Some Thoughts on the Coastal Riverine Force

Even the smallest economy-of-force programs aren’t immune to Navy budget cuts and accordingly, numerous reductions to NECC force structure were submitted for POM 13. The Navy’s Riverine and Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) units make up a significant and important part of this community, and comprise the majority of the Navy’s combatant craft outside of Naval Special Warfare. Following the decommissioning of six MSRONs over the next few years, the resulting force structure will consolidate to seven combined Coastal/Riverine Squadrons (CRF) Squadrons for a total of about 4,400 active and reserve Sailors. “The primary mission of CRF is to conduct maritime security operations across all phases of military operations by defending high value assets, critical maritime infrastructure, ports and harbors both inland and on coastal waterways against enemies and when commanded conduct offensive combat operations.” As these changes are enacted, it’s worthwhile to look at where this leaner expeditionary force has come from and where it might go in the future.

A Bit of History

Fighting in inland and coastal waters has been a regular occurrence throughout the U.S. Navy’s history, with notable campaigns in North America, China, and of course, Vietnam. Following the Vietnam War, the navy’s riverine force was largely disestablished and by the 1990s, the sole capability remained in one NSW unit.  The 21st Century riverine force, assembled a few years after the Navy Staff realized that Operation Iraqi Freedom wasn’t just a ground war, now consists of three squadrons of highly trained Sailors with boats and kit sufficient to conduct their missions globally. During OIF, the RIVRONs protected the Haditha Dam and performed hundreds of combat patrols in support of ground forces along Iraqi rivers. The RIVRONs also were equipped with the RCB, a very capable troop carrying boat based on the Swedish CB-90. These boats have been recently used for coastal missions, but are not optimized for extended operations in heavier seas.



 RPBs and RCB in USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication
Specialist 2nd Class Michael R. Hinchcliffe

The arguably less well known Maritime Expeditionary Security Force originated out of the Inshore Undersea Warfare units that defended harbors and other inshore areas against Viet Cong sappers. In the 1970s, the IUW community reverted to the reserve force, added new equipment and missions such as electronic and acoustic surveillance. MIUWs and IBUs performed landward and seaward security roles for amphibious and JLOTs operations, with some units mobilized for Operation Desert Storm. Following the October 2000 attack on USS COLE, the then-called Naval Coastal Warfare community gradually shifted to a boat-centric force, added active force structure, and changed its name to MESF, to reflect the increased emphasis on anti-terrorism/force protection. Throughout the last decade,  thousands of MSRON Sailors have deployed globally to austere locations and successfully deterred new terrorist attacks on critical maritime infrastructure. They have escorted thousands of naval and civilian ships, defended dozens of different ports, and lived for months at a time on Iraq’s rusty OPLATS - all thankless, but vitally important missions.  Interestingly, the new CRF is not the first time that the Navy has combined coastal and riverine units.

On boats

The MK VI will be the newest addition to NECC’s fleet (see Chuck Hill’s post here) and provide a much needed augmentation to the smaller MESF and RIVRON craft. There is room to debate whether the MK VI will be the right vessel for coastal NECC missions. Certainly, the ability to embark a boarding team and better sea-keeping and endurance will make the MK VI a tremendously more capable platform than the MESF’s current 34’ PBs. But one the thing to keep in mind is that combatant craft are small, inexpensive relative to every other surface (and air) platform, and designed to have a short life span. Therefore, if the initial buy of six vessels doesn’t prove ideal for CRF, then OPNAV shouldn’t dwell on what amounts to rounding errors in the larger acquisition budget and move quickly to another design.

That said, it should be understood that the MK VI does not meet the requirement for a green water Cyclone PC replacement which would be more properly classified as an offshore patrol vessel or offshore support craft. The MK VI just doesn’t have the legs and payload for that mission set and requires either a near-by land base or sea-basing as seen in the above photo of well deck testing last year. Ostensibly, LCS was going to take on the offshore patrol role, along with the missions for apparently every other ship class smaller than a DDG. Time will tell how that idea works out.

Some Future Opportunities

Along with continuing to conduct NECC’s mainstay riverine, force protection, and security force assistance missions, the CRF has the opportunity to expand into new mission sets. As the combined CRF stands up next week, it’s heartening to hear one of the MESG Commodores recognize the offensive potential of these units. “Although Coastal Riverine Force will predominantly perform force protection type missions, when required it will be capable of conducting offensive operations which will enhance mission effectiveness throughout the force.”  These operations will require new equipment, training, and tactics.

Although the MK VI is not heavily armed or armored, it does appear to have a remotely operated MK 38 Mod 2 (25mm) on the bow. The Israelis have similar mounts on their fast attack craft that include coaxial Spike ER laser guided missiles (8 km range). One hopes that NAVSEA CCD is planning on installing at least an equivalent capability on the MK VI to add to CRF’s offensive punch. I recently was aboard a similar sized vessel capable of carrying 16 griffin missiles in a VLS-type launcher, so this sort of firepower not out of the question for 20-30 meter fast attack craft. Furthermore, by becoming targeting nodes in a distributed naval fires network, these small vessels could fight above their weight class.


MIUWU 114 Mobile Operations Center on Khawr Abd Allah River
Iraq, April 2003 (author’s photo)

 Similarly, the MESF’s land-based sensor detachments have the potential to improve targeting in the littorals. A primarily defensive force since COLE, MESF’s 90s-era equipment is in need of a radical facelift, with the addition of lighter and more numerous fixed, mobile, and disposable sensors. In the IUW era, the MIUWUs routinely deployed and listened to sonobuoys in support of coastal ASW.  Today, a myriad of air and sea droppable sensor packages with various combinations of EO, signals, acoustic, and METOC collection capabilities are readily available. These smaller, smarter, and cheaper sensors can rapidly disseminate their data globally via a number of means, and along with small tactical UAVs, should become a staple of the CRF.

The Navy must sustain traditional brown and green water MSO missions, but new technology will also make it possible for NECC units to become an integral component of distributed maritime operations in higher intensity warfare.

******
Thanks to Lee Wahler, a frequent commenter on ID, and other hard core boat guys for helping with ideas and research on this article.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Experimenting with Distributed Maritime Operations

Observing the lethality and effectiveness of modern distributed special operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere gives one an appreciation for the potential benefits these types of ISR-leveraged, economy of force operations may someday bring to the maritime realm. Over a series of posts, I’ve attempted to articulate this operational concept. Here are some thoughts on decentralized warfare in the littorals.  Next, a discussion on one of the ways these operations could be employed in an irregular warfare setting. And here, some ideas on how distributed firepower could enable small ships to become a force multiplier in big wars. Finally, a post arguing that adequate bandwidth at sea is critical to tie all of these concepts together.



Sea-launched RQ-7 Shadow

 The proliferation of small remotely provided vehicles is going to provide unique opportunities to test some of these operational concepts. For example, the Marine Corps and Army will soon have more than 400 RQ-7 Shadows in their inventories.  This interesting article discusses the utility of these 100lb payload class platforms to drop Shadow Hawk precision guided munitions. Yes, these platforms are small, and their lethal payloads are even smaller. Though there is significant tactical value in being able to provide very precise yet low yield munitions from a small persistent drone, that isn't the point. This platform is ideal for relatively low cost experimentation on concepts of distributed operations at sea. Following pending draw-downs of Army and Marine Corps forces in Afghanistan, these assets will be available for other tasking, and conducting a series of naval experiments on distributed operations would maximize the post-war utility of these platforms. Some of the goals of these battle exercises would be to:

