River Wars II

While I was about two years premature with Part I, it appears that predictions about Ethiopia's hydro-electric developments on the Blue Nile have panned out with increased rhetoric and the potential for war in the region.  Egypt's President has recently stated plainly that he is prepared to defend its water rights, keeping military conflict open as an option.

These threats shouldn't be taken too lightly.  Reduced down-stream water levels would have severe negative impacts on Egypt's electrical and agriculture production.  For years, while Egypt should have been focused inward in developing  infrastructure to assist their people, the previous Mubarak regime - with our help through billions in defense support and a series of Bright Star exercises - instead developed the military force structure and tactics to fight a Desert Storm-like scenario.  Throw in continued dissatisfaction with the Mursi government, ethnic proxy fighting upstream between the Sudans, and some possible religious undertones, and the potential for a wider conflict is readily apparent.  

The Nile River supports the lives
of more than 100 million Africans.

The U.S. has interests in both countries.  Egypt, as the most populous country in North Africa, is geo-strategically important to the U.S. and Europe because it controls the vital Suez chokepoint.  Ethiopia, while land-locked, has proven to be a strong ally in the fight against al Qaeda in East Africa. The Ethiopian National Defense Force currently holds ground in southwest Somalia, preventing al Shabaab from regaining a foothold there until the nascent Somalia National Army can take its place. So while discussion of intervention in Syria, continued threats by al Qaeda in other parts of Africa, and a multitude of other issues currently absorb limited national security band-width, this water conflict should not go ignored by diplomats and military planners.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Battleground Africa: The Upcoming Siege of Kismayo

The war taking place in east Africa is very difficult to follow through the media, indeed without good background on events it might be impossible to get an accurate picture on any given day - although there are several great summery articles like this one every few days. Several reporters from news agencies across the globe are struggling to follow unfolding events due to the confusion and chaos that comes from the fog of war. There simply isn't much information outside of official sources, and it is not safe for journalists (or anyone else) to seek information themselves.

There are several factions, clans, nations, and organizations - all with different objectives, fighting on the same Somalia battlefield with different military objectives. The level of cooperation between these factions is unclear, and the degree to which any one faction will work with another is limited so far. Suggesting alliances or even assistance unifies different factions involved is an abuse of either term, and thus is the complex nature of the 2011 war in Somalia.

Kenya's military objectives have been explained as developing a buffer zone between Somalia and Kenya, with a focus of the operation on overthrowing Al Shabaab from the major port hub in Kismayo. From my perspective, taking Kismayo is the primary military objective of the operation - because over the last many months the port at Kismayo had become the primary logistics hub for Al Shabaab.

The invasion of Somalia by Kenya has been ugly to observe. The Kenyan Army is better armed and thus a very formidable force relative to Al Shabaab, but not relative to other African nations, like Ethiopia. The Kenyan Army is also a foreign military invading a country that doesn't like foreigners, and as an organization the Kenyan Army is inexperienced and not very disciplined. This is a serious concern for nations Kenya is seeking support from, because military occupation forces require discipline to be effective.

The key question facing the US is whether or not to openly and actively throw direct support behind Kenya in their ongoing military operations in Somalia. This is how the US is presenting the question diplomatically as an open, unanswered question:

Question: Would the U.S. support a request for international assistance (NATO or some other international org) to blockade Kismayo?

Answer: We are aware of the request from Kenya and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to impose a blockade on Kismayo. Blockades are generally difficult to enforce and may have unintended consequences in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. This proposal must be discussed with international partners, particularly the African Union and UN Security Council and carefully considered in the context of the overall strategy for restoring peace and stability in Somalia.

What the US is trying to say with this cryptic word puzzle of an official State Department response is that we are not yet sure we are ready to fully commit our resources in support of Kenya's military operation and objectives. It's not clear what role the US is playing in support of Kenya, but the answer at this time appears to be that we are not contributing directly in any significant way - and I've heard more than a few credible diplomatic and military folks legitimately describe the US actions in response to Kenya's invasion of Somalia as political dithering. Being that all major military decisions by the Obama administration are made on Friday, perhaps we are only hours away from announcing our policy.

While recent reporting highlights the USAF is now flying Reaper drones from an upgraded airfield in Arba Minch, Ethiopia, this activity is part ongoing military activity by the US is completely independent of Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi. Had Kenya not invaded southern Somalia, the base would still exist and still conduct the same missions. We are seeing evidence of indiect US support for Kenya, for example, detailed information related to arms shipments for Al Shabaab to the airport in Baidoa is very likely a product of US intelligence. The only Western nation that has announced they are publicly supporting Kenya at this time is France, and that support is limited to military logistics that is mostly, if not all, done within the Kenyan borders.

It is important to note that both Kenya and the US are two different sides of a multi-sided war taking place in Somalia. The completely ineffective Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which the UN recognizes as the legitimate government of Somalia, is a third side. AMISOM, the African Union military force established to support the TFG, often acts as it's own side in Somalia as well. There are also several different clans in southern Somalia, which are not really the side of the TFG or Al Shabaab, and there is a very strong pirate organization that operates out of Kismayo with 'very loose affiliations' with Al Shabaab, and by 'very loose affiliations' it is more accurate to describe that relationship in the context of blackmail.

And as always, there are innocents who are caught in the middle of these factions.

