US Soft Power in Ukraine is Missing Hard Power's Escalation Control

The most frustrating thing about watching events unfold in the Ukraine is the realization that the United States apparently learned nothing from the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. If you recall the invasion of Georgia in 2008 by Russia, you will also recall it took place right in the middle of an American election. It would appear that timing favored Russia, because lessons were apparently not learned, indeed there is scant evidence the issue was truly studied.

Today, in nearly every avenue of action, tactical options are being discussed on how to 'react' to Russia's occupation of Crimea. For the last 5+ years, time has been lost that could have been used developing a policy that included strategic options for how to deal with aggressive Russian military behavior. Many of those options are finally being explored (like working the region towards energy independence from Russia) but they are years away from being employed, and lack value in dealing with the current crisis.

In 2007 the United States Navy developed the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in which the strategic object of preventing war was elevated to a primary mission statement of the US Navy. There was some hope that the DoD would adopt this stance as part of it's lexicon of capabilities provided. In rhetoric, the DoD demonstrated some appreciation for the concept of preventing war, but there is scant evidence the strategic object has been developed into an actual capability. Planning and rhetoric aside, the United States right now needs to prevent a war in the Ukraine. Yes, Russia has invaded the Crimea, and is using military power - but this is not a war, yet. Should the shooting start inside the Ukraine, the distinction between the non-violent occupation by the Russian military and an all out shooting war will be made evident, so no need to parse definitions.

As of Tuesday March 4, 2014, success for President Obama's soft power diplomacy policy depends entirely on preventing a war inside the Ukraine. I have been observing two starting assumptions represented in the mainstream assumptions of many "experts." I guess I am naïve to reject the prevailing wisdom of experts, time will tell.

First, I do not underestimate Putin, and I believe too many important people in this process are underestimating Russia right now. I have seen a number of media and political folks who talk to the White House regularly speak as if they believe Putin is acting from a position of weakness, and that Putin has somehow lost control of the situation and is improvising. Please stop. The EU is who lost control of the situation, and everyone has been scrambling ever since as Russia has set the parameters for the conditions inside the Ukraine to date. This administration has a history of underestimating Putin right up to the point where they get kicked sideways and told what the end game is - which seem to always favor Russia and leaves the US in a poker game holding a pair of twos trying to save face. This Rice/Kerry/Hagel team has yet to win on the field of play in foreign policy has no business underestimating this or any opponent, and has every reason to continuously expect the unexpected. The US must shape conditions favorably when given any opportunity, and right now I do not see the United States taking this kind of full court press approach to suggest we are in it to win it.

Second, I believe we are overestimating our ability to shape the outcome. Today NATO met and started discussing the situation, and tomorrow the EU will meet and start discussing their options. The US really needs the assistance of both NATO and the EU to prevent a war and shape the outcome favorably to our interests, but I am unsure the US will ultimately get much assistance from either the EU or NATO. It didn't even take 24 hours for both Germany and Great Britain to fold on economic and trade sanctions as a form of diplomatic coercion, and with the constant reinforcement in rhetoric by Senior US officials that there are no military options, I think it is absolutely clear that the study of strategy is completely dead in the DoD today. The effectiveness of the President's preferred soft power approach to crisis resolution depends on a single condition - that war inside the Ukraine is prevented. I am unclear how the US or Europe can guarantee that war is prevented inside the Ukraine without deterring the further use of Russian military power, and even though the situation might not escalate into a war, diplomatic success depends on the guarantee that war is prevented.

The US needs to shape conditions towards a favorable diplomatic solution, and I am not convinced the US is doing this today.

I believe Russia's primary objective is to take Crimea without using violent military force. Russia believes they can play a long game, wait out the Ukrainian military forces still inside Crimea, and eject those forces from the region. I am not one of those who believes Russia will simply annex Crimea, rather Russia will establish an autonomous state like they did in Georgia with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Just like in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia is the only country that wins that arrangement. The US needs to be thinking right now how to handle this outcome - because this is the best case outcome right now and we know it. History shows US policy over time does nothing but punish the people inside those regions, not Russia, so the US clearly needs to start the hard work of developing a new policy that addresses the situation more realistically.

I believe President Obama and the United States could potentially soon be standing alone against Russia on the issue of the occupation of Crimea in the Ukraine. I am not convinced the US can apply sanctions unilaterally without serious blowback by Russia, but maybe we can? It seems to me the US needs to define exactly what our national interest is in the Ukraine before we apply sanctions, because there are ways that Russia can put pressure on other, well defined, national interests in a game of diplomatic warfare against one another. I have no idea if President Obama sees the Ukraine situation as a national interest to the US, because I am yet to hear him articulate his argument why the crisis in Ukraine unfolding is a national interest of the US.