• Test the ability to embark, support, and employ dozens (if not 100+) of small UAVs from large deck amphibious ships. Determine maximum sortie rates/ISR lines achievable, C2 and bandwidth requirements, manning and maintenance needs, and the best ratios of manned rotary wing to unmanned ISR/strike aircraft.  An LHA/LHD would be an ideal platform for this testing, not only due to deck and hangar space, but because of available bandwidth, staff planning/C2 spaces, and the ability to reserve some deck space for manned aircraft used to move the various ground forces involved.
• Develop concepts to support persistent armed overwatch to more lightly armed small ground units and ships and combatant craft at hundreds of miles away from the mother ship. This concept has been proven time and again on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, reducing the risks to small remotely operating troop elements and giving these elements the ability to see and sometimes engage the threat over the next ridgeline. Lightly armed vessels operating independently such as mine countermeasures, logistics ships, and yes, LCS, would benefit from having a 24x7 eye in the sky extending the ship's organic sensors, and dealing with low end threats, while allowing embarked manned helicopters to conduct higher value missions.
• Test over-the-horizon cooperative targeting and engagement between these same formations against surface and ground threats.
• Explore new lightweight payloads that would exploit the capabilities of large numbers of small persistent drones. These might include jammers, improvised expeditionary communication networks as an alternative to satellite communications, ASW sensors, and the ability to deploy remote unattended ground and ocean sensors. 
• Develop ways to employ smaller ships as forward arming, refueling, and communications relays for these aircraft. 
• Assess the ability to bring large formations of these aircraft together into cohesive swarms to defeat boat swarms in the littorals or complex insurgent attacks in an urban environment. Model the use of these massed formations of low cost UAS to penetrate air defenses and attack larger ground and surface targets. A few dozen 11 pound munitions would not sink a large naval combatant, but employed creatively they might achieve a mission kill rendering that vessel's sensors and weapons systems inoperable. Use the results of these tests to develop artificial intelligence algorithms that will reduce the manning necessary to control such a large fleet of remotely piloted aircraft. 
• Employ the above concepts with various deployed nodes of special operations forces, Marine, and NECC elements, in an effort to understand the capabilities and limitations each of these units brings to the distributed littoral fight. 
• Test all of the above concepts in electronically-challenged environments. Naysayers of network-centric warfare are quick to point out the difficulties of fighting in an environment where jamming is present. The thing about distributed operations from the sea is that since the platforms are always moving, fixing them and relocating jammers to be effective is more challenging than it would be in a static environment. Many critics have rightfully pointed out the liability that LCS speed requirements have produced to payload, range, and overall platform cost, but in an EW environment, her speed becomes an asset. Jammers have limited ranges and small more numerous platforms able to relocate faster than the enemy's jammers will be able to mitigate some of those issues.

RQ-7B with Shadow Hawk munition

Though distributed operations with small units are certainly not new in our Navy's history (Vietnam small boat ops come to mind), the proliferation of persistent armed and networked remotely piloted vehicles adds a whole new dynamic.  The concept has applicability across the spectrum of conflict, but especially in the irregular wars in which we increasingly find ourselves engaged. The upcoming few years will provide an excellent time for experimentation on operational concepts such as distributed maritime operations and the higher end AirSea Battle. The mistakes made and lessons learned will pay dividends the next time our Navy/Marine Corps is called to war.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Where Was the Sea Base?

Military Times has a six-part series of articles up on what they call The Secret War in Africa. It is a provocatively named series, and technically accurate as what the series has done to date is reveal the unknown details of previously reported but never detailed military activities in Africa - mostly Somalia. The 6th article is expected next week.

This is the 5th article in the series, and it involves a topic worth discussing here.

The U.S. operators were in trouble. Deep trouble. Along with some Ethiopian troops, a “really small” number of U.S. personnel were hunting a high-value target near the town of Bargal in Somalia’s autonomous Puntland region when they came under heavy fire that not only prevented them from killing or capturing the target but also pinned them down, according to several sources.

Running out of options on June 1, 2007, the operators called the destroyer Chafee sailing off the coast. In response, Chafee fired more than a dozen rounds from its 5-inch gun, a senior Pentagon official told Stars and Stripes (without mentioning that the mission was a desperate bid to rescue U.S. troops in Somalia). That naval gunfire — a rarity in the modern age — enabled the United States and Ethiopian troops “to break contact” and get away, a senior intelligence official said.

When I read this, I remembered this incident was reported and that I had discussed back in June of 2007; in fact I distinctly remember Jeff Schogol describing the Navy using gunfire support as "Old School."

I remember that incident because I recall thinking about how the US Navy had the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) somewhere near that region and yet was using a destroyer to support forces ashore. Now maybe in that case it was smart to use a destroyer for a little naval fire support, because as the article notes - it solved the problem.

But hindsight being what it is, I do have serious questions if the US Navy leverages the flexibility of the amphibious ships well in modern irregular warfare situations like offshore of Somalia. Does anyone honestly think it is a good idea to put a $2 billion ship like USS Chafee (DDG 90) in green water for fire support? Our destroyer force is being primarily resourced to fight sophisticated air targets, not shoot guns to shore in littorals which are always the most risky.

What a false choice current US force structure forces on warfighters for gunfire support - either send in $3 billion DDG-1000s with advanced gun systems or send in the less expensive, terribly armed 57mm hauling LCS. Honestly, where are Reapers on LHDs, because right now the only other option is to task the RW community for their capabilities.

I encourage folks to read the whole Military Times article and give it some serious thought. When I read that article, I ask myself why the US Navy and US Marine Corps spends so much money building and maintaining amphibious ships to deploy structured air-sea-land battalions if the MEUs are unable to accomplish the sustained irregular warfare missions by sea as described in that article. That situation in 2007-2009 off Somalia appears to have been crying for a Sea Base, and yet none existed. Why?

It seems to me that scenario is both the past and the future of irregular warfare in any ungoverned or weakly governed littoral nation, and if expeditionary forces (amphibious readiness groups) aren't properly configured to be relevant for the missions found in that situation - maybe Marines are no longer relevant because Marines are not organized towards the most probable mission sets.

Then again, perhaps they are organized but are poorly utilized, because using Marines for the work as described in that article would appear to require as many changes to policy as much as it does changes to doctrine.

Lots of angles for conversation here I think.

Winding Down the Year

I'm going to slow down my posting as we approach the holiday season. The reason is actually two fold. First, my wife is due to have our third child at the end of December, and I still have many things to get done before then. Second, Christmas is approaching and I am absolutely committed to finish reading all the books I have purchased and not yet read this year so I can restock via a delivery from Santa.

With the budget basically being a 90 day hanging curve-ball, I figure now is as good a time as any to step back awhile.

But I also believe now is a good time because the Navy is also winding down for the year. The USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) is on her way home while the USS George Washington (CVN 73) has wrapped up her patrol, and not likely to sustain another patrol until closer to the new year.

The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) will soon deploy, but otherwise there are few US Navy deployments I have my eye on, although there is one in particular I think everyone should be following closely.

On Sunday, January 8th the USS Bataan (LHD 5) deployment will be 291 days (41 weeks and 4 days) old. On that day the USS Bataan (LHD 5) will pass the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) as the longest big deck deployment since the Vietnam War (290 days in 2003).

Friday, January 20th the USS Bataan (LHD 5) deployment will be 303 days (43 weeks and 2 days) old. On that day the USS Bataan (MHD 5) will pass the USS Okinawa (LPH 3) as the longest amphibious ship deployment ever (302 days in 1990).

The Navy public affairs folks have informed me the USS Bataan (LHD 5) will come close but not break the record for longest deployment since WWII set by USS Midway (CV 41) at 327 days in 1973. My experience with Murphy's Law is that you never say never.

If for any reason the USS Bataan (LHD 5) finds itself in contingency mode and unable to return on schedule, the day the ship would potentially break the USS Midway (CV 41) record of 327 days in 1973 would be February 15th, 2012 - the day after Valentine's day 2012.

It is noteworthy, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) came as part of the support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, while USS Okinawa (LPH 3) happened as a result of the response to the first Gulf War. The USS Bataan (LPD 5) deployment went early in response to Libya, which we downplayed politically as only a minor military operation, and is staying late because of a legitimate lack of amphibious ships to cover rotation requirements for ARGs. If you recall, the extended deployment of Bataan ARG was announced early by the Navy who because of Libya, was forced to keep the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) ARG late from August 27, 2024 through May 16, 2024 - a nearly 9 month deployment.

This is the Tipping Point. The Naval services - all three of them - are doing more with less for longer periods of time, and do not have the support necessary on Capitol Hill to sustain the requirements being driven by Presidential policy. Something has to change - either on the policy side or the resource side, but either way something has to change.

Something to think about.

