Building a True 21st Century Fleet

The modularity and concept of space designed into the Littoral Combat Ship is exactly the right direction that the Navy needs to go. The 21st century fleet needs to be flexible with large payload space. Whether or not this space should be interchangeable is still a question to be answered in the future, but the ability to utilize space as an interconnected capability is absolutely the future of surface warfare.

One can make all kinds of comments regarding how many DDG-1000s the Navy should be building. In my opinion - 4 ships is a capability (NSFS w/ 4 BBs for example), 2 ships is a technology demonstration (USS Long Beach (CGN 9) and USS Bainbridge (DLGN 25)), and 3 ships represents a sign that no one in the Navy or Congress has the vision or leadership necessary to make a decision absent the influence of parochial self interest when it comes to Navy shipbuilding.

The DDG-1000 has consumed the greatest piece of Navy R&D for the last 7-10 years, but the ten key technologies are going to be game changers in the way we think about and design ships. I have said it on Midrats at least twice, and will say it again here...

The DDG-1000 program will represent a resounding success for the Navy even if the ships do not last their full service life or never make a substantial contribution in the service of the country as a warship. The intellectual capital that has been and will be gained from DDG-1000 is going to facilitate the Navy's effort to shift from a largely platform centric perspective - to a perspective of exploiting a network of combat and non-combat systems centric capabilities. This is a doctrinal change that will almost certainly emerge as part of the Air-Sea Battle doctrine development process mentioned in the 2010 QDR.

We are entering an age of energy. The most important technology on the DDG-1000 is the Integrated Electric Drive (IPS). Taking a comprehensive HM&E approach, the Navy has positioning itself to realize the incredible flexibility that comes with trade space for both the weapons system acquisition folks as well as the operators when these ships go into the fight.

This gives the Navy the opportunity to design and build platforms that are nothing more than the "boxes" of flexible payload space Bob Work discusses, utilizing integrated power and open architecture integration to enable the Navy to maintain pace with technology developments. This approach capitalizes on a common network interface systems for ESM, Missiles, Radars, Comms, C4ISR, Manpower, Guns, Lasers, Hospitals, etc. to give the Navy the flexibility for rapidly upgrading systems to insure a platform designed in the 21st century remains relevant through the life of the ship.

With a properly managed HM&E design that leverages IPS and open architecture, the Navy is poised to treat a 21st century warship like a smart phone - with network interface modules representing the apps. As the apps get old, the open architecture approach allows them to be rapidly upgraded as new technologies are fielded.

The challenge for the Navy is streamlining this process. We only hear pieces of this description from naval leaders, but no vision statement as articulated here - even as this represents the future as even they see it in the future fleet. The challenge is to invest in design to produce HM&E maturity for a future surface combatant with Integrated Electric Drive so that we can then take advantage of the systems - like AMDR.

So far in FY2011 budget discussions, Navy leaders have identified the Burke for HM&E and specific findings in an AMDR study as specific desired systems. The problem with this approach is that it wastes the decade by spending money on ships without Integrated Electric Drive. That matters, because any ship built without Integrated Electric Drive after 2015 will be obsolete before they retire. Can the nation really afford to spend so much money on high end fleet capabilities that will almost certainly not be viable in 20-30 years?

Last year Gene Taylor mentioned money may need to be spent getting the Burke design into a modern design software tool. It was a good suggestion, because that will be the only way the Navy can get the Burke aligned to the HM&E -> IPS -> Systems approach in the right order. Until the Navy gets to that point with a major surface combatant, the Navy will remain stuck in the 20th century at the high end of naval warfare.

Expect our challengers and adversaries to continue moving towards the approach discussed in this post by the end of the decade. Considering our nations economic problems, we should make it a strategic objective to get there first.

Still Looking Good For DDG-1000

While the consensus opinion is the DDG-1000 is going to be this impossibly expensive warship, Chris Cavas has an article up on Defense News noting that the first Zumwalt class destroyer is on cost and on schedule. It is still early, but apparently the Navy is willing to demonstrate some confidence regarding the ship, because from whatever quiet cubicle they have been hiding the DDG-1000 program manager, Captain James Syring, apparently he has been given permission to do an interview.

As far as I know, at least the rumor on the street has been... Captain Syring has not allowed to give interviews since at least March of 2008, some 16+ months ago.

There is no point in citing any specific part of this article, read it all, and if you are even partially familiar with the way most ships have been developed over the last many years take note at all the positive signs. Imagine the Navy completing systems designs, hull designs, integration testing, and waiting until maturity before construction... a novel concept that so far points to a DDG-1000 that may actually be the first surface warship class since the Ticonderoga class not 100%+ over cost.

The only real surprise to me in this story is the very last paragraph, which suggests the DDG-1000 CO will be a Commander. I guess that makes sense, being the Navy continues to insist the Zumwalt is a destroyer even as they will displace more weight (by several thousand tons) than every warship in the world except for the Russian nuclear battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy.

I do wonder though, if that by letting Captain Syring loose with interviews with the press if that doesn't represent a sign that the DDG-1000 hull is getting more attention as a future surface combatant option after FY11. DDG-1000 is, at least at this point in time, the only good news story in surface combatant shipbuilding when it comes to first in class cost and schedule. While this can surely change, good news in surface combatant shipbuilding is so rare can anyone blame the Navy for getting this information out to the press?

I don't. I have no idea what the future of the DDG-1000 hull is, but I still say we end up with four, not three, when it is all said and done. From an industrial perspective, not to mention a historical perspective of the Navy wanting 4 NSFS vessels (remember, there were 4 Iowa class maintained in the 600 ship Navy plan), building 3 the DDG-51s in Mississippi and building a 4th DDG-1000 in Maine should get both shipyards to FY12, by which time the Navy should have a better idea what they want for the CG(X) program, not to mention some idea how to meet the often stated requirement of "more than 313 ships" testified to Congress every time the Flags go to the hill.

Return of the Arsenal Ship

The letter dated May 11, 2024 from Chief of Naval Operations Gary Roughead to Senator Edward Kennedy reveals a lot of very interesting information worth analysis. In one massive stroke the entire debate regarding DDG-51s or DDG-1000s has been completely flipped on its head, essentially discrediting most of the testimony by the Navy about the program change and turning the discussion primarily towards the issue of cost. For the first time, we have some data that makes an apples to apples comparison instead of an apples to oranges comparison of the two platforms, and I think the data is quite revealing.

Before diving into analysis of the letter, I want to first highlight that it has been over 15 months since the Navy last publicly advocated for the DDG-1000 program, and has spent the better part of 11 months attempting to discredit the DDG-1000 in favor of the DDG-51 with various arguments, none of which were really about costs, and has now essentially admitted in the letter that the last 11 months worth of arguments against the DDG-1000 have been largely inaccurate. To list the number of times VADM McCullough testified under oath something that has been retracted as inaccurate would be an entire blog post in itself. That guy is clearly a loyal soldier, but with all the inaccurate testimony over the last 11 months he has made it very difficult to believe anything he says - even under oath. It is unclear if he has been intentionally dishonest, or been fed information that was intentionally dishonest. Either way, the truth has turned out to be something opposite the testimony of VADM McCullough in both the House and Senate on several occasions.

It should also be pointed out the DDG-1000 program has no momentum that I can see. The Secretary of Defense has clearly stated he wants to end the DDG-1000 program at 3 ships, and the Navy is trying to end the program at 3 ships. Then again, the Secretary of Defense has not publicly committed to the DDG-51 program beyond FY 2011, and has pointed to the QDR as the place where all the chips will fall on future shipbuilding.

What Have We Learned

The revealing point made in the May 11 letter is that the Navy does not see any difference in ASW capability between the two platforms. This contradicts a lot of testimony otherwise over the last 11 months. Of the three original arguments made against the DDG-1000, the Navy has now decided the DDG-1000 will in fact be able to shoot SM-2 missiles, after previously testifying otherwise; and has also now decided the DDG-1000 is equally capable against blue water submarines as the DDG-51, after previously testifying otherwise. The only 'threat' issue separating the DDG-1000 and DDG-51 that has yet to be hit on is Ballistic Missile Defense. However, in making the apples to apples comparison for Senator Kennedy, ADM Roughead gives us a good idea of what adding BMD to DDG-1000 would cost, and potentially look like. All discussions below refer to the details in the May 11 letter, available here.

If you look at table 1, the Navy lists $1.76B RDT&E from FY11 out in order to achieve the apples to apples comparison of the DDG-51 Advanced Capability Build 12 baseline. This figure suggests the cost estimate for software and hardware to bring the DDG-1000 up to the same ballistic missile defense capability as the DDG-51, but also design and engineering modifications necessary to replace both Advanced Gun Systems with VLS. The Navy does not identify whether the VLS would be MK41 or MK57, although presumably one was used for making the estimate.

The DDG-51 Flight IIA Advanced Capability Build 12 baseline is basically the DDG-51 Flight IIA that will be modernized in FY 2012 to include every currently planned enhancement to the combat system including BMD, the most capable of the DDG-51 capability set. The new build DDG-51s are also expected to have a towed sonar array (existing DDG-51 Flight IIA do not have a towed array). The Navy expects these new ships to cost an average of $1.9B according to the letter.

