Whither Patrol Coastals?

The Cyclone Class PCs have had an interesting service life beginning when the first ship (since transferred to the Philippine Navy) was launched in 1992. Consistent with history, the US Navy has been unsure how to best use these smaller vessels. Originally designed and operated for SOCOM, they proved inadequate for the task of supporting SOF, so they were transferred to the surface force in the late 1990s. Later, several of them were transferred to the Coast Guard for use primarily as counter-narcotics duty, but in another month or so, all remaining 13 PCs will be back in Navy hands.

The PCs’ mainstay mission the past decade has been protecting OPLATs in the North Arabian Gulf, but the ships have been plagued by hull cracks requiring extensive repairs in Bahrain. Previously, they performed a variety of fleet duties, including patrolling the coast of West Africa in what could be considered a predecessor to the APS. According to NAVSEA, these ships are scheduled to be in service through the mid-2020s. I find that estimate incredulous, especially in view of the above material problems and the contradictory quote of a 15 year life from another NAVSEA spokesman in the above article. Regardless, we seem to find excuses to decommission ships well before their estimated useful service lives (see SPRUANCE class for examples).

The PCs and similar sized naval vessels clearly excel at missions such as TSC and MSO. But with some creativity, they are capable of many other non-traditional operations. Consider that from an operational standpoint, the most valuable components of a multi-billion dollar nuclear submarine in an IW scenario are the sensors located on the last few feet of its periscope. Combining a UUV with these same sensors launched from a small surface mother ship provides a like surveillance capability for a fraction of the cost, saving submarines for higher-end missions. In other posts, I've mentioned the utility of small combatants combined with distributed firepower . What other roles should coastal patrol vessels play in tomorrow’s navy?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Sinking Aircraft Carriers

How would you sink the Shi Lang? The question led to quite a few comments. My answer to this question is simple - we will sink an aircraft carrier the same way we have always sank aircraft carriers.

The United States Navy has a history of sinking aircraft carriers. The following history guides suggests how the United States Navy would attack and sink aircraft carriers.

Japanese Aircraft Carriers sunk in WWII:

• Akagi - Scuttled on 5th June 1942 after taking heavy damage from US bombers at Midway.
• Kaga - Sunk on 4th June 1942 after taking heavy damage from US bombers at Midway.
• Ryujo - Sunk at the battle of the east Solomon Seas by aircraft from the USS Saratoga and USS Enterprise on the 24th of August 1942.
• Soryu - Sunk on 4th June 1942 at Midway after US bombs caused fires which reached her fuel tanks.
• Hiryu - Scuttled on 5th June 1942 after taking heavy damage from US bombs at Midway.
• Shokaku - Survived Coral Sea and Santa Cruz battles but was torpedoed and sunk on 19th June 1944 by the sub USS Cavalla.
• Zuikaku - Sunk on 25th October 1944 by US bombers in the Leyte Gulf operations.
• Hiyo - Sunk on 20th June 1944 by torpedo from US aircraft in Philippine Sea.
• Chitose - Sunk on 25th October 1944 in Leyte Gulf actions.
• Chiyoda - Sunk on 25th October 1944 in Leyte Gulf actions.
• Unryu - Sunk on 19th December 1944 by the sub USS Redfish.
• Amagi - Sunk on 24th July 1945 by US bombers.
• Taiho - Sunk on 16th June 1944 after a torpedo from the sub USS Albacore.
• Shinano - Sunk on 29th November 1944 by the sub USS Archerfish.
• Taiyo - Sunk on 18th August 1944 by torpedoes from the sub USS Rasher.
• Unyo - Sunk on 16th September 1944 by torpedoes from the sub USS Barb.
• Chuyo - Sunk on 4th December 1943 by torpedoes from the sub USS Sailfish.

In WWII, 10 aircraft carriers were sunk by aircraft while 7 aircraft carriers were sunk by submarine. In other words, the most things have changed with technology, the less things are different in naval warfare. Navies still strike from long range through the air, and still strike at short range from underwater.

And just like in WWII, the surface fleet protects the high value assets from air and sub threats, conducts littoral operations near the shore in support of operations on land, and commits to combat with other ships when required.

So has anything changed? It is very much unclear. There has been tremendous investment towards the capability of ships to defend the fleet, but no one is sure how effective this capability would be in war. The defensive capability of the surface fleet actually reflects history in WWII. As Wayne Hughes highlights in his great book Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, towards the end of WWII the number of guns combined with more effective radar on surface ships became a remarkably lethal and effective combination against attacking aircraft, including Kamikaze attacks.

That raises the question regarding the extent to which fleet defenses must be rolled back to defeat an aircraft carrier. This question does not have an answer derived from combat, so we really do not know whether quantity or quality will be the decisive factor in defending an aircraft carrier. What we do know, however, is that for offense - quantity is generally preferred.

The Cost Value of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles

From Sandra Erwin at the National Defense Magazine Blog.

In the Libya operation to enforce a no-fly zone, the Navy so far has launched 161 Tomahawk cruise missiles that, according to a senior U.S. Navy official, cost between $1.4 million and $1.5 million apiece. The Navy is so well stocked that it can fire up to 255 of these weapons a year without making a significant dent in its budget, or its capabilities to replenish supplies, said the official, who was speaking off-the-record at a private meeting. The Navy purchases 196 Tomahawks each year. In economic terms, the official said, the missiles are “sunk costs” that already have been incurred and could not be recovered.

From a military tactical standpoint, the Tomahawk is the perfect weapon to use in the initial stage of a conflict such as this one, says Eric Wertheim, military analyst and author of "Combat Fleets of the World."

“That’s where the risk is the highest” and the military wants to avoid putting airplanes in harm’s way, he says.

When million-dollar weapons were used in the past, complaints about their price tag didn’t make headlines the way they are now. That may be one reason why the Pentagon did not deploy a Navy aircraft carrier off the coast of Libya, says Wertheim. “It sends a strong message that we are not going to be dominating for the duration of this campaign and we do not want to hold the lion’s share of the burden.”

