Continuing Resolution = Bad Governance

Defense News has four (here, here, here, and here) articles discussing the impacts of operating under the continuing resolution instead of getting a FY11 defense budget passed - the budget that was supposed to have been passed by October 1, 2010. It is the second quarter of fiscal year 11 and still no budget.

Bottom line, folks on Capital Hill need to get in gear and get last years budget done already - we are still fighting a war and nobody seems to care. There are serious repercussions if the Navy is unable to get a budget soon, starting with disruption to production lines. The 'no new starts' issue that comes with a CR is a big deal too, the inability to issue a contract for a Virginia class submarine last month can turn into huge delay costs if the budget doesn't pass.

Why the President isn't hammering the new Congress on this issue every day makes no sense to me. Why the Republicans in the House aren't hammering the Senate folks on this issue makes no sense to me. It is as if nobody wants to do the job of the folks who failed to do their job last year.

That hardly represents admirable leadership by anyone.

House Armed Service Committee - Subcommittee Assignments

U.S Rep. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-Calif.) and U.S. Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee, today announced the leadership and membership of the subcommittees for the 112th Congress.

Below are the subcommittees for the Armed Services Committee in the 112th Congress (listed alphabetically):

Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Republican Members (10)
Mac Thornberry of Texas, Chairman
Jeff Miller of Florida
John Kline of Minnesota
Bill Shuster of Pennsylvania
Michael Conaway of Texas
Chris Gibson of New York
Bobby Schilling of Illinois
Allen West of Florida
Trent Franks of Arizona
Duncan Hunter of California

Democratic Members (8)
Jim Langevin of Rhode Island, Ranking Member
Loretta Sanchez of California
Robert Andrews of New Jersey
Susan Davis of California
Tim Ryan of Ohio
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland
Hank Johnson of Georgia
Kathy Castor of Florida


Military Personnel

Republican Members (8)
Joe Wilson of South Carolina, Chairman
Walter B. Jones of North Carolina
Mike Coffman of Colorado
Tom Rooney of Florida
Joe Heck of Nevada
Allen West of Florida
Austin Scott of Georgia
Vicky Hartzler of Missouri

Democratic Members (6)
Susan Davis of California, Ranking Member
Robert Brady of Pennsylvania
Madeleine Bordallo of Guam
Dave Loebsack of Iowa
Niki Tsongas of Massachusetts
Chellie Pingree of Maine


Oversight and Investigations

Republican Members (6)
Robert J. Wittman of Virginia, Chairman
Michael Conaway of Texas
Mo Brooks of Alabama
Todd Young of Indiana
Tom Rooney of Florida
Mike Coffman of Colorado

Democratic Members (4)
Jim Cooper of Tennessee, Ranking Member
Robert Andrews of New Jersey
Loretta Sanchez of California
Colleen Hanabusa of Hawaii


Readiness

Republican Members (12)
J. Randy Forbes of Virginia, Chairman
Mike Rogers of Alabama
Joe Heck of Nevada
Austin Scott of Georgia
Frank A. LoBiondo of New Jersey
Chris Gibson of New York
Vicky Hartzler of Missouri
Bobby Schilling of Illinois
Jon Runyan of New Jersey
Tim Griffin of Arkansas
Steve Palazzo of Mississippi
Martha Roby of Alabama

Democratic Members (9)
Madeleine Bordallo of Guam, Ranking Member
Silvestre Reyes of Texas
Joe Courtney of Connecticut
Dave Loebsack of Iowa
Gabrielle Giffords of Arizona
Larry Kissell of North Carolina
Bill Owens of New York
Tim Ryan of Ohio
Colleen Hanabusa of Hawaii


Seapower and Projection Forces

Republican Members (11)
W. Todd Akin of Missouri, Chairman
Duncan Hunter of California
Mike Coffman of Colorado
Scott Rigell of Virginia
Tim Griffin of Arkansas
Steve Palazzo of Mississippi
Todd Young of Indiana
Roscoe G. Bartlett of Maryland
J. Randy Forbes of Virginia
Robert J. Wittman of Virginia
Todd Platts of Pennsylvania

Democratic Members (9)
Mike McIntyre of North Carolina, Ranking Member
Susan Davis of California
Jim Langevin of Rhode Island
Rick Larsen of Washington State
Joe Courtney of Connecticut
Chellie Pingree of Maine
Mark Critz of Pennsylvania
Hank Johnson of Georgia
Betty Sutton of Ohio


Strategic Forces

Republican Members (9)
Michael R. Turner of Ohio, Chairman
Trent Franks of Arizona
Doug Lamborn of Colorado
Mo Brooks of Alabama
Mac Thornberry of Texas
Mike Rogers of Alabama
John Fleming of Louisiana
Scott Rigell of Virginia
Austin Scott of Georgia

Democratic Members (7)
Loretta Sanchez of California, Ranking Member
Jim Langevin of Rhode Island
Rick Larsen of Washington State
Martin Heinrich of New Mexico
John Garamendi of California
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland
Betty Sutton of Ohio


Tactical Air and Land Forces

Republican Members (14)
Roscoe G. Bartlett of Maryland, Chairman
Frank A. LoBiondo of New Jersey
John Fleming of Louisiana
Tom Rooney of Florida
Todd Platts of Pennsylvania
Vicky Hartzler of Missouri
Jon Runyan of New Jersey
Martha Roby of Alabama
Walter B. Jones of North Carolina
W. Todd Akin of Missouri
Joe Wilson of South Carolina
Michael R. Turner of Ohio
Bill Shuster of Pennsylvania
Doug Lamborn of Colorado

Democratic Members (11)
Silvestre Reyes of Texas, Ranking Member
Mike McIntyre of North Carolina
Jim Cooper of Tennessee
Gabrielle Giffords of Arizona
Niki Tsongas of Massachusetts
Larry Kissell of North Carolina
Martin Heinrich of New Mexico
Bill Owens of New York
John Garamendi of California
Mark Critz of Pennsylvania
Kathy Castor of Florida

Comment: At first glance this is a good group with several veterans and some new faces. It will be interesting to see how this shakes out. The difference between a Presidents budget request and the final Congressional budget bill is usually so little it takes deep research to find changes, and never does one find substantial changes. Will that change under the leadership of Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-Calif.)? Probably not.

I will miss Gene Taylor, and I believe Todd Akin is still a relative unknown to most people. The reviews of Todd Akin's speech at Surface Navy Association were mixed. No one I know was able to get a hold of a transcript of the speech, and it was described mostly as red meat style tea party politics - the kind of speech one would give at a fundraiser rather than a speech given at a professional defense forum of officers expected to be apolitical. By all accounts it was more of a first impression rather than a lasting impression.

While my focus isn't entirely on the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee, most of my focus is. There are no wild cards in this list, and more importantly there is a lot of youth. That usually means two things: parochial questions in hearings and a lot of chummy relationships between the DoD and the HASC - at least until someone facing a contested reelection in 2012 gets burned or blindsided. To use a few political puns, there is a lot of change here, and until further notice - not much room for hope that statesmen and strategic thinkers will influence existing DoD policies anytime soon.

In the Spirit of Lies and Secrecy

I've been thinking about this discussion on Wikileaks by Glenn Greenwald all day. I was unimpressed with the personal attacks and respectfully disagree with several points, but in general I think that article makes several compelling arguments regarding the abuse of power behind the veil of secrecy, and might be one of the best contributions in support of Wikileaks in the discussion I have seen yet.

I particularly enjoyed the part where Bill Keller is thoroughly mocked, shamed, and disgraced. That alone makes the article worth reading.

These things were on my mind when I read Bill Gertz tonight.

The Obama administration, despite public denials, held secret talks with Russia aimed at reaching a ballistic missile defense agreement that Moscow ultimately rejected in May, according to an internal State Department report.

Disclosure of the report to The Washington Times comes as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Tuesday pressed for a new anti-ballistic missile treaty, warning that a failure to reach an agreement would trigger a new strategic arms race.

The four-page document circulated on Capitol Hill stated that administration officials held four meetings with the Russians and last spring presented a draft Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement (BMDCA) to Russian negotiators.

The internal report contradicts congressional testimony by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in June denying a missile defense deal was in the works.

So Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates lied under oath in testimony to Congress. This revelation carries almost no significance anymore though, because being dishonest under oath has become common place on Capital Hill and no one - ever - gets called out for it.

Whether you are the Secretary of Defense or a major league baseball player - committing perjury isn't enforced on Capital Hill. If the people who write laws do not enforce laws like perjury committed against them - then what exactly is the value of a nation that claims rule of law when the law is selectively enforced - and often excused - when the lawbreakers are the rich and powerful? Good thing US Navy Admirals never lie to Congress under oath.

Oh, wait, damn!

No problem, in the 21st century tradition of Navy accountability ashore - that particular Admiral was promoted.

Detail of Note: H.R. 5136 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011

Haven't really been able to follow the DC news on the House bill, so I am probably repeating something others have highlighted. I did think this was noteworthy though.