The DDG-1000 being evaluated is basically a modified version without the Advanced Gun System (AGS), but including the other 9 new technologies of the ship class. According to the letter, both guns would be replaced with VLS and would possess a capability "not less than" the most advanced DDG-51 on the books. The AGS is huge. If one was to put the AGS on a DDG-51, it would consume the space not only of the 5" gun but also the 29 VLS cells on the bow of the ship. As I understand it, one AGS can be replaced by at least 1 x 61 Mk41 VLS cell system.

That means the Navy has given us a $2.55B estimate for a stealth arsonal ship with 80 Mk 57 PVLS cells, 2 MK110 57mm guns, and anywhere from 80 more MK57 PVLS cells or 122 MK41 VLS cells, and is comparing this behemoth of missile power to a DDG-51 Flight IIA.

I don't know about you, but I never realized the cost difference between a stealth BMD capable super arsenal ship and a DDG-51 Flight IIA is about the cost of a single Littoral Combat Ship. Is this letter supposed to advocate the position of the DDG-51? I don't think the letter makes a particularly compelling case for the DDG-1000, although the idea of a CNO giving a Senator a quote for a super stealth battleship is kind of a novel concept, but the one thing this letter does not do is make the case for more DDG-51s.

The 2012 Forever Plan

I don't know if anyone else reads Ronald O'Rourke's excellent reports, but you should if this topic interests you. Specifically I would encourage everyone to check out Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress dated June 4, 2024 (PDF). The report compares the DDG-1000 to the DDG-51 Flight IIA, and I list all the elements, including the Anti-Surface Warfare/Strike Warfare section, even though it would not apply to a modified DDG-1000 as described in the May 11 letter since the guns are replaced by VLS cells (of some kind).

Growth Margin
The DDG-51 and DDG-1000 designs each have about a 10% growth margin. For the roughly 9,000-ton DDG-51, this equates to about 900 tons of growth margin, while for the 14,987-ton DDG-1000, this equates to about 1,400 tons of growth margin.

Ship Mobility
The two designs are roughly equivalent in terms of maximum sustained speed, cruising endurance, and seakeeping (i.e., stability in rough seas). The DDG-1000’s draft (28 feet) is somewhat less than the DDG-51’s (31 feet). Other things held equal, this might give the DDG-1000 an ability to operate in (or be berthed at) places where the water depth is sufficient for the DDG-1000 but not for the DDG-51. The DDG-1000’s length (600 feet) is greater than the DDG-51’s (505 feet). Other things held equal, this might give the DDG-51 an ability to be berthed in spaces that are long enough for the DDG-51 but not for the DDG-1000.

Electrical Power for Weapons and Systems
The DDG-51 has 7.5 megawatts (MW) of electrical power for its weapon systems, while the DDG-1000 design, with its integrated electric-drive system, can provide up to 78 MW for its weapons and power systems by diverting power from propulsion to weapons and systems.

Signatures and Detectability
The DDG-1000 has a smaller radar cross-section and lower infrared, acoustic, and magnetic signatures than the DDG-51. The two designs are roughly equivalent in terms of the detectability of their radar and other electromagnetic emissions. The DDG-1000’s reduced signatures will make the DDG-1000 harder to detect, localize, classify, and target, giving the DDG-1000 a significant advantage in engagements against enemy forces.

Survivability and Damage Control
The Navy states that the DDG-1000 would be able to keep fighting after an attack like the one that disabled the USS Cole (DDG-67) on October 12, 2000.

The two designs are roughly equivalent in terms of degree of compartmentalization and ship stability when flooded. The DDG-1000’s vertical launch system (VLS) is more heavily armored than the DDG-51’s. The DDG’s fire-suppression system is automated only in the engine room and magazine, while the DDG-1000’s system is automated throughout the ship, making it safer and more effective. The DDG-51’s flood-control system is not automated, while the DDG-1000’s is, which the Navy believes will make it more effective. The DDG-1000’s electrical power distribution system is an “integrated fight-through” system, meaning that it is designed to automatically isolate damaged areas and reroute electrical power around them. All critical DDG-1000 systems are dual-fed, meaning that if power from one source is cut off, it can be routed through a second source. The DDG-51’s electrical power distribution system lacks these features.

C4I/Networking Bandwidth
The C4I121 and networking systems on the DDG-1000 would have five times as much bandwidth as those on the DDG-51. The C4I/networking capability of the DDG-1000 is equivalent to that on the LHD-8 amphibious assault ship. In addition to improved warfighting capability, this increased bandwidth would provide sailors aboard the DDG-1000 a better ability to “reach back” to information sources ashore when conducting at-sea maintenance of shipboard equipment, potentially increasing the availability rates of shipboard equipment.

Flag-Level Command Facilities
The DDG-1000 has facilities for embarking and supporting a flag-level officer and his staff, so that they could use the ship as platform for commanding a group of ships. The DDG-51 does not have such facilities.

Anti-Air Warfare/Ballistic Missile Defense (AAW/BMD)
The radars on the two ships are roughly equivalent in terms of dB gain (sensitivity) and target resolution. The firm track range of the DDG-1000’s dual-band radar—the range at which it can maintain firm tracks on targets—is 25% greater for most target types than the firm track range of the DDG-51’s SPY-1 radar. The DDG-1000’s AAW combat system would be able to maintain about 10 times as many tracks as the DDG-51’s Aegis system. The DDG-1000’s radar has much more capability for resisting enemy electronic countermeasures and for detecting targets amidst littoral “clutter.” As a result of the better performance amidst littoral clutter, the Navy believes that ships escorted by the DDG-1000 in defended littoral waters would have three times as much survivability as ships escorted by the DDG-51.

The two designs would use the same types of area-defense and point-defense interceptor missiles. They would also use the same flares, chaff, and decoys to confuse enemy anti-ship cruise missiles, but the Navy believes these devices would be more effective on the DDG-1000 because of the DDG-1000’s reduced signatures.

Anti-Surface Warfare/Strike Warfare
The DDG-1000 would have considerably more naval surface fire support (NSFS) capability than the DDG-51. The DDG-51 has one 5-inch gun, while the DDG-1000 has two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems (AGSs). The DDG-51’s gun can fire an initial salvo of 20 rounds per minute and can subsequently fire at a sustained rate of four rounds per minute (20/4). The DDG-1000’s two guns have a combined firing rate of 20/20. The shells currently fired by the DDG-51’s gun have a range of 13 nm. Future shells are to have a range of up to 50 nm. The shells to be fired by the DDG-1000’s guns are to have a range of 63 to 74 nm, and consequently could cover (at 74 nm) more than three times as much area ashore (assuming a 25 nm standoff from shore) as a shell with a range of 50 nm. The shells fired by the DDG-51 carry 8 pounds of explosive, while those fired by the DDG-1000 are to carry 24 pounds of explosive. When fired at less than maximum range, the shells fired by the DDG-1000 can alter their flight paths so that six to eight of them can hit a target at the same time; the shells to be fired by the DDG-51 do not have this capability. The DDG-51 carries 600 of the 13nm-range shells or 230 of 62nm-range shells, while the DDG-1000 carries a total of 600 of its shells. It might be possible to fit the DDG-51 with one of the 155mm guns to be carried by the DDG-1000; it would likely require the removal of both the DDG-51’s 5-inch gun and its forward (32-cell) VLS. In this configuration, the DDG-51 might carry about 120 of the gun’s 155mm shells.

The 155mm guns on the DDG-1000 could be replaced in the future with an electromagnetic rail gun or directed-energy weapon. The DDG-51 does not have enough electrical power to support such weapons.

Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
The DDG-51’s sonar system is more capable for blue-water ASW operations, while the DDG-1000’s system is more capable for littoral ASW operations. The DDG-1000’s bow-mounted sonar and towed array can interact to more rapidly triangulate targets. The Flight IIA DDG-51 lacks a towed array. The DDG-1000’s radar would have more capability than the DDG-51’s radar for detecting submarine periscopes.

The DDG-51 has six torpedo tubes for firing lightweight (12.75-inch diameter) anti-submarine torpedoes, while the DDG-1000 has none, but the Navy does not believe these tubes to be of significant operational value against potential future threats. Both ships can launch lightweight torpedoes from their helicopters or fire the Vertical Launch Antisubmarine Rocket (VLA), which is armed with a lightweight torpedo.

The ships would use the same countermeasures for confusing enemy torpedoes, but the Navy believes these countermeasures would be more effective on the DDG-1000 because of the DDG-1000’s reduced signatures.

Mine Warfare (MIW)
The DDG-1000’s bow-mounted sonar includes an in-stride mine-avoidance capability; the DDG-51’s sonar suite has less capability for detecting mines. The DDG-51 can be built to a design that permits the ship to embark and operate the Remote Minehunting System (RMS); six ships in the DDG-51 program (DDGs 91 to 96) have been built to this design. The Navy says that the DDG-1000’s reduced acoustic and magnetic signatures would translate into a significantly greater operating area in mined waters.

