A 2012 DoD Definition of Redundancy

Happy New Year! I am not up on current events, so expect my posting over the next very many days to be of stuff that is not always fresh (as in current events), but fresh as in something I finally read. With a hat tip to Pete Speer for emailing me this article, lets start the 2012 conversation already!

So I'm reading this article by Bill Sweetman and Paul McLeary from Aviation Week dated Jan 6, 2012, and it starts off informative enough, but I have highlighted for the audience in bold where the discussion becomes something that is really enlightening, I think...

“We have run out of money, so now we must think,” remarked U.S. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Philip Breedlove during a presentation on the emerging Air/Sea Battle concept in July. It’s becoming a common saying. The military is not in its current predicament by accident. Poor performance—programs years or decades behind schedule, costing too much to acquire and costing far too much to operate—has helped drive almost every military in the world to make pious sounds about “doing more with less” while doing exactly the opposite.

For the first time in a decade, the Pentagon is going to have to budget, rather than just spend. This not only means some programs will have to be removed from the procurement ledger, but new weapons programs will have to cap development—and perhaps more importantly, sustainment costs—significantly.

At the Credit Suisse/Aviation Week 2011 Aerospace and Defense Conference in New York in December, Shay Assad, the Pentagon’s director of defense pricing and acquisition policy, tried to assuage some fears defense contractors have vocalized about their potential profits now that the Pentagon is going on a diet. Assad said the Pentagon is making an effort to use the promise of profitability “to motivate contractors to reduce their cost structures.” To track this effort the Defense Contract Management Agency is adding more than 350 experts in cost estimating: If costs can be more accurately predicted up front, everyone will enter an agreement with the same realistic expectations.

Wow! Where the hell is the pride in ones work? WHAT THE *^%*! That folks, is an issue of military integrity, and it highlights that the Pentagon is unable to do this work effectively themselves. Why? I think civilian and uniform leadership needs to answer that question, and I for one would love to hear the answer.

So the Pentagon apparently can't do this part of their job, but no worries, they will now go hire 350 private sector experts. The DoD might as well have hung a huge banner outside their building that reads...

"We suck at our jobs, so we're hiring others to do it for us!"

And yes, this is a military integrity issue. Why can't you do your job effectively? What prevents you from doing your job accurately? Did you or did you not get trained to do you job... at taxpayers expense? 350 private sector experts, all of which will be 100K+ jobs if they are actually "experts", means we need to spend at least $35 million to hire private sector experts to do the jobs of public sector employees that apparently can't do the jobs they were hired and trained to do. It's 2012, and money is tight. The nation can no longer afford ineffective civilian and military leadership doing contracting for the Defense Department.

This is, unquestionably, a leadership issue and one that raises serious questions about the integrity of the military. Accountability? Prove it. Based on everything in testimony and media reporting lately, the entire concept of 'accounting' in any context fled the DoD long ago.

....

By the way.... hey Bill, Paul, why the picture of the DDG-1000 with the article? Looks like an editorial mistake to me, because you highlighted a picture of one of the few good programs while discussing the problems other programs are having. Not cool boys, you guys are much smarter than that, unless the cheap shot at the Navy was intentional.

TMI

From today's DoD contract announcements.

PAE Government Services, Inc., Arlington, Va., is being awarded an $87,621,822 modification under a previously awarded cost-plus-award fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (N33191-07-D-0207) to exercise option four, which provides for base operating support services at Camp Lemonnierand forwarding operating locations, i.e., Camp Simba, Manda Bay, Kenya. The work to be performed provides for general management and administration services; public safety (harbor security, security operations and emergency management program); ordnance; air operations (airfield facilities and passenger terminal and cargo handling); supply; morale, welfare and recreation; galley; housing (bachelor quarters and laundry); facility support (facilities investment, janitorial, pest control services and refuse services); utilities (water, waste water and electrical); base support vehicle and equipment; and environmental. The total contract amount after exercise of this option will be $379,157,194. Work will be performed in Djibouti, Manda Bay, and Kenya, Africa, and is expected to be completed by March 2012. Contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Europe Africa Southwest Asia, Naples, Italy, is the contracting activity.

A few rules. First, I don't want to hear about your sex life, it's just too much information. Second, I don't want to read about contracts for forward operating bases used by special forces near Somalia in the contract announcements.