According to the Navy.mil website, a Tomahawk missile has a Unit Cost of approximately $569,000 in FY99 dollars. They are indeed "sunk costs" because of the multi-year purchase nature of the contracts that keep stores current - contracts that I have been led to believe kept costs for Tomahawks down. There is a pretty wide difference between $569,000 in FY99 dollars and between $1.4 million and $1.5 million today, in fact in FY11 dollars the difference is somewhere around $600 million a unit if my green book math is right.

Two destroyers and three submarines have put 161 Tomahawks in Libya. I'd be curious if every other nation in the coalition combined has conducted 161 strike sorties in Libya to date, because I bet the answer is no. In that context, I'd like to highlight the value of Tomahawk missiles, rather than just focus on the cost.

In my opinion, all of these discussions on Tomahawk missile costs are missing the mark if the subject is operational costs for Libya. Just wait until Congress gets the gas bill for all the tanker sorties. I'll wager any fool who wants to bet that energy costs will be a major budget discussion in defense sooner rather than later, because the gas bill for the DoD in 2011 is going to be enormous.

Navy Developing New Anti-Ship Missile

Phil Ewing has a story on Navy Times regarding a new program to develop the next anti-ship missile, which sounds a bit like a smart ramjet missile.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval Research issued a $10 million contract to defense giant Lockheed Martin on June 30 to begin work on a “Long Range Anti-Ship Missile.” If the project moves forward, the Navy could begin buying an advanced, high-speed missile that would ride in cruisers’ and destroyers’ Mk 41 Vertical Launch System tubes.

In a statement, DARPA spokeswoman Jan Walker said the goal was to develop a weapon that can think and hunt without much help from its firing ship.

I particularly enjoyed, and agree completely, with the response by Norman Friedman.

U.S. commanders became wary of ship-launched anti-ship missiles in exercises in the 1980s, during which they missed or hit neutral ships about as often as they found their targets, naval weapons expert Norman Friedman said. The weapons suffered from the classic problem of needing good information about their targets.

Friedman said he was skeptical about the prospects for DARPA and ONR’s new missile. Although sensors have gotten better in the age of unmanned aerial vehicles and higher-tech satellites, the classic target-finding problem still remains, he said.

“There are constant efforts to make hypersonic missiles — you see claims about them — but they don’t seem to go anywhere.”

Scouting, Scouting, Scouting. My favorite paragraph in Wayne P. Hughes book Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat covers the problem perfectly.

It seems pedestrian to say that scouting has always been an important constant in war. Perhaps the way to put it is this: winners have outscouted the enemy in detection, in tracking, and in targeting. At sea better scouting - more important than maneuver, as much as weapon range, and oftentimes as much as anything else - has determined who would attack not merely effectively, but who would attack decisively first.

While I have no problems with the development of a new anti-ship weapon system, particularly considering this is a weapon system that doesn't seem to get much attention in the US Navy anymore; I still say the challenge for the US Navy is improving the capabilities in scouting. I could be wrong, but I don't see any evidence that delivering firepower is a problem for any service branch of the armed forces.

But developing effective maritime domain awareness of the battlefield... I see that as a major issue emerging in the 21st century, particularly with hybrid threats emerging that look and act exactly like the normal maritime traffic seen globally every day.

The Anti-Ship Missile Gap

Anytime I read about anti-ship missiles for the US Navy, I get interested. Lets face it, nobody should be surprised when a new idea for the 25 year old Harpoon gets canceled, the Boeing missile is a great weapon against a previous generation of ships defense systems, but it is not the way ahead in the future.

Bill Sweetman is reporting Raytheon is going to introduce another previous generation anti-ship missile upgrade and sell it as the future. Hmm...

At the U.S. Navy League exhibition in Washington this month, Raytheon Missile Systems will unveil an upgrade to the BGM/UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV land-attack cruise missile that will make it a multirole weapon capable of hitting moving ships. The package has four elements: An active electronically scanned array, millimeter-wave seeker provides target acquisition and homing; a passive electronic surveillance system is for long-range acquisition and identification; the 1,000-lb. blast-fragmentation warhead is replaced by a shaped charge; and the two-way data link gets more bandwidth.

The missile is designed to kill or disable large, hardened warships in difficult environments such as littoral waters, over a greater range than Boeing’s Harpoon/Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM), the U.S. Navy’s standard antiship missile. The Raytheon warhead is twice as large as SLAM’s, and the 900-naut.-mi. range is six times greater. This is not an antipirate weapon, and it is not hard to guess which navy is the most likely target.

Sounds great, but I'm not impressed. While I like the idea of a 1000lb warhead on a ship launched anti-ship missile, lets think about this. The Tomahawk is outstanding against undefended targets, but is it really a weapon that can penetrate the defensive network of an enemy combatant force? Neither the Harpoon nor the Tomahawk have any terminal speed or maneuverability, so what exactly makes these missiles a viable option or long term solution to the anti-ship missile gap?

The lack of anti-ship missiles on the surface fleet, and honestly an effective anti-ship missile for our sub fleet as well, is a major warfighting gap that continues to be proven in analysis. How much longer will this be ignored? Will this even be a consideration in the QDR? It is bad enough the Navy spends half a billion dollars to build a ship, the LCS, that relies almost completely on a single helicopter for over the horizon firepower. It is even worse when one considers how much our large warships rely on aircraft to attack other ships with a weapon other than guns. An AEGIS ship is limited only by quantity in defeating the air force of most nations, but the best weapon these ships bring to the fight against other naval vessels is either a helicopter, or a 5" gun?

Oh that's right, the SM-2 can handle it. Nothing like a relatively tiny warhead to stop a warship. How many SM-2s would it take to sink a 5000 ton warship? I'm betting the answer is more than 10 direct hits.

Bill Sweetman's article covers a number of anti-ship missile options that will be on display, but I have to say it is pretty sad in my opinion that US contractors have not evolved their anti-ship missile options beyond the Tomahawk or Harpoon. Is a VLS launched 200nm range anti-ship missile with effective terminal capabilities really too much to ask for in the 21st century? I'm not looking for a ramjet missile, but it would be nice if we were talking about a missile that was designed after the Carter administration.

Evolution, One Revolution at a Time

Sometimes a story stands out because someone says something very smart. This is a good example.

The U.S. Navy flight-tested Raytheon Company's Standard Missile-2 target detecting device. The SM-2 Block IIIB flight marks the lowest-altitude intercept to date using the new device, which enhances the SM-2's ability to detect and destroy threats.

