that says anything other than existing force structure plans in Deepwater is the bare minimum force necessary for the Coast Guard. It also makes clear anyone who says otherwise has no supporting facts - none. The material condition of the US Coast Guard is not good by any standard, so the Coast Guard has solid footing in taking a stand with Deepwater.

Just how bad is it? As of August of last year the US Coast Guard operated 250 cutters 65' or more, and the average age of those cutters was 41 years old. I doubt things have changed much in ~9 months.

USCG to DoD?

My Senator has a proposal:

Freshman Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) suggests trimming $500 billion from the federal budget this year (Fiscal Year 2011). Among the new senator's suggestions for getting the numbers down is to cut the DHS budget by 43%, according to a watchdog group, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget.

Paul proposes moving the Coast Guard - an armed, uniformed service - into DOD with all the other armed services. The Coast Guard would take its funding along with it to the Defense Department.

A summary explaining Paul's bill, which is labeled the “Cut Federal Spending Act of 2011,” states that the transfer from DHS “'will promote uniformity, administrative savings, and reduce duplicative functions.”

Is there any sense to this? I suspect that there might be some savings, but I can't imagine it would be all that large. Moreover, the act of shifting the USCG to DoD would probably incur a substantial one year cost, which wouldn't matter so much except that this is a plan to cut $500 billion in a year.

And another problem:

The way Paul and his advisers see it, the Coast Guard is practically a part of the DOD already because by law it operates under the authority of the Navy in time of war or when the president so directs. Coast Guard units are currently working with the Navy in the waters off Iraq as well as in anti-piracy operations near the Horn of Africa.

But Paul's folks seem to have forgotten, or ignored, the fact that the Coast Guard also has civilian law enforcement authority and is the only armed service exempt from the restrictions of the 1878 Posse Comitatus law that bars federal troops from enforcing civilian laws on U.S. soil (except in very limited situations like armed insurrection.)

Because of that law enforcement exemption, the Coast Guard's mission has been repeatedly expanded - especially since 9/11 - to include drug and illegal migrant interdiction, port security, vessel safety inspection and intruder interdiction in the airspace over Washington, D.C.

Coast Guard advocates also note the entire Coast Guard is never made a part of the Navy in wartime, just designated units, vessels and personnel. While Paul's plan to move the Coast Guard is considered highly unlikely to pass, it does raise the question of what would happen to the Coast Guard's role as the enforcer of U.S. maritime safety and security laws if it became just another one of the armed services.

The Posse Comitatus objection is legitimate, but surmountable through legislative action. I suspect that any modification that might weaken Posse Comitatus would worry Senator Paul, however. On the final point I'm not sure I understand the objection; the USCG is not a non-governmental organization, and doesn't belong to the UN. Why it should matter whether the USCG is part of DoD or DHS while enforcing US maritime safety and security laws isn't 100% clear to me.

The Navy and Climate Change

Interesting observations over at the CNAS Natural Security Blog.

Any audience member who may have been skeptical about how seriously the Navy is taking climate change probably had their fears allayed by RADM Titley’s statement that “we in the very top of the Navy believe that climate change is real and is having big impacts on the Navy.” Titley explained that much of the Navy’s concern about climate change is not about climate models theorizing what may happen in the future, but the very real changes that they are seeing in the Earth’s oceans and the Arctic. As global temperatures rise, the Arctic is warming 2 times faster than the rest of the world and Arctic sea extent continues to melt and thin from year to year.

Titley asserted that increasing Arctic activity is the aspect of climate change that will have the biggest impact on Navy operations, emphasizing that by the middle of the century, a significant volume of trans-Arctic shipment will probably be the norm, and that the Bering Strait “could have similar significance as the Strait of Hormuz” today in terms of hydrocarbon shipping. He also noted that the QDR describes climate change as an accelerant of future conflict. The Navy is taking these threats seriously, engaging at the top in developing energy use reduction goals. Titley also emphasized Arctic exercises and Port visits, regional security cooperation and careful environmental observation and prediction as important tools of adapting to the effects of climate change.

And an important item from Jan 5, 2011.

Todd Shipyards Corp. said Wednesday it received a $16 million contract modification from the U.S. Coast Guard for work on the icebreaker ship USCGC Polar Star, which is being reactivated.

Todd said the contract is in support of the reactivation of the Polar Star, which is designed to move through ice covered waters and can break through up to 21 feet of ice. The ship was commissioned in 1976 and placed on special caretaker status in June 2006. The Coast Guard plans to reactivate the Polar Star by 2013 and announced last year that Todd Pacific would retrofit the ship.

FYI the USCG has three icebreakers, none of which are currently operational. If the maritime services are serious about climate change, the nation needs more icebreakers.

