Call for (Sharing) Papers and Books: Political Histories of Building a Strong U.S. Navy

Carl Vinson (Image courtesy Library of Congress)

There have been several interesting articles of late that touch on the politics of U.S. naval strength. I’ve discussed the topic with a number of friends and colleagues, and unsurprisingly I’ve heard a wide range of views. One thing I think they’re all in agreement on is that we were clearly approaching a strategic precipice even before the Budget Control Act of 2011.

It strikes me that any political strategy for preserving a strong Navy ought to be informed by how that very strength was politically achieved in the first place. We know that the political path to a global U.S. Navy began with the naval authorization acts of the 1880s and 1890s, was amplified in the ‘second to none’ Naval Act of 1916, and was cemented in Naval Authorization Acts of 1934-1940. I personally can’t say I know much about how the sponsors of these acts or their navalist backers achieved what they did, though.

For example, while it’s well understood that Carl Vinson was the driving political force behind the pre-Second World War U.S. naval rearmament, how exactly did he gain the support of those in other positions of Congressional and Executive power who were necessary for passage? Granted, his efforts benefitted from the fact that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was an unabashed navalist, but Roosevelt was not always fully on board with Vinson’s initiatives. How did he obtain Roosevelt’s active cooperation when possible and Constitutional consent when necessary? What specific roles did the Navy’s leaders of the era play? The media? Advocacy groups? How did global events factor in? Did the general public play any roles, and if so to what degree did navalists reach out to them to obtain their support or otherwise get them engaged?

I find what Vinson achieved in 1934 particularly remarkable. Amidst substantial American political opposition to rearmament and overseas entanglements, Vinson and his Senate counterpart Park Trammell got the first of the major interwar naval authorization acts passed through Congress. It seems likely that selling naval investment as a Great Depression jobs program helped, but it’s not clear to me just how much that offset the arguments of those opposed.

Therefore, if you’ve read (or written) books or journal articles that contribute to answering questions similar to the ones I outlined for any of the aforementioned periods, please share the titles in the comments thread. And if you’re in college or grad school and are searching for historical naval policy topics of great contemporary relevance to write about for coursework—and then perhaps get published—I don’t think you can go wrong exploring the late 19^th and early 20^th Century political paths to U.S. naval strength.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.  

The Sense of Congress on Amphibious Ships

Proposed MLP and AFSB option for LSD(X)

Normally when a defense budget is passed, I can't wait to dig through it and highlight all the important details. This time, with no associated appropriations bill (or plan) coming anytime soon, it would be a waste of time to suggest anything in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Act is worth discussing, because it is worthless until the elected folks in Washington, DC get their budget priorities sorted out.

There is one section in the bill that I do want to highlight though. This reads like something inserted by a lobbyist, and it doesn't belong in my opinion.

SEC. 131. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS LIFT AND PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS.

a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1. The Marine Corps is a combat force that leverages maneuver from the sea as a force multiplier allowing for a variety of operational tasks ranging from major combat operations to humanitarian assistance.
2. The Marine Corps is unique in that, while embarked upon naval vessels, they bring all the logistic support necessary for the full range of military operations and, operating ‘‘from the sea’’, they require no third-party host nation permission to conduct military operations.
3. The Navy has a requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships to meet this full range of military operations.
4. Due only to fiscal constraints, that requirement of 38 vessels was reduced to 33 vessels, which adds military risk to future operations.
5. The Navy has been unable to meet even the minimal requirement of 30 operationally available vessels and has submitted a shipbuilding and ship retirement plan to Congress that will reduce the force to 28 vessels.
6. Experience has shown that early engineering and design of naval vessels has significantly reduced the acquisition costs and life-cycle costs of those vessels.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

1. the Department of Defense should carefully evaluate the maritime force structure necessary to execute demand for forces by the commanders of the combatant commands;
2. the Navy should carefully evaluate amphibious lift capabilities to meet current and projected requirements;
3. the Navy should consider prioritization of investment in and procurement of the next generation of amphibious assault ships as a component of the balanced battle force;
4. the next generation amphibious assault ships should maintain survivability protection;
5. operation and maintenance requirements analysis, as well as the potential to leverage a common hull form design, should be considered to reduce total ownership cost and acquisition cost; and
6. maintaining a robust amphibious ship building industrial base is vital for the future of the national security of the United States.

To me this looks a lot like some Marine Corps General and his industry buddies throwing their weight around via Congress to try an influence the Analysis of Alternatives taking place regarding the LSD(X). Congress should not be trying to influence the decision unless they are ready to pony up the big bucks for what they are basically calling for - which to me sounds like more LPD-17s.


From what I understand, LSD(X) will be a design to cost ship. The recurring cost (ship 3 and beyond) is pegged to be about $1.2 billion in the shipbuilding budget. That makes the LPD-17 hull a nonstarter without a significant increase in cash from Congress.

The Marines face several challenges in dealing with amphibious requirements, but two stand out as important challenges that must be addressed. The first challenge is that the lift footprint of the amphibious MEB is growing, and the second challenge is that the MPS squadron only carries about 70% of the MEB's equipment. With limited funding and only one platform in the shipbuilding plan able to address these issues - the LSD(X) - folks are either going to have to get creative to solve these challenges, or accept that the challenges will not be solved.

The LSD(X) is a choice between 4 alternatives.

The first choice is a new build, best possible lift vessel for $1.2 billion recurring. I have no idea what design that would be, but if we are being honest it almost certainly wouldn't be anything similar to a current LSD if it is going to meet the stated requirements.

The second choice is for a LPD-17 mod, best possible for $1.2 billion recurring. I do not believe that is possible, but I'm sure there is a shipbuilding guru who other Marines call "General" willing and ready to convince a gullible politician it is possible. Experts I have spoken to in NAVSEA say it's not possible, and I'll trust their expertise and opinion over any Marine General when it comes to shipbuilding.

The third choice is to use a foreign design brought up to NVR standard at a cost of no more than $1.2 billion recurring with the third ship. The design that is specifically highlighted with this option is the French Mistral class. The ships would be built at a US shipyard. There is not a consensus whether these ships can be built in a US shipyard for $1.2 billion recurring.

