EU Strikes Somali Pirate Depot

Apparently the Europeans were serious when they voted to start striking targets on land. Release from EUNAVFOR.

15th May - Earlier today, following the decision taken on 23 March 2024 by the Council of the European Union to allow the EU Naval Force to take disruption action against known pirate supplies on the shore, EU forces conducted an operation to destroy pirate equipment on the Somali coastline.

The operation was conducted in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 and has the full support of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. The focused, precise and proportionate action was conducted from the air and all forces returned safely to EU warships on completion. Whilst assessment is on-going, surveillance of the area during the action indicates that no Somalis were injured ashore as a result of EU action.

Speaking about the operation, the Operation Commander of the EU Naval Force, Rear Admiral Duncan Potts said “We believe this action by the EU Naval Force will further increase the pressure on, and disrupt pirates’ efforts to get out to sea to attack merchant shipping and dhows. The local Somali people and fishermen - many of whom have suffered so much because of piracy in the region, can be reassured that our focus was on known pirate supplies and will remain so in the future.”

At no point did EU Naval Force ‘boots’ go ashore. Rear Admiral Potts went on to say “The EU Naval Force action against pirate supplies on the shoreline is merely an extension of the disruption actions carried out against pirate ships at sea, and Operation Atalanta remains committed to fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa and the humanitarian mission of protecting World Food Programme ships that bring vital aid to the Somali people.”

Operation Atalanta is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to tackling symptoms and root causes of piracy in the Horn of Africa and the EU strategic framework for that region adopted in November 2011. Currently there are 9 warships in the EU Naval Force and 5 Maritime Patrol Aircraft.

The reach of Somali pirates is vast; they have attacked merchant ships up to 1,750 miles off the Somali coast. Preventing them getting out to sea is a crucial step in removing their impunity ashore and to further the success of counter-piracy operations.

First, this is the French and the Danes, both of whom have had enough of piracy. The Danes have been particularly effective in their anti-piracy tactics for a long time. The attack was likely launched from the French Mistral class vessel in the area. I am hearing the shooters were British, and concentrated on taking out the outboard motors of pirate boats. We have discussed this in the past on the blog - indeed taking out outboard motors on pirate boats has been something US Navy officers who have patrolled off Somalia have mentioned several times in several venues as being one way to quickly hurt pirate operations. Why hasn't the US Navy done this before? Someone should ask the State Department...

A target in Somalia with no people was probably low hanging fruit. Its hard to believe an airstrike against a depot so important no one was there is going to be an effective deterrent against piracy.

I don't mean to sound cold, but I do think the EU is going to have to actually kill pirates if their little land attack strategy is going to be an effective deterrent. Based on the way this press release is worded, I'm not sure that's the plan.

Updated: Turns out it was a Spanish SH-60B from the frigate Reina Sofía (F-84) with other EU forces supporting. What a good sign to see the Spanish engaged like this, and with success it is more likely we will see more of this kind of activity.

The Dutch To Fight Pirates On Shore

On March 23 the European Union decided to extend operation EU NAVFOR until December 2014. At the same time the AOR has also been extended to include Somali coastal territory and internal waters. 

On April 3 their operation plan has been adjusted accordingly.Soon after that, the Dutch government has decided that they will act according to the new operational plan. The Dutch have wanted this extention for quite some time now.

And to be effective against pirates, the Dutch had also agreed last year to put helicopters on every ship they would send to the Horn of Africa.

Because the NH90 has been delayed and the Westland Lynx' are end-of-life, instead of the frigate HNLMS Tromp, the Dutch will now send HNLMS Rotterdam, a LPD. In 2010 they also sent a LPD and used LCU's and LCVP's to block the Somali coast. But HNLMS Johan de Witt didn't have a helicopter on board. This time the Dutch will be sending 2 Cougars (that have been training for this during excersice Cold Response 2012), along with a Scan Eagle.

And they will send in another submarine. And some extra marines. 

So from September-December the Dutch presence is substantial.

But the kicker.....from September-December the Dutch will be leading a Standing NATO Maritime Group for Operation Ocean shield from their LPD, and the sub is also in the area after a NATO request.

So will the Dutch do what they did when freeing the MV Taipan, and temporarily put their ship under national command (or EU command), so they can tackle those pirates ashore?

Arms to the PRC

In my latest column I talk a bit about the SIPRI report on the Russia-China arms trade, and suggest (pursuing Robert Wall's logic), that ending the EU arms embargo against China might be a way to drive a wedge between Russia and the PRC. As the SIPRI report points out, the arms trade relationship is already on life support:

By the middle of the last decade, however, the factors that made the relationship so strong had begun to subside. The sophistication and reliability of Chinese military equipment improved, while the quality of Russian industrial production declined. Some Russians also began to express concern about the growing military might of China, with which many border issues remain unsettled. By contrast, the military relationship between Russia and India appears to have remained relatively healthy, even in the face of recent disagreements over the price and delivery schedule of a refurbished Russian aircraft carrier.

The problem of intellectual property rights also looms large in the Sino-Russian arms trade. Russia remains concerned that China will not respect Russian intellectual property rights for arms transferred to China or licensed for Chinese production.

Europe's Offshore Dog and Pony Show For Libya

I love the American people. For a wealthy nation we really are one of the most compassionate peoples that have ever existed on the planet. I think of this when I see all kinds of different ideas being promoted on how to help the Libyan rebels fight their dictator.

While I am sympathetic to the struggle by Libyan rebels, I am firmly against the United States taking any sort of military action against Libya in support of the rebels. I am not against the United States helping the Europeans take military actions, but for context, the US role should look and feel like the German contribution to Afghanistan - and I have to tell ya, that isn't saying much. As I watch events unfold I keep thinking to myself that if the US gets involved, we will eventually get stuck doing everything. Why? Because when you see what the Europeans want to do, it is all style and no substance - for example.