Should we even bother with this Danger Room article? Who wants to talk about ice capabilities of the Virginia class, or is that subject taboo...

Leading by Example

I'm getting a lot of interesting comments from folks at SNA Day 2 this morning. Apparently in what is being described as a "uncomfortable" and even "stupid" - Vice Admiral D. C. Curtis kicked all the Coast Guard COs (including a 3-star) out of this morning's Commanding Officer brief.

Uncomfortable? Stupid? I bet.

Update: PAO in the room provides clarification here.

He Did What?!?

Chuck Hill at the Coast Guard blog tips to this story.

Lee Daniel Renfro did more than illegally drive past a guard station and onto the Port Angeles Coast Guard base earlier this year.

Undetected, the Forest Grove, Ore., Navy veteran made it past a second watch shack at 5:30 a.m. March 28, then boarded the 210-foot cutter Active.

Renfro strolled into the Active's commanding officer's stateroom, took a shower -- and smoked marijuana he had carried onto the cutter.

He was apprehended three hours later while still on the vessel, according to a Coast Guard report of the incursion obtained by the Peninsula Daily News.

The guy was found dead a few days later a few miles away - the autopsy found the cause of death to be hypothermia. It is a very strange story.

Developing Realistic Security and Assistance Squadrons

For nearly 20 years none has challenged the supremacy of the United States in the open-ocean, blue-water environment. Increasingly, the contest of ideas is being waged in niche arenas, in the littorals, the near-shore green-water areas, and up and down contested riverine estuaries that provide concealment and cover for terrorists, pirates, and warlords. It is in these areas that the slow erosion of law and order is an accepted fact of life, and it is in these areas that the U.S. Navy must go if it is sincere in its strategic premise that preventing wars is at least as important as winning them. This is the environment of the Influence Squadron.

It is a naval force tailored to missions both new and old. Harking back to the founding of the republic, Influence Squadrons will be numerous enough to combat piracy-the only naval mission actually enshrined within the U.S. Constitution-and strong enough to take on terrorists who smuggle weapons across the seas as well as interdict the drug lords whose products kill more Americans per month than al Qaeda has in its history. Larger numbers of platforms will also enable Influence Squadrons to both provide local medical assistance in the form of vaccinations and respond swiftly to natural disasters and thus prevent epidemics of such diseases as dysentery and cholera.

In addition, the simplified characteristics of the Influence Squadron's platforms will help the Navy to build partnership capacity and perform security force assistance missions without over-awing local coalition partners with Aegis-level technology. These missions will extend and solidify the continuing U.S. role of defining and administering the global political-economic system. To perform these missions, Influence Squadron commodores will need a strong and varied complement of platforms to cover low-end missions. Function, in this case, will follow form.

More Henderson, Less Bonds, Proceedings, April 2010, Commander Henry J. Hendrix, U.S. Navy

In his April 2009 groundbreaking Proceedings article Buy Fords, Not Ferraris, CDR Jerry Hendrix advocated that in order to meet the broad requirements of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the US Navy needs to realign force structure to better manage steady state engagement operations with regional partners. Among observers of the US Navy, this strategic concept resonated as a responsible function of US naval power, but in the form advocated (the article suggested reducing the number of carriers in the fleet) it was met with visceral objection within the big blue Navy. In his second Proceedings article discussing Influence Squadrons, CDR Hendrix expanded the role of Influence Squadrons while also describing in specifics the form an Influence Squadron would take as an operational squadron supporting sustained presence in various regions globally.

Full disclosure. When I first read Buy Fords, Not Ferraris, it became my objective to get to know Jerry Hendrix, and over time we have become very good friends. My thought process was - this fool is about to get thrown out of the Navy for writing this article, because as I saw the environment in the Navy; I did not believe the Navy would be very accommodating of any Commander who writes an article that challenges the status quo via Proceedings. Time has proven my assumptions in 2009 both regarding Jerry's career and the resilience of the Navy leadership to take criticism completely inaccurate. However, you might ask, if Jerry and I have become such good friends - why haven't I ever written about More Henderson, Less Bonds until now?

The answer is - I believe the Influence Squadron represents an incomplete concept that 1) needs to be tested before any serious investments are made and 2) better developed as a Joint concept more than it has been described to date in the two Proceedings articles. I see one specific issue completely absent from the Influence Squadron as produced to date that I believe must be addressed.