The Makin Island Deployment - Another Reminder the US Needs More Amphibs

The Makin Island ARG consisting the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8), the amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18), and amphibious dock landing ship USS Pear Harbor (LSD 52) departed San Diego with Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) 5 and the 11th MEU on Tuesday. The deployment has generate a bit of news in the media with articles at DoDBuzz, Marine Times, the San Diego Union Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times. Of the various articles, the Los Angeles Times has this right - pirates should be concerned.

While ARG deployments in the Pacific are old hat for the Navy and Marine Corps, it is becoming increasingly rare to see an ARG deployed from either coast to spend any significant amount of time anywhere other than operating under CENTCOM command in the 5th fleet. I have heard many suggestions that the Makin Island ARG has been working overtime during deployment preparations training for activities specific to activities one might find around Somalia and Yemen - like piracy. If I was a pirate warlord, my advice is to take the best deal you can for ransom as soon as possible, and start looking for a new job with less associated risk.

All I'm saying is that I have noticed the US is giving the Horn of Africa a lot of attention lately, and if we are ever going to see a shift in US policy towards piracy, that policy change will arrive in the form of an ARG that added extra training specific to the piracy issue - and a new ARG just deployed to that region following rumors of intense anti-piracy training.

But while we are talking about Amphibious Ready Groups and CENTCOM, I want to point out that Makin Island hasn't done anything yet, and the real amphibious ready group story is the unfolding record breaking deployment of the Bataan ARG. If you recall, as a response to unfolding events in Libya, the Bataan ARG deployed a few weeks early on March 23, 2024 - 207 days ago (nearly 8 months ago). Lets just say she isn't coming home for Christmas, and if she isn't home by Valentines Day (a legitimate possibility) - the ships will break all records for deployment length since World War II.

Tipping Point much?

Seriously, keeping up with folks on LHD5 has been one of my most enjoyable blog related activities in 2011, and while that deployment has been very challenging for the families, I will pass on that the morale on The 5 is still very high. There are some special folks on those ships, and it's a good thing too because a deployment that will exceed 10 months like that Bataan ARG requires nothing less to be successful.

For the record, Bataan ARG represents a visible data point regarding the need for more amphibious ships. When amphibious ship deployments start breaking modern deployment length records - which WILL happen with Bataan - that means the Navy has not built enough amphibious ships. Politicians in Washington have held many hearings on the topic of dwell time for the Army, but right about now I'm thinking the Navy and Marine Corps folks who have been on ship for over a year in training and deployment are probably wondering who the hell their dwell time advocate is in Washington DC. At what point will Congress get the message that without more amphibious ships - which consistently has by percentage the highest number of days at sea annually of any surface vessel type - the nations leaders are asking way too much of the smaller, always desired but usually-overlooked-by-big-Navy amphibious force. 10 months is a long time for a battalion of Marines at sea, but because they are Marines - no one will ever hear a single complaint about it.

That doesn't mean it isn't a real problem.

The maintenance bill at the end of these very long ARG deployments isn't going to be small. Remember, Kearsarge ARG was at sea for 8+ months and now Bataan ARG will be at sea for 10+ months. I think these are important issues to keep in mind as Makin Island ARG heads to sea.

Rethinking Amphibious Assault

For USNI subscription members only (behind the paywall), this article by Noel Williams titled The Next Wave: Assault Operations for a New Era is a really interesting read. Here is a sample:

Perhaps the most promising technology area is unmanned systems. In the 2020s and beyond there will simply be no reason to place 20 Marines in a steel box and drive them through mined waters to land on an area-denied beach. An unmanned breacher vehicle (UBV), or family of unmanned systems, could clear and mark the assault lanes ahead of any manned surface movement. These UBVs could be launched from surface, subsurface, or airborne delivery means—overtly or covertly. UBVs could be given large magnetic and acoustic signatures to trigger influence mines and could be equipped with cameras, remote gun systems, plows, cutters, and/or line charges to clear beach obstacles. Additionally, it would be possible to transition the UBV to convoy reconnaissance and clearing missions once manned vehicles are ashore.

Introducing an unmanned system breaks the tyranny of the hybrid vehicle that we have found to be so costly and that inevitably results in compromises in both operating domains—afloat and ashore. Since current plans call for landing existing manned breacher vehicles roughly 30 minutes after the first amphibious tractor landing, the time frame requiring a vehicle that transitions seamlessly from sea to shore is roughly 30 minutes. If the joint force is able to achieve beach superiority for this brief period, there is no need for a hybrid vehicle at all. Introducing an unmanned initial assault wave completely eliminates the requirement.

Unmanned systems can provide improved operational capability and enhanced force-protection at significantly reduced cost. Unmanned breachers allow the introduction of ground-fighting vehicles to shore via surface-effect and displacement connectors. By thus avoiding the requirement for a hybrid vehicle, the Marine Corps can focus its limited resources on producing a new fighting vehicle optimized for operations ashore.

This combination of unmanned systems for the initial surface wave and non-hybrid wheeled fighting vehicles for ashore provides a real opportunity to lighten the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), while drawing a clear distinction between Marine Corps and heavy Army units. Additional savings might be realized by participating in a joint venture with the Army to produce a next-generation fighting vehicle (a Stryker successor) with riverine capability. The latest generation of light armored vehicle, or its commercially available equivalent, would provide operational flexibility, training, maintenance, sustainment, and affordability benefits. Determining the actual material solution should be facilitated by additional wargaming and analysis based on threat and operational-concept considerations.

If the USMC did something like this - going unmanned with their breach vehicle from the sea - that would have a trickle down impact on several things including the MPC (Marine Personnel Carrier) requirements, because the MPC would become more important as the primary mover of Marines. There are a lot of things you can do when you remove the EFV/AAAV role and replace that with an unmanned system, but it is also obvious it adds additional impacts to other areas of the USMC ground vehicle force that would require additional study.

I like this idea a lot, but need more time to consider the degree to which it impacts other things.

Whither the Flexible Force

From here.

The Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), along with the embarked 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), departed San Diego Sept. 29 to begin a MEU certification exercise (CERTEX) in preparation for an upcoming deployment.

Led by Commander, Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) 5, the Makin Island ARG consists of the Navy's newest amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8), the amphibious-transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18), and the dock-landing ship USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52).

"The success of this final stage of pre-deployment training will prove that we are now deployable worldwide in support of a wide-range of missions," said Capt. Humberto Quintanilla, PHIBRON 5 commander.

"It will take extensive Blue-Green team efforts, from all the Navy and Marine Corps ranks, to make this event a success," said Quintanilla. "I am confident that our combat skills honed during previous ARG-MEU integrated training events will deliver the levels of expertise and operational art required to master the unforeseen and blind missions that will be thrown at us during CERTEX. It's time to line up and snap the ball."

Quintanilla said the CERTEX is expected to include the evaluation of multiple evolutions, including small boat raids; visit, board, search, and seizure training; helicopter and mechanized amphibious raids; mass casualty responses; and a non-combatant evacuation operation.

"The certification exercise is a validation of ARG-MEU capabilities by observers who will evaluate both our ability to conduct missions under real time conditions and variables beyond our control. The end product will be a finely tuned combat force ready to deploy," said Col. Michael R. Hudson, 11th MEU's commanding officer.

Hudson said the outcome of the exercise will be captured in a report and presented to the commanding general of the First Marine Expeditionary Force. If the 11th MEU's performance meets the standard, it will be certified to deploy.

"This exercise solidifies best practices and is the capstone event for the MEU before we deploy," said Hudson. "The certification process ensures that the 11th MEU will have the most up-to-date training to support the commanders we will work for overseas."

The Makin Island ARG is scheduled for a routine deployment later this year.

Commissioned in 2009, Makin Island is the Navy's newest amphibious assault ship capable of utilizing surface and air assets to move Marine forces ashore. The ship is named in honor of the daring World War II raid carried out by Marine Raider Companies A and B, Second Raider Battalion, on Japanese held Makin Island Aug. 17-18, 1942. LHD 8 is the second ship to bear the name "USS Makin Island."

I continue to watch the USS Makin Island (LHD 8) as it prepares for deployment, and I hope others are paying attention too. What looks on paper to be a normal deployment for another MEU/ARG team is, in fact, one of the troubling signs of the times for both the Navy and Marines and needs to be observed carefully for what it actually is.

