Unmanned Systems, Autonomy, and Naval Culture

What do unmanned systems have to do with the future of naval command, control, and culture?  In an attempt to answer that question, I wrote this piece several months ago and it recently hit USNI's site.

For some more interesting discussion on drones, listen to my friend Matt Hipple over at his podcast (you'll have to sit through some Africa discussion to get to the piece about the drones, which is also fascinating). 

The views in this post are those of the author's alone and not reflective of the U.S. Navy or any other organization.

In Somalia, We Have a Problem

Events over the weekend that included the capture of an al Qaeda operative in Libya and a raid in Somalia are the focus of military conversations I've been involved in since Friday night. I have nothing to add to the news in public regarding the operation in Libya. Well done to all on that action. My focus, as it has been since the early days of the blog, is with Somalia.

By now everyone has likely heard a story regarding events Friday evening local time in Somalia, but because the story has been told many different ways and the media has been running a stealth auto-correct campaign to virtually every news article posted as new facts become known, allow me to tell the story as I know it to have happened so you are keen on the details as of October 8, 2013.

In the late evening of Friday October 4, 2024 local time Navy SEALs belonging to the now famous DEVGRU, or SEAL Team 6 depending upon your preference, inserted into Somalia by small boat near the coastal village of Barawe, Somalia. The objective of the SEAL team was to capture, alive, a Kenyan insurgent named Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir, known by the nickname “Ikrima.” As the SEALs approached a seaside villa, the target house, they came under fire from security posted near the villa. A firefight broke out almost immediately and the SEAL team came under heavy fire. Rather than fighting a frontal assault, the team withdrew under cover of helicopter gunships back to their boats and returned to a US Navy ship offshore.

Intelligence

One of the most interesting aspects of the action in Somalia on Friday is that the intelligence appears to have been very good. First we have the target, Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir (Ikrima), who appears to be a very smart target for the US in the context of a 'capture alive' operation. Ikrima is a foreign militant in Somalia with ties to al Shabaab Central leadership including Ahmed Godane, ties to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and ties to al-Hijra - a terrorist organization in Kenya with ties to al Shabaab that is believed to have executed the recent Westgate mall attack. As a central figure he represents an intersection between foreign fighters in al Qaeda, local Somali insurgents, and al-Hijra operating in Kenya. His escape from capture Friday night means he is basically a walking dead man.

The intelligence of the location was also very good, because it turns out the reason for high security was because not only was Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir at the villa, but Mahad Mohamed Ali, known as “Karate,” was also there. Mahad Mohamed Ali (Karate) is the leader of Al Shabab’s Amniyat division, the intelligence wing of al Shabaab. According to the Toronto Star, there was a third leader there as well, but the name is not given. The journalist only describes the 3rd individual as Abu Hamza, which is not a name and simply means kunya or "father of," which is not helpful in identification.

Regardless, the presence of three major figures - one of which was the head of al Shabaab's intelligence wing - suggests the intelligence regarding the target villa was good. It is worth pointing out that presence of both Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir (Ikrima) and Mahad Mohamed Ali (Karate) in the same place would appear to validate suspicions that the Westgate attack was not only well financed, well planned, and well executed but also demonstrates some coordination between al Shabaab Central leadership and expertise across other organizations in the al Qaeda network. It certainly should trouble folks that multiple large, well resourced al Qaeda organizations were potentially coordinated in the attack at a detailed level, even if the details themselves weren't disseminated widely prior to the attack. Combining expertise and resources from across the various al Qaeda associated groups not only increases the likelihood of attacks, but increases the lethal potential of those attacks.

Environment and Geography

When Kenyan military forces invaded Somalia from the south in October 2011, the offensive was a disaster. Invading during the wet season, the Kenyan Army soon found themselves, literally, stuck in the mud. After slogging their way through the mud for eight months, Kenyan forces were formally integrated into the UN sanctioned AMISOM force in Somalia. That's another discussion for another time, but basically Kenya was granted political cover by the rest of the world for invading Somalia. Finally, in September of 2012 the Kenyan force under the AMISOM flag liberated Kismayo from al Shabaab control. The loss of Kismayo represented the recapture of the last major city stronghold al Shabaab had in Somalia.

The AMISOM military leadership projected expectations that with the loss of control of major cities by al Shabaab, Somalia was at a turning point. The reality is, over the past year AMISOM has done little outside of skirmishes near the towns of Burkakaba, Dinsoor, and Tieyglow - small inland towns north and west of Mogadishu. The lack of offensive military activity by AMISOM since the fall of Kismayo has been matched by a lack of offensive action by al Shabaab, which has spent the last few months in an internal power struggle that appears to have been resolved with Ahmad Godane consolidating his power over al Shabaab in Somalia.

Somalia in October 2013 looks very different than Somalia in 2011, before the Kenyan Army invaded Somalia with the objective of seizing Kismayo. The most important feature change from a military perspective is how the posture of al Shabaab's forces has changed from one of a mobile force roaming the rural country in the exercise of establishing local control to one of consolidated control in a more garrison posture. When US special forces went to Barawe, they basically ran into a garrisoned force that had fortified the city, and it is important to understand that nearly every town under the control of al Shabaab is likewise a fortified town with a garrison force.

It is very important to understand what Somalia is today compared to what Somalia was prior to the AMISOM success of liberating Mogadishu and Kismayo. Westerners often describe Somalia as an ungoverned, lawless territory with an insurgency, but on the ground in southern Somalia it is more akin to a dispersed collection of independent city states loosely affiliated with the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu or a collection of smaller, independent villages under local tribal control under a very strict al Shabaab rule.

In the north with Somaliland and Puntland - both territories are officially unrecognized but self-declared sovereign, autonomous but not yet officially independent states, and are not the focus of this discussion.

Obviously Somalia is much more complicated than I can summarize in a few paragraphs, but I feel this background is necessary for discussing the broader points below that are more relevant to this audience.

US Military and Somalia

In the last week of September, USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) was sent to Djibouti to offload all elements of the 26 MEU and take on board special operations forces including the SEAL team that executed the raid this previous weekend. When a US Navy ship has it's command authority switched over to SOCOM, there are a number of details involved, particularly when it involves an amphibious ship. First, all Marine Corps equipment is offloaded - air, sea, land - everything Marine Corps is taken off the ship. Special operations forces bring it's own everything - including aviation, and there is no such thing as "Joint" in the context of terminology used elsewhere when discussing the US military. There is no such thing as a traditional COCOM command structure for these type of military operations either. Basically, when SOCOM needs something from a COCOM for assistance in situations like Somalia, they tell the COCOM what to give them. It is a one way street, and the COCOM that is supposed to run military operations is often just lucky to get a memo after the fact regarding what happened. It shouldn't be this way, but this is the way counter terrorism policy under the Obama administration works when it comes to special operations forces, some drone activities, and Cyber warfare sourced from DC.

Command authority for special operations off Somalia are directed by the Joint Staff in DC and the National Security Council, with SOCOM integrated throughout. The COCOM is a sideshow when it comes to command authority of these kind of operations.

SOCOM is bringing the tactical and operational lessons learned from Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond to Somalia, with step one being grab some bad guys for intelligence purposes. It would be a mistake to call the events of last Friday evening a failure, because failing a primary objective is not the same as a failure. The reaction by al Shabaab since the Friday night raid suggests the impacts have, in fact, been anything but a failure.