From the Obama administrations reaction to H.R. 5136 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011.

Decommissioning of Naval Vessels: The Administration strongly opposes the requirement to retain two ships - the USS NASSAU (LHA 4) and the USS PELELIU (LHA 5) - in service and to the specific limitation of decommissioning no more than 2 ships for every 3 ships commissioned. The Department is committed to replacing older, less capable ships that have become increasingly expensive to maintain and operate with ships better suited for current and future needs that will provide forces the capability to meet a wider range of Combatant Commanders’ requirements. Additionally, the Administration objects to Section 1022’s burdensome new notification requirements for decommissioning any battle force vessel of the active Fleet.

The Obama administration wants to retire Navy ships faster to save money, while the House bill looks at this specific issue to try and find ways to keep the Navy from shrinking too much. I'm going to watch from the cheap seats - but this is what I do know.

There is no way on planet Earth that some of the CGs or DDGs are ever going to make 40 years. No chance. Not only will they be retiring at a rate of 4-5 per year starting in about a decade, but several are going to have to retire early because they simply are not in good enough material condition to make it the full expected 40 year life.

A lot of people, including Secretary Gates, are focused on recapitalization of the Army following Iraq and Afghanistan. Great... so we can rebuild the Army to fight another land war in Asia?

Sorry, but if we are serious about a 21st century military, we need a better strategy that includes a smarter approach to affording both manpower and material while maintaining our edge in technology. We cannot afford a strong Navy and to recapitalize the now larger Army for the next land war in Asia.

Pick which one you want, because both isn't a legitimate option. Congress has the long view on this issue - the Navy is shrinking and new ships aren't coming very quickly. The administration, under Secretary Gates, has not given a long view in public testimony or speech. Gates is intentionally vague and rarely provides a clear vision in his speeches. I don't blame Congress for ignoring the recommendations of any administration that cannot provide a vision of force structure to match defense strategy - whether it was Bush or Obama.

This footnote in the House bill may be nothing, but it could also be a good starting place for a healthy debate regarding the future of the DoD.

FFs, LSDs, and PCs - OH My!

The excellent reporting in Inside The Navy (subscription only) has once again created the daily buzz, this time by quoting some comments by Gene Taylor during the QDR hearing on Feb 4th. Apparently Gene Taylor isn't happy that after 30 years of service, the Perry class FFs are going to be retired. These are the noteworthy comments.

“Expect language from this committee that says for every surface combatant you want to retire, you had best have two new ones in the budget,” Taylor said Feb. 4. “Because if you won’t do what is a logical thing to do on your own, then it’s going to take a congressional mandate to do it.”

The frigates slated for decommissioning are still usable, he noted.

“If those frigates are good enough to give to another nation, why aren’t they good enough to keep in the fleet for a few more years, particularly for a mission like piracy off of Somalia or keeping the small boats away from our ships as they transit off of Iran?” he said. “I would think they would be ideally suited. So why does it make sense to take a ship that’s good enough to give to an ally and retire it today if we need bodies out in the sea?”

I think it is a good idea to have a discussion in Congress on the Perry class frigates, because they represent an opportunity to address something that deserves more Congressional examination. Let me begin from the top.

Right Direction

I fully support the Navy's decision to retire the FFs once they turn 30 years old, which most of them will over the next decade. With that said, we have a bunch of ships that are over their half-life and in my opinion, the FFs represent an excellent opportunity to evaluate how effective a job the Navy is doing in maintenance. Let me explain.

Gene Taylor is advocating the FFs from the perspective that we should be using them in the 5th Fleet area of operations, half way around the world. The Perry class has not been built or upgraded significantly in the United States in years. I think Congress should have the Navy, under oath, give the Chairman a detailed walk step by step through the process of what happens when something breaks on a Perry class while deployed halfway around the world.

For example, lets pretend the USS Nicholas (FFG-47) is somewhere in the Indian Ocean and is having a serious engine problem. How many layers of "sea enterprise" does it take to identify the problem, get the part shipped out, and the part installed to resolve the problem - you know, without a tender or serious base support structure? Over how many days given the time difference does this process take? How many emails does it take because there is no bandwidth to use live video? How many people in Washington have to fill out forms for "reach back?" And when it is all said and done, how much does this process cost - before we pay for the part?

I ask these questions because I heard something recently that surprised me, and I'd be interested to hear what people think. If there is a problem in a deployed Burke anywhere in the world, it usually takes less than a week to resolve the problem even if they have to reach back to the original designer or contractor in the US through the reach back process, and the cost is usually relatively inexpensive, usually in the thousands.

But for a Perry class, I hear the cost of the same process is sometimes much greater. I'd like to know if that is true, and if so... why?

How expensive is it to operate Perry class FFs forward, because I'm curious if it is prohibitively expensive to the point we can explain why Perry's have not been utilized to any real degree for protecting shipping against attack - the primary mission the ship class was built in the first place.

Gene Taylor picks a hobby horse issue at the beginning of every budget year, and this year it is the frigates. I'm OK with that, but can he put Eric Labs or someone at GAO on the issue to dive into the cost of operating and maintaining FFs in the Indian Ocean so we can all work with some good information? It would be an important exercise, after all, isn't the longevity of the existing fleet of Burkes the most important issue for the Navy right now? Why not use the Perry class FFs to examine existing processes for maintaining ships to see if there is anything Congress should be looking closer at in regards to the Burkes. Older ship classes don't come along often as a good case study, and I think everyone would be interested to know how FF operating costs compare to say, estimated LCS operating costs?

Multiple Targets

I don't know what exactly has Gene Taylor focused on the FFs, but I think Gene Taylor is missing a real opportunity to beat on the Navy with the facts on behalf of his district.

Just in case you are wondering who the hardest working sailors in the Navy are, they currently serve on USS Bataan (LHD 5) and USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43). I would love to know how many days since February 3rd, 2009 those two ships have been to sea, because I bet that number is very close to 300 days. If you think about COMPUTEX in Feb 09, CERTEX in March 09, deployment from May 13, 2024 - December 8, 2009, then back to sea on Jan 14, 2024 through today in Haiti - both ships may be over 7000 hours underway over the last 53 weeks. As an editors note, when considering the recent leadership changes on USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), what the crew of that ship has been through over the last year makes problems on other ships throughout the fleet look really silly.

Consider the following. In 2008 there were seventeen ships from Atlantic fleet with more than 4,000 hours underway. I have not seen the numbers yet for 2009, so I am using the most recent I have. Lets consider a moment the ships:

USS San Jacinto (CG 56)
USS Hue City (CG 66)
USS Carney (DDG 64)
USS Gonzalez (DDG 66)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81)
USS McInerney (FFG 8)
USS Boone (FFG 28)
USS Dewert (FFG 45)
USS Simpson (FFG 56)
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)
USS Oak Hill (LSD 51)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)

• Two of ten Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 20%
• Four of twenty-five Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 16%
• Four of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 22%
• Two of six Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 33%
• Five of nine Atlantic Fleet PCs - 55%

For ships over 3000 hours underway in FY 2008, the breakdown is as follows:

• Five of ten Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 50%
• Thirteen of twenty-five Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 52%
• Nine of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 50%
• Three of five Atlantic Fleet large deck amphibious ships - 60%
• One of four Atlantic Fleet LPDs - 25%
• Three of six Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 50%
• Five of nine Atlantic Fleet PCs - 55%

In 2007 there were nineteen ships from Atlantic fleet with more than 4,000 hours underway. Lets examine them for comparison:

USS Anzio (CG 68)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Mitscher (DDG 57)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94
USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)
USS McInerney (FFG 8)
USS Underwood (FFG 36)
USS Klakring (FFG 42)
USS R G Bradley (FFG 49)
USS Hawes (FFG 53)
USS Bataan (LHD 5)
USS Shreveport (LPD 12)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Oak Hill (LSD 51)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)

• Two of eleven Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 18%
• Five of twenty-five Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 20%
• Five of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 28%
• One of six Atlantic Fleet large deck amphibious ships - 17%
• One of five Atlantic Fleet LPDs - 20%
• Three of six Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 50%
• Two of eight Atlantic Fleet PCs - 25%

For ships over 3000 hours underway in FY 2007, the breakdown is as follows:

• Six of eleven Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 55%
• Eleven of twenty-five Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 44%
• Ten of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 56%
• One of six Atlantic Fleet large deck amphibious ships - 17%
• One of five Atlantic Fleet LPDs - 20%
• Four of six Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 67%
• Five of eight Atlantic Fleet PCs - 63%

For ships over 3000 hours underway in FY 2006, the breakdown is as follows:

• Seven of twelve Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 58%
• Twelve of nineteen Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 63%
• Seven of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 39%
• Two of six Atlantic Fleet large deck amphibious ships - 33%
• Three of six Atlantic Fleet LPDs - 50%
• Three of seven Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 50%*
• Three of eight Atlantic Fleet PCs - 38%

*USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) plus USS Tortuga (LSD 46) adds up over 3000

For ships over 3000 hours underway in FY 2005, the breakdown is as follows:

• Four of thirteen Atlantic Fleet cruisers - 31%
• Six of twenty five Atlantic Fleet destroyers - 24%
• Eight of eighteen Atlantic Fleet frigates - 45%
• Two of six Atlantic Fleet large deck amphibious ships - 33%
• Two of five Atlantic Fleet LPDs - 40%
• Two of six Atlantic Fleet LSDs - 33%
• Four of seven Atlantic Fleet PCs - 57%

I think it is fair to say that there is a relationship between the number of hours a ship class is at sea and the demand for that capability. If someone believes this is an unfair assumption, please explain in the comments.