The Selective Engagement Problem

In December of 2009 I was shocked when Bryan McGrath posted that he believed a serious review of the Navy's maritime strategy was necessary, as CS-21 represents a document he was personally intimately involved in developing. He noted legitimately a concern that allies "will quickly grow disenchanted with us as the operational realities of declining budgets drive us away from cooperative security arrangements and toward selective engagement and offshore balancing." We are already seeing policy decisions during a time of difficult budgets force the Navy to primarily focus on high end naval requirements, but even more remarkable on the point of selective engagement - 3 years after the release of CS-21, Task Force 151 represents the only example where the US Navy has attempted to develop a force towards addressing a low end spectrum security threat. With all due respect to the US Navy, if results matter - Task Force 151 has been a feeble effort, at best.

The naval forces have done a much better job with cooperative assistance. Global Fleet Stations and Medical Diplomacy and Engagement activities have been impressive activities of the maritime services over the last few years. The Southern Partnership Station, the African Partnership Station, and the Pacific Partnership deployments all represent forward thinking engagements where maritime forces can and have made a significant impact in developing partnerships in various regions. It is important to note however that while these are very important and useful activities, at a time when security problems in the maritime domain are expanding and the nation is fighting enemies in a global war on multiple maritime fronts - these engagement activities provide no direct warfighting contribution to the global war effort. Ultimately the success of promoting security with these deployments depend almost entirely on secondary effects by training other nations to make a contribution towards maritime security.

I find it frustrating that three years after the release of maritime strategy the Navy cannot point to a single major activity, whether experimental or traditional, where the entire range of low spectrum threats are addressed as a dedicated naval solution to a specific regional problem - the very quiet Philippines operations being an "almost" example. While the Navy is clearly globally distributed, as a naval observer I would argue that the Navy's version of "mission tailored maritime forces" is in reality either 'whatever can be spared from high end requirements' or 'mission tailored engagement only' activities. Where is the intellectual rigor within the COCOMS towards deploying naval capabilities that aligns "mission tailored maritime forces" to a region specific to the strategic objective of "preventing war?" The absence of a single example, and compounded by the feeble results of Task Force 151 in the context of expanding problems off Somalia, explains why Influence Squadrons resonates as a starting point, or strategic foundation, for how to leverage naval power along the broad range of capabilities short of major war at sea.

Evolve the Influence Squadrons Capability

We are seeing serious negative trends is Somalia. In an AP interview last week, Interpol's secretary general Ronald K. Noble said "we believe that 'the Afghanistan' in the next five to 10 years will be Somalia and those parts of Africa (countries in the north and west)." That is a serious warning, and in the context of all the counter-terrorism activities across Europe over the last week, it is a warning that goes to the heart of CS-21 regarding preventing future war. As the US prepares to potentially draw down forces in Afghanistan, will events unfold that will make Somalia the next land war against terrorist extremists? If that scenario is possible (and I believe we are trending towards probable), then it should be the strategic purpose of naval forces to prevent such a war from occuring - as it is the specifically stated strategic purpose of naval forces as spelled out in the US Navy's own maritime strategy.

I completely understand this is a policy issue, but this is the case that Navy leadership must be able to make at the policy level if the Navy is to justify its role as a military capability intended to prevent future war.

One of my biggest complaints with the US Navy today is how discussions regarding the rise of al-Shabab in Somalia immediately trends towards a conversation of a problem on land. The same is true of conversations surrounding Somali piracy - very smart people stand up to sound smart describing piracy as a problem on land. These are factual statements, but it is also a factual statement that throughout the history of the United States, naval power formed the foundation by which our nation has successfully influenced events on land.

My issue with Influence Squadrons as described is that it is an organization of capabilities that addresses functions of naval power specific to the maritime domain. In public policy debates of the 21st century, even Navy advocates often refer to the shore line as a great wall that seemingly prevents naval power to be influential to problems that originate in ungoverned spaces on land - short of recommending major combat activities. The shore is not a wall; it is a Maginot line waiting for military power from the sea to blitzkrieg across selectively for purposes of positively influencing local conditions. In ungoverned spaces like Somalia where security threats like terrorism and piracy are on the rise; where narcotics, human migration, weapons proliferation, human trafficking, and other illicit activities are prevalent primarily due to the conditions on land - it is critical that naval forces develop and deploy mission tailored maritime forces with the capabilities to influence this entire range of challenges. I believe the US Navy is capable of fielding "Influence Squadrons" with the ability to make positive regional influence, and I include regions like Somalia that are ungoverned and extremely complicated.

Developing Realistic Security and Assistance Squadrons

It is said that rising powers like China prevent the US Navy from adequately providing the forces necessary to address regional security problems in places like Somalia. I would argue that the rise of China is why addressing problems in other regions is critical to overall US strategy that emphasizes positive sum arrangements among allies. With that said I completely understand why the shipbuilding budget cannot be adjusted at this time to meet regional security challenges in places like Somalia. I also do not believe the funding must come from the shipbuilding budget to address the range of threats in places like Somalia.