It would be inappropriate to suggest the upcoming siege of Kismayo as one of the pivital military battles in Somalia given the length of time the nation has been at civil war and following the August liberation of Mogadishu from Al Shabaab, but there is one context we can accurate describe the upcoming siege of Kismayo.

From a US national security interest point of view, the battle for Kismayo will be the most important military battle fought against Al Qaeda aligned transnational terrorist organizations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq since September 11, 2001. From the perspective of geography and logistics, not to mention financial support, Kismayo is a key holding by Al Shabaab, and the removal of AL Shabaab from Kismayo would be a strategic defeat even beyond that the organization suffered in Mogadishu earlier this year. No single military battle holds more opportunity at a strategic level for all parties involved than the upcoming siege. The question isn't whether the US gets involved in the battle - after all the US has been striking targets around Kismayo for years - the key questions are to degree the US will get involved - and to what degree can successful achievement of military and political objectives in Kismayo create genuine change in the region.

After all, it isn't just social and environmental change potential with taking a port like Kismayo and the mouth of the Jabba River, the economic potential and resources throughout that region of Africa from Southern Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan potentially adds balance to opportunity costs that come with the development of a regional port like Kismayo, and the financial opportunity is in the trillions of dollars. As Kismayo goes, so does the region. It will be very interesting to see how committed the international community becomes as the siege of Kismayo approaches, because I think Kenya is on the verge of discovering several fair weather friends if the upcoming siege of Kismayo doesn't turn into a strategic blunder for their military.

What would I do? I would send the Bataan ARG along with every FFG and PC in the region to establish sea control off Kismayo, and prepare for the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe that is almost certain to result from the siege of the city. The US has committed significant military forces in the region over the last many years with a clear understanding that this region represents a clear national security interest in the defense of the United States. Al Shabaab and AQAP represent the significant national security threats by Al Qaeda to the US, passing on the opportunity to deal a significant blow to Al Shabaab when others have committed to doing the heavy lifting would be a strategic mistake. Establishing sea control and insuring access of humanitarian assistance would be the primary objectives of the United States, and having the Bataan MEU available to insure security in those roles gives the US the best possible opportunity to achieve success in those roles. If there is any military role outside of sea control or humanitarian assistance, it would be logistical and perhaps limited fires support for AMISOM - not Kenya, in securing the infrastructure and port facilities to support the aftermath of a Kismayo siege.

The US has no business getting military engaged on the ground in any type of sustained way, but having operational flexibility at those key moments almost certain to reveal themselves in the near future for a surgical strike operation or an amphibious raid operation to insure success of key objectives could potentially be the difference in success or failure towards guiding events towards a conclusion aligned with long term US national security and foreign policy objectives in that region. The Obama administrations military approach of leading from behind but selectively engaging with minimal force has to date been a very smart adjustment in the use of US military power - and has been largely successful in guiding outcomes of ongoing chaotic events towards achieving US national objectives with minimal commitment. The same policy approach may soon be necessary in Kismayo with so many US national interests at stake in that region.

River Wars

We take them for granted, but rivers are the primary lifeblood of many developing countries; they provide life-sustaining water, irrigation for agriculture, energy, and ready-made highways for transporting people and goods through otherwise hostile arid deserts and dense jungles. The 21st Century's first water war may occur some time in the near future in East Africa as various countries jostle to exert competing claims and exploit the Nile River. Friction over the Nile's waters isn't new by any means, but the confluence of several factors has the potential to bring it rapidly to the forefront.

Developing economies and increasing populations have raised the demand for energy, food, and water from the Nile. A number of nations with precarious stability -- primarily Egypt, Southern Sudan, and Ethiopia -- rely on the Nile’s water. From FUUO (which by the way, is an excellent blog written by a Navy FAO focused on African affairs), Ethiopia is building a series of new hydroelectric dams to satisfy the country’s increasing demand for electricity. This project will almost certainly create issues down the river, even though Ethiopia intends it to benefit the entire region. Additionally, very-soon-to-be independent South Sudan's Blue Nile region is one of the areas of contention with their northern neighbors.

For additional reading, Churchill’s The River War is a classic work on the strategic importance of the Nile. For the ADHD crowd (myself included), al Jazeera has a very interesting video here on the history of these disputes. Our riverine forces should work at developing relationships with the countries involved and familiarizing themselves with this riparian environment, because it is likely to become a future flashpoint.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Will War For Water

Remember all those predictions about how the world will go to war over peak oil? Well, those predictions never came from the US government. However, the US government has been predicting that we could, in the future, see war over water - and this is an example.

Ethiopia on Wednesday said it planned to build a huge dam on the Nile despite a long-running row with Egypt over use of the river and concern the dispute may spark a war.

The nine countries through which the river passes have for more than a decade been locked in often bitter talks to renegotiate colonial-era treaties that gave Egypt and Sudan the lion’s share of the river’s waters.

However, six of the nine upstream countries — Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi — have signed a new deal stripping Egypt of its veto.

“The Great Nile dam construction is scheduled to commence presently near the Ethio-Sudan border,” Water and Energy Minister Alemayehu Tegenu said.

In November, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told Reuters that Egypt was backing rebel groups in his country because of the Nile dispute and that if it went to war with upstream countries over the river it would lose.

More background on the issue here. Worth noting the timing as Nile River nations are moving against Egypt while their government is at the weakest point in several decades.

This could turn into a legitimate election issue in Egypt.