Now that we have some data, here are some questions for Gene Taylor to add to his FF concerns:

We have all heard about the problems with the San Antonio class LPDs. The USS New York (LPD 21) crew heard something that didn't sound right in the engine, and didn't know they were supposed to simply turn the engine off (not shutting the engine off caused a bigger problem on that ship). Why? How did virtual training as opposed to time working on an actual engine factor into this becoming a bigger problem? Is the Navy training our mechanics correctly? Is the Navy prepared to deal with problems when automation fails?

SUPSHIPS inspected and approved welds on the LPD-17 class, but we didn't hear about problems until many months later. Why? Why is it that when the Navy announced the LPD-17 problems, it was only the Program Manager of the LPD-17 program with reporters? When an entire class has problems, the best the Navy can do is send a Captain out to get shot at by the press? Where was VADM McCoy on this issue? Where was Allison Stiller? How extensive is the problem on DDGs anyway? This LPD-17 situation smells of either a cover-up or a cluster-fuck.

Allison Stiller has testified in front of the House Seapower committee many times claiming the problems in shipbuilding related to issues just like what has specifically occurred with LPD-17 over the last few months are being addressed - in fact she has made the same testimony for at least the last few years. How can she be so inaccurate in testimony on this issue for more than two years in a row? Why should anyone believe the Navy has fixed the problems 'this time?'

The LPD-17 program, built in Gene Taylor's district, has taken an enormous reputation hit because of repeated problems - several of which are not the fault of the shipbuilder. As a coincidence, the Navy is making several decisions that avoid building ships in his district - like pushing way out Command Ship replacements (which would use LPD-17 hulls) and limiting the number of amphibious ships to the bare minimum (and those are also built in his district).

At the same time, over the past several years (and I expect 2009 to be very similar) the frigates, LSDs, and PCs are consistently disproportionately at sea more often than cruisers and destroyers, and yet the Navy is looking to retire the frigates, build as few amphibious ships as possible, and has decided not to replace the PC rather just SLEP them. If new PCs are not a worthy investment in the future Navy, why is the Navy clearly using the hell out of the PCs in the current inventory?

Why is the Navy building Burkes for BMD if this is a temporary problem anyway, and there are better ways to address the issue. The Burke run from FY11-FY15 is cost neutral to the previously proposed DDG-1000 purchase, so there are no savings. They create less work for the yards, so there is no advantage to the industry. The ships will be fielded to the fleet too late to be part of the BMD system being developed - which is the ground based SM-3 system. They have no new technologies, so it isn't like a new capability is being gained. Modernization of existing DDG-51s is a quicker and less expensive approach to BMD. My point in asking these questions is to highlight that R&D investment for the Burkes is more important than actual construction right now, because if we expect these ships to be the future in FY16 and beyond, we have to find a way to get DDG-1000 technologies like integrated power into that hull. Failure to do that makes building the Burke the biggest waste of money in the DoD, and that is saying something.

The plan, based on my read of the FY 2011 budget, is to replace the high demand for the frigates and LSDs with Littoral Combat Ships and Joint High Speed Vessels. Is this a square peg and round hole approach, because on paper it looks like the Navy is giving up a lot of capabilities - not to mention survivability - in trade for the added capability of... tactical speed? What is the compelling argument to bet the farm on an unmanned systems capability that is tiny in the Navy today, and will run on a current sea based network that has extremely limited bandwidth even before the enemy adds extra tensions in wartime.

While Gene Taylor is worried about the aging and clearly heavily utilized FFs, he should expand his questioning to at minimum include amphibious ships and PCs, although there are so many questions for the Navy right now he could hold hearings until summer and still be short all the needed questions.

It is my hope that as part of his support for frigates he gets someone in the Navy to explain why the Perry frigates, built for merchant ship protection duty, are not out fighting pirates that are threatening merchant ships off Somalia. I have a feeling the answer is maintenance, and my hope is if Congress takes a closer look there they will see what an expensive mess it is to work within this top down managers logistics dream but operational level logistical nightmare - a serious problem that needs to be examined as the rest of the fleet ages.

Todd Akin and Secretary Gates on F-18

Secretary Gates doesn't talk about the Navy much. He should be asked more questions like this.

Something about this discussion bothers me. I am not, and am unlikely to ever be, a fan of the F-35C. As I was walking around the USS Midway Museum on Tuesday night I kept noticing all the one engine aircraft. The Navy has been down this road, and while lots of studies have been published by the aviation industry to prove single engine aircraft have only "slightly" higher crash rates than multiple engine aircraft, those studies never reveal how many multiple engine aircraft have had an engine failure and yet the aircraft is able to return home.

Lockheed Martin would like everyone to believe the F-35C is the future of carrier aviation. Many naval pilots would like to believe it. ADM Mullen would like everyone to believe it. Maybe, but the X-47B is a more likely choice. If the F-35A and F-35B are having serious problems, just wait until they start testing the F-35C seriously (which has not been done btw).

This "we need stealth aircraft" nonsense misses the point. The F-35C will never be stealthy if it is carrying a payload. Stealth, if it exists, will come from the magic of the EA-18G - and that is something nobody talking up the F-35C ever mentions.

Navy Times has a copy of the Navy 30-year aviation plan here (PDF). Is the report informative? I think it leaves a lot to be desired - like a detailed plan.

Latest FY 2011 Navy Plan Rumor

Tony Capaccio, who always gets brilliant scoops on Navy issues with Bloomberg, has found a copy of the Navy's new five-year budget plan. Some of the proposed cuts.

• SM-2 is reduced to 849 from 1,033
• JSOW-C is reduced to 1,879 from 2,663
• SM-6 is reduced to 637 from 688
• LW MK-54 reduced to 770 from 1,336
• ESSM will be boosted to 236 from 62
• Joint Tactical Radio is canceled
• EP-X replacement delayed
• MV-22 reduced to 132 from 150
• KC-130J reduced to 15 of 28
• 1 LHA(R) canceled
• All Mobile Landing Platforms canceled
• Both Command Ship replacements canceled
• JHSV is reduced to 9 from 11
• 1 Virginia class submarine canceled
• All FFG-7s retired 1 year early

This is the key point.

The service’s proposal to trim planned spending from 2011 through 2015 to $666.3 billion from $698 billion reflects Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s guidance calling for modest growth with emphasis on improving the security of nuclear weapons and upgrading the capabilities to conduct irregular warfare and cyber defense.

President Barack Obama assigned Gates to rein in defense spending, which now consumes about 19 cents of every dollar of the federal budget. Adjusted for inflation, defense spending has grown about 43 percent since fiscal 2000. When war costs are included, the number increases to 72 percent.

Budget cuts are hard, but observe the trends. Fewer Littoral Combat Ships, fewer JHSVs, cutting the Command Ships, and cutting the logistics fleet sea base ships means the Navy is cutting the bottom tier of shipbuilding to support the top tier. Cuts to the Command Ships in the information age suggests the Navy has become too reliant on communication networks in belief that the Virtual Admiral in Virginia or Hawaii can effectively command the fleet during war. While everything else can be legitimately debated as a priority alignment, cutting the Command Ships is a highly questionable decision I think.

The Navy is reducing the total budget $31.7 billion over five years through 2015, an average of $6.34 billion annually, by deferring or canceling weapons programs by $7 billion and cutting the shipbuilding account by $18 billion (an annual average of $3.6 billion). In other words, when it came time to reduce the Navy budget, shipbuilding took over 55% of the cuts! The shipbuilding budget only makes up 10% of the entire Navy budget at around $13 billion annually, but takes more than half the total cut? WTF? With priorities like that, it is legitimate to ask whether the Navy is a sea service, or a government jobs program. Congressman, next time any Admiral says 313 ships under oath, keep in mind the Admiral is knowingly being dishonest to your face.

At a time when we have recently stood up 4th Fleet and 10th Fleet, the shore based Flag staff bureaucracy continues to plow ahead with a cut of only $1.34 billion annually to the entire Navy and Marine establishment. The Navy needs to do some soul searching, and cut deep into the shore based bureaucracy. Some of those Flag commands have staffs that number in the thousands. It is time to move what can be moved onto ships, and reduce the bureaucracy footprint ashore.

It should be noted that one reason why the $1.34 billion cuts outside acquisition is probably so low is because this cut comes as the administration moves forward with expanding the Marine Corps by 22,000. It is likely that even with the $1.34 billion cut to personnel and readiness, that budget will be much higher in FY2011 than just a few years ago.