On March 23, 2024 the USS Bataan (LHD 5), USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), and USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) deployed early in support of operations off Libya. Arriving in the Mediterranean Sea the ARG relieved the Kearsarge ARG off Libya on April 27th. It has already been 6 months and it is unclear when the Makin Island ARG will be deploying, but clearly they are not ready yet. It is starting to look like the Bataan ARG will be deployed at least 9 months, potentially longer.

The Kearsarge ARG, which was relieved by Bataan ARG, consisted of the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), USS Ponce (LPD 15), and USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) had been deployed 9 months from August 27, 2024 - May 16, 2011.

Bataan ARG will almost certainly be second 9-month ARG deployment in a row.

Other than the picture in the top right, you might otherwise be unaware that on September 30, 2024 USS Cleveland (LPD 7) was decommissioned, leaving the Navy with only 28 amphibious ships. The agreement between the Navy and Marine Corps is a floor of 33 amphibious ships, with the requirement actually set at 38 - meaning we are now 10 amphibious ships below requirement and already seeing the results.

A few points.

When the Navy talks about 'strategy' in the context of force structure planning, at what point do naval officers note the high demand for amphibious ships and what are they doing about the current shortage? Is it time to start asking better questions, for example, whether the LSD(X) program should be about replacing existing LSDs or if the LSD(X) program should be about adding additional hulls to the nations amphibious force to compliment existing amphibious ships rather than replacing them?

Is it time to look at the LCS program for what it is - a short run of a couple dozen ships intended to kickstart a lessons learning process in unmanned technology networks and instead of building more, the Navy should be moving money towards building capacity in larger, much more flexible amphibious ships which have greater space and significantly more options for providing mothership capacity to the US Navy force?

There is a maintenance bill for two east coast LHDs at the end of these 9+ month deployments. Are those maintenance bills properly funded? Is the professional development of sailors and officers, including promotions, aligned properly to account for the extraordinary efforts made by the people who have done more here than others have been expected to do in similar circumstances?

USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) was commissioned on December 15, 2007. The ship and crew participated in UNITAS Gold in April 2009 and PANAMAX 2009 in September 2009. The ship and crew was on deployment from January 18, 2024 - August 15, 2024 in support of operations from the Haiti earthquake to anti-piracy operations off Somalia. The ship and crew departed again on March 23, 2024 and is unlikely to return home until December of 2011. In the ships first 48 months since commissioning, the ship will have been on at least 20 months of deployments and major international exercises. It is hard to imagine the ship is going to be in good condition after being pushed this hard, and any sailors who have been on that ship since the ship was commissioned almost certainly have a stressed family situation to prove it. No other ship in the US Navy has even close to as much time on deployment or deployment training than USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), it's not even close - even for forward deployed ships.

In case you were wondering, the experts of the San Antonio class LPDs are all on one ship - USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), because it is the ship of that class that has done the most in the least amount of time, and done so at the operational tempo of deployment vs the shoreline.

The amphibious fleet of the US is in high demand because they are the most flexible ships in the US arsenal, but is seen as and is given a low priority by leaders in the US Navy with the total amphibious force now 15% below clearly articulated bare minimum size and 25% below stated requirement size. For whatever reason, both Congress and the DoD are watching the Avondale shipyard that builds amphibious ships go out of business due to lack of work.

What is the plan to address these problems, because all indications are there is no plan.

Drones, Not Helicopters Over Somalia

I was wrong and deserve to be criticized for not trusting my instincts, and also for relying on questionably sourced media reports. Helicopters over Somalia? Washington Post says it was drones.

The strike last week against senior members of al-Shabab comes amid growing concern within the U.S. government that some leaders of the Islamist group are collaborating more closely with al-Qaeda to strike targets beyond Somalia, the military official said.

The airstrike makes Somalia at least the sixth country where the United States is reportedly using drone aircraft to conduct lethal attacks, joining Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq and Yemen. And it comes as the CIA is expected to begin flying armed drones over Yemen in its hunt for al-Qaeda operatives.

Nice to see a major newspaper note we are now engaged in combat operations in six countries. The United States is now fighting two wars on the ground, Iraq and Afghanistan, and noteworthy the other four countries the United States is fighting drone wars in (Yemen, Libya, Pakistan, and Somalia) all have very long coastlines.

It is my hope that when Admiral Greenert becomes CNO, he sets goals that inspire innovation. For example, set goals like launching a Reaper off the future USS America (LHA 6). It isn't hard to predict that airpower alone in the form of drones won't solve serious problems, meaning the serious problems will only fester until some point when a nation hosting CIA drones will kick you off their property.

If the drones fly from the sea, particularly if they fly off platforms where airpower isn't the only option like a LHA/LHD, we don't have to worry about those kind of problems.

Mistrals Represent Politics and Industry, Not Military Power

By now everyone has likely heard that Russia and France have finalized the deal for the Mistral class amphibious ships. If you want to know more, I highly recommend this remarkably thorough article at Defense Industry Daily that covers just about every angle possible from the industry perspective.

As I have mentioned in the past, this deal is not a threat to US interests and the only threat that might exist to US allies is the possibility the ships could be used in a territorial dispute with Japan. With all due respect to Russia, in a territorial dispute involving conventional military power between Russia and Japan, the spirit of Admiral Togo Heihachiro will prevail in that fight every single time. The Mistrals won't be used in that way, or they will not survive. I suspect when the Mistrals are finally making a deployment, they will be used in much the same way everyone else uses large amphibious ships these days - acting as a command node for conducting soft power diplomacy missions and helping address 3rd world problems from offshore.

The deal between Russia and France is about politics and industry, and really isn't so much about military power like some politicians would like you to believe. I find myself in strong agreement with this Stratfor analysis.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov are visiting Paris to meet with French President Nicolas Sarkozy and other French government officials on June 20-21. The visit quickly follows the conclusion of an agreement between Russia and France for two French Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, worth $1.7 billion, that France has agreed to sell to Russia with the full technology transfer Moscow demanded. The ships would be built in France and delivered in 2014 and 2015, with the potential for another two to be built in Russian shipyards under French supervision.

The Russian officials’ visit is a chance to very publicly emphasize the Mistral deal, a boon for the Kremlin which wants to signal to the rest of Europe that it has a strong security relationship with France (part of its ongoing campaign to unsettle the Central Europeans and make them doubt the commitment of their West European NATO allies). It is also an opportunity to discuss several other deals the two countries are working on, covering energy, military and space technology cooperation. For France, building close ties with Russia is about ensuring that the evolving Berlin-Moscow relationship does not leave Paris unable to affect security issues on the continent.

The issue I intend to watch closely is how much Russian shipbuilder OSK will ultimately contribute and learn from the French in construction of these ships, and whether it is even possible to get a base of subcontractors stable enough to support construction of large navy vessels in Russia. All indications are if any new Mistrals are built in Russia, they would be built by the recently announced new STX shipyard being built in St. Petersburg.

The Russian shipbuilding industry can really only build two types of naval vessels - submarines and small frigates/corvettes. Exports of these types of ships to various nations sustained the industry through the really bad years following the cold war, but export orders for Russian naval vessels are drying up as most of the world is expanding domestic shipbuilding markets. Is the Mistral a program that can truly kickstart the Russian shipbuilding industry towards better quality and production techniques in the 21st century, or is this a gamble unlikely to pay off? I tend to believe it will ultimately be a small step in the right direction, and not the leap Russian political leaders hope.

Picture of the Day

I love this picture.


Here is the Navy article. Good stuff. I smell some Bold Alligator '12 planning behind the scenes here.

NECC Tests With Amphibious Ship

Building on the post yesterday, the Navy is starting to test the concept of integrating Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) with Amphibious ships, in this case Riverine.

Tuesday, the Navy tested the ability to dock and secure the RCB and the smaller riverine patrol boat in the well deck of the anchored dock landing ship Oak Hill during a proof-of-concept test held at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.

Riverine force leaders gave the demonstration a thumbs-up. If senior Navy leaders agree, the riverine force could find itself with a new post-Iraq war mission set outside the green-water arena for which it is designed, and the Navy with yet another capability for the flexible and heavily deployed amphibious force.

“I think we had a successful test today,” said Capt. Chris Halton, commander of Riverine Group 1, during a high-speed ride on an RCB from Oak Hill back to Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, where the ship and Halton’s parent command, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, are based. “We showed that one, we can do it, and two, we’ve got some stuff to work on. But the bottom line is, I think our concept is sound.”