European Union and NATO ships should patrol the international waters off the coast of Libya to prevent arms smuggling and check on migrants trying to enter into the EU, Italy proposed Thursday.

In an informal 'non-paper' seen by the German Press Agency dpa, Italian officials called for 'a joint EU-NATO maritime surveillance operation off the Libyan coast to implement the arms embargo,' declared by the United Nations Security Council.

This call by the Italians is nothing more than a naval dog and pony show for domestic political consumption, because why would NATO or the EU need to blockade Libya when in fact there is no known threat at all of arms shipments being sent to Libya by sea - unless there is some intelligence that is being withheld by governments. Even if there is a ship with arms heading to Libya, does that really mean the U.S. Navy needs more presence?

Having at least 1 amphibious ship ready to respond to American civilians makes sense, but sending in a fleet to 'watch' Libya and enforce an arms embargo against a phantom fleet of arms smugglers does not. Right now we have 2 amphibious ships, a few other surface ships, and at least two submarines in the Med. I'd say that's about the right level of naval presence, and any more quickly becomes overkill and politics.

I also got a bit of a laugh out of this paper from CSBA (PDF) that examines options for a "no-fly zone" in Libya. I am don't know what is in the water at CSBA that made this sound like a good idea to publish, but I do question the seriousness of this proposal.

A third option would be to establish a partial no-fly zone using standoff systems that would take advantage of the fact that the vast majority of Libya’s population centers and air bases are located near its coastline. A combination of sea and air assets operating off the coast could enforce a no-fly zone covering most of Libya’s contested cities, including those hit by recent airstrikes. Ship-based Aegis radars and land-based AWACS aircraft could identify and track hostile aircraft at long range. Aircraft violating the no-fly zone could be intercepted using ship-based SM-2 surface-to-air missiles or land-based fighter aircraft armed with beyond-visual-range AIM-120 air-to-air missiles. This approach differs substantially from those employed in the Balkans and Iraq, and thus there is no historical cost basis upon which it can be compared. A notional plan would use three Aegis destroyers positioned off the coast in combination with persistent day and night coverage from AWACS aircraft and an associated combat air patrol. Given the operating cost of these systems and related munitions, this approach could cost in the range of $15 million to $25 million per week. Importantly, since the aircraft involved would remain off the coast of Libya and US forces would use standoff missiles to intercept aircraft violating the no-fly zone, strikes on Libyan air defenses may not be necessary.

Let me get this straight. The U.S. Navy cited before Congress in testimony that the anti-ship missile threat from Hezbollah was so credible that greater AAW capability in the U.S. Navy was needed, and the result at the time was the U.S. Navy truncating the DDG-1000. The same ASM threat by Hezbollah has been cited to suggest the U.S. Navy cannot get closer than 25 miles of shore to offload Marines.

But now we have defense professionals who believe the U.S. Navy can sit off the coastline of a nation, Libya, and shoot down aircraft like they are skeet, and not expect Libya to counter with every ASM in their inventory? I thought CSBA was being paid to dedicate time and resources to the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threat? Is the anti-ship missile threat by the political organization Hezbollah really a greater legitimate threat than the anti-ship missile threat by the nation of Libya?

If anyone wants to establish a "no-fly zone" in Libya, it starts with a declaration of war by Congress, because anything short of that is a boondoggle. There is no way any nation is going to run around and shoot down aircraft inside Libya without taking out the defense infrastructure including SAM and ASM sites, virtually the entire Libyan Navy, every airfield being used, every aircraft that is in the open on the ground, and every radar and electronic emission site. That means thousands of strike sorties just to set the conditions for a no-fly zone, because establishing air superiority is the prerequisite of any no-fly zone.

If the Europeans want to do that, we should support them, but we should not bail them out if it gets hard. In my opinion, Libya represents an opportunity for the US to make a serious mistake. The U.S. Navy is already stretched very thin given the maintenance situation and the recent increase in presence requirements of aircraft carriers in the 5th fleet. The very last thing the U.S. Navy needs right now is presence requirement creep from 6th fleet that will contribute towards stretching the U.S. Navy to a serious breaking point.

Robert Gates needs to be honest with the American people and admit the U.S. Navy is too small to address the requirement creep of non-strategic interests like Libya. If you think events like Libya are important to the United States, you need to start telling President Obama and Congress that the United States needs a bigger Navy.

Hopefully the President will not get caught up in feeling the need to participate in Europe's offshore dog and pony show. If they want to take action, I fully support the US helping our European allies, but we can legitimately support our European friends without adding Libya to the list of US military commitments.

Photo: MEDITERRANEAN SEA (March 3, 2024) The guided-missile destroyer USS Stout (DDG 55) transits the Mediterranean Sea. Stout is currently underway supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Gary A Prill/Released)

Libya: The Western European Response (The Assets)

While Galrahn is raising some interesting questions about what the US has so far (not) done when it comes to Libya (loved the #carelovejoyrainbow) , I thought a overview of what the individual Western European countries are doing might also be interesting.

I'll focus on the actual assets used and not on the politcal rhetoric.

Austria: Was the first EU country to react and prepositioned a C-130 at Malta. She returned to Austria the 21st with 62 people. She is back at Malta now.
A regular Austrian Airline flight also got 136 people from Tripoli to Vienna on the 21st.

France: 3 planes (Airbus A-340 & A-310). The first plane to arrive back in France had 172 people on board, the 2nd 230 and the 3rd plane left from Tripoli today with 152 people on board.

Germany: A chartered Lufthansa plane and 2 Transalls picked up 350 people. More flights with these planes are being planned.

Italy: Alitalia tries to regularly fly to Tripoli. A C-130 has also been used. So far they got 400 people out of Libya.
Also 3 naval vessels are underway: INS Francesco Mimbelli and not INS Elettra as was posted by some news agencies, INS San Marco and INS San Georgio.