In response to the raid by US special forces it is noteworthy al Shabaab Central leadership has been remarkably quiet, despite some in western media describing the US Navy SEAL action as a failure. You would think if they saw the events of Friday night as a victory they would be out shouting as much as loud as possible. Not so, none of the major players are doing any such thing. When US special forces hit the villa with some of al Shabaab's top people inside, considerable fear and doubt was injected into the organization. The population in Barawe, through Tuesday morning in Somalia, remains in lockdown with a curfew being enforced. Reinforcements have been sent to increase the garrison there. US intelligence was ultimately too good for al Shabaab's comfort level, and it is a good bet they have spent the last few days turning their own organization inside-out trying to plug security leaks.

Putting doubt into the enemy force is a feature of US special operations.

But the core problem still exists, and someone in the DoD needs to speak up. Somalia under al Shabaab in October of 2013 is a distributed garrison. In the history of special operations in Somalia, I am unaware of a single special operations incident in any area controlled by al Shabaab that took place in a populated town or city that didn't result in a major battle. Jessica Buchanan was in a secluded rural area nowhere near a town. Warsame was taken offshore. Indeed, every reported special operations action by every country that has been reported in the last several years took place outside a populated town or city. There should be no expectation that US special forces will successfully conduct any major operation without a major battle inside an al Shabaab controlled population center, because it has never happened.

And yet, that's apparently the new policy of the Obama administration. The US is apparently going to attempt to conduct low level military operations inside Somalia against al Shabaab forces that are postured like traditional Army forces with an expectation of success and a low profile. To protect SOCOM rice bowls, we are not going to use military forces in the region that operate under COCOM control, because SOCOM is not a joint force and in this case, insists it should not operate with the joint force. There will be no heavy forces provided by the Marine Corps available to help SOCOM if things go bad, and that is an intentional choice that the Command authority for Somalia operations - the Joint Staff in DC and the National Security Council - endorses.

It is policy to discard lessons from 1993 learned in blood in Somalia, but good luck trying to get an explanation from Susan Rice why this policy makes sense, because she is probably completely clueless smiling and nodding to her SOCOM handler oblivious to the details. The lack of experience on the President's National Security Council really does matter, and this is yet another example. Maybe General Dempsey should be asked that question, although given his leadership record, expect him to simply punt the answer to someone not picking up the phone at SOCOM.

I have long believed US special operations forces are incredible, intelligent, and always make good choices, but I have to admit I'm struggling with the policy that has been developed and is being executed by the Obama administration in Somalia in October 2013. From the outside looking in, this looks like SOCOM defending rice bowls for no reason other than defending rice bowls, and while I understand the political reluctance to use Marines in Somalia, it is very hard for me to believe the US is making the best use of Special Forces in Somalia when all of the targets of value are postured in military garrisons.

That isn't going to work.

Looking Ahead

It is going to be interesting to watch Somalia unfold over the next few weeks. I do not see a scenario where special forces find much success trying to grab useful intelligence sources from the fortified town areas al Shabaab controls, because al Shabaab knows we are coming and will have a huge numerical advantage in every fight. Does that mean President Obama will do nothing? Unlikely. The question is, how far is the President willing to go to achieve a meaningful strategic victory against al Shabaab?

Let's be honest, a drone strike on that villa Friday night would have been a huge victory for the US. It is unclear if we would have known how effective the drone strike would have been, but had the US killed Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir (Ikrima) and Mahad Mohamed Ali (Karate) that would have been a huge counter terrorism win for the US against al Shabaab.

Some of the instant analysis following this past weekends events suggest the President is moving away from a drone centric counter-terrorism strategy. Not so fast, because in Somalia his preferred alternative of using special operations forces on the ground isn't likely to work out well against garrisoned military forces. That is going to force a decision by the President:

1. Increase the use of Drones in Somalia.
2. Use the rest of the Joint Force as designed to augment special operations on the ground.
3. Nibble ineffectively around the edges of towns and in rural areas with SOF.

If the US tries to operate SOF in the fortified, garrisoned towns al Shabaab has control of, don't expect things to go well, because history consistently says it will not. The US faces significant operational problems in Somalia if the nation is indeed serious about increasing counter terrorism operations against al Shabaab. The celebrated option this week is using special operations forces on the ground, but the reality is, Somalia is the wrong place to send in lightly armed military forces, and US history in Somalia is a story why that approach to al Shabaab is a bad idea. In Somalia to use special operations forces on the ground effectively the options are either to heavily increase the use of drone strikes to wither down enemy force, or use heavily armed Marines to augment special operations forces in reducing the threat from the garrisons.

The use of Marines and assets of the Joint Force has the potential to significantly increase civilian casualties and the likelihood of US casualties, although used in hit and run operations also give the US a much higher potential for success in significantly damaging al Shabaab. That option may not be politically possible or desirable though.

Which takes us back to contemplating the use of drones, whose demise in recent days has been widely overstated.

MQ-4C Triton Takes Flight

ALMDALE, Calif. (May 21, 2024) Two Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicles are seen on the tarmac at a Northrop Grumman test facility in Palmdale, Calif. Triton is undergoing flight testing as an unmanned maritime surveillance vehicle. (U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman by Chad Slattery/Released)

From Danger Room.

The MQ-4C Triton took off today for the first time from a Palmdale, California airfield, a major step in the Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program. Northrop Grumman, which manufactured the 130.9-foot-wingspan drone, said the maiden voyage lasted an hour and a half. The Navy even announced it via Twitter.

“First flight represents a critical step in maturing Triton’s systems before operationally supporting the Navy’s maritime surveillance mission around the world,” Capt. James Hoke, Triton’s program manager, said in a statement.

If the Triton looks familiar, it should. It’s a souped-up version of the Air Force’s old reliable spy drone, Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk. The Navy’s made some modifications to the airframe and the sensors it carries to ensure it can spy on vast swaths of ocean, from great height. (It’s unarmed, if you were wondering.)

The idea is for the Triton to achieve altitudes of nearly 53,000 feet — that’s 10 miles up — where it will scan 2,000 nautical miles at a single robotic blink. (Notice that wingspan is bigger than a 737's.) Its sensors, Northrop boasts, will “detect and automatically classify” ships, giving captains a much broader view of what’s on the water than radar, sonar and manned aircraft provide. Not only that, Triton is a flying communications relay station, bouncing “airborne communications and information sharing capabilities” between ships. And it can fly about 11,500 miles without refueling.

Read the rest at Danger Room.

The Navy has taken a very patient approach to large unmanned systems, too slow for some. With the MQ-4C Triton the Navy decided to go with a mature hardware design and take on the risk with the software. Despite the June 2012 crash in Maryland of a Global Hawk used for developing the Triton, I think everyone can agree the Navy has done a great job with the BAMS program.

Some will cite how the US Air Force has stepped back from the Global Hawk in favor of the U-2. That makes sense when the vast majority of US Air Force Global Hawk missions were being flown in dedicated missions to monitor specific targets, something the U-2 has been doing effectively for decades - and is still capable of doing at less cost. But over vast oceans, that 11,500 mile range at ten miles up role is much better suited for an unmanned aircraft because the platform's role is constant surveillance of a broad area, not dedicated surveillance of a specific area.

Thus the name: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS).

Between X-47B carrier launch and MQ-4C Triton, the US Navy has achieved major successes with two of the most important new Navy programs being worked on today in a span of just over a week. Northrop Grumman is having a good month.

