Expanding A2/AD: Is it Time to Start Worrying about the Eastern Mediterranean?

Note from Jon Solomon: My Systems Planning and Analysis colleague Jonathan Altman has long been interested in the Mahanian aspects of Russia’s foreign policy initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean. Overshadowed by the ongoing Russian ground intervention in Ukraine or the headline-grabbing bomber sorties into the North Atlantic and Arctic, Russia’s cultivation of “places” and potential bases for its forces in that region over the past few years simply has not received much public attention from the security studies community. This needs to change, as the Mediterranean not only remains central to U.S. and European defense strategies, but is also a vital market as well as thoroughfare for Western economies. Jonathan has generously taken the time to outline his thoughts below on this overlooked topic.

Much has been written about the challenges posed by the Chinese adoption of what the U.S. military calls “A2/AD” (anti access area denial) in the Western Pacific. Accordingly, the Pacific remains a key focus area for both the U.S. Navy and Air Force, with the Navy promising to put 60% of its forces in that theater as part of the so-called “Pacific pivot.” Yet as focus remains on PACOM, the rest of the world is not standing still. This is exemplified in the Eastern Mediterranean, as the Russians have already begun laying the seeds to create an A2/AD zone in the region against the U.S. and its allies. If fully realized, an A2/AD envelope could put Western access to the Suez Canal, the Black Sea and the resource-rich Eastern Mediterranean at the mercy of Vladimir Putin.

There are three interrelated elements that make the development of an A2/AD zone in the Eastern Mediterranean possible for the Russians. The first of these is the prospect of a credible military presence, which in this case would most likely be provided by forward deployments from the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Armed with three (six by 2016) new enhanced Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, 11,000 marines and a surface flotilla of 42 ships[1] as of last year, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is probably the most capable maritime force in the region. By contrast, the U.S. Sixth Fleet has a single command ship and four DDGs that will be permanently assigned to it from 2015 onward (though those DDGs are based on the other end of the Mediterranean in Spain), with only occasional rotational presence from ships passing through its area of regard on the way to or back from the Middle East. Though the U.S. does have allies in the region with credible maritime combat power, the Russians are working to drive wedges into these relationships; which not coincidentally is the second pillar of regional Russian strategy.

The Russian effort to decouple longstanding allies such as Turkey, Greece, and Egypt from political and military alignment with the U.S. is helped by policy choices the U.S. has made, as well as favorable circumstances the Russians can exploit. In the case of Greece, the formation of a coalition government by far-left and right wing parties that are deeply resentful of the European Union (and its American allies), committed to breaking out of the fiscal austerity “straitjacket” imposed as terms for European Union loans, and ideologically aligned with Russian “Eurasianist” geopolitical theory has opened new opportunities for extending Russian influence. The Russians have waded into this fray, supporting the Greek government politically and entertaining the possibility of assisting Greece with its debt issues. Greco-Russian relations have unsurprisingly warmed considerably. In the case of Turkey, Russia has taken advantage of a decade-long trend by the Erdogan government away from democracy toward authoritarianism. As the West has criticized Erdogan for imprisoning journalists, fabricating charges against political opponents, and repressing civil dissent, the Russians have remained supportive to the point that Erdogan is now praising Putin directly. The other Russian charm offensive in the region has been focused on Egypt. Faced with a virulent insurgency in the Sinai, and a U.S. Administration that until recently was withholding military aid as punishment for the suspension of democracy, Egypt's repressive military junta has instead turned towards the Russians for military equipment procurement for the first time since the mid-Cold War. The sum total of these actions is to cultivate Russian goodwill with three countries that control chokepoint access to and freedom of maneuver within the Eastern Mediterranean, not to mention use of the Eastern Mediterranean to access the Black and Red Seas. Neutrality by these countries in the event of a Russian-American crisis or conflict could be devastating to U.S. strategy.

With access for their credible maritime combat power vastly improved, the final aspect of Russian regional strategy is to secure and expand basing agreements. Limited by geography, the Russians have no port on the Mediterranean; anything they want to put in the region would likely come via the Black Sea (though assets could be deployed from there other fleets as well assuming they could pass through Gibraltar or Suez). Even though Turkey may be friendly with Russia now, basing agreements hedge against a risk of change in the political winds that could bottle the Black Sea Fleet up. Additionally, as Admiral Greenert states again and again, forward basing allows a Navy to keep more assets in theater, multiplying the impact of a smaller force. Russia's only base outside of the former Soviet Union is in Tartus, Syria, which of course is in the Eastern Mediterranean. Recently the Cypriots, long prone to Russian sympathies, agreed to an expansion of Russian port calls and even potentially an air base, giving the Russians an additional strategic location to use in the region. Current deployment of land based Russian-supplied Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles in Syria provides an additional boon to the area denial aspect of their approach, which could be augmented by further sales or deployments of Russian forces equipped with ASCMs to friendly countries.

