It's Only a Checkbox

From the Command Inspection of Naval Postgraduate School report by the Naval Inspector General, dated October 22, 2012. The following section begins on page 10 of the report. Highlights by me.

Academic (didactic instruction) Requirements

a. NPS delivers graduate master and doctoral degree programs, graduate level certificate programs, and professional development courses. Graduate degree programs include 56 resident degree programs and 18 distance learning programs. NPS offers 38 certificate programs with various delivery formats including resident, distance learning, or combination of resident and distance learning (hybrid delivery). NPS provides various professional development courses that range in duration from a few days to weeks with resident, distance learning, or hybrid delivery including mobile education teams domestically, afloat, and internationally. Professional development courses, referred to as "short courses," are training courses that do not qualify for academic credit.

(1) These various academic programs and courses undergo comprehensive levels of external and internal curriculum reviews. Part of the external curriculum review process occurs through four accrediting bodies: Western Association of Schools and Colleges, Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology, The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, and National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration.

(2) Eighty-Four percent of the in-residence degree curricula respond to Navy and Marine Corps sponsors and are subject to a biennial curriculum review process, which establishes and updates the essential skill requirements expected of graduates. Eighty-Nine percent of the distributed learning degree programs and 72% of the NPS certificate programs have DON sponsors and also undergo this curriculum review process. This level of collaborative curriculum review with sponsor involvement allows the curriculum to be responsive to the requirements of DON. An examination of the collaborative curriculum review process found that it is generally an effective process that serves sponsors and NPS appropriately. However, a notable exception is the friction between the Graduate School of Operational and Informational Sciences (GSOIS) and OPNAV N2/N6 who sponsors three GSOIS curricula. The Dean of GSOIS indicated they reached an impasse and temporarily suspended the curriculum review process. The Dean of the Graduate School of Engineering and Applied Sciences indicated it was more difficult than normal, but his school had recently successfully completed curriculum reviews with OPNAV N2/N6 for its sponsored curricula.

RECOMMENDATION
048-12 That NPS develop standard procedures for collaborative curriculum review with sponsors (where there is also a business relationship). The procedure should contain safeguards to ensure sponsors do not compromise fundamental graduate level educational requirements for rigor or length of time of educational programs. NPS should maintain a majority voice in how curriculum is best delivered.

b. NPS conducts internal curriculum reviews through the NPS Review and Assessment Program (RAP) Framework. RAP is an academic measures and metrics program that facilitates comprehensive assessment and improvement of all of the academic programs conducted by NPS. The Western Association of Schools and Colleges visiting team indicated that NPS was a "model for others" for mapping course work for program outcomes (a key component to effective curriculum review). Recent modifications, that include new program reviews, have made the curriculum review process more responsive and transparent which should improve an already solid system of ensuring the education is directly tied to current and future requirements of DON. While the new NPS program process requires both sound academic and business cases for approval, it does not formally solicit approval from DON leadership prior to implementation.

RECOMMENDATION
049-12 That NPS include the Navy’s Education Coordination Council in its new program review process.

c. The effectiveness of the quality of instruction can be captured by these various metrics: establishing a correlation between program outcomes and learning objectives in coursework (part of curriculum review), performance of students in coursework, end of quarter student surveys, alumni surveys, and surveys of sponsors (or supervisors of the students after graduation). Collectively, inspection of these metrics indicated that most students and sponsors/supervisors were satisfied with the effectiveness of the quality of education. However, there were students and faculty who would routinely refer to NPS as "a pump and not a filter." The perception was that all the students will graduate (> 98% graduation rate) regardless of performance and that a student would have to "work at it" to actually fail a course or not graduate.

d. The NPS 2008 Strategic Plan shifted the focus of NPS to become a "naval/defense oriented research university" that also provides graduate education. From 2007 to 2010, total sponsored program (education, research and services) funding doubled and research funding tripled, while mission funding from DON remained static, or declined. This influx of funding and
discussions with faculty indicate that research and reimbursable programs are the first thought of many at NPS. Collectively, with the emphasis of NPS on becoming a top-tiered research institute, and "a pump and not a filter" perception among a significant representation of faculty and students, there are some indicators that NPS is not appropriately focused on educating (didactic teaching of) naval officers.

RECOMMENDATION
050-12 That NPS renew its commitment to educating naval officers in its Strategic Plan.

According to the Navy Times back when the news of IG investigation broke it was reported that Juan Garcia, assistant Navy secretary for manpower and reserve affairs, had been tasked to look into several aspects of the issues raised in Naval Postgraduate School IG report. I am not sure exactly what level of responsibility he has in looking into all of the issues at NPS that are cited in the IG report, but I recently heard that Juan Garcia was looking at all three Navy schools as part of setting a standard for Navy education.

This makes sense to me, because under the law the Secretary of the Navy appoints the heads of the schools and faculty, and the CNO is the resource sponsor who pays the bills. I have no idea how long Ray Mabus intends on staying on as Secretary of the Navy, but if he leaves at any point over the next 4 years my money is on Juan Garcia being the next Secretary of the Navy... and I think it would be a job he has earned btw.

After reading the full IG report on NPS - and it's an eyeopener - I've been thinking a lot more about what education actually means in the US Navy. For example, the NPS Fact Book boasts of 12 PhDs awarded to students in 2011. I've been told that zero of the twelve PhDs that were awarded were to US Navy officers in the unrestricted line. When I inquired what year the last US Navy officer in the unrestricted line was conferred a PhD from NPS, I was told they would get back to me, and of course they never did. I am sure there had to have been at least one US Navy unrestricted line officer to get a PhD at NPS over the past many years, but be aware if you are that one person - you were unmentionable.

I have noticed people don't really want to talk or hear about the topic of higher education in the Navy, for whatever reason. I struggle to find evidence the Navy as an institution actually cares about higher education, and if we look at the trend lines produced both at NPS and NWC, distance education is becoming more important while spending a year thinking about big issues in a setting like NPS and NWC is becoming less important. Said another way, to the Navy advanced education is just another check box on a career path that is nearly entirely determined by a persons checked boxes.