When you count the first vertical takeoff of the F-35B earlier this week, the Department of the Navy is having a good month too.

With Great State Power Comes Greater Need for Oversight Responsibility

Please recognize this post as an informal, free form flow of incomplete thoughts as a I step through several ideas that have been swirling in my brain lately. I am very much interested in your thoughts, opinions, criticisms, and resources of note that can help me mentally step through some of the issues raised for discussion below.

I recently read an article written by former Secretary of the Navy, former Senator from Virginia Jim Webb titled Congressional Abdication published this month in the National Interest. It is the best published article I have read this year, because I frequently find myself pondering much of what it says. I have no intention on quoting from the article, because I believe that if you click the link and begin reading the article - you will find yourself compelled to read it all. It is an article I believe everyone should read, and give serious consideration to the content.

We are in a very strange place in America today, particularly politically. In my opinion the establishment of the Republican party is frequently not very conservative, and the establishment of the Democratic party is frequently not very liberal. Partisan loyalty to the establishments is still very high, but the loyalty of partisans has become emotional, not intellectual, as the problems continue to mount with neither side willing to compromise - largely for political purposes - towards any actual solutions to any of the current challenges that all need legitimate solutions. My sense is the President is poised to step up to the very real challenges facing America, and as he does so he will become much less popular in the eyes of everyone for doing the things that must be done.

Sequestration happened. I told you - 22 months ago - it would. Very few people believed it would. The DoD is still operating under the rules of the Continuing Resolution, although hopefully that will change very soon. The result of sequestration + the CR means operations and maintenance will be sacrificed to the sacred cow of the defense infrastructure - the defense industry. It is how the two laws work together. For the Navy that means they must park ships at the pier to pay contracts that cannot be canceled. It is very easy to get all /Facepalm about how horribly managed all of this has been for the DoD, but I find myself in agreement with the argument that three and four star Generals and Flag Officers are basically political appointments to the executive branch these days, so why should we expect them to act any different than exactly that? In the end I believe sequestration and the continuing resolution are applying legitimate and correct intentions in the worst possible way. The US is in trouble, but only because all strategies in the Department of Defense today are for purposes of domestic politics, not international politics. The history of the world tells us that our nation will take a hit for taking our eyes off the ball in the hubris that we are a superpower and too big to fail, and fixing what amounts to small (in context) budget problems doesn't solve this problem.

Among our political leaders and political appointees, very few men and women stand out as unique voices with a core set of beliefs and a willingness to stand up for them. When they do - we know who they are, and even when we disagree with them we love them for being genuine. This is exactly why so many in this community and the US Navy have so much admiration and respect for men like Admiral John Harvey and Undersecretary Bob Work, and why Bob Work in particular has stood out as one of the singularly most unique government officials in the Navy community in many decades. Undersecretary Work advocated the same positions he had before his appointment, and I assure you his positions will remain consistent when he moves into his new position over at CNAS. My observation is very few people agree with him on everything, particularly his positions on the Littoral Combat Ship, but disagreement with his positions does not diminish how he earns respect among his critics for engaging them in respectful public debate on the merits of any specific issue, and most critically - the debate is always a discussion of substance.

The ability to sustain a focused debate on the substance of an issue was probably why I was easily distracted by Rand Paul's activity on the Senate floor last night. I know nothing about Rand Paul except that I know of his father, and I never agreed with his father much on political issues. It is easy to dismiss the absurdity of drawing a line in the sand on the issue of drones killing American citizens on American soil, because that would never happen, right? Common sense screams - "of course not!"

And yet Eric Holder would not commit the Obama administration to that position, the implication of his intentional omission being that "yes, drones may indeed one day kill American citizens on US soil." You may not think this is even possible, but this is a legitimate civil liberties issue and as many smart people have pointed out (example here), the administration cannot easily stand with Rand Paul on this issue, because there are legal issues regarding the use of drones in targeted strikes around the world that extend well beyond American soil that have not been sorted out legally, and there are lawsuits already out there regarding American citizens killed by drones in other countries that the Administration must tread very cautiously because of.

For me, that is really where this issue Rand Paul raises comes into play, and impacts many of the issues we discuss here on Information Dissemination. Rand Paul vs Eric Holder on drones isn't something any of us can simply dismiss as a silly political trick or an argument over a hypothetical issue, because the issue is very much legitimate. A few things to think about...

The rise of prominence in using drones to execute US Foreign Policy and US National Security Policy is a bigger issue than the limited but important aspect of drones Rand Paul championed yesterday on the Senate floor. The single biggest drone issue, in my opinion, is that drones have lowered the threshold for use of force. It is why the CIA is now operating drones for targeted killing, and why the USAF has basically restructured itself over the last decade to support this activity as needed globally. It is why the US does not fly manned military aircraft into Pakistan to kill Al Qaeda - the people in Pakistan would be outraged if we did - but those same Pakistani citizens don't seem to care when we send an armed unmanned flying computer into Pakistan and kill a bad guy. This oddly acceptable condition has allowed the Obama administration to fly drones and kill people in Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Afghanistan over the last four years, with an unknown level of approval or consent. AFRICOM is setting up a drone base as we speak, and it is a safe bet we will be killing people with drones in Africa in the near future. South America - you are almost certainly next.

Drones have lowered the political risk and raised the political reward of using lethal force and done so at a lower cost to the US taxpayer. In my opinion, the use of armed drones globally represents a natural and expected 21st century asymmetrical evolution of military power in our dealing with non-state actors that distributed towards smaller footprints after we engaged with overwhelming conventional military force. I see the US use of drones as a completely understandable military capability evolution. Like any new adaptation of State power that changes the rules of any battlefield in our favor, there are new considerations for using this new State power that must be addressed to insure rules of the road for others who also develop the same State power capability.

The Obama administration is reshaping the United States National Security Strategy around remotely piloted drone strike capabilities, offensive cyber capabilities, and special operations capabilities. This basically shifts the liberal use of US military power (that is very common in American history) towards three precision strike capabilities on a global scale that - legitimately - can create unforeseen collateral damage. To take it a step further, none of these capabilities have easily recognized legal frameworks because they operate outside the normal rulesets that would otherwise govern the use of lethal military power.

For example, armed drones have killed Americans - now under two consecutive Presidents. There are lawsuits in the name of dead Americans that cite the US Constitution regarding judicial process, because in the end the precision strike capability - in this case drones - ultimately killed American citizens without due process under the law. It is not even clear if the Americans were the target or not - but in the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi all indications are he was the target. Like the vast majority of Americans (according to the polls anyway) the inner Patton in me thinks the guy deserved his fate, but as an American wanting to protect my own civil liberties I certainly would appreciate if our political leaders would step out and clearly define the rule set for use of force with this global precision strike capability so that I know the law protects me and my family from the use of such State power. It is hard for me to imagine any American likewise wouldn't appreciate similar such protections under the law - particularly on US soil as Rand Paul articulates.

Another example - Cyber. The collateral damage from STUXNET has been enormous. With a weaponized cyber capability that probably was developed by the government of the United States, if we examine purely from a monetary standpoint this cyber smart bomb called STUXNET did more collateral damage than any single military strike since we dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The lack of lethality for using such a weapon makes the use of these cyber smart weapons highly attractive to political leaders, but what protections do American businesses have against these kind of State power precision payload military grade capabilities that also have huge collateral damage implications? Even more to the point, what happens when military grade smart worm does actually kill people? There is no legal framework in this country, much less on an international scale, to govern use of such weapons, and yet when examined on a financial scale this military grade weaponized cyber capability is only comparable to the use of a nuclear weapon. The political leadership of this country is waiting for people to die before they take this very serious issue specific to emerging National Security Policy seriously.