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the presence of Yakhont ASCMs in Syria alone has been enough to create a surface naval A2/AD zone in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, rolling the three Russian thrusts together, it becomes clear how an expanded Eastern Mediterranean A2/AD envelope could be enacted in the very near future. As Mahan famously wrote, the land features of a region can play a large role in determining maritime influence and access. For example, consider the military implications of a Russian deployment of advanced long-range SAMs alongside its existing Yakhonts in Syria, or perhaps a deployment of those SAMs in notional locations in Cyprus. Much has been written about the capabilities of Russian “triple digit” SAMs (in service S-300s and S-400s and the developmental S-500). S-500s will have up to a 600 km anti-air range according to some Russian sources - enough to blanket the region from Crete east assuming they are based in Cyprus (the same sources cite S-400 range at 400km and newer S-300 variants at a more modest 200km). The Russians may also seek to adapt these systems to enable integration aboard surface ships beyond the existing S-300F integration in Russian cruisers; further increasing deployment flexibility. A Russian deployment of Kilo-class submarines to the region would insert a further threat into the undersea domain at a time when more advanced but already overtasked U.S. nuclear submarines continue to decline in force structure. The degree to which U.S. and allied surface and air access in the Eastern Mediterranean would be imperiled by any single one of these potentialities, and especially by combinations of them, should be clear.

Fortunately there are options available to mitigate the risks of such an outcome. Beyond political, economic and diplomatic solutions, of which there are a great many possibilities, there are three broad Navy-focused options that could be pursued. The first of these, and the least desirable, would be transferring forces from other theaters to increase our capability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The issues in the Eastern Mediterranean are fundamentally a symptom of a U.S. Navy that is undersized for the global tasks assigned it and a NATO maritime force that no longer provides sufficient deterrent effect. To redeploy existing U.S. forces to the Mediterranean would simply exacerbate these symptoms in another part of the world. The second option, which is from a navalist's perspective the most desirable but simultaneously the most politically challenging, is to grow the size of the U.S. Navy. During the Cold War, carrier and amphibious group deployments to the Eastern Mediterranean were routine and kept the Soviet fleet in check. By contrast, the Navy’s current supply of day to day deterrence through credible combat power and presence is far outstripped by demand the world over.

Acknowledging this issue, and taking the fiscal policy conflict between Congress and the Administration into account, reinvigorating NATO Standing Maritime Groups may be the quickest and most feasible way to push back on the Russian A2/AD threat. Currently NATO operates two Standing Maritime Groups, though between them both only seven ships are combatants (and three of those were recently augmented above normal force structure). Given that no allied submarines and only a handful of helicopters exist within both combined groups, this force is highly vulnerable to Russian submarine attack or coercion. This could be addressed by augmenting the standing group assigned to the Mediterranean with allied undersea forces. Furthermore, with the allocation of dedicated land-based air power and additional surface combatants, NATO maritime forces’ credibility in the region would be greatly increased. To be maximally effective, this Standing Group should field electronic warfare capabilities and be trained to employ counter-surveillance techniques that can together defeat the over-the-horizon targeting systems supporting the Syria-based Yakhonts. Additionally, Standing Groups have the deterrent benefit of tying nations together as an attack on the group would affect at least a half-dozen different countries. To add further effect, NATO leadership should work to ensure Greek and Turkish participation (though perhaps not concurrently for historical reasons) in the Mediterranean Standing Group and cycle it through the Eastern Mediterranean regularly.

Whatever course of action the U.S. and NATO ultimately pursue, it is important for policymakers and strategists alike to recognize the gross implications of a Russian A2/AD envelope in the Eastern Mediterranean. Such an envelope would present grave challenges to U.S. influence in the region, and would imperil the free flow of commerce that is essential to U.S. (and global) prosperity.

Jonathan Altman is a Program Analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. who holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the Korbel School at the University of Denver. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis Inc., and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

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[1] Though not all of these ships can be assumed to be self-deployable. Counting only principal combatants and amphibious ships, the Black Sea Fleet has 14 self-deployable ships; though it should be assumed that any deployment of these ships would be accompanied by some number of smaller combatants (missile boats or patrol craft), of which the Black Sea Fleet has 19.

River Wars II

While I was about two years premature with Part I, it appears that predictions about Ethiopia's hydro-electric developments on the Blue Nile have panned out with increased rhetoric and the potential for war in the region.  Egypt's President has recently stated plainly that he is prepared to defend its water rights, keeping military conflict open as an option.

These threats shouldn't be taken too lightly.  Reduced down-stream water levels would have severe negative impacts on Egypt's electrical and agriculture production.  For years, while Egypt should have been focused inward in developing  infrastructure to assist their people, the previous Mubarak regime - with our help through billions in defense support and a series of Bright Star exercises - instead developed the military force structure and tactics to fight a Desert Storm-like scenario.  Throw in continued dissatisfaction with the Mursi government, ethnic proxy fighting upstream between the Sudans, and some possible religious undertones, and the potential for a wider conflict is readily apparent.  

The Nile River supports the lives
of more than 100 million Africans.

The U.S. has interests in both countries.  Egypt, as the most populous country in North Africa, is geo-strategically important to the U.S. and Europe because it controls the vital Suez chokepoint.  Ethiopia, while land-locked, has proven to be a strong ally in the fight against al Qaeda in East Africa. The Ethiopian National Defense Force currently holds ground in southwest Somalia, preventing al Shabaab from regaining a foothold there until the nascent Somalia National Army can take its place. So while discussion of intervention in Syria, continued threats by al Qaeda in other parts of Africa, and a multitude of other issues currently absorb limited national security band-width, this water conflict should not go ignored by diplomats and military planners.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Soccer, the Suez, and Irregular Sea Denial

I'm back from a little vacation in the Sahel...