I highly recommend reading the entire article as it covers the challenges. This was a first step in testing, and there will be lessons to learn as the article makes clear.

There are several reasons why this type of integration is important. First, once integrated it will become part of the capability requirement for future Riverine equipment. That's important, because right now Riverine mostly uses some very old equipment. Second, once the offload and onload procedures are worked out, a culture of innovations that comes from actually using these forces from an amphibious ship will begin.

I suspect we will see creativity not only from the NECC side, but also from the Amphib side with the amphibious ship COs. One thing I've noticed being around the Navy for the past several years is that amphibious ship COs tend to take more risk than their cruiser and destroyer cousins, but that's probably a product of the promotion system that tends to trend heavily towards cruiser and destroyer captains vs SWOs of amphibious ships.

It may also have to do with some amphibious ship COs being aviators instead of SWOs, and looking for ways to stand out against the backdrop of Carrier officers in the aviator community. This isn't scientific by any means, just an impression I get based on observation.

I think the Navy will find tremendous value in the integration of NECC and amphibious ships, and I actually prefer this approach to building specialized ships for NECC. However, I also think there is an opportunity for the JHSV to be used in support of Naval Special Warfare assets.

Those of you familiar with leesea in the comments may know he has quite a background in both NECC and amphibious ships, and he has been pointing out for years how the JHSV, while not perfect, has the utility to provide the NECC with an afloat offshore staging base capable of fast response and logistical support. I think leesea will ultimately be proven correct on this once the JHSV and NECC get teamed up.

The key distinction between the JHSV and the MLP or amphibious ships (or LCS for that matter) is that the JSHV is designed with capacity in mind, where these other platforms considered in the context of modularity are designed with capability in mind. Capability minded design approaches end up leading to trade offs and sacrifices that ultimately reduce flexibility and add cost, but I will agree there are positives in the capabilities built into the design spec (sea state operational parameters and survivability are often cited examples). As the Navy ventures further down the road into modular vessels, I believe it is going to be important for NAVSEA to think about modular platforms in the context of capacity during initial design rather than capability, a subtle but important change early in new vessel concept design and development.

After all, the CVN is a great example where the Navy has long designed the platform with capacity in mind, instead of capability. That approach has been a winning design methodology, and if you look at the evolution of aircraft carriers you will note that the evolutions comes from systems capabilities added to improve upon the base large capacity platform which over time, gives the Navy the best of both capacity and capability on a Navy ship.

I am very excited to see the Navy testing Navy Expeditionary Combat Command integration with the surface fleet, and I truly believe good things will come from this. We will all know the Navy is really making progress with these concepts when we start seeing Marines involved and integrating into this mix of capabilities, although I also believe there is a real opportunity to get a Navy SOF RW unit up and running in support of these integrated capabilities as something like a Navy version of the Army's 160 SOAR (A), or put in a Navy context - the Top Gun of the RW side of aviation.

(this post was updated because the author screwed it up)

General Ham Nods Towards the Marines

Libya is the most predictable real world wargame ever observed in real time. There is no way General Ham would say this unless it has been discussed with the President and Secretary of Defense.

The use of an international ground force is a possible plan to bolster the Libyan rebels, Ham said at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

Asked whether the U.S. would provide troops, Ham said, "I suspect there might be some consideration of that. My personal view at this point would be that that's probably not the ideal circumstance, again for the regional reaction that having American boots on the ground would entail."

President Barack Obama has said repeatedly there will be no U.S. troops on the ground in Libya, although there are reports of small CIA teams in the country.

Pressed by Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., about the situation in Libya, Ham agreed that a stalemate "is now more likely" since NATO took command.

I stand by the analysis I wrote on March 22nd, as virtually everything I said then has come about. The only thing I have not seen yet that I kind of expected to see by now is the US media asking questions like, "where the hell is Cameron or Sarkozy?" It is a true lack of respect for Europe how almost everyone interviewed on cable TV describes the European military capabilities as the punchline of a joke.

I honestly would have expected the US to be pushing the media to ask questions about the European efforts for success in Libya as a way to deflect the attention away from the questions asking about what the US is or is not doing. I'm not sure why the Obama administration isn't doing that yet, but maybe it's not time yet.

If things continue to go to hell, and if tough questions don't start getting asked of Cameron or Sarkozy, Obama will take political criticism (unfairly btw). The rebels are a rag tag group of untrained, unprofessional, uneducated dudes with guns that have no chance of defeating military forces of Gaddafi. Without troops on the ground, NATO airpower will continue to be ineffective.

I am OK with that, but I am probably in the minority. As much as I hope the United States continues to do no more than what we are currently doing, I doubt Obama will keep the US on the sidelines if things continue to deteriorate.

For the record, the Bataan ARG is about 10 days out if they have been cruising at 12 knots. As I have written previously this may move towards a Marine amphibious raid scenario, because right now amphibious raids (quick shore assault, attack, and withdraw) are the precise military capability necessary to deal with the specific problems we see in places like Misrata.

And yes, I'll say it, the EFV sure would be useful in the type of amphibious raid scenario we see in Libya where we do not want under any circumstances to have US Marines on land for longer than a single day at a time. The ability to rapidly move a Marine Rifle Company to shore from sea at sunset, roll into the city, blow up enemy equipment in an urban environment (hiding by a hospital, for example), hit a FARP, attack another couple targets, then pull back out to sea before daylight... EFV sure would be useful. I am not convinced the AAVs can do that, and if you send M1A1s and LAVs, you are staying longer than a single night because you can't get them on and off the shore fast enough.

Operation Tomodachi: Following USS Tortuga (LSD 46)

This story continues to interest me. USS Tortuga Loads Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Vehicles By Task Force 76 Public Affairs.

Sailors aboard USS Tortuga (LSD 46) and soldiers from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Northern Army loaded vehicles and trailers pierside in Tomakomai Ko, March 15, in support of earthquake and tsunami relief efforts.

Tortuga’s crew loaded 13 jeeps, 10 utility trailers, six water trailers and three humvees via crane onto the flight deck and additional equipment via landing craft into the well deck, totaling 90 vehicles and 300 JGSDF soldiers.

"This is an extraordinary opportunity for us. Seeing these vehicles on our ship really demonstrates the bonds between the U.S. and Japan," said Cmdr. Adrian Ragland, commanding officer of Tortuga.

Tortuga’s visit to Tomakomai Ko, though brief, marks the first time a Navy ship has ever pulled into the port. After the ships brief stay, Tortuga will offload the equipment in Ominato, which will be used to transfer supplies, personnel and water to areas affected by the earthquake and tsunami in northern Honshu in support of Operation Tomodachi.

US amphibious ships have conducted exercises for years with the men and material of other nations embarked on our ships, but I am curious... is this the first time it has been done during a real operation? I really don't know, I keep thinking it has happened in other humanitarian operations before, but I am not sure.

Can anyone educate us?

US Navy Surging Vessels for Mediterranean Operations- Updated

The United States Navy has moved up the deployment of the Bataan ARG.

There's word Thursday that the USS Bataan, homeported in Norfolk, will head out on deployment later this month.

Navy officials tell WVEC.com that the Bataan is surging to replace the Kearsarge, as part of a contingency operation.

The surge is designed to give the president flexibility regarding the recent uprising in Northern Africa and in the Middle East.

There's no word on the exact time of the deployment or for how long it will last.

There are several things here.

The Kearsarge had unloaded Marines into Afghanistan, and while the ship has been reinforced with additional Marines, the Bataan ARG will represent a fully prepared MEU for operations in that theater, if called upon. If the Bataan is being called to the Med, as reported, that would suggest the Boxer ARG recently deployed from California would be sent to the 5th fleet to meet the presence requirements for Marines in that theater.

The Bataan ARG was planned to deploy later this year, but this deployment is a surge because the deployment date has been moved up in response to recent events in Northern Africa.

This deployment represents an increase in presence requirements for the 6th fleet. Once again, the operational tempo of the US Navy is being increased. The continuous and nearly annual increases in operational tempo and requirements demand by the US Navy - whether it is for HA/DR, contingency planning like North Africa, or Ballistic Missile Defense - needs to be noted as there has been no subsequent increase in funding towards the construction of Navy vessels to account for the demand increases.

