It's Time to Consider Raiding, Again

Jon Solomon's note: When we think of expeditionary operations, we tend to picture the insertion of a ground force to seize and hold some territory for a relatively long period of time. My SPA colleague Jonathan Altman points out below, though, that short-duration raids can be just as strategically useful under the right circumstances. In this piece he examines the potential use of small-scale raids as a means of signalling and compellence outside of major war. I've asked him to write a follow-up piece as his time permits examining larger-scale raids in major war, as I believe that such operations in some scenarios might be highly useful for disrupting or rolling back an adversary's localized maritime denial capabilities. 

The term “raiding” seems like an anachronism upon first reflection. For the average person, it's as likely to conjure up images of Vikings as anything else, and even serious students of military history are challenged to come up with a more recent example than WWII of an effective raid (discounting small scale Special Forces actions in the Middle East). Nonetheless, in the current security environment, where large scale maritime and land forces can be held at risk by A2/AD systems, and inter-state disputes seem to be increasingly playing out on the lower rungs of the escalation ladder, raiding operations hold terrific promise. Compared to a ‘permanent’ insertion of ground forces in some area, brief hit-and-run raids offer increased flexibility and decreased resource needs—as well as options under certain circumstances for plausible deniability. These inherently interconnected qualities and their attendant impact on conflict management suggest a future in which the practice of raiding is likely to once again become an indispensable tool for planners and policymakers alike.

A quick note on definitions is needed. For the purposes of this discussion, a “raid” is defined as a military operation by amphibious and/or airborne forces to temporarily seize enemy territory for some operational purpose. Raids in this article should be considered to be solely directed against territory-holding actors (normally recognized nation-states but a limited set of sub-state actors would also fit such as ISIS or FARC in Columbia) on a scale from a platoon to battalion size effort. Most counter-terrorist operations are accordingly outside the focus of this paper. Larger scale raids that could enable or buttress full scale military campaigns will be covered in a follow on post as these are qualitatively different operations from the smaller-scale raids described in this one.

Because they are by definition intended to be temporary actions and need not incorporate many personnel, smaller-scale raids can often be plausibly deniable. While certainly some media may correctly identify the raid as such before it is complete (especially if the raid lasts longer than a few hours), at least broadly speaking, with respect to the public and third party nations many raids should be generally deniable. This confers tremendous advantages in conflict management.

First, deniability allows the raiding nation to avoid criticism from third parties while sending a desired message of resolve and/or punitive punishment to the state or substate actor being raided. It is likely that the nation being raided will at least have an idea of who is conducting the raid and why based on the target selected, which should be enough for them to understand what brought on the attack. In this sense raiding is an excellent medium to encourage compellence, where an adversary is given a face-saving method to deescalate a conflict without being forced to publicly admit they've been compelled. Consider a scenario where the United States wished to compel a rogue nation not to continue on a path of supporting terrorism. A raid could be used against a target of military significance or symbolic value to the rogue nation's support of terrorism, whereby its seizure and/or destruction by “unknown” forces would directly retard their efforts and convey a level of seriousness that sanctions or diplomatic censure simply cannot. The willingness to spill blood through a plausibly deniable attack against a symbol of an adversary's offending behavior cannot be overstated as a demonstration of earnestness.

On a related note, the deniability of a raid also assists in ending conflicts at the lowest possible levels of escalation because it allows an adversary to potentially save face. Without a smoking gun linking the raid to a nation, the targeted nation will have a better chance of tamping down internal pressure to respond to the raid, providing an off ramp to additional escalation. Again, even if an adversary was aware of who conducted the raid with a reasonable degree of certainty, so long as they do not want war and can keep that information from firing up a domestic base then de-escalation is feasible. In any case, the nature of a raid’s target (against which actor, what sort of specific target, etc.) can be calibrated to minimize the chance of starting of a tit for tat raiding exchange. While not a certainty, de-escalation is a much more likely outcome from a deniable action than one that is not.

The other key quality associated with raids is their flexibility. While the size of a raid will vary inversely with its deniability; this too can be used to a nation’s advantage. Want to offer an adversary an escalation off-ramp? A smaller-scale raid makes sense. Want to send a message of resolve not just to the targeted adversary but also a deterrence message to other potential adversaries? Then a larger-scale raid probably is a better fit. Raids are also flexible in their duration and objectives. A longer raid may send a different message than a shorter one, and the choice of objective can be a message unto itself. For example, deliberately limited objectives may be used to showcase capabilities that could be used in a much more destructive fashion should offending actions continue, while more ambitious efforts may be used to show a commitment to not only threaten that which the adversary holds dear but also demonstrate that the raider is already prepared to (publicly) risk as many lives as it takes to stop the targeted nation. While the difference in messages is subtle, the ability to calibrate them so carefully gives raiding enormous messaging utility.