Ireland: a Learjet 45 and a CASA 235 of the Air Corps have been prepositioned at Malta.

The Netherlands: A RNLAF KDC-10 has been to Tripoli and back, returning with 82 people. A C-130 has been prepositioned at Sicily and should fly to Tripoli tomorrow.
The Dutch also have a Coast Guard Dornier 228-212 in the area, because of Operation Hermes.
The Netherlands have also sent HNLMS Tromp to Libya. The vessel was in the Red Sea on her way to Operation Ocean Shield, but was ordered to
return to the Med. This means that HNLMS De Ruyter will not return home from Ocean Shield for the time being.

Portugal: Has flown with a C-130 to Libya twice, returning with 130 people the first time and 84 the second.

Spain: Wants to send an air force plane. The Spanish Foreign Minister has received harsh critique for the length it takes her to evacuate Spanish citizens. The first Spanish plane has yet to land in Tripoli, while the French have had 3 planes return already. Spanish oil giant Repsol thought it took too long and arranged a charter plane themselves.

UK: Has chartered a plane, but that never left Gatwick Airport because of a mechanical fault. Have also ordered HMS Cumberland to go to Libya. This is her last job, as she will be decommisioned on returning home.

So how many naval vessels are we counting?
HMS Cumberland (F 85)
HNLMS Tromp (F 803)
INS Francesco Mimbelli (D 561)
INS San Marco (L 9893)
INS San Georgio (L 9892)

So, that's 1 destroyer, 2 frigates and 2 LPD's.

It's the usual suspects that are sending ships I guess, although I'm really missing the French in this list, because when it comes to Africa, it's usually France that leads the other European countries.

Yet everyone can learn something from Turkey. They were quick to react and at first sent 3 ships, followed by 2 more a day later. Total capacity: 4800 people and they are carrying more than that now on their return.

Frontex - Operation Hermes 2011

Frontex is the external border control agency of the Schengen countries that was set up in 2005. It tries to streamline all the national capabilities in the Schengen countries, and they can call upon Frontex to help them when they have problems.

Several countries in the south of Europe have done so in the recent past. That is why there was a Dutch minesweeper doing Coast Guard duties in Spanish waters and there were Dutch gendarmes guarding the Greek border.

Italy is the latest country to call upon Frontex to help them with the massive influx of Tunisian refugees.

Frontex received a formal request for assistance on February 15th from the Italian Ministry of Interior regarding the extraordinary migratory situation in the Pelagic Islands. The Italian Government requested assistance in strengthening the surveillance of the EU’s external borders in the form of a Joint Operation. Additionally, Italy requested a targeted risk analysis on the possible future scenarios of the increased migratory pressure in the region in the light of recent political developments in North Africa and the possibility of the opening up of a further migratory front in the Central Mediterranean area.

The Dutch have said they will help, thus you can now see a Dutch Coast Guard plane flying over the Mediterranean Sea.

So in the past 6 months 3 of Europe's southern countries have asked Frontex to help them and with the current situation in Libya chances of less refugees trying to get to Europe look slim.

HNLMS Johan de Witt and soft power

HNLMS Johan de Witt ended her tasks of the Somali coast on June 29.

Just before her return to Den Helder she did a little soft power.

First it's crew gave a training session on the 17th for 50 members of the Yemeni Coast Guard. The CO of the ship, Ben Bekkering, said that having the landing craft enabled them to let the Yemenites do things on their own.

On June 24 Somali elders from Xhabo met with Dutch navy personnel aboard one of the LPD's landing craft. They told that local villagers are also at risk from the pirates, who confiscate boats from the local fishermen and rob the locals.

The village of Xhabo does not have any medically trained inhabitants, so the crew of the Johan de Witt organised a possibility for the locals the get medical treatment aboard one of the landing craft. It had to be done this way because the EU mandate does allow for operations on land. So on the 28th 73 people went to the landing craft by skiff to receive medical treatment.

The next Dutch ship off the Somali coast will be HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën, a frigate, that is already on her way. She will lead SNMG2 in NATO operation Ocean
shield.
That means wainting for another LPD untill September, when the Spanish will send SPS Galicia, a sister of the Johan de Witt, to Somalia. We'll have to wait and see if they will use the same tactics with their landing craft as the Dutch have used.

And I'll also use this blogpost to give kudos to the PR department of the Dutch MoD for the amount of attention they generated in announcing the Netherlands will send submarine HNLMS Walrus to Somalia, following a NATO request. I'm still wondering why it is that newsworthy.

(And for tho who want to sea the landing craft in operation and hear an explanation from the CO and the Dutch Minister of Defence (in English!) about the tasks the LPD performed: a video.)

EU To Extend Operation Atalanta Another 2 Years

Today the Council of the European Union has extended Operation Atalanta with another 2 years, so they will be off the Somali coast until December 2012 at least.
The Council has also agreed to extend the current AOR further to the east and south.

The press release doesn't say how much further east and south, but currently they operate as far from the Somali coast as the Seychelles and Tanzania. So maybe we'll see in future news thatsome EU vessel has diverted a pirate attack near the Maldives or the southern point of Madagascar.

The Council reiterates the EU´s commitment to help countries in the region to enhance their capacity to facilitate the prosecution and detention of suspected pirates consistent with applicable international human rights law. The Council commends Kenya and the Seychelles for their cooperation and invites other countries in the region to engage in these efforts.

It is a really good thing, to get all regional players more involved. Because whatever the verdict will be in the pirate trial in the Netherlands, it is clear that the pirates will be better off: a Dutch prison cell-with television, shower and a toilet- beats any Somali shack, as does live as a refugee over here.

Another interesting bit is this:

It strongly encourages the international maritime community to further promote full adherence to recommended best practice in order to continue increasing its capacity to meet its responsibility to keep its vessels safe.