Another question. There are two serious events taking place worldwide right now, in North Africa/Middle East with the protests and in Japan. When there are wartime challenges, the President is known to ask "Where are the Carriers?" When there are challenges short of war, the question is "Where are the Amphibs?" As the requirement creep continues to increase for operations other than war, the question is whether the minimal number of 33 amphibious ships the current plan budgets for is enough. It would appear 33 is not enough.

Update: Aviation Week is reporting that F-22s of the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, Va. are quietly bring readied for deployment just in case they are called upon for a Libyan no-fly zone.

Bold Alligator 2012 (BA 12)

Admiral Harvey is suggesting folks read up on their history.

FM COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA//N00//
TO ALFLTFORCOM

BT

UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR COMMANDERS, COMMANDING OFFICERS, OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND COMMAND MASTER CHIEFS FROM ADM HARVEY

SECINFO/-/-//MSGID/GENADMIN/COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA/N00/MAR//SUBJ/AMPHIBIOUS AND EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS READING PROGRAM//GENTEXT/REMARKS/

1. A LARGE-SCALE OPERATION TO EXERCISE THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS' ABILITY TO CONDUCT PROMPT AND SUSTAINED AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS FROM THE SEA, A FUNDAMENTAL CORE COMPETENCY FOR US, HAS NOT OCCURRED IN THE LAST TEN YEARS BECAUSE OF OUR FOCUS ON OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CORE COMPETENCY NOR THE FACT THAT THIS COMPETENCY IS AND ALWAYS WILL BE A UNIQUE CAPABILITY DELIVERED BY THE NAVY/MARINE CORPS TEAM.

2. TO THAT END, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT EXERCISE BOLD ALLIGATOR SERVE AS OUR PRIMARY OPERATIONAL ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE FOR THIS YEAR TO CULMINATE IN BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 (BA 12), WHICH WILL BE THE LARGEST PAGE 02 RUCBCLF0050 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR COMMANDERS, COMMANDING OFFICE AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE CONDUCTED BY THE FLEET IN THE LAST TEN YEARS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS EXERCISE IS TO REVISIT NAVY/MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES AND REINVIGORATE OUR CULTURE OF CONDUCTING COMBINED NAVY/MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS FROM THE SEA. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT BA 12 WILL BE A MAJOR FLEET EXERCISE, NOT SIMPLY ANOTHER ARG/MEU EVENT.

3. AS WE BEGIN PLANNING FOR BA 12, IT IS APPARENT TO ME THAT OUR COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, WHICH CERTAINLY INCLUDES MY KNOWLEDGE, OF AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS HAS ERODED OVER TIME. TO ENSURE I AM FULLY READY FOR BA 12, I HAVE ESTABLISHED A PERSONAL READING PROGRAM THAT I ENCOURAGE YOU TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AS WELL FOR YOUR OWN BENEFIT AND THAT OF YOUR UNIT. THIS READING LIST IS VOLUNTARY, AND WILL NOT BE MADE MANDATORY, BUT I TRULY BELIEVE IT CAN FORM THE BASIS OF A STRONG PROFESSIONAL READING PROGRAM, REGARDLESS OF THE LEVEL OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN BA 12. MY READING PROGRAM CONTAINS FOUR BOOKS THAT CAN BE READ WITHIN A YEAR WITH ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDED READINGS FOCUSED ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE DOCTRINE AND TACTICS.

3.A. CORE LIST: CURRENT DOCTRINE AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN A MODERN ENVIRONMENT

3.A.1. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-02 (JP 3-02) AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (10 AUG 2024) JP 3-02 IS THE CURRENT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. THIS DOCTRINE PROVIDES THE FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR READING SUBSEQUENT BOOKS ON AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND THEIR HISTORY. READERS SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

3.A.1.A. ASK YOURSELF HOW YOUR UNIT, COMMAND OR SPECIALTY FITS INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MARITIME INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS? HOW WOULD AN AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE TIE INTO A CARRIER STRIKE GROUP AND EXECUTE COMPOSITE WARFARE?
3.A.1.B. READ WITH AN EYE TOWARDS HOW THIS DOCTRINE FITS IN WITH OVERALL JFMCC/FLEET DOCTRINE AS CONTAINED IN JP 3-32 COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS AND NWP 3-32 MARITIME OPERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR.

3.A.2. THE 1982 FALKLANDS CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA FEATURED AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION CARRIED OUT BY A MODERN MARITIME FORCE UNDER A SIGNIFICANT THREAT FROM CONVENTIONAL AIR-DELIVERED ORDNANCE WITHOUT AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE AOA. WHILE TECHNOLOGY HAS ADVANCED SINCE 1982, MANY OF THE WARFIGHTING ISSUES WE FACE TODAY ARE SIMILIAR IN NATURE TO WHAT THE UK FORCES FACED WHILE PROJECTING FORCES ASHORE AT THE END OF A LONG AND COMPLEX LOGISTICAL PIPELINE IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT. BELOW ARE MEMOIRS BY THE THREE CRITICAL UK MARITIME COMMANDERS IN THIS CONFLICT - READ THESE THREE BOOKS AND COMPARE THE PERSPECTIVES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM EACH. ADDITIONALLY, READ WITH AN EYE TOWARDS HOW A U.S. MARITIME FORCE WOULD ORGANIZE AND OPERATE AGAINST AN UPDATED THREAT THAT WAS AS RELATIVELY DANGEROUS TO OUR FORCE AS THE ARGENTINEANS WERE TO THE BRITISH IN 1982.

3.A.2.A. WOODWARD, SANDY. ONE HUNDRED DAYS: THE MEMOIRS OF THE FALKLANDS BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER.
3.A.2.B. CLAPP, MICHAEL, AND SOUTHBY-TAYLOUR, EWEN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT FALKLANDS: THE BATTLE OF SAN CARLOS WATER
3.A.2.C. THOMPSON, JULIAN. NO PICNIC: 3 COMMANDO BRIGADE IN THE FALKLANDS.

3.B. SECONDARY SELECTIONS: THE FOLLOWING GROUPS OF BOOKS WILL BROADEN READERS UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AREAS.

3.B.1. DIVERSE AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONS: WWII ACTUALLY SAW THE DEVELOPMENT OF THREE GENERAL MODELS FOR U.S. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: THE U.S. MARINES AND NAVY IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC; THE U.S. ARMY AND NAVY IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC; AND THE ALLIED COALITION IN EUROPE. OUR CURRENT DOCTRINE DERIVES MAINLY FROM THE USMC-USN CAMPAIGNS IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC. HOWEVER, THE U.S. ARMY CONDUCTED MORE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN WWII THAN DID THE MARINES. TOGETHER WITH THE NAVY, THE ARMY DEVELOPED APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES IN THEIR THEATERS THAT ARE NOT CAPTURED IN CURRENT DOCTRINE, BUT ARE CERTAINLY WORTH REVIEWING CLOSELY AND CONSIDERING, IN UPDATED FORM, THEIR APPLICABILITY TODAY. THE FOLLOWING BOOKS PROVIDE A GOOD BACKGROUND OF THESE UNIQUE APPROACHES TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS:

3.B.1.A. ISELY, JETER A., AND PHILIP A. CROWL. THE U.S. MARINES AND AMPHIBIOUS WAR: ITS THEORY, AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE PACIFIC.
3.B.1.B. YUNG, CHRISTOPHER D. GATORS OF NEPTUNE: NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING FOR THE NORMANDY INVASION.
3.B.1.C. BARBEY, DANIEL E., VICE ADMIRAL USN (RET). MACARTHURS AMPHIBIOUS NAVY: SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE OPERATIONS, 1943-1945.

3.B.2. THE FOLLOWING TWO BOOKS PROVIDE BASIC LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS IN THE DIFFERENT THEATERS IN WWII.

3.B.2.A. ROTTMAN, GORDON L. U.S. WORLD WAR II AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS: MEDITERRANEAN & EUROPEAN THEATERS.
3.B.2.B. ROTTMAN, GORDON L. U.S. WORLD WAR II AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS: ARMY & MARINE CORPS, PACIFIC THEATER.