Operationally speaking, raids are a more useful tool than others because they require only a limited logistics tail and lend themselves to the element of surprise. Since raids by definition do not intend to hold territory permanently and last at most a matter of days, the supplies and supporting forces needed to execute them are comparatively minimal. One only needs a method of raiding force insertion, some small amount of supplies to support the operation, and perhaps some combined arms supporting fires if the circumstances dictate. Since the scale of resources is relatively small (for short operations raiders may simply carry on their bodies all that they need), it is likely that the preparations for a raid can be kept secret, and a range of platforms not available to larger operations can be used. For example, “white shipping” (unmarked, non-military flagged ships) or relying exclusively on airborne insertion and exfiltration can be effective in facilitating successful raids. Beyond supply needs, because a raid by definition is a relatively small operation, the number of people and computer networks needed to plan and execute the raid can also be small, making the potential for adversary discovery of the raid before the fact much less likely. Thus because the preparations for a raid can be done in a highly secure manner, raids are much more likely to maintain the element of surprise than other military operations with similar objectives; thereby lowering the risk to the raiders themselves and amplifying the chance of mission success.

Looking out to a future where inter-state conflict continues to take place at lower levels of the escalation ladder, and where obfuscating one's own military actions will be important to achieving national objectives, raiding would seem to be an essential part of a military planner's toolkit. Raids convey national level resolve at a minimum risk of friendly loss of life, and provide an adversary with either escalation off-ramps and/or clear direction that a behavior will not be allowed to continue. It's time to think about raiding less from an historical lens and instead consider how it can best be used for strategic effect in the modern world.

Jonathan Altman is a Program Analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. who holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the Korbel School at the University of Denver and an undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis Inc., and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

The Use of the Marines in Europe for Deterrence

Marine COL William Nemeth has an intriguing article in this month’s Proceedings about how the Marines could contribute to deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Nemeth suggests the existing Black Sea Rotational Force could be expanded to a “full battalion combat team” he dubs “Rotational Force Europe” that could be deployed anywhere in Eastern Europe as needed. This combined arms force would consist of a reinforced infantry battalion with supporting combined arms attachments such as a reconnaissance platoon, light armored vehicle platoon/company, tank platoon, amphibious assault vehicle platoon, artillery battery, aviation combat element, and logistics combat element. I’m not going to do the approximate manpower counts for each of these components, but I’ll wager that their collective size would be more than double the Black Sea Rotational Force’s recent size.

Using Robert Rubel’s hierarchy of presence as a reference, my instinct is that Rotational Force Europe’s inherent capabilities when deployed as a aggregated group would fall somewhere between a tripwire force and a force capable of delaying/disrupting a notional Russian ground offensive (at least for a short time). If it functioned as part of a larger NATO standing forward combined arms conventional deterrent, the likelihood of bogging down a Russian thrust would probably be even greater.

But Nemeth also talks about splitting this Rotational Force Europe up into reinforced companies for deployment in widely-separated locations from the Baltics to Romania to even Georgia. He notes that the additional equipment needed to reinforce these companies could be pulled from the Marines’ prepositioned stockpiles in Norway, with augmentation personnel flown in from the U.S. All this is fine for peacetime engagement, training, and showing the flag. In a crisis, though, it seems to me that these companies would still be nothing more than tripwires. That’s okay as long as we’re honest about how a tripwire gambit must be structured in order to be effective. First, the tripwire must be placed in a location where an aggressor’s conventional forces cannot avoid coming into direct contact with it. Second, it must be latently backed by larger and heavier combat-credible forces positioned further back in the theater that can immediately provide it with combined arms support, begin deploying forward to reinforce it, and begin inflicting countervailing damage on the aggressor. Third, it must be able to latently back the host nation’s constabulary forces responding to an aggressor’s “salami tactic” incursions; the constabularies in turn must be able to provide physical security support for the tripwire’s emplacements and lines of communication/maneuver. Lastly, it must be accepted that losses in the tripwire force will likely be horrendous. That’s the price of being on the frontline at the beginning of a major war.

Nemeth goes into commendable detail regarding the air and naval assets that would be needed to support his Rotational Force Europe. It’s worth noting that he calls for there to be a standing presence in theater of two to three amphibious warships to perform transport, force insertion, or afloat staging base tasks. Given that the amphibious fleet is already overtaxed, something would almost certainly have to give in terms of presence in other theaters in order to restore that kind of presence in 6^th Fleet. The same is true for his call for a standing presence of two to four additional DDGs on top of the four now permanently deployed in Rota, Spain, plus four to five Littoral Combat Ships. He also calls for a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to be assigned to 6^th Fleet at all times; it is not clear whether this is the same as the amphibious warships he listed for transport or an additional set of such ships carrying their own Marines. While I don't disagree with him in terms of the need to reestablish a more sizable standing U.S. Navy forward presence in the European theater, note that CS-21R all but declares our existing force structure is insufficient to do so and also achieve all the other prioritized strategic tasks in other theaters assigned by our political leadership. CS-21R makes clear the burden for naval presence in Europe therefore falls on our NATO allies' fleets.

COL Nemeth briefly discusses how a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) might be used to quickly reinforce Europe in the event of a conflict with Russia. He suggests that a standing MEB headquarters element should be attached to European Command to plan for and command the flying-in of Marines from the U.S. to marry up with the prepositioned equipment stockpiles in Norway, and then deploy where needed in northeastern Europe—including the Baltics. He also implies that equipment could be prepositioned on NATO’s Black Sea members’ territories for contingencies in that portion of the theater. While I strongly agree with the use of a MEB for these purposes, I would point out that any use of the Baltic or Black Seas for transporting the MEB’s units towards frontal areas would be risky as a crisis peaked and nearly impossible if it had to occur after a war had already started. Russian sea denial capabilities in those waters will be too dense, at least during a conventional conflict’s first few weeks. This means gear must be prepositioned closer to where it might actually be needed. Norway is probably fine for Scandinavian operations. Prepositioning in Poland is probably necessary for operations in that country or the Baltics. Prepositioning in Romania and possibly also Bulgaria is unquestionably necessary for operations in those countries. Nemeth suggests that Rotational Force Europe might be used to enable the MEB’s theater entry and then movement to action; this could be a very important role for the former that deserves further analysis.