While it sounds so obvious, apparently it isn't. The recently released analysis of the deployment of HNLMS Evertsen to Operation Atalanta from August 13 - December 18 in 2009 concluded that the majority of hijacked vessels didn't adhere to Best Management Practices or used the recommended transit routes from the Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA). The report says that (during the time of the Evertsen's deployment) 28% of all merchant vessels do not register with MSCHOA and 4% doesn't use the IRTC. And about 10% of the vessels that are categorized 'very vulnerable' due to their slow speed do not use group transits through the IRTC.

One other thing the EU should look into the Dutch claim that EU vessels are also doing national tasks, such as protecting the fishing vessels and hijacked ships from their respective countries, although they're officially under EU orders.
This hampers the effect of Operation Atalanta because the vessels can then not be deployed for those tasks.
This could leave the operation with not enough ships to carry out it's tasks.

Off The Coast Of Somalia: The Flying Dutchmen

Yesterday at around 13.30 CET the Dutch frigate HNLMS Tromp has rescued the crew of a German freighter from a pirate attack. At 9.45 CET the Tromp received a distress call from MV Taipan. The onboard Lynx was sent to asses the situation and saw the freighter dragging along two of the pirates skiffs. Meanwhile the crew of the frighter had retreated into a safe room on the ship, after disabling the propulsion of the ship -in line with the MSCHOA 'best practises'.

After consultation with the Dutch authorities in the Hague -effectively bypassing EU command- it was decided to free the freighter. While approaching, the frigate's crew detected a mothership on its way to the MV Taipan. When communication with this ship led to no result, the Tromp fired warning shots with its 127mm canon, sending the mothership running.

After the Tromp failed to establish communication with the pirates onboard the MV Taipan the CO of the Tromp, Captain Lodder, gave the order to retake the ship.
At first the pirates fired on the approaching Lynx, but that fire stopped when both the Lynx and the Tromp started firing into the bridge of the Taipan -no equipment has been damaged, so the Taipan can still sail on its own. During this suppression fire, which was aimed at the windows to stop the pirates from seeing what went on, a team of the Unit Interventie Mariniers (Dutch Maritime Special Operations Forces) fast roped onto the ship.
Once onboard they took the pirates without any resistance and all 15 crew members from the Taipan were found unharmed and have given their statements.

During the operation 1 Dutch marine sustained a minor injury, that was unrelated to the firefight.

German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle has thanked his Dutch counterpart Maxime Verhagen for the Dutch action. Meanwhile the German and Dutch Prosecutors Office are discussing how to move forwards from this point. It's obvious to me that it's up to the Germans whether to prosecute. If the Germans don't want to take the pirates to court, the Netherlands will not do so for them.

And a trial in the region is unlikely with Kenya starting to cancel its agreements to prosecute pirates. And I don't think the Seychelles will see any reason to prosecute these pirates if the Germans won't.

Tromp Trumps Pirates (Again)

I was suspecting HNLMS Tromp to see less pirates, after Operation Sweeping Broom -during which the Dutch actively hunted for pirates- ended. Guess I was wrong.

I guess these pirates never learn, because yesterday the Tromp was attacked 270 NM of the Somali coast. A German MPA -I guess one of the Orions that used to belong to the Dutch but were sold to Germany in 2004- had located pirates and the Tromp sailed towards them. When they were 8 NM from the pirates, 2 skiffs came at the ship at full speed, only to turn around when they realised it was a warship they were going after.
Warning shots from the ship and the Lynx helicopter kept the pirates from fleeing and 3 skiffs with 12 pirates were detained. After destroying 2 skiffs and disarming the pirates they were put back in a skiff and sent along to Somalia.

Later the same day the Tromp caught another 7 pirates in 2 skiffs. In a recurring theme, these have also been set free.

Today a Swedish MPA discovered pirates and the Tromp was send to intercept them. The crew caught 10 pirates with a mothership and 2 skiffs, which have both been distroyed along with all the fuel not necessary for the pirates to reach the Somali coast. So yes, that means they have indeed been let go - again.

Since February 17 HNLMS Tromp has disarmed 61 pirates.

The German Navy's Lack of Power Projection

This past weekend Solomon asked why, of all the European Powers, Germany has the weakest navy in terms of power projection.

It's not that the German navy hasn't been thinking about it.

In 1994 Germany had trouble with the withdrawal of its troops from UNISOM II in Somalia. The navy thought a new type of ship could prevent future problems. The ship had such a priority that the navy said it should be fully operational before the year 2000.
The idea from MTG Marinetechnik GmbH -the company that has been established by the German government as an independent centre of excellence in 1966 to design German surface warships- was the Taktische Konzept Mehrzweckschiff (TKM), a 20,000t ship.
The ship would have had a range of 7,500 NM, room for 700 personnel from the army, ro-ro capability and room for 271 vehicles, 8 helicopters, 2 landing craft and a 70 bed hospital with 2 operating rooms. The cost for this all would be between 500 and 620 million Deutschmark.
For comparison it's interesting to know that HNLMS Rotterdam (12,750t) was 265 million Guilders (about 237 DMark).
In 1995 the plug was pulled by the politicians, mainly because of the huge cost of the ship.
The navy, however, hadn't given up on the idea.

In 1998 the Weizsäcker-commission was formed, with the intruction to give the goverment advice about the future of the German armed forces. This commission adviced to get a 'transport and deployment support ship'.
This became the ETrUS (Einsatz Truppenunterstützungsschiff) project. In 2003 it was removed from the Navy's plans, mainly because of costs. Most likely it would have been a further development of the Rotterdam/Galicia class.

The navy, however, was still not giving up and in 2007 news came that Joint Support Ships were to be included in the 2009 plan for the navy.
This resulted in inclusion of these Joint Support Ships -most likely a LPD/LHD- in the Zielvorstellung Marine 2025+ (Navy Plan 2025+).
However, a final decision is not expected before 2016.