The fourth option is to build two ships - a MLP and an AFSB - and use the combination of both ships to replace the single LSD. The idea is for the AFSB vessel to cover both the lift for amphibious groups and carry residual lift for the MPS MEB while MLP serves as a well deck surrogate. What is important to understand here is that the AFSB design would actually be a non-mil spec LPH with a limited hanger capacity, but it gives the option for that vessel to carry forward the helicopters in an ARG while the LHA/LHD operates 20 JSFs. Neither the MLP or AFSB would be a gray hull though, which is a major reason why old school Marine Generals who have been doing amphibious assaults for 30 years (cough!) hate the idea.

When I read Section 131 of the 2013 National Defense Act, what I read as "Sense of Congress" actually represents the traditionalists mindset on amphibious capability and their Gulf coast lobby buddies.

But the bottom line is this. The fourth option is the only option that will actually meet the capacity requirements for amphibious lift and the MPS, but I fully expect the United States Marine Corps to outright reject the very suggestion of any option away from the traditional 3 ship ARG. The third option for a foreign design will be rejected solely because it is a foreign design, even though the logic of that escapes me completely when the ships are being built in US shipyards. A new design is possible but unlikely, and until we see more in-house design expertise in NAVSEA I can't say that is necessarily a bad thing.

So ultimately I fully expect the final choice for the LSD(X) to be a LPD-17 mod that the Navy budget cannot afford, and in the end I suspect the Marine Corps will end up with about 8 LSD(X) because that is all they can afford.

But if it was me, I would go for the MLP + AFSB concept. I believe it carries with it the highest risk, but I also believe it would give the Marine Corps the most flexibility when it comes to operations at sea. In my opinion it is much easier for the USMC to remain a relevant national defense asset when they are operating from more ships than when they are operating from fewer ships, and the MLP + AFSB option puts Marines on well over 40 vessels that deploy frequently, vs less than 30 possible vessels that deploy less frequently when one picks the quality LPD-17 mod option.

The Brand New Approximately 300-Ship Shipbuilding Plan

The Navy has sent Congress the FY13 Shipbuilding plan. It begins with this letter:

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As required by section 231 of title 10, United States Code, I am forwarding the annual long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels. I certify that both the budget for Fiscal Year 2013 and the future-years defense program (FYDP) for Fiscal Years 13-17 provide a sufficient level of funding to procure the naval vessels specified by the plan on the schedule outlined therein.

The plan outlines the naval force structure requirements that are derived in response to the new set of strategic priorities and guidance contained in the recently released Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense; the construction plan necessary to meet these requirements; and the fiscal resources necessary to implement the plan. The plan is affordable within the FYDP but presents a resourcing challenge outside the FYDP largely due to investment requirements associated with the SSBN(X) program.

I look forward to working with you to achieve the requisite investments to safeguard our Nation's maritime strength and endurance.

Ashton Carter

Enclosure 1:
Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2013

cc:
The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces has a hearing tomorrow at 10:00am that will discuss Oversight of U.S. Naval Vessel Acquisition Programs and Force Structure of the Department of the Navy in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Request. I am presuming the FY13 Shipbuilding Plan will be discussed at the hearing, and likely become publicly available from news websites that are not pay wall blocked shortly.

I only have a two thoughts before the hearing, and suspect this topic won't be going away anytime soon.

Thought One

The inherent flexibility of naval people and platforms and assets has been proven again and again. The ability of high-end assets to flex for a number of missions along the spectrum of operations has been a staple of deployments by carrier strike groups and their escorts and their air assets. What has not been proven is the ability of a global navy to use forces that are not dominant or not present overseas to deter challengers, deny regional aggressors, or reassure partners. When you are no longer present in one or two areas of vital national interest with dominant maritime forces, you are at the “tipping point.”

The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?, CNA, March 1, 2024

Were you aware that the US Navy no longer needs to be present with ships in one or two areas of vital national interest to preserve Naval dominance and deter aggression? If you were unaware of this magic, as I am, then you are in luck - because the "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan actually makes the suggestion that the P-8 is sufficient maritime presence to preserve our vital national interests in places ships can't be due to insufficient numbers. There are, in my opinion, several very strange assumptions and arguments in the US Navy's new "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan that argue against the necessity for ships. No, I am not kidding.

Ashton Carter is right on the money - the only parts of this plan worth staking a reputation on is Fiscal Year 2013 and the future-years defense program (FYDP) for Fiscal Years 13-17. It is remarkable that this administration implies any sort of emphasis towards seapower in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (PDF) and follows up that not-really-a-strategic document with a revised shipbuilding plan that significantly reduces the construction of Navy ships being built from 45 to 31 in the FYDP.

It isn't the Republicans who undermine President Obama's new defense policy; the Obama administration has gone ahead and done that for the Republicans. I have no idea why.

In 2006 the 313-ship shipbuilding plan pushed the bulk of shipbuilding to reach the target of 313 ships to the right so that the Navy would be building at least 9 ships and as many as 13 ships a year starting in FY13 until about FY23. Now that FY13 has arrived, the Navy has developed a new "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan that does exactly the same thing claiming exactly the same results in future years as the old plan. The "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan pushes the bulk of shipbuilding into the out years, and now the big ramp up in shipbuilding will now take place beginning in FY18 and go into the middle of next decade.

The Navy is now officially doing the same thing again and again with their shipbuilding plans in the 21st century and expecting everyone to believe the result will be different this time. The new plan - same as the old plan - is to meet a specific number of ships determined by requirement (313 or approximately 300) by loading all of the construction of the ships needed to meet that number in the budget years beyond the FYDP. If the new "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan is doing exactly what failed in the old 313-ship shipbuilding plan, then how can the Navy claim to have a plan - or for that matter - how can the Navy claim to have a valid ship requirement that needs a plan if the Navy doesn't have a legitimate plan intended to meet that requirement?

The shipbuilding plans of the US Navy have become a fallacy of the highest order. The surface combatants and submarines the Navy claims it will build in higher numbers in the out years of the new plan are the next generation evolutions of current surface combatants and submarines, and those next-gen surface combatants and submarines will have additional requirements that will result in the platforms being even larger than they are today, and those platforms will each have a higher expected unit cost. Who exactly is supposed to legitimately believe the Navy can execute a plan that builds these larger, more expensive platforms in higher numbers as per the new "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan? Congress is supposed to believe that? Do leaders in OPNAV honestly believe this plan can be executed?