Finally, have you seen Zero Dark Thirty? It's a fictional movie, but it's a good frame of reference. Have you read about the Osama bin Laden raid, the various books and articles of substance? Lets just review what happened generically. The United States sent a military unit into a foreign country for purposes of a precision strike on a facility right next to a major military installation. What would have happened if the Pakistani Army rolled up during that action with the tactical approach of shooting first and asking questions later? The other guy gets a vote, so what if our special forces folks were immediately attacked by the Pakistan Army and never given an option to surrender? Would the folks in the White House listened intently as all members of the special operations unit were killed, or would they have allowed the unit to call in air support and defend themselves? A special forces unit has the capability, and in most situations has the higher level military support, to rain hell and fire on anyone within their sights. A very legitimate different outcome that night could have been the US military killing a thousand soldiers of the Pakistani Army in what was supposed to be a clandestine precision strike inside another country.

Under any legal apparatus governed by the US Constitution, if the US would have started a war with Pakistan because of that action, it would have been a violation of every intent outlined in the US Constitution regarding the use of military force in starting a war, and under the law would have been legitimate basis for articles of impeachment for the President who - in this American citizens opinion - was doing the right thing by going after Osama bin Laden. But that's the key issue - our small special forces teams are supported by a US conventional military infrastructure of precision strike capabilities that outmatches everything else in the world. Some of our smallest special operations forces have the firepower and capability equivalent to the entire military of some nations at their fingertip. There is nothing new about special forces, but there is a lot of new about featuring special forces operations as a primary instrument of State power. Do the old rules that govern use of military force apply sufficiently to global precision strike capabilities of platoon sized forces with brigade level firepower at their fingertips? Do we need new rule sets for the emerging predominance of special forces operations in our global military taskings? Will America have to wait for Murphy's Law to kick us between the legs before Congress decides to rethink how the emerging predominance of special forces operations influences existing laws regarding the use of military force globally? When these guys come home from Afghanistan, they are not going to be sent home to sit on the couch - they will be used, everywhere else.

Has Congress sufficiently thought through this? With the nations mature long range strike network from air and sea, a special forces unit today can leverage the firepower of at least a battalion sized unit 20 years ago, but we never sent units with battalion levels of firepower around the world on quick strike missions 20 years ago. Emerging policy is to send special forces around the world on quick strike missions for the next 20 years, and my gut tells me our political leaders haven't stepped through this mentally yet.

The House and the Senate need to wake up and step up, because the growth of executive power since 9/11 has gone unchecked and is in dire need of a balance. Rand Paul may be focused on the details of civil liberties, and it is as good a place to start as any in my opinion, but the framework for 21st century National Security Policy is being established by the Obama administration - built on top of the Bush administrations eight years of very interventionist policies - that predominately feature means of very new, very capable State powers that lack rule sets, and drones is only one small piece of it.

I am generally supportive of the direction the Obama administration is taking with drones, cyber, and special forces instead of leveraging the large US Army approach of the Bush administration, but I see some serious issues with the policy that I believe needs a much healthier dose of oversight than what I - as an American citizen - has seen to date. I also believe the critical foundation of naval power - offshore, near but not intrusive State power, is being undervalued as a non-intrusive and diplomatically capable element of State power in emerging policy, and I believe it is with credible, present naval power the United States needs not always lead with the precision strike while still being able to leverage the potential use of it as a form of deterrence.

Without some serious oversight and consideration that includes alternatives to precision strike, this National Security Policy framework being developed by the Obama administration - that I generally agree with btw - is ripe for exploitation by future administrations if Congress doesn't get in there soon to address many of the very legitimate issues and shortcomings in each approach.

The Founding Fathers had it right all along. The nation maintains a Navy and the ability to raise an Army when needed. That framework works well within the construct of President Obama's National Security Policy that leverages drones, cyber, and special forces, and within that construct the Navy adds a very legitimate, very important, very enormous diplomatic wrapper of sea based military power around America's very lethal and capable precision strike capabilities. I see it as Sea Power in support of State Power, and not just State power in the context of precision strike, but State power in the context of the State Department and other elements of State power throughout the US government. In the abstract; drones, cyber, and special forces can be used in almost exactly the same way, but as asymmetrical alternatives to, a large Army invasion by the United States of another country - with the outcome of a state level war possible, after all we are - either figuratively or literally - bombing another country from the air with drones, destroying the economy of another nation with cyber, or putting boots on the ground for military operations with special operations forces. While I acknowledge it is legitimately my bias, I see sea power as a historical military framework that helps buffer an alternative to check and balance the emerging 21st century models for the liberal use of politically convenient, emerging State power military force options.

Back to the Future - Targeting the New TASM

Raytheon’s Tomahawk is arguably one of the U.S. Navy’s most storied and well-employed weapons systems.  Over 2,000 missiles have been launched in combat in seven or so countries since 1991 with another 500 successful operational tests launches.  The Navy recently ordered 361 of the latest variant (BLK IV) at a cost just short of $1 million apiece, so clearly the weapon is valued by the Combatant Commanders.

While the Navy has enjoyed strong success with this strike weapon, our surface-based ASuW capabilities have atrophied.  The subsonic LRASM-A (the supersonic LRASM-B was canceled in January 2012) in development by DARPA offers promise, but will not see fleet service for quite some time, if ever.  SWOs old enough to have served in the 1980s and 1990s aboard ABL or VLS-equipped ships will remember the RGM-109B, or Tomahawk Antiship Missile (TASM).  The problem with this fire-and-forget weapon was that we had no good way to cue and target the missile.  As a young TLAM engagement officer, I recall that doctrine for its employment was rather squishy and we tended to either wish away or just ignore the over-the-horizon targeting problem which would be required to successfully employ this missile at its maximum range of more than 200 NM, especially if neutral shipping was present.  Complicating the targeting problem was the weapon’s early 70’s era Harpoon active radar seeker and subsonic speed, which would enable an enemy ship traveling at thirty knots to move more than twelve miles from when the TASM was launched. Because of these limitations, the TASM was withdrawn from the fleet later in the 1990s.  Many of the TASMs in storage were modified to the BLK III version to meet the growing demand for strike weapons.

The requirement for a surface-based launch range ASuW capability has recently reemerged. NAVAIR has awarded Raytheon a contract to update the BLK IV Tactical Tomahawk with maritime interdiction capabilities to be deployed by 2015.  This upgrade will be a tremendous step up from the old TASM in targeting and takes on the BLK IV’s 900 NM range.  As a point of comparison to other long range anti-ship missiles, the subsonic Russian 3M-54 Klub ranges about 1350 NM while the new Indian BrahMos travels about the 160 NM, but at the blazing speed of Mach 2.8.