Sea denial might be described as the obverse of sea control, where a weaker force is able to achieve an operational objective at sea by thwarting a superior fleet, even if only for a short duration.  History is rife with examples of irregular conflicts ashore threatening freedom of navigation. Straits, channels, and other narrows are particulary lucrative targets for insurgents striving to deny the sea to conventionally-stronger opponents.

On the low end of the scale, irregular forces or angry populations have attempted to blockade or disrupt port traffic with various levels of success.  These mostly unorganized efforts tend to fizzle out or be crushed by overwhelming force when maritime law enforcement or navies get involved.  The Indian Coast Guard had to intervene in 2011 when local fishermen distraught over the recent destruction of their houses parked fishing trawlers at the mouth of Goa’s major port used to export iron ore.  In the United States, Occupy protestors temporarily forced the closure of the port of Seattle in 2011, then the following year, longshoremen strikes closed Southern California ports for over a week, sending shockwaves through global supply chains. 

Egyptian security forces keep watch as protesters burn tires in Port Said,
east of Cairo, Egypt, March 9, 2013. (MSNBC)

Earlier this year, fallout from soccer violence (amplified by Arab Spring reverberations) threatened the Suez Canal. Media reporting indicates a variety of tactics were used by approximately 2,000 protestors to disrupt shipping near Port Said. Rioters tried to block car ferries from crossing, lit tires on the piers on fire to prevent ships from mooring, and set supply boats adrift in an attempt to block the channel.  Egyptian naval forces were deployed to ensure this vital shipping channel remained open.  Although unsuccessful, these efforts indicate the potential for localized unrest to impede global commerce afloat. 



14 March 2013- A Bahraini anti-government demonstrator was set on fire
when a shot fired by riot police hit the gasoline bomb he was holding.

The introduction of modern weapons into irregular conflicts amplifies the seriousness of these threats. Guerrilla fighters have laid mines (Tamil Tigers) and terrorists bombed oil export terminals (AQAP/AQI).   During the 2006 Lebanon war, Hezbollah attacked navy and merchant shipping with advanced ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles. 

Of potentially more relevance and importance to the U.S. Navy is the ongoing low-level insurgency in the island kingdom of Bahrain. The home of COMFIFTHFLT, base to forward-deployed American and British mine-sweepers, USN/USCG patrol vessels, and USS Ponce is potentially vulnerable to disruption should this conflict spill over from attacks on exclusively on Bahraini government forces to the US Naval presence. Some observers have accused Iran of meddling in this revolution, which is largely based along Sunni/Shia fault lines. It wouldn’t be a stretch for malign Iranian actors to someday prod their proxies into disrupting allied naval operations or supply insurgents with more lethal and effective weapons as they have done in Syria, Yemen, and the Levant.
 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency. 

Africa Maritime IW Potpourri

AQIM Maritime Terror Plot Disrupted: Algerian officials recently detained three terrorists from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb plotting a COLE-like attack against U.S. or European ships in the Med. Had this attack been executed, it would have represented a significant escalation in AQIM’s tactics, which thus far have been mostly focused on kidnapping Westerners for ransom and smaller local bombings.

al Shabaab Flees to Sea: Numerous reports have discussed al Shabaab's use of the sea as a means of travel both up and down Somalia's long coast and to and from Yemen. These stories demonstrate al Qaeda's continued interest in maritime attacks and the sea as a means for movement and support. They also reflect AQ's strategic shift out of the FATA into Africa as drone strikes have successfully hammered the networks's core leadership in Pakistan.

Also from East Africa:
Pirate/Human Smuggler Nexus: This is an interesting twist on the Pirate/al Shabaab nexus and demonstrates the extent that pirates have entrenched themselves into Somalia's illicit economy.

Finally, some new news on Africa's river wars: “A new 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement, now signed by most of the key upstream abutters, would give all riparian states (including the Congo, where a stream that flows into Lake Tanganyika is the acknowledged Nile source) equal access to the resources of the river. That would give preference to large scale upstream energy and industrial, as well as long-time agricultural and irrigation uses.

Egypt and Sudan have refused to sign the new agreement, despite years of discussions and many heated meetings. Given climate change, the drying up of water sources everywhere in Africa and the world, Egypt, which is guaranteed 56 billion of the annual flow of 84 billion cubic meters of Nile water each year, hardly wants to lose even a drop of its allocation. Nor does Sudan, guaranteed 15 billion cubic meters.”

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

The American Made Corvette

As most of us know, the US does build naval corvettes, just not for the US Navy. The first of four intended for Egypt is in the news. Here is a bit from the VT Halter Marine, Inc. press release.

VT Halter Marine, Inc. (VT Halter Marine), a subsidiary of VT Systems, Inc. (VT Systems), held a dedication ceremony for the first of four Fast Missile Craft (FMC) built for the Egyptian Navy at its Pascagoula shipyard. The keel for this first FMC was authenticated on April 7, 2010.

Chris Cavas has more at Defense News.

Construction of the ship began in a newly built fabrication facility at VT Halter in November 2009 under a U.S. Navy Foreign Military Sales program managed by the U.S. Navy's Naval Sea Systems Command.

The original contract for the program was awarded to VT Halter in November 2005. Since then, the U.S. has awarded the shipbuilder more than $800 million for the ships.

The Ezzat is expected to leave Mississippi for Egypt during 2012.