This is the Tipping Point that CNA continuously warned everyone that was coming, and right now it is time for the CNO to step up because his Inflection Point moment has arrived. The evolution of the current force structure consisting of big deck aircraft carriers, big surface combatants, and big attack submarines results in each generation getting bigger and bigger as requirements are added to each new class of a vessel type, and as they grow they get more expensive. The big deck aircraft carrier, the big surface combatant, and the big submarine as vessel types have now evolved to the point where the Navy has published consecutive shipbuilding plans that push the construction of these vessels in high enough quantity to sustain force structure target numbers to beyond the FYDP - and only by pushing the construction of those ships in quantity beyond the FYDP can the Navy claim legitimacy for their plans to meet their own stated requirements. The shipbuilding plans themselves now represent a cycle of unrealistic execution of shipbuilding plans.

The Navy must break the cycle while they can, and the only way to do so is to fundamentally reevaluate the design of naval vessels of all types in a way that fields sufficient quantity of naval vessels for both presence and power projection while at the same time fielding sufficient combat capacity necessary to win wars. No class of ship - whether aircraft carrier, surface combatant, submarine, amphibious ship, or Littoral Combat Ship - should be immune to the fundamental reevaluation of force structure. This does not automatically mean there won't be big deck aircraft carriers, big surface combatants, or big submarines in the new force structure, but whether one is talking about existing force structure plans or new force structure plans - there will almost certainly be fewer of those vessels than what the "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan suggests.

This new shipbuilding plan - without a shadow of a doubt in my mind - represents the Navy has passed the Tipping Point. Thursday's hearing is useful for beginning the process of taking names regarding those who are in denial of this blatantly obvious and now officially documented reality. This shipbuilding plan is described as a shipbuilding plan for "approximately 300 ships," and Ashton Carter certifies only the realistic aspect of the plan which is the years represented in the FYDP (which can be examined in earlier released FY13 budget materials). The FYDP represents an average of 7.75 ships per year - more than half of which are small combatants or non-combatants - and using the realistic numbers of the FYDP the math suggests a future fleet of approximately 230 ships is the legitimate future of the Navy if the Navy stays on current course with force structure. That's 70 Navy ships below the stated requirement, and under the new "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan it is a very safe bet that most of those 70 ships that will not be affordable in any future where this plan is followed would represent the surface ships and submarines that make up the combatant power side expected in the "approximately 300-ship" fleet.

Thought Two

Though the formal hierarchy is clear, the relative influence of the civilian leadership of the Pentagon vis--vis its most senior uniformed leaders has varied over time. During the 1990s, some observers were concerned about what they saw as the inappropriate assertiveness of uniformed members of the military on policy issues. By contrast, George W. Bush's first defense secretary, Rumsfeld, was dominant in shaping the president's defense polities and was known for having a directive and demanding leadership style toward military subordinates. Though the relationship varies, a key challenge - ensuring democratically appropriate and strategically effective civil-military relationships in which professional military leaders provide senior civilian policy makers with the best possible expert advice - will remain.

American National Security, By Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., Michael J. Meese, Suzanne C. Nielsen, James Schlesinger, JHU Press, Feb 20, 2024

The first thing that I realized when reading the new FY13 shipbuilding plan is that the Honorable Undersecretary of the Navy Bob Work wrote this plan himself, or at least most of it. Bob Work has a wealth of published reports, and I've read all of them that are public, and because of this I am very familiar with both his writing style and lexicon - both of which come jumping off the page as I read the new shipbuilding plan.

Externally both the folks in OPNAV and the folks in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy praise each other and claim to speak from the same sheet of paper in support of one another, but it is difficult for me to believe that any Admiral in the US Navy actually believes this shipbuilding plan has any legitimacy beyond the FYDP.

I'm not even convinced that Bob Work believes in the legitimacy of this shipbuilding plan beyond the FYDP, and I say that while betting $100 worth of beer at Sine's he wrote the thing himself. I can't explain why the shipbuilding plan is a month late nor why Bob Work wrote the shipbuilding plan himself. Is it unusual or common for a top level civilian in the Navy to personally write this document? I don't know.

Someone please explain to me how professional military leaders in the Navy can provide senior civilian policy makers in Congress with the best possible expert advice on this shipbuilding plan without either being critical of the plan, or being dishonest to Congress about the legitimacy of the plan beyond the FYDP. Is either the Honorable Sean Stackley or Vice Admiral Blake really naive enough to legitimately believe this is a realistic shipbuilding plan for approximately 300 ships of the types outlined in the plan?

I sincerely hope not. The hearing in the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces on Thursday has the potential to be a fascinating circus. Beware the clowns.

The Politics of Fleet Constitution

I went back and reviewed the Navy Readiness Posture hearing in the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness back on March 22, 2012. The hearing was held 2 days after I wrote this blog post.

The panel included Vice Admiral William Burke, Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy, and Vice Admiral David Architzel. I have a few thoughts.

It should be noted that nobody, not Congress and not the Navy, wants to keep USS Port Royal (CG 73). Considering that the current CNO classified INSURV reports several years ago, the condition of the USS Port Royal (CG 73) has been previously concealed to Congress and the American taxpayer.

All discussions apparently focus on the remaining three FY13 cruisers and to some extent, the three FY14 cruisers also set for early retirement.

Rep. Forbes and the Navy both cited different estimates for the modernization and maintenance of the cruisers scheduled for decommissioning in the March 22 hearing, but in the hearing Admiral Burke does a great job of highlighting how the numbers are actually the same - from different point of views. Rep. Forbes cites an estimate of $592 million in FY 13 and $859 million in FY 14 to modernize the cruisers, while the Navy claims the estimate of savings for early retirement of the cruisers is over $4 billion. It looks like they are both right, and both sides are making interesting arguments.

Vice Admiral Burke and Vice Admiral McCoy's arguments are very smart. Basically what they are saying is that it will cost about $4.1 billion to modernize, maintain, and operate the cruisers through the FYDP (next 5 budget years), and the Navy number includes manpower, training, and equipment costs like the helicopters while the numbers used by Rep Forbes estimates only part of the bill for keeping the cruisers. The concern the Navy has is that just because Congress finds money for modernization and keeping the cruiser hulls, the Navy won't get the additional funding for maintenance and operations of the cruisers in the out years and thus down the road the Navy won't have the extra funding to properly maintain the ships that Congress spent just enough money to save and modernize. That partial support of the early retirement cruisers would force the Navy to maintain the cruisers at the expense of other ships in the out years, which the Navy does not want to do.