The missile was fired from USS STERETT (DDG-104) during combined combat system ship qualification trials. The test flights included additional SM-2 Block IIIA, SM-2 Block IIIB, and SM-2 Block III missiles. The missiles engaged multiple targets under stressing conditions representing a variety of threat scenarios.

"These tests demonstrate the reliability and accuracy of SM-2 as it continues to evolve," says Ron Shields, Raytheon Missile Systems Standard Missile program director. "The SM-2's ability to employ this new target-detecting device against challenging targets enhances the missile's usefulness to the warfighter."

zen.

Good job to the Navy for getting a good photo, love it. Would have been more interesting had they told us how low the altitude was for the intercept. Probably best they didn't.

The Navy news article on this story is really good.

"I am extremely satisfied with the gun's performance," said Sterett's Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Brian Eckerle. "It has really performed exceptionally under the taxing demand of firing 582 rounds."

In addition to direct engagement systems, Sterett's Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities were tried, as were chaff countermeasures and the SPY-1D(V) air search radar. However, the centerpiece of the CSSQT was the live firing of 7 SM-2 missiles against air and ground launched drone targets.

Test objectives for the events, in addition to certifying Baseline 7.1R for tactical use in the fleet, included operability tests of the SM-2 Block IIIB Missile, which contains an infrared (IR) seeker head assembly in the guidance section. The missile has the ability for dual mode terminal homing and can start homing on RF energy, switching to IR homing if necessary for a successful intercept.

In a true testament to the warfighting ability of Aegis Baseline 7.1R, Sterett simultaneously directed four SM-2 engagements to prosecution, and the test was an enormous success. CSSQT was highly anticipated as a critical milestone toward the development and testing of future weapons capability for the next generation of surface combatants.

This represents further evolution of existing systems, good stuff here. I am particularly pleased to read an article like this and note the use of live ammunition in training, including ASW training if you can believe it. To me, this is another example of how the Navy outside of Washington is doing really good things. If we could only fix the issues that seem centric to Washington.

Adapting to Changing Conditions

If there is one truth of the modern US Navy, it is that ships designed for any specific role will find itself conducting mission profiles for a role it was never intended. This is also the history of major combat systems in general, but can be narrowly defined to the US Navy specifically for the purposes of this discussion.

In October of 1987 the USS Leftwich (DD-984) and USS John Young (DD-973) participated with the guided missile destroyers USS Hoel (DDG-13) and USS Kidd (DDG-993) in Operation Nimble Archer. Both Sprunace class destroyers, despite the lack of adequate AAW defenses, sailed at night through the Strait of Hormuz to attack a pair of Iranian oil platforms. Using their 5" guns, the combined force put thousands of shells on both platforms before special forces were sent over to gather intelligence and destroy the platforms. After the attack, the destroyers returned the following night back through the Strait of Hormuz. This wasn't the first time the Sprunace class had fired its guns in anger, indeed ships supported Marines with naval gunfire support off Lebanon in the 80s.

In 1991 and 1999 the Spruance class was also utilized in the Gulf War and Kosovo conflict respectively. Rather than defend against enemy submarines, as originally intended, the Spruance class was instead utilized as a launch vehicle for Tomahawk cruise missiles against enemy defenses. Throughout the entire career of the warship class, despite being designed and deployed specifically for ASW, the ship never engaged and sank a single submarine.

We have seen the same thing with the evolution of AEGIS. Despite the capability to shoot down multiple targets in both air and space, the only manned aircraft AEGIS has successfully engaged in a combat situation to date is a civilian airliner. The CG-53s in particular were built for blue water AAW supremacy, and yet to date the only combat actions these vessels have seen at sea are against small boats less than 100 tons in the littoral, whether off the coast of Iran, Iraq, or Somalia. When the designers thought up the concept of the blue water AAW supremacy cruiser, I don't think they foresaw a CONOP of patrolling in protection of ABOT and KAOOT, and yet here we are today.

Accepting the reality that ships are going to perform roles they were not designed to perform, is the Navy adjusting to conditions to prepare our ships for these roles? I would argue not enough, and our battleships, first and second rate, are the best examples. So here in the question:

What needs to be done to counter the ASuW threat against our AEGIS battleships face in todays threat environment?

My thoughts. We need more small mounts. When I look at an AEGIS battleship, I don't see enough guns, and I'm talking about both crew served mounts and computer guided 30mms. To adapt to the threats in WWII, the Navy put every possible gun you could on our warships to deal with the threats those guns could counter. I do not see the same type of dedication towards defeating threats in the Navy today.

We need more small ships to screen our battleships. If one of our battleships is being swarmed by a dozen small boats, why are we putting our Captains in a position where they are required to engage with SM-2s at visual range simply because they have no other ships to screen them? Is the Littoral Combat Ship going to adopt the added role of screening our battleships in task force operations? Corvettes or Frigates, the LCS is neither. Otherwise we leave our battleships to engage at point blank range. Unacceptable. The recent Moskva incident in the Black Sea should be an unmistakable warning to the US Navy regarding the dangers of small boats in the littoral, even against inferior forces.

Unmanned technology is the future of warfare, and despite what the manual says, unmanned surface vehicles are good for only two things: They can be a glorified pair of binoculars, or they can blow stuff up with weapon payloads. Where are the fast launch capabilities for these USVs on our AEGIS ships. Are we even looking into rapid deployment capabilities? We should be.

Finally, if NETFIRES lives up to its sales billing, and it really is the solution to small boat swarms, why isn't it being built into the DDG modernization? If this system can be parachuted behind enemy lines, dropped off the back of a truck, are we seriously supposed to believe we can't find enough space on the top of a DDG-51 hull to chain one down ready to go? It never made sense that the DD-1000 was supposed to be fighting ship in the littoral and it doesn't even carry what is being labeled the primary weapon for littoral combat for the future US Navy.

The US Navy's AEGIS battleships are certainly very capable of the roles they were designed for, but when we look at the roles those platforms perform outside their intended design parameters, there is a lack of commitment towards preparing our battleships to face the threats they are most likely to face today, and by the way, have historically already faced. Failure to adjust to conditions is an unacceptable risk for our major battleships, each of which represents a major investment of national treasure.