Whether one calls it an Influence Squadron or African Partnership Station - East, I believe the US Navy should deploy a realistic security and assistance squadron to the Horn of Africa scheduled to arrive in October of 2011. This squadron would be developed with existing platforms the Navy already has access to and would consist of:

The most reliable LPD in inventory whether 2 years old or 42 years old. The LPD will support a company sized SOF capable force of Marines tailored to meet the requirements of anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and regional security assistance training. The well deck will support the M80 Stiletto and small boats, and a 2 helicopter UH-1 detachment is a requirement. The LPD will act as flagship for the squadron and primarily focus on influencing activity ashore.

A dedicated T-AKE to provide logistics support for the squadron.

FSF-1 Sea Fighter. Sea Figher will primarily be used as a UAV launch, recovery, and maintenance platform for the squadron, but will also function in regional maritime security operations and as a security training and assistance platform for regional security engagement and exchange.

ALAKAI and HUAKAI (both PDF), which for the record MARAD purchased at auction for $25 mil each on September 30, 2024 (so the rumor goes). These ships will function as UAV platforms in addition to transporting riverine squadron equipment and other detachments from the NECC. Supporting small boats and participating in regional training exchanges, the high speed vessels will be expected to do a lot of everything.

Two Perry class frigates. These ships will be outfitted with both lethal and non-lethal weapons of many types, and also serve as platforms for helicopter detachments. These are my primary pirate hunters.

Sea SLICE is my primary inshore platform that would be utilized to support disruption operations against both terrorist and pirate related activities.

The USCGC Bertholf (WMSL 750), which will work in cooperation with regional Coast Guards to establish fishery protection operations and training around Somalia.

Other assets will include Coast Guard LEDET and DOG detachments, a Riverine detachment, a SEABEE det, and a Navy medical det with at least 4 doctors.

This force would be sent with a mandate to kill terrorist, hunt pirates, assist the various United Nation operations in the region, train local security, and generally establish a proactive American presence off the Horn of Africa leveraging less restrictive rules of engagement for the purposes of preventing a future war that could potentially require western ground forces in Somalia. The squadrons mandate includes building security capacity and information exchange with the regional Coast Guards including regional nations but specifically the Coast Guard and maritime security forces of Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland. Disruption of terrorist activity and pirate activity is a primary function of this squadron. Any nation willing to join this security and assistance squadron would be required to commit forces for training and workups by February 1, 2011.

To me, that is what an Influence Squadron would be. It would operate both at sea and selectively on land. It would be designed to meet the entire range of challenges in a region suffering from maritime security and governance instability issues. It would consist of enough vessels that it can support security operations and regional engagement concurrently. It would be constructed using existing assets readily available for purchase or charter. It would provide opportunity for buy-in from allies willing to conform to established ROE, or allow for logistical support from allies wanting to contribute but politically unwilling to commit at the warfighter level. It combines joint maritime service capabilities into a single force, tailored to the mission, globally distributed while regionally concentrated to meet specific emerging security problems with the intent of preventing war. The squadron sustains presence for 6 months, October 2011 until March 2012 - with Sea Fighter and Sea SLICE remaining permanently deployed to the region as operational assets for future operational experimentation.

The US Navy doesn't need to invest major shipbuilding budget money to deploy Influence Squadrons, but should indeed leverage GWOT operational funding to invest a small amount towards preventing a future war in Somalia using existing vessels readily available, and letting loose a few highly creative Navy and Marine officers ready to prove that US naval power can influence the global war on terror in ungoverned regions at a much lower cost than land military power can.

Speaking of USCGC Escanaba (WMEC 907)

There appears to be some interest in story I wrote regarding the gunfight by the crew of the USCGC Escanaba (WMEC 907) with some smugglers a few weeks ago. Well, if you want to know the story of the USCGC Escanaba (WMEC 907), follow the blog of the USCGC Escanaba (WMEC 907).

More on the gunfight here. More here.

Peacemaking: The High Seas Gunfight

In the missile age, it is noteworthy that with the exception of a single torpedo attack - we continue to see a series of gunfights of various natures define military combat at sea. Navy Times reported yesterday that just two weeks ago, the US Coast Guard engaged in one such firefight.

A boarding team from the medium endurance cutter Escanaba got in a shootout with suspected drug smugglers while attempting to board a vessel in international waters near the coast of Nicaragua Sept. 14, the service said in a statement.

The Coast Guardsmen were perusing a go-fast vessel in Escanaba’s over-the-horizon small boat and were closing in when the suspects began shooting at the team. The Escanaba’s crew members immediately returned fire while the coxswain began evasive maneuvering and continued the chase, according to the Coast Guard statement.

The suspected smugglers then entered Nicaraguan waters, and the boarding team lost contact with them.

