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| Carl Vinson (Image courtesy Library of Congress) |
There have been
several
interesting
articles
of late that touch on the politics of U.S. naval strength. I’ve discussed the
topic with a number of friends and colleagues, and unsurprisingly I’ve heard a
wide range of views. One thing I think they’re all in agreement on is that we
were clearly approaching a strategic precipice even before the Budget
Control Act of 2011.
It strikes me
that any political strategy for preserving a strong Navy ought to be informed
by how that very strength was politically achieved in the first place. We know that the
political path to a global U.S. Navy began with the naval authorization acts of
the 1880s and 1890s, was amplified in the ‘second to none’ Naval Act of 1916, and was cemented in Naval
Authorization Acts of 1934-1940. I personally can’t say I know much about how the sponsors of these acts or their navalist backers achieved what they did, though.
For example,
while it’s well understood that Carl Vinson was the driving political force
behind the pre-Second World War U.S. naval rearmament, how exactly did he gain the support of those in other positions of
Congressional and Executive power who were necessary for passage?
Granted, his efforts benefitted from the fact that President Franklin D.
Roosevelt was an unabashed navalist, but Roosevelt was not always fully on
board with Vinson’s initiatives. How did he obtain Roosevelt’s active
cooperation when possible and Constitutional consent when necessary? What specific
roles did the Navy’s leaders of the era play? The media? Advocacy groups? How
did global events factor in? Did the general public play any roles, and if so to
what degree did navalists reach out to them to obtain their support or
otherwise get them engaged?
I find what
Vinson achieved in 1934 particularly remarkable. Amidst substantial American political opposition to rearmament
and overseas entanglements, Vinson and his Senate counterpart Park Trammell got
the first of the major interwar naval authorization acts passed through
Congress. It seems likely that selling naval investment as a Great Depression
jobs program helped, but it’s not clear to me just how much that offset the
arguments of those opposed.
Therefore, if you’ve
read (or written) books or journal articles that contribute to answering
questions similar to the ones I outlined for any of the aforementioned periods,
please share the titles in the comments thread. And if you’re in college or
grad school and are searching for historical naval policy topics of great contemporary
relevance to write about for coursework—and then perhaps get published—I don’t
think you can go wrong exploring the late 19th and early 20th
Century political paths to U.S. naval strength.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and
are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official
positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do
not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any
U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.