Bottom picture caption: The battleship USS Pennsylvania leads USS Colorado, USS Louisville, USS Portland, and USS Columbia into Lingayen Gulf before the landing on Luzon, Philippines in January 1945. Battleships and other big gun naval vessels that served in the Pacific Theatre during World War II were used primarily for offshore bombardment of enemy positions and as anti-aircraft screens for aircraft carriers.

Getting Back on Course

Colin Clark is highlighting a new report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies titled Abandon Ships: The Costly Illusion of Unaffordable Transformation. Colin has some interesting commentary worth reading, and it is noteworthy we have more calls for some leadership changes in the Navy.

We have not read the report yet, but with buildup like this from Colin, looks like its a must read for the weekend.

Their analysis zeroes right in on the absence of any strategic vision for the Navy. “The problem starts at a conceptual disconnect between strategy and reality. The Navy’s ‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ is a set of concepts that was not linked to any clearly defined force plan, modernization plan, program, or budget. Navy shipbuilding plans are now shaped more as the result of budgetary constraints than as a response to strategic requirements. They seem to be an expression of wishful thinking rather than a realistic strategic guideline for naval procurement.”

It gets worse. “The Navy’s procurement policy is in serious disarray, and is creating situation where the most serious threat to the US Navy is now the US Navy.” Can you hear the Chinese admirals chuckling in the background?

With the political phase in Georgia picking up steam, we are closing the book on that topic and moving back towards a bunch of good material we have been putting off. The CSIS article will probably find its way into the discussion, as it appears to fit next weeks theme well.

We are also going to start something new next week. We are going to start publishing contributions from readers, although very limited at first as we try it out. As a blog whose readership can apparently stomach 2500 word articles, we think we offer an alternative medium for those who write articles for a naval centric audience. We see what the Small Wars Journal is doing, and have long believed something like that is needed for Navy centric discussions. Rather than waiting for someone else to facilitate it, we will open up the blog and see if the interest is there-- at least until someone comes along and does it better.

We also think that perhaps opening up the blog will give us a way to provide balance in the future to discussions like the recent DDG-1000 hearing in the House. We don't apologize for having strong opinions, but we are flexible enough to allow alternative points of view; indeed we think discussions like that deserve alternative points of view. I doubt we'll see anyone from the Navy or industry take up the offer, but you never know.

Finally, we can tip off that next week the theme takes the US Navy to war. We haven't had a theme week on naval combat in several months so we are clearly due, particularly with the Olympics in the background and the Navy’s new strategic focus. Personally speaking, I'm biting my upper lip not to comment in CDR Salamander's latest LCS post, which in my opinion, is the best post and comment thread regarding the Navy this week. Eagle1 had some thoughts to. We will definitely be building off those conversations very soon.

Sid and Ken, bring your A-Game. We have a lot of newbies in the comments lately that may need a lesson by the professionals. Should be fun.

As Similar Ideas Go Round and Round...

This exchange took place during Thursdays hearing in the House.

Rep. Jim Langevin (D-RI)
You've stated that the new DDG 51s could incorporate additional technologies, but we haven't heard a clear explanation as to what those would be.

Do your cost estimates for the future DDG 51s reflect current design and capability? Or do they incorporate additional technologies, each of which could lead to insertion or new design costs?

And finally, do your life cycle comparisons between DDG 51 and the 1000s incorporate the increased personnel required for the 51s? And have you developed estimates -- termination costs for DDG 1000s?

Vice Admiral Barry McCullough
Sir, the capability set I described for a DDG 51 that would restart as DDG 113 is based on the modernization program that we currently have funded in the DDG modernization program.

And that includes the COTS-based computer hardware, the open- architected computer program, the multimission signal processor with inherent ballistic missile defense capability, and the extended range antiair warfare capability with SM-6.

That combat system, because of the way it's been developed, costs less than the current combat system that's in DDG 112. That will be available to drop into DDG 113 if it is an '09 restart. So I'm confident in the cost numbers that -- that we provided in letters, what the restart cost for a DDG 51 is.

Life cycle costs -- because the DDG 1000s are projected to come on service or in service inside this POM '10 developed F.Y. '10 future year defense plan, we used the N4's models on how we project costs for ops and maintenance and manpower on DDG 51s and the DDG 1000s.

And we look at -- when we look at manpower and fuel costs and spare parts, a DDG 51 over the life cycle is about $4 million more expensive to operate than a DDG 1000. I'll get you the exact number, but I think it's $4 million.

That's different than what's in the selected acquisition report because the SAR reflects different requirements for life cycle costs than we do when we do budget development for ops and maintenance and manpower on ships.

Clear as mud. There is a lot of confusion over this statement because the DDG modernization of record wasn't thought to include "ballistic missile defense capability," which implies maybe something has changed with the DDG modernization program? We will discuss the Navy's communication strategy later this week, but this is one example where explaining what the hell is going on is just not what the Navy does well.

Clearly there are a number of ways to interpret this statement, and after consulting my crystal ball, I came up short and decided to ask around instead. We "think" the Navy is saying there will be ballistic missile defense included in the new Arleigh Burke class destroyers, although we admit that is a guess, because on Sunday we did not think so. Basically, there is a lot of hardware/software issues that could be ready by FY15, meaning BMD is in play. As things stand today, what Vice Admiral Barry McCullough is saying does not automatically imply BMD will be included in the new Burke's. Either way, bottom line is, with or without ballistic missile defense the Navy wants new DDG-51 Flight IIA models with all the modernizations expected throughout the Flight IIAs. Those are good ships.

It is noteworthy the Navy has decided not to do any changes to the Arleigh Burke class destroyers beyond the modernization already planned. There are a number of potential reasons why, but most likely it is to try to recapture some credibility on costing for ships and build credibility for the Navy in shipbuilding. A run of eight destroyers on time and budget right now would be a very welcome sight in Navy shipbuilding, and perception means a lot in Washington. It could also be to avoid making changes to the design knowing Congress has passed a law that requires nuclear power for warships, a point brought up in the hearing on Thursday. After all, if you make changes A, B, and C why not also make it nuclear? Requirement creep should be a concern, the reason for the Burke's in the first place is because requirement creep has turned the SC-21 shipbuilding plan into an enormous disaster. At the end of the day we think the reason is much simpler to explain, the Navy is led by people who think all solutions start and end with large surface combatants, and they are making a grab at more large surface combatants.