Dropping the Carrier Requirement to 10, 9, and Potentially 8

The big Navy news over the past week was the rumor, as reported by DoDBuzz, that the Navy is evaluating a further reduction of aircraft carriers to nine. This is how DoD Buzz reported the story.

File this one under QDR rumors, although senior OSD officials thought about cutting a carrier from the very beginning of the QDR. Now, sources tell us that OSD may actually chop an additional carrier from the Navy’s battle fleet, a move that would take the force down to nine carriers from the current total of 11.

The Navy plans to retire the CVN-65, the Enterprise, in 2012. The resulting 10 carrier force would be further reduced by one if DoD’s rumored reduction is enacted. Skipping a future carrier purchase doesn’t save money now. Cutting one flattop from the existing force would.

Some additional information in the story.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates endorsed the Navy’s plan to shift procurement of the new CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford class carriers from one every four-and-a-half years to one every five years. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost to build a Ford class carrier at $11.2 billion each; the Navy plans to buy 7 by 2038.

To be sure, there are plenty of obstacles to cutting a carrier from the fleet. For one, the Navy is required by law to maintain 11 carriers. The Navy has an outstanding request for a legislative waiver from Congress so it can retire the Enterprise, which would drop the carrier force to 10 for 33 months between the retirement and the scheduled entry of the first of the Ford class into service in 2015. Lawmakers have yet to act on the request.

There is some legislative activity to back up what is being discussed here. Section 1022 of the House Armed Services Committee Report (H.R. 2647) for FY 2010 would authorize a waiver to title 10 USC 5062(b) and allow the early retirement of USS Enterprise. This would give the Navy a temporary waiver to the requirement in section 5062(b) of title 10 to maintain 10 operational aircraft carriers instead of 11.

S. 1390 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee, is a bit more specific and states:

Notwithstanding section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, during the period beginning on the date of the decommissioning of the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN 65) and ending on the date of the commissioning into active service of the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), the number of operational aircraft carriers in the naval combat forces of the Navy may be 10.

The Senate language makes more sense, because it allows for problems with technologies like EMALS that may delay the USS Ford (CVN 78) without new legislation. Unfortunately, delays because of new technologies may occur with the USS Ford (CVN 78).

The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) was procured in FY2008 and is scheduled to enter service in 2015. As part of Secretary Gates announcement, CVN 79 would be procured in FY2013 (5 years later) and would presumably enter service in 2020 or 2021. CVN 80 would then be procured in FY2018 and would presumably enter service in 2025 or 2026.

The FY 2007 defense authorization act established a procurement cost cap for USS Ford (CVN 78) of $10.5 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. It also established a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford class carriers of $8.1 billion each, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. It is unclear what the cost impact of shifting the CVN 79 procurement date one year to FY 2013 (instead of FY 2012) and the CVN 80 procurement date by two years to FY 2018 (instead of FY2016) will be, but odds are very good this will increase, not decrease, the cost of building Ford class nuclear aircraft carriers. The Ford class is already suffering cost growth, and the full extent of what the total cost growth might be with many outstanding questions is still unknown. There does not appear to be many cost saving options available due to the US economic situation. With the Nimitz class, the Lincoln and Washington were ordered together and the Stennis and Truman were ordered together, and there were cost savings in ordering the carriers in pairs.

The inflation to shipbuilding combined with tough economic times appears to make this option unavailable to either Congress or the Navy, even though the savings would be in the billions of dollars.

One thing is absolutely clear though; any reduction in aircraft carriers below current planned levels does not appear to effect new construction of the first three Ford class. As the DoDBuzz report indicates, the Navy is evaluating other ways should a decision to reduce the aircraft carrier force to 10, or 9, be made. There is a dirty little secret though, the operational aircraft carrier number will already drop to 9, not 10, long before the Ford enters service.

With an understanding the USS Enterprise will be retire in 2012 at a healthy age of 52 years old, lets look at the 10 Nimitz class aircraft carriers.

• USS Nimitz (CVN 68) was commissioned May 3, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2025.
• USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) was commissioned October 18, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2027.
• USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) was commissioned March 13, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2032.
• USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 70) was commissioned March October 25, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2036.
• USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) was commissioned November 11, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2039.
• USS George Washington (CVN 73) was commissioned July 4, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2042.
• USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) was commissioned December 9, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2045.
• USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) was commissioned July 25, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2048.
• USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) was commissioned July 12, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2052.
• USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) was commissioned January 10, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2058.

Each Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carrier requires what is known as a refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH) after ~23 years of service. RCOH is a complex and expensive 3 year maintenance that costs almost $3 billion (see interesting analysis by Tim Colton) and is mandatory for Nimitz class aircraft carriers, as the nuclear fuel requires refueling. As of last week, the Navy paid a huge chunk of the RCOH cost for the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 70). The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) would begin her RCOH in 2012 and be unavailable until 2015, the same period the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) will be retired. This is why there will actually be only 9 operational carriers.

It is important to note that with the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) unavailable from 2012-2015, the Navy will actually be down to 9 carriers already with the retirement of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). I have not seen any detailed public discussion of this operational loss of aircraft carrier availability to 9, even public discussion in Congress was fairly weak when the questions about Enterprise were asked this year. The Navy has suggested that adjustments have been made to account for the loss of the Enterprise, but it is unclear what that means for the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). After the Lincoln emerges from RCOH in 2015, USS George Washington (CVN 73), commissioned in 1992, would then begin RCOH in 2015, roughly ~23 years after commissioning per schedule and be unavailable under current plan until 2018. Presumably after that, USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) would begin RCOH in 2018, ~23 years after commissioning, and emerge back into service in 2021. With CVN 79 expected to enter service in 2020, under current plans the Navy would then have 12 aircraft carriers by ~2020 (2 Ford class and 10 Nimitz class), with the Stennis in RHOC thus unavailable, but the Navy would still be back to the current legally mandated 11 operational aircraft carrier requirement.

One of the ideas I have heard floating around is to retire the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) early instead of undertaking a RCOH, which wouldn't influence current short term plans since USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) is expected to be unavailable from 2012-2015 anyway. When the USS Ford (CVN 78) enters service in 2015, the Navy would then perform a RCOH on USS George Washington (CVN 73) from 2015-2018 and perform the planned USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) RCOH from 2018-2021. From the period when CVN 78 enters service until CVN 79 enters service, the Navy would maintain 10 aircraft carriers, but 9 would be operational available while 1 was continuously undergoing a RCOH.

In 2021, as CVN 79 enters service, the Navy would then conduct the RCOH for the USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) from 2021-2024. Upon emergence from RCOH, the USS Nimitz could be retired and the Navy would stay at 10 operational carriers. In 2025, CVN 80 will come online bringing the total to 11, but the Reagan will be due for her RCOH and be unavailable from 2026-2029, and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) is expected to retire in 2027, so the true operational carrier number would again drop to 9 until 2030, when the number will return to 11 with the return of Reagan and CVN 81 entering service.

The USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) will get her RCOH from 2032-2035 and the retirement of USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is scheduled for 2032, so that will drop the Navy back down to 9 operational carriers from 2032-2035 if a Nimitz class was retired early, but with the return of Bush and the CVN 82 entering service, the Navy would be back to 11 by 2035. In 2036, the Navy will retire Roosevelt but CVN 83 will be in service by 2040. Washington retires in 2042 and Stennis in 2045, but CVN 84 would come into service by 2045, so with the retirement of Stennis the operational number of carriers would level at 10, dropping periodically to 9 with the retirements of Truman (2048), Reagan (2052), and Bush (2058) but presumably bouncing back to 10 with CVN 84 (2050), CVN 85 (2055) and CVN 86 (2060).

I've even heard the number 8 operational carriers bounced around, under a more aggressive retirement plan (but the plan would sell it as 9 operational carriers, by always counting carriers in RCOH as operational). In addition to the early retirement of Lincoln in 2012, the Navy would retire the Truman early in 2021 when CVN 79 enters service. This would allow cost savings in the early 2020s when the Navy must build SSBN replacements at the same time they attempt to replace the cruiser force.

The dirty little secret though is that with the retirement of USS Enterprise (CVN 65) in 2012, the number of operational aircraft carriers will actually only be 9, because Lincoln is scheduled to refuel from 2012-2015, the same years Congress is making the exception for the Enterprise. Given that 9 is acceptable just 3 years from today, and will remain 9 from 2012 until CVN 79 enters service around 2020, it is not unreasonable that the QDR could make 9 the new number long term. The Navy already intends to use fuzzy math and count Lincoln as operational while in RCOH, suggesting they are meeting the legal requirement of 10, so realistically the Navy could retire both Lincoln and Truman by 2025 and still maintain a quasi legal number of 9 as DoD Buzz is reporting.