The USCGC Escanaba (WMEC 907) seized 963 pounds of cocaine that was jettisoned from a vessel 21 miles south of Providencia, Colombia on Sept. 17, 2010 - just three days after this incident. In that incident, the suspects beached their vessel and fled on foot, evading capture.

There is a huge human centric training discussion in the action described by Navy Times that I am skipping - not because I don't recognize it exists, rather because I think the US Coast Guard actions in this case once again verifies my belief that our people are well trained to react to this situation appropriately.

But the question is do we equip them right? My favorite piece of the often maligned Deepwater Program isn't any of the aircraft or cutter programs, rather the Coast Guard's Long Range Interceptor & Short Range Prosecutor programs. I have no information regarding the specific equipment the Coast Guard is purchasing as part of these programs, but at the conceptual level I appreciate the value the Coast Guard is placing on these systems - and in my opinion, the Navy does not have a good reason not to be making a similar focus on small deployable manned boats.

It is important to note the nature of operations has not changed - but what has changed is the frequency in which maritime security operations is putting small boats of navy and coast guard personnel in close proximity to small boats with armed men. For example, yesterday it appears that Turkey became the latest nation to position their warships right off the coast of some piracy port in Somalia to intercept pirates as they departed for the sea. That operation looks very similar to what the FSD De Grasse (D 612) was doing off the Somalia coast a few weeks ago.

In all of these cases we continue to find maritime security operations using small boats - sometimes with helicopter assistance and sometimes not - in situations where a deadly gunfight can break out. Within the context of the emerging irregular warfare threat matrix to be faced by naval and coast guard forces in the maritime domain - are we putting our people in the best position to insure their safety during small boat operations?

In the context of daily activity, I think it is pretty obvious small boat operations during daily Maritime Security Operations is where our people are the most vulnerable - and the necessity to protect people becomes an even bigger challenge when our naval ships intended to specifically address the MSO function (like LCS is expected to do) are being fielded with smaller crews, because the loss of even a single sailor has greater impact to the operation of a ship.

There is a school of thought that argues unmanned surface vessels represent the solution to these issues. I don't believe that is true, and a focus on unmanned technologies would be a distraction in understanding the value of more capable small manned deployable boats.

Unmanned vessels can give naval forces at the small boat level a higher level of warfighting capability - but must do this at the cost of greater peacemaking capabilities at sea. An unmanned small boat takes up the space of a manned vessel, and when most of the activities of small boat operations require a human touch, you lose capability with an unmanned technology.

For example, how does a robot help with this problem - or put another way, how much worse would this situation have been had the US Navy been using an unmanned small boat instead of a manned small boat?

Thirteen people aboard a skiff drowned Monday in the Gulf of Aden as the crew of the U.S. destroyer Winston S. Churchill attempted to assist the disabled vessel, a military statement said.

The skiff was found drifting in a Gulf shipping corridor on Sunday.

When U.S. Navy personnel couldn't repair its engine, the ship was towed toward the coast of Somalia and assistance was offered to the 85 people on board -- 10 Somalis and 75 Ethiopians.

"While transferring humanitarian supplies to the skiff, the passengers rushed to one side and the skiff began taking on water, quickly capsizing and sinking rapidly, leaving all 85 passengers in the water," according to the U.S. Navy.

The Navy said the destroyer crew immediately began search and rescue operations. Thirteen passengers drowned and eight were missing, the Navy said. Sixty-one passengers were rescued.

Unless the small unmanned surface vessel has a gun that can shoot lifeboats and flotation devices from its stern, you have sacrificed capability by replacing a small manned craft with an unmanned vehicle.

This discussion goes to the nature of warfare evolving in the 21st century. A few observations:

Naval surface vessels are trending toward gun warfare in the 21st century. Naval surface vessels represent the only human peacemaking capability at sea - underwater and aviation capabilities can not substitute in the primary functions of peacemaking, even as the greatly contribute to the battlespace awareness in peacemaking. Peacemaking is a primarily human activity.

Naval surface vessels are the most vulnerable vessels in warfighting. Naval warfare has not changed since WWII, warfighting in the missile age at sea is still primarily done by aircraft and submarines. Warfighting is a primarily technological activity.

So I ask again... when looking at the activities our forces, do we equip our people in a way that aligns activity with capability? When I look at programs like the Littoral Combat Ship and think about what kind of Coast Guard cutters we need in the 21st century, I'm not always convinced we are aligning our technology choices with activities as well as we could be.