If we assume the occupation of Crimea represents a threat to our national interests, and I do believe it is, the US must guarantee that we do everything possible to prevent escalation of hostilities. To do so, the US must deter Russia from taking any further territory with military force. I am of the opinion that if 1) Russia starts facing a violent confrontation in any form, including insurgency, or 2) if our diplomatic warfare activities actually hurt Russia, that Russia will seek to occupy more territory in the Ukraine with hard military power, and will not hesitate to create a refugee problem with hard power. Ukrainian authorities continue to observe, every day, that Russia is massing more troops on the Russian border side of the Kharkov, Luhansk and Donetsk regions. If things start to go unfavorably for Russia, as of today nothing exists that will stop Putin from drawing a line from Kharkov to Odessa and occupying all points East. I don't think Putin is interested in a prolonged occupation, but that territory would given Russia several key advantages in diplomatic negotiations - including not just the territories, but a forced relocation refugee problem that would make everything inside the Ukraine considerably more complicated for any nation attempting to support the Ukraine with economic packages.

Obama has several military options to prevent a war. First, NATO could establish a air defense zone over Ukraine. If NATO is conducting the anti-air defense of Ukraine, the Russian military is not going to find success advancing in the Ukraine while being bombed from the air by the Ukrainian Air Force while also fighting the Ukrainian Army on the ground. NATO support for the Ukraine towards Air Superiority over the Ukraine would add significant assurance to the situation on the ground inside the Ukraine that Russia would not further advance militarily. I do not understand why the US DoD hasn't already been out front with this military option, diplomacy depends on the prevention of further hostilities, and the US is often quick to discuss setting up no-fly zones over enemy states, but is somehow slow in providing the same level of support to people we call friends?

NATO should also start mobilizing MIW capabilities just outside the Black Sea in case they are needed, because if the port in Odessa gets blocked by Russia, logistics is going to get very difficult for the Ukraine quickly. The railroads in the region are not that great, and cannot support Ukraine if - for any reason - access to the port of Odessa becomes restricted. Bryan discussed the need for more US seapower, but in my analysis of the kind of seapower the US would use in a situation like this given the various treaty obligations and operational challenges, the US Navy doesn't really field the kind of naval capabilities most needed for this type of conflict prevention strategic objective with the exception of the Littoral Combat Ship. The capabilities at sea needed are those for operating in the littoral, functional for electronic warfare and ISR, and capable of MIW. A CVN in the Eastern Med could sink the entire Black Sea Fleet in a day if it came to that, but this is about sea control without hostilities - soft power at-sea capabilities, not hard power like aircraft carriers. I'm not convinced even the LCS is a good fit for this crisis, but a combat capable corvette certainly would be. Other NATO nations have that capability, so perhaps US Navy logistics is the best capability for the US Navy to bring to this type of war prevention engagement.

Finally, NATO should commit some special units for military training and Ukrainian Army readiness inside the Ukraine - and do it starting today. The presence needs not be large, but the need to prevent war demands reassurance to the Ukrainian military to reinforce professionalism and maintain preparations towards the prevention of escalation of conflict with Russia. Sending ground forces in gives the US and EU escalation control, and does not represent escalation of tensions in and of itself - in fact it stabilizes tensions. The cost of these type of engagement activities in prevention of war pales in comparison to the costs of a refugee crisis on the border of yet another NATO nation, and one look at the refugee crisis coming from Syria should be a reminder that preventing a war before it starts is an excellent investment by NATO compared to reacting to the conditions of war after the the shooting starts.

It is incredible to me that the DoD has offices like Air-Sea Battle and the Office of Strategic Landpower and yet the DoD seems incapable of offering what I see as obvious military options that help deter Russia from further conflict. My biggest concern is that these military options have been presented to the President, and the Obama Administration (Susan Rice?) rejected these options, because I believe rejecting such options would represent nothing short of faith based foreign policy absent the serious substance necessary to control conditions in the real world; a political decision that, in my opinion, would justify every criticism related to weakness and incompetence of the administration and the people in it made to date.

As of today there are no obvious efforts being made towards preventing escalation of the crisis in the Ukraine by Russia if they choose to do so, even though US diplomatic activities will - by intent and presumably by effect if effective - escalate the crisis by imposing costs on Russia. Hard power in the form of forward deployed military presence represents the deterrence capability necessary to empower the effectiveness of diplomatic solutions by the Obama administration, and has the capacity to contain crisis through the stabilization of conditions that work favorably for our diplomatic soft power.