So why is it taking Germany so long to get an amphibious capability?
Because Germany doesn't have a real naval tradition. Historically their focus has always been on the army and they therefore lack the marines that are usually associated with these type of ships.
This army-centric thinking also dominated during the Cold War and still exists today. Besides that, the army and air force are seeing these amphibious ships as a threat to their dominance in the 'lift' role.

The Holland-class OPVs Will Need A Change

Background
On December the 20th in 2007 the Dutch MoD and Schelde Marinebouw (now: Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding) signed a contract for the construction of 4 patrol vessels. These vessels were the result of the Marinestudie 2005 which proposed to sell 4 M-class (Karel Doorman class) frigates. With that money 4 patrol vessels should be bought, the Marine Corps should be strengthened, getting more capabilities for the successor of AOR HNLMS Zuiderkruis (the contract for this Joint Support Ship was signed this December) and re-introducing a minesweeping capability (in 2009 5 companies have send their proposals after a RFI).

However, even prior to signing the contract then Deputy Minister Cees van der Knaap criticised the Dutch defence industry.

A few years ago during economic hardship the Ministry, according to Van der Knaap, 'stuck out its neck to help the business ". As main example the Deputy Minister mentioned the acquisition of four patrol vessels. These had no priority for the MoD, but to prevent the industry from having empty shipyards, it was decided to buy the ships.

Characteristics
For an OPV - called Ocean Going Patrol Vessel by the MOD - it's huge at 3750t. Even if the MoD calls them 'small flexible patrol vessels'. It's bigger than the 3320t M-class it replaces.
There are a couple of reasons for this. First, mild steel is used to build the vessels. This is heavier than the high tensile steel used for frigates. Mild steel is cheaper and since the ships will only do 22 knots, high tensile steel is not necessary. A plus is that this cheaper steel is actually more blast resistant. The second reason is the use of a lot of armour on the ships and the last reason is the need to operate the NH-90 helicopter up to Sea State 5.

Length: 354ft.
Propulsion: Diesel-electric
Max Sustained Speed: 22kts
Range: 5000nm (@15kts)
Endurance: 21 days
Crew: 50 (max. 90 + 100 evacuees)
Armament: 1x 76mm Oto Melara, 1x30mm Marlin WS, 2x 12.7mm Hitrole (all remotely operated)
Stern Launch: 1
RHIB Davit: 1 RHIB
Aviation Facilities: One NH-90 + hangar
Cost: €120 million a piece of which about €30 million is for the Integrated Mast from Thales.

On paper it actually has a lot in common with the notional characteristics of the future Offshore Patrol Cutter from the USCG.

Missions
The missions the OPV's are intended to do are at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. And compared to the M-class the OPV's are supposed to be a lot cheaper to use. The OPV's will do Coast Guard type duties -patrolling the Exclusice Economic Zones of the Kingdom of the Netherlands- and Maritime Security Operations around the globe. A lot of these MSO's tend te be relatively close to shore and not in the 'blue water'. Examples of these MSO's would be the current operations of the coast of Somalia against pirates (although that one is moving more and more towards the open ocean) and the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force that tries to prevent smuggling, especially of arms to Libanon.

What stands out
Looking at its intended missions, there are 4 things about the OPV's that really stand out. The first is the lack of a CIWS, the second is the Integrated Mast and all its capabilities, the third one is the lack of 'provisions for' and the last is its lean manning.

A CIWS is wat the Holland class is really missing. And having no "provisions for" means that the through-deck Goalkeeper is a no-go. Both the Phalanx and the Rolling Airframe Missile are options though. The SeaRAM that's currently being developed would be easier than the RAM, since the RAM must be integrated with the ship's combat system and the SeaRAM would have it's own independent sensors.

The capabilities of the Integrated Mast are really good (at least on paper). They are actually way beyond what an OPV would need. The reason that they did buy those masts is the Defence Industry Strategy from the MoD. This Strategy has highlighted 6 technology areas in which the Dutch Defence Industry has chances of developing products that could attract international customers. Sensor systems is one of these areas and so to help industry the Dutch MoD acts as launching customer.

The absence of 'provisions for' means that upgrade possibilities in armament are very limited.
The lack of a X-band Fire Control Radar means that the Seasparrow Missiles the M-class did have can't be used. For terminal guidance these and its successor the Evolved Seasparrow, require a X-band FCR.
And though the SM-6 would be a possibility, because it has active homing, adding a VLS means a rework of the internal layouts to the point that building a new ship would be easier. The same goes for the active homing MBDA Mica, which has another drawback: it would be a new addition to the Dutch inventory. And I do think these missile systems are too much for the Holland class and its intended missions.
There are however two other options. One is the possibilty to add point deffence missile launchers to the Marlin. There is a module to add MBDA's Mistral to the Marlin WS. The other one is to add the STRALES system to the 76mm. The first fully operational 76/62 STRALES should be installed on board an Italian Navy ship at the end of this year.

The lean manning is one of the reasons the costs of operation for the OPV are much lower than for those of an M-class frigate, since the OPV's have about 1/3 of the manning of the M-class.

The lean manning might make the ship relatively inexpensive to operate, but it has a couple of drawbacks. The small crew has been accomplished by a lot of automation, but that comes at certain risks. The biggest reduction to the crew has been achieved by the automation of damage control, which means that the crew size for damage control has been reduced a lot. But it does mean that there are few people to repair the ship in the event of an emergency, so it has to get into port for repairs much earlier than a frigate. And lets hope there's never a malfunction in this control system, because there are not enough people on board to take over.

The Marlin and Hitroles are both remotely operated. An operator has to point them to a target, but after that the Combat Management System takes over.