Personally, I think the whole idea of retiring aircraft carriers early is a terrible waste of resources. Beforef retiring nuclear aircraft carriers, perhaps the most flexible warship in the world, I'd like to see the Navy use the RCOH of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) and USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) and turn them both into massive mobile Sea Bases, one for each coast, and replace everything from the proposed sea base aviation ships to the hospital ships in the current plans. The nuclear aircraft carrier is the most flexible warship in the world, I'd encourage Congress to capitalize on their flexibility before allowing them to be retired early. Simply using them for something other than supporting the carrier airwing will immediately save costs, and refitting them while removing fixed wing carrier aviation support will allow a lot of other crew savings. I don't know how many helicopters the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne division can put on 2 aircraft carriers, but I think it would be a useful exercise to find out.

I find it hard to believe any platform in the world could be a better Joint Sea Base enabler than a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. Instead of giving up such useful platforms, I'd like to see them used for something else before retired outright. It would be a tragedy of Congressional imagination to simply give up such useful platforms, indeed, it took Congressional action to insure the Navy used the retiring SSBNs in alternative ways in the 1990s - and I'd say that encouragement has paid off very well in the form of the SSGN. Hopefully, should budget require adjustment to the CVN force, Congress takes the same approach with any Nimitz class aircraft carriers suggested to be retired by this administration, and turns them into something imaginative and useful at a reduced cost instead of simply retiring them from service.

Webb Follows Through

The debate whether to move a nuclear aircraft carrier to Mayport, FL has been consistently challenged by Virginia Senator Jim Webb, who is opposed to losing a CVN in from his home state of Norfolk. Typical political stuff right? Well, Webb's argument has been that the money could be better spent, and follows a line of thinking that strategic basing on the East Coast is not as convincing an argument as it is on the West Coast. It should also be noted that Senator Webb has supported funding to dredge Mayport to allow CVN access, which means the decision to base a CVN in Mayport will continue in the future.

The strength of Senator Webb's argument has been that the money should be used for other things, specifically Navy shipyards. It is no wonder then he is touting the decision by the GAO to investigate the funding shortages of the Navy shipyards.

The Government Accountability Office has agreed to investigate the shipyards, operated by Naval Sea Systems Command, after a July 13 request by Webb and seven other senators. The Navy confirmed in May that it had a $1.3 billion backlog in work and upgrades for its shipyards, part of broad funding problems earlier this year.

Webb and other Virginia lawmakers were concerned that if the flow of money dried up to Hampton Roads-area shipyards, the business would have to lay off their skilled employees for lack of work. After a visit Friday to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Webb said he also was worried about what he called “the yard’s aging facilities and its worn-out infrastructure.”

“The GAO’s commitment to investigate the material condition of our nation’s four naval shipyards is a necessary first step to ensure that we are allocating resources adequately and responsibly,” Webb said in an announcement. “The Navy’s four public shipyards play an essential role in enabling the fleet’s operational availability and mission success.”

While it is easy to buy into Senator Webb exercising control in this case to support his political agenda, it is very difficult to ignore that he has a good point. The GAO and CBO have been highlighting with consistency the financial problems the Navy is facing, and analysis from just about everywhere continues to point out ship depot and maintenance activities at the Navy shipyards are critical to sustaining the existing fleet to their full service lives. This goes beyond the widely reported INSURV issues, it specifically addresses problems related to dealing with unexpected damage like what happened to USS Port Royal (CG 73).

I for one would much rather see the funding for Navy shipyards shored up before worrying about whether Mayport needs a carrier. The Mayport issue is more political for both Virginia and Florida than it appears strategic from the Navy's point of view, while the shipyard funding issue is absolutely vital to sustaining the fleet.

The Debate to Arm Merchant Ships

The AP has an article discussing the debate to arm merchant ships. It begins by noting that France has put soldiers on Tuna boats in the Indian Ocean, and Belgium is offering soldiers for its ships moving through the Horn of Africa region. There is already some concern that these moves will increase the level of violence off the Horn of Africa, which is a legitimate debate. While piracy is at the highest point in recorded 'modern' history off the coast of Somalia, very few people are killed by the actions of pirates. Given all the ammo used against merchant ships before pirates actually get on board a ship, it is hard to tell if this is in large part due to sheer luck or not. After all, it isn't like one can pretend a bridge that has been shot, of which several merchant ships have had, is done in hopes no one is hurt. There are also several injuries and deaths associated with piracy, and can never be claimed to be nonviolent.

Following Maersk Alabama, Congress is trying to take action but there are still several concerns what to do. First the AP report.

In June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an amendment that would require the Department of Defense to put armed teams on U.S.-flagged ships passing through high-risk waters, specifically around the Horn of Africa where Somali pirates have become a scourge of world shipping.

The amendment now goes to the Senate. A separate bill introduced last month would grant immunity from prosecution in American courts to any "owner, operator, time charterer, master, or mariner who uses force, or authorizes the use of force, to defend a vessel of the United States against an act of piracy."

Both measures face tough debate — U.S. military resources are spread thin and onboard weapons, especially in the hands of civilian crew, are seen as an extreme option.

Last month I had the pleasure of chatting with Captain Gordan Van Hook, U.S. Navy (Retired), who now works with Maersk Line, and several Navy officers who are involved in the discussions surrounding these various concepts in Congress. The only thing that emerges in discussing the issues involved with the various people involved is that there is no clear consensus.

Of all the various issues though, what strikes me as wrong headed thinking is that the Navy is trying to disconnect themselves from the responsibility of putting their people on merchant ships in the guardian role. Of all the various possibilities that could result from the debate, that the Navy doesn't want their people engaged seems first and foremost, wrong headed.

It seems to me that if you start from the position the US Navy assumes the responsibility of protecting ships, then it becomes much easier to articulate the level of legal protection necessary to be articulated by Congress in laws passed. Just as Congress has had to manage legal issues surrounding Air Marshall's, it seems to me that Congress should also be able to manage the legal framework for Sea Marshall's.

But the real reason I believe the US Navy should get involved, probably in conjuction with the other maritime services, is because I see this as an opportunity to collect intelligence and expand the picture of the operating environment. Interestingly enough, Captain Gordan Van Hook, U.S. Navy (Retired) discusses one such possibility in the latest issue of Proceedings.

The Department of Transportation's Volpe Center, a developer of marine traffic management systems, saw the potential for AIS to comply with recent U.S. government direction to achieve maritime domain awareness. Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe (CNE) had been linking the surveillance systems of NATO allies to provide an unclassified common operational picture of the Mediterranean Sea. Using AIS to complete this picture, CNE and Volpe developed an unclassified network to share AIS data, known as the Maritime Safety and Security Information System that quickly enhanced awareness for maritime security forces. However, AIS has limitations, as it can be easily spoofed or altered or can malfunction to provide erroneous information. Professional mariners treat AIS as only one fallible piece of data, and they constantly scan the horizon visually and electronically to confirm their surface picture.

What if maritime security forces could access this correlation and comparison of a ship's AIS with shipboard sensors? Recent experiments by Maersk Line, Limited and Lockheed Martin used a prototype AIS and radar correlator known as "Neptune" that sent data via satellite to a network that could conceivably be used by a maritime operations center. This system revealed thousands of contacts outside the range of shore-based AIS, as well as anomalies that did not match AIS. Such information could greatly enhance regional maritime awareness for commercial vessels and maritime security forces in unstable regions.

These systems could gain widest acceptance if they become available with minimal technical and financial investment. Built on IMO-sanctioned standards, they should not be considered intelligence or surveillance systems, but rather safety systems providing vital situational awareness, greater coordination of efforts, reduced risk of collisions, and identification of high-traffic and congestion solutions through analysis and simulation.

Maersk seems to be a great place to start, and by putting some sailors on the ship, the US Navy can help develop this type of system in real world operations off the coast of Somalia with people to test, manage, verify, and maintain as necessary the new system and integrate it into CTF 151. Even better, we secure the system by placing armed naval personnel on the ship to do exactly that. This type of system, in theory, would allow every US flagged ship (beginning with the Maersk Line ships) be a connected node of the MDA network off Somalia.

The idea that the US Navy is against using US Navy personnel to protect US flagged ships screams wasted opportunity, and quite honestly suggests the US Navy does not take its role for the protection of US shipping very seriously. A US flagged ship with US Navy personnel on board represents an opportunity, and quite frankly I have a hard time believing Maersk Line would be against the US Navy adding not only this type of AIS network, but also allowing the Navy to use UAV systems to give better maritime domain awareness to their ships. It doesn't have to be a big UAV like a ScanEagle, although the way Boeing has touted the latest ScanEagle launch and recovery system as lightweight and mobile, there is no reason it couldn't be either.

When the US Navy is, with its right hand, using the argument they don't have enough ships to effectively manage the piracy problem off Somalia, then with the left hand refuse to provide any additional operational support to protect US ships from piracy except deploying their biggest or newest ships, I think it can legitimately be claimed the problem is attitude, not capability.

The political support to protect US shipping should be, from the US Navy perspective, seized as an opportunity, but I don't see the US Navy trying to exploit this opportunity at all. Part of the suggestion may leave the impression that Congress is trying to militarize US shipping, but the analogy is like saying the Mayor of Chicago should not support the Chicago Police Dept. We know piracy is active in that region, the insurance premiums for shipping through that region reflects that reality, so why not add protection.