To make Rotational Force Europe, standing 6^th Fleet presence by a MEU, and the contingency MEB possible, Nemeth asserts that the Corps will have to stop rotationally deploying East Coast Marine units to augment Marine forces in Japan. While this is contrary to the Defense Department’s strategic prioritization of East Asia, it does make sense given the comparatively far higher military tensions with Russia than China at present. It also offers further evidence that our Navy-Marine Corps team is undersized (and budget levels being what they are, underprepared) for the strategic tasks it is assigned.

All in all, Nemeth has laid out an excellent and provocative article. Future analysis ought to look at how his ideas might pair up with Terrence Kelly’s ideas on how army forces (both U.S. and allied) ought to be used for conventional deterrence in Poland and the Baltics. More attention also needs to be paid with respect to how air and naval forces (whether U.S. or allied) ought to be used, especially in support of U.S. and allied ground forces fighting on the continent. And of course, the means for protecting the flow of reinforcements and logistical support into Europe and then onward towards frontal areas still requires much focused thought.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

The Cost of an Army Path in the Pacific

PACIFIC OCEAN ( Dec 9, 2024) Sailors aboard the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70) direct an Army OH-58 Kiowa Warrior helicopter from the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (25th CAB) off the coast of Hawaii during joint training operations. The 25th CAB is expected to participate similarly in other training exercises in 2014. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist John M. Hageman/Released)

The following contribution is submitted by Major David Andersen, US Marine Corps.

Recently, Rajiv Chandrasekaran discussed the Army’s efforts to become more expeditionary and maritime capable.  Yet, as Mr. Chandrasekaran points out; the United States already has a maritime expeditionary force: the Marine Corps. 
   
In business, new initiatives are challenged by various barriers such as cost, equipment design, licensing, and market saturation. If a hardware store wants to expand its business, it’s unlikely to diversify into car tune-ups. Just because a handyman can turn a wrench doesn’t mean he can drop an engine.  However similar the Army and Marine Corps may appear to the untrained eye, the same may be said regarding amphibious operations. While the Army did amphibious landings quite well in World War II, they involved a short time at sea as a preamble to the sustained operations ashore that armies are designed for. Today’s amphibious operations are more diverse and require a force designed, trained and equipped to operate at and from the sea over extended periods—as Marines are.
 
The Army’s current barriers include:

Cost: Army equipment is not “marinized;” a process where everything from engine intake systems to the metals and paints used are designed to withstand high levels of salt water so that corrosion can be minimized and service life extended. This is why several Army aircraft were scrapped after Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, as Mr. Chandrasekaran pointed out. The Army subsequently explored the price of marinization and concluded it was cost-prohibitive.

Equipment design: The majority of Army helicopters have neither rotor brakes nor folding blades and tail booms. These features are unnecessary for land-based operations but essential for safety, shipboard stowage, and operational tempo reasons in sea-based operations. Without brakes rotor blades continue spinning for extended periods of time, gradually drooping as they slow and endangering crews and equipment on a pitching flight deck.  Without folding components most Army helicopters take up an inordinate amount of precious deck space on an amphibious ship. A few do have manually folding blades to permit occasional embarkation in C-17 transport planes, rather than the faster and less manpower intensive automated type found in Marine aircraft.  As a result, in the time it takes to tow, spread, spot and start a single Army H-60, a typical Marine squadron can launch two full waves of six aircraft.
  
Licensing: Most of the Army’s aviation weapons systems are not certified for shipboard use or storage. Why does that matter?  Because the many emitters aboard the ship could make them launch, fire, or detonate prematurely.  Sure, the ship could turn off those emitters, but then it can’t see or communicate with other ships, or identify threats, making operations in hostile or congested waters unsafe.

Market saturation:  Plenty of global business exists for expeditionary crisis response forces, so the market is not saturated.  What is in short supply, however, is the number of Navy ships capable of projecting forces in “ready to fight” condition. Amphibious ships, specifically designed for that purpose, are obviously the preferred platforms. Unfortunately, the Navy does not have enough amphibious ships to lift the force specifically designed to operate from them: the Marine Corps. While aircraft carriers may appear a viable alternative, the Navy’s inventory is smaller today than it was during Operation Uphold Democracy, meaning that the ability to replicate that model without disrupting existing deployment and maintenance cycles is problematic and likely to occur only in the event of a dire national emergency. What about the USS Lake Erie as cited in the article? She had space because she was at home. When a cruiser, destroyer or frigate, deploys, she does so with a detachment of Navy helicopters designed for sea going missions, like anti-submarine warfare. So, while the market is not saturated, the current budget environment and underfunding of the fleet means the shortage is not sea-based expeditionary forces, but the ships from which they operate.