However, there are also several compelling arguments why the Navy should make changes. Ronald O'Rourke makes a number of interesting cases (PDF) regarding hull design possibilities for the DDG-51 Flight IIA. In his testimony before Congress last Thursday he listed a number of options in his submitted statement, but among the more interesting options to us were a few operating and support cost saving initiatives.

adding automated equipment and making other changes to reduce crew size;

adding some electric-drive equipment for interconnecting parts of the ship’s mechanical-drive propulsion system so as to permit the system to operate more like an integrated electric drive system; and

installing a near-surface bow bulb above the existing sonar dome to improve hydrodynamic efficiency.

The last one is interesting, one wonders how it would effect the ship regarding sound. A louder Burke is probably counterproductive. However, in the report Ronald O'Rourke highlights that based on estimates for cost savings, these O&S changes could potentially save $7 million dollars a year, which would make the new Burkes purchased cheaper to operate and support than the DDG-1000 which had a sales point of being less expensive to operate. $7 million per ship annually for 35 years would be nearly $2 billion dollars operational cost savings over the lifetime of eight ships. Does it cost $2 billion dollars to make these rather simple changes to eight Burkes? Considering the probability that fuel cost would skyrocket during any period of wartime, the actual savings could potentially be much higher.

However, we also started thinking about a Flight III. Why would the Navy want to look at a Flight III, or more specifically, why would Congress? Considering the rationale of ballistic missile defense for surface combatants, we began thinking perhaps the best reason for doing modifications to a new purchase of Arleigh Burke class would be to invest towards the CG(X) program, which was what the DDG-1000 was supposed to do. One way to do that might be to go ahead and meet part of the Cruiser requirement early, save costs, and build some consistency regarding the combat system into the fleet.

In our research on the modernization program, trying to figure out why McCullough's statements are so confusing, we found ourselves reading Bob Work's report on the surface combatant modernization programs, and we came across this:

The seven “Baseline 2” cruisers are the oldest surviving “Ticos,” the five earlier “Baseline 0” and “Baseline 1” cruisers having been retired as a cost-saving measure. For the purposes of this report, these seven ships will be referred to as the CG-52 class. Each of the CG-52s is equipped with the earliest version of the SPY-1 radar, the SPY-1A; the oldest and least capable Navy-proprietary computers, known as UYK-7s and UYK-20s; and four fire control illuminators. Their main battery consists of 122 Mk-41 VLS cells. Their secondary battery consists of eight Harpoons or SLAMs, two 5-inch/54 naval guns, and two Phalanx CIWSs. They can hangar and support two MH-60R (or MH-60S) helicopters...

because their systems are so old, the first seven “Baseline 2” CGs cannot be easily upgraded to the SPY-1D(V) standard. Recall that these seven ships will not receive the SQQ-89(V) for similar reasons. As a result, the near-term TFBN battle line will consist of two different classes of Interim Large Battle Network Combatants with much different anti-air warfare capabilities.

If you recall, before Gene Taylor revealed his source was Admiral Roughead in the hearing Thursday, we revealed it while also discussing how current events were being played out much how Bob Work recommended as an alternative path to the DDG-1000. In that discussion we cited the modernization report. In the same report, one of Bob Work's suggestion for the Navy was to replace the seven DDG-1000s with seven modified Arleigh Burke class ships as a stopgap between generations as the Navy looks forward. What he calls the LBNC stands for Large Battle-Network Combatant.

Fourth, starting in FY 2008, build a minimum of seven modified Burke DDGs to help sustain the industrial base until the new LBNC is ready for production... all seven ships would serve as active test beds for DDG improvements identified as possible candidates for further BNRAM back fits, or to test next-generation LBNC technologies. As such, the ships would serve much the same purpose as both the Forrest Sherman-class destroyers, which helped to bridge the shipbuilding gap between World War II and Cold War combatants, and modified legacy combatants like the USS Gyatt, DDG-1, which helped to illuminate the way forward toward a new generation of warships. Provided all went as planned, Congress would authorize two of the next generation LBNCs in FY 2015, split funded as in the current arrangement for the DDG-1000, giving each of the two construction yards one ship. The general fleet-wide transition from Aegis/VLS I-LBNCs to the new design would then begin in FY 2017, with three ships authorized after a bidding competition. Of course, if the design was not ready, additional Burkes could be built until it was.

It is actually brilliant advice, indeed one might suggest Admiral Roughead was reading Bob Work when he came up with his plan. The Navy, or Congress, could go two different ways. If the decision was simply to buy Burke's instead of DDG-1000s, and increase the total destroyer force, the Navy could continue with the current plan sent before Congress.

However another option is to replace the "baseline 2" CGs with 7 new "plugged" DDG-51s, essentially a Flight III version of the Arleigh Burke with more missiles, or perhaps the Advanced Gun System (although now the Navy says surface fires requirements are already met). In Ronald O'Rourkes statement on Thursday this is covered as one of a couple alternatives.

Additional vertical-launch tubes could be installed by lengthening the ship’s hull forward of the deckhouse. A 1994 CRS report discussed, on the basis of Navy information, how a 12-foot extension could permit the installation of 32 additional VLS cells.19 In 1997, to support research that CRS was conducting into possible alternatives to the Navy’s proposed Arsenal Ship, the Navy provided CRS with information on how lengthening the DDG-51 hull so as to install additional VLS tubes might change the ship’s procurement cost. The information is summarized in Table 2 below. The estimated changes in procurement cost were parametric, rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates only, subject to further engineering evaluation, and did not include detail design or nonrecurring engineering costs. Although the table shows variants equipped with Mk 41 VLS tubes (the kind currently used on Navy surface ships), adding vertical launch tubes of a newer design may also be possible.