As seen in Raytheon's recently released concept video above, the new "TASM" will use advanced targeting features including ESM and an Active Electronically Scanned Millimeter wave radar seeker.  More important is the two-way UHF SATCOM data link which will allow for cueing and updated tracking of targets in conjunction with naval drones, manned ISR, or SOF during the missile's long flight.  These improvements will mitigate some of the challenges in firing the missiles over-the-horizon, especially against targets in crowded litoral seas.  Also critical is the flexibility of these missiles to still be employed in their traditional strike mission, saving space in surface and sub VLS magazines.  Now is the time to start developing the operational concepts and experimenting with TTPs for employment of these missiles. 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

CNO Hints Towards the (New?) Future of Carrier Launched Naval Aviation

Contrary to a recent suggestion regarding the decline of influence by the US Naval Institute and the organizations flagship product Proceedings magainze, Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert has penned an article in Proceedings magazine this month that is already getting a lot of attention. Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course is a really important article, indeed there are several aspects of the article that jumped off the page the first, second, and every other time I've read the article.

In general I have been less than impressed with the analysis of the Proceedings article to date, indeed I think most people who have publicly commented either missed the point, or failed to connect the dots. The whole article is important, not just the pieces that made headlines, and I believe it really informs us on modern ideas being circulated inside the Navy - many of which are very smart.

Please, if you have not done so, go read the entire article before reading any further. Once you have read the article, come back and read what I'm saying, then go back and read the article to see if I have this right. I'm not certain I am reading it correctly, but I think I am.

Ready? OK...

First, I have to address something. This kind of industry shrilling by think tank people who I thought were credible analysts needs to stop. The suggestion through fear by Mackenzie Eaglen that the end of manned military aviation will occur if any aspect of the Joint Strike Fighter program is changed by the Navy is either the definition of jumping the shark, or perhaps more appropriately the act of 'credibility hara-kiri.' If the defense analyst community continues to promote political fear in lockstep support of industry and policy failures instead of legitimate ideas for the DoD to deal with programs and policies that have gotten way out of control (too big to fail, a meme that applies to both the JSF and Afghanistan), then the defense analyst community is damaging their credentials beyond the ability of those folks to ever effectively lead the defense establishment in the future, and a new source of expertise needs to be sought after.

The fine line between think tank analyst and defense industry lobbyist is being blurred today by a lot of folks who were once thought of as highly credible, and I absolutely include folks at CNAS in the same category as Heritage Foundation and AEI. There is a lot of self-licking Ice Cream cone BS coming out of DC today, and that article in AOL Defense pissed me off with it's new extreme in hyperbole.

Second, Phil Ewing got it right, TWICE, but failed to connect the dots. Did the CNO just take a big swipe at the F-35? You bet the CNO did. The CNO absolutely made clear that the cost of stealth and exactly what the capability advantage of stealth is has forced the Navy to evaluate with clear eyes how to use stealth in naval aviation in the future, but the stealth issue is bigger than just the F-35C - it also must be applied to unmanned carrier aviation as well.

The CNO starts out by stating clearly that the Navy needs "to move from ‘luxury-car’ platforms—with their built-in capabilities—toward dependable ‘trucks’ that can handle a changing payload selection." Because the use of the word "truck" has historically only been applied to ships in the context of modularity or swapping out equipment on ships, it is assumed he is speaking only about ships when he mentions trucks. That would be a bad assumption, because I think he is talking about naval aviation as well.

If you recall, Bob Work sent out a memo on July 7, 2024 to Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley, Vice Chief Of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert and assistant Marine Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford to form a team to develop three alternative tactical aviation force structures, respectively representing cost savings of $5 billion, $7.5 billion and $10 billion across the future years defense plan. Ultimately, Work expects to determine “the best-value alternative, factoring in both cost and capability. The purpose of the study was to determine whether the Navy and Marines could operate fewer than the 40 squadrons of JSFs currently planned and to look at the possibility of accelerating development of unmanned alternative systems."

Everybody knows the costs of the Joint Strike Fighter has grown too high for the Navy to afford the future carrier air wing, indeed there is no future for unmanned carrier aviation unless the Navy reorganizes current plans of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and existing Unmanned Carrier Launched Systems programs in an effort to find more money. That memo last year was the study of plans to determine what the options are. We have never seen the results of that memo, although my impression is the CNO just hinted what they might be.

What I believe the CNO is basically saying is that the F-18E/F works effectively as a manned truck, if new weapons are brought online to support the aircraft's ability to strike at long range - which is the cover story that Captain Hernandez ran out to Phil Ewing after his original post. Like I said, Phil Ewing got it right, twice!

What the CNO is also saying is that the stealthy UCAS-D is too expensive, and that unmanned carrier launched aviation doesn't need to be stealthy, rather it needs to be capable of endurance/range and high payloads. This has been coming awhile, because one of the worst kept secrets is how many problems there are with UCAS-D. UCAS-D weighs way too much, costs too much, has less than desired endurance, and has a limited payload capacity in favor of its stealth profile. My bet is the Navy isn't going down that road long term, although the Navy will use UCAS-D as a technology demonstrator.

But the CNO emphasized stealth was important? You bet he did, and how he discusses the importance of stealth in that Proceedings article reminded me of a concept I heard discussed with regards to the future of unmanned naval aviation at a recent USNI conference where the Joint Strike Fighter will still play an important role in future naval aviation that includes unmanned systems.

Basically, the Navy would field carrier launched aviation platform "trucks" that carried a variety of long range missiles forward, and escorting these large flying trucks - trucks which would include F-18E/F manned fighters and unmanned carrier launched medium payload delivery vehicles - would be stealthy F-35Cs that basically functioned as forward observers that helped targeting for the payload trucks that could operate at stand off distances. By taking that approach, fewer F-35Cs would be needed, because the internal strike payload of the F-35C is no longer as important relative to the payload capacity of the overall strike package - which would be offloaded to manned F-18E/Fs and medium capacity carrier launched UAVs.

So that is basically where I think this is going. The Navy is going to address the very real concerns about the future carrier air wing in FY14, and they will restructure the various programs. The F-35C program will likely be restructured in the same way it was last time, by reducing the number of squadrons fielded per carrier. Last time the F-35C was reduced to 2 squadrons per carrier, this time it will likely be reduced to 1 squadron per carrier. With F-35C IOC currently scheduled for FY14, but expected to be delayed, the purchase of fewer F-35Cs and the delayed IOC will mean more F-18E/Fs will need to be purchased. This comes just in time too, because the production line for F-18E/F only goes through FY14, so more F-18E/Fs will keep that production line open longer.

The rest of the savings, which will be either $5 billion, $7.5 billion and $10 billion across the FYDP will decide the details of the F-35C and F-18E/F program changes, and also determine to what degree unmanned carrier aviation will play in the future Carrier Air Wing by 2020 and beyond. I believe it is a very good bet that unmanned carrier launched aviation will find funding, that the F-35C purchase will be reduced, and that the F-18E/F production line will stay open beyond FY14 - but the details of what unmanned carrier launched aviation will look like by 2020 is still very much unclear.

It is also important to recognize that under the CNO's emerging vision of payloads instead of platforms, platforms like the F-35C still have a primary role, but that role is changing. In part, the F-35C is still a very necessary stealth capability that will perform the always important intercept function - although the payloads for intercept will be carried at stand-off range. F-35C will also function in the forward observer role - again in support of weapons held at safer, stand-off distances. These roles for the F-35C would be vital to the tactical and operational level execution of air superiority and combat air support by carrier aviation well into future decades, which means that while the total number of F-35Cs might be fewer in the future Carrier Air Wing, it's existence in the future Carrier Air Wing becomes even more vital than it is today - particularly if the unmanned "truck" options materialize as legitimate. In many ways, I could see these changes seen as a mixed result for Lockheed Martin, on one side the F-35C is purchased in lower quantity but on the other side the platform becomes the most critical piece of the puzzle, something the platform is not under current plans.