In thinking about Navy higher education i noticed a few things. For example, RADM Ted Carter has been named the Prospective President of the Naval War College. According to his biography RADM Ted Carter is the recipient of the U.S. Navy’s prestigious Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Leadership Award, the recipient of the U.S. Navy League’s John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership, and has even been designated an Honorary Master Chief by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy. His personal decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal (two awards), Legion of Merit (two awards), Distinguished Flying Cross with Combat V, Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal (two with Combat V and five strike flight), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (two with Combat V), and various service medals and unit awards. By every standard I use to make such judgments, RADM Ted Carter is an American badass in uniform today.

But when you go through and take a close look at RADM Ted Carter's biography, you struggle to find a single reason why he was selected to be the 54th President of the Naval War College, because the Naval War College is a Masters degree granting postgraduate school, and RADM Ted Carter doesn't have a Masters degree. Apparently the only qualification RADM Ted Carter has to be President of the Naval War College is that... he is a native of Rhode Island. By no possible standard can it ever be said that education was an important factor in selecting the 54th President of the Naval War College.

Then I noticed it again. Vice Admiral Miller became the 61st superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy on Aug. 3, 2010 when VADM Fowler resigned 30 day early under a cloud of controversy related to financial irregularities at the academy as well as multiple honor-code violations by USNA midshipman. Again, using my very sophisticated criteria for making such judgments, Vice Admiral Miller is unquestionably an American badass in uniform. When I read his biography my first question was to ask if any active duty military officer since WWII has done more work with political leaders during a time the nation has been at war than VADM Miller has? Unless my math is off, VADM Miller has almost as much time addressing military politics with civilian leaders as General Marshall did in the 1940s.

But Miller also has a Bronze Star, the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (6 awards), three Air Medals, the Meritorious Service Medal (3 awards), the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal (2 awards), Navy Achievement Medal and various service and campaign awards. He is recognized for combat operations against Libya in the 1980s, Iraq in the 1990s, and Iraq again in the 2000s. He's a Viking pilot, which makes him either a legend or a myth, plus he worked at N3/N5 - which is where the Navy sends all the smartest officers to work.

And yet, the 61st superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy doesn't have a Masters Degree, so once again by no possible standard can it ever be said that education was an important factor in selecting VADM Miller as the 61st superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy.

I do not want anyone to misinterpret what I am saying. Vice Admiral Miller might be a great superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, and RADM Ted Carter could turn out to be an outstanding President of the Naval War College; this is not about them as individuals, and focusing on them specifically would be to completely miss the point.

Just as the Navy has a requirement that aviators command aircraft carriers, a Masters degree should be a minimum education requirement to command one of the educational institutions of the US Navy. I don't think that is inappropriate to suggest. As of December 2012 I looked at every single University with a Division I football program (I searched by conference) and from what I could tell, USNA is the only University superintendent or Chancellor/Vice Chancellor equivalent without a Masters degree.

So what is the value of education to the professional US Navy officer? If there is any value at all, and if so, up to what point does value exist? Where is the evidence Navy leadership recognizes or even appreciates that value? The trends that favor distance learning in the US Navy look to me like a budget priority from the resource sponsor, and in my opinion lack of value on higher education sends a clear message what the priority of education is to officers within the Navy.

Budgets are tight, and education is a popular topic when it comes time to trim budgets. In today's Navy the check box that marks completion of mandatory annual political correctness training is more important to a naval officers promotion prospects than any hard work a naval officer commits towards a higher education like a Masters degree. Incentives and priorities should influence our expectations for the final product, so tell me, what exactly do we expect with the current US Navy training/education priorities in the career paths for Navy officers, and how do we translate those priorities into expectations of how Naval leaders are prepared at the strategic and tactical levels on the next naval battlefield?

Gray Matter for Gray Hulls: The Intellectual Software Powering the U.S. Navy’s Asia-Pacific Rebalance

East Asia

The following guest post is by Gabe Collins. Gabe Collins is the co-founder of China SignPost and a former commodity investment analyst and research fellow in the US Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute.

The Naval War College is poised to play a pivotal role in America’s Asia-Pacific refocusing. Here are the programs and professionals that the Navy will draw on.

U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert recently penned “Sea Change,” a landmark article for Foreign Policy that explains America’s rebalancing toward Asia. Building the Admiral’s Sailing Directions (PDF), Posture Statement (PDF), Navigation Plan (PDF), and Position Report (PDF), it represents his definitive public statement on what the U.S. Navy is doing to support the Asia-Pacific Rebalance.

Admiral Greenert’s assessment highlights the centrality of the Asia-Pacific region to American interests, but even more importantly, notes the need for the U.S. Navy to “establish greater intellectual focus on Asia-Pacific security challenges” and to help create the intellectual software that will enable Washington to employ its military hardware to maximum effect in the region. Having Navy institutions play a leading role in formulating Asia-Pacific strategy makes sense given the region’s maritime geography and manifold commercial and military maritime security challenges.

As a part of rebalancing, the Admiral notes  that “[the U.S. is] refocusing attention on the Asia-Pacific in developing and deploying our intellectual talent.” He cites The Naval War College as “the nation’s premier academic center on the region,” with strong and growing programs on Asian security. Illustrating the comprehensiveness of the Navy’s commitment to Asia-focused strategic thought, Greenert adds that the Naval Postgraduate School has also “expanded its programs devoted to developing political and technical expertise relevant to the Asia-Pacific.” The Admiral highlights a core strength of the Navy’s thought centers—their focus on continually developing human capital and actionable operational concepts that can be sent right back out to the fleet, pointing out that “we [the Navy] continue to carefully screen and send our most talented people to operate and command ships and squadrons in the Asia-Pacific.” 

This top-level recognition of the need to focus on intellectual software is refreshing given that the subject typically receives far less attention than the hardware end of naval activities (i.e. ships, planes, missiles). It is also important because as the U.S. and China move forward with their “frenemies” relationship that mixes cooperative and competitive aspects, it will be vital for Washington to base its actions in the Asia-Pacific area on a firm, comprehensive, and forward-looking intellectual foundation.