Construction continues on the other three ships: F. Zekry, M. Fahmy and A. Gad. The last ship is contracted for delivery in December 2013.

Something caught my attention here. The previously reported cost of this ship is off by over 100%, as the vessels were originally expected to cost $100 million each but have suffered a great deal of cost overruns.

If you ever wanted to know what ~$220 million in FY05 dollars buys, which is what the Littoral Combat Ship was originally supposed to be, this is what you get: 500 tons, 8 days at sea, 2000nm range, and even 41 knots.

Egypt Cracks Down - On Private Security for Shipping

This was sent out by the Suez Canal Authorities last week. Not a good development for US policy towards piracy.

Following the Sea transport sector meeting with the Supreme council if the armed forces (acting in the position of the Egyptian president) to touch base in setting responsibilities towards the different parts Of the country.

The meeting targets mainly to lead the Foreign Commercial ships to abide the Egyptian rules inside the Egyptian territories concerning the security groups on board of ships.

The meeting concluded the (NON-ACCEPTANCE) of the presence of arms/Security groups on board of the ships which is contradicting the The International Maritime law in the following points:

1) Gulf of Suez is considered totally Egyptain water.

2) Accepting and following the Egyptian position related to the Security teams on board of ships in compliance to the laws and regulations adopted by the International maritime organization.

3) A declaration has to be passed from the master to the pilot on his boarding at inner or outer anchorage and port authority confirming that the vessel does not include any arms or ammunition for the purpose of security.

4) In case the vessel found carrying any of the above PROHIBITIONS inside the Egyptian waters and the Suez Canal, the vessel And the master and the people/team holding such items (arms - Equipment- ammunition) will be arrested and charged according To the law number 394 for the year 1954 and its amendments which is concerned with holding arms and ammunitions.

In other words, vessels that cross the Suez canal cannot have armed security teams or they will be arrested. The policy of the United States is that we want our commercial shipping to protect itself - preferably with armed security teams because no ship with an armed security team has ever been hijacked by pirates.

This is an example where the policies of the United States are not congruent with the policies of other nations. When people want to know what the US can do to fight piracy, the answer is simple - the US needs to be working the diplomatic route with nations like Egypt to insure that US flagged vessels can protect themselves.

With this circular from the Suez Canal authority, the Obama administrations policy for US shipping dealing with piracy is undermined to the point of being ineffective. Egypt almost certainly has legitimate reasons for a policy that makes carrying arms and ammunition through the Suez canal illegal, but the same policy completely undermines those who have taken the responsibility of protecting their ships upon themselves.

It will be interesting to follow how the State Department deals with this conundrum.

River Wars

We take them for granted, but rivers are the primary lifeblood of many developing countries; they provide life-sustaining water, irrigation for agriculture, energy, and ready-made highways for transporting people and goods through otherwise hostile arid deserts and dense jungles. The 21st Century's first water war may occur some time in the near future in East Africa as various countries jostle to exert competing claims and exploit the Nile River. Friction over the Nile's waters isn't new by any means, but the confluence of several factors has the potential to bring it rapidly to the forefront.

Developing economies and increasing populations have raised the demand for energy, food, and water from the Nile. A number of nations with precarious stability -- primarily Egypt, Southern Sudan, and Ethiopia -- rely on the Nile’s water. From FUUO (which by the way, is an excellent blog written by a Navy FAO focused on African affairs), Ethiopia is building a series of new hydroelectric dams to satisfy the country’s increasing demand for electricity. This project will almost certainly create issues down the river, even though Ethiopia intends it to benefit the entire region. Additionally, very-soon-to-be independent South Sudan's Blue Nile region is one of the areas of contention with their northern neighbors.

For additional reading, Churchill’s The River War is a classic work on the strategic importance of the Nile. For the ADHD crowd (myself included), al Jazeera has a very interesting video here on the history of these disputes. Our riverine forces should work at developing relationships with the countries involved and familiarizing themselves with this riparian environment, because it is likely to become a future flashpoint.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Thud

This is the transcript of the President's speech yesterday about the Middle East and North Africa.

I thought the speech was too long and poorly crammed two different issues into one speech, and the speech never really found a way to link the different issues effectively.

The Arab Spring is a unique event, and the White House needs to be smarter and understand that it is a big enough event that it doesn't need to tie into Israel and Palestine. Had these two issues been treated separately, the President would have resonated with more people on each issue. Instead I believe the message intended got lost.

The President tried to spread it around too much, and my sense by the reactions I have read by those in the Middle East and North Africa, this speech hit with a resounding thud of 'ho-hum' to many target audiences while leaving the President exposed politically on Israel.

I find some of the Israel related political criticism by the Presidents political opponents very legitimate, and I believe that criticism could have been avoided. It is hard to be Presidential in credibility when the President issues hollow warnings of possible UN sanctions to government leaders in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria regarding the killing and imprisonment of their own civilians when the only real substantial action advised to Middle Eastern nations by the President was his instruction to Israel to concede land for peace.

Threatening governments with possible UN sanctions that may not even be attainable politically is hardly the stuff of a bully pulpit by the President of the United States in the defense of people seeking freedom and liberty from tyrannical regimes, and yet that was the substance of the speech to the Middle Eastern government leaders dealing with the Arab Spring by killing or rounding up their own people. I was underwhelmed.