So, why go to the hardware store to change your muffler?

Rather than trying to diversify its business, what if the hardware store found another means to deliver its existing products? The Army and Marine Corps have experimented with high speed logistics vessels since 1999. The Westpac Express, leased from Austal Marine, has internally transported Marines, aircraft and vehicles throughout the Pacific theater.  The Army conducted similar operations aboard TSV-1X Spearhead.  With these logistics ships, aircraft and other equipment can be carried internally, requiring no special equipment or training. While they are not capable of conducting sea-based operations, they provide a means to project forces via austere port facilities. Upon arrival, vehicles are driven off and stowed aircraft are craned off and reassembled for operations. These ships and others like them are available for contract for a fraction the cost of marinizing Army capabilities, allowing the Army to improve their expeditionary responsiveness without attempting to become a second Marine Corps.



Maj Andersen is a Marine Corps AH-1W Super Cobra pilot who has conducted three Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployments, twice as a pilot where he served in the squadron Maintenance Department (OIC of the Airframes and Quality Assurance Divisions) and once as the MEU Air Officer where he was responsible for all MEU aviation operations. During these deployments he conducted extended amphibious operations into Iraq, Kuwait, the Horn of Africa, Bangladesh and the United Arab Emirates. In Bangladesh he was responsible for all MEU aviation operations in support of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations for Operation Sea Angel II following Typhoon Sidr. Maj Andersen also participated in one of the first deployments which utilized the Westpac Express during which his squadron deployed a detachment of 4 AH-1W and 3 UH-1N helicopters as well as required support equipment aboard the vessel, along with additional ground combat equipment, to support exercises in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the Republic of the Philippines and Thailand. Maj Andersen has also completed combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Air-Sea Battle Defined in Testimony Last Thursday

On Thursday the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee conducted a public hearing on the Air-Sea Battle Concept involving a handful of Congressmen and a panel of senior leaders from the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army and Joint Staff. The panel included Rear Admiral Upper Half James G. Foggo III, USN, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations, Plans and Strategy) (N3/N5B), Major General James J. Jones, USAF, Director of Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and, Requirements, Brigadier General Kevin J. Killea, USMC, Director of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Major General Michael S. Stough, USAF, Vice Director, Joint Force Development, J7, and a late addition - Major General Gary H. Cheek, US Army, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7.*

The hearing was not widely attended by members of the subcommittee. The hearing was not widely attended by the press. There were very few journalists in attendance, and I am aware of only one media article discussing the hearing. There were no submitted written statements as far as I know. The hearing lacked the political theater found elsewhere during the current government shutdown. At no point during the hearing was a partisan point a political context raised or made. There were no threats made to China, or anyone else, and there were very few sound bytes produced that would draw in a broader American audience to the content of the discussion.

The video is here.

The Air-Sea Battle hearing was a public intellectual discussion between the US military and Congress on matters related to the art of war. Since the opening of the Air-Sea Battle office in the Pentagon, the DoD has been unable to publicly articulate what the Air-Sea Battle Concept is intended to do. The absence of a clearly articulated Air-Sea Battle Concept has allowed critics to define the concept on behalf of the DoD, and leverage any context in that criticism. Following the testimony of Rear Admiral Foggo who articulated the concept clearly, in context, with examples, and with thorough regard to definition - a clear understanding of Air-Sea Battle has been established as the intellectual baseline for future public commentary. An excerpt from his prepared oral testimony is available on the Navy Live blog.

For future discussions of Air-Sea Battle, nerds like me (and you) now have plenty to discuss. Examples ranging from overlapping, integration of multiple capabilities provided by the US Army, US Navy, and US Air Force in providing air defense coverage of the Persian Gulf highlights the defensive utility of the Air-Sea Battle Concept in action, just as Operation Odyssey Dawn - the military action against Libya in 2011 (that RADM Foggo was directly involved in btw) - highlights the offensive utility of the Air-Sea Battle Concept. It is not every day recent exercises involving US Army Apache helicopters operating from US Navy ships is discussed in a Congressional hearing, but Air-Sea Battle Concept isn't an every day type of discussion.

For the first hour of the hearing, through statements, questions, and answers Air-Sea Battle Concept was defined and explained in thorough detail to those interested in the intellectual explanation of a joint, complex military concept. In the future, critics of Air-Sea Battle who missed this hearing can be dismissed outright as ignorant, because critics who actually paid attention to this hearing are going to make much better arguments than they have in the past.

There are numerous examples of conversations within the hearing I could choose from to discuss, but this one has been on my mind:

WITTMAN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today. I appreciate you taking time to give us your perspectives on the AirSea Battle concept.

Brigadier General Killea, I'd like to go to you and get your perspective on the Marine Corps' role within that AirSea Battle concept. Looking at where we've been and where we're going with the size of our amphibious fleet as you know continues to be on the decline, the proposal is to retire early two more LSDs. How does the size of our amphibious fleet affect the Marine Corps ability to carry out its role in an AirSea Battle plan?

KILLEA:

Thank you for that question, sir. That's a fantastic question and I think that goes to the collaboration that has to go on amongst the services within the AirSea Battle Office.