3.B.3. ANALYZING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: THE FOLLOWING BOOKS PROVIDE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, USING BROAD SETS OF CASE STUDIES TO DERIVE THEIR CONCLUSIONS.

3.B.3.A. EVANS, MICHAEL. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: THE PROJECTION OF SEA POWER ASHORE.
3.B.3.B. GATCHEL, THEODORE L. AT THE WATER'S EDGE: DEFENDING AGAINST THE MODERN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT.
3.B.3.C. GATCHEL, THEODORE L. EAGLES AND ALLIGATORS; AN EXAMINATION OF THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCES DURING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT RESEARCH MEMORANDUM 1-97).

3.B.4. OVERVIEW HISTORIES. THE FOLLOWING BOOKS PROVIDE BROAD HISTORIES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT.

3.B.4.A. MESSINA, BARRY P. DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. JOINT AND AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE, 1898-1945. (CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, SEPT 1994).
3.B.4.B. BARTLETT, MERRILL L. ASSAULT FROM THE SEA: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE.
3.B.4.C. ALEXANDER, JOSEPH H., AND MERRILL L. BARTLETT. SEA SOLDIERS IN THE COLD WAR: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, 1945-1991.

4. UNDERSTANDING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS HISTORY, DOCTRINE, AND TACTICS IS IMPORTANT TO ALL OF US - NOT JUST TO THOSE SERVING IN AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS OR THOSE IN THE SURFACE FORCE. EFFECTIVELY EXECUTING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS INVOLVES OUR ENTIRE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TEAM. OVER THE COMING YEAR, I ENCOURAGE YOU TO READ, TO THINK ABOUT WHAT YOU READ AND THEN TO APPLY WHAT YOU'VE LEARNED TO THE TASK AT HAND AS WE PREPARE FOR AND EXECUTE BA 12.

5. ADMIRAL J. C. HARVEY JR., COMMANDER, U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND
SENDS.//

I have included links to all of the selections I was able to locate online.

I ordered a few of the selections here to jump start myself into the reading program. I think there might be an opportunity to take a historical view of amphibious assault in the online space in conjunction with the efforts being taken inside the services. Maybe the Small Wars Journal or ChicagoBoyz have some ideas on how social media might engage this conversation leading towards Bold Alligator 2012.

If anyone has any suggestions, leave a comment. In the meantime, plenty of good material here to read.

Remember When the Navy/Marine Corps Did NEO?

Remember when naval forces could conduct non-combat evacuation operations of American civilians in trouble? I do too, which is why I am very curious why after many weeks of governments falling on the North African coastline the US Navy doesn't have any ships in the region capable of making it happen. Instead we get stuff like this.

"As always, the safety and well-being of Americans has to be our highest priority," she said. Clinton didn't mention Gadhafi by name.

State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said 35 U.S. Embassy personnel and families, who were ordered to leave Libya on Monday, haven't yet been able to depart. "The fact is today we were not able to move any of our personnel out of the country," he said.

The State Department said late Tuesday that it had chartered a ferry for U.S. citizens wanting to leave Libya that would depart from Tripoli on Wednesday to the islands of Malta, across the Mediterranean Sea.

So who is responsible for making sure the Navy is prepared for these type of operations when unrest is now into its seventh week in the region? Admiral Stavridis, Admiral Locklear, Vice Admiral Harris, or Rear Admiral Wary? Did any of these folks request a ship and get denied?

After seven weeks without a single ship surged, I am starting to wonder if the problems related to the San Antonio class has prevented the Navy from surging an amphibious ship to the Mediterranean Sea. I get it that the Kearsarge ARG might be in a holding pattern near 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain due to the tensions in that region right now, but is the Navy so short on Amphibious ships that despite the last month and a half of protests in North African coastal nations we lack the ability to get an amphibious ship from Norfolk to the Med?

The JHSV sure would be handy right about now. For that matter, if LCS-2 was actually operating as designed, she could move the 300 folks in Tripoli to Malta without any trouble.

Change Is Always Hard

Timeless wisdom.

It is evident, also, that we must not too lightly assume the methods of former days, however admirably they may have been adapted to the ends then in view, as mere precedents, to be followed unquestioningly in our modern practice. We can only safely reason upon the experiences of the past when we have penetrated to, and laid firm hold upon, the principle, or principles, which received recognition and interpretation in our predecessors' methods. When the latter have stood the searching criticism of experience and analysis, we can confidently assert that they were a valid application, under the conditions of one age, of principles that are probably true at all times, and which we may hope to detect by patient study. But when we have correctly stated the principles, it by no means necessarily follows that the application of them will be the same, or superficially even much like those of previous generations.

There is another caution which I think may wisely be observed, namely, not to assume too easily that our forefathers hit upon methods absolutely certain of success in practice—not liable at times to failure. There are few, if any, characteristics of the utterances which I from time to time hear, or read, on the subject of actual warfare, which impress me more strongly than the constantly recurring tendency to reject any solution of a problem which does not wholly eliminate the element of doubt, of uncertainty, or risk. Instead of frankly recognizing that almost all warlike undertakings present at best but a choice of difficulties that absolute certainty is unattainable—that the "art" consists, not in stacking the cards, but, as Napoleon phrased it, in getting the most of the chances on your side—that some risk, not merely of death but of failure, must be undergone—instead of this, people wish so to arrange their programme as to have a perfectly sure thing of it; and when some critic points out, as can so easily be done, that this may happen or that may happen, and it is seen undeniably that it may, then the plan stands condemned. " War," said Napoleon again, "cannot be made without running risks, and it is because my admirals have found out that it can, everything attempted by them has failed."

Blockade In Relation to Naval Strategy, By Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. Navy, Proceedings Magazine 1895

Worth thinking as we ponder the topic of this November 2010 Proceedings article Hitting the Beach in the 21st Century by Under Secretary of the Navy Robert O. Work and Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired).

I imagine both men ran into a storm of criticism when they suggested to replace "forcible entry" and "amphibious assault" with "theater entry" and "littoral maneuver."

It is, in my opinion, a good way to begin the conversation though.

The Evolution of Expeditionary

My latest column at World Politics Review is on British expeditionary capability:

The idea that wars should be fought at a distance has informed British military policy for centuries. To this end, the United Kingdom has historically structured its military forces with expeditionary capability in mind, even if other missions -- the British Army's commitment to the defense of West Germany, for example -- have at times competed for money and interest. That would seem to apply even more today, when for the United Kingdom, virtually every conceivable military conflict is an expeditionary war.

However, the defense cuts outlined in the Strategic Defense and Security Review (.pdf) threaten to undermine Britain's ability to undertake expeditionary operations. For the first time in centuries, the United Kingdom will effectively lose the ability to conduct unilateral expeditionary war.

Marine Corps Operating Concepts Released Tuesday

Where it has not been possible to set in motion initiatives to meet certain future operational needs, the Secretary has identified vectors for the evolution of the force, calling on DoD components to devote sustained efforts toward developing new concepts and capabilities to address those needs. Assessments of future operating environments will continue, with an eye toward refining our understanding of future needs. At the same time, the Department will continue to look assiduously for savings in underperforming programs and activities, divestiture, technology substitution, less-pressing mission and program areas, and other accounts so that more resources can be devoted to filling these gaps.

In some capability areas, meeting emerging challenges will call for the development of wholly new concepts of operation. Confronting sophisticated anti-access challenges and threats posed by nuclear-armed regional adversaries will pose particularly difficult problems. In recognition of the dynamism of the threat environment and advances in unmanned technologies, the Department will be examining future operational needs in several capability areas, including ISR, fighters and long-range strike aircraft, joint forcible entry, and information networks and communications. Assessments of programmed forces in these areas will center on iterative, interactive war games, in which force planners, operators, and technical experts can explore alternative strategies and operational concepts in an environment that tests forces against an intelligent, adaptive adversary. Insights gained from these efforts will inform future investments in research and development and, over time, will help decision makers to further rebalance future forces.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) pg 40-41

As I was reading through the Marine Corps Operating Concepts third edition, this section of the QDR came to mind. The Marine Corps Operating Concepts third edition document to be released publicly on Tuesday is one of the best documents I have read from a maritime service since I began the blog. If you are frustrated by the lack of specifics and generic speak that often characterizes US Navy documents like the recently released NOC, you will find the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (MOC) document a breath of fresh air. Detailed? You betcha. This document works on the Company CO's chalkboard, or PowerPoint - if you prefer.