Missiles for Performing Above Missions
The DDG-51 has 90 missile-launching tubes in its VLS, while the DDG-1000 has 80. The DDG-51’s VLS tubes can accommodate a missile up to 21 inches in diameter, 21 feet in length, and about 3,000 pounds in weight. The DDG-1000’s VLS tubes can accommodate a missile up to 24 inches in diameter, 22 feet in length, and about 4,000 pounds in weight. The gas-management (i.e., heat-management) system of the DDG-1000’s VLS tubes can accommodate a hotter-burning missile than the gas-management system of the DDG-51’s VLS, so the DDG-1000 might be more capable of using future missiles if they are hotter-burning.

Aviation for Performing Above Missions
The DDG-51 can embark and operate two SH-60 helicopters but does not have electronics for launching and recovering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The DDG-1000 can embark, operate, and provide full maintenance for two SH-60 helicopters or one SH-60 helicopter and three UAVs. The DDG-1000’s flight deck is larger than the DDG-51’s and can accommodate all joint rotary-wing aircraft, including the MV-22, the CH-53, and the H-47. The DDG-1000’s flight deck is 10 feet higher off the water and can therefore be used for full flight operations in a sea state (i.e., sea condition) that is at least one step higher (i.e., rougher) than is possible for the flight deck on the DDG-51.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) Support
The DDG-1000 has additional berthing for 20 SOF personnel (i.e., a platoon), as well as a space for SOF mission planning and spaces for stowing SOF gear. The DDG-51 lacks these features.

Boats
The DDG-51 can embark two seven-meter boats that are deployed and recovered with a davit. The DDG-1000 can embark two 11-meter boats and four rubber raiding craft that are deployed and recovered with a stern ramp, which permits faster and safer launching and recovering, and launch/recovery operations in higher sea states.

Habitability Features for Crew
On the DDG-51, enlisted crew berthing spaces accommodate 20 to 60 sailors each. On the DDG-1000, every sailor would have a stateroom, and each stateroom would accommodate four sailors. The Navy believes these features would improve crew quality of life, which can improve retention rates.

In addition to the information presented in Table 4 above, another slide in the Navy briefing stated that the DDG-1000’s radar cross section will be similar to that of a fishing boat. Navy officials have also stated separately that the DDG-1000’s acoustic signature will be similar, at certain speeds, to that of certain U.S. Navy submarines.

In elaborating on the point in Table 4 above pertaining to the DDG-1000’s electrical power, Navy officials stated at the briefing that at a speed of 20 knots, the DDG-1000 would have 58 megawatts of power available for powering non-propulsion shipboard systems. The briefing stated that the DDG-51, by comparison, has 7.5 megawatts of power available for non-propulsion systems.

In what 4 decade period during the entire history of the US Navy has a ship remained relevant at a static level of technology? Among surface combatants, only the wooden-hulled, three-masted heavy frigates like USS Constitution from 1797 - 1855, and the Iowa class battleships from 1943 - 1992 remained active duty vessels in the Navy for a duration that long. The ships of sail served until steam arrived, while the big guns of the battleships kept them in action only in third world actions where opponents did not have naval capabilities to threaten the big battlewagons.

There is no way someone can look at today and suggest weapon and sensor technologies being fielded today will remain the dominant systems in 40 years, not when we have already begun issuing contracts for laser weapon technologies for ships (like the recent laser contract for DDG-1000) and demand for sensors that can extend to space has many feeling even the latest and greatest available on DDG-1000 simply won't get it done against emerging ballistic missile threats.

In order to put new and emerging technologies on the DDG-51, more power must be added, which means new generators and cooling equipment that will consume space that already doesn't exist, thus replace something the DDG-51 uses like one of the helicopter spots. 2+ billion dollars is an enormous investment of funds for a platform already evolved twice from a 1985 design, and it is unrealistic that this 1985 design will be capable of meeting the needs for the fleet in 2055, some 70 years later and before these new DDG-51s will be decommissioned.

It boggles my mind that to make the case for the DDG-51, the Navy would be deceptive about the capabilities of the DDG-1000 to promote the DDG-51, except that the cost argument reveals just how silly it is to make such an enormous investment on either the DDG-1000 or the DDG-51. ADM Roughead is making the argument that the greatest surface vessel to ever be built, a modified DDG-1000 with somewhere between 160 - 200 PVLS/VLS cells (if not more) with an advantage in virtually every single capability a ship could possibly have, including plenty of room and power for growth into the 21st century is a worse deal because the difference in cost between this super 21st century stealth battleship and a DDG-51 is one Littoral Combat Ship?

And we truncated the entire DDG-1000 line in favor of the DDG-51 so we could have ~94 cruisers and destroyers instead of 91? Are those 3 extra ships worth the effort? I wish I could say there is hope in the QDR, but all evidence suggests Secretary Gates doesn't get it. This statement sounds as contradictory and confusing about surface combatant capabilities as the Navy does when it comes to surface combatants.

Where the trend of future conflict is clear, I have made specific recommendations. For example, I hope to accelerate the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy’s big, blue-water surface combatants. As we saw last week, you don’t necessarily need a billion-dollar ship to chase down a bunch of teenage pirates. The size of the ship in such cases is less important than having Navy SEALs onboard. To carry out the missions we may face in the future - whether dealing with non-state actors at sea or near shore, or swarming speedboats - we will need numbers, speed, and ability to operate in shallow waters.

We also must examine our blue-water fleet and the overall strategy behind the kinds of ships we are buying. The need to show presence and project power from a piece of sovereign territory called a United States Navy ship will never go away. But we cannot allow more ships to go the way of the DDG-1000 - where since its inception the projected buy has dwindled from 32 to three as costs per ship have more than doubled. One of the things that I am recommending in this budget is to upgrade and build more Arleigh Burke destroyers, still a best-in-class ship that has been the workhorse of the U.S. surface fleet for nearly two decades. And a ship that has proven that it can be upgraded rapidly with new capabilities and technologies.

The United States must not take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in programs, platforms, and personnel that will ensure that we remain preeminent at sea. But rather than go forward under the same assumptions that guided our shipbuilding during the Cold War, I believe we need to develop a more rigorous analytical framework before moving forward - the type of framework that will be provided by the Quadrennial Defense Review. That is one reason I delayed a number of decisions on programs such as the follow on manned bomber, the next generation cruiser, as well as overall maritime capabilities. The purpose was to develop an analytical construct through which we can more precisely determine what will be needed in coming years. To determine what kind of tactics and strategies future adversaries, both state and non-state actors, are likely to pursue.

To build the DDG-51 is to go forward under the same assumptions that guided our shipbuilding during the Cold War, and it can be highlighted by noting the 2 big Navy platforms of our time, the F-18 and DDG-51, are holdovers from said Cold War. We are making assumptions like saying the Littoral Combat Ship will "go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy’s big, blue-water surface combatants" and pretending like this even makes sense to anyone who has studied littoral warfare at even a basic level.

If the surface Navy can't do better than a $2 billion, 25 year old designs with no growth margin and 40 year life expectancies or a $2.55 billion super arsenal ship when discussing our options for surface combatants, and do everything from highlight delivering humanitarian aid to Georgia on a 9,000 ton destroyer or consistently making misleading statements under oath in testimony just to discredit a 14,500 ton destroyer during a time of shrinking fleets, tight budgets, and a contracting global economy...

The future surface Navy could easily find itself stuck in 2012 for decades. At least now when we talk about the DDG-1000, when we talk about costs, we are in line with the Navy. It only took 11 months for cost to become the reason to cancel the DDG-1000, and only after every other reason was discredited.

The Navy's May 11 Letter to Senator Kennedy

Many of you have asked why I have not commented on the recent study conducted at the University of Tennessee National Defense Business Institute that compared the DDG-1000 and the DDG-51 (PDF).

It is an interesting report, but what immediately stuck out to me is the new information in the report citing a source I was previously not aware of, and until I was able to see the source information I did not want to comment.

Somehow the authors of that report were able to obtain a letter sent by Chief of Naval Operations Gary Roughead to Senate Armed Services Committee member and Seapower Subcommittee Chairman - Senator Edward Kennedy, and do so without anyone in the media even being aware of such a letter. The letter was dated May 11, 2024 and is published in full below.

The copy of the letter I was sent had html tables that did not format well on the blog, so the images of the tables are courtesy of insidedefense.com

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower
Senate Armed Services Committee
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of October 24, 2024 concerning the Navy's Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan and the decision to truncate the DDG-1000 program, I stated in my letter on January 5, 2024 that I would provide the cost estimates comparisons you requested when they were developed in conjunction with the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget.

Specifically, you requested a comparison of "Acquisition Costs for DDG-51s and Modified DDG-1000s" with design specifications for the Modified DDG-1000 reflecting nominally equal capability. Table 1 provides a comparison of acquisition cost of Fiscal Year 2010 ship and average follow ship for a DDG-51 and Modified DDG-1000 based on a multi-hull procurement in constant FY10 dollars. The cost of 10 additional DDG-51s is less than a 7 ship class of DDG-1000s.