And if the US taxpayer is going to add protection, why not explore as per Captain Van Hook's suggestion adding capabilities to that protection that assist US Navy operations instead of just being a burden on resources? I think there is opportunity here just waiting for some clear eyed and resourceful Navy officer to commit some intellectual rigor towards, because I think once that starts... good things will happen.

Regardless, tactical evolution from the other side is just weeks away, the Monsoon season is about to end. I hope our tactical evolutions are ready too...

What Military Stimulus Looks Like in 2009

I'm just not sure how I feel about this.

Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Southwest awarded EPC Corporation of Glendale, Ariz. a $1.2 million Recovery Act funded contract June 15 for sanitary sewer improvements at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, Ariz.

EPC Corporation will perform the improvements to the existing sanitary sewer system at various locations throughout MCAS Yuma. This project will include cleaning and photographing of the existing sewer mains, repair of the indicated segments using a pipe-bursting method or a cut and cover method of installation, construction of new manholes, rehabilitation of existing manholes, provision of a temporary bypass pumping of sewage, reconnection of service laterals, restoration of the construction site, and traffic control.

It could be said that when it comes to the Recovery Act and military spending, this official Navy news article gives perspective to what it means when Congress gave stimulus money to the DoD.

Insert analogy (or joke) here about flushing money down the toilet with the Recovery Act funds. I'm not saying the the work won't help Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, Ariz., but I remain skeptical whether we had our economic (not to mention strategic) priorities right with the enormous amount of spending that was done with the Recovery Act.

Avoiding the World’s Largest Helicopter Carrier

“I am concerned about the EMALS program for the next aircraft carrier. As the Secretary knows well, I recently visited the production facility and was favorably impressed; however, failure of this one system to deliver on its promises means we are building the world’s largest helicopter carrier. I would like the Secretary to address what additional oversight and continuity of oversight he envisions for this program."

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, Chairman Gene Taylor, Hearing on the Navy FY10 Budget Request for Shipbuilding Programs, May 15, 2024

Back in February I began hearing bad news from several places that EMALS was in serious trouble. The post was immediately attacked, because I apparently don't know anything about anything because I did not provide precise details of the problem. It is July, and EMALS has been widely reported as a problem both in Congressional hearings and in various media stories, and yet, still no precise details exactly what the EMALS problem is.

I have been critical of several freshman in the House this year, primarily accusing them of acting like freshman members of the House (parochial issues only). Apparently I missed graduation, as I was very pleased to come across this Chris Cavas article quoting questions from freshman Rep. Eric Massa (D-NY) (a 24-year retired Navy CDR SWO) discussing the EMALS problems.

"What happens if it doesn't work?" he [Eric Massa] asked.

"The technology now is critical to the ship," replied Architzel, who detailed the Navy's steps in reviewing the program but did not mention an EMALS alternative.

"I say again, what happens if it doesn't work?" asked Massa.

"We have every expectation that it will work," replied Architzel.

"With all due respect," Massa asked again, "what happens if it doesn't work?"

"With all candor, if that new system will not work … we will have to make sure it does work," Architzel said.

After noting that no similar system is in use by any navy, Massa, a former professional staffer on the House Armed Services Committee, spoke directly to Architzel, sitting only a few feet in front of him.

"I will state for the record that I was against the Navy shifting construction to the Ford class and taking such a large leap of technology," Massa declared. "I think it is a bridge too far with exceptionally high risk.

"I am exceptionally concerned about the inability to extract an answer to the simple question of what happens if it does not work. … the reality is, we have just bought the world's largest helicopter carrier."

You know, "world's largest helicopter carrier" is no longer just a phrase used once thanks to Rep Massa, now it is a slogan... and that is not good.

Speaking to a reporter after leaving the hearing, Massa noted his concern extended beyond the carrier program.

"This actually goes to a larger subset than just EMALS," Massa said. "Across the library of the Department of Defense, we have committed ourselves to taking leaps in the second and third generations of the next great technologies without any fallback positions.

"This is bigger than EMALS. This is about maintaining a carrier strike force that can answer the nation's requirements. We are already accepting an aberration … as to the number of carriers we can maintain on active duty by accepting the early retirement of the USS Enterprise. If [the future USS Gerald R. Ford] is delayed, it has exceptionally significant impacts on our carrier strike force.

"The fulcrum of delay is the electro-magnetic launching system," Massa continued. "The decision has been made to go to Las Vegas, put the Navy's life savings on the crap table, and roll the technological dice. We've never done this before."

Well sir, you were elected because previously elected officials had a really terrible record of oversight so far this decade, so it is only natural that you are going to take the sheets off the bed and discover a few dirty little secrets that tell the story of what business has been like prior to your election. For the Navy, given the state of shipbuilding, can you (or anyone) really say you are surprised? Until Congress, both the House and the Senate, develop some way of enforcing accountability into the system, nothing is likely to change.

Now back to EMALS for a second... since most of you didn't believe me back in February when I discussed the looming problem in EMALS no one else was discussing at the time, there is probably no point in believing me now when I suggest the yet to be publicly discussed Plan B may be just over the horizon.

Just saying...

SASC Cuts One Ship For FY2010

The SASC cut one of the T-AKEs, reducing the total ships for FY2010 from 8 to 7 citing concerns over the Sea Base concept. The House funded 2 T-AKEs, so this will be settled in conference.

One would think the Senators would be more concerned with the small size of the logistics force, of which the T-AKE contributes to with or without the Sea Base...

See the full details of the SASC markup at DODBuzz.

The Senate Hearing Thursday

Next week I intend to expand on the topics covered in Thursdays 2+ hours of Senate testimony by Secretary Ray Mabus (PDF), Admiral Gary Roughead (PDF), and General James Conway (PDF). If you haven't see the hearing or didn't follow it, the links above are to the testimonies and you can watch the entire Q&A video on the Committees website. This post represents some initial reactions, obviously with tons of details to follow.

For the most part, I have avoided discussion of the FY 2010 budget discussion until this point. I was left with the sense in April that the decisions by Secretary Gates regarding the Navy framed a direction forward, but the most important result of the decisions made by Gates in the Navy discussion was the way ahead regarding DDG-1000. That decision all at once removed the allbitross of the shipbuilding discussion from the neck of Admiral Roughead, and in my opinion he has been brilliant in the public ever since. Amazing what happens when he doesn't have to answer the same question asked 100 different ways every time he goes into public. I have watched many hearings with Admiral Roughead giving testimony, in my opinion Thursday he was at his best.

I think General Conway is underrated. He is clearly one of the most impressive leaders in the armed forces of this generation. The Marines are at war, have been consistently engaged since 2001, are in the process of growing the size of the Marine Corps, are emerging with still new technologies like the MV-22 that adds range and speed to the operational campaign, thus drastically changes how the Marines deal with the logistics and other challenges that come from such dispersion. They have as of this budget increased the planned size of the amphibious fleet to 38 ships, while also adopting new force structure changes including the establishment of the SC MAGTF. The Marines remain committed to fundamental core capabilities like amphibious assault, are embracing new doctrines like counter-insurgency, and yet the Marines are still adapting doctrine to leverage new capabilities with Sea Basing. Many of these changes are significant, and individually could create major problems to any large organization, and yet the Marine Corps according to General Conway is doing just fine thank you.

General Conway is doing one damn fine job in my opinion, and cannot be praised enough for the achievements the Marine Corps has made under his leadership.

I thought Ray Mabus did fine. Clearly he still has some learning to do on the shipbuilding, maintenance, and operational topics when fielding questions in testimony, but he was better than I expected him to be on the personnel issues, and fielded the mental health question very well.

Piracy

Roughead emphasized the operational security environment as the Navy's focus, and had nothing to offer as a service to US flagged ships. This answer appears to be a reflection of political policy. There are several ways to look at this conclusion, but for me it means the Obama administration is who is on the spot for the safety of ships right now, not the Navy. The DoD's role for the safety of US flagged ships, based on the testimony I heard and even Senator Webb's comment on the subject, is that piracy is a political issue not a DoD issue. It should be noted that on the piracy issue, Webb also made a comment that gave a clear nod to the Navy that being lethal when necessary, that being lethal is a good thing and aligns well to US policy. Sending messages regarding the dangers involved in piracy is the strategic communication strategic aim.

Maintenance

I hope the media starts asking more questions about the life-cycle management programs for fleet maintenance, because this might be the most important program ADM Roughead has established as CNO. It is noteworthy ADM Roughead mentioned the Virginia class as not only a model for how to design ships, build ships, and reduce cost of ships... but it turns out the Virginia class is also the program being used to scale estimating life-cycle management costs. The back log of maintenance facilities on the east coast and the funding short falls are impacting the Navy in a bunch of ways at a cost slightly less than $500 million. For me, the #1 issue towards achieving a fleet with a floor of 313-ships is fleet maintenance and modernization, not shipbuilding.