Securing American Maritime Boundaries

When I started my blog Information Dissemination in 2007, I made the conscious decision to use a pseudonym from my days as an iRCop - Galrahn. The intention behind using a nickname was to focus the readers attention on the content of what was being written, rather than who was doing the writing. The maritime services - and indeed topics like maritime strategy and maritime security - are topics where the details are important to insiders but can sometimes be boring to average Americans. The citizens of our country no longer feel the same connection to the ocean as it relates to our livelihood as Americans once did in the early years of our country. I can be a long-winded writer though, and my tactic was to suck people into my message with just enough information to be insightful, educational, and hopefully interesting and entertaining. Like all bloggers - my success rates may vary.

My inspiration behind using a nickname was my favorite founding father and fellow New Yorker Alexander Hamilton, who along with James Madison and John Jay published the Federalist Papers from fall of 1787 until the spring of 1788. On September 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia had approved a new constitution and sent it to the Continental Congress, which ten days later sent it to the states for ratification. It was a difficult period for America in those first years after the Revolutionary War - the country was broke and heavily in debt; and Congress under the Articles of Confederation had no power to raise funds. Our founding fathers believed the federal system under the Articles of Confederation was fatally flawed, and the country would not survive without a stronger federal system.

It was Alexander Hamilton's idea to publish a series of essays urging ratification of the new Constitution, and he threw himself into the work producing 51 individual essays in four months. James Madison added 29 and John Jay wrote 5. All were published under the pseudonym "Publius." The Federalist papers, as they are known today, were printed in four New York newspapers between October 1787 and May 1788.

In his book Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy, Ian W. Toll describes how the Federalist papers revealed the importance of maritime security in the minds of our founding fathers.

Hamilton's Federalist essays made a ringing case for "active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine." (No. 11) It was America's destiny to trade by sea, and "the little arts of the little politicians" could never "control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature." The major Europeans powers were determined to suppress the growth of American trade -- to "clip the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness." If America was serious about asserting her maritime rights and protecting her hard-won independence, "we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy." (No. 24) Madison pointed to the vulnerability of the nation's long, unfortified coastline. Those living near the sea, north and south, should be "deeply interested in this provision for naval protection." (No. 41) Without a navy to defend them, they were vulnerable to the "predatory spirit of licentious adventurers," and would sooner or later be "compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders."

Today these words are even more applicable, indeed with 90% of the worlds trade taking place by sea today - there remains an inherent bond between freedom and access to the sea and the United States of America. Today is the first day of Homeland Security 2020: The Future of Defending the Homeland conference at the Heritage Foundation. The panels for the day will include:

1000-1100: Defending Domestic Waters: U.S. Maritime Security Policies

Mr. Michael Barrett, President of Diligent Innovations and former Director of Strategy, Homeland Security Council, White House

Mr. Adam Salerno, Senior Manager, U.S. Chamber of Commerce

1100-1200: Programs, platforms, and People: Public Sector Capabilities for 2020

VADM Terry Cross, USCG (Ret), Vice President for Homeland Security Programs, EADS-NA, and former USCG Vice Commandant

Dr. Steve Bucci, Associate Partner and Cyber Security Lead, Global Leadership Initiative at IBM Global; former DASD for Homeland Defense and Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

America's Maritime Challenge

The CIA World Factbook lists the land boundaries of the United States as 12,034 kilometers (7,477 miles), and the coastline as 19,924 km (12,380 miles). The CIA World Factbook breaks down the land boundaries further to include 8,893km (5,526 miles) for Canada (including 2,477 km or 1,539 miles with Alaska), and 3,141km (1,951 miles) for Mexico.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration lists the US coastline as 12,383 miles. Most organizations who use geography figures of the US coast line cite the numbers provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration instead of the CIA Factbook, but maybe the CIA knows something about those 3 miles that the rest of us don't know?

The Learning Network has a breakdown of coastline length by state using the 12,383 mile coastline figures of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The 12,383 miles of United States coast line includes 2,069 miles of Atlantic coastline, 1,631 miles of Gulf coastline, 7,623 miles of Pacific coastline, and 1,060 miles of Arctic coastline along Alaska's northern border.

Following 9/11 the US government gave priority to port security as the maritime defense layer in most need of security. While Congress has passed legislation to protect America’s ports, it’s important to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation passed, as well as that of intelligence measures taken since 9/11. 90% of the worlds trade is transported by sea, and an attack on a major port would have serious economic impacts to America. In every maritime security conference I have been to, port security is usually the first and foremost topic.

But in the conference at the Heritage Foundation today I hope to learn more about three other topics that I believe requires the constant attention of our national political leaders if they are to truly address the dynamic change of the maritime security environment around our nations maritime borders.

The Coast Guard

The United States Coast Guard is a national treasure, but it is also taking on water at a phenomenal rate. The material condition of the Coast Guard has long passed the tipping point, and the funding necessary to provide the manpower and training for the US Coast Guard to address the emerging roles and missions of the 21st century has not been provided. It is a real credit to the men and women of the US Coast Guard that they are able to do what they do, because every single day they are - in my opinion - carrying more responsibility with less money provided than any agency in the Federal government today.

