Showing posts with label European Theater. Show all posts
Showing posts with label European Theater. Show all posts

Thursday, May 28, 2024

The Use of the Marines in Europe for Deterrence


Marine COL William Nemeth has an intriguing article in this month’s Proceedings about how the Marines could contribute to deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Nemeth suggests the existing Black Sea Rotational Force could be expanded to a “full battalion combat team” he dubs “Rotational Force Europe” that could be deployed anywhere in Eastern Europe as needed. This combined arms force would consist of a reinforced infantry battalion with supporting combined arms attachments such as a reconnaissance platoon, light armored vehicle platoon/company, tank platoon, amphibious assault vehicle platoon, artillery battery, aviation combat element, and logistics combat element. I’m not going to do the approximate manpower counts for each of these components, but I’ll wager that their collective size would be more than double the Black Sea Rotational Force’s recent size.
Using Robert Rubel’s hierarchy of presence as a reference, my instinct is that Rotational Force Europe’s inherent capabilities when deployed as a aggregated group would fall somewhere between a tripwire force and a force capable of delaying/disrupting a notional Russian ground offensive (at least for a short time). If it functioned as part of a larger NATO standing forward combined arms conventional deterrent, the likelihood of bogging down a Russian thrust would probably be even greater.
But Nemeth also talks about splitting this Rotational Force Europe up into reinforced companies for deployment in widely-separated locations from the Baltics to Romania to even Georgia. He notes that the additional equipment needed to reinforce these companies could be pulled from the Marines’ prepositioned stockpiles in Norway, with augmentation personnel flown in from the U.S. All this is fine for peacetime engagement, training, and showing the flag. In a crisis, though, it seems to me that these companies would still be nothing more than tripwires. That’s okay as long as we’re honest about how a tripwire gambit must be structured in order to be effective. First, the tripwire must be placed in a location where an aggressor’s conventional forces cannot avoid coming into direct contact with it. Second, it must be latently backed by larger and heavier combat-credible forces positioned further back in the theater that can immediately provide it with combined arms support, begin deploying forward to reinforce it, and begin inflicting countervailing damage on the aggressor. Third, it must be able to latently back the host nation’s constabulary forces responding to an aggressor’s “salami tactic” incursions; the constabularies in turn must be able to provide physical security support for the tripwire’s emplacements and lines of communication/maneuver. Lastly, it must be accepted that losses in the tripwire force will likely be horrendous. That’s the price of being on the frontline at the beginning of a major war.
Nemeth goes into commendable detail regarding the air and naval assets that would be needed to support his Rotational Force Europe. It’s worth noting that he calls for there to be a standing presence in theater of two to three amphibious warships to perform transport, force insertion, or afloat staging base tasks. Given that the amphibious fleet is already overtaxed, something would almost certainly have to give in terms of presence in other theaters in order to restore that kind of presence in 6th Fleet. The same is true for his call for a standing presence of two to four additional DDGs on top of the four now permanently deployed in Rota, Spain, plus four to five Littoral Combat Ships. He also calls for a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to be assigned to 6th Fleet at all times; it is not clear whether this is the same as the amphibious warships he listed for transport or an additional set of such ships carrying their own Marines. While I don't disagree with him in terms of the need to reestablish a more sizable standing U.S. Navy forward presence in the European theater, note that CS-21R all but declares our existing force structure is insufficient to do so and also achieve all the other prioritized strategic tasks in other theaters assigned by our political leadership. CS-21R makes clear the burden for naval presence in Europe therefore falls on our NATO allies' fleets.
COL Nemeth briefly discusses how a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) might be used to quickly reinforce Europe in the event of a conflict with Russia. He suggests that a standing MEB headquarters element should be attached to European Command to plan for and command the flying-in of Marines from the U.S. to marry up with the prepositioned equipment stockpiles in Norway, and then deploy where needed in northeastern Europe—including the Baltics. He also implies that equipment could be prepositioned on NATO’s Black Sea members’ territories for contingencies in that portion of the theater. While I strongly agree with the use of a MEB for these purposes, I would point out that any use of the Baltic or Black Seas for transporting the MEB’s units towards frontal areas would be risky as a crisis peaked and nearly impossible if it had to occur after a war had already started. Russian sea denial capabilities in those waters will be too dense, at least during a conventional conflict’s first few weeks. This means gear must be prepositioned closer to where it might actually be needed. Norway is probably fine for Scandinavian operations. Prepositioning in Poland is probably necessary for operations in that country or the Baltics. Prepositioning in Romania and possibly also Bulgaria is unquestionably necessary for operations in those countries. Nemeth suggests that Rotational Force Europe might be used to enable the MEB’s theater entry and then movement to action; this could be a very important role for the former that deserves further analysis.
To make Rotational Force Europe, standing 6th Fleet presence by a MEU, and the contingency MEB possible, Nemeth asserts that the Corps will have to stop rotationally deploying East Coast Marine units to augment Marine forces in Japan. While this is contrary to the Defense Department’s strategic prioritization of East Asia, it does make sense given the comparatively far higher military tensions with Russia than China at present. It also offers further evidence that our Navy-Marine Corps team is undersized (and budget levels being what they are, underprepared) for the strategic tasks it is assigned.
All in all, Nemeth has laid out an excellent and provocative article. Future analysis ought to look at how his ideas might pair up with Terrence Kelly’s ideas on how army forces (both U.S. and allied) ought to be used for conventional deterrence in Poland and the Baltics. More attention also needs to be paid with respect to how air and naval forces (whether U.S. or allied) ought to be used, especially in support of U.S. and allied ground forces fighting on the continent. And of course, the means for protecting the flow of reinforcements and logistical support into Europe and then onward towards frontal areas still requires much focused thought.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Thursday, May 31, 2024