It is important to discuss the assumptions used in formulating Table 1. Specifically:

• Advanced Gun Systems and associated magazines in the current DDG-1000 design deleted and additional missile-launch tubes installed in their place.
• Ship and missile modifications as needed for the ship to successfully employ SM-2, SM-3, and SM-6 missiles and otherwise give the ship a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and area-defense AAW capability not less than that of Flight IIA DDG-51 with Advanced Capability 12.
• The primary system differences between the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 ships with respect to ASW are the bow mounted sonars, the Periscope Detection Radar (PDR) planned for the DDG-1000, and the DDG-1000's planned lower ship self noise characteristics. There is a known performance difference at the sensor level between the hull mounted sonars on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 ships due to physical size and source level differences between the ships. The DDG-51 has greater detection capability with respect to environmental and threat variations in blue water environments. While it is less clear at the ship engagement level, analysis indicates the DDG-51 has slightly better performance, but when factoring the PDR and quieter self noise characteristics, the DDG-1000 could be expected to perform as well as, or possibly better than the DDG-51 under certain scenarios and acoustic conditions. At the campaign level when the ship is utilized in fleet ASW tactics in conjunction with other ship and air assets the magnitude of the performance difference is unclear. Due to the probability that the difference in performance levels at the campaign level would be low, I will forgo the detailed analysis and assess the two ships as equal in this area without modification.

The 10 additional DDG-51s would join an existing fleet force structure of 22 CGs and 62 DDGs. These follow-on DDG-51s build on a common hull and stable combat system configuration incorporating advanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) and Anti Submarine Warfare suite optimized for blue water sea base defense. Besides the enhancements required to gain IAMD capability in DDG-1000, the technical risk and acquisition costs associated with DDG-1000 are not as well defined as the known cost for the DDG-51 hull and combat system. Therefore, the additional capacity and capability gained through continuation of DDG-51s with lower technical risk and defined cost, coupled with the risks associated with the DDG-1000 make the restart of the DDG-51 line the preferred choice for affordable warfighting capability and capacity.

Table 2 provides data for your request to compare "Annual O & S Costs for a DDG-51 and a Modified DDG-1000" in constant FY 2010 dollars. Although DDG-1000 requires a smaller crew, comparing the individual element of manning costs between the two ships can be misleading. DDG-1000 was able to decrease its crew size through increased automation and by growing shore support primarily to complete maintenance traditionally performed by ship's company. Navy is committed to increasing the shore infrastructure to perform this maintenance however; those added maintenance costs generally negate the savings generated by the smaller crew size.

Assumptions used in compiling Table 2 included:

• All costs are expressed in FY 2010 dollars
• Reflects average annual cost per ship, calculated on a 35 year service life basis. Includes periodic depot maintenance and fact of life upgrades.
• Annual Fuel Usage rate of 87,373 barrels for DDG-51 and 121,233 barrels for DDG-1000

Crew Size is based on the following manning documents:

• DDG-51 FLT IIA Part 3 (DDG 91 - DDG 102) Final Ship Manpower Document, 9 April 2024
• DDG-1000 Program Preliminary Ship Manpower Document, DCDRL-C.12 Rev b, Attachment 2, 31 August 2024
• Three additional crew members added to each ship class for BMD
• Reduced manning benefits are best realized over a large class of ships such as LCS with 55 ships.

In my role as Chief of Naval Operations, I will continue to develop a shipbuilding program which provides affordable combat capability in sufficient capacity to maintain our position as the dominant naval power in the world. For less cost and risk, truncating DDG-1000 and building additional DDG-51s is the clearest path to that end.

Thank you for your continued interest in our shipbuilding program and for your unwavering support of our Navy. If I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

G. ROUGHEAD
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Observing Cost Growth in Shipbuilding

Without the detailed budget information, we don't know why, but I think I'll go ahead and float this.

From the Navy shipbuilding section in the FY 2010 Presidents budget (PDF), line item 22 under prior year program costs we have this little blurb:

Completion of PY Shipbuilding Programs (454,586)

SSN-774 (MEMO NON ADD) (45,608)
DDG-1000 (MEMO NON ADD) (309,636)
LPD 17 (MEMO NON ADD) (99,342)

----------
454,586
----------

In other words, the Virginia class is over budget by $45.6 million (~2%), the LPD-17 is over budget by $99.3 million(~6%), and the DDG-1000 is already over budget by $309.6 million (~9%).

Like I said, we don't know why, perhaps John Young who touted "on cost, on schedule" all last year can make himself available for comment?

Considering this is previous fiscal year, it happened before October 1, 2008, over 6 months ago and more importantly after Congress pushed ahead with the third DDG-1000 in the FY09 budget. One can't help but have a really bad feeling when the new $3.5 billion dollar destroyer that has only been under construction for 3 months is already 9% over budget.

We should keep in mind there almost certainly will be unforeseen cost growth this year in the program due primarily to the new shipbuilding agreement between General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman to build all the DDG-1000s at BIW. Still, this little budget line item cost increase for the DDG-1000 could have purchased the Coast Guard an additional 6 Sentinel class fast response cutters, or 6 of the latest F/A-18E/F Super Hornets.

The DDG-1000 may get fixed price contracts for the 2nd and 3rd ship, but something tells me the first one is going to cost a lot more than John Young's $3.5 billion number, and I won't be surprised if it costs more than the 55,000 ton yet to be built brand new USS America (LHA 6) when it is all said and done.

Cruisers, Destroyers, and Questions...

Emelie Rutherford has a story out for Defense Daily (subscription only) titled Young: Study If DDG-1000 Hull Is Right For Future Cruiser discussing some comments made by John Young regarding the DDG-1000. This article is just loaded with good information, way too much to quote. Here are the key points listed broken down by category:

Destroyer Programs:

• The Navy had not crafted requirements spelling out the need for more than 64 DDG-51s
• The Navy estimates the new-production DDG-51s would be $2 billion hulls.
• * DefenseNews reports Young said DDG-1000 will "be a $2.5 billion hull"
• DDG-1001 and DDG-1002 will be a fixed-price incentive contract, which suggests some cost certainty for taxpayers (and BIW seems OK with this).
• Plans for future-surface combatant have gone nowhere

CG(X) Program:

• The CG(X) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is completed.
• Requirements work done by the Navy as part of an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the CG(X) cruiser shows that future ship having features of the DDG-1000 hull.
• CG(X) AoA showed the cruiser costing $6 billion.
• Studies have looked at the LPD-17 hull for the CG(X), because of the need for a ship with enough hull size, displacement, and power to accommodate the CG(X) radar.

It looks to me like the recent deal between the Pentagon, Navy, and industry to truncate the buy of DDG-1000s at three ships and build more DDG-51s is nothing more than a 2 year shipbuilding plan to stabilize shipbuilding for a few years, also known as buy time to make a decision. I'm not sure how stable this plan is for Mississippi though, at first glance, of the 3 DDG-1000s and 3 DDG-51s, 4 of those ships are being built at Bath Iron Works.

That raises the question, what don't we know about what will be built in Mississippi? Why would Gene Taylor (D-MS) celebrate this deal if his district does not appear to be getting more work? There has to be more to this, because even though LPD-17 is continuing, that work would be shared with Avondale. I also don't see a National Security Frigate option.

I think this LPD-17 hull version of the CG(X) is in play. There have been rumors of CG(X) being built in two versions, is that what is developing here? One version based on the LPD-17 hull built in Mississippi and one version based on the DDG-1000 hull built at Bath Iron Works?

Gates is punting the CG(X) issue to the QDR, which means the Navy has until the QDR to make the case that it should lead ballistic missile defense. The only way a $6 billion CG(X), or potentially 2 versions of the CG(X) will ever be built is if the Navy makes the case that naval ballistic missile defense is the best investment in the near term (what would amount to 13 years of shipbuildnig for the entire CG(X) program) than any alternative solutions over that period. With ballistic missile defense funding, a short build for $6 billion CG(X) LPD-17 hull versions and a larger build of DDG-1000 hull versions of CG(X) are a lot more affordable. I for one don't think the Navy understands strategic communications well enough to sell this, even though I think that argument is more easily made with the American people than you may assume.

If the Navy is looking at 2 versions of CG(X), the part of the whole mess that makes the least sense to me is restarting the DDG-51. Either the Navy does not need a CG(X) and builds more DDG-51s, or the Navy needs a CG(X) and doesn't build more DDG-51s. The grand plan as outlined by Gates calls for three DDG-51s, which will run at least $2 billion each to restart.

Why not just build a 4th DDG-1000 instead of a 3rd DDG-51? The 4 DDG-1000s can replace the 4 Iowa's and the naval gunfire support requirement is met.

Will there be more than the 3 proposed DDG-51s? If the answer is no, and the current requirement for DDG-51s is 64, build the 4th DDG-1000 instead of the 3rd DDG-51.

If the answer is yes, how many and under what requirement? Furthermore, why? How does the Navy justify the DDG-51 class serving until 2060 and beyond? How in the world will that system remain relevant over the first half of the 21st century when there is very little margin for growth left?

Are there any new ship designs planned? The lack of alternative designs for surface combatants looks to be part of the problem Congress has to deal with.