Instead of building 8-9 new Burkes, Congress could instruct the Navy to use the money towards building seven "plugged" Flight III versions of the DDG-51 that, according to CRS testimony, potentially carry up to 256 VLS cells. That would clearly make this new ship the most powerful weapon system ever built, but what is also interesting is that as an evolutionary "plug" that has already undergone some study, based on a proven design it would certainly be cost affordable for that much firepower. Why do we like this idea? Because evolutionary has a proven track record, one look at the Ohio SSGNs and one can see the value of an evolutionary approach that carries a lower cost but high rate of return on investment.

The key here is that by replacing the seven "baseline 2" CGs with a plugged version, the Navy sets itself up well with the challenges they face with the CG(X) program, what we have consistently called the most important surface combatant program for the future of the US Navy.

The CG(X) is already under a number of constraints, in particular the Congressional requirement for nuclear power, but also the necessity to scale well in a constantly evolving world driven by the pace of technology, a much faster pace than warships with a service life of 30-40 years. It has been suggested that the CG(X) would not use the DDG-1000 hull, indeed this was brought up in the hearing. If you recall last year, the Navy had discussed two types of CG(X) replacements, one was an escort cruiser of the DDG-1000 hull, or in this case the evolved DDG-51 hull, while the other was a large CGN(X) built to support ballistic missile defense, which at the time we speculated on the reported size as potentially using the LPD-17 hull.

It really isn't as bad an idea as one might think, particularly if you care about the CG(X). The CBO estimates the CG(X) may cost as much as $4 billion per ship for 19 ships, but those 19 ships are based on the use of the DDG-1000 hull at 14,500 tons. CBO does its cost estimates on millions per 1000 tons, which is noteworthy because 19 ships at 14,500 tons is more total tons than 12 ships at 20,000 tons. Essentially, while the CBO would estimate the 12 ships more than what the Navy currently budgets for the entire CG(X) line, the number would be less than the $4 billion the CBO currently estimates for the CG(X) line based on the DDG-1000 hull. Adding 12 nuclear reactors would probably make up the difference, but at least the Navy would then be within the current estimates and be conforming to the law regarding nuclear power, something a CG(X) program based on the DDG-1000 hull cannot do.

As for the seven "baseline 2" ships, we wouldn't retire them early. Just allow them as modernized first rate battleships to serve out their time in areas like Africa and South America where the ballistic missile threat is not as critical as it is in the Middle East or Pacific. These cruisers make excellent flagships for those regions, and as we have pointed out in the past, the local economy never complains when a ship with 400+ sailors makes port. These ships send the right signal when conducting exercises with major allies in Europe, and even without BMD they still outmatch everything competitors can put to sea. Another option might be to replace the FFGs currently in reserve with these seven cruisers, and keep them maintained as the new contingency platform. They would certainly make a much smarter reserve force than the old FFG-7s currently holding that position.

There are a number of options regarding the Arleigh Burke battleships the Navy wants for the stopgap. Congress should seriously consider all the available options, from the operation and support cost saving measures to the large plug advanced ballistic missile defense cruiser option. With BMD now the primary driver of the large surface combatant fleet, the "Baseline 2" CGs offer the Navy additional ways to save money by putting these ships into reserve and replacing them with more capable Burke's. In our opinion, the Navy should make adjustments to the ships, that way when these ships reach 20-25 years old, they won't be retired early like other older ships have in the past because they are made obsolete due to the emerging technologies of competitors.

The Greatest Battleship In History

Of all the revelations that came from Thursday's House Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee hearing, we particularly enjoyed how the Navy made a great case for the modern rating system for surface combatants used on this blog. In our opinion, the confusion reveals that we tend to be more consistent than the Navy's own classification system labeling ship types. John McCain once said he had never heard of a 14,000 ton destroyer. Neither have we, and a DDG that can't use Standard missiles sounds equally ridiculous.

For all the folks who are new, this blog has adopted a "solemn, universal and unalterable" classification for rating warships in the spirit of Samuel Pepys, who as Secretary to the Admiralty created a ship rating system in 1677 for administrative and military use within the Royal Navy. We note Pepys's classification system was updated many times, including in 1817, a full 140 years after it was developed. A few years ago we observed a modern rating system used by Bob Work, and with his permission, we have adopted it for use on the blog.

Our modern rating system, as Samuel Pepys rating system did as far back as the 17th century, rates a warship by its primary weapon system. In the modern era, the primary weapon system is the guided missile. Just as many modified Samuel Pepys rating system in his era, we have slightly modified Bob Work's rating system in our era, specifically by recognizing that not all ships are rated.

The Arleigh Burke class has either 92 or 96 VLS cells, depending upon which Flight the ship is. According to our rating system, ships armed with 90-99 battle force VLS cells, and/or 90-99 battle force missiles are rated as second class battleships. To classify the Arleigh Burke class as a second rate battleship in comparison to the rest of the world Navy's is not a stretch, indeed there are only 4 classes and 10 total warships outside the United States that are even in the same class or higher as the Arleigh Burke class. Those ten ships are of the 4 ships of the Japanese Kongo class, 2 ships of the Japanese Atago class, the 3 planned ships of the South Korean King Sejong the Great class, and one active Russian Kirov class.

The 62 Arleigh Burke class battleships, 53 of which have already been commissioned, represent one of the greatest surface combatant classes in naval history, and certainly one of the top few in US history. To put the Arleigh Burke class into perspective, if the Navy builds 8 more as is currently being discussed, DDG-113 commissioned around 2015 would be expected to serve in the US Navy until 2050 to meet its 35 year life, meaning the entire Arleigh Burke class would be expected to span at least 60 years of service in the US Navy. That would be longer than the Iowa class battleships that served in WWII and fought in Gulf War I.

I wanted to write this post today as sort of a bridge, or interlude if you will. While we fully support the Navy's decision to cancel the DDG-1000, and have long before revelations made last Thursday, we will not hide that we are not impressed with the decision by the Navy to build more Arleigh Burke class battleships.. This has nothing to do with the ship itself, the Arleigh Burke class is absolutely the best ship in the world today. Our criticism is instead rooted in strategy, we do not believe the best way to prepare the next generation of naval warfare is to turn back and build the ship best designed to win the war of the last generation. The 21st century is here, it is time to embrace both the changes and challenges of this century. While taking the best the last century has to offer is certainly a safe bet, we wonder if by 2035, when the ship is barely 20 years old, if she will be obsolete to meet the challenges of that era of naval warfare.