If the US is unwilling to set conditions for US diplomacy to work, expect the conditions to be changed by Russia in a way that works unfavorably against our diplomatic activity.

Coast Guard as a Means of National Power

I received many great comments and e-mails, in response to my post a few weeks ago looking for thoughts as to ways the USCG was a national instrument of power and how best to articulate that value to the public.  A standard method at looking at the various elements of national power is to group them in one of four general areas, Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic.  This is the DIME model (as one commenter pointed out, there is a body of opinion that DIME is an outdated model in that other kinds of power elements may also be found.  I recognize this perspective, but personally prefer DIME, so I will use it here).

The thoughts on "how" were generally similar to my own:

The USCG is able to project US power and influence through when, where and over whom it exercises law enforcement jurisdiction, those with whom it works, trains, exercises, deploys, and when it is able to respond to a contingency, especially when already deployed.

All of this works well within the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which is a great expression of how the efforts of the three sea services should fit together.

Across the USCG's 11 missions, I find six, Drug interdiction, Living marine resources, Defense readiness, Migrant interdiction, Ice operations, and Other law enforcement, that regularly fit within my definition.  My list is somewhat flexible as there are certainly times when the other five missions (Ports, waterways, and coastal security, Aids to navigation, Search and rescue, Marine safety, and Marine environmental protection) can also be flexed.  I am attempting to parse out missions that regularly reflect elements of power, rather than simply may appear on an international stage.  Feel free to fire away in comments.


The USCG's work in these six missions won't always be an exercise of power, but, looking at the elements of DIME, many of the activities undertaken in these missions do fit in at least one of the elements of power.


I will build on some of the specifics in my next several posts.

The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard. Nor should they be construed as official or reflecting the views of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

Additional Thoughts on Iranian Naval Diplomacy

This is my response to several email responses who either suggest, imply, or outright state that I am a fool for suggesting in my last post that Iran is exposing weaknesses in the US Navy. You bet your fancy pants they are exposing our weaknesses, because they are exploiting the US Navy's inability or lack of desire to deter political influence from naval diplomacy being applied to our economy from a competitive state.

Two Iranian ships are exercising naval diplomacy near the Suez Canal. The Israeli's are freaking out, likely for valid reasons, but largely for reasons that aren't being well disseminated in the media. The impact to the oil markets as of earlier this morning was $.90 a bbl and the US uses 21 million bbl per day. The political influence inflicted by Iran has already cost the US around $19 million in oil futures in 24 hours - mind you from the naval diplomacy of a corvette and a tanker which is operating right next to a US Navy Carrier Strike Group.

Future prices are hedges and are influenced heavily by actions, and the perception of those actions. The increase in price of oil reflects concern over Iranian ships, and when you think about it, the challenge to influence investors is rooted in either ignorance to the dangers two ships represent to a global market or lack of confidence in the deterrence methods of maintaining stability in the markets. The "perception" aspect matters in this market, so the ability to influence perception is an important capability in this case.

Now, according to the US Navy's own strategy, the US Navy claims its global responsibilities include the stability and freedom of access to sea lines of communication, meaning the primary strategic justification for supporting the organization you belong to is to maintain stability for purposes of commerce. How do we reconcile the strategic justification of your organization juxtaposed with the political and economic influence being applied to us by the political influence through naval diplomacy of a couple Iranian ships? The key question here is whether the Navy is a deterrence to that Iranian political influence or not? I believe the US Navy should accept as a primary role to ALWAYS be a deterrence to the naval diplomacy of regimes like Iran.

If we extrapolate the influence Iran is applying to the global oil market, in the last 24 hours alone they have had at least $100 million impact - with a f-in corvette no less! Oh btw, who gets to sell oil at higher prices?

This little corvette and tanker just paid for itself many times over with a single deployment.

If the US Navy as an organization doesn't see a role for itself in the strategic politics of situations like this, then I'm thinking I need to question the value of our nations investment in naval forces. If the Navy as an organization considers itself too big to manage the complexities of strategic competition absent a shooting war, then taxpayers and Congressmen should rightfully ask whether the return on investment in the Navy by the taxpayer is worth it.

The strategic political competition in peacetime is being fought today in the information and communication space. Either the Navy learns to engage that fight during the information era, or needs to give up money to other instruments of national power that will engage that geopolitical competition.

Final Exams!

Here is my fall 2010 National Security Policy final exam:

Answer one of the following three questions. Your exam is due in two hours.