The budget and size of the Coast Guard is out-of-sync with the responsibilities being tasked. According to a recent tally by Rep. James Oberstar, D-Minn., in the past 35 years Congress has handed the agency at least 27 new responsibilities. Prior to the BP oil spill in the Gulf, the Obama administration planned to cut Coast Guard personnel by 773, decommission five large cutters, retire four HU-25 Falcon medium-range surveillance aircraft, retire five HH-65 Dolphin search-and-rescue helicopters, and dissolve five 90-person marine safety and security teams next year. Following the BP oil spill, Congress has added minor increases to personnel end-strength for offshore oil monitoring, canceled the elimination of around 1,100 billets, and decreased the number of ships and aircraft scheduled for decommissioning. These adjustments are token changes and fall well short of what is necessary to strengthen the Coast Guard.

The FY 2011 budget for the Coast Guard is $10.1 billion (PDF) - 4% less than the FY 2010 budget. The Acquisition & Construction budget in FY 2011 for the entire Coast Guard is $1.536 billion - about 70% the shipbuilding cost of a single US Navy destroyer. The material condition of the US Coast Guard is not good by any standard. The US Coast Guard operates 250 cutters 65' or more, and the average age of those cutters is 41 years old.

“No amount of maintenance can outpace the ravages of age,” retired Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen said in a recent speech. “The condition of our fleet continues to deteriorate, putting our crews at risk and jeopardizing our ability to do the job.” Of the 12 major cutters assigned to Haiti relief operations, 10 of the cutters (87%) suffered mission-altering breakdowns. In the immediate hours following the explosion on DEEPWATER HORIZON, no less than 3 Coast Guard aircraft were unable to respond due to maintenance problems. In February of 2010, Mackenzie Eaglen of the Heritage Foundation made an applicable analogy:

The mismatched demands of the nation and the President’s budget cuts for the Coast Guard are unacceptable. One can only imagine the outcome—and outrage—if 83 percent of the fleet assigned to the Battle of Midway had to return to Pearl Harbor for emergency repairs. The Coast Guard should not be held to lower standards.

The DEEPWATER HORIZON explosion is only one symptom of a larger problem related to the Coast Guard being able to meet the responsibilities they have been tasked by our national leaders, and the Gulf oil spill is only a taste of the real economic disaster that awaits any nation with insufficient capabilities in maritime security and protection.

Technology Evolutions

In November of 2006, a Coast Guard cutter operating 100 miles off Costa Rica observed a strange blur in the water. Upon investigation, spotters on the cutter observed what appeared to be several snorkels poking up out of the water. It turned out to be a self-propelled, semisubmersible built in the jungles of Colombia carrying 3 tons of cocaine. Nicknamed "Bigfoot" the simisubmersible is now on display at Truman Annex, Naval Air Station Key West in Florida.

In 2009 officials estimated that 70 such simisubmersibles are now being constructed every year, and it is estimated only 14% are interdicted as they transfer narcotics from source to destination. In 2009 simisubmersibles were believed to carry 30% of Columbia's total cocaine exports. The cost to build a drug smuggling simisubmersible is around $500,000, and simisubmersibles are only used for a single trip. However, it is a remarkably affordable way to smuggle drugs into the United States.

The street value for 1 kilogram of cocaine in the United States can be averaged at $20,000. These simisubmersibles can transport between 3 and 7 tons of cocaine, and one short ton contains about 907 kilograms. That puts the street value of one simisubmersible full of 3 tons of cocaine at just over $54 million. At $54 million the transport costs using simisubmersibles with a 3 ton payload from South America to the United States is below 1% of the total street value.

In the 21st century, the rate of technological change drug cartels and other non-state actors have demonstrated is remarkable. In just the last 10 years, the drug trade has gone from go-fast speed boats to simisubmersibles to - as recently discovered in July 2010 in Ecuador - full midget submarine technology. Leveraging tides that ebb and flow through the rivers and tributaries in South America, simisubmersibles and submarines are being constructed well away from the coast in swamp areas sometimes as much as a hundred miles inland.

At roughly 30m long, the drug smuggling midget submarine found in Ecuador is roughly the same size as the midget submarine suspected of sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan, albeit far less sophisticated than its North Korean counterpart. Leveraging off the shelf technologies like the Hummingbird depth finder and GPS technologies, Jay Bergman, Andean regional director for the DEA, told CNN the submarine costs about $4 million to build. As a fully submersible submarine capable of carrying 10 tons of cocaine and reusable unlike its simisubmersible counterparts, one can see how the full submarine approach would be more cost effective - thus more likely to be used - by drug cartels in the future.