I look forward to seeing what the Navy intends to build in FY2012, because right now we have no idea what surface combatant shipbuilding looks like after FY2011.

We Know Enough to Know We Don't Know...

A few things have been bothering me since the Gates announcement. First, I have been unsure about the shipbuilding agreement details, and I am still not sure I really understand it. Second, I have not seen any information that suggest the Navy has a real plan ahead after FY11, in other words, all we really know right now is the Navy has a 2 year shipbuilding plan mostly constructed to fix the problem with surface combatants.

What caught my attention is a recent Zachery Peterson article with InsideDefense (subscription only) titled Navy: General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman Agree on Destroyer Builds. It is one thing that Gates has the Air Force bending over backwards for the F-22, but it is quite a feat that he was able to get General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman to do this:

"After extensive discussions with General Dynamics Corporation Bath Iron Works and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, the Navy arrived at a plan that most affordably meets the requirements for Navy surface combatants, commences the transition to additional, improved missile defense capability in new DDG-51 class construction, and provides significant stability for the industrial base," Navy spokesman Lt. Clay Doss said.

"The plan will align construction responsibilities for DDG-1000, 1001, and 1002 at BIW with [Northrop] continuing participation in the program," Doss continued. "This will help stabilize and minimize cost risk for the DDG-1000 program. The plan also calls for efficient restart of the DDG- 51 program with DDG-113 and DDG-114 to be constructed at NGSB and DDG-115 to be constructed at BIW."

...

Gates announced last week that the Pentagon would request two destroyers in FY-10. This request would fund one DDG-51 and complete funding for the third DDG-1000, according to Pentagon sources.

So if I am reading this right, the Navy is going to buy 1 DDG-51 for Ingalls and finish paying the third DDG-1000 for Bath in FY 2010. Then in FY 2011 the Navy is going to buy two DDG-51s, one for Ingalls and one for Bath. That appears to be what is confirmed in this Navy Times article, which adds one more interesting note.

The deal also includes a provision for Northrop Grumman’s shipyard in Avondale, La., to continue building San Antonio-class amphibious transport docks.

This means General Dynamics will build three DDG-1000s and 1 DDG-51 while Northrop Grumman builds only 2 DDG-51s, but the LPD-17 class is not retired and will continue construction. Additionally, Northrop also would continue to build the composite-structure deckhouse for all the Zumwalt-class ships at its facility in Gulfport, Miss.

Prior to the new building strategy, the Zumwalt destroyer was going to be built under a shared model of 25% for each contractor, with the remaining 50% being built at alternating yards. So for DDG-1000, 75% would be built by General Dynamics while 25% would be built by Northrop Grumman. The new agreement kills the divided workforce approach, because unless the deckhouse is considered 25% of the ship (I don't think so), Northrop Grumman is getting a limited share of each DDG-1000.

In the end, Northrop Grumman only gets 2 DDG-51s and new LPD-17s, while General Dynamics in Bath ends up building 3 DDG-1000s and 1 DDG-51. Now it makes sense why the Maine Senators were celebrating, this is a short term boost for them.

What about FY 2012? I have not heard a thing, which suggests that could be where the Future Surface Combatant comes along. With Northrop Grumman the lead contractor of DDG-51 now, it could be they evolve right into the Future Surface Combatant if it is based on the DDG-51 hull, or General Dynamics assumes the role of prime contractor if Future Surface Combatant is based on the DDG-1000 hull. If this is what is happening, such a building strategy would line up surface combatant construction with this document (PDF) produced by Navy Times earlier this year.

Bottom line, while the newspapers are out touting there are going to be more DDG-51s, unless I am missing something there is no evidence there will actually be more than three new DDG-51s built. So what is going on here? Has the Future Surface Combatant idea been put to bed? Maybe, I can't think of a good reason the Navy would open up the DDG-51 line at two shipyards, then stop production, but this is the US Navy surface combatant construction program we are talking about, so anything is possible.

In the July 31, 2024 hearing Vice Adm. Barry McCullough told Congress the Navy intended to buy DDG-51 destroyers at a rate of one in FY 2010, two in FY 2011, one in FY 2012, two in FY 2013, one in FY 2014 and one in FY 2015. Based on the unofficial (and obsolete) 30-year shipbuilding plan leaked to Navy Times (see PDF above), the Navy had planned to build FSCs at a rate of three every 2 years from FY 2012 through FY 2025. If that plan is followed as a baseline for hull types under a new DDG-51 plan, that could potentially mean the Navy builds 21 more DDG-51s to add to the 62 already in service, for a total of 83 total DDG-51s. It is noteworthy that if the Navy decided to do that, the DDG-51 class would serve until 2070, assuming a 40 year service life. That seems very unlikely, a DDG-51 is probably not going to be relevant at sea come 2070. With that said, based on the plan outlined by Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, the DDG-51 funded in FY 2015 would serve until 2060, and I'm not convinced the ship will be relevant then either.

The budget is going to answer many questions, but for all the happy talk of the Navy following the Gates briefing last Monday, it looks to me like all Gates did was inject a short term, 2 year solution into shipbuilding surface combatants and everything starting FY 2012 is essentially a blank slate.

With the MLP and the second LPD-17 pushed out to FY 2011 per Gates vision forward, I don't see how the Navy builds 10 ships this year as the Congressmen have been suggesting. The way I read FY 2010:

1 SSN
1 DDG-51
1 LPD-17
3 LCS
1 JHSV
2 T-AKE

That would be 9. Where does the 10th ship come from, or do they count the DDG-1000 from FY 2009 as number 10? The FY 2011 plan would, in theory, look like this:

2 SSN
2 DDG-51
4 LCS
2 JHSV
1 LPD-17
1 MLP

That is 12 ships but without the 2nd LHA(R), which according to the last schedule I saw would be built in FY 2011. The 11th LPD-17 and MLP being pushed to FY 2011 would suggest the 2nd LHA(R) would be pushed back as well.

Looking at everything, I think there are a lot of questions. How many total DDG-51s beyond the three are going to actually be built? Will a DDG-51 funded in FY 2012, delivered in 2017 with a service life of 40 years still be relevant come 2057? These ships have essentially been upgraded to the point they have no room for growth left, so what is the strategy here?

The way I look at the Gates plan for the Navy, the Navy needs a crash course design program for surface combatants and they need it yesterday. If the DDG-1000 is too big, and the DDG-51 is too old, what is left, a VLS LCS Navy?

Gates has essentially outlined a two year shipbuilding strategy for surface combatant construction, hardly the stuff of vision or substance the Navy can rest easy with. It is going to be very interesting to see what FY 2012 and going forward looks like.

Statement of US Rep. Gene Taylor on the DDG-51/DDG-1000 Agreement

Things are moving quickly. Hang on...

April 7 2009, (Washington, DC) - In order to meet the Navy’s requirement for a 313 ship fleet, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead, proposed reducing the number of DDG-1000s Zumwalt-class destroyers and restarting production of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

The Navy has been working with Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics, the two builders of the Navy’s destroyer fleet, to reach an agreement on future surface combatant workload within the shipbuilding industry.

Under the agreement, the Navy would restart construction of DDG-51s at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, and General Dynamics would build three DDG-1000s at its shipyard in Bath, Maine.

The Navy’s decision to reduce the number of Zumwalts is based on affordability and the ship’s vulnerability to emerging threats.

The DDG-1000 is estimated to cost $5 billion per ship and the cost per DDG-51 is estimated to be $1.3 billion. Therefore, the Navy could get three DDG-51s for the cost of one DDG-1000.

The Navy will realize additional cost savings through economies of scale in constructing larger numbers of DDG-51s in series production, rather than three or less DDG-1000s. The Navy will also realize savings in leveraging its existing training and logistics pipelines for its current and future DDG-51s.

The reason that this is good news for the state of Mississippi is that Northrop Grumman will begin building the first two DDG-51 restart ships beginning in 2010 and they will continue building these ships over the next decade. Whereas, General Dynamics will build two or three DDG-1000s at most, stop production, and then restart their DDG-51 line.

I think Northrop Grumman made the right decision. They will continue to build the world’s most capable destroyer at a fair price to our citizens for many years to come. By agreeing to the DDG-1000-DDG-51 swap, Northrop Grumman is aligned with where the Navy sees its future.

Sounds like the deal is done. I agree with everything Gene Taylor is saying, and I would add it looks like the destroyer debate that began in the House last July just ended.

By my estimate, the huge winner is... Gene Taylor (D-Miss), who is without question the most important politician for the US Navy, because without his support on this issue no deal would ever get done.

Interesting times. I can't wait to see the budget, which appears to include 2 DDG-51s and the rest of the funding for DDG-1002 in FY 2010.

Letter to Secretary Gates on DDG-1000

The irony is, the Senators and Congressman are being factually correct in this letter, and the Navy would love people to beat up their elected officials for this. Indeed, the Navy's entire "stay silent" strategy has been to hope that by saying nothing good about the DDG-1000, Americans ignore that the Navy is breaking virtually every single rule of acquisition that would normally be put in place to protect taxpayer money. The Navy is counting on Americans, in particular bloggers who tend to favor sensationalism, to be ignorant to what the Navy is doing when in fact all budget numbers that have been released show the DDG-51 replacement program is at least the same cost as the DDG-1000 program being cut, assuming no cost overruns make it even more expensive.