After all, the USS Ticonderoga (CG 47), ordered in 1978, commissioned in 1983, and decommissioned in 2004 after only 21 years may soon be turned into a museum. While she served strong for 21.7 years, her sister ships are expected to serve 40 years, and she would still be serving an additional 15 years from right now had she not been made obsolete by the evolutions in technology.

Weekend With the Movies

Sean Meade, blog editor for Thomas Barnett, channels his inner journalist to somehow get a trip to Europe on Ares dime maybe? Sean sends this dispatch from Farnborough. If only SysAdmin looked this good. Click the links for popup video, and turn up the volume.

Eurofighter ready

We've been thinking about air power a lot lately, particularly with the UCAS discussion, but also with this emerging F/A-XX discussion. If the Navy wants to develop a new aircraft, we would suggest starting with the A-10 and make it capable of operating off an aircraft carrier. In other words, navalize an existing design, or an evolution of an existing design, but avoid as much as possible building brand new. The only bleeding edge carrier based aircraft the Navy should be developing is the UCAS. All the bleeding edge aircraft the Navy need right now are land based.

If the Naval aviation community and the Navy take a strategic position to keep an evolutionary focus for carrier based airpower, never attempting to be the bleeding edge leader in aviation with a carrier system, the Navy will maintain at least 10, if not 12 large aircraft carriers in the 21st century. If the Navy tries to push for bleeding edge aircraft, the Navy will see the big deck carrier downsized, and will never be able to afford enough small carriers to forward deploy strike aircraft in the same numbers they can today with big carriers.

And yes, we think the whole 'but big carriers are so vulnerable' argument is silly. Show me the Navy or Air Force that makes getting passed the US surface and submarine fleet for a good shot at the carrier look easy, and I'll change my position. Bottom line, carriers are vulnerable to nukes, and in that scenario, no surface ship is a good investment.

Littoral Dominance Requires a Broader System of Systems Battle Force Approach

Building upon yesterdays discussion on corvettes we want to add something a bit different to the discussion. The lines have become blurred between what a modern battleship, cruiser, destroyer, frigate, and corvette is, so we thought we would try to break down what we see as a frigate and what we see as a corvette in the modern era, and discuss another corvette option.

Using our modern rating system for warships, we see a modern frigate as a fifth-rate warship armed with 20-47 battle force VLS cells, and/or 20-47 battle force missiles. That means by our rating system, both LCS MMC versions would constitute a frigate. As we have previously discussed, the Lockheed Martin version of the multi-mission combatant offers 16 strike length VLS cells while the General Dynamics version of the multi-mission combatant offers 16 tactical length VLS cells. Both also feature at least 4 Harpoons, qualifying them both as fifth level frigates in our modern rating system.

Using the same rating system, we see a modern corvette as a sizth-rate warship designed specifically for the protection of shipping role, armed with either VLS cells or legacy missile systems, and armed with local air defense SAMs and anti-submarine and anti-ship cruise missiles for convoy defense; or a seventh-rate warship optimized for a single role, usually either anti-submarine or anti-surface warfare, or for general-purpose naval missions. The distinguishing feature of these ships is that they carry only terminal missile defenses—either in the form of rapid fire guns or short-range terminal defense SAMs.

The Perry class of today and the existing Littoral Combat Ship design both qualify as seventh-rate corvettes. Only the US Navy would operate ships between 3000-4000 tons with a weapons payload equal to or below a modern corvette.

However, just because the US Navy doesn't understand what a frigate or a corvette is, confusing the concept with a mothership in fact, and is demonstrating strategic absence in regards to the cruiser role, it doesn't mean the rest of the world is. In particular we go back to a July 13, 2024 article in Janes called TKMS unveils new reconfigurable patrol ship by Alex Pape, in which the Meko Class evolved into a modular platform. What is different? On a platform level, the payload is very different:

Planned mission modules incorporating existing naval systems into the modular architecture include the BAE Systems Bofors 57 mm gun, Saab Bofors Dynamics RBS 15 anti-ship missiles, as well as the latest generation of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) from Atlas Elektronik and Saab Underwater Systems.

If you can find it, there is also an excellent sales brochure called Modular Security Ships for Littoral Supremacy, which is sometimes available by this link (PDF), that details both of the MEKO Fusion concepts.

• The MEKO® Combat Ship for the Littorals: 108m, 2750 t, >40 kts, steel hull, composite superstructure, up to 21 MEKO® Mission Modules.
• The 84m MEKO® FUSION: 84 m, 1500 t, >40 kts, composite hull & superstructure, up to 15 MEKO® Mission Modules.

We don't highlight the MEKO Fusion because we think it is a better ship than the Littoral Combat Ship, this isn't about one ship vs one ship, rather we note the biggest difference here is that ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) is taking a total battle force network approach to littoral dominance with modularity. A ship compatible in a modular network doesn't necessarily have to be as big of a frigate to be effective, or small as a corvette even, rather it is about meeting requirements and metrics beyond a single purpose ship capability, even if the ship is modular.

Network-Centric Warfare in Navy terms was intended to get people thinking about ship designs as system of systems approaches to solving complex maritime problems, and modularity was one result. One of the questions we would pose is why modularity became the only result when the US Navy was thinking about a system of systems approach to the littorals?

When we think about the littorals, we don't believe one shoe in many colors can fit all, rather we believe we need to be looking at different sizes and styles of ships to fit all. The US Navy uses strike groups for naval aviation and expeditionary warfare, but chose to take a single system approach to what has been described as the most difficult challenge facing maritime forces today: the littoral. If the challenge really is as big as the US Navy claims, why did the Navy throw an unrated mothership at the problem?

We keep thinking a truly modular, interchangeable approach to the littorals will include a large ship, preferably an amphibious ship, as the command node within a modular system of systems network. The mothership will be able to both support the modules itself, but also distribute modules to other platforms of all sizes. Modules don't have to be a complete set of systems, rather the set of systems is part of the distributed modular network. The idea of using amphibious ships in a modular naval network approach to the littorals isn't a unique thought, we note the existing LCS modules will be tested on Amphibious ships rather than Littoral Combat Ships, due to delays of the LCS platforms under construction.