The reason this section of the QDR came to mind is because there are still many questions about what Joint Forcible Entry means today - phrase that seems to have direct connotation for the Marine Corps. I think it is interesting that Information Dissemination author LtCol Roger S. Galbraith has been out fighting the perception war on this topic. His recent LA Times op-ed was akin to a rebuttal for the arguments against the Marines in another LA Times article. The discussion point that forcible entry amphibious assault is no longer feasible in the 21st century is becoming a popular meme, but it is also a distraction.

As the QDR stresses in the section quoted - the question isn't whether the nation needs the capability of forcible entry, rather how the capability is executed in the context of the emerging environment. When I read the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (3rd edition), I was very pleased to read that the Marines are taking seriously the necessity to tactically adapt amphibious assault as part of the requirement to retain the tactical necessity for such a capability. Forcible entry in the 1940s and 1950s may have indeed been a large scale beach amphibious assault, but that isn't what it might look like in 2010 and beyond. The Marines seem to understand this, while those outside the Marines are framing the forcible entry discussion in historically accurate but otherwise irrelevant terms within the modern context.

The Marines come out swinging early and often with a focus on two mission areas - assuring littoral access and winning small wars. If first impressions mean anything - my first impression was that the focus on these two mission areas reads like a slap in the face of the Navy who I believe is actively retreating from the littorals at flank speed, and a slap at the Army as a reminder that it is Marines who own the small wars history of the United States. The document reads as a slap to neither in truth, but the Marine brand is strong enough that the first perception existed for me nonetheless.

But as I read the document I immediately found it one of the most insightful operational concept document produced by a maritime service I can ever recall reading. I was engaged with the specific guidance towards a general direction one finds in the issues framed by the contents, and when I finished reading I came away as a reader impressed by the depth and detail. This document is instructive to every Marine, and yet informative to broader defense establishment as well - indeed one could even note how the document gives guidance directly to the defense industry without doing the program centric cheerleading we used to see in the 90s in these types of documents.

For example, when reading through the section discussing the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) I was surprised to see the comment "there may be a requirement for a light-attack platform to add to the ACE inventory" being made as a comment of speculation - the implication being a recognition that the Marines must be open to examining alternatives. How refreshing - read a Navy document and you will never find a discussion of force structure of any kind whatsoever - nevermind a discussion that includes speculation regarding alternatives.

Briefly - a few points. A good portion of the document discusses Small Wars as the core of the Corps. Leveraging the 'small wars' meme (in no small part popularized by brand names) is a pretty smart way to introduce Enhanced MAGTF operations across a broad range of missions and relate it at a generic level with the reader. The detail of size, shape, and guidance towards operational requirements and capabilities is done very well.

But what caught my attention in the document is how the Marines emphasized themselves as a critical piece of assuring littoral access across a range of access environments; permissive, uncertain, and restricted. From a detail perspective I think one could argue the Marine Corps made a better case for US Navy 'joint forcible entry' capabilities at sea and in the air than the US Navy did with their own NOC. There are several pages dedicated to discussing a range of naval capabilities from mine warfare to carrier aviation to strike from the sea - indeed there might be more words dedicated to discussing the value of the aircraft carrier in the MOC than the NOC - and I'm not kidding - the word count will be close.

The MOC does an interesting thing to the reader - or at least this reader - by raising serious questions regarding whether or not the US Navy is capable of having a blunt discussion on forcible entry. That discussion would include topics like technologies and tactics, operational requirements and force metrics necessary to achieve access. The Marines appear willing to have a public discussion on the topic; but if AirSea Battle is any indication - the Navy is not prepared for that discussion publicly.

The open communication approach of the Marines in the MOC leads directly to Annex A - which for me is a critical discussion of Strategic Communications. I believe N3/N5 would do well to copy Annex A from the MOC, change a bit of text to 'navalize' the wording, and directly insert the section into the NOC. Annex A represents the single best discussion of integrating strategic communications into operations in any military document released by any of the maritime services to date, and one of the most important sections missing from the Naval Operations Concept. I highly encourage every US Navy officer, even if they don't give a shit about the MOC, to read carefully Annex A because there is no question that section belongs in every command at sea today.

I want to stress this point. The single most important lesson we can learn from the Israeli maritime blockade of Gaza incident that occurred recently is the role that YouTube played for the Israeli Navy. Without those YouTube videos that highlighted the events from the Israeli Navy perspective, Israel was left absent context and without weapons in an information war being waged against them. With YouTube videos, Israel had ammunition in their fight. Understanding the information and communication context of every operational decision will be critical to Navy leaders who will often find themselves in very difficult situations all alone in distant seas. Annex A emphasizes the role of these communication efforts to operations, and the discussion in the MOC is useful not only to Marines, but to the Navy as well.

I'll post a link to the MOC as soon as I find one, and I encourage everyone to read it. For once, I can recommend a document produced by the maritime services that won't make your eyes bleed, because the MOC is highly informative and a lot more thought stimulating (thanks to detail and depth) than the documents I typically link to from the blog.

About Those Fixed Wing Aircraft on Bonnie Dick

Wow. Scoopdeck had part of the story when they spotted the photos, but when I asked what was going on the other day I was told to wait for the rest of the story.

I am not disappointed.

The amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), en route to participate in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2010, is carrying unique cargo for training evolutions during the international maritime exercise. Bonhomme Richard left San Diego June 14 with two Czechoslovakian-built 1964 and 1965 Aero-Vodochody airplanes, modified with U.S. standard small turbojet J60 engines. These planes will simulate air to surface missile attacks for training purposes, during RIMPAC.

Traveling aboard with the embarked aircraft is retired U.S. Navy Cmdr. Gerry Gallop, who is Chief Operating Officer for Tactical Air Support Inc. The company, that owns and operates the aircraft, provides consulting services, tactics development and test and evaluation services to U.S. THIRD Fleet.

“Our company’s main goal is to increase readiness through quality training with affordable platforms,” Gallop explained. “It adds realism and training value, because we can do a pretty-good job simulating a profile a missile would fly.”

Gallop said that he and three other retired military pilots will fly the Aero Vodochody airplanes during the RIMPAC exercise.

“We all happened to retire from the military, but we weren’t done contributing,” reflected Gallop. ”So we came together and found a way to continue doing what we are passionate about and continue to contribute to training and readiness of the U.S. military.”

Gallop said the modified Aero-Vodochody airplanes reach top speeds of approximately 420 knots or approximately 500 miles per hour. Tomahawk cruise missiles move at speeds of approximately 550 miles per hour. The ability to use the contracted aircraft in training simulations provides a more realistic and time-sensitive approach to the detection and countermeasures used to combat an inbound threat.

“They (Aero-Vodochody) are a particularly reliable, simpler airplane, which we have modified extensively to give us more power and performance,” explained Gallop. “We’re not as fast as an actual missile, but we’re pretty close.”

Big time well done to Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Katherine Barkley for the article, and indeed, the PAOs who are putting out information on RIMPAC 2010 appear to be doing a great job.

I guess I only have one question. Will they be offloaded by crane and flown from Pearl during the exercises, or will they take off and land on the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)? I know, I know... Just saying, it can't be too hard to trap a L-29, and I don't think launching would be the issue.

What I'm really trying to say is it will be a very good day when we get some fixed wing aircraft back on our big deck amphibious ships - and I'm not talking about Harriers and Joint Strike Fighters either. I might be a big fan of big carriers, but I am not oblivious to the advantages and utility smaller carriers and the benefits these type of simplistic fixed wing aircraft can provide the fleet. We don't always need a fighter jet and there are still significant advantages to having people in the loop as a compliment to unmanned systems.

I certainly believe expanding the options of available aircraft types that could fly from the big deck amphibious ships would reduce overall Naval operational costs in specific conditions and circumstances (HE/DR, IW at sea, etc), because we get the option of having more aviation globally postured forward without necessarily having to send a big deck.

Seriously, something similar to the L-29 would be very useful in today's Navy for a number of things - potentially including fixed wing ASW support btw. I wonder if you could fold the wings in a way it could be deployed forward via C-17...