The hearing was very interesting to me to listen to the second time because this time I noted that from the opening testimony - the discussion was focused on the cruisers, which I think has been the plan from the beginning. Lets take a step back and observe objectively what is happening.

A few years ago the Obama administration drew up a new strategy for National Ballistic Missile Defense that centered on the Navy's AEGIS BMD capability. A lot of noise was made of this major change, but in terms of shipbuilding, maintenance, and modernization of naval forces capable of fielding ballistic missile defense - no plan has changed since that announcement and no additional funding for ships from the administration ever went to the Navy to take on that rather important strategic role. I think that is important, because it highlights the strategy the Navy has come up with to find more money from Congress during the tight FY13 budget season.

The Navy has put 7 cruisers up for early retirement. Keep in mind that all 7 cruisers put up for early retirement in FY13 and FY14 are capable of being modernized for ballistic missile defense (Port Royal already has BMD capability, but Port Royal is apparently a lemon). I think that is pretty remarkable, because the US Navy actually has 7 cruisers not capable of being upgraded to BMD - the baseline 3 Ticonderoga class cruisers CG 52-58 which do not have the proper radar for AEGIS BMD. In other words, despite being given a new national strategic mission in ballistic missile defense, the US Navy has put up 7 surface combatants capable of performing the BMD mission up for early retirement when in fact the Navy has 7 surface combatants not capable of performing that BMD mission. Why would the Navy do this?

It is fairly obvious to this observer that the Navy put these cruisers on the chopping block precisely because they expected Congress to swoop in and save the 6 cruisers the Navy wants to save, and allow the Navy to dump the amphibious ships and no one will care. Cruisers are shiny toys that represent power projection, and these specific cruisers have a significant future ahead of them if the money was to be found and made available for the US Navy to keep them. To big Navy, amphibious ships are dull and boring, and all they do is all the hard, unsexy stuff.

I believe it is fairly obvious Congress is doing exactly what the Navy and the Obama administration wants them to do - saving the 6 cruisers and allowing the Navy to retire USS Port Royal (CG 73), and in fact the House Republicans are saving the cruisers in exactly the way the Navy and Obama administration (by that I mean SECNAV and CNO) wants them to do it - by making it an issue the House Republicans feel ownership of and thus are able to find funding for when budgets everywhere are tight. The Obama administration is basically using Rep. Forbes and Rep. McKeon to find money and pay for the administrations ballistic missile defense policy that is otherwise neglected and unfunded by the administration. It is part of a political game, and the Republicans seem perfectly willing to be played like a political fiddle in this political game.

Meanwhile big Navy is getting exactly what they want out the game. When it came time to make budget adjustments to the FY13 FYDP, to pay for more surface combatants the Navy is moving amphibious ships to the right, and by putting up the cruisers for early decommissioning the Navy insures Congress will save them, and discard the amphibious ships (which are listed, and nobody is talking about). Whether the issue is new shipbuilding or early retirements, big Navy has framed the argument perfectly in a way that Congress focuses on saving the surface combatants while the amphibious force suffers. Meanwhile, it is the amphibious ships that are making record length deployments being further worn out, while the replacements for the ships being worn out faster are being pushed further and further to the right in the shipbuilding plan.

Apparently Congress doesn't think the short dwell time of amphibious ship sailors is a big deal, so why should the CNO care? Congress is trying to draw a line in the sand on the early retirement of the cruisers, which is exactly what the Navy and the Obama administration wants Congress to do. In my opinion, Congress needs to think for themselves and not get sucked into the political game they are being manhandled in. If the House Republicans were playing this smart politically, they would target the LSDs for saving and save USS Cowpens (CG-63) - which is the cruiser in the best condition of those listed, and let the Obama administration hang themselves with their political shenanigans. If Congress doesn't save the cruisers, it is the Obama administration that has to answer questions why they are now neglecting their own ballistic missile defense strategy. Nobody cares of course, except Congress - which is why it is a solid plan by the Obama administration.

Make no mistake, the Obama administration not only expects the House Republicans to save the cruisers, they are in full support of it - because Congress saving the cruisers is actually the Obama administrations plan. By the time the voting comes around, I fully expect broad bi-partisan support to save the cruisers, but I do not believe there would be bi-partisan support to save the amphibious ships. Why? Because that isn't the administrations plan.

The administration doesn't care how the cruisers are saved when there is no money to pay for them, because if they did they wouldn't have given that problem to the House Republicans to figure out.

I find it all fascinating. I also truly believe that if the Congress doesn't save the cruisers set for early retirement in the FY13 budget, those three cruisers set for early retirement in FY14 will suddenly find the money to survive early retirement. The Navy is only gambling as many as six cruisers because it is a safe bet that some of them will be saved. I still wonder to myself what the number of cruisers is the Navy expects to get back from Congress - in a worse case scenario - and if that number can be achieved while saving the amphibious ships.

If Congress wants to draw a line in the sand on early retirements, I hope they draw that line around the amphibious ships. The Navy will find a way to fund their major surface combatant force - and the FY13 budget itself is proof they always do. Come hell or high water, before a single cut is made to surface combatants in either shipbuilding or early retirement, observe that first the amphibious ships will be thrown overboard by big Navy until and only if/when Congress says otherwise.

Keepers

And this is why the Navy picked the cruisers for decommissioning.

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon wants the Navy to keep seven Ticonderoga-class cruisers the service planned to retire to meet congressionally mandated budget cuts.

McKeon, R-Calif., said in a March 14 speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, Calif., that the ships are needed to secure U.S. interests in the Pacific, the focal point of the Obama administration’s new national security strategy. His plan would call for funding needed upgrades to keep the ships — all of which were commissioned in the 1990s — for their full 35-year service lives.

“Though the administration says we’re shifting to Asia, they’re actually reducing the number of ships and planes we have available to respond to contingencies anywhere,” McKeon said. “We will try to hold back cuts to the Navy’s cruiser force, finding the money for our cruisers to undergo proper upgrades, instead of mothballing vital ships needed to sustain the shift to Asia.”

The question I have been asking myself since the beginning is how many cruisers the Navy expects Congress to save. 100%? 75%? 50%? Both the House and the Senate has several members that would prefer to keep these vessels. It isn't just the capabilities of the ships, it is the workload for the yards and industrial base support that needs these ships to stay around.