The main problem I see with the lean manning however are not in the above points, but with operating the sensor systems. I think that the Dutch Navy should assign someone to implement the proposal of Lt. dr. ir. Wilbert van Norden on a new decision support system by on the OPVs - in its wisdom the Navy has decided to assign Van Norden to HNLMS Evertsen for 3 years, instead of letting him implement his proposal on the OPVs. In his disertation Sensing What Matters he writes:

Decision support functionalities are needed to support the human operators on board Royal Netherlands Navy ships since the missions are increasingly complex and they take place in increasingly complex environments. Furthermore, growing complexity in sensor systems requires more knowledge to utilise these sensor systems to their fullest potential. The available human knowledge on board rnln ships however is decreasing due to a strive to reduce ship's complements and to reduce their training and education time. Where previously each individual sensor was assigned to a specialised operator, now one generic sensor operator is expected to control all sensors together.

The increasingly complex missions and environment he refers to are the missions in the littoral. There are a lot of vessels in the littoral, but not all are adverseries. Just look at the current operations of Somalia. There are a lot of skiffs out there, but not every skiff has pirates on board.
Operating sensor systems close to land is more difficult than on the open ocean. Near land the weather changes faster, making sensor performance harder to predict. There's also land clutter influencing sensor systems. The above makes it harder to find your targets, resulting in a small amount of time left in which to react. And having only a few operators makes it even more difficult than it already is.

Conclusion
With its Integrated Mast the operators on board will have a really clear picture of that anti-ship missile coming in. And while the greater range Mistral or STRALES system are nice to have, it's actually te CIWS that is really missing. This is after all an OPV, with a need for defence against an unforseen AShM or low slow flyer, and not a frigate. Everybody knows the story of what happened to INS Hanit and it shows that even these MSO's are not without danger. And who guarantees that Somali pirates can't get their hands on a Silkworm.
So for MSO operations, such as those mentioned already, a CIWS is absolutely necessary. Any suggestions that the OPV will be protected by coalition ships in these events is utter nonsence, since the ships aren't sailing in close tactical formation. They are widespread along the coastline and other ships will be too far away to offer any assistance. So the OPV has to be able to protect itself against an unforseen event. And while you may have a choice to not send the Holland-class on MSO's, that would effectively make it a Coast Guard ship without any need for either its current weaponry or sensor system.

A lot of times the OPV's will be operating in the littoral. A really complex environment with a lot of vessels, not all of whom are adverseries, and land nearby, which results in a lot of land clutter in the sensor systems. Both mean that you need more people to operate effectively in the littoral than on the open ocean. But the OPV's have a much smaller crew than the ships the Netherlands uses for these littoral tasks at the moment.
A new decision support system, such as the one proposed by Lt. dr. ir. Wilbert van Norden, could alleviate this problem.

So in its current form the Holland class are not the right ships for all of its intended missions. But this should be relatively easy to correct.

EU NAVFOR Have Been Busy This Weekend

It looks like the decision on the 24th of February to expand the objectives of Operation Atalanta to include control of Somali ports where pirates are based as well as going after mother ships is already paying off.

According to the EU NAVFOR website:

Over the weekend of 5 - 7 March, EU NAVFOR units have been involved in concerted operations to interdict and disrupt pirate action groups before they had the opportunity to pirate vessels in the Indian Ocean.

Six pirate action groups have been intercepted, mother ships and skiffs have been destroyed and over 40 pirates have been taken into custody.

The French captured 35 pirates and seized 4 motherships and 6 skiffs during these actions.

Now we'll have to wait and see what happens with the captured pirates.

The European Response to Haiti: United in Diversity

Where Information Dissemination has so far mainly focussed on the US response on the Haiti earthquake, here's a brief analysis of the European response.

Leadership
Let's start with asking that all important question: Who's in charge? The answer to the question is fairly easy. It's Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Have we seen her so far? Only very briefly.
The problem Ashton has is that she has 'competition' when it comes to Foreign Affairs. The competition are:
Spain, which holds the current Presidency of the Council of the EU.
Herman van Rompuy, the President of the European Council.
José Manuel Boroso, the President of the European Commission.
All the 27 ministers of Development Aid from the EU members.
Larger members making their own policy (think about France with its international donor conference).

This all makes that there is one guarantee with a EU answer to problems: it takes about forever before there's a general agreement on actions to be taken.

As a Dutch saying goes: with Baroness Ashton the EU isn't going to win the war. She was absent from European Defence Summit in Majorca on february the 24th, the first one since her installment. Javier Solana always attended these meetings and at this one NATO secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen was also present. Ashton, however, decided that it was much more important to attended the inauguration of President Yanukovych in Ukraine.
That doesn't give much hope for the future.

Money
So the only thing that the EU has commonly decided on is to pledge €330 million in aid. (That only took them SIX days, so it was a really quick response in EU-time.)
But member states have also pledged money separately. The Netherlands national government has promised about €44.5 million besides the EU offer. So it's almost impossible to figure out what the total amount is. Especially because some of the amounts are hard to decipher. Let me explain why that is.
That Dutch promise is made up of the immediate offer of 1 million. Later 2 million was added and then another 41,5 million. The last amount came about because the Dutch minister of Development Aid promised to match what the Dutch public would raise during a telethon. But only in the Dutch press the distinction is made everywhere else you only see the total amount of €83 million raised by the telethon.

Assets
The EU has hardly any assets, but its members do. So in true EU style there was hardly any coordination of all the individual efforts.
So what happened was some mad dash to send planes to Haiti. But it's a long flight to Haiti from Europe and a fair amount of planes couldn't land in Port-au-Prince because the airport was clogged up. The delays weren't too dramatic though, so these small scale efforts went reasonably well.