There were so many mixed messages in the President's speech that it is difficult to believe the message communicated was the same message delivered. What exactly is the message to the Middle East when on one hand the President asks Arabs to quit blaming Israel for their problems, and on the other hand the President tells Israel the path towards peace with a neighbor that rejects the existence of Israel as a starting point is land concessions of major population centers?

Everyone knows Israel must make concessions for peace, but if the policy of the United States in addressing the issue doesn't begin with the concession by Palestine for 2-state, peaceful mutual existence with Israel as a starting point - then any US policy related to Palestine and Israel is going nowhere.

While I think the part of the speech that focused on Egypt and Tunisia was very well done, I'm not sure the rest of the speech did much to forward American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East or North Africa, nor did much to build American credibility with the various folks engaged in the Arab Spring movements throughout the Middle East. I wouldn't call the speech a strike out, but with that speech the President never made it to first base.

Will War For Water

Remember all those predictions about how the world will go to war over peak oil? Well, those predictions never came from the US government. However, the US government has been predicting that we could, in the future, see war over water - and this is an example.

Ethiopia on Wednesday said it planned to build a huge dam on the Nile despite a long-running row with Egypt over use of the river and concern the dispute may spark a war.

The nine countries through which the river passes have for more than a decade been locked in often bitter talks to renegotiate colonial-era treaties that gave Egypt and Sudan the lion’s share of the river’s waters.

However, six of the nine upstream countries — Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi — have signed a new deal stripping Egypt of its veto.

“The Great Nile dam construction is scheduled to commence presently near the Ethio-Sudan border,” Water and Energy Minister Alemayehu Tegenu said.

In November, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told Reuters that Egypt was backing rebel groups in his country because of the Nile dispute and that if it went to war with upstream countries over the river it would lose.

More background on the issue here. Worth noting the timing as Nile River nations are moving against Egypt while their government is at the weakest point in several decades.

This could turn into a legitimate election issue in Egypt.

Coherence

Some thoughts at WPR on military professionalism and the Arab Spring:

The decision to develop a professional army able to maintain its form and coherence, therefore, is inherently risky for civilian rulers, whether autocratic or otherwise. The lack of professional forces may leave a state vulnerable and without some foreign policy tools. On the other hand, an army that exists organizationally in only a minimal sense is less likely to overthrow the government. At the time of this writing, it appears that pro-Gadhafi forces in Libya have regained the upper hand against the country's armed rebellion. These loyalist forces appear to include some elements of the uniformed armed services, including artillery and air units, but also mercenaries and other militia raised by Gadhafi. With unified command and control and some superior weaponry, these units are pushing poorly organized rebel forces back, even though the rebels include some defectors from the army. Although the situation remains precarious, Gadhafi may have remained in power because of, rather than despite, his decision not to invest in a professional army.

The Ungoverned African Coastline is Becoming Enormous

As I continue to observe the events unfold in Libya, allow me to play the role of Captain Obvious and raise a bit of concern regarding what we have been watching over the last several weeks.

If we just look at a typical map of Africa, like the one in this blog post, allow us to look closely at how much Africa is transforming before our eyes and why now is probably the right time to get the US Navy over there in force.

Start at southeast Africa at the border between Somalia and Kenya and start tracing Africa around the HOA, and we find Djibouti, then we find Eritrea, then Sudan, then Egypt, then Libya, then Tunisia until we get to the Algeria border. The tiny country of Djibouti is now the most stable country along that enormous coast line. Eritrea and Sudan, both of which contribute nothing positive to security of the region, are the next most stable (unless you count South Sudan, which I'm not), but ultimately Somalia, Egypt, and Tunisia currently have no functional government today. The actions by the government in Libya on Monday were very disturbing, and we should keep in mind that Algeria and Morocco could be next.

That is a lot of coastline to be ungoverned along major sea lines of communication trade routes for Europe. I find it a bit disturbing that the EU isn't calling for a surge of European naval power to the Mediterranean Sea, because the US Navy may have one, possibly two ships, in the entire Med right now while the entire northern coastline of Africa is suffering from government revolts? I keep thinking any day now Russia is going to announce a huge naval deployment to the Med, because Putin has a history of seeing political opportunity in the midst of chaos.

I was thinking about that when I read the last two paragraphs in this Navy.mil article titled: USS George H.W. Bush Strike Group Certified Combat Ready.

"The scenarios [the crew] experienced during COMPTUEX/JTFEX are based on real-world operations today's carrier strike groups can expect to face in the deployed environment," said FitzPatrick. "Geo-political situations are fluid and ever-changing across the globe, and leadership needs the multi-mission flexibility a strike group brings to their area of responsibility. The mission of our carrier strike groups can change at a moment's notice depending on real time events, and the George H.W. Bush Carrier Strike Group Sailors are ready to deploy and accept any mission given to them."

"The Navy's carrier strike groups are critical to the nation's maritime strategy," said Tyson. "Our combined capabilities allow us to deploy to any region around the globe to lend support, whether it's to U.S. forces on the ground or to mariners in distress or to countries reeling from natural disaster. We are a powerful force for good, and our success during COMPTUEX and JTFEX is proof that this Strike Group is ready to take on any tasking we are given."