The thing is though, I don't think the Navy will keep all 7. The USS Port Royal (CG 73) is a perfect example, ever since hitting the reef off Hawaii to become the first AEGIS ashore asset for the United States, that ship has reportedly not been right. Cracks in the hull are just the beginning, the bottom line is the SPY radar is built into the superstructure of these ships - a little damage from grounding can go a long way towards causing serious combat related problems.

So my guess is Congress will find a way to keep at least 2 and as many as 6 of the cruisers. It really isn't as much money as you think, and if modernization is fully funded for each of these cruisers, most of them should be able to serve 40 years with expectations of being viable and competitive naval assets.

What to Watch For Today

There might be a very interesting hearing in the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces today. The hearing on Sustaining GPS for National Security starts at 11:30am and will feature the following line up:

General William L. Shelton
Commader
U.S. Air Force Space Command

Ms. Teresa M. Takai
Chief Information Officer
U.S. Department of Defense

The Honorable Julius Genachowski
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission

Mr. Karl Nebbia
Associate Administrator, Office of Spectrum Management, National Telecommunications and Information Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce

Mr. Anthony J. Russo
National Coordination Office, Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Training
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Now you are probably wondering why I would highlight this. Eli Lake has the story on the Daily Beast.

The four-star Air Force general who oversees U.S. Space Command walked into a highly secured room on Capitol Hill a week ago to give a classified briefing to lawmakers and staff, and dropped a surprise. Pressed by members, Gen. William Shelton said the White House tried to pressure him to change his testimony to make it more favorable to a company tied to a large Democratic donor.

The episode—confirmed by The Daily Beast in interviews with administration officials and the chairman of a congressional oversight committee—is the latest in a string of incidents that have given Republicans sudden fodder for questions about whether the Obama administration is politically interfering in routine government matters that affect donors or fundraisers. Already, the FBI and a House committee are investigating a federal loan guarantee to a now failed solar firm called Solyndra that is tied to a large Obama fundraiser.

Now the Pentagon has been raising concerns about a new wireless project by a satellite broadband company in Virginia called LightSquared, whose majority owner is an investment fund run by Democratic donor Philip Falcone. Gen. Shelton was originally scheduled to testify Aug. 3 to a House committee that the project would interfere with the military’s sensitive Global Positioning Satellite capabilities, which control automated driving directions and missile targeting, among other things.

According to officials familiar with the situation, Shelton’s prepared testimony was leaked in advance to the company. And the White House asked the general to alter the testimony to add two points: that the general supported the White House policy to add more broadband for commercial use; and that the Pentagon would try to resolve the questions around LightSquared with testing in just 90 days. Shelton chafed at the intervention, which seemed to soften the Pentagon’s position and might be viewed as helping the company as it tries to get the project launched, the officials said.

Read the whole thing. Two important things here.

Lightsquared's product is National WIFI, and right now they are the only company ready to move on bringing WIFI at that scale. With the power of network access being demonstrated worldwide, National WIFI is obviously a technology that could offer the US a lot of promise, and has great potential as a service to areas of the US that even today suffer from a lack of broadband. The potential disruption to GPS would make their specific technology a non-starter in the eyes of the DoD - and should be considered a non-starter by everyone else too, but apparently not. It's nice to know the right people I guess.

The second point is - Administration tampering with testimony before Congress is never acceptable. It wasn't acceptable when the Bush administration did it regarding climate science, and it isn't acceptable to tell a General to favor a technology that might have political influence - but also disruptive to existing important technologies like GPS.

This has all the makings of a very interesting hearing on the Hill today.

Congressman Kissell Throws Three Strikes

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness hearing that focused on Navy Readiness on Tuesday is a gold mine of good information. Unfortunately, most of the real eyeopening information to those outside the bubble (like me) came from the Committee members, not the Navy. My impression was VADM Burke and VADM McCoy walked into a lions den of tough questions and came off looking unprepared, for example, the uncomfortable long pauses followed by very short answers to tough questions didn't project much confidence in the answers being given by the Navy. That is a body language analysis, but a fair one - I think. With that said, both Vice Admirals did remarkably well considering there is no question the questions being asked by Congress were really tough questions almost throughout.

What made this hearing better than most Congressional hearings is that Steve Palazzo of Mississippi was the only subcommittee member to ask parochial questions that really seemed out of place in the context of the hearing. Did you get your Northrop Grumman check for that series of questions Steve? If you didn't get paid, then keep in mind you sounded unprepared and out of place for free. Sorry dude... you have a long way to go if you want to fill Gene Taylor's shoes. Every one else in the hearing asked tough, probing questions to the topic on hand. People familiar with Congressional hearings will recognize just how rare it is for any House subcommittee hearing to be absent the parochial non-sense one usually finds in a Navy budget hearing.

The Navy is in a maintenance mess and everyone knows it. This was a tough hearing for the Navy, because nobody wants to go testify under oath about public, obvious problems that have difficult, long term solutions. For me, what is great about this hearing is that it provides plenty to write about - indeed I hope this will be the first of several posts because my time is limited and this hearing produced a cart load of low hanging fruit.

Lets kick it off with three important issues raised by Larry Kissell from North Carolina, who in my opinion really did some top quality work probing the Navy with these questions and getting the responding, revealing answers.

FORBES: Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Kissell.

KISSELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today. Admiral Burke, you said a couple times, "a limited supply of forces." What were you referring and -- in the big picture there and what does that affect?

BURKE: What I'm referring to when I say we have a limited supply is we only have 285 ships. And I'm - as a submariner, I'm most familiar with the submarine model, where COCOM demand is for about 16 or 18 sub SSNs at any one time. We deliver about 10 SSNs at any one time. So why do we only deliver 10? Because that's all we can afford to deliver. So...

KISSELL: When you were talking about limited supply of forces, you were talking about specifically ships, not personnel, not aircraft, not missiles or equipment for the ships? You were talking specifically for ships?

BURKE: I'm talking about ships as a representative of the entire Navy. So the same sort of thing happens with aircraft. But the aircraft in the Navy are typically on ships. So they're part of that process. So, in other words, we frequently get asked to deliver more carrier presence with the carrier and the aircraft than we can deliver.