In the end, all I believe can be said with any certainty is that based on the CNO's Proceedings article and the fiscal reality of naval aviation heading into the next two very, very tight budget years, the UCAS-D is the least likely full production approach for the future of unmanned carrier aviation.

What is the potential and what are the challenges the Navy faces in fielding a UCLASS to the fleet?

Today's guest is J. Randy Forbes, Congressman from Virginia's fourth district, Member of the House Armed Services Committee and Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee.

What is the potential and what are the challenges the Navy faces in fielding a UCLASS to the fleet?

It is a pleasure to contribute to the 5th Anniversary celebration of Raymond Pritchett’s Information Dissemination. As an advocate for seapower, I have long regarded this blog as one of the most important hubs for naval discussions.

While a carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle is known by many names (J-UCAS, X-47B, UCAS-D, and UCAV, among others), the current program scheduled for initial operating capability in 2020 is known as UCLASS, or the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike platform. To understand the potential of UCLASS, as well as the challenges this program faces, we must first take a step back and look at the role the nuclear powered aircraft carrier (CVN) and its associated Carrier Air Wing (CVW) will play in tomorrow's naval strike missions.

For seven decades the carrier has served as the modern-day “capital ship” of the U.S. Navy, routinely adjusting to the prevailing security environment to offer Washington's decision-makers a range of diplomatic and strategic options. Now, as new challenges to America's power projection capabilities have developed, including anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities like the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), another round of carrier innovation is necessary to ensure American presidents retain a viable power projection option in the CVN when a crisis arises.
The carrier’s enduring utility to strategists can be attributed to its mobility, operational flexibility, and modularity. First, a CVN provides U.S. policymakers with unlimited mobility. In an unpredictable and competitive global environment, America’s 11-carrier fleet gives it the capacity to deploy two or three CVNs to the Pacific and Indian Oceans at the same time. This provides the commander-in-chief a constant symbol of strength to project America’s intentions to both friends and competitor states during, for example, missile tests on the Korean Peninsula, tensions in the Straits of Hormuz or South China Sea, or elections in Taiwan.

Boeing X-45 C

The CVN’s operational flexibility can help balance America’s critical need for overseas bases with the diplomatic and geopolitical challenges often associated with maintaining overseas basing rights. Indeed, the Pentagon’s new Joint Operational Access Concept identifies the pressures on America’s overseas defense posture as one of the three trends affecting its ability to gain access to areas contested by competitors’ anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. As well, the proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles and land attack cruise missiles is increasingly allowing competitors to hold America's overseas airfields at risk. A CVN's ability to freely operate in international waters allows it to surge to a regional crisis when called on and then withdraw quietly when tensions subside.

Finally, the modularity of the carrier platform ensures its continued adaptability to emerging threat environments. Traditionally, a CVN has operated as a regional strike platform that can project power with short-range tactical aircraft. For instance, tactical strike-fighters were used during the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and continued to provide close air support as these conflicts continued. Currently, the CVW has four squadrons of roughly 10-12 F/A-18 fighters, of which the current E/F variants cost $80M apiece. In the years ahead, the new F-35C will be entering the fleet to provide a low signature complement to the F/A-18. At roughly $130M per copy, the Navy plans to purchase 340 of these airframes and eventually equip two out of four squadrons of each CVW with them. While the internal (stealth) payload of the F-35 is more limited than the F/A-18, its sensor package and stealth capability are a quantum leap beyond the F/A-18. However, because of its sophisticated power plant, C4ISR systems, and low-observable characteristics, the operations and maintenance costs of the F-35C will be about $35,000 per flight hour, or twice the O&M costs of the F/A-18.

Northrop Grumman X-47B UCAS

Despite the long-standing utility of the CVN, there are two emerging trends that threaten the ability of the carrier to remain a relevant power-projection tool in the future. First, the People’s Republic of China has developed the means to harness the power of ASBMs that can strike naval assets at ranges up to 950 nm from its coasts. This development stands to be a “game changer” for U.S. defense policy in the Indo-Pacific. The F/A-18 and F-35 lack the combat range to allow a CVN to operate outside the ASBM’s maximum effective reach and still strike adversary territory. Alongside these platforms, an unmanned platform with greater endurance will be required to overcome A2/AD threats and help preserve Washington's freedom of action in the Pacific theater.

Second, stealth alone is not enough to defeat the A2/AD threats of the future. New detection methods and technologies including long-wave IR and low-frequency radar are slowly eroding the benefits of investing in expensive stealth capabilities. Bistatic and multistatic radar detection, empowered by dramatically improved computer processing, will also make stealth platforms easier to find. Therefore, while signature reduction efforts will remain important, we will also need to improve our ability to reach the enemy from farther away with unmanned sensors and stand-off weapons. These new payloads should include an improved Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) with a range of roughly 300 nautical miles (nm), the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM-A), and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER).

The UCLASS faces at least two challenges. Partially as a result of the the $487 billion in defense cuts levied on the Department of Defense by the Budget Control Act of 2011, the first challenge is that the program's IOC has already slipped from 2018 to 2020. Estimates hold that it would cost roughly $300M to accelerate the program to 2019 and $600M to field it in 2018. Congress must also be aware that further cuts may force this date to slip further.

A second challenge the Navy faces concerns what type of UCLASS it should build and the tradeoff between stealth and range. Some have argued that UCLASS must have a very low radar signature, with the expectation it will need to conduct sustained operations inside a high-threat environment. However, because carrier-based aircraft are limited by their size and weight, an unmanned airframe that has both endurance and stealth would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Alternatively, an unmanned aerial vehicle with conventional wings and modest stealth could provide greater endurance at a more reasonable price.

General Atomics Predator C

Along with squadrons of F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets and the F-35C, I believe the CVW of the future should include a detachment of 4-6 UCLASS so that it could have a larger strike radius. A UCLASS program with an endurance of greater than 12 hours (or roughly a 1,000nm combat radius), that is moderately stealthy, and can carry as much or more payload than the F-35 carries internally would transform the CVW from a capability with short tactical reach to a global naval strike and reconnaissance platform. A UCLASS with 12-14 hour endurance would allow for 2 launch/recoveries each day to provide full 24-hour ISR coverage from each platform.  More importantly, a UCLASS outfitted with JSOW could operate as a "missile truck," to borrow the Chief of Naval Operations terminology, while freeing up high-end platforms like the F-35C to perform other missions.

In short, a CVW with a detachment of UCLASS equipped with stand-off weapons would give the CVN of the future the capacity and reach to hold targets at risk while operating outside the ASBM envelope. This would help to reduce the operational advantage the ASBM offers while increasing the strategic and operational flexibility of American decision-makers.

Considering the changes to the security environment on the horizon, the promise of the UCLASS program (teamed with stand-off weapons) for the Navy should be considered on par with the early 20th century leap from 20nm battleship gun battles to carrier air strikes from 300nm. Just like during this period of innovation and transition, it will be up to civilian and military officials to lead the Navy forward and the Congress to adequately invest in the capabilities to ensure the CVN's continued relevance as an instrument of American power in the coming half-century.

Experimenting with Distributed Maritime Operations

Observing the lethality and effectiveness of modern distributed special operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere gives one an appreciation for the potential benefits these types of ISR-leveraged, economy of force operations may someday bring to the maritime realm. Over a series of posts, I’ve attempted to articulate this operational concept. Here are some thoughts on decentralized warfare in the littorals.  Next, a discussion on one of the ways these operations could be employed in an irregular warfare setting. And here, some ideas on how distributed firepower could enable small ships to become a force multiplier in big wars. Finally, a post arguing that adequate bandwidth at sea is critical to tie all of these concepts together.