Shipbuilding

The number of amphibious ships now numbers 38. The LSD will reuse the hull form of the LPD-17, meaning a total of 27 LPD-17 mods will be built. I couldn't be more pleased seeing this stated in testimony. The future Command ship will be built on either the LPD-17 hull form of the T-AKE hull form. Roughead said many times the LCS is "where we will get our numbers" when discussing the LCS, so in his mind it is 55 or bust for the LCS. I never once got the sense any ship smaller than the DDG-51 is on his chalkboard. Roughead credited R&D for reducing the costs of the Virginia class, noted a budget increase for R&D for the rest of shipbuilding (have not confirmed this in the budget, need to do some homework), and cited R&D as a reason the Navy is moving forward with the SSBN(X) now instead of later.

I thought Roughead actually had a good answer to a question regarding how the Zumwalt translates into future ships. He discussed the DDG-1000 new technologies and cited the integrated air defense and BMD technologies of the DDG-51 and said that both will drive towards a cruiser replacement. That answer, for me anyway, gives some purpose to the three new DDG-51s and three new DDG-1000s, but I have a bunch more to say on this topic in detail later.

TacAir

This issue was clearly the one most discussed, specifically the fighter gap. I thought Senator Claire McCaskill was quite entertaining with her forceful approach, and did everything but wear her Boeing T-Shirt to the hearing. I have so much to say on this I'm afraid if I start, I'll write all night, but let me say that I had a problem with the way ADM Roughead talks about this issue in the context of the QDR.

ADM Roughead kept discussing how the QDR will evaluate the fighter shortfall of TacAir platforms by accounting for TacAir in all services to define the requirement. This is the issue with that answer, if the number of tactical aircraft the other services need carries influence for the number of tactical aircraft the Navy needs, then that would imply the total number of aircraft carriers is still under review, and a reduction below 10 aircraft carriers is legitimately on the table.

Why would the number of TacAir platforms in the Air Force matter in the Navy fighter shortfall discussion if Air Force TacAir can't land and take off from aircraft carriers? Isn't the numerical requirement for Naval TacAir determined by the number of aircraft carriers? If not, how is the requirement determined?

ADM Roughead suggested IOC for a N-UCAS program will be in 2020s.

Obviously there were many other issues discussed, including Ballistic Missile Defense, Mayport, and even a nod towards the issue of nuclear power for future ships. In my opinion, FY 2010 budget looked and sounded like the FY 2009 budget with only very minor differences. There was a lot of focus on the China, North Korea, and Iran scenarios, and while I could have missed it, I never heard anything regarding Green or Brown water challenges.

Congress Gives Roughead an Opportunity

A handful of House lawmakers are playing hardball with the Pentagon regarding the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. No question about it, this is a political trap for the Navy. It is also an opportunity.

From Phillip Ewing at Navy Times.

Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., and seven other Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee have filed a “resolution of inquiry” directing Defense Secretary Robert Gates to file a shipbuilding plan.

Forbes’ “resolution of inquiry” is unusual because the Armed Services Committee has only 14 legislative days to consider it before it goes to the floor of the full House — as opposed to a standard resolution, which might sit in committee for months. The full House can reject the measure, but its quick timetable is a way to bring the issue to Congress’ immediate attention.

If it was me, I would submit the same 313-ship plan as last year only reflecting the announced changes Gates has made to date. The result will be another hit for credibility in shipbuilding in the press cycle (hopefully more than one), which is the desired effect. Nothing has been more discredited than the 313-shipbuilding plan, so unless the Navy is going to try to achieve something within the next 2 weeks with this political game, just reset back to yesterday and keep looking towards tomorrow.

If I was advising ADM Roughead, I would find something related to the 313-shipbuilding plan that was signed by Donald Rumsfeld and Admiral Mullen and submit it to Congress with the FY2010 plan. I would do this for specific reasons though.

First, it is time for ADM Gary Roughead to send a clear message who has the helm. If ADM Roughead is going to be man the helm, he needs to put the 313-ship plan in context, which means associate that plan with Rumsfeld and ADM Mullen. I do not care about the sensitivities involved with ADM Mullen being CJCS. The 313-ship plan was his plan, that is just a fact, let him defend it, or even shit on it like everyone else already does. The 313-ship plan was his vision, not ADM Rougheads. ADM Roughead is taking the Navy a new direction and everyone, including these Congressman, know it. If they want to know where we are, do so by first reminding them where we are.

Second, the 313-shipbuilding plan is poison, so to submit it sets expectations of poison, which is a good thing right now. I have a great deal of faith in the men and women engaged in the QDR process. Just in case you haven't heard, or for you industry folks looking for a tip, change is coming and it isn't minor polish on the edges, it is the real deal. I have made it clear that you better read Bob Work (PDF), Frank Hoffman, Robert Rubel (PDF), and CDR Henry J Hendrix. If you haven't been listening, then it is time to do your homework.

Finally, this development gives the Navy leadership a chance to turn a problem into an opportunity. Shipbuilding is the albatross of the Navy discussion right now. The Chief of Naval Operations could barely give an interview before April when Secretary Gates announced his decision regarding the DDG-1000/DDG-51 way ahead, which is revealing in that it highlights just how the single issue of shipbuilding has all but shut down the leadership of the Navy in terms of public credibility and communication. If the QDR process is going to produce significant changes to the Navy's shipbuilding plan while also aligning itself to the maritime strategy, then the Navy can submit an old plan while positioning itself for strategic surprise with a new one.

If done right, that may be just the thing for the CNO to position himself to ask Congress for bit more money for shipbuilding, which everyone in the entire world knows is a necessity if the US Navy is going to remain strong and the US Shipbuilding industry is going to remain afloat.

What Do You Suppose That Means?

What do you suppose Rep. Gene Taylor (D-MISS) meant when he said this:

“It now appears the Navy has learned how to deflect criticism of the shipbuilding plan: Don’t submit one,” Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., said during opening remarks at a hearing held by the House Seapower subcommittee, which he chairs.

“Although required by Title 10 of the United States Code, all plans for future years’ ship procurement are being withheld from the Congress,” Taylor continued. “This obviously makes it very difficult for the members of this Congress to fulfill their Article I responsibilities to ‘provide and maintain a Navy’”

Speaking sternly, Taylor twice said his next line: “If the Navy chooses not to submit a shipbuilding plan, Congress will.”

That last part was not mentioned in Rep. Gene Taylor's prepared opening statement, rather was ad hoc during the session on Friday. I have no idea what it means.

I will add one point. From time to time we see Congressmen breathe fire at the military services, but we never really see any smoke (even when someone gets burned). I don't know what it means that Congress will make a 5 year shipbuilding plan, but I don't see this having any meaningful influence over this years budget, or next, or any actually.

Still, an interesting comment nonetheless.

Coast Guard remarks on piracy

RADM Salerno appeared before a Senate subcommittee yesterday to discuss piracy. He covered a lot of ground and a lot of what he said meshes well with the administration's approach to piracy. Out of the gate he stressed the breadth of the CG's international agreements and this is probably going to be their biggest contribution to the fight.

These agreements underpin a wide range of Coast Guard operations including counter-drug, migrant interdiction, fisheries enforcement, and Proliferation Security Initiative missions. The Coast Guard understands the domestic and international legal frameworks and the associated boarding and enforcement requirements necessary to ensure the successful negotiation and implementation of agreements to facilitate counter-piracy operations on the water and the delivery of legal consequences to the pirates ashore.

Since the administration favors the law-enforcement tack, these agreements can offer a starting point to begin accomplishing something in the legal realm with respect to piracy. After so many pirates have been released because of jurisdictional issues, it's important that we start building the multilateral agreements necessary to successfully prosecute them. This is an explicit benefit of the CG's dual role as military and law-enforcement.

While the Navy has the statutory authority to go after pirates and more than capable when it comes to assault, the CG teams detached to these ships in CTF 151 and elsewhere have the procedural experience when it comes to international crime that is going to be really important when these guys are tried in a Western democracy. Salerno rightly says a lot about the strength and importance of this particular partnership.

He also touched on something else that has been popping up in ADM Allen's remarks recently about the threat small vessels represent.

Small vessels are the vehicle of choice for pirates to conduct their attacks. These vessels are fast, readily available, relatively inexpensive, and blend in well with other small vessels commonly operating in the area.

Smaller vessels have been the vehicle for pretty much all maritime mayhem in recent memory including the bombing of the Cole, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard incident last year and you could even include the Chineese fishing boats recently. Small boats also represent the largest maritime threat on the domestic front too. When I heard Allen point this out for the first time I was dumbfounded how simple the connection was. Simple as it may be, there is no comprehensive solution to this threat here, in Somalia or anywhere and they know it.

As the piracy cases off Somalia have illustrated, there is a continuing need for maritime domain awareness - the ability to detect, classify,, and identify vessels at sea. We need greater awareness of maritime activities around the world, as well as along our coastlines, for both safety and security purposes.