Once we identified the capabilities that we have and then the gaps are identified from that and then the services propose solutions to those gaps and the AirSea Battle Office will take those solutions and rack and stack them and then provide them an advocate, a capability's list that goes forward.

So if that capability's list includes additional amphibious shipping or something that could augment the capabilities of that amphibious shipping, that would come out of the functions and the process of the office.

But I think for the Marine Corps where we stand today with our amphibious shipping is actually on pretty good stead for the missions that we have for our focus -- for our forward presence in crises response and as we get into a major combat operation that would involve this kind of environment, then our participation with that is only going to be as good as we are pre-integrated with that joint force through the efforts that we've been talking about this morning. I hope that answers your question, sir.

As the US pivots to the Pacific, logistics is going to be important. The ability to maneuver forces to exploit the size of the region to ones advantage is also going to be critical in the next war in the Pacific, regardless of who the adversary is. I would like to see more discussion regarding the augmentation of amphibious forces, because while I don't think the Marine Corps needs to have the standing capability to assault with more than 1 MEB at a time, if the future United States is going to be truly expeditionary, the Marine Corps is going to need to be able to move as many MEBs as possible around theaters of battle.

The Army is not the expeditionary force, the Marine Corps is. A healthy discussion regarding how to increase the concurrent expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps is a conversation worth having. If one considers amphibious assault a tier I capability for moving expeditionary forces, and the ability to maneuver forces in permissive environments is a tier II capability, then I would like to see a 2:1 MEB ratio for the Marine Corps regarding Tier II/ Tier I concurrent maneuver capacity.

The MLP is as good a place as any to start.



For an example of what I am thinking... If a war was to break out on the Korean peninsula for any reason, the US Marine Corps may not need more than a single MEB capable of amphibious assault in that conflict. I'm not talking about reliving the Inchon landings, rather I am speaking directly to taking the various islands along the North Korean coastline that might have to be taken in support of choking off logistic lines at sea along the North Korean coast during war.





But there is another issue... the US might also need the ability to move large numbers of Marines into South Korea quickly, not necessarily in an assault posture, but in a permissive southern port with the ability to roll off the ship into the order of battle. That tier II level of capability is what the MLP is supposed to provide the Marine Corps, but with AFSBs and with a limited number of MLPs, one wonders how many Marines can be moved quickly.

I'd like to see more discussion regarding whether there is legitimate value for the Marine Corps to have fewer traditional amphibious ships and more non-tradiational expeditionary vessels. For example, can someone explain why 12 LHA/LHDs + 12 LPD-17s for 24 total amphibious ships wouldn't be enough amphibious assault capability if the Marine Corps also operated an additional 8 MLPs and 8 AFSBs? I think a legitimate conversation regarding the AoA for the LSD replacement is missing from the Marine Corps, because in my opinion, throwing the budget for high end amphibious ships at the Marine Corps holds less value than spreading that same money around on a greater capacity although reduced forcible entry capability. If we truly examine the way the Marine Corps is evolving in the 21st century, those 12 LHA/LHDs are a lot more important to the future battlefield than the ability to heavily lift a company of main battle tanks with LSDs during an amphibious assault.

At minimum, I'd like to see someone challenging the Marine Corps on the LSD(X) as a full amphibious platform instead of as a less expensive alternative that could be produced in multiple versions and greater numbers. The Marine Corps of 2013 is focused on preserving forcible entry, but I'd like to see more emphasis placed on expanding global capacity, particularly as it relates to more permissive environments around Africa where the nation has found itself needing Marines that can't be there because they don't have enough big, expensive amphibious ships to cover COCOM demand.

There was another moment during the hearing that took place about an hour and five minutes into the hearing that I want to highlight. While the hearing that clarified, explained, and defined the Air-Sea Battle Concept specifically was a necessary and worthy exercise for Congress, the strongest takeaway for me occurred when Chairmen Randy Forbes decided to ask a prepared question:

FORBES:

The gentleman from Texas is recognized for five minutes, Mr. (inaudible). Then if the gentleman has no questions, I have just three left, as I said, I deferred them until the end of -- the first one is since we understand that the Secretary of Defense released the Defense Strategic Guidance in January 2012, but as yet, an actual defense strategy has not been released, how is the department designing and executing operational concepts such as AirSea Battle in the absence of an actual defense strategy, in other words what defense strategy is the joint staff combatant commanders and service is using has the baseline to design operational concepts such as AirSea Battle?

And if a defense strategy does exist in your view, can you describe it for us and what formal document articulates it for the public?

FOGGO:

Sir. Go ahead, if you like, Mike (ph).

STOUGH:

So I just can say from the joint perspective -- for the view of the joint staff at this point, really, the focal point is far when you talk about force development activities which is really -- I think what we're talking about here. It is the defense strategic guidance. It is the 10 missions that are laid out there.

For example, we're talking about here the mission to defeat the Anti-Access Area Denial Challenge, to be able to address that and, but that's a precursor, if you will, or it's a foundational to all the other missions that we would be able to accomplish.

FORBES:

General, is it your thought that that guidance and -- how many pages was that guidance? Eleven?

STOUGH:

I think -- yes, sir.

FORBES:

At 11 pages that that guidance was in fact are now, are National Defense Strategy?

STOUGH:

No, sir. I mean, no -- that -- I think the strategy you said that's published is probably 2012 is the last strategy that's published.