Sea-launched RQ-7 Shadow

 The proliferation of small remotely provided vehicles is going to provide unique opportunities to test some of these operational concepts. For example, the Marine Corps and Army will soon have more than 400 RQ-7 Shadows in their inventories.  This interesting article discusses the utility of these 100lb payload class platforms to drop Shadow Hawk precision guided munitions. Yes, these platforms are small, and their lethal payloads are even smaller. Though there is significant tactical value in being able to provide very precise yet low yield munitions from a small persistent drone, that isn't the point. This platform is ideal for relatively low cost experimentation on concepts of distributed operations at sea. Following pending draw-downs of Army and Marine Corps forces in Afghanistan, these assets will be available for other tasking, and conducting a series of naval experiments on distributed operations would maximize the post-war utility of these platforms. Some of the goals of these battle exercises would be to:

• Test the ability to embark, support, and employ dozens (if not 100+) of small UAVs from large deck amphibious ships. Determine maximum sortie rates/ISR lines achievable, C2 and bandwidth requirements, manning and maintenance needs, and the best ratios of manned rotary wing to unmanned ISR/strike aircraft.  An LHA/LHD would be an ideal platform for this testing, not only due to deck and hangar space, but because of available bandwidth, staff planning/C2 spaces, and the ability to reserve some deck space for manned aircraft used to move the various ground forces involved.
• Develop concepts to support persistent armed overwatch to more lightly armed small ground units and ships and combatant craft at hundreds of miles away from the mother ship. This concept has been proven time and again on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, reducing the risks to small remotely operating troop elements and giving these elements the ability to see and sometimes engage the threat over the next ridgeline. Lightly armed vessels operating independently such as mine countermeasures, logistics ships, and yes, LCS, would benefit from having a 24x7 eye in the sky extending the ship's organic sensors, and dealing with low end threats, while allowing embarked manned helicopters to conduct higher value missions.
• Test over-the-horizon cooperative targeting and engagement between these same formations against surface and ground threats.
• Explore new lightweight payloads that would exploit the capabilities of large numbers of small persistent drones. These might include jammers, improvised expeditionary communication networks as an alternative to satellite communications, ASW sensors, and the ability to deploy remote unattended ground and ocean sensors. 
• Develop ways to employ smaller ships as forward arming, refueling, and communications relays for these aircraft. 
• Assess the ability to bring large formations of these aircraft together into cohesive swarms to defeat boat swarms in the littorals or complex insurgent attacks in an urban environment. Model the use of these massed formations of low cost UAS to penetrate air defenses and attack larger ground and surface targets. A few dozen 11 pound munitions would not sink a large naval combatant, but employed creatively they might achieve a mission kill rendering that vessel's sensors and weapons systems inoperable. Use the results of these tests to develop artificial intelligence algorithms that will reduce the manning necessary to control such a large fleet of remotely piloted aircraft. 
• Employ the above concepts with various deployed nodes of special operations forces, Marine, and NECC elements, in an effort to understand the capabilities and limitations each of these units brings to the distributed littoral fight. 
• Test all of the above concepts in electronically-challenged environments. Naysayers of network-centric warfare are quick to point out the difficulties of fighting in an environment where jamming is present. The thing about distributed operations from the sea is that since the platforms are always moving, fixing them and relocating jammers to be effective is more challenging than it would be in a static environment. Many critics have rightfully pointed out the liability that LCS speed requirements have produced to payload, range, and overall platform cost, but in an EW environment, her speed becomes an asset. Jammers have limited ranges and small more numerous platforms able to relocate faster than the enemy's jammers will be able to mitigate some of those issues.

RQ-7B with Shadow Hawk munition

Though distributed operations with small units are certainly not new in our Navy's history (Vietnam small boat ops come to mind), the proliferation of persistent armed and networked remotely piloted vehicles adds a whole new dynamic.  The concept has applicability across the spectrum of conflict, but especially in the irregular wars in which we increasingly find ourselves engaged. The upcoming few years will provide an excellent time for experimentation on operational concepts such as distributed maritime operations and the higher end AirSea Battle. The mistakes made and lessons learned will pay dividends the next time our Navy/Marine Corps is called to war.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

VTUAV Updates

In the past year or so, Navy Fire Scouts have been proving their value in Afghanistan, Libya, for counter-piracy, and other operations. The Navy recently announced the stand up of its first operational VTUAV squadron, HSM-35, in 2013. As the author notes, the Navy has taken a cautious approach to deploying UAVs. Better late than never, I suppose.

What is interesting is that the Fire Scouts are being incorporated into an existing rotary wing squadron, rather than getting their own squadron as the Air Force has done with their unmanned aircraft. The Navy has recently experimented with data links between manned helos and unmanned aircraft. Does it make sense to include UAVs in a helo squadron or should they be considered a capability distinct from manned aviation? I’ve heard arguments for both ways. What do y'all think?

Also of note, the Navy has decided to arm the MQ-8s with 70mm guided rockets. This capability is hugely important and will extend the anti-surface/ground attack capability of small surface combatants.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Let Enlisted Personnel Fly UAVs?

This is interesting:

[UAVs] are significantly cheaper to purchase and operate than manned aircraft, and they do not require officer pilots. Officer pilots are necessary in manned aircraft because they make decisions independent of a commander's control, due to distance and communications limitations. UAVs remove these impediments. Today a team of enlisted personnel can remotely operate numerous aircraft under the supervision of a single officer. Currently, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all use enlisted personnel to fly some UAVs. Yet the Air Force insists on maintaining antiquated requirements that all pilots -- including of UAVs -- be officers.

A recent internal audit of the Air Force's UAV training pipelines found that if properly structured, the training cost could be decreased to $135,000 per pilot, an impressive number when compared with the more than $2.6 million the service spends to train a fighter pilot. Of the approximately 1,200 individuals entering the Air Force's pilot training pipeline last year, roughly half will pilot UAVs. It costs the United States Air Force Academy $403,000 per officer graduate, while it costs less than $45,000 to recruit and train an enlisted service member. If a switch from officer to enlisted UAV pilots were made in the Air Force alone the total recruiting and training savings could amount to over $1.5 billion each year. If all of the services were to begin replacing officers in flight training pipelines with experienced enlisted personnel, such programs could yield several billion dollars in savings each year.

These would not be one-time savings, as maintaining an officer on active duty costs far more than maintaining enlisted personnel. Last year, for the first time, a Navy Petty Officer First Class completed the basic flight standards course, the first step in the Navy's pilot training pipeline. Before flight pay, bonuses, and allowances this individual is paid $2801.40 a month, compared with the $5117.10 a lieutenant is paid for the same month's work. These soldiers, sailors, and marines complete highly technical operations with extremely high levels of efficiency and do so at a fraction of the cost of an officer.

Thoughts?

Filling Navy ISR Gaps

This will be a wonderful capability some day, but when, and at what price?