Now that midget submarines have transitioned from a theoretical capability used off the US coast to an actual capability to be used off the US coast, how does this influence the resource and training plans of the US Coast Guard? If the drug cartels are already using submarine technologies, what happens when organizations with more nefarious plans than smuggling narcotics develop these capabilities to use off the shores of the United States? The United States is not only unprepared for these types of challenges, there is little evidence that Congress is taking the rapid technological evolution of maritime threats seriously. Asking tough questions about US Coast Guard sonar technologies and training highlights the significance of the challenge the US faces today - much less the near future.

America's Arctic Problem

In September of 2008 the MV Camilla Desgagnés, owned by Desgagnés Transarctik Inc., transported cargo from Montreal to the hamlets of Cambridge Bay, Kugluktuk, Gjoa Haven and Taloyoak through the Northwest Passage. The transit marked the first time supplies were delivered to communities in western Nunavut from an Eastern port.

In 2009 two German ships, the Beluga Fraternity and the Beluga Foresight left the Russian port of Vladivostok with cargo picked up in South Korea bound for Holland. The traditional route for the ships would have been through the western Pacific towards the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean over to the Suez Canal, and out through the Strait of Gibraltar up to Holland for a total of roughly 11,000 nautical miles (12,658 miles). Using the Northeast Passage over Russia, the ships cut ~4,000 nautical miles from that trip and saved roughly $300,000 - of which $100,000 was in fuel savings alone. With permission from Russia to make the trip, the nuclear powered icebreaker 50 Years Since Victory escorted the two freighters through the Northeast Passage.

Last week the Barents Observer reported that the 100,000 ton tanker “Baltica” left Murmansk loaded with gas condensate for China escorted by 3 nuclear powered icebreakers. This is the first time a high-tonnage tanker will take the Northern Sea Route from Europe to Asia. The Northeast Passage will cut ~5,000 miles from usual route taken around Africa, as a 100,000 ton tankers are too large for the Suez canal.

As the Northwest and Northeast Passages open up new sea trade opportunities, it is important to note that regardless of which route is taken, both routes will increase the number of ships transiting in US waters - as both routes require ships to pass through the Bering Strait. Alaska has 1,060 miles of Arctic Ocean coastline of which any vessel utilizing the Northwest Passage will transit through. What the United States does not have today is any operational heavy icebreakers to escort and insure safety of navigation in those icy waters.

The Coast Guard has two heavy polar icebreakers — Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11). The Polar Star is not operational and has been in what is called "caretaker status" since July 1, 2006. Congress has provided funding to repair Polar Star and return it to service for 7 to 10 years, and the Coast Guard expects Polar Star reactivation to be completed by 2013.

On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an unexpected engine problem and consequently will likely be unavailable for operation until at least January 2011. That leaves the United States currently without any operational heavy polar icebreakers.

The Coast Guard also operates a third polar icebreaker — Healy — which entered service in 2000. Compared to Polar Star and Polar Sea, the medium polar icebreaker Healy has less icebreaking capability but more capability for supporting scientific research - and is primarily used supporting scientific research in the Arctic.

With 1,060 miles of Alaskan Arctic coastline, and by international law the United States claims out to 200 miles of that coastline to be part of the American economic exclusion zone; how can our nation afford to have ZERO operational heavy icebreakers today? If I had a penny for every time I have heard a news anchor or politician say "Global Warming" on Television, our nation could buy 10 heavy icebreakers - and yet in 2010 we have none.

The Arctic policy of the United States has no political leadership at all, because there isn't a single US politician who would take responsibility for a policy we have no capabilities today to enforce policy with. There is significant global economic potential should either the Northwest or Northeast Passages become a viable sea trade route between Europe and Asia, which means the shipping industry will be exploring these trade routes over the next few years. While politicians in America will openly discuss scientific theory related to global warming, there is a tangible economic and maritime boundary issue for the United States taking place in plain sight today related to climate changes impact to global maritime commerce trade patterns that could result in US territory - the Bering Strait - becoming a crowded sea trade choke point in the very near future. The US economic exclusion zone off the Alaskan coastline is a marine resource, a potential energy resource, and a possible economic trade resource that the United States must be prepared to protect.

The condition of the United States Coast Guard, the technology evolutions by non-state actors and criminals in the 21st century, and the missing-in-action US Arctic Policy represent three homeland security concerns along our nations maritime borders that are evolving at a pace greater than our nations political leaders in Washington are adapting. I look forward to the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security 2020 event today in hopes that these issues are discussed thoughtfully and inform our national leaders on how the United States can best address these and other emerging challenges off our nations shorelines.