Among bastions of naval strategic thought in the U.S, the Naval War College is singularly well-positioned to play a leading role in formulating the foundations of American naval power in the Asia-Pacific. Having furnished critical inputs (PDF) to support the formulation of the latest U.S. maritime strategy (PDF) —the first endorsed by the chiefs of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard—the College is already making substantial contributions to U.S. strategy regarding how to grapple with China’s rising maritime power, as well as the evolving roles of India and U.S. allies such as Japan in a dynamic and strategically-vital part of the world. To understand and how Newport will continue shaping policy in coming years, it is necessary to consider its three major Asia-Pacific programs and the individuals that lead them.

First is the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). Founded in 2006 by Dr. Lyle Goldstein and led by current director Prof. Peter Dutton, a retired naval flight officer and judge advocate who enjoys considerable policy influence (PDF) through his research on Chinese maritime strategic and legal perspectives, CMSI aims to enhance the U.S. Navy’s understanding of the maritime implications of China’s rise. CMSI draws on the work of both dedicated researcher professors and affiliated teaching faculty who are able to read and analyze Chinese-language original source materials from the Institute’s library, which offers the most specialized collection of China-related military maritime publications outside of Greater China. In 2008, CMSI was praised by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as a model for conducting open source research on China’s military.

CMSI draws on these unique resources to offer multidimensional research capabilities covering a range of issues including China’s naval policy and development, civil-military relations, civil maritime organizations, territorial and maritime claims disputes and associated legal positions, defense science, technology, and industry, aerospace dimensions of naval operations, seaborne energy security, and maritime relations with the U.S. and other nations. In addition to developing and curating its library, CMSI holds an annual conference, publishes the China Maritime Studies monograph series, and hosts regular guest speakers.

Second is the Asia-Pacific Studies Group (APSG). Established by Dr. Jonathan Pollack, now a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and acting director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, and led by current chairman Dr. Terence Roehrig—like Pollack, a recognized expert on Korean peninsula affairs —the APSG focuses on policy and strategy issues concerning the entire Asia-Pacific region, including Australia and Russia. APSG’s research serves the needs of the Navy, U.S. Pacific Command, and other elements of the U.S. Government responsible for formulating policy, strategy, and planning related to Asia and the Pacific. In addition, at the Naval War College, APSG performs vital outreach and academic functions by hosting guest speakers and seminars and offering course for students.

Third is the John A. van Buren Chair for Asia-Pacific Studies, endowed in 2010 with a generous grant through the Naval War College Foundation. Dr. Toshi Yoshihara, the inaugural recipient of the chairmanship, is a leading analyst of Chinese maritime power and has authored multiple books and numerous scholarly articles on the subject.

Supported by the Naval War College leadership and the chairs of their respective departments, the heads of these programs work closely with a wide range of faculty members whose teaching, research, and scenario evaluation covers a full range of regional issues, as well as relevant strategic and cross-cutting functional specialties. A critical mass of faculty, for instance, conduct research using original Chinese-language sources; at no other institution outside of Greater China is such a substantial group of Chinese language-capable professors devoted to military maritime matters. Students participate directly in these activities, contributing important operational and technical insights and applying their knowledge in the fleet and its various support organizations following their time in Newport.

The U.S. Navy has a long and storied history of constructive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. The rapid settlement and growth of the Western U.S. in the post-Civil War period, coupled with the subsequent statehood of Alaska and Hawaii as well as the affiliation of Guam and other U.S. Pacific territories—which together confer on the U.S. the largest territorial waters and claimable Exclusive Economic Zone of any nation, has bound the U.S. national interest inextricably to economic and security events in the Asia-Pacific.

This bond continues to animate Washington’s foreign policy to this day. Indeed, as Admiral Greenert points out, “The importance of the Asia-Pacific, and the Navy’s attention to it, is not new. Five of our seven treaty allies are in the region, as well as six of the world’s top 20 economies. We have maintained an active and robust presence in the Asia-Pacific for more than 70 years and built deep and enduring relationships with allies and partners there.”

Continuing to build on that powerful legacy will require new approaches as the world becomes increasingly Asia-centric and the need for naval presence and engagement becomes more acute. Research and analysis from the Navy’s bases of Asian studies excellence in Newport, as well as Monterrey and Annapolis, will help lay the intellectual foundation of these approaches and the strategies and policies that result. As the U.S. prepares to continue its indispensable role in the world’s most dynamic region, watch for contributions from its critical centers of naval thought.

What fundamental skills do today's midshipmen need to learn in order to lead the Navy three decades from now?

Today's guest is Vice Admiral Michael H. Miller, the 61st Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy.

The plebes entering the Naval Academy this year will be flag officers and general officers in the 2040’s and 2050’s. What fundamental skills do today's midshipmen need to learn in order to lead the Navy three decades from now?

One of the great strengths of the Naval Academy is our dedication to a relatively short - but incredibly important - Mission Statement. In just one sentence it lays out a three step process, essentially unchanged for 167 years, designed to produce leaders of character to serve the nation:

“To develop Midshipmen morally, mentally, and physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor, and loyalty in order to graduate leaders who are dedicated to a career of naval service and have potential for future development in mind and character, to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.”

Whether our graduates are serving in the 2040’s/2050’s as flag/general officers, captains of industry, or leaders in government, this mission lays out the guiding principles of how we prepare them to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.  Central to this process, midshipmen graduating today must possess the integrity, imagination, and innovation to adapt to the ever-changing landscape of security challenges in the future.

First and foremost, we must graduate leaders with the proclivity for continuing development in mind and character.  Indeed, our ultimate goal must be to produce officers who embark on a lifetime of learning - the journey only starts at the Naval Academy. The successful delivery of this end product naturally requires that we look to more tangible metrics and near term objectives in the course of “building tomorrow’s leaders, today.” We are aided in this process by our customers, the United States Navy and Marine Corps, who charter us to commission roughly 1000 Ensigns/Second Lieutenants each year.  We have built a process that enables Fleet feedback, so that we are able to adjust the 47 month experience here at the Academy to meet the needs of the Fleet.  As a starting point, before they are ready to take command or wear stars, these young men and women must first succeed at the challenges they will first face as junior officers.  As a result, much of the four year experience at the Naval Academy is focused on building a “thinking warrior” with the adaptability to confront the conflicts of today while planting the seeds that will bear the fruits of victory thirty years hence. The fundamental skills needed to lead the Navy three decades from now are inseparable from those needed in this coming decade; it is a continuum of integrity, commitment, self-discipline, and a sense for when it’s time to “throw out the book.”  These are the traits that have been the hallmark of successful naval officers for over 235 years.