Cyber Warfare...Brought To You By J.C. Wylie

Future thinking about cyber operations is often analogized to early airpower doctrine. Like the early airpower theorists, Gregory Rattray also points out that cyberwar theorists also make the mistake of assuming that cyber operations capabilities will be standalone strategic weapons. The cyber weapon, in other words, is not always going to get through. More likely is cyber warfare operations and tactics augmenting regular operations and tactics. In other words, the difference is between an unrealistic vision of cyberwar and a very much plausible conception of cyberwarfare.


Naval warfare and special operations theory may present a better prism for viewing how cyber operations will play out. In his seapower classic Military Strategy: A Theory of Power Control, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie argued that the aim of strategy was to gain some measure of control over the adversary. There were essentially two styles of strategy: sequential and cumulative. Sequential strategy utilizes force in discrete, linear packages. An land army on campaign sweeping through a territory destroys an enemy state layer by layer, division by division. Cumulative forms of strategy, on the other hand, build gradual and nonlinear pressure on an opponent.

The classic example is the relationship between the land war in the European Theater of Operations and the Combined Bomber Offensive. By tying down precious German resources, the Bomber Offensive amplified the strategic effect of the land campaigns. Airpower advocates were, of course, wrong that a strategic airpower offensive would on its own negate the need for a land campaign. But the Bomber Offensive cannot simply dismissed as a failure merely because it did not live up to its planners' strategic expectations.  In naval warfare, the Pacific Theater of operations paired a sequential strategy of advance through fortified island networks with the cumulative destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet by submarines. To go even farther back in military history, Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan, which exploited Union strength on the rivers and the oceans, amplified the strategic effect of land operations in the Western and Eastern theaters of operation.

So how does Wylie fit into cyber operations? Well, first let's take a look at what Kings' College professor Thomas Rid has written about the characteristics of cyber weapons:
Cyber-weapons span a wide spectrum. That spectrum, we argue, reaches from generic but low-potential tools to specific but high-potential weaponry. To illustrate this polarity, we use a didactically helpful comparison. Low-potential 'cyber-weapons' resemble paintball guns: they may be mistaken for real weapons, are easily and commercially available, used by many to 'play,' and getting hit is highly visible -- but at closer inspection these 'weapons' will lose some of their threatening character. High-potential cyber-weapons could be compared with sophisticated fire-and-forget weapon systems such as modern anti-radiation missiles: they require specific target intelligence that is programmed into the weapon system itself, major investments for R&D, significant lead-time, and they open up entirely new tactics but also novel limitations. This distinction brings into relief a two-pronged hypothesis that stands in stark contrast to some of the debate's received wisdoms. Maximising the destructive potential of a cyber-weapon is likely to come with a double effect: it will significantly increase the resources, intelligence and time required to build and to deploy such weapons -- and more destructive potential will significantly decrease the number of targets, the risk of collateral damage and the coercive utility of cyber-weapons.
We also know that certain weapons are modular and customizable for multiple roles, the development and acquisition cycle (at least compared to certain air superiority platforms) is very agile, weapons utilize the target system itself as a means of inflicting coercive damage, and they are heavily customized to the target and difficult to utilize in a salvo capacity. Because of this, it is unlikely they can be utilized as a standalone strategic weapon.