Less is more people, less is more. Carry on.

The Stark Realities of Defense Contracting

Davida Isaacs and I have an article at The American Prospect on intellectual property, Iron Man 2, and defense contracting:

Explosions, tattoos, and Scarlett Johansson notwithstanding, the disputes between Tony Stark and his antagonists revolve around ownership of the rights to the Iron Man technology. Iron Man 2 is the most expensive movie ever made about an intellectual property dispute.

Thoughts on Thursday

This Vanity Fair article on Erik Prince is very interesting. Despite being one scary as hell dude, I always thought Erik Prince was interesting because he owned a company of iconic status in history. Who knew that Erik Prince himself was iconic and the real deal Hollywood action hero for the US government? It really is too bad he has become yet another covert American agent exposed, because anytime any American covert agent is exposed in public it does not do any favors to the American people. I imagine his global access and reputation made him very useful to the CIA, but I also think that he was intentionally exposed for reasons that go well beyond party politics.

With a hat tip to Joshua Foust for informing via Twitter, this TPMMuckraker article is informative, but irrelevant and perhaps a bit stupid. The writer of that article is too blinded by politics to make a good point with his useful information, because when Justin Elliott starts complaining that the government is paying $5 billion for 104,100 contractors in Afghanistan, all he does is reveal how he has never undertaken any business venture or enterprise beyond his own opinion in his entire life. Work doesn't get done without people Justin, you should try undertaking a task bigger than the Christmas party at your local newspaper before complaining how work gets done in the real world.

He has done good research though, and has useful information in that article. According to his data, the average cost of a contractor in Afghanistan, according to my math, is somewhere around $48,000 if $5 billion annually is spent on contractors. That is really damn good actually.

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was intended to distribute $787 billion to create and save 1.6 million jobs. Do the math, that is $491,875 per job. If we note the Afghanistan war cost as a government jobs program, the Presidents new troop surge plan is the most successful government funded private sector jobs program of the Obama administration to date.

What I don't understand though is why people are worried about ~105,000 contractors in Afghanistan when the entire strategic purpose of the "new plan" is to raise an Army of over a quarter million soldiers in one of the most dangerous parts of the world. When the strategic point of the Presidents War Policy is to raise and fund a brand new Army of over 1/4 million troops in Asia, worrying about the number of contractors on government payroll to support our own Army seems more than a little trivial.

Five Interesting Contracts

There were five very interesting contracts yesterday.

The Boeing Co., Seattle, Wash., is being awarded a $109,098,924 advance acquisition contract to procure long lead materials in support of P-8A low rate initial production (LRIP) I aircraft, and production line slots in support of P-8A LRIP II aircraft. Work will be performed in Seattle, Wash., (87 percent) and Baltimore, Md., (13 percent), and is expected to be completed in Dec. 2013. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-09-C-0022).

We need that!

The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Mo., is being awarded a $45,433,000 ceiling-priced, undefinitized contract action to provide persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (UAV) services in direct support of Operation Enduring Freedom land based efforts. Work will be performed in Bingen, Wash. (65 percent) and St. Louis, Mo. (35 percent), and is expected to be completed in Dec. 2009. Contract funds in the amount of $22,716,500 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-2. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-09-C-0050).

Is this the ScanEagle over Iraq?

Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, Portsmouth, R.I., is being awarded an $8,676,152 firm fixed price delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement to provide intermediate “I” level support equipment used for the AN/AQS-22 Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS), including reeling machine test benches, reeling machines and reel and cable assemblies. This equipment will support a variety of maintenance and testing tasks on the ALFS system aboard the MH-60R. Work will be performed in Johnstown, Pa., (90 percent) and Portsmouth, R.I., (10 percent), and is expected to be completed in January 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $3,000,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, N.J., is the contracting activity (N68335-07-G-0005).

We are starting to see the Romeo's and Sierra's deployed in numbers. This is the good news story of NAVAIR I should probably discuss more. Sure a medium lift RW asset would be great, but I'm very pleased with the Romeo's and Sierra's to date. Very flexible and capable helicopters.

Raytheon Co., Integrated Defense Systems, Tewksbury, Mass., is being awarded a $6,928,056 Task Order 0001 Phase 1A under a cost plus fixed fee, indefinite delivery indefinite quantity order contract for the preliminary design of a 100-kw class Free Electron Laser (FEL) device which can be used to demonstrate scalability of the necessary FEL physics and engineering for an eventual MW class Free Electron Laser device. The Office of Naval Research is the contracting activity (N00014-09-D-0353).