There are some tools available that I'll discuss in a later post but as it stands now it's a vulnerability we have to live with for the foreseeable future. The law enforcement approach to piracy might be appropriate now but it won't do anything to remedy the larger threat in the long run. That's going to take a sizable coalition and they're smart to start floating this idea and get the discussion started even though they don't have the answer.

Statement of US Rep. Gene Taylor on the DDG-51/DDG-1000 Agreement

Things are moving quickly. Hang on...

April 7 2009, (Washington, DC) - In order to meet the Navy’s requirement for a 313 ship fleet, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead, proposed reducing the number of DDG-1000s Zumwalt-class destroyers and restarting production of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

The Navy has been working with Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics, the two builders of the Navy’s destroyer fleet, to reach an agreement on future surface combatant workload within the shipbuilding industry.

Under the agreement, the Navy would restart construction of DDG-51s at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, and General Dynamics would build three DDG-1000s at its shipyard in Bath, Maine.

The Navy’s decision to reduce the number of Zumwalts is based on affordability and the ship’s vulnerability to emerging threats.

The DDG-1000 is estimated to cost $5 billion per ship and the cost per DDG-51 is estimated to be $1.3 billion. Therefore, the Navy could get three DDG-51s for the cost of one DDG-1000.

The Navy will realize additional cost savings through economies of scale in constructing larger numbers of DDG-51s in series production, rather than three or less DDG-1000s. The Navy will also realize savings in leveraging its existing training and logistics pipelines for its current and future DDG-51s.

The reason that this is good news for the state of Mississippi is that Northrop Grumman will begin building the first two DDG-51 restart ships beginning in 2010 and they will continue building these ships over the next decade. Whereas, General Dynamics will build two or three DDG-1000s at most, stop production, and then restart their DDG-51 line.

I think Northrop Grumman made the right decision. They will continue to build the world’s most capable destroyer at a fair price to our citizens for many years to come. By agreeing to the DDG-1000-DDG-51 swap, Northrop Grumman is aligned with where the Navy sees its future.

Sounds like the deal is done. I agree with everything Gene Taylor is saying, and I would add it looks like the destroyer debate that began in the House last July just ended.

By my estimate, the huge winner is... Gene Taylor (D-Miss), who is without question the most important politician for the US Navy, because without his support on this issue no deal would ever get done.

Interesting times. I can't wait to see the budget, which appears to include 2 DDG-51s and the rest of the funding for DDG-1002 in FY 2010.

Skelton, Tauscher Statement on North Korea Missile Launch

Reproduced in full:

Washington, DC - House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-MO) and Strategic Forces Chair Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) released the following joint statement concerning North Korea’s missile launch:

“We strongly condemn North Korea’s test of a long-range ballistic missile. The test is a provocative action and a clear violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, which expressly prohibits North Korea from conducting further ballistic missile launches.

“We call on North Korea to cease any further ballistic missile launches and return to the Six-Party talks without any preconditions. We will support President Obama’s efforts to work with the international community to appropriately address North Korea’s actions.

“North Korea’s ballistic missile capability is a threat to the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies in the region.

“The House Armed Services Committee has worked for many years to ensure that we have fully funded critical near-term missile defense systems, such as the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, based in Alaska and California, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system.

“Finally, we have continued to push to make certain that our missile defenses are sufficiently tested so that we have a high degree of confidence that they will work if needed.”

Gates is rumored to be dissolving the Missile Defense Agency tomorrow. Interesting times.

Wal-Mart Called, They Want Their Yellow Smiley Face Back

The House Appropriations Defense subcommittee held a hearing on Wednesday with Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Ships and Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources providing testimony. As I understand it, the hearing was open but apparently very few reporters actually attended, after all, there is no budget to discuss right? John Murtha attended, and he asked some very good questions.

Emelie Rutherford has a report out on Thursday in Defense Daily (subscription only) discussing the hearing. In particular, she is reporting on some questions John Murtha apparently "peppered" those giving testimony on the topic of EMALS. The answers are very interesting (emphasis mine).

"We're looking at all options," said Allison Stiller, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for ships. "There has been cost growth to the EMALS system. We're looking at the total cost of acquisition and life cycle for EMALS and steam. We're looking at the schedule and what does that do if we went back to steam...(and how that would impact) the CVN-78 (schedule)."

"(We're) in the process of getting information from industry so that we can make an informed decision," she added. "We've had independent technical looks at it within the department."

Cost Growth? Steam?

At yesterday's hearing, Stiller said the cost-and-schedule comparison data is being prepared by Northrop Grumman [NOC] Shipbuilding Newport News, which last September was awarded a $5.1 billion contract to build the next-generation aircraft carrier CVN-78, the Gerald R. Ford.

Murtha asked if the EMALS issues will slow down work on the CVN- 78. Stiller replied that the Navy does "not see that it will have an impact on the actual schedule of the carriers at this point."

How is it even possible a 100,000 ton ship with a certified design already cutting steel is apparently facing problems so severe that the potential to redesign towards steam is real enough to mention in testimony, and yet there not a schedule issue?

Allison Stiller goes on.

"There's a lot of rigor we want to go through for component testing, so that we understand the reliability of components, as well as system testing," Stiller said. "We're in the component-testing phase right now. We have seen minor issues in testing which we've been able to resolve. But there is some concern (regarding) schedule....One of the things we want to evaluate going forward is if the development (stage) is still ongoing, how do we mitigate the risk to this carrier schedule so that that doesn't hurt it. Right now we don't see it impacting the carrier schedule."

Adm. Barry McCullough goes on to give the Navy's official line.

Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources, told Murtha that the Navy has determined cost growth with EMALS has not exceeded lifecycle savings the advanced system is expect to generate because of factors including reduced personnel requirements.

McCullough said the Navy's current plan is to "continue with the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System."

"That's going to be briefed to the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead) and the acting (Navy) secretary here in the next week to 10 days," the admiral said.

VADM McCullough is right about the massive savings potential the Ford class carrier will have over the Nimitz class. With the intended design that includes EMALS, the Ford class CVN cost savings will be enormous. If we look at manpower alone, if the Navy saves $75,000 annually on the 2000 additional crew members alone, and 75K per sailor annually is being conservative, the life cycle savings in manpower alone is around $7.5 billion. Add in the excessive wear on the aircraft caused by steam catapults and the energy- absorption system for aircraft landings, and the Ford class has enormous potential to save on operating costs.

To review the odd series of answers given in testimony, there has been cost growth for EMALS. This was apparently not revealed in the opening statement, rather was admitted only when EMALS was asked about directly by John Murtha. The exact or even a ballpark figure for the cost growth was apparently never given, but given the options discussed, clearly the cost growth must be enormous. Allison Stiller testifies that the Navy is "looking at the schedule and what does that do if we went back to steam," yet apparently doesn't believe that the problem with EMALS that could result in a redesign to steam "will have an impact on the actual schedule of the carriers at this point."

That doesn't make any sense to me. How is that even possible? Is she expressing faith, dishonesty, or ignorance regarding how conflicting this combination of statements is?

If the ship has to be redesigned for steam, the ship will have to be redesigned not only for the launch system, but also to address the new landing system that is dependent upon EMALS as well. Not only that, you have to redesign the ship for more people, account for the changes to weight and balance, and who knows how many sections of the ship are going to need new plumbing, cooling, and water breaks that comes with a redesign for steam. One would expect this also requires a design change to the nuclear reactor, you know, since that is where the catapults would get the steam from. EMALS is gigantic, with three 80,000-pound motor-generators required for each of the four catapults, which consumes an enormous amount of the Ford class design.

How is it possible the Navy believes EMALS can be interchanged for steam without any impact to schedule? It isn't possible, it isn't even probable, which raises questions regarding the intent of the statements.

In what world does it make sense that a problem is so serious, and apparently so expensive that redesigning a 100,000 ton aircraft carrier for steam catapults AFTER construction has already begun is an option being seriously considered, and yet, the schedule for the ship is just fine? The cost growth for EMALS must be pretty high if the Navy is seeking input from industry on the cost and schedule impact of switching to a steam catapult. What is really telling though is that if the Navy has already actually got to the point where they are weighing the cost and schedule impacts of the redesign, including leveraging both the industry team and an independent internal analysis as described in the Defense Daily article, it becomes very clear that the expenses of the undisclosed EMALS problem is going to be very high.

I still have not heard of any specific problem with EMALS. What I do hear is the EMALS system described as a science project, and it simply doesn't work yet. It will be interesting to learn the results of the briefing Vice Adm. Barry McCullough suggests will be given to the CNO "in the next week to 10 days."

My take from the testimony is that the cost growth for EMALS is very high, and the delay options are not good regardless of whether the Navy changes to steam catapults or waits for EMALS. I also think that when John Murtha figures out he was essentially given a whirl in the Navy spin cycle, he is going to rightfully be upset about it.

Wednesday was the wrong way for the Navy to begin FY 2010 budget discussions. The new SECNAV has a lot of work to do. I would suggest starting by promoting an atmosphere of honesty and transparency before someone in Congress gets really pissed off.