When asked about the foundation needed to lead in the naval service, I am often reminded of the dialogue we attribute to John Paul Jones regarding the qualifications of a Naval Officer. “It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that of course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.” I have no doubt that the next generation of Naval Officers must possess refined manners and punctilious courtesy, as well as a cultural awareness and understanding that was also expected of mariners during Jones’ era.

US Navy Photo

The challenges of today require that our officers possess a multi-disciplinary education, and all indications are that this broader vision will be only more greatly valued in the future. We must take the additional steps beyond the traditional model of a “liberal education,” and focus on the nuanced interrelationships of a variety of disciplines.  Naval Officers have historically held diplomatic roles, as they frequently would be the first to reach and interact with other nations and cultures. This remains true today in the sense that the nation continues to expect that our graduates will be global leaders. At the Naval Academy, this means we must have a continued emphasis on language and cultural experience for all midshipmen, so they are prepared to work with new and emerging partners, such as China, Russia, Brazil, India, and South Korea, as well as our traditional allies around the world. International immersion for midshipmen is one of our highest priorities here at USNA.

Perhaps the most pressing, multi-disciplinary threat we face today is cyber warfare. I am convinced that the officers we commission today will have to prove themselves as warriors against threats in cyberspace long before they assume flag rank. Cyberspace cuts across the traditional disciplines, and it is for this reason that we created the Center for Cyber Security Studies at USNA.  In point of fact, we have mandated this immersive experience for every student across the broad range of the curriculum. Our Center enhances the education of midshipmen, the research of our world-class faculty, and the training of our future officers with courses and affiliations across the academic departments, as well as internship opportunities at the National Security Agency and National Defense University.

Ethical leadership is the critical third dimension of everything we do at the Naval Academy and is what Jones meant when he referred to a Naval Officer having the “nicest sense of personal honor.” The distinguishing feature of our future naval professionals must be their ability to serve as ethical, covenant leaders. Producing honorable leaders who have the trust of seniors and subordinates alike is a timeless requirement, even more important today as the nature of warfare changes and the nation looks to our military for the defense of its people and principles.

These leaders of the future will be challenged with ethical questions that would have sounded like science fiction only a decade ago. Drone warfare, cyber attacks, and other technological advances have changed our risk/reward calculations and must be balanced against issues of national sovereignty, moral imperatives, and human rights. Already, our graduates are returning to the field with complex prosthetic limbs to replace those lost after a decade of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan.   They will soon need to decide whether weapons with artificial intelligence will be permitted algorithms that enable them to decide to take human life.

I am confident that our graduates will be ready to answer these challenges when called. They are already thinking about these issues and others as part of our combined programs of honor, character, and leadership education; programs designed to instill in them the understanding that being a leader of character requires a lifelong commitment to personal development. It goes back to the Mission of the Naval Academy and the task to graduate leaders with the potential for future development of mind and character. They have more than the potential for future development; they are already in the development process, and know that they must continue on that path. The future of our Navy, Marine Corps, and Nation depends on them.

I think we can all agree with Jones’ sentiment that a Naval Officer “must of course be a capable mariner.” After all is said and done, a naval force is made of men and women who “go down to the sea in ships.” Our officers must be capable mariners throughout their careers - but over the course of decades, they need be so much more. The Navy/Marine Corps team is a calling as much as it is a profession, and as such the Naval Academy must produce leaders with the technological know-how, the cultural insight, and the ethical foundation that will stand the test of time.  Most assuredly, those tests are coming - and our young Midshipmen must be up to the challenge.  Given what I have witnessed here on the banks of the Severn, they will meet, and exceed, those expectations, thanks to their creativity in adapting skill sets from the past and applying them to the threats of the future. 

Digerati

I would encourage folks to read this article by Larry Sanger, and you will find there are a number of magnificent articles linked from the original. The article is very important for anyone who is interested or employed in education, particularly higher education.

See this if you don't know who Larry Sanger is.

Tacit Knowledge and Networks

Roger Fortier has an interesting response to my review of James Russell's book:

First, I disagree with your assumption on a 'common environment'. No two units are exactly alike, have the same operational context, have as capable commanders and troops etc, even in the same area of operations. Thus, the lack of variation in the dependent variable neither proves nor disproves top down or bottom up. And paraphrasing Einstein's blackboard; not all that counts can be counted, and not all that can be counted counts. Perhaps less metrics and more tacit knowledge from the field will help illuminate this issue.

I think that this is rather my point; there's considerable variation in what we would call independent variables, which most definitely include operational context, capability of commanders and troops, and area of operations. What we don't have is variation on the dependent variable; in spite of these differences, all of the brigade teams that Russell studies seem to learn the same things at roughly the same pace. That's fine and well, and indeed ideal from a practical, operational point of view, but it doesn't necessarily support the bottom-up explanation that Russell is positing. If best COIN practice is spread by networks of officers and NCOs sharing information in formal and informal settings, you'd expect factors specific to each unit (including commander experience and capability, area of operations, etc.) to affect the learning process. But Russell doesn't present much evidence of that; his evidence, rather, is pretty consistent with a top-down explanation of the spread of best practices. It might have helped if Russell had sought out examples of units (whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, or some other war) that failed to adapt to best practices, and try to figure out why.

Incidentally, I wrote my dissertation on the spread of tacit knowledge through networks of officers, which I realize is rather like saying I wrote my thesis on life experience...