When that much coastline of Africa is in turmoil, I just don't see a scenario where NATO can stand by and watch. For all the talk about how NATO doesn't have a mission, I'd suggest it might be time to shelve such talk; because the mission just popped up on Europe's southern lawn. The hit to the European markets is likely to get much bigger before it gets smaller, particularly when there were quite a few unconfirmed reports going around on Monday night that several oil rigs off the Libyan coast were on fire. Libya is an important oil producer for Europe, or at least was until now.

The next 6 months in the southern Mediterranean Sea is going to be very important to shaping the next several years of what could be a renaissance in North Africa, but the same region could also become a complete meltdown of security and stability. Engagement is going to be key in deciding the outcome there, and not being engaged politically is absolutely the worst approach.

It seems to me that if the George H.W. Bush (GHWB) Carrier Strike Group has indeed been training for this mission, now might be the time to send them on their mission.

The GHWB Strike Group ships and units include, USS George H. W. Bush, USS Mitscher (DDG 57), USS Gettysburg (CG 64), USS Truxtun (DDG 103), USS Anzio (CG 68), the squadrons of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 8, as well as Spanish frigate ESPS Almirante Juan de Borbon (F 102), French Frigate Primauguet (D644) and French Submarine Perle (S606). Carrier Strike Group TWO is led by Rear Adm. Nora W. Tyson.

If one was to add Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 with additional ships from contributing European countries under a NATO flag, I believe naval power can be leveraged to diplomatically and economically support the region to buy time until the election periods in Egypt and Tunisia, and potentially even prevent a colossal bloodbath in Libya by enforcing a No-Fly zone and other potential UN mandated assistance.

There are many good reasons not to get involved in the activities taking place in North Africa today, but when one considers the sheer size of the coastline of Africa we are dealing with that has fragile littoral governance and security - at best, one glance in the direction of Somalia informs what happens when you don't engage in the stability of volatile regional issues. NATO and the UN must engage, and the US must contribute, at least initially.

A Few Thoughts on Egypt

Many are now observing the events that have unfolded in Egypt, culminating with the resignation of the nations President, Hosni Mubarak. It is too early to celebrate events as a conclusion just as another phase begins, but I can't help but make a few quick observations.

Credit Connectivity. We are all standing witness to a manifestation of the power of connectivity. Whether it is the internet, cellular technologies, Al Jazeera, or any number of networks and networking tools leveraged for communications and information flows and access - connectivity is the underwriting power that is motivating social changes globally in 2011. The impacts of connectivity are influencing cultures and society in real time. The global human network exchanges and relationships enabled by connectivity help explain how Ben Ali, who held power for 23 years, can be ousted in just 29 days by a peaceful protest. The same power of connectivity explains how Hosni Mubarak can be ousted in just 18 days after holding power for 29 years in Egypt.

Keep watching the youth in Egypt. Many prominent people and polarizing organizations will get publicity in the western media, but those people and organizations jumped on the bandwagon of a generational movement that is primarily made up of Egypt’s unemployed, interconnected youth who desire a better future. History shows the period following a leadership change by revolution leads to more tension, and often violence. Political transitions are hard, and Egypt is both Africa and the Middle East - places not usually associated with democracy and too often associated with violence. There will be a political power struggle, but keep an eye out for an emerging and charismatic younger figure to emerge who isn't focused on religious ideology, rather is instead focused on economy.

Credit the Egyptian Army. The initial decision to not engage the protesters directly in protection of the regime has proven the Egyptian Army as a remarkably professional organization at time of extreme pressure. Internal revolutions can stir many emotions, but the professionalism demonstrated in Egyptian Army's character, methods, spirit, and conduct at the street level day after day is the single greatest contributing factor that led to today's result. As much as the youth of Egypt represent an inspiration for the cause of freedom, the military of Egypt represents an inspiration for the cause of military professionalism.

Credit the US military. For the tens of thousands of US Marines who have deployed on MEUs over the last many, many years and worked along side the Egyptian military training them to be professional soldiers, take pride in your efforts this day. You cannot be credited as a primary cause of the professionalism demonstrated by the Egyptian Army, but by any measurement you can be credited as a significant contributing influence towards that professionalism.

Credit Al Jazeera. There are several notable informers, reporters, and journalists who deserve credit, but as an organization Al Jazeera deserves high praise both on the Arab language side and English side. Al Jazeera is no longer simply reporting to 80 million people in the Middle East, they are humiliating American cable news outlets by single handedly outclassing all of their competitors with high quality news coverage. Al Jazeera was so remarkably effective in their news coverage in and about Egypt that the government of Egypt specifically targeted the news organization as a threat to the regime. The independence, integrity, and commitment to journalistic freedom demonstrated by Al Jazeera is an important part of the story in Egypt, because press freedoms represent a pillar of a healthy democracy.

Good Luck Egypt. Welcome to the Democracy club. Lesson #1, freedom is hard.

Friedman, Egypt, and Mil-to-Mil Relations

The situation in Egypt has been an interesting case study in the limits of American power and influence.  We may wish it, but that doesn't make it so--whether you are on the side of Mubarak and stability, or the protesters and change. Egypt's future is largely in the hands of Egyptians.  Tom Friedman has a decent overview of things in this morning's NYT, a piece that tangentially brings up the importance of a subject not highlighted in press accounts--the importance of military to military relationships in crisis management.