March 20, 2024


The Honorable Robert C. Gates
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Gates

As you know, last year’s Department of Defense Appropriations Act provided partial funding for the third DDG-1000 and directed the Navy to budget for the remaining funding requirement in FY10. Congress expects the Navy to adhere to this direction; therefore, we write to urge your support for full funding of the DDG-1000 program in the FY10 President’s budget, and request that you continue a thorough and transparent review and evaluation of the Navy’s proposal to truncate the DDG-1000 program and restart DDG-51 production.

We remain very concerned about the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan. Despite several months of Congressional and Department of Defense requests for further analysis, the Navy has yet to provide sufficient justification in support of the proposal to truncate the DDG-1000 program and restart DDG-51 production. We continue to await an in-depth comparative analysis of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000. The Navy’s failure to provide such a detailed cost analysis strongly implies a lack of supporting documentation of the Navy’s position and undermines our confidence in the merits of the Navy’s plan to truncate the DDG-1000 program. Congress must have this information before acquiescing to a change of this magnitude.

Supporting the DDG-1000 program will enable the Navy to leverage $11 billion in already invested research and development funding. The ship has been designed with significant growth margins including power, cooling, space, and weight to enable rapid enhancements to meet evolving threats in the existing hull. We believe that continued production and delivery of DDG-1000 class destroyers is essential to the long-term stability of our shipbuilding program and the timely delivery of needed capabilities to the Navy.

With respect and appreciation, and thank you for considering this request.


Sincerely,


Edward M. Kennedy
Jack Reed
John F. Kerry
Sheldon Whitehouse
Nikki Tsongas
Patrick Kennedy
Michael Capuano
James McGovern
Michael Michaud
Paul Hodes
Richard Neal
James Langevin
Stephen Lynch

It is a quark that the only new shipbuilding program on cost and schedule is the DDG-1000. I still can't find anyone outside those directly involved in industry building the DDG-1000 who believes the program will actually stay on budget, anyone that is, except the Navy folks who testify in front of Congress under oath! You can't make this up...

I know it is unpopular to say, but if it was me, I'd build at least 4 DDG-1000s while moving with all haste into designing a brand new 10,000 ton future surface combatant (FSC) and a CG(X) intended to provide theater BMD.

I know, that choice sucks, but the sad reality is the shipbuilding plan is such a total disaster the DDG-1000 is the least painful way to support industry and transition towards a future plan. If you want to know who to blame, find the very top Admiral in the armed services and examine his record...

or simply ignore accountability, analysis, justification for decisions, and tell your political leaders to make defense decisions on a gut feeling, kind of like what the Navy is doing with the DDG-51. I'm sure in hindsight taxpayers will feel really good about those many billion dollar 'gut' decisions they advocate for in defense. Actually, the Navy is counting on exactly that.

15 Classified Intel Reports Say Stealth Ships Aren't Stealthy

The Washington Post is railing against defense earmarks, but that wasn't what got my attention.

And last July, when the Navy's top brass decided to end production of their newest class of destroyers -- in response to 15 classified intelligence reports highlighting their vulnerability to a range of foreign missiles -- seven Democratic senators quickly joined four Republicans to demand a reversal. They threatened to cut all funding for surface combat ships in 2009.

Later in the article.

Intelligence reports have warned that the ship will be unable to fend off missile threats, including an advanced missile being developed by China and simple ones already possessed by Hezbollah. As a result, the Navy agreed to end production of the hard-to-hide 14,000-ton vessels, capping the program at two ships instead of seven.

I'm not impressed with the political discussions in this article. Am I supposed to be impressed that independent sources have verified that the political party in power is receiving more political donations from the defense industry? Shocking...

What I find interesting is the "15 classified intelligence reports highlighting their vulnerability to a range of foreign missiles." I think someone, or 15 someones, suggest that stealth at sea has turned out to be unrealistic even against the electronic threats it is intended to defeat, as opposed to the visual MK 0 eyeball it fails to help against already.

Captain Hughes defined stealth at sea as cover. Some people don't like that definition, and those people are usually taking an Army or Marine point of view to cover. Appropriate if you ask me, the Navy has been taking an Air Force point of view to stealth. I think what is important it that environment matters, and specific concepts will be different because the environment is different.

I think Hughes was right to describe stealth at sea as cover, and the mistake to adopt other definitions and treat stealth at sea like stealth in the Air Force is why pirates operate with stealth off Somalia and the Navy actually believed it was a good idea to build 14,500 ton stealth battleships.

At Least That Debate is Strategic...

My colleagues at the United States Naval Institute have been reading this Proceedings article (subscription only) and a recent Navy Times article on the FFG-7 upgrade programs overseas, and are debating FFG-7 vs LCS here and here.

The FFG-7 vs LCS debate is a case where reasonable people can disagree, because we are talking about two very different capabilities and two unique ways of strategy towards the littoral. If you are looking for a debate to really boil your blood regarding what could have been, should have been, or perhaps the right question is what the #@&!...

Lets keep it in the SC-21 family and take a serious look at the DDG-1000.

The Great Debate About the Future Fleet Structure

In 1794 when the nation decided to build a Navy for the United States, the first thing the government did was talk to the shipbuilders. Talking to shipbuilders about Navy shipbuilding is a tradition in this country OLDER than the official Navy itself. The first name Congress knew relating to the Navy was not an Admiral or Commodore, it was a Quaker named Joshua Humphreys.

So when I see Admiral James Lyon's noting the absence of shipbuilding executives at the table regarding Naval shipbuilding problems today, I think he has a good point. Look, costs are challenging the Navy at every turn and the problem isn't specific to shipbuilding. The inflation of shipbuilding looks really bad right up until one calculates the inflation associated with manpower costs in general, and all of a sudden shipbuilding is just one of several issues. There are several aspects of Admiral Lyon's Washington Times piece that could be discussed, but this part stood out as a basis for any shipbuilding conversation.

There is now a great debate about the future structure of the U.S. Navy....

The debate has to do with what kind of naval surface ships the country needs to build for the future. Capable surface combatants are key because they are the backbone and most visible assets for safeguarding U.S. national security interests and ensuring freedom of the seas and economic stability. U.S. strategy has been to forward-deploy our naval forces as one of the key elements in maintaining the proper level of deterrence and stability, in order to meet our global responsibilities. Should deterrence fail, we have had the recognized naval combat power to prevail.

The United States is a global super power and must meet that obligation. Admiral Lyon's piece is specific to the shipbuilding industry, and perhaps that is his greatest concern right now. I have a different concern, and it is less industrial and more specific to strategy. I agree with everything I have quoted from the piece Admiral Lyon's has written, but I think everything I didn't quote is subject to debate, or put another way, is his opinion.

I think the debate begins with strategy, not industry, so I want to avoid the rest of Admiral Lyon's editorial which is almost entirely about industry. Unlike Admiral Lyon's, I do not think the Navy will get the high end of warfare wrong in their choice between the DDG-51 and DDG-1000. The Navy will ultimately choose the more capable platform that represents the best long term interest of the Navy, and if neither platform meets that requirement, I have every faith the Navy will design an entirely new large surface combatant. I see no reason to waver in my faith that the Navy will do everything possible to meet the high end requirements of surface warfare. This is the only aspect of Navy shipbuilding where my optimism overflows.

Where I am less optimistic is whether the Navy will attempt to optimize the use of the high end surface combatant fleet. I believe the flawed strategic vision in the Navy today is the faith that the same tools that win war in blue water can win the peacetime challenges in the littorals. The requirements are very different, and unless the Navy addresses the requirements at the peacemaking level they will not be effective in preventing crisis from developing into warfighting scenarios; OR a warfighting scenario will always be our peacemaking solution... which in my book is just as bad.

The littoral threats are evolving towards non-state challenges at the same time the littorals are becoming more and more populated. Unmanned systems will increase our lethality in war and decrease our requirements of manpower for being lethal, but there are limits to what technology can do as the RoE becomes more restrictive (as they tend to be in the littorals). The helicopter is a brilliant littoral strike platform, but becomes more limited as the RoE becomes more restrictive in environments where dissemination between the good guys and the bad guys are not easily done. The Navy requires a physical level of scouting (VBSS) to compliment their tremendous electronic and visual scouting capabilities that come from radar/EW and UAV technologies respectively. Physical scouting, unless someone has invented Terminator style robots I'm not aware of, means manpower and boarding operations.

Many experts have talked in the past about the necessity to have more than one type of fleet to address more than one type of challenge facing 21st century Navy forces. In general I tend to agree with this but I am cautious regarding how to implement such an idea. If it was to be done, the approach to take in my opinion would be two types of fleet strategic concepts, one centered on a hard power warfighter strategy as the dominant fleet, and one centered on a soft power peacemaker strategy as the subordinate fleet. This fits with Economy A/Economy B fleet ideas, and could be visualized and explained in terms of Nelson's battle line/cruisers operational model. I don't believe taking such an approach changes the fundamental 'global power projection navy' intent of the US Navy, rather embraces the distinction of hard and soft power with naval forces, and describes how one supports the other in war and peace (i.e Phase 0,1,2,3,4 operations).