But the large scale effort is a real disappointment. Where are all those European LPDs, LHDs and carriers that were built because the future, since the Cold War is over, is in Sea Basing and disaster relief?
A few in Haiti, but mainly not going at all. And that's disappointing, since in total the EU members have 6 CV's, 2 LPH's, 2 LHD's, 11 LPD's, 4 LSD's

Spain has sent a LPD, the UK sent a LSD, Italy a CV and the Netherlands offered a LPD.
But it took these countries more than a week to offer them in the first place and not all vessels actually went. The Dutch LPD HNLMS Johan de Witt didn't go. The reason is the UN has said it will not be needed any more by the time it will get there. Now there's a shocker. That's what happens when you wait too long with a decision.
But the Dutch can now take the moral high ground. They offered and the UN has said it isn't necessary.

The EU will also send a European police force of 350. We all know that's going to be an invaluable contribution next to those 20,000+ American soldiers and 2,000 Canadian soldiers.

Conclusion
The EU members have definitely taken the EU motto “United in Diversity” quite literally. The lack of a coordinated response is certainly what unites them.

Any EU members still wondering why the US world doesn't take them serious, especially on a military level?

The European Commission's Seminar on Piracy

The Mobility and Transport department of the European Commission - the executive body of the EU - has a seminar today in Bruxelles called 'Piracy and armed robbery at sea: How best to protect seafarers'.

Looking at the agenda it seems like the focus of the seminar is on how seafarers can protect themselves, the impact of piracy on their personal lives and the economic consequences for shipping and insurance companies.
While this is an interesting subject, it's not one I'd discus with the Commission and if I were a seafarer or a shipping company I'd have different questions for the Commission.

I think the Commission should be discussing 2 points:
1. What's the role of the EU in protecting seafarers?
2. How best to protect seafarers.

While EU NAVFOR is the first maritime EU operation that's reasonably planned and not some haphazard action by individual members you can't help but wonder where all the EU vessels are. Together the EU members have about 120 frigates and destroyers. And they are struggling to deploy around 6 frigates a time.
So the role of the EU is to make sure its individual members deploy more resources to protect seafarers.

And on the second question the answer is simple: stop the piracy from happening.
And while the recent decision to expand the mission of Operation Atalanta to include control of Somali ports where pirates are based, as well as catching pirate mother ships will help, it's battling the symptons and ingnores the root of the problem. Because the root of the problem, as has been said by Galrahn and others often enough, is on land.
But who is seriously thinking the EU will intervene on land?

European Shipbuilding

The predecessor of the current European Union Was called the European Economic Community and they had one big achievement: a free flow of goods, people and services between all their members and thus creating a single European market. That also meant that governments had to open their tenders for this single market.
There was however a notable exception to the single market regulations: it was not applicable when national security was at stake.

In practice that meant that every country would claim national security issues with defence contracts and award the majority of these contracts to companies within its own borders.

Shipyards
This all has resulted in the following in shipbuilding in the EU (+Norway).

Combatants (2000t>)	Combatants (<2000t)	Subs	Amphibious	Carriers	AOR	OPV
10	9	7	9	4	3	5

This is the number of shipyards involved in building specific types of vessels over the past 10 years and vessels currently under construction.
Combining all the data and removing the duplicate yards that have build more than 1 type, it means since 2000 24 different shipyards have been involved in building these naval vessels. The number of (parent) companies that own these yards is 21.

In comparison: since 2001 ships for the US Navy have been build by 6 yards owned by 2 companies.

Vessels
And although some vessels were designed by multiple countries, it still means that Europe has produced 4 classes of 5,500t+ frigates/destroyers:

• Absalon and Ivar Huitfeldt in Denmark
• LCF (Zeven Provinciën), Sachsen (F124), �?lvaro de Bazán (F100) in the Netherlands, Germany and Spain
• Horizon (Orrizonte) in France and Italy
• Type 45 in the UK

And while the Absalon may be the odd one out, the Ivar Huitfeldt class that is based on the Absalon has the same AAW role the 3 other classes have.

Radars
In the naval radar business it's 5 companies:

• Thales with the APAR, SMART-L, SMART-s, Herakles and Integrated Masts (Seamaster/Seawatcher/Gatekeeper)
• BAE with its SAMPSON and Artisan 3D
• Saab and their Sea Giraffe
• EADS with the TRS-3D
• SELEX has the S1850 and EMPAR

Of these Thales has the biggest market share and SELEX's S1850 is actually a modified SMART-L.

Conclusion
The cost of the overhead and duplicated efforts that could and should have been avoided in military ship building must run into the billions for all projects combined. Money that would have been well spend on more vessels or capabilities instead.

Although baby steps are taken all the time to come to a single European defence market in the European Union it will take time before this will be realized (if ever).
It would require the lead of the UK and France, because they have -by far- the biggest defence budgets and highest ambitions. Unfortunately they are also the ones fighting for the 'top' spot in Europe and seem not able to work together at all, as can be seen in the withdrawal of the UK from the Horizon project and France from the Eurofighter.
Maybe the construction of the Queen Elizabeth class and the PA2 can be a new starting point.

Because if there is one thing the EEC and EU members must have learned after all these years is that a single market is a requisite for economic growth.

People interrested in a bigger picture about what's wrong with European Defence Policy are highly recommend to read this policy paper from Nick Witney.

Why You Can't Call Europe

An often made distinction in regions is this one. It is a subdivision of the world in so called culture realms. Their scale, however, is so enormous and the diversity within each of the realms so great that the very concept misleads more than it informs.

The above is not hard to understand when you realize that language and culture are related to an extent you might even say that language is one of the key defining points of a culture.

Seen from that perspective Europe becomes a lot less heterogeneous than, say, North-America.

There's also the problem of which Europe you are talking about. The European Union, or the Council of Europe or the Eurozone? Or perhaps about the European countries within NATO.

Besides this there are also the mental maps, that show a -subjective- perception of the world.
So the way people in Europe see Russia differs from country to country. The general rule is that the closer a country is to Russia, the more it perceives Russia as a threat.

And finally, we are talking about sovereign countries here people. And these sovereign countries sometimes have mutual interests, but as least as often they don't, certainly on military affairs.