DoD seems to realize this too. Take a look at this graf from an article on DARPA's Plan X: 
Cyberwarfare conjures images of smoking servers, downed electrical systems and exploding industrial plants, but military officials say cyberweapons are unlikely to be used on their own. Instead, they would support conventional attacks, by blinding an enemy to an impending airstrike, for example, or disabling a foe’s communications system during battle.
Yup, sounds cumulative. DoD's vision of cyber capabilities is explicitly based on the presumption that they amplify the capabilities of conventional attacks.

One vision of how cumulative strategy might be realized in a cyber context can be found in a distillation of cumulative strategy in the special operations community. James D. Kiras has argued in his work on special operations that the relationship between special operations forces and general purpose forces also demonstrates the intersection of cumulative and sequential strategy. Special operations forces use psychological and material attrition to raise cumulative costs of operating, enhancing the striking power of conventional forces. A group of commandos raising havoc in the enemy rear area disrupts the target's logistics and forces tactical dispersion, weakening the ability to win the fight in the forward edge of the battle area. Unlike the stereotype of attrition encountered in maneuver warfare literature, attrition can have nonlinear cumulative effects. The kind of damage inflicted by cumulative capabilities, be it naval forces, airpower, or special operations units, snowballs into a fearsome weapon.

Lukas Milevski has made the analogy that cyber operations have many of the same characteristics as special operations forces. High-risk special operations depend on significant amounts of target intelligence, surprise (the zero-day exploit), and are utilized against targets in which tailored and customizable means trump general purpose conventional power. Moreover, Milevski observes that utilizing an exploit against an important system also simultaneously ensures that the same vulnerability cannot be exploited readily again through exposure.  While Milevski is right to observe how the specialized nature of cyber operations generates a particular kind of cumulative pressure that augments sequential strategy, there is more to the Wyliean metaphor than simply special operations theory.

The routine conflation of intelligence exploitation systems with weapons is but one symptom of what NDU professor Sam Liles argues is a common confusion of information security (the protection of systems) and the optimization of networks with offensive warfare. Network-centric enhancement to make war or the ability to manage and provision a network, Liles observes, is not the same thing as waging war.  Liles also argues in another post that the real ream of cyberspace is the zone of command, control, coordination, data and cognition---a "seam" between the respective domains that US military doctrine (at times artificially) defines. Such a conception broadens not only our conception of cyberspace but also our idea of what our means of cyber operations may be. We aim to use the seam to achieve a measure of control over the adversary. Moreover, just as the purpose of operations on the sea is to effect events on land, cyber operations ultimately are a means of exploiting the seam cumulatively to amplify the conventional (sequential) campaign.

Finally, this paragraph also demonstrates once again that some of the better ideas about this subject were written fifteen years ago:
Another goal is the creation of a new, robust operating system capable of launching attacks and surviving counterattacks. Officials say this would be the cyberspace equivalent of an armored tank; they compare existing computer operating systems to sport-utility vehicles — well suited to peaceful highways but too vulnerable to work on battlefields. The architects of Plan X also hope to develop systems that could give commanders the ability to carry out speed-of-light attacks and counterattacks using preplanned scenarios that do not involve human operators manually typing in code — a process considered much too slow. Officials compare this to flying an airplane on autopilot along predetermined routes.
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt originally conceived the role of cyber war not as a standalone strategic weapon but the integration of cyber tactics and operations into warfare as a whole. Hardened systems capable of surviving hits and giving back, at speeds faster than tactical operators can contemplate, as a means of amplifying conventional effects are well within the idea of warfare they predicted in their early works.

J.C. Wylie's works are, of course, an highly imperfect means of thinking about information power. But they offer a starting point as doctrine development, operational tests, and perhaps wartime employment further determine the American approach.