I completely reject those who argue that small ships are a fighting force for a global power projection navy. This "Visby School" is built on the theories that technology has evolved so much that some missile FAC is able to effectively engage and sink fleets. On this blog history is used to guide strategy, and history suggests the record of FACs vs larger vessels is 43 sunk FACs against 0 kills, suggesting the "Visby School" is built on a foundation of shifting sand and unsound theories. I'm not saying this wouldn't be very effective off the Coast of Sweden, but I am saying it will not be effective in places where the US Navy is projecting power. It is like the Type 022 projecting power off the US west coast. Please stop, because I assure you some Apache Longbow battalion will impliment a blue paint artificial reef project of Type 022 hulls in that scenario. The same would be true of Visby School strategy in projecting naval power.

It is the helicopter, or other similar armed man or unmanned aviation platform; that represents the strike platform of choice in the littorals. Small ships are absolutely necessary in the future fleet of the US Navy, but their primary payload is not missiles, it is people.

I do not believe the Navy should put ASMs on small ships, or try to arm them to fight major combatants, as this does not represent either their primary function to the fleet nor the environment small ships are needed to operate in today. The weapon systems would be gun based and the payload manpower centric. The Navy today is in dire need of a peacemaking force for stability operations at sea, security enforcement, SOF, soft power training and engagement, and humanitarian response ships. The littorals represent some of the most manpower intensive requirements facing the future US Navy, and a littoral force is not intended to fight modern battle fleets rather help build partnership with global coast guards to increase the security apparatus of the maritime domain. Small ships are the beat cops and manned nodes of a Maritime Domain Awareness network in troubled, populated littorals.

I believe the nation needs small ships to support the US Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard when peacemaking requirements force them to be the point of contact with irregular forces operating in the complex populated maritime environment the littorals represent. Any small ships built should be prepared to fight the irregular threats, not conventional threats, and those ships should look the part so they hopefully don't have to. Because manpower is costly, the approach to the littorals should be a joint service approach, if for no other reason than to insure the manpower costs are spread around while the individual capabilities and specialties of the various maritime services are utilized efficiently.

I believe motherships for manned and unmanned systems will be at least as important in the 21st century as the aircraft carrier was in the 20th century. The ability to field unmanned ASW, MIW, ASuW, and AAW systems will change the way the US Navy fights war, particularly as these systems develop autonomous capabilities that don't require direct network links for decision making. Unmanned systems increase range, lethality, endurance, etc.. for warfighting, which is the basis for why I don't believe the Navy needs as many sailors to be lethal in wartime in the 21st century. That means our future high intensity conflict force can afford to have less manpower and remain or increase capabilities towards being lethal.

But unmanned systems are limited to scouting and kinetic solutions only; they cannot replace the roles of manpower centric operation at sea. This is why the USS Vella Gulf and USS Mahan act as motherships for both unmanned aviation platforms, manned H-60s, and manned RHIBs when fighting pirates. They are essentially acting as motherships for manpower intensive operations, and are not being used in an optimal way that utilizes their capability.

This is sending the wrong message, an image that takes a thousand words to explain. Using very large ships to combat speed boats suggests to the American people that the Navy has ignored requirements at the maritime security level while also suggesting large surface combatants may not be necessary because they are used in this role. In a time of dwindling fiscal capacity for naval funding, and a time when the Navy is absolutely awful at communicating with the American people the requirements currently burdening the fleet, sending the wrong perception is an unaffordable approach.

I think the Navy can do these operations with a corvette/PC and LCS combination instead of AEGIS ships and be far more productive along a broader set of low intensity roles. Using AEGIS cruisers and destroyers acting as the principal point of contact vessels is inefficient use of necessary high end capabilities. The Navy needs to invest a little money in order to save a ton of money managing these low intensity challenges, and do so while increasing capability across the broad spectrum of low intensity challenges in the process.

The LCS cannot be a manned mothership due to the flaw of limited berthing space, which really pisses me off btw. The LCS only has a core crew of 40, and it has been suggested that none of that 40 man crew is intended to qualify for VBSS operations, another point I am not happy about if true. A flight crew of 20 is intended to support 1 H-60 and 3 Fire Scouts. Freedom can carry 2 H-60s and 3 Fire Scouts in that hanger; I measured when I was on the ship; but to carry all the equipment possible the module crew of 15 gets shifted to make up the additional flight crew.

That leaves no crew available for unmanned systems necessary for supporting littoral operations, or berthing for manned VBSS teams necessary at the point of contact with the enemy, much less both. People who suggest the Navy can fill the module bays with berthing modules don’t get the concept in my opinion. Not only are the module bays the loudest part of the ship outside the engine room when the turbines are running, but that space is critical to the primary capability of deploying unmanned systems. Fixing the manpower issues to optimize the use of the LCS for the complex human terrain of the littorals needs to be the primary focus in any early evolutions of the platform. More than speed or survivability or weapons kit or any other criticism of the LCS, the inability to support sufficient manpower for littoral operations ranks highest as the limiting factor of a platform intended to operate in the littorals.

While manpower issues prevent flexibility, the LCS is as good a place as any to start for the Navy’s initial approach to unmanned systems. It has tremendous potential for growth as a C2 node in a battle force network. It is badly named; LCS should stand for Littoral Combat Support, because the LCS role in the fleet is in every sense a support ship for enabling other vessels to do their work. The problem is the Navy didn't build any other vessels to operate in the littoral environment for the LCS to support. The one that they planned to build grew into a 14,500 ton money sucking pig, and will hopefully be truncated at 2-3 ships.

So I say build the supporting network. Operating beside four corvettes/PC each carrying a squad of Marines or Coast Guard detachment, the LCS becomes a C2 system for supporting a full rifle platoon or a bunch of Coast Guard capabilities with this squadron package. The LCS carries the manned aviation that can support plenty of operational RHIB teams from the corvette/PC manned motherships, and each corvette/PC can support UAVs similar to how very small vessels like the M-80 have proven they can support ScanEagles. Most importantly, our $500+ million LCS doesn't become the point of contact vessel in the complex irregular sea space, our corvettes/PCs do, which reduces the risk to the LCS and allows it to stand off with NLOS 30mms, and a 57mm. The LCS was designed to be a standoff support vessel, not a hunter, so I suggest the Navy needs to maximize the LCS as a standoff support vessel by building littorals hunters.

To be honest, I don't want the Navy to try to turn the LCS into a strictly manned mothership though, unmanned systems are too important to throw another requirement at the LCS after the fact. Optimize the LCS for an additional helicopter and some VBSS capabilities and call it a day. The Navy needs to get unmanned systems right with the LCS, and 55 is fine IF there are PCs/corvettes for the LCS to support in the complex littorals. If the Navy isn't doing that, and is trying to make the LCS the one-ship-fits-all solution, I suggest the Navy cuts the LCS build at 26 to replace the mine ships and rethinks the surface warfare approach at the low end in the littorals.

That final point is important. This High / Low talk gets all fouled up as historical bias and futuristic perspectives attempt to define what high / low means in the emerging maritime era. Too many people want to suggest that low end combatants need to be able to fight and survive in high end environments, and to do so the Navy should stack missiles of all kinds on small combatants. I disagree. Small ships may support operations in high intensity warfare, but their roles will still be within their capability toolkit (like supporting MIW or escort operations in chokepoints).

High/Low end today for me means how the Navy addresses Hard/Soft power operational demands with fleet forces. It is about warfighting/peacemaking, and can be (with a lot of words) used to describe conventional/irregular warfare scenarios. I want to see the Navy optimize their high end AEGIS fleet for dominance of the maritime domain when dealing with wartime challenges (train as you intend to fight). I also want to see the Navy optimize the low end to address the Phase 0 and Phase 4 operations in the littoral environment (ABOT and KAAOT is a great example, good thing Iraq has a relatively small coast line).

The Navy should do low intensity with Amphibious ships, MSC, and small combatants; supporting the NECC, Coast Guard, Marines, and other government agencies. The Navy shouldn't be doing this with aircraft carriers, submarines, or AEGIS destroyers. The reason the Navy should build more amphibious ships, MSC, and small combatants is to optimize the use of their heavy warfare aircraft carriers, submarines, and AEGIS ships. Those platforms are going to be more expensive, and the Navy is going to need as many as possible. The Navy must insure the optimal use of high end warships since the cost of high intensity conflict capabilities are making the high end ships more difficult to both build and operate.

An aircraft, including a UAV with exceptional endurance, is not a substitute for presence in the littorals. Their options are limited to watching or destroying. The littorals come with baggage today, just like as the land forces found out in Iraq. When talking about complex populated environments, or the human terrain on the battlefield, the United States doesn't have a political system that enables a RoE for shooting first and asking questions later. In fact, the military often has to ask questions first, which requires a human interaction, and if they don't trust the answer, they may have to verify with physical scouting, another human centric action. A helicopter can do the first part, but it takes a boarding team to do the second.