1. The Obama administration has pursued a “reset” of relations with Russia. What security dividends, if any, has this reset paid? What costs has the reset incurred to the United States? How important to the US is a good relationship with Russia?
2. Outline the pitfalls associated with the use of military force in response to North Korean provocations. How should the US and its allies (Japan and South Korea) evaluate the utility of force in their relationship with North Korea?
3. Discuss the costs and benefits of a long-term NATO commitment to Afghanistan. How important is it that the US achieve its preferred objectives in Afghanistan, and what should those objectives be?

The exam takes the form of (and is designed as preparation for) a minor MA field exam in National Security. National Security majors have to answer two of four questions. The questions are typically tailored with the specific interests of the students vaguely in mind (a China specialist is likely to receive a China question), but also reflect the idea that students graduating with a national security credential should have some baseline knowledge of the most important problems and issues.

The full comprehensive normally involves two major questions, one minor, and two "professional," with the latter being drawn from the general Patterson curriculum, and from current events. Students have eight hours to write on those five questions, and must defend their answers in a one hour oral exam.

It's a fun process. My column this week at WPR is about the archipelago of foreign policy schools in the United States, and is the first in what should be an intermittent series of columns about graduate foreign policy education.

President Reponds With Modern Gunboat Diplomacy

The President of the United States, no matter who it is, never gets to make easy choices in foreign policy. The recent clash between North and South Korea presents nothing but very tough choices. While the Army is fighting two wars on land, the Navy is being called to the northwest Pacific ocean to keep the peace. Naval power has been doing exactly this for nations going back thousands of years, but that doesn't make the task any easier this time.

First, let me state up front that I am concerned things are more serious than our nations political leaders want to admit. We may be on the brink of renewed hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, but neither the administration nor the media are projecting that level of concern. That is likely part of the political calculation that came with the decision for this specific action, but not warning the public of the gravity of the situation may not have been a good decision. Likely driven by a down economy and with the intent not to spook the market, it seems pretty clear to me the administration is attempting to portrait a mood of calm in this situation. That is probably wise, but if things do not go as planned over the next week or so the result will be a political catastrophe for the United States.

As the news outlets are starting to report, the United States is exercising a bit of gunboat diplomacy by sending a remarkably well armed naval task force into the Yellow Sea. The audience here is China, and this move will piss them off big time, thus must be intended to humiliate Chinese leadership. The most likely outcome here is 2 billion pissed off Chinese. That makes our policy an interesting approach, and potentially smarter than it sounds.

In part this is a game of chicken with the childish North Korean leadership that acts out in temper tantrums when they want something - and right now North Korea wants many things. In part though, this is also a game of chicken with daddy. China has repeatedly warned the US of consequences for moving an aircraft carrier into the Yellow sea, and many Generals have made threats including advocacy in editorials that China should strike with military power should the United States move a carrier into the Yellow Sea. It is one thing to play chicken with a spoiled brat, and quite another to play chicken with big daddy.

By making this move, we are changing the issue from one of a skirmish to one of an out of control belligerent state in need of a spanking, and we are focusing the worlds attention towards China demanding they wield the paddle. As a big picture move, which means a policy reaction to the skirmish that also includes the newly disclosed uranium nuclear facility as part of the problem, China is being accused and held accountable for all belligerence activities of North Korea. The President is decided upon a risky but otherwise bold response in the face of this belligerence. Is it smart or dumb? Depends on the results...

It is possible the reason the naval exercise were put off until Sunday is to give China time to condemn North Korean aggression, thus take the lead and reduce the need to move the GW into the Yellow Sea. Will China join the international community and condemn North Korea? Unlikely, however I wouldn't rule it out, and I would imagine there must be a block inside Chinese leadership that is advocating this. 2010 has been a brutal year for Chinese prestige and the recent skirmish between North and South Korea appears poised to further discredit China with their neighbors in the region. I tend to think the Obama administration hasn't miscalculated our understanding regarding the size of the Chinese egos involved in this situation, rather I just don't believe President Obama cares anymore if the PRC takes an ego bruise for their position. Said another way, President Obama is thinking China might act responsibly, allowing him to offload some of the worlds concern for responsibility on Chinese leadership. From what I have seen watching China's leadership, I don't see it happening.

Moving the George Washington Carrier Strike Group into the Yellow Sea is bold, and carries a great deal of risk. This move will piss of Chinese leadership, and that will insure plenty of propaganda that enrages China's population. I don't expect China to attack the US Navy, but I do expect China to respond in a serious and potentially harsh way. The US is making a safe bet that nothing will happen and no one will be foolish enough to attack the US and South Korean naval forces. It is a good bet, but it is still a bet - and anyone who bets knows the rule: you can lose any bet.