We hear much of the role of the Egyptian Army as guarantors of the state, and much of the Egypt-watching centers around "which way" the Army will go.  To the extent that we know this at all, we must rely on a web of interpersonal relationships forged between Egyptian military officers and US military officers over the course of decades long careers.  Some of these relationships start in service academy exchange programs, they continue to deepen with bi-lateral exercises and other operational exchanges, often War College friendships are forged--whatever the process, the products are friendships at the personal level that lend insight into institutional biases. 

Those who would have us pull back from the world in order to practice "restraint" minimize the importance of this interlinked web of  relationships to the practice of statecraft and world leadership.  Those who would urge us to deftly time the use of military power in order to "re-establish" favorable security balances fail to explain upon what information such deft decisions will be made, as such networks wither from disuse and neglect. 

Bryan McGrath

Information Quantity is Prevailing - and Failing - US Policy in Egypt

With a hat tip to the Lowy Institute Interpreter blog, which for those who don't know is the best blog in the southern hemisphere of planet Earth, comes this rather interesting video. It is an interview with Wael Ghonim, a Google Executive, who was taken into police custody on January 25th and was held 12 days. This interview was done within hours of his release. Make sure you hit the CC in the bottom right for subtitles.

I have been very disappointed with the reporting from Egypt. There is very little actual analysis, and a bit too much cheerleading from folks I would normally expect to get analysis from. I mean come on folks, Mohamed ElBaradei is seen in front of a microphone and within hours we start seeing these types of news reports? You can bet your house they are related, but you haven't seen that discussion on CNN.

The reporting from Egypt strikes me as odd. Al Jazeera has owned the narrative, of that I can be certain. They report several things throughout Egypt that no other media outlet apparently can find a reporter to confirm, despite having their HQ sacked and being specifically targeted by the internal police. I'm not saying Al Jazeera is making things up, I'm simply noting what concerns me. When it is said and done, Al Jazeera should probably be added to every cable outlet in the US for the work they are doing in Egypt, but only as long as someone goes back and confirms their stories no one else has ever reported along the Nile coast, for example.

This special comment at Nightwatch from last week makes a lot of sense to me:

Most old hands will attest that little is ever straightforward in the Middle East. The mainstream Western media interpretation of events is simplistic, linear and narcissistic: huddled Egyptian and other Arab masses yearning to breathe free but thwarted by sclerotic, venal dictators and their cohorts. It's an underdog story that is spontaneously fresh, it's just not true.

The sclerotic, venal dictator part might ring partly true, but none of the rest is. There are just too many anomalies, inconsistencies and signs of planning. Unlike Tunis, the protestors in Cairo have been organized and supported for ten days. Their banners have been huge and professionally printed. Security forces have been more restrained than in any prior uprising in Egypt.

It is not credible that the Egyptian Army would tolerate protests against the commander in chief without having been directed to do so by people in the chain of command. This is deep Arab politics.

The protests never connected, but in a real revolutionary scenario they always connect. Demonstrations occurred in outlying cities, but they appeared to have no linkage to events in Cairo, where power resides. This was obvious after cell phone and social media services were cut.

In hindsight, the cutting of these services looks like an indicator of an Egyptian government investigation into the backers/instigators/financiers of the demonstrations in Cairo. The demonstrations continued to follow the script, but with much less energy. Without cell phones and internet, the demonstrations should have collapsed into confusion, but they did not. That is a manifestation of planning.

Also worth noting that as cell phone and social media services have returned to Egypt, the strength of the protests has been rejuvenated - with yesterday's protests the largest to date.

There are two statistics that I think would tell us a lot. How many Egyptians have signed up for Twitter and Facebook since January 25th? I think those numbers would reveal the extent to which this is a growing youth movement, or this is a movement growing by gaining outside allies.

I think the video by Wael Ghonim is very revealing. There is evidence that a large segment of the political uprising in Egypt is a youth driven, internet organized attempt at modern revolution. They probably counted on support from folks like Muslim Brotherhood without ever needing to coordinate, much in the same way a lot of people can plan for opportunistic folks to take something done online and run with it without having to ever say a word to them directly about it. I do it all the time on the blog, on Twitter, and on Facebook; and I know other bloggers do it in various mediums as well.

It is a combination of targeted strategic communications and herding cats. The strategic communication is for an audience outside of Egypt, and the cats being herded are inside Egypt. Rally points, symbols of nationalism and patriotism, as little violence as possible, and as best as can be maintained - no outwardly inflammatory rhetoric towards those outside Egypt. It is a perfect elixir for driving a sympathetic narrative to sympathetic audiences, because everyone loves an underdog.

The Obama administration has been easily influenced by a foreign political movement that from the beginning appears to have been counting on the administration to be bleeding heart, sympathetic optimists about large, organized protests in Cairo. The administrations reaction has been half emotion and half logic. The inability of the Obama administration to consistently articulate a message well on Egypt reflects the tensions within the administration between their emotional and logical sides. It is fairly sad how very few media organizations will call out the administration for the naivety demonstrated to date on Egypt, trying to be everything to everyone.

US options from the beginning have been to either support the youth reform movement or support the regime; we can do one really well or do both very poorly. To date the US has done both very poorly.

I do not know what will happen next, but one observation on what is happening now. Even with tremendous flows of information out of Egypt in various forms and from numerous sources, it is still very hard to figure out what is going on, but it is very easy to see that we are consistently only getting the part of the story they want us to get. Without NY Times reporters being detained or interviews with Google executives, it would be hard to see past the constant imagery and reporting on television, or the rapid fire Twitter feed from the multiple dozens of people on the ground.