Second, understanding "the precise nature through which doctrine changes" solves the wrong problem. It is a mistake to think doctrine is the anti-dote to fluid dynamics. Is it any wonder that the old cliche of 'generals fighting the last war' has such staying power. What's meaningful is an open network of information sharing and dissemination in real time where emergent, and bottom up, processes and techniques change as rapidly as an adaptable enemy. The tacit is personal and non-linear and always defies articulation.

Two thoughts. First, the development of an open network of information sharing and dissemination in real time et al isn't something that's disconnected from the top-down/bottom-up debate; I think there's a fair amount of evidence that some military organizations fail utterly at developing that kind of network, even when they're generally moving towards the right kind of response to whatever war they're fighting. One way to phrase this is that senior officers need to be comfortable with the bottom-up process of information sharing and development of "best practices;" some command environments facilitate such developments, and some don't. In that sense, command functions best when it "gets out of the way," and deserves credit for making itself absent. That's a mostly, but not entirely, bottom up account of doctrinal development during wartime.

But I don't think that's the whole story. Open networks of practice dissemination have to be aimed in the right direction, and need to have a baseline grounding. We can radically overstate the impact of FM 3-24, but we can also understate it; the work taking place in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 in terms of development and sharing of best practices was certainly informed by the general lines of thought emerging around the Counter-Insurgency manual. There are, after all, multiple strategies available to the counter-insurgent. It's not all that surprising that the techniques and best practices developed and employed in Iraq were generally consistent with the precepts of FM 3-24. This might not entirely be a top-down explanation, but it's not really bottom-up, either.

Much of the question here revolves around the role that senior command plays in institutionalizing an environment in which best practices can be developed and disseminated. There's surely an element of "get out of the way," and not just in COIN; we have the examples of German infantry and armor tactics in both wars, US submarine tactics in World War II, etc. But I think it's also important to point the organization in the right direction. It's fine and good to say "here's the job, surprise me with your ingenuity," but I think that a lot goes into how the "job" is chosen, defined, and then described to the people who are tasked with execution.

Sunday Book Review: Innovation, Transformation, and War

James Russell's Innovation, Transformation, and War tracks doctrinal innovation in the US Army prior to the Surge. Russell, an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, wrote the book based on face-to-face interviews of personnel operating in Iraq between 2005 and 2007, and close attention to primary documents associated with the development of counter-insurgency on the ground in Iraq. Russell gives what is essentially a bottom up account of doctrinal innovation prior to the Surge. Networks of officers and NCOs shared information about tactics that worked across units, leading to general increase in the institutional capacity of units to conduct the Surge. Russell's work runs orthogonal to many accounts of the Surge, which focus on top-down doctrinal innovation coming from the group of officers and civilian experts closely associated with David Petraeus and FM 3-24. We read Russell as part of my Spring 2011 Counter-Insurgency course at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce.

Russell's unit of analysis is the brigade combat team, and he tracks the development of certain tactics across several brigades in Anbar and Nineva. These tactics include what have come to be known as COIN best practices, including census taking, engagement with local leadership, and maintenance of presence amongst the population. Russell finds that these best practices spread through low level interaction between officers and NCOs from units participating in the fight.

But here's the problem: Good social science typically needs some variation on the dependent variable. This is to say that in order to determine what causes learning, we need some examples of units that have learned, and some examples of units that have not. Russell, as far as I can tell, gives no account of units that have failed to learn. As Russell writes:

All the units studied here demonstrated a grasp of COIN principles and sought to build organizational competencies that could be operationalized in plans and operations. Senior leaders in each of the units studied here universally recognized that the ultimate objective in their operations was to secure the support of the local population and isolate the insurgents from local support.

One reason for this may be that Russell worked closely with many soldiers and marines, and was reluctant to suggest that any particular unit had failed to learn. Identification of the researcher with the subject is a problem that invariably affects social science projects that involve face-to-face interaction. But another possibility goes to the core of Russell's argument. When I'm presented with a situation in which there is no variation across units, I'm inclined to wonder whether a unit based (that is, bottom up) explanation is really necessary. We normally focus on unit level processes (and I use "unit" in the social science sense rather than in the "brigade" sense) when we see lots of variation across units. When all of the units act similarly, social scientist are inclined to look for a common cause. In this case, it's not clear that the development of counter-insurgency was really "bottom-up" as described by Russell. If it were so, we'd probably see variation across brigades, rather than uniformity. The uniformity that Russell describes is an indicator that the units all share a common environment (potentially a top-down oriented learning environment) that focuses their learning around certain goals. Networks may function, but they function as part of a hierarchical system that supports the learning of certain tactics, rather than others.

Long story short, while Russell argues that he's presenting a bottom-up doctrinal case, it seems to me that his evidence is quite consistent with a top-down account, albeit one rich in process-oriented detail. There's a lot at stake here, and not just for counter-insurgency; whenever any military organization recognizes a need to shift course, it's crucial to understand the precise nature through which doctrine changes. The bottom-up vs. top-down distinction is one of the arguments common to the literature, along with the civilian vs. military distinction. It's not clear to me that Russell is on the side he thinks he's on.

Nevertheless, the book was extremely helpful in the context of my counter-insurgency course. On the day we read Russell, Colonel James Crider (who recently took command of the 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division) spoke to the class about his experiences in Iraq, and the development of counter-insurgency theory. We also read Colonel Crider's CNAS monograph on learning during the Surge, which supported Russell's argument. We also had the pleasure of Pete Mansoor, who discussed his book Brigade Commander at Sunset the week after Crider spoke. This allowed us to compare Mansoor's practices in 2003-4 with Crider's during the Surge, which was an exceptional informative exercise.

See also Frank Hoffman's review.

New York, New York

It is Fleet Week in New York City, and I'd like to highlight two items I think folks will find interesting. First, ROTC is returning to Columbia.

Student and faculty leaders voted in April for the move after the military dropped its ban on openly gay service members. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus and university President Lee Bollinger plan to sign the agreement aboard USS Iwo Jima as part of New York's annual Fleet Week today.

The Navy will have an office on Columbia's campus, and recruits will train at SUNY's Maritime College in The Bronx. Columbia already participates in Army and Air Force ROTC, as well as the Marine Officer Candidate School, but none of those programs has space on Columbia property.