FORBES:

OK. So we had a strategy in 2011, but the guidance has basically changed that strategy, has it not or -- I'm just asking. I'm not ...

STOUGH:

That's a good question. I can't say it's fundamentally changed the strategy because the missions that it -- has outlined...

FORBES:

And maybe you can take that for the record. We don't want to put you on the spot. But one of the things we're wrestling with now is what's our strategy, you know, what -- we don't want to have a strategy that developments -- that develops based on our procurement policy.

We would prefer to have a strategy that we're doing our procurement after that, but at least for most of us sitting up here, we've had a rough time getting our arms around that or getting someone that can answer that for us, and I don't think we want to -- we feel comfortable relying on an 11 page guidance and saying that's our strategy. So if you guys would confer at some point in time and get back to us for the record on that, I think all of us would appreciate that.

When a Congressman asks four Generals and an Admiral what formal document articulates the military strategy for the public, and all five of the military leaders fail to articulate the military strategy for the public...

That's not good. In no way is the answer to the question Forbes is asking good enough. At the time it sounded humiliating, but it should have been a humbling experience for those military leaders.

In a world where military strategy matters, which should include the Air-Sea Battle shop one would think, the answer given in testimony should be embarrassing for the DoD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, all the service Chiefs, and the Secretary of Defense. There is no other way to put it, that moment in the hearing Thursday is a reflection point in history that can and will be recited again and again in the future until such a time the question can be answered in front of Congress.

And for Congress - both the House and the Senate, this sad state of affairs regarding the absence of a military strategy that guides activities of the DoD is the result of Goldwater-Nichols. YOU Senator, and YOU Congressman, enabled this deficiency in strategic thinking, and it is up to you guys to fix it.

Overall, this was an informative hearing worth watching in the archived video if you missed it.

* I was unable to find an official online biography for Major General Gary H. Cheek, and considering the historic animosity for Air-Sea Battle by the US Army, I found that both ironic and amusing.

Navy is Thinking Outside the Box on LX(R)

Found this from January 16, 2013. Very interesting.

The Navy is interested in concepts for improving future amphibious ship affordability while still retaining warship capabilities. One approach towards this goal might be to use commercial design and build practice for as much of the ship as possible, and apply military standards only where necessary to achieve specific performance requirements. The Navy would like Industry perspectives on potential benefits and challenges to implementing such a concept. Specifically, the Navy requests information on:

o The feasibility and cost of building a Navy ship to commercial standards (as opposed to military standards), classed by ABS to Steel Vessel Rules (www.eagle.org), with the following capacities:

o 20,000 ft2 (1,860 m2) vehicle stowage space, with access to both well and weather decks, and with at least 13.5 ft (4.1 m) clear overhead

o Well deck capable of embarking either two Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) or one Landing Craft Utility (LCU)

o Troop berthing for 400

o 20,000 ft3 (570m3) magazine capable of stowing all types of USMC ammunition

o NAVAIR certified flight deck with two land/launch spots for MH-53E or MV-22 aircraft

o The feasibility and cost of imposing the following additional design requirements on the above concept:

o US Navy crew (approximately 350), with Navy standard damage control lockers & equipment

o US Navy combatant damaged stability standards

o Longitudinal bending moment dictated by Navy rather than being derived from seaway loads or ABS rules

o Grade A shock qualified emergency take-home auxiliary propulsion system

o Grade A shock qualified command and control spaces for government furnished electronic systems

o Segregated Grade A shock qualified Navy standard electrical, cooling water, and other distributive systems to service take-home auxiliary propulsion and other vital systems.

For the purpose of this RFI, assume that half of distributive system loads are to vital systems.

o US Navy firefighting systems

o The practicality of implementing a mixed commercial and military standards ship by designating certain compartments as reserved for military standard equipment, with the shipbuilder free to outfit all other compartments in the most cost effective manner that satisfies ABS Steel Vessel Rules.

o Labor and material breakdowns for any ship costs estimates.

o Explanations for how specific potential future amphibious ship requirements would affect costs.

o Contractual, specification, or other issues that might impact a mixed commercial and military standards ship program.

o Other ideas or suggestions for future amphibious ship affordability such as acquisition strategies, innovative total ship solutions, technology advancements, or design and construction concepts/methodologies.

It is desirable that data be received with unlimited rights to the Government.

Nevertheless, we recognize that proprietary data may be included with the information provided. If so, clearly mark such proprietary information and clearly separate it from the unrestricted information as an addendum.

I've highlighted the pieces I think are highly relevant here. The money for LX(R) is not going to change. It is $1.3 billion. If your budget is finite, as it is for this program, how can the Navy maneuver within a fixed budget?

Well, if I am reading this solicitation for information correctly, one way would be to trade some of the survivability of the ship for more survivability on shore. By that I mean it looks like someone is looking into what it might mean if some areas of the ship were built to a commercial (I read as below NVR) specification as a way of saving money and using those savings to add more options to the capability of the vessel in support of LX(R) features that help meet more aspects of the requirements stated by all parties.

This is a clever solicitation designed to encourage clever ideas.