The Boeing Co.,. Directed Energy Systems, West Hills, Calif., is being awarded a $6,922,312 Task Order 0001 Phase 1A under a cost plus fixed fee, indefinite delivery indefinite, quantity order contract for the preliminary design of a 100-kw Class Free Electron Laser device which can be used to demonstrate scalability of the necessary FEL physics and engineering for an eventual MW class Free Electron Laser device. The Office of Naval Research is the contracting activity (N00014-09-D-0354).

OK I'm interested, who wants to educate the rest of us on these mine hunting lasers?

Legacy of the 87

Two weeks ago the Coast Guard commissioned the last of the 87-foot Marine Protector patrol boats and by any measure this was a hugely successful product line. So I thought it would be appropriate to discuss the extremely important role this humble boat had on the state of today's Coast Guard and how it laid the foundation for successful modernization.

From the start the 87 was on-time, on-budget and, most importantly, operationally capable. Powered by two Mercedes MTU diesels, the 87s have a top speed of 25 knots. When this contract was awarded in 1996, only the 110-foot PBs were faster at 28 knots. These two classes went a long way towards ensuring the CG's habit of under-powering ended after years of being under-funded (I've heard quite a few sea stories about siphoning gas from the grey-hulls back in the "old guard.") In all seriousness, the struggle to eliminate the idea of "doing more with less" from the CG culture continues today. The procurement of the 87 was a glimpse of the future in this respect.

Among other innovations, the 87s were the first cutters to incorporate a stern-launch. This makes small boat evolutions safer than with traditional over-the-side launch and allows the RHI to be deployed in a higher sea-state. This, however, was not the main intent of the design team. With a crew of ten, someone is almost always sleeping. They hoped to reduce crew fatigue by reducing the number of people required to launch the boat down to 2. This thinking turned out to be a bit too forward as operators justifiably felt it was important to have all hands on deck in case of an MOB.

It's also important not overlook the fact that the 87 is crewed by just 10 or 11, and sometimes less. Yet these boats can perform almost every function a larger cutter can. They also had the capability for mixed berthing. Many more afloat billets were available to female coasties because of these coed boats.

One of the reasons the platform was so innovative was input from the fleet. A large group of operators, mostly from other PBs, were brought in to lend their experiences and shape the requirements for the procurement even before the contract was awarded and were an integral part of the project well through it's first sea-trials on choppy San Francisco Bay. A similar group was formed in the successful response boat-medium project.

Also, full size mock-ups were made to limit redesigns after construction had started. As a result, the spaces are intuitively laid out (they were able to coax a full 360-degree view from the bridge) and there were minimal mods once the welding had begun or after being put to sea.

Probably the largest part of the 87's success is because it was based on a proven platform. It was a Dutch design that had been adopted by the Brits and successfully used for fisheries in the English Channel. CG Acquisitions (CG-9) calls this a "parent class" design and it has become the standard for major procurements as already noted on ID.

This all bodes well for the fast response cutter going into production that just happens to be an established Dutch design and almost all of the successes of the 87 were incorporated. The parent-craft concept obviously works and probably made it easy for the GAO to uphold the decision to award the FRC contract to Bollinger (who also happened to build the 87s.)

Thankfully, RADM Blore (CG-9) is gung-ho when it comes to the parent-craft concept and has repeatedly stated his preference for an OPC parent-craft design. This project is particularly important due to the state of our large cutters (WMEC/WHEC) - more than half were built in the 60s and 70s, none built later than the 80s and we can only expect 8 or so NSCs.

Even though this situation is less than ideal, we'll be able to manage the problem with both the FRC and OPC likely to come online with minimal delay because they are being built on a foundation of success. Credit is due to CG leadership for recognizing the solution to their procurement problems was as simple as reusing designs and not falling prey to notions of sexy, first-in-class designs. Though maybe as much credit is due to the team that guided the 87 project.

ONR Does Guns

Anytime ONR has a gun contract, I'm interested. From yesterday.