Second, speaking of SUNY Maritime College, the school is currently conducting a search for new President. Four current flag officers are listed among the six finalist candidates for new President at SUNY Maritime College including RADM Wendi B. Carpenter, VADM Derwood C. Curtis, RADM Joseph Kilkenny, and RADM Michael J. Lyden.

I think the array of candidates interesting, and I also really appreciated that I was able to read the submitted biographies of the applicants online. I think it is interesting to look into the careers of Navy leaders as they present themselves in their own words.

After careful review of each of the biographies, I almost went the way of a homer and was going to root for Rear Admiral Michael J. Lyden for the job because, well, he is an RPI guy. I'm breaking ranks with the hometown cooking criteria though, and I'm cheering for VADM Derwood C. Curtis instead. After careful review of all the biographies, his quickly became the easy choice to cheer for among the listed biographies, because VADM Curtis is the only applicant who lists the United States Naval Institute as one of the associations listed in his biography.

Nice!

Seriously, good luck to all. I think it is good to see several US Navy leaders interested in SUNY Maritime College.

Whether it is the Ivy League or the maritime colleges, only good things can happen as the US Navy and the education communities build closer relationships.

China Seeks a Smarter Navy

From the Global Times.

A recent pledge by the navy to find top talents to upgrade its weaponry has led to new speculation that China plans to build its first aircraft carrier, a key move that would pave the way for a blue-water maritime force.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA)Navy is seeking to recruit more than 2,000 PhD degree holders in the next five years, Xia Ping, head of the Navy Personnel Department, said Monday at a military conference.

The military already cultivated more than 1,000 commanders and technical personnel to develop and operate new batches of marine weaponry, including "large surface combat ships," nuclear submarines and new warplanes, between 2005 and 2010, Xia said, without identifying the weapons.

Such plans to build a talent pool for large surface combat ships have served to reinforce widespread assumptions of the launch of an aircraft carrier later in the year, analysts suggested.

Indications of the carrier's development were believed to have begun in 2009 when Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli announced a development plan for large surface warships.

In an interview with the Xinhua News Agency that year ahead of the Chinese Navy's 60th founding anniversary, Wu revealed the army's ambition to accelerate its development of advanced weapons, including large surface warships.

But Wu did not specify if the plan included the development of an aircraft carrier, with media reports only citing him as defining large surface combat ships as those with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons.

At last count, which was only a few weeks ago, among all of the officers in the unrestricted line there are only SIX PhD's in the entire US Navy.

Bonus question: There are 52,310 total officers in the US Navy. How many have a PhD? Luckily, Navy Medicine rocks, so the Navy actually looks good on paper when it comes to education with all the MDs.

Final Exam!

This was my Defense Statecraft final exam from last Thursday:

Defense Statecraft Final Exam

May 5, 2024

Please answer one of three questions, and return to Dr. Farley by 4:30pm today.

1. Under the aegis of NATO, military operations to protect civilians continue in Libya. Please evaluate the costs and benefits of conducting a war under the control of a major international organization relative to a unilateral intervention.
2. Four days ago, President Obama authorized a Special Operations Force mission to kill Osama Bin Laden. In terms of their utility as tools of military statecraft, compare and contrast SOF with strikes by manned and unmanned aircraft. In what context should a policymaker choose one over the other?
3. The time frame for developing new advanced weapon systems can now be measured in decades. Many defense analysts, however, have argued that we now live in an age of uncertain and unpredictable threats. What are the implications of this apparent contradiction for military procurement, doctrine, and grand strategy?

So what's the point?
The motivating concept behind the Defense Statecraft course is to give students who will become policymakers a sufficient grounding in defense issues such that they can understand and evaluate basic military and security questions. The Bin Laden question, in this context, is nearly perfect; it allows the students to tell me what they know about airpower and special forces, and to make a first cut evaluation as to the utility of either in a specific situation. The other two questions call for esentially the same kind of reasoning, with #1 giving the students the opportunity to discuss command and control as well as political issues, and #3 letting them talk about the budget, the defense industry, and any specific weapons systems they like.

Why the 2 hour time limit?

The exam is intended to mimic a minor comprehensive exam at the Patterson School. At the end of their Patterson careers, students write five essays over the course of eight hours, including two major, one minor, and two "professional" questions. This exam is intended to prepare the students for that experience. Also, we believe that most professional work that our students will be asked to do will involve producing coherent work under severe time pressure.

Which ones did they answer?

7 answered question 1, 5 answered question 2, and 3 answered question 3.

How were the answers?
Very good. The purpose of any exam is to reveal variance between students, and there's no question that this exam did so. However, the variance was in a narrow band that spoke well of the students' mastery of the subject matter and ability to produce coherent arguments in a short amount of time.

Patterson Summer Reading

This year's Patterson School summer reading list has been released:

What do policymakers have to read in order to be "informed" on international affairs -- or just to be thought of as informed? The question, which Daniel Drezner posed yesterday, is more than just a theoretical exercise, as every summer the Patterson School assigns a list of seven or eight books on international affairs to its new and returning students. Summer reading lists are not uncommon in academia, in both graduate and undergraduate programs. Many universities assign one or more books to give faculty and new students a common intellectual foundation. The Patterson list has a twofold purpose. The first is to familiarize students with many of the most important issues in international affairs. The second is to ground students in the most important and relevant recent books on international politics. Thus, there is an effort to provide both objective and subjective expertise: what's happening in international affairs as well as what the most influential observers are saying about what's happening in international affairs. As would be expected, there can be some tension between these two objectives, as on the rare occasions when what the most influential people are saying makes little sense.

Last Thucydides Post...

My WPR column this week puts a cap on Thucydipalooza:

Thucydides is nearly ubiquitous in the serious and general study of American foreign policy. Although we lack good statistics for how often particular texts are taught in graduate or undergraduate courses, nearly every professor of international relations I spoke to at the conference confessed to teaching Thucydides to undergraduates, and most remembered first reading selections from "History of the Peloponnesian War" as undergraduates. But the study of Thucydides extends to graduate and policy programs as well. At the Naval War College, students are required to read Thucydides in their first course, with additional study available. Thucydides also appears on syllabi in required courses at the Army War College...