Maybe the LCS should be another platform in the littoral battle force network, but we expect the LCS is ultimately both too big and too expensive to truly distribute and dominate the littoral battle network that is required for the littoral challenges of war and peace, and the LCS is certainly not well armed enough to dominate enemy naval forces in any but the least threatening environments. Information dominance is critical to success, but it doesn't do the Navy any good if the Navy has complete information dominance but lacks physical presence due to lack of manned vessels necessary to follow up and engage for both war time and operations other than war.

The real advantage we note in regards to the MEKO approach over the US approach to modularity isn't the design characteristics of the corvette platforms themselves, nor the broad approach to the modular options per platform (even though it shows more creativity), rather the advantage of the MEKO approach to modular, system of systems networks is the concept of introducing more than one platform to contribute to the littoral challenge, and we really appreciate the total system of systems approach towards the strategic ends of littoral dominance.

After all, it is worth noting that when TKMS designed their modular corvette force, they just happened to design a mothership capable of supporting the modular battle force at the same time.

Another Expert Calls For the Corvette

It is our favorite time of the month, that time when Milan Vego writes an article in the Armed Forces Journal that challenges the conventional wisdom of some naval topic, puts forth a historical view with a modern alternative, and discusses conditions and options. This time around Milan Vego advises it is time to Think Small: Adding small combatant ships would beef up the Navy’s capabilities and the article is top quality.

The article is the combination of advocacy for small combatants, an indictment of the Littoral Combat Ship, and a counterargument to the conventional wisdom bias against small combatants inside the blue Navy. We address those three points in reverse order, starting by countering the argument that small combatants are somehow expendable and irrelevant in the maritime domain.

Perhaps the Navy has felt that if such a force were needed, it could quickly create one. It did this in World War II when, within a short time, some 426 patrol torpedo boats were built, organized and deployed in the most distant war zones. Only 42 of these PT boats were lost to enemy action. Modern small surface combatants are technologically sophisticated and relatively expensive, however. They cannot be built quickly once the conflict at sea starts. There is also the unfounded belief that small surface combatants are of little use in the modern era. Although that might have been true in the past, it is not the case today. Modern multipurpose corvettes and missile combat craft carry weapons and sensors and are fully capable of conducting a wide range of combat and non-combat missions.

The combination of "technologically sophisticated" and "relatively expensive" are two points we have been taking a hard look at lately. There is an idea out there that small surface combatants are going to 'inexpensive' thus able to build up rapidly. That hasn't been true of small surface combatants in any country for several decades. The value of modularity is key here, even if a payload swap consists solely of changing an 11 meter RHIB for a 11 meter Protector USV, the ability to interchange is important. This would allow a small combatant to quickly transition from a VBSS security operation to a ASW operation or armed unmanned vehicle force protection operation against small attack craft.

More to the point, while this capability could probably be achieved through a reproduction of something like the old Asheville class, the Navy would want a new Asheville class designed from the keep up, taking advantages of the evolution in technology in shipbuilding over the last 4 decades since the Asheville was originally designed. Furthermore introduction of a small combatant suitable to challenge the 21st century littoral threats requires a total strategic approach, including operational concept of operations with command and control, logistical support, and sustainment considerations. In other words, it needs to be better thought out than the existing Littoral Combat Ship concept.

Speaking of the Littoral Combat Ship, Milan Vego represents our own position very well with these comments. As we have stated many times, often to a bit of criticism, build a few, but recognize the platform isn't perfect, represents a blue water platform for a green water mission profile, and is clearly not the solution.

The LCS is not really a littoral vessel but, rather, an ocean-going platform. Its draft of 20 feet is too large for maneuverability in the confined waters of a typical narrow sea such as the Persian Gulf. Its sprint speed is generally of little use around islands/islets and in shallow water. It is highly doubtful that a ship of 3,500 tons, no matter how well-armed and -equipped, could match the agility of hostile small boats, and suicide boats in particular. Another shortcoming of the LCS is that it has to move outside the littoral for refueling and rearming.

That last point is a bit confusing without consideration. Without a dedicated tender capable of operating in the littoral itself, the suggestion intended is that the MSC ships that will be required to refuel and rearm will be out in blue water. This is exactly where our concept of a mothership for smaller platforms comes into play, and why we see such a platform to be the flat bottom shallow draft existing LSDs with 21ft draft or new LPD-17s with its 23ft draft.

The first point is important though. The Littoral Combat Ship really is an optimal platform for a blue water platform to move closer in shore within the framework of an existing Carrier Strike Group or Expeditionary Strike Group. The LCS doesn't have the firepower to operate independent, and indeed all the off board systems are intended to be unloaded into the littoral by the LCS while the ship moves back out to blue water, and uses unmanned systems as a relay to teh unmanned systems reporting inshore. This is blue water thinking about the littoral in its zenith, and will be reflected as such by historians.

Milan Vego goes on to recommend existing options, both foreign and domestic as alternatives. We only consider one of the foreign alternatives as realistic, and that platform gets a good writeup in this piece.

The Visby corvettes have a maximum speed of 35 knots on gas turbines and 15 knots on diesels. They are built of fiber-reinforced plastic in sandwich construction. The Visby was designed to drastically reduce optical and infrared signature, above water acoustic and hydroacoustic signature, underwater electrical potential, and magnetic signature. The Visby can be detected at the range of 7 nautical miles in rough seas and 12 nautical miles in a calm sea, without jamming. In a jammed environment, the Visby corvette will be detected at a range of 4.3 nautical miles in rough seas and 6 nautical miles in calm seas. They will carry SSMs. Other weapons include a 127mm rocket launcher, depth charges and three 400mm tubes for homing torpedoes, and a single 57mm general purpose gun plus mines.

The fiber-reinforced plastic construction is usually the turn off for this platform by many, to us it is the appeal. The materials for construction are much easier obtained and purchased in large quantities than that of aluminum or steel. We always refer back to this outstanding PDF when considering the options for the Visby class, highlighting they come in more than the existing size.

We don't claim to have the right answer, and appreciate the approach of Milan Vego to highlight a range of alternatives. We maintain a firm belief that the way ahead for realignment of resources to the new maritime strategy is to cancel the DDG-1000 after two hulls, concentrate on the CG(X) and