The Institute of Advanced Technology at University of Texas, Austin, Austin, Texas, is being awarded a $9,129,778 cost plus fixed fee contract to perform railgun assessment including laboratory testing and scalability between small and medium scale launcher, pulsed power assessment and conceptual prototyping and assessment of electromagnetic railgun contractor development items including advanced containment launcher and pulsed power systems. This contract contains options, which is exercised, would bring the contract value to $12,063,851. Work will be performed in Austin, Texas, and work is expected to be completed Jan. 31, 2012. Contract funds in the amount of $10,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured under the Office of Naval Research Broad Agency Announcement Number 08-001. The Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Va., is the contracting activity (N00014-09-C-0187).

How much power does an electromagnetic railgun take? I'm assuming a small launcher needs less than a medium or large launcher, but how small could small be.

I'm just wondering if an electromagnetic railgun could ever work on something like the LCS. What do ya think?

Looks and Smells Like a Mafia

Remember that GAO protest about AEGIS work we've discussed a bit on the blog? Basically Raytheon isn't happy the Navy is issuing nothing but sole source contracts on AEGIS work to Lockheed Martin, and is protesting with the GAO to get some of the work. They should, every decision made right now in the Navy gives the impression of an AEGIS mafia, a term I'm sure none of us have ever heard used before.

The Navy is trying to have Raytheon's protest thrown out. This is quite diplomatic, in a bulldog kind of way.

The Navy rejected Raytheon's arguments in a strongly worded motion to dismiss filed October 22 with the GAO, the nonpartisan congressional agency which rules on federal contract disputes. A heavily redacted version was obtained by Reuters.

"The Navy properly determined that only Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors is capable of performing its requirements because Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems failed to respond adequately to the Navy's requests for information regarding its ability to meet the government's requirements," the Navy said in the response.

The Washington Post article expands on that point.

"Raytheon IDS squandered that opportunity, however, choosing instead to disregard the Navy's request for further information, and renewing its speculative promise to assemble a national team" that was to include Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics , the only other company that had expressed interest in the Aegis upgrade work.

Then we get to the heart of Raytheon's argument, which I guess the Navy doesn't quite understand very well.

The Navy also said a team including Lockheed, Raytheon and General Dynamics would be "fundamentally anti-competitive."

But such a move would not be without precedent.

When Raytheon won a contract to develop the combat system for the new DDG-1000 destroyer, the Navy ordered it to give Lockheed a share of the work, and Lockheed ultimately wound up with about a 40 percent share of the work.

So in the opinion of the Navy, sole-source contracts are not "fundamentally anti-competitive" but cooperative work between the big contractors would be "fundamentally anti-competitive," except in the case of the DDG-1000 where part of the radar system was shared with Lockheed Martin? Is it out of bounds to ask if this is a silent Vern Clark backlash by the Navy? Seriously...

The article goes on to note the following is in the report:

The Navy said Raytheon had offered no evidence that it had negotiated agreements with the other companies, and it had no reason to believe that Lockheed, the sole developer and integrator of the Aegis system, would agree to such a deal.

So the Navy is blaming Raytheon for not trying to negotiate with Lockheed Martin for AEGIS work? Who the heck is issuing the contracts? I don't know if that is article spin, as it is a summery of the redacted report, but that would be an odd argument...

Except the whole PR war on Raytheon is odd to begin with. Virtually every claim the Navy has made about Raytheon in regards to AEGIS or BMD, in both the AEGIS modernization work and the DDG-1000 program, have been attacks on the capabilities of the systems Raytheon is developing. The Navy has basically said no one but Lockheed Martin can do it, and we will attack anyone who tries to compete for that work. And oh btw, cooperative work would be "fundamentally anti-competitive" but sole-source contracts are not "fundamentally anti-competitive?"

The Navy's claims of capabilities regarding BMD and DDG-1000 have all been discredited, even the Navy has backtracked from previous arguments to the new but equally silly position that ~$500 million to add BMD is 'too expensive'. I'd buy that, if we weren't already spending at least $5 billion to upgrade the existing baseline of AEGIS to be BMD capable.

The final GAO decision should be interesting, because this legal trick will probably fall short. The tip is in the language, if the Navy had a good case, they wouldn't fall back on the position of being unnecessarily harsh of Raytheon. What the Navy needs to do s line up their PR so it isn't so consistently inconsistent. Maybe they should outsource that to Lockheed Martin, because their PR kicks ass.