Consequently, almost everyone involved with either the professional study or formulation of foreign policy is familiar with some parts of Thucydides.

Adventures in Educational Gadget Blogging

The Patterson School has embarked on a trial effort to evaluate the utility of the iPad in a professional foreign policy program. I'll be contributing to the iPatt blog, which will follow the course of the trial for the next two years. Also follow on twitter.

Final Exams!

Here is my fall 2010 National Security Policy final exam:

Answer one of the following three questions. Your exam is due in two hours.

1. The Obama administration has pursued a “reset” of relations with Russia. What security dividends, if any, has this reset paid? What costs has the reset incurred to the United States? How important to the US is a good relationship with Russia?
2. Outline the pitfalls associated with the use of military force in response to North Korean provocations. How should the US and its allies (Japan and South Korea) evaluate the utility of force in their relationship with North Korea?
3. Discuss the costs and benefits of a long-term NATO commitment to Afghanistan. How important is it that the US achieve its preferred objectives in Afghanistan, and what should those objectives be?

The exam takes the form of (and is designed as preparation for) a minor MA field exam in National Security. National Security majors have to answer two of four questions. The questions are typically tailored with the specific interests of the students vaguely in mind (a China specialist is likely to receive a China question), but also reflect the idea that students graduating with a national security credential should have some baseline knowledge of the most important problems and issues.

The full comprehensive normally involves two major questions, one minor, and two "professional," with the latter being drawn from the general Patterson curriculum, and from current events. Students have eight hours to write on those five questions, and must defend their answers in a one hour oral exam.

It's a fun process. My column this week at WPR is about the archipelago of foreign policy schools in the United States, and is the first in what should be an intermittent series of columns about graduate foreign policy education.

Cultural Differences

Check out this well written, interesting story worth reading in full.

During off-duty hours, the sauna is at the heart of socializing on the ship. Spanish, German and Norwegian officers meet their Swedish colleagues there after long days in the Indian Ocean searching for pirates, responding to their attacks and planning escorts for ships.

Of course, in the waters off the sweltering Somali coast, sailors can work up a good sweat by simply doing nothing. Temperatures often hover around 100 degrees (37 degrees Celsius).

Taking a steam together is an essential way of getting to know someone in much of Scandinavia, said Mika Raunu, a sailor in the Finnish navy. It's in the same tradition of Scandinavian egalitarianism that sees officers sharing rooms with lower-ranking sailors.

It also has led to a few cultural misunderstandings.

Lt. Cmdr. Carl Sjostrand told of a Swedish captain who invited a U.S. admiral to meet his senior officers after a formal ship's dinner. The American was led down to the sauna in full dress uniform - only to end up shaking hands with a line of sweaty, smiling and naked Swedish sailors.

Like all facilities, the saunas are used by both men and women, and the Swedish military does not segregate living quarters or bathrooms.

The repeal of DADT will introduce some form of cultural change. No one can say with any accuracy how much, but since all change is difficult in military culture - it can be safely expected that this change will be hard as well.

But like any challenge, opportunity exists, and it should be noted that DADT repeal is not the only cultural change being introduced to the military these days. There is now a strategic focus on developing broader cultural understanding among our soldiers, sailers, and airmen. This process essentially involves preparing our service folks to manage situations where human interaction falls outside an existing cultural norm.

Something tells me the Admiral in the story above may have felt uncomfortable being in that situation, and yet something also tells me that Admiral was able to adapt to the cultural differences that exist in the human interaction described. Given the Carlskrona is acting as the EU Flagship fighting pirates, it is not unreasonable to assume that one day LT Jane American will be serving on that vessel. To improve relations and become accepted among her culturally different shipmates, she could very well end up being one of those sailors standing naked in line shaking hands with Admirals outside the sauna.

The same professionalism, discipline, intelligence, and control of instincts come into play regardless of the cultural situation being discussed - whether one is discussing DADT or serving on a Swedish warship. The military is moving forward with both eyes wide open regarding the challenges that come with operating in the diversity of cultures that exist in the world. Those same skills will be necessary in dealing with any cultural diversity that exists within the military services.

I for one believe that the soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the military can meet this challenge, but I strongly believe the unpopularity and divisions that result from the diversity industry in the DOD may be the biggest challenge to overcome - a bigger challenge than any particular policy change. When the focus of diversity deviates from the development of professionalism, discipline, training, and education - the foundation in addressing cultural understanding and strengthening human self control - the efforts become counterproductive to the organization because they act as a segregation technique, rather than an education technique.

Defense Statecraft Syllabus Crowdsourcing

I'm in the midst of putting together my syllabus for Diplomacy 750: Defense Statecraft. It is, broadly conceived, a course focused on what civilians need to know about defense affairs. The course blog is here, and last year's syllabus is here. I have only one week specifically reserved for naval warfare; this is what I listed last year:

Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd edition (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999), pp. 1-44, 145-168, 266-309

US Naval Strategy in the 1990s, Chapter 3 “From the Sea”, Chapter 5 “Forward… From the Sea”.

Hoffman, Frank, The Fleet We Need, Armed Forces Journal, August 2006

This year I was planning on adding CS 21. I'm curious, however, about other thoughts; given that I can't really pile much more on top of this, what would people suggest keeping and cutting? My students are MA seeking, policy oriented graduate students; they're interested in the topic and have good academic skills, but know little if anything about maritime affairs. As it's not possible to fit everything in, I like to include documents that give part of the picture, and will spark discussion.

Graduation Day at Patterson

Today, my school graduated its 49th class. I was asked to give the graduation keynote, which I have reproduced below:

Congratulations to the graduating class and to the families of the graduating class, and thank you for asking me to speak. This is the 49th class to graduate the Patterson School, and the fifth that I have had the pleasure of teaching. The first class to graduate from Patterson faced a much different world than the one that graduates today, but let me suggest that there are some common threads that tie together all of the Patterson School’s 49 classes. I’d like to talk about these in the context of the some ideas that the President discussed yesterday in Norway, ideas about the role that the United States has played in international affairs for at least the last forty-nine years.