The above results in three problems for me to give a single European point of view.

• A lot of times there is no single European point of view.
• I'd have to follow all European countries' foreign policy, which is impossible to do in my spare time.
• It would require me to know 23 languages, just for the EU.

So, while I can give the readers of Information Dissemination a point of view from the European side of the Atlantic Ocean and I will try to give a broader European view, it will never be the European point of view.

EU Looking The Wrong Direction

Someone tell this guy he is looking the wrong direction.

The European Union’s anti-piracy operation may expand the area it patrols because Somali pirates have begun to threaten ships as much as 1,000 miles (1,609 kilometers) from shore, according to the mission’s commander.

“We’re looking at extending the area of our mandate,” Rear Admiral Peter Hudson said in an interview in Northwood, the fleet’s command center north of London. “We’re looking at whether we have the assets to do it, whether it would provide more security.”

I thought we developed the corridor in the Gulf of Aden to reduce the amount of area at sea needed to cover. Shouldn't the EU be looking towards the coast, instead of away from it?

The Bloomberg news article is excellent. This is the key part for me.

The Atalanta mission costs about 500 million euros ($736 million) a year, Didier Lenoir, head of military operations at the EU, said at a conference Dec. 7 in Paris. Each nation pays costs for the ships it contributes.

In total, there are about 25 warships off Somali waters. While the EU and NATO fleets carry out patrols and hunt for pirates, gunboats sent by Russia, China, Japan and Saudi Arabia mostly organize and protect convoys of their nations’ merchant ships.

That is a lot of money. The EU mission spends $736 million to maintain 6 frigates year-around, plus aircraft? Now add NATO, China, Russia, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the US and who wants to guess the total costs?

The world is now spending well north of $2 billion in terms of supporting Somali anti-piracy naval and aircraft patrols. The extra insurance costs for 30,000 ships annually is no small number either. Even if the average ransom of every ship hijacked was $2 million, at 44 ships hijacked in 2009 we are only talking about $88 million - less than %5 of the costs being spent to protect shipping.

We are not getting enough bang for the buck spent in prevention, and I don't believe closer cooperation between all nations would significantly improve the mismatch in costs nor significantly reduce the number of attacks/hijackings. There remains no solution in sight for piracy at sea, and the EU Naval authorities appear to be looking for solutions in the wrong direction (at sea, vs on land).

Until the coalition takes meaningful steps to reduce the areas pirates can safely operate from ashore, the situation is not likely to improve at sea regardless of how many extra vessels the European Union commits to the problem. I still think Dr. Peter Pham has a good suggestion.

This is where to start, and would be where to go next. In other words, the State Department must come through with political changes on land, or it will remain global government policy to sail in circles at sea. If the State Department does nothing, and the military policy for piracy remains prevention, this problem will not be contained, and become something much worse.

For me, observing the Somali piracy issue is like watching Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 90s, where policy was to make minimal military efforts with precision while watching the problem grow quietly. In a few years it will be plainly obvious how signs were ignored. The good news? It is more likely to explode in the face of Europe or China than in the face of the US, at least when I step through the highly improbably possibilities, that is what I see unfolding.

EU Piracy Policy Topics To Be Raised Next Week

There are two articles discussing EU evaluations of piracy options looking into 2010. The first is the need for more frigates. This one is from DefenseNews.

"The EU has committed three or four frigates, in 2010 but we probably need between six and 10 to cover that vast area," Gen. Henri Bentegeat said at a news conference following a meeting of the EU Chairs of Defense Staff (CHODs). He insisted that there was coordination between the EU and NATO naval assets in the area and "certainly no duplication."

As for progress on developing military capabilities at the EU level, he said it was "hard to tackle shortfalls in a time of economic crisis" but stressed that "countries cannot afford to go on focusing on national priorities without giving more thought to European cooperation."

The EU was formed for reasons of economics, but is coming around to seeing the link between security and economics. That last sentence would normally be noteworthy, but it is a General not a politician making the statement.

Spain wants more than just ships though, they are discussing the necessity for the EU NAVFOR to change tactics.

Spain wants EU naval forces to blockade three Somali ports used to launch pirate attacks against ships in the Indian Ocean, Defence Minister Carme Chacon said Wednesday.

She said Spain will call on European Union foreign and defence ministers to concentrate military efforts on blockading the ports at a meeting next Monday and Tuesday.

"We know that it is from these three ports that most, if not all, 'mother ships' used by pirates reach up to one thousand miles away from the coast -- as they did yesterday -- and carry out kidnappings far from the coast," she told RNE public radio.

Chacon also said the pirate gangs "have ties to sophisticated law firms in London," and she called for the international community to do more to track ransoms given to pirates to release hostages.

Two critical points here. The UN already allows operations by foreign navies in territorial waters of Somalia, so there is a legal foundation to build a case for such tactics. With that said, a blockade is going to require a lot of ships and is a lot different than simply escorting convoys.

But the main point is the last one, specifically following the money. Pirate attacks originating from Somalia are up, particularly in the Seychelles area in the Indian Ocean. It is only a matter of time before the next major incident, and it is unlikely to be as spectacularly handled as the Maersk Alabama incident.

The Other German Incident

Sailors from the frigate Brandenburg, participating in Operation Atalanta off Somalia, have shot and killed a pirate.

The German navy shot dead a suspected pirate off the coast of Somalia on Monday after a boat carrying five men failed to heed warning shots, the German military said.

"After an exchange of fire, one of the men on the boat was critically wounded and died despite immediate medical treatment," a statement said.

The suspected pirates threw weapons overboard after the exchange and officials are now inspecting their boat, the statement added.

It does not sound like many details have been released, at least in the English language news, because 'exchange of fire' implies the pirates were shooting at either the frigate or perhaps a helicopter? If they were shooting at the helicopter, that would be the second time in a month that pirates opened fire on a helicopter...

A pattern developing perhaps?