Without timely and accurate intelligence, regardless of source, an operator cannot maneuver his fleet or employ his weapons. Whether we want to find, fix, and finish terrorists from the sea, or engage in long range maritime scouting against a belligerent Navy, a sufficient quality and quantity of "multi-int" capable air platforms is essential. The SECDEF realized in 2008 that a shortage of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms was hurting our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Following some prodding, the Air Force finally shifted into gear and began to build, borrow, and contract dozens of new aircraft, which are being employed to good effect on those two battlefields and elsewhere today. As Navy and Marine units find themselves dispersed wider sea and littoral areas, a sufficient quantity of supporting ISR becomes even more important.

A couple of decades ago, a typical carrier air wing had a number of organic platforms capable of collecting intelligence, including fast movers with TARPS and ES-3A Shadows for ELINT. These aircraft were supplemented by a robust ground-based P-3 fleet along with numerous FLIR and radar capable LAMPS on the small boys. Contrast this capability with today's much-reduced organic ISR capability and some long-in-the-tooth P-3s which are often being employed overland. Today's global naval missions require extraordinary amounts of ISR, but the resources just aren't adequate to source them properly.

ISR seems to be getting short shrift in the Navy's ever-changing procurement plans. Outside of the naval special operations community, the energy and funding to increase the fleet's airborne ISR capabilities seems lacking. The Navy is slowly introducing rotary and fixed-wing UAVs such as Fire Scout and BAMs, but lacks more robust collection capabilities that could be provided by manned sea-based aircraft. The P-8 will eventually bring a capable P-3 replacement to the fleet, albeit a big, expensive, noisy, and manpower intensive one. But there are numerous smaller prop-driven aircraft in use over battlefields today that provide similar, and in some cases better capabilities than the P-3 or P-8 in many ISR roles, at a significantly lower price point.

Is a Navy ISR "surge" in order to fill some of the current capability gaps in this area until more advanced programs are brought online? A major R&D or procurement effort is not necessarily required. Rather, the Navy should leverage the work of the Air Force and SOCOM to rapidly acquire both manned and unmanned platforms and adapt them for sea service. Is there a reason that an aircraft similar to the Air Force's "Project Liberty" MC-12W couldn't be retrofitted with stronger landing gear and tail hook for use from carriers or even large deck amphibs? This sort of platform would provide a number of tactical and operational advantages over our current ISR fleet, giving the Navy the ability to collect volumes of intelligence over land and water from sovereign US territory without a large expeditionary footprint ashore.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Unmanned Systems: Security by Obscurity

This is almost incredible news, until you realize it has been part of the risk assessment of the system all along. Still, a very troubling reminder that our information infrastructure is also our major weakness, not only one of our major strengths.

Militants in Iraq have used $26 off-the-shelf software to intercept live video feeds from U.S. Predator drones, potentially providing them with information they need to evade or monitor U.S. military operations.

Senior defense and intelligence officials said Iranian-backed insurgents intercepted the video feeds by taking advantage of an unprotected communications link in some of the remotely flown planes' systems. Shiite fighters in Iraq used software programs such as SkyGrabber -- available for as little as $25.95 on the Internet -- to regularly capture drone video feeds, according to a person familiar with reports on the matter.

Skygrabber is software often used in the United States to steal satellite TV signals, among other things. It is relatively easy to use, and the commercial sector has dealt with this type of problem in many ways in the past. It is never inexpensive though. The article goes on.

In the summer 2009 incident, the military found "days and days and hours and hours of proof" that the feeds were being intercepted and shared with multiple extremist groups, the person said. "It is part of their kit now."

A senior defense official said that James Clapper, the Pentagon's intelligence chief, assessed the Iraq intercepts at the direction of Defense Secretary Robert Gates and concluded they represented a shortcoming to the security of the drone network.

"There did appear to be a vulnerability," the defense official said. "There's been no harm done to troops or missions compromised as a result of it, but there's an issue that we can take care of and we're doing so."

But here is the key part:

The potential drone vulnerability lies in an unencrypted downlink between the unmanned craft and ground control. The U.S. government has known about the flaw since the U.S. campaign in Bosnia in the 1990s, current and former officials said. But the Pentagon assumed local adversaries wouldn't know how to exploit it, the officials said.

Ahh, the heart of the problem... the Pentagon assumed Security through Obscurity. I have been pounding sand on the blog about the DoDs information infrastructure being a significant problem (particularly for the Navy's plans of the future), and I have a feeling I will no longer be one of the few voices. How many network systems are based on a such a false sense of security? As the Navy in particular relies almost exclusively on satellite based communications, this could be a bigger problem than people know.

The thing is, a bit more advanced bit of software like this would allow one to do a lot more than watch video feeds when tied into a network, for example, allowing one to track back to the source of the feed, otherwise known as location identification of the unmanned platform. Encryption won't solve that problem, and neither will radar coatings and stealth design.

Anyone else see why manned systems aren't going away anytime soon? We are decades from autonomous systems, and unless we can significantly increase the amount of bandwidth in our orbital communication networks (or learn how to integrate advanced routing into our DoD networks so we can develop more advanced information transport protocols), our potential in military technology capabilities will continue hitting the barriers of our information infrastructure.

The fix to this problem is going to be expensive. The DoD needs to rethink their information network infrastructure before throwing good money after bad. It would be a mistake to treat this problem like a patch solution when it should be a siren its time to upgrade.

Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD) To CENTCOM

The end of Amy Butler's Aviation Week article on BAMS is noteworthy.

Meantime, the first Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD) UAS deployed to the U.S. Central Command has arrived in its Middle East-Central Asian theater of operations. The system is expected to conduct its first flight shortly, Shannon says.

The aircraft, a precursor to the full BAMS design, will support maritime surveillance requirements there. Navy officials demurred on deployment details, but it is likely the UAS would be collocated with Air Force Global Hawks that operate out of Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates.

While there are plenty of activities in the Persian Gulf that can keep this platform busy, I keep thinking this may be an effective system for dealing with pirates.

I don't believe that any of the international partners fighting piracy have the capabilities to prevent an attack, but the real challenge is catching the folks who attack and fail. BAMS appears to be a system that can address that challenge, by keeping tabs on the small boats that get chased off following attacks.

As it is right now, often when a pirate attack is broken up by a coalition response, or a successful defense by a ships crew, the pirate ship simply disappears into the mass of fishing boats by blending into the populated seas.

BAMS might be the capability that can keep the pirate vessel flagged for coalition forces for a much longer duration allowing coalition naval forces to track down and inspect the pirate vessel. This goes to the heart of the problem fighting piracy, everything is responsive, but if the responsive capabilities can be made more capable, that can have a long term effect of curbing pirate efforts, and reduce the risk to commercial shipping.

Previous discussion on the GHMD deployment here.

Global Hawk deploys in the march to BAMS

In the march towards BAMS, the U.S. Navy may move one of its two Global Hawk Maritime Demo aircraft to the Iraq theater to begin maritime surveillance operations. Aviation Week says that while no announcement of its base was made, "it is widely known that the Air Force’s high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft supporting activities in Iraq and Afghanistan operate from Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates."

If the GHMD can demonstrate successful shipping lane surveillance in the Persian Gulf, this will mean that the Navy's P-8 Poseidon (ex-MMA) follow-on to the P-3 Orion will indeed be able to look forward to assistance in broad area surface surveillance missions. It will be interesting to see if the GHMD can track small boat traffic as well as ship traffic from its normal (high) operating altitudes using its systems, which are less capable than those scheduled to be on the BAMS version. If, however, it does well enough, I'll go out on a limb and say we should expect to see additional acquisitions of the Navalised Global Hawk before BAMS comes online in 2015.