The Sense of Congress on Amphibious Ships

Proposed MLP and AFSB option for LSD(X)

Normally when a defense budget is passed, I can't wait to dig through it and highlight all the important details. This time, with no associated appropriations bill (or plan) coming anytime soon, it would be a waste of time to suggest anything in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Act is worth discussing, because it is worthless until the elected folks in Washington, DC get their budget priorities sorted out.

There is one section in the bill that I do want to highlight though. This reads like something inserted by a lobbyist, and it doesn't belong in my opinion.

SEC. 131. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS LIFT AND PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS.

a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1. The Marine Corps is a combat force that leverages maneuver from the sea as a force multiplier allowing for a variety of operational tasks ranging from major combat operations to humanitarian assistance.
2. The Marine Corps is unique in that, while embarked upon naval vessels, they bring all the logistic support necessary for the full range of military operations and, operating ‘‘from the sea’’, they require no third-party host nation permission to conduct military operations.
3. The Navy has a requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships to meet this full range of military operations.
4. Due only to fiscal constraints, that requirement of 38 vessels was reduced to 33 vessels, which adds military risk to future operations.
5. The Navy has been unable to meet even the minimal requirement of 30 operationally available vessels and has submitted a shipbuilding and ship retirement plan to Congress that will reduce the force to 28 vessels.
6. Experience has shown that early engineering and design of naval vessels has significantly reduced the acquisition costs and life-cycle costs of those vessels.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

1. the Department of Defense should carefully evaluate the maritime force structure necessary to execute demand for forces by the commanders of the combatant commands;
2. the Navy should carefully evaluate amphibious lift capabilities to meet current and projected requirements;
3. the Navy should consider prioritization of investment in and procurement of the next generation of amphibious assault ships as a component of the balanced battle force;
4. the next generation amphibious assault ships should maintain survivability protection;
5. operation and maintenance requirements analysis, as well as the potential to leverage a common hull form design, should be considered to reduce total ownership cost and acquisition cost; and
6. maintaining a robust amphibious ship building industrial base is vital for the future of the national security of the United States.

To me this looks a lot like some Marine Corps General and his industry buddies throwing their weight around via Congress to try an influence the Analysis of Alternatives taking place regarding the LSD(X). Congress should not be trying to influence the decision unless they are ready to pony up the big bucks for what they are basically calling for - which to me sounds like more LPD-17s.


From what I understand, LSD(X) will be a design to cost ship. The recurring cost (ship 3 and beyond) is pegged to be about $1.2 billion in the shipbuilding budget. That makes the LPD-17 hull a nonstarter without a significant increase in cash from Congress.

The Marines face several challenges in dealing with amphibious requirements, but two stand out as important challenges that must be addressed. The first challenge is that the lift footprint of the amphibious MEB is growing, and the second challenge is that the MPS squadron only carries about 70% of the MEB's equipment. With limited funding and only one platform in the shipbuilding plan able to address these issues - the LSD(X) - folks are either going to have to get creative to solve these challenges, or accept that the challenges will not be solved.

The LSD(X) is a choice between 4 alternatives.

The first choice is a new build, best possible lift vessel for $1.2 billion recurring. I have no idea what design that would be, but if we are being honest it almost certainly wouldn't be anything similar to a current LSD if it is going to meet the stated requirements.

The second choice is for a LPD-17 mod, best possible for $1.2 billion recurring. I do not believe that is possible, but I'm sure there is a shipbuilding guru who other Marines call "General" willing and ready to convince a gullible politician it is possible. Experts I have spoken to in NAVSEA say it's not possible, and I'll trust their expertise and opinion over any Marine General when it comes to shipbuilding.

The third choice is to use a foreign design brought up to NVR standard at a cost of no more than $1.2 billion recurring with the third ship. The design that is specifically highlighted with this option is the French Mistral class. The ships would be built at a US shipyard. There is not a consensus whether these ships can be built in a US shipyard for $1.2 billion recurring.

The fourth option is to build two ships - a MLP and an AFSB - and use the combination of both ships to replace the single LSD. The idea is for the AFSB vessel to cover both the lift for amphibious groups and carry residual lift for the MPS MEB while MLP serves as a well deck surrogate. What is important to understand here is that the AFSB design would actually be a non-mil spec LPH with a limited hanger capacity, but it gives the option for that vessel to carry forward the helicopters in an ARG while the LHA/LHD operates 20 JSFs. Neither the MLP or AFSB would be a gray hull though, which is a major reason why old school Marine Generals who have been doing amphibious assaults for 30 years (cough!) hate the idea.

When I read Section 131 of the 2013 National Defense Act, what I read as "Sense of Congress" actually represents the traditionalists mindset on amphibious capability and their Gulf coast lobby buddies.

But the bottom line is this. The fourth option is the only option that will actually meet the capacity requirements for amphibious lift and the MPS, but I fully expect the United States Marine Corps to outright reject the very suggestion of any option away from the traditional 3 ship ARG. The third option for a foreign design will be rejected solely because it is a foreign design, even though the logic of that escapes me completely when the ships are being built in US shipyards. A new design is possible but unlikely, and until we see more in-house design expertise in NAVSEA I can't say that is necessarily a bad thing.

So ultimately I fully expect the final choice for the LSD(X) to be a LPD-17 mod that the Navy budget cannot afford, and in the end I suspect the Marine Corps will end up with about 8 LSD(X) because that is all they can afford.