KISSELL: So for every ship that we're short, then you're saying there's just a multiplied shortness there of everything that you could want or imagine or need with that ship, and that's what kind of - I was just curious more about, when you say, limited supply of forces, just, you know - so that's kind of a - for every ship, then, what comes with that ship, we're missing?

BURKE: Yes.

VADM Burke is hitting home the impact of a small fleet in high demand, the impacts at both the operational end and how that cascades in the cycles towards training and maintenance. The Navy struggles with these challenges, and Navy leaders do a good job juggling priorities in meeting COCOM demands while also meeting engineering and training requirements. It's a tough situation that leaves only tough decisions where something gets missed due to circumstances.

Fewer ships under higher demands equals higher tempo, and the administration appears to be ignoring the impacts of that equation to the Navy while Congress is struggling to deal with those impacts.

The key detail provided by VADM Burke is, I think, an important topic, and I'll likely repeat this revealing detail in future posts - "COCOM demand is for about 16 or 18 sub SSNs at any one time. We deliver about 10 SSNs at any one time."

WOW! Will the Navy please communicate challenges like this more often! Unfortunately, that probably won't happen. When this tidbit was discussed among folks in social media yesterday after the hearing, several very bright military savvy folks started asking the questions the Navy doesn't have a public answer for, like:

• "Why do COCOMs have such a high demand for submarines?"
• "What do submarines actually do that makes them this important?"
• "Could this be true? What do submarines do?"

As much as folks email me to answer these questions publicly, I won't - it's not my job to answer these questions; it is the Navy's job. All I will say is this... and encourage folks to think about it.

What would you do in the modern technological age with an invisible nuclear power source off a country where bad things are taking place? Here is another question... if you don't have a submarine to conduct operations, does that mean you have to fill that requirement gap with secret bases filled with spooks? Give it some thought.

The American people don't seem to understand that a smaller Navy offshore means more US presence on land inside other countries will be a required result to compensate for the lack of ships. The American people aren't alone in failing to see how this cause and effect activity takes place, because even think tank policy shops like the Center for American Progress are apparently unsophisticated enough in national security affairs analysis to figure out how lack of ships translates into other activities. Policy will be executed... one way or the other. That will never change without a massive overhaul of US foreign policy, and President Obama rejected the option to overhaul US foreign policy when his turn to make the choice came. It is a safe bet that future Presidents will maintain current policy as well. Frustrating..., but true.

KISSELL: OK. And Admiral McCoy, you mentioned a percentage of ships being deployed. And I know we had some charts here, and I probably - it's on there somewhere and I just missed it. But is there an optimum level that we operate against in saying this is the percentage that we would like to have deployed at any one time, in order to have the rest and retrofitting and everything else that we need going on at one time? Is there a percentage that we shoot for, or does it just kind of vary to tempo levels, or...

BURKE: Let me take that one.

KISSELL: OK.

BURKE: There are - first of all, there are about 12 percent of our forces forward deployed. In other words, it is home ported in Sasebo, Yokosuka, Japan or in Bahrain. So those forces are always forward, if you will. That number has essentially doubled over the last 10 years, effectively doubled, given the increase in forces forward and the decrease in overall forces. But 40 percent - so the 40 percent includes that. What we've done over the last several years is, by increasing those that are forward deployed, we have taken those that are rotationally deployed - those that deploy from Norfolk and Groton and San Diego and Hawaii go other places. We've taken that number and kept it the same, even though the force size is dropping. So where we are today is we're not at a sustainable level. Forty percent is not sustainable in the long term.

KISSELL: Is there a percentage that would be, you know, all things being equal, more sustainable?

BURKE: Well, in the submarine force, that number is about 22 percent.

KISSELL: OK.

BURKE: So 22 percent are forward at any one time.

This is a very interesting answer, and represents the kind of 'process model' answer the Navy isn't very accustomed to giving as an answer under oath. I'm curious if VADM Burke knowingly let slip this answer, because he may regret being bluntly honest (the Navy doesn't reward revealing their thought processes to Congress). Basically VADM Burke is admitting that as the Navy shrinks, more ships will have to be forward based in order to meet the deployment requirements. This is an even more curious issue because the Navy has already announced they intend to forward base several Littoral Combat Ships. The answer by VADM Burke raises a serious question just how far away the 284 ship Navy of today actually is from being able to meet the COCOM demand for naval forces?

The LCS program with it's dual crew model, modular engineering, and massive offshore maintenance infrastructure requirement is supposed to offer the Navy more deployment time than the ships the LCS replaces. So more deployment time + more forward based Littoral Combat Ships means the Navy is hoping to leverage the LCS as a way of meeting the COCOM demand that is currently being unmet with a 284 ship fleet. The real problem here though is that the argument VADM Burke is making makes it sound like even 313 or 324 ships wouldn't come close to being enough to meet the COCOM demands either, and that demand is being driven by US foreign policy.

I honestly don't know how Congress can read VADM Burke's answer and come to the conclusion that 313 or 324 ships is a legitimate number of ships to meet COCOM requirements when so many of the ships in that plan yet to be built (LCS) don't exist yet and are attempting to meet forward deployment requirements well above existing capacity for forward presence. From my perspective, COCOM demand seems to be suggesting the Navy has a quantity problem, while the Navy is busy focusing force structure on developing quality solutions which ultimately reduces the quantity of available ships to the COCOMs.

The way I read this answer, the Navy has a square peg (COCOM requirement), round hole (Navy Force Structure plans) problem that VADM Burke's comments contribute more skepticism towards.

KISSELL: And one other question, Admiral Burke, you talked about that, with aircraft, that there's a certain number of hours you get to fly them. And with the delayed delivering of the F-35 and the more hours that we're flying on the wings we have now, where are we heading to? Are we heading towards to the point we don't have the aircraft that we need? And how soon might we be there or the consequences - what do you foresee there?

BURKE: The delay and the arrival of the F-35 is a challenge for us. It will add hours on those other aircraft that we call legacy aircraft. It will add hours to them. And those hours are costly, particularly at the end of the aircraft's life.

KISSELL: And how many more hours do you think we have there? When are we going to reach the point where those lines start coming too close to each other?