As it always does with information, quality trumps quantity every time. Who is the voice of quality in the Obama administration on Egypt, because policy to date suggests the quantity approach is prevailing, while failing.

Focus in Egypt Shifts to the Suez Canal

Just as you thought the protests in Egypt were going to pass, this happens.

Suez Canal Company workers from the cities of Suez, Port Said, and Ismailia began an open-ended sit in today. Disruptions to shipping movements, as well as disastrous economic losses, are expected if the strike continues. Over 6000 protesters have agreed that they will not go home today once their shift is over and will continue their sit-in in front of the company's headquarters until their demands are met. They are protesting against poor wages and deteriorating health and working conditions.

It is both political because it is part of the broader protests throughout the country, but the distinction is the workers have a specific set of objectives making the protest a legitimate labor issue.

A few days of this and the European markets are going to get very loud in a hurry, with the potential to hit some Europeans in the wallet rather quickly. It's very smart timing by the Suez workers, maximum attention during a period of heightened interest and concern.

An interesting thing to watch for is to see how long any strike lasts, because if ships start loitering on both sides of the Suez waiting to get through, a bottleneck in one of the worlds most important choke point can stack up quickly.

For the record, the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group is still in the Med. I don't see a scenario where the strike group crosses the Suez during a worker strike.

As the Big E Heads Towards Egypt

From the CNN blog.

[Update 8:38 p.m. Cairo, 1:38 p.m. ET] A team of heavily armed Marine Corps security personnel have been sent to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo to provide additional security for the facility, defense officials tell CNN. The small team of Marines, about a dozen according to one of the officials, are part of a Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST). The Marines are inside the embassy perimeter. Egyptian military and security forces continue to provide security outside the embassy, the officials said.

The history of revolutions over dictatorships is not a bloodless story.

The USS Enterprise (CVN 65) and the rest of the carrier strike group have wrapped up their weekend visit to Portugal, and it's a safe bet the Big E is heading to Egypt.

The Suez canal, as a major global choke point, is reason enough to send an aircraft carrier strike group to monitor events in the eastern Mediterranean Sea - but we must also acknowledge that unfolding events are bigger than the Suez. Revolution is leading to instability and unknowns, and the interest of the US is rooted squarely in stability and predictability.

The strategic communication in Egypt is being well orchestrated to blame the US for allowing Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to remain in power. How can the US influence this perception without blatantly tossing President Mubarak under the bus? What can the US Navy do to support stability in the region? Is there a role for the US Navy in the ongoing information war taking place in the region regarding the role of the US? Presence alone sends a message, so if we answer no to the last question, then I would argue we have not fully developed a clear and in-depth understanding of what impact presence has on strategic communications in the modern era of communications. Allowing others to interpret our signals for us should not be an option, so why we go where we go must be clearly stated - particularly when there are stresses to information and communication streams as there are today in Egypt.

For example, now would be a good time to ask the folks at Al Jazeera if they would like to put a camera crew and a reporter on the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Seriously, one smart diplomat and a live broadcast from an American aircraft carrier on Al Jazeera might be all it takes to reshape the perception of America's role for Egypt right now.

This isn't just an information war though, while the Egyptian Army has already pledged they would not fire upon civilians, the Egyptian Air Force remains firmly in the control of the Mabarak government. Nothing is going to displease (or flat-out outrage) the American public more than watching F-16s bomb civilians on CNN who are revolting against a dictatorship in the name of democracy. I can't imagine a scenario where the US wants to intervene in Egypt, and yet, I'm sure someone else can...

Someone answer me this - what is the strategic communication of the United States sending a major naval armada like the Enterprise CSG through the Suez canal while Egyptians are protesting in Cairo? Not only do we need to know what that answer is before we send our ships through the canal, but we need to make sure we are aligned with that signal as we go.

It doesn't take a lot of imagination to see how the US Navy can make a positive, productive impact on unfolding events in the region. It also doesn't take a lot of imagination to see how current events can go to hell in a hurry. If aircraft carriers are strategic assets with strategic purpose, we must also insure that the strategic communication associated with the strategic presence of aircraft carriers is well aligned and well communicated as part of the mission.

STRATFOR Alert on Egypt

Not really sure what to make of this latest report from STRATFOR, but mostly because it has been unclear to me what role the Muslim Brotherhood has been playing in what mostly appears to be a street level event.

The Egyptian police are no longer patrolling the Rafah border crossing into Gaza. Hamas armed men are entering into Egypt and are closely collaborating with the MB. The MB has fully engaged itself in the demonstrations, and they are unsatisfied with the dismissal of the Cabinet. They are insisting on a new Cabinet that does not include members of the ruling National Democratic Party.

Security forces in plainclothes are engaged in destroying public property in order to give the impression that many protesters represent a public menace. The MB is meanwhile forming people’s committees to protect public property and also to coordinate demonstrators’ activities, including supplying them with food, beverages and first aid.

We would be fools to think the Muslim Brotherhood is sitting on their couch waiting for the internet to come back on, so this is certainly possible. Whether or not Muslim Brotherhood can assume control in Egypt if the government falls is certainly a debate, but even if they do not assume power - they will maintain a powerful presence in Egypt regardless.

If Egyptian security have abandoned their positions near Gaza, it does raise legitimate questions regarding the security of the Suez Canal at present time.