But if it was me, I would go for the MLP + AFSB concept. I believe it carries with it the highest risk, but I also believe it would give the Marine Corps the most flexibility when it comes to operations at sea. In my opinion it is much easier for the USMC to remain a relevant national defense asset when they are operating from more ships than when they are operating from fewer ships, and the MLP + AFSB option puts Marines on well over 40 vessels that deploy frequently, vs less than 30 possible vessels that deploy less frequently when one picks the quality LPD-17 mod option.

The Expeditionary... Army

The cold war is over and the wars in southwest Asia are ending, so the Army is making moves as it prepares for the future. The New York Times has a few of the details.

Plans call for the brigade-size stock of armored fighting vehicles now stored in Europe to be brought home, although other infantry and support equipment would remain. A primary mission for the gear to be stored in Europe would be to supply multilateral training exercises among American and allied troops.

The Army wants to locate sets of equipment that could be pulled from storage for multilateral training exercises and other contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, most likely aboard ships and perhaps in Australia, officials say. Other Army storage sites around the world may see an increase in gear designed for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The Army emptied many of its overseas weapons warehouses to fight the wars of the past decade and is using the end of combat in Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan to analyze where the gear — officially called Army prepositioned stocks — should be located, and exactly what types of equipment should be included to carry out the shifting Army mission. 

This is noteworthy.

The Army is planning for a significant portion of the prepositioned stocks to be afloat, an effort that would include eight ships. Two vessels would be dedicated to munitions, with one assigned to the Pacific and one to the Middle East.

The other six ships, which could be sailed to conflict zones as required, would carry equipment for an infantry brigade with MRAPs, and a sustainment brigade. The vessels would carry equipment necessary for transforming a commercial port into a dock that could load and unload military equipment. 

This accounts for some wargaming as reported by other media sources that has revealed that the Army struggles to get ashore without a fully capable port.

I don't really have much to say on this because right now I am not impressed with the policies that are guiding the US Army towards the future, nor am I very impressed with the transformation plans of the US Army is executing heading into 2013. Here is the problem as I see it.

The US Army is organizing around 71 brigade combat teams and 212 support brigades by next year. 43 of those BCTs are in the active component, with the rest in the National Guard. If you look at the Pacific and the Middle East, and you accept that the long range, precision missile threat is the primary threat in both places, then one must ask what becomes a critical function of the US Army in that environment. When I ask these questions, the answer leads me towards the most important capabilities being Air Defense, Airborne, and Air Assault.

The future active duty Army is expected to be 15 Armored Brigade Combat Teams, 8 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, 10 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (light), 6 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (Airborne), and 4 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (Air Assault) for a total of 43 active duty Brigade Combat Teams. When I look at the first month of the next big war, without another nation successfully contributing significant force, only 10 of these Brigade Combat Teams are relevant in the first 60-90 days of the conflict (the 6 Airborne and 4 Air Assault) and nearly every bit of the Army's underfunded and low priority yet critical air mobility defense assets will be dedicated to those 10 brigade combat teams, and fixed locations necessary for the US Army to transit to the battle zone.

In other words, in my opinion the US Army is basically being structured to fight the next war exactly like the last war in Iraq with 15 Armored BCTs, 8 Stryker BCTs, and 10 Infantry BCTs that cannot enter the fight without counting on Saddam Hussein level of incompetence that allows for an Army buildup to occur, or more likely, a fully manned and equipped Marine Corps with enough ships to kick down the door - which for the record isn't something that will organize and happen any quicker than 60-90 days.

What strategic genius it is to pay homage to the parity of the DoD iron triangle when 75% of the standing, active duty US Army has to operate on Navy time to join the next war of significance. Tell me again why the major assets of the US Army, which will take 60-90 days to put in place under ideal conditions anyway, is in the Active Duty Army and not the Reserves? The US Army force structure organizational chart is written to insure the US Army is important to the US Army, but in general it really doesn't do anything meaningful for the nation.

When one looks at the size of an Army one needs for 21st century in both war and peace, it becomes clear the United States needs the US Army sized to at least 100 BCTs - roughly 30% larger than current plans. Yes, that means the Army will need to be bigger, and thus be more expensive to maintain, but I also think it is fairly obvious that only 25 of those BCTs are needed in the active duty force and the rest could be moved to the Reserves without any loss of options for the President of the United States in using the US Army.

The US Army reinvented itself for the war in Iraq in 2005, and reinvented itself again in 2009 in Afghanistan - and bought completely new gear both times specific to each conflict. This isn't new, the Army did the same thing in Vietnam and WWII. Relative to the Navy and Air Force, the US Army can be raised and reinvented very quickly when the money for war is provided.

However, all the money in the world isn't going to help industry invent new ships or aircraft faster, much less allow either service to reinvent themselves in the next war. For the Air Force and Navy, what you have when the conflict starts will likely be all you will have to decide conflict. This theory of naval war was true for WWII, if you believe the results of Midway decided the conflict at sea in the Pacific.

Why rant on all of this based on a news report on prepositioning forces? Because, all of these topics should be discussion points for the upcoming debate of consequence facing the DoD over the next 5-10 years - the recapitalization of the DoD following the conclusion of two wars in southwest Asia.