BURKE: Well, we're addressing that now. We have a surface life assessment program and a service life extension program for our F-18s. And we're in the middle of actually assessing and extending some of those aircraft. So they're built as a 6,000-hour aircraft. And we're doing the engineering analysis. And we think we can get them to 8,000. And then there's additional analysis that's going on, to try to get longer life out of them. But there's only so far you can go.

The other thing we're trying to do in that regard is to add simulation time. So if we can simulate our hour as one cheap - if we can make if effective, we can reduce the hours on the actual airplane.

KISSELL: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask the admiral to give some more information on that and to kind of project where these lines may be going, because if we don't get the F-35 in and we can't get there, you know, how soon is that crisis point coming?

BURKE: I'd be happy to do that.

KISSELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FORBES: Thank you, Larry.

Everything about the Joint Strike Fighter stinks. Everything. It is time for Congress to start asking if a larger quantity of enhanced F-18E/Fs is a better value than the cost nightmare quality of the F-35C. I still support the F-35B - it is past time to replace the AV-8s, but someone explain to me how an aircraft carrier with 2 squadrons of F-35Cs and 2 squadrons of F-18E/Fs is better than an aircraft carrier with five 12-plane squadrons of F-18E/Fs supported by 2 squadrons of EA-18Gs. With 70 F-18 E/F/Gs, would the Navy save more money in procurement, maintenance, training, support, etc (every category) than they will by adding the F-35C into the mix? I think the numbers would be very close.

When quantity is less expensive than quality, something doesn't add up. If the X-47 can support the carrier based refueling role, then I no longer see the value of the F-35C on an aircraft carrier. JSF is the modern A-12, only no one will admit it. I still say the Navy would be better off modifying a version of the F-22 for naval operations to fill the intercept role than chasing the F-35C any longer - and even that radical idea could potentially be less expensive if the Navy is willing to accept 10-15% less capability in the navalized version of the F-22.

Regardless, the F-35C is a serious challenge and I just don't know how the platform fits the Navy anymore, particularly if it continues to get more and more expensive making the actual aircraft carrier expected to carry the JSF no longer affordable for the Navy.

Today's Hearings on the Hill

There are two House Armed Services Hearings today that might interest folks. I know I'll be watching both of them online.

Jul 12 2011 1:30 PM
The Evolution of Strategic Communication and Information Operations Since 9/11
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Rayburn House Office Building - 2118

Witness Panel

Ms. Rosa Brooks
Professor
Georgetown University Law Center

Dr. Christopher Paul
Social Scientist
RAND Corporation

Dr. Tawfik Hamid
Senior Fellow and Chair for the Study of Islamic Radicalism
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

This panel will either be fantastic or terrible, and there won't be room for much middle ground. US STRATCOM is in the dumps right now, as evidenced by the complete absence of STRATCOM for Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and more importantly - the general image of the United States globally. For example, when the German crowd started cheering for the US womens soccer team in the world cup game Sunday, it marked the first time in my living memory a foreign crowd cheered for the US during an international sporting event. We have an image problem.

IO is a very interesting topic, and a conversation I think Congress should jump into. Is it successful IO when the CIA runs a vaccination program to obtain Usama bin Laden's DNA? It might be, but hopefully the extent to which our nation can run Information Operations extends beyond our ability to scam foreign populations. Can IO be used to shape the movements of the bad guys? Our greatest fear is that information quality cannot be assured, but I often wonder how effective we are in placing doubt into the minds of our adversaries regarding the quality of their information.

Jul 12 2011 3:00 PM
How Does the Navy Get Ready, and Where are We Today?
Subcommittee on Readiness
Rayburn House Office Building - 2112

Witness Panel

Vice Admiral William Burke USN
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4)

Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy USN
Commander
Naval Sea Systems Command

It would be a wasted opportunity for Congress if they throw softball questions at this panel today.

Why are INSURVs classified? While it might be fair to classify some details, the idea that a result must be classified is a load of bull. Speaking of INSURVs, why does the Navy conduct INSURVs on $220 million ships but not conduct INSURVs on aircraft that cost almost as much? Does Congress even realize that the material of a P-8 squadron is probably going to cost more than the material of a Littoral Combat Ship Squadron? BAMS is going to be expensive too. Does the concept of Capital Asset need to be revisited in the 21st century?

Why isn't the Navy talking about the need for LCS tenders or more oilers for a growing fleet? Tell me why the Navy 313 plan added more quantity of ships but decreased the quantity of logistics ships? Oh, and in the process, the LCS consumes more fuel than the ships it replaces. The logistics of forward deployed LCS operations doesn't add up without adding more logistics ships, but the Navy isn't even discussing the potential need yet. Someone needs to raise the red flag, because the absence of even a generic logistics discussion for supporting LCS operations raises questions whether the Navy is being serious about LCS operations.

13 of the 31 currently overmanned ratings are in the aviation community. 6 of the 31 are in the Sea Bees. Roughead testified about reducing shore based infrastructure, is this what he was talking about? Ten years ago optimal ship manning and the disestablishment of the shore based maintenance activities for ships became the cost saving approach for the Navy. We have seen the results to the surface fleet as a result. It appears now it is naval aviation's turn under the axe. These are tough choices, and may be the best of the bad choices, but the Navy needs to explain it.

It is possible the LCS-2 issue will get some attention in this hearing. This really isn't a big issue as people suggest. Known problems with known solutions aren't the challenge for LCS, known or unknown problems with unknown solutions will be the LCS challenge. Those problems are coming, and may already exist. For example, a lot of people have made noise about the material condition of LCS-1 based on pictures. Stupid. They saved money primarily due to a late FY11 federal budget and decided these things will be addressed during the upcoming dock period. Good decision, I think. External corrosion isn't the challenge LCS has - the treatments plus shore maintenance support will prevent that from being a problem. The LCS corrosion issue is internal to the ship, including engine spaces. How does the Navy address corrosion inside the LCS hulls when most of that surface isn't treated for prevention and the crew simply doesn't number enough to deal with the issue while underway? The LCS is such a strange discussion, because my impression is people on the outside are always complaining about the wrong problems.

It would be a tragedy if the COBRA JUDY replacement didn't get some attention. The COBRA JUDY replacement encountered the same problems on sea trials that were identified on builders trials, and the government accepted almost all the spaces of a ship that failed acceptance. VADM McCoy told the Senate earlier this year these types of shipbuilding problems were solved, but the COBRA JUDY problems were announced the DAY AFTER THE HEARING he testified to the Senate the problems were solved. In other words, the Navy hides the ugly before giving testimony. It begs the question what news we will learn tomorrow that sure would have been useful for Congress in the hearing discussion today.