I also believe we are making a move not unlike March 1996 when then President Clinton ordered the Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups to sail through the Taiwan Strait. The consequence of that move was a vow by China of "never again," a vow we are actually about to challenge in a different region off China's coast. The unintended consequence of Clinton's policy decision has been the most remarkable modernization in human history of the worlds largest Army, Navy, and Air Force. In less than 14 years, China's military has essentially jumped 2 generations of combat capability. That is a remarkable pace, and highlights how no one can predict what reaction will come from moving the GW into the Yellow Sea.

Do you know any US Korean War veterans? I do, and unfortunately they are now old men whose sage wisdom and advice is only heard by those willing to hear it. South Korea is generations removed from the Korean War, and there is a lot of political pressure for the government to take action. I think this means the US must make a bold statement like moving the US Navy in force into the Yellow Sea, because we need to redirect attention politically to assist President Lee Myung-Bak. If you don't believe that, then you need to go read what today's South Korean news and comment sites are saying. Again, as we have discussed on the blog for years - preventing war with an extended show of force is one way Naval power can be used in crisis, and naval power can do many things politically for any nation with a strong Navy.

Most US Presidents have at one point or another found the nation in a situation where the Navy is asked to move well forward, show the flag, and keep the peace. This is a function of naval power that US Navy officers and sailors are trained to do, and a function of military power the US military thinks about all the time, and practices for. Obama has called for a form of gunboat diplomacy to redirect the political focus and walk both sides of the Korean Peninsula back from the brink of war. Gunboat diplomacy takes its form and function unique to its political purpose for the situation. Gunboat diplomacy is always distinct to time and place, and even in the 21st century remains a policy of force intended to deter other nations from exercising the violent use of military power.

Will it work? President Obama is betting it will. The Obama administration policy is to follow South Korea's lead politically but position the US to lead militarily with a show of force. The political signal is to maintain the peace, but respond with strength. That means South Korea will update rules of engagement, reinforce military positions in vulnerable areas, and ask for the US for assistance in pressuring China into reigning in North Korean belligerence. I commend the President for being bold and essentially holding China accountable for their proxy state. This is a bold move. Time and events will decide whether fortune favors the bold, or if our risk calculations are flawed.

Nagorno-Karabakh Exercise

Last weekend the Patterson School, in conjunction with the Army War College, ran the latter's International Strategic Crisis Negotiation Exercise. The exercise is most often run with members of the AWC's International Fellows Program, but has also appeared at Princeton, Georgetown, and Texas A&M; in recent years. The simulation focuses on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, and includes teams representing Russia, the United States, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijian, and Nagorno-Karabakh. My latest WPR column details the purpose and course of the exercise:

The Caucasus exercise always takes place 10 years in the future. The scenario is meant to be plausible rather than predictive, and is built around the necessity of creating a compelling simulation. For the most part, the scenario involves extrapolation from current trends: Azerbaijan has enjoyed tremendous energy-driven economic growth, while Armenia has resolved some of its disputes with Turkey. Iran moderates its foreign policy, having reached an accord with the United States about its nuclear weapons program. The basics of the relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation haven't changed appreciably. With the growth of Azerbaijani economic prosperity, the status quo in and around Nagorno-Karabakh has become increasingly untenable, leading to multilateral efforts to defuse the impending crisis...

the students failed to arrive at a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The Azerbaijanis were reluctant to accept a no-use-of-force pledge, while the Russians, Turks, and Americans could not agree on the constitution of a peacekeeping force. The Iranians maintained a relatively low profile, although they did react aggressively to perceived Azerbaijani brinksmanship. Efforts to create light and space between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh delegation failed. Retired Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, who has participated in actual negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh as well as in this simulation several times, told the students, "If you find a solution, we're taking it back to Washington." Although the contours of each exercise develop along unique lines, Mr. Dion suggested that no simulation has ever culminated in a politically acceptable resolution of the problem. Indeed, the closest that the participants have ever come involved a near-abdication by Azerbaijan that would likely have resulted in significant problems for the Azerbaijani negotiating team upon its return to Baku.

The point of the exercise, however, is to highlight the importance of process. Principally, the problems result from asymmetries in interest, information, and commitment. Negotiators have a strong incentive to withhold information about the intensity and nature of their interests, in large part because others might take advantage of that information. The incentive to deceive animates all sides, narrowing the space in which agreement can be achieved. While outsiders can imagine a variety of potential settlements to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, the dynamics of negotiation make arriving at any of those outcomes difficult.