The President put forth a vision of international society that placed America at the center of the effort to build and maintain a new architecture of world affairs. Since the Second World War this effort has enjoyed magnificent accomplishments, including a reduction of great power war, the spread of democracy and human rights across wide swaths of the globe, and an explosive increase in international commerce. The President concentrated on the role that Americans have played in making this architecture a reality. We can quibble about whether this amounts to American exceptionalism, or simply an appreciation of the Spidermanian notion that with great power comes great responsibility, but I want to use the President’s address as a touchstone for thinking about the contributions that Patterson students make to this vision of international society.

Part of the President’s vision involved a strong, capable military that could maintain the peace and defeat those that menace international society. Patterson graduates do this. Our graduates serve in the military, in the intelligence community, and in all of the elements of government that are necessary to support a powerful and capable defense of American beliefs and interests. If American military power has helped underwrite global security with the "blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms", then Patterson students have played a key role in laying and maintaining the foundation of international society.

The President spoke about the need to facilitate cooperation between nations. He spoke about the value of international law, and international institutions, and of the importance of making and maintaining “rules of the road” that every country, including the United States, must hold to. Patterson graduates do this. Our graduates work at the State Department and at other government bodies to make cooperation and diplomacy happen. They help to build relationships and create peace between our nation and other nations. Our graduates work for non-governmental organizations and international institutions that specialize in democracy, trust-building, and the maintenance of international law. This work matters, and Patterson students do it.

The President also spoke about the idea that freedom from want. He spoke about helping farmers to feed their own people, or nations to educate their children or care for their sick. Patterson graduates do this. Our graduates work in the elements of the US government that administer and dispense international aid. They oversee programs that help ensure that refugees around the world receive food, clothing, and health care. Our graduates in government and in non-governmental organizations work on programs designed to enhance agricultural productivity in developing nations. They also help develop frameworks in which commerce and trade can thrive, giving people around the world the opportunity to improve their lives and the lives of their children. This work changes lives, and Patterson students do it.

For 49 years, Patterson graduates have done these things. Whether in government, or in non-governmental organizations, or with major companies, Patterson graduates have helped make this vision of international society a reality. They have done so in the United States, and (lest I slight our those students not from the United States) they have done so elsewhere. The creation and maintenance of the modern architecture of international affairs has been a magnificent undertaking, and Patterson graduates have played roles in all of its essentials.

I have no doubt that the 49th graduating class of Patterson will continue this tradition. Thank you, and congratulations again to our graduates.

Forbes, West Point, and Higher Ed

At the risk of re-opening a discussion that has (thankfully) come to a close, I want to briefly revisit Thomas Ricks' proposal to ditch the service academies. Galrahn dealt at some length with Ricks' argument that the service academies should be eliminated, and I contributed a bit to the discussion at my other blog. When Forbes decided to make West Point its number one American college, Hana Alberts interviewed me as to whether I thought such a ranking was plausible. My answer was a qualified yes, with the qualification centering on what precisely was expected from the number one undergraduate institution in the United States. Given that I had also come to qualified agreement with Ricks regarding the shut down of the academies, this probably requires further explanation. To set forth a couple of priors, I am an academic, I believe pretty strongly in the academic project (in the sense that I think that an abstract undergraduate education is good for individuals and good for society), and I teach in a graduate program that is primarily geared towards policy.

Is West Point #1? Sure, depending on what you want from a student. To the best of my recollection, we haven't had a service academy grad at Patterson since I started teaching there in 2005. We have, however, had several VMI grads, and they have been of uniformly high quality. Indeed, I'd go so far as to say that VMI grads have substantially outperformed the expectations generated by GPA and GRE scores. I have no reason to believe that service academy grads would perform any differently, and I think that we would view graduation from a service academy as a significant plus during the admissions process.

This doesn't necessarily mean that West Point/Annapolis/USAFA produce the best students, or the smartest students, or that I would always prefer an academy grad to a elite college grad. Harvard graduates will, by and large, have a stronger academic profile than West Point grads, and in some cases this will weigh in their favor. I also wouldn't want a graduate program (or a work force) composed solely of academy grads, at the expense of elite civilian institution grads. Diversity of viewpoint is extremely valuable in any academic setting, and in most work settings.

Then Why Shut it Down? Primarily, because I think that much of what makes a service academy graduate great is present before the student steps foot on campus. Even considering attendance at a service academy requires an enormous amount of fortitude; I know that I gave up the idea when I was a high school senior because I was convinced I couldn't hack it. Going to Yale, Michigan, UC-Berkeley, the University of Kentucky, or the University of Washington is unlikely to weaken the resolve of the typical service academy applicant; I don't believe that exposure to a more rigorous academic environment will make the typical cadet or midshipmen less capable or dedicated. On the contrary, I suspect that exposure to the wider academic universe, accompanied by capable ROTC training, would produce better officers.

Moreover, I think that it's a two way street. The number of academy students who would be diffused across the American university system is relatively small, but would represent the elite of those interested in military service. I suspect that the diffusion of the very best of America's military officer prospects across America's university system will serve to improve the system, both by providing more diversity in the classroom and by raising the general level of student commitment. It's fair to say that this is not, in academia, a universally held sentiment; while I was always very happy to have ROTC students in my courses, some faculty view them in a less positive light.

But isn't this all academic (heh)? The debate over shutting the academies? Yes. The discussion about the strength of academy grads and about the content of military education, however, will endure. I hope that the next decade will see the end of two things; the exclusion of ROTC from several elite civilian educational institutions, and a series of misunderstandings of military affairs within the academy. The former will likely result from the end of DODT, which almost everyone agrees is on its last legs. The latter will result from generational change in academic faculty. Both developments will, in my view, have significant positive effects for both society-at-large and for the military. For the period 1970-2000, there was an unfortunate disconnect between the military establishment and the system of higher education. The cause was Vietnam, and the effects were all-around negative. I think, however, that this era has already been supplanted by a more modern, sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the academy (writ large) and our military institutions.