MARAD Is Selling the Superferrys

This makes no sense at all to me, except that when it comes to team players in government - MARAD is a bad teammate. MARAD is selling the Hawaii Superferrys, Alakai and Huakai, to the highest bidder. Here is how this is most likely to go down...

Some operator is likely to purchase the vessels, and sometime in the very near future the Navy will charter both vessels. The Navy will then pay $10-15 million more to company that operates those vessels than the Navy would pay if MARAD simply transferred the vessels to the Navy today. That is insane, but that is how all of this will almost certainly end up.

The US Navy is not big enough to turn down 2 high speed vessels they are only going to charter in the future anyway. The government owns these ships, what valid reason is there to give up ownership when the US Navy is currently buying similar ships new?

What should happen is the House Appropriations Committee should add language to the FY12 budget bill directing MARAD to transfer the two SuperFerries from Title XI holdings (bankrupcy) to the National Defense Reserve Fleet in a Retention Status with a militarily useful classification. That way the Navy can hold on to the two vessels until they can figure out where to get the money for upgrades and operations. There are all kinds of options really, simply forcing MARAD to reclassify the ships to recognize the fact that they are something useful to the military would be enough to salvage the situation, because if the vessels are in the NDSF fleet and militarily useful, then MARAD can not fire sale them like they are trying to do right now.

Congress is often highly critical of the military for lacking the flexibility to rapidly adapt to acquisition and procurement opportunities. In my opinion, the two Hawaii Superferry's present an opportunity for Congress to lead by example.

The link above is from the sales announcement listed in the Federal Register, and lists the details of both Superferry's. I don't know about you, but I can think of dozens of ways those two vessels could be better than an 85% solution for a great number of operational needs today.

Early Reaction to Mullen and Gates

The reactions to the testimony by SECDEF Gates and CJCS Mullen are already starting to pop up. This seems like a good place to start with a view from the minority: Congressman Hank Johnson's statement on the FY 2012 Department of Defense budget request is as follows:

Congressman Hank Johnson (GA-04), serving his third term as member of the House Armed Services Committee, released the following statement regarding today’s Department of Defense posture hearing with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen:

"I commend Secretary Gates for his courageous efforts to find savings in defense spending, which has skyrocketed to levels 36% higher (adjusted for inflation) than during the Vietnam era and is obviously unsustainable. Reining in defense spending while winning two wars and modernizing the force is no small task, but it is a critical task if we are serious about fiscal restraint.

The significant reduction in funds requested for war-fighting abroad in 2012 signals the Administration’s effective execution of the drawdown in Iraq. Timely victory and withdrawal from Afghanistan ahead of the unacceptably slow timeline outlined by military leaders would secure Secretary Gates’ place as one of the greatest Defense Secretaries in the history of the country. But unless the Administration can expedite the timeline for drawdown in Afghanistan, the Pentagon and the White House may find it difficult to maintain Congressional support for war funding."

Expect more reactions as the day goes on. Oh and btw, did you see how the House finally voted to cut the second engine for the JSF? This might end up being one entertaining session of Congress...

HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Appearance

Chairman Akin

Earlier this afternoon, I appeared on a panel before the HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee.  I was invited by Chairman Akin and Ranking Member McIntyre to participate in a closed discussion with members on a variety of subjects attending to Seapower.  As it was a closed session, I cannot go into the details, but I can state that being asked to appear was a personal and professional thrill. Thanks to our Blog-Meister Raymond for allowing me this platform from which to spout off.

Subcommittee staff gave me permission to post my opening remarks, and they are below, as prepared for delivery.  We were given 3-5 mins, and I think this took 2.

Bryan McGrath

------------

Good afternoon Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and members of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. My name is Bryan McGrath and I am a Defense Consultant. I spent 21 years on active duty in the Navy, and I retired three years ago. On active duty, I commanded a destroyer and I led the team that wrote current Maritime Strategy entitled ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower’. 

In this opening statement, I would like to make 5 quick points that I hope you will ask me to discuss during the question and answer period.

Point 1:  America is stagnating economically and directionless strategically, as our position of leadership in the world is increasingly challenged.  We have no discernable over-arching Grand Strategy for protecting and furthering our national interests, and we do not have a strategy to maintain world leadership in the face of rising challenges and our own lost initiative.

Point 2:  If we had such a Grand Strategy, it would have as its central component the conservation and renewal of our national power.  The natural, military component of such a grand strategy for a maritime nation would necessarily privilege Seapower, and to some extent, airpower.

Point 3:  Seapower is the most versatile and flexible element of military power in our portfolio, and it is the most efficient and cost effective, yielding powerful benefits in both peacetime and wartime.  No other element of military power can make a similar claim.

Point 4:  We spend a considerable amount on national defense, perhaps too much.  But it is spent inefficiently because it is not spent strategically.  Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have had half a dozen sweeping defense reviews during times of vastly different strategic challenges, yet base defense budgets have remained almost equally split among the three service departments.  Spending scores of billions of dollars to recapitalize the Army so that it can continue to fight counterinsurgencies—where it is always to the advantage of the other side to draw the conflict out—makes little or no sense in the face of the mounting strategic challenge that is our military and security competition with China.   Seapower will be at the center of that competition and Seapower must be more favorably resourced.  

Point 5:  Any re-balancing of priorities from land power to Seapower is unlikely to happen in a Pentagon beholden to the secular religion of Jointness, the paradigm born of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986.  Jointness values consensus over advocacy and cooperation over competition. Jointness on an operational level has made our fighting forces the envy of the world.  Jointness in acquisition shows great promise in fielding interoperable systems efficiently.  Jointness in doctrine development is a necessary pre-condition for operational excellence.  But Jointness applied to the creation of military strategy prevents hard choices and prioritization - the very elements that comprise strategy. 

Simply put, the Pentagon is incapable of making arguments that might privilege one element of military power over another, irrespective of the strategic sense such a move would make.  It is incapable because the system does not permit such arguments to be raised and taken seriously, and because raising such an argument would be detrimental to the career of any officer seeking to make it, irrespective of rank.  Therefore, I believe that the system for generating coherent military strategy is impoverished and broken.

Thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to your questions.