So in general, I agree with Admiral Lyons that surface combatants are key to the shipbuilding debate, but I think that debate is far more complex than can be summarized in an editorial anymore. The US Navy is way beyond the point where less than 1000 words can even begin to touch the complexities of a shipbuilding discussion, ANY part of it actually. For its part the Navy is silent on the complex challenges they are facing regarding both shipbuilding and manpower, and the industry is simply following the Navy's lead in regards to shipbuilding.

The fleet of today is the best starting place for deciding where the Navy should be striving to be with the fleet of the future, and if the Navy isn't connecting the cost issues related to manpower with the cost issues related to building new ships, then the Navy is not connecting all the dynamics that are directly effecting the fleet constitution strategy needed to deal with 21st century challenges.

A Defense Program With Its Own PAC?

Is it possible for a specific defense program to have its own Political Action Committee? Or something similar...

Just Might be!

It is actually a smart idea. Keep in mind this platform may have touch to as many as half a million American jobs, is the only Navy shipbuilding program on cost and schedule, and is much more advanced than what we intend to replace it with. It might even end up the same cost as the lesser capable replacement, we just don't know...

There is much disinformation about this program. DDG-1000 is such a strange concept for a ship anyway, and because no one has been able to establish any credible authority the rest of us don't really know who to believe.

Analysis of the Navy's FY 2010 Surface Combatant Options

In Chris Cavas's article the other day, he notes the Navy's FY10 30-year budget to include four major surface combatants: DDG-1000, DDG-51 Flight III, Future Surface Combatant, and CG(X).

These are my observations regarding what I think is going on.

It is important to remember the Navy has not received a top line budget figure (that we know of) from the new administration, so the FY 2010 30-year shipbuilding plan Chris Cavas is discussing in his Defense News article is a bookmark, nothing more than a Christmas list reflecting what the Navy would do if money existed for all items. I don't think it is inaccurate to suggest there appears to be a strategy behind the plan, but that strategy appears to me to be political.

When the Navy announced USS Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001) as the name of the second Zumwalt class, it left no doubt the Navy intends to build this ship. There is no chance in hell the Navy will dishonor him by not building this ship, regardless of the costs. I also don't believe the Navy is too concerned with the result of FY 2009 that partially funds DDG-1002, but I do not believe we will see DDG-1002 named until either late 2010 or sometime in 2011, nor do I believe we will ever see the ship built at all.

The Navy will build the first two DDG-1000s, regardless of cost, but will hold the money for DDG-1002 as long as possible as a safety net. While the Zumwalt class has no cost growth, and has a very mature design relative to when naval warships usually begin construction, there does appear to be a lot of concern the ship will be more expensive than estimated. This means the Navy will hold the funds for DDG-1002 and use them if necessary to complete the first two Zumwalts if cost growth occurs. The Navy intends to fight any additional funding for more Zumwalts.

In my opinion, building 2 is the right decision, and not building any more than two is also the right decision. No matter how hard I try to like this ship, it is a disaster of requirements planning and had no business ever being designed the way it was anyway. It is intellectually insulting to watch the Navy spend huge amounts of money for a 14,500 ton stealth hull, then design the vessel for optimal operations in a littoral environment which is also the most populated part of the sea, and then decide to make the main weapon system of this stealth littoral (star)ship Zumwalt the loudest naval gun developed since World War II. In my opinion, this is the kind of contradictory nonsense we see everywhere in the results of the SC-21 development process.

The LCS is another perfect example of these contradicting capabilities. Why in the world would someone think any ship should be emphasized for speed and space, when the result of filling space is to add weight that reduces the speed. We look very stupid to the rest of the world when the primary capabilities of our "21st century" warship designs are in direct contradiction of one another. I want to believe the Navy is smart enough not to buy into what is being sold here.

The final piece of the SC-21 program is the CG(X), what Chris Cavas notes is a 22,000 ton nuclear powered ballistic missile defense juggernaut. The Navy apparently intends to build 8 hulls, one every three years beginning in 2017. This ship makes no sense though, and appears to be included in the FY 2010 budget as a major budget distraction. Do the math, even assuming the Navy uses the LPD-17 hull and minimizes requirement creep to the minimum, with nuclear power this ship will run on average around 5 billion dollars per ship, roughly 1/2 the cost of a Ford class aircraft carrier.

It doesn't make any sense though, because ballistic missile defense requires more than one ship, a tracker and a shooter. Why in the world would the Navy build a 22,000 ton hull to be both tracker and shooter in one platform? If the Navy is serious about ballistic missile defense, and they appear to be serious enough about BMD to cancel major shipbuilding programs and inject a healthy dose of uncertainty into the shipbuilding sector, they will take a distributed network approach to shooters and trackers. The only reason the Navy would put a 22,000 ton nuclear powered BMD ship into the budget is to make a political point regarding the high cost of nuclear power, and to insure there is an easy target for the budget axe. Clearly the Navy has no intention to ever build this ship, which means its addition to the shipbuilding budget is for political purposes, not strategic purposes.

I believe Admiral Roughead is doing everything he can to kill all of SC-21, and after reading Gene Taylors announcement on Thursday I believe that includes the LCS. We have all seen this movie before, it was just last year out of nowhere members of the House came along and began questioning the DDG-1000 due to cost in the shipbuilding budget, and on Thursday Gene Taylor did it again, this time attacking the Littoral Combat Ship. He has an excellent case to make, lets review the history of this program.

• The first LCS, LCS-1 was funded in FY05 and was delivered September 18th, 2008.
• The second LCS, LCS-2 launched April 26th, 2008, and has yet to conduct sea trials yet.
• The third LCS, LCS-3 was canceled by the Navy in Apirl of 2007 after cost overruns.
• The fourth LCS, LCS-4 was canceled by the Navy in November of 2007 after cost overruns.
• The fifth and sixth LCS were canceled by the Navy in March 2007 so funds could be used to cover other program costs.
• The seventh LCS, LCS-5 ended up having its funds rescinded by Congress in September of 2008 as part of the FY09 defense appropriations act.
• The eighth and ninth LCS funded in the FY09 defense appropriations act are to be combined with any LCS purchased this year as part of a contract for 5 ships.

If the Navy buys no LCS in FY 2010, Congress can just rescind the funding from FY 2009, and five years later the Navy ends up with two single class LCS technology demonstrators, just like they end up with two DDG-1000 technology demonstrators. In other words, SC-21 goes down in history as the modern ABCD, but instead of a squadron of evolution or the "white squadron" we end up with the fleet of revolution, what I'd call the "black eye squadron" which ironically went full circle in its revolutionary approach only to slap the Navy in the face.

So if we are stopping the DDG-1000 at two ships, and the CG(X) has been gold plated to the point it will never be built in a period of tight budgets, and Gene Taylor is beginning a new crusade against a broken LCS ship concept... what will the Navy build?

In FY 2010 the Navy hopes to fund at least one DDG-51, and regardless of what John Young says the Navy most likely intends to build it exactly as Admiral McCullough told Congress, a Flight IIA design with AEGIS BMD additions, or what I am calling DDG-51 Flight III. The Navy would then build 2 of these Flight III ships in FY 2011. These three hulls would act as a cost certain bridge towards a Future Surface Combatant that may or may not be available by FY 2012. If it isn't ready, then the Navy will build more Flight III ships to fill the time delay.

Look, I know lots of people think the Navy intends to gold plate a DDG-51 Flight III, and yes John Young would like to see AMDR added, but I don't see that being where the Navy goes. Gates has made clear that 75% solutions are just fine, and no matter how you look at it, brand new DDG-51 Flight IIIs with SPY-1 and AEGIS BMD are the very best ships being built today anywhere in the world. SC-21 has made us look stupid, but we have such a lead over competitors our fallback position is still more advanced than anything being built by any competitors, so the Navy is smart to make use of our situation to get back on the right track.

In the meantime we do what must be done to move towards a future surface combatant, what I like to call CLG-9. Yes, it will be an evolved Burke hull, and from what I understand the Burke can evolve up to ~11,600 tons, and was originally going to be something like that back in the early 90s before the Navy decided otherwise, and went with what we call Flight IIA instead. The design has a ton of room for growth, the designs have been verified for exactly that for more than a decade, and it is not a terrible thing we are only now looking into options. I have no idea what it will be, and quite honestly, if it can be built well at a reasonable cost in good numbers I don't know that I care about the specific details, just as long as the intent is to evolve technology instead of revolutionize.

There are 18 FSCs in the budget, and I believe the Navy will be quite content when the CG(X) gets the budget axe and the money gets shifted for more than 18 FSCs. Either way the FSC allows the Navy to move forward at an evolutionary pace while fixing whatever processes helped develop the ridiculous, inconsistent, constantly contradictory requirements that resulted in the DDG-1000 and LCS platforms, and turned US Navy surface combatant development into the punchline of a really bad joke.

You thought FY 2009 was fun watching the DDG-1000 go down, FY 2010 is beginning to look from this section of the cheap seats to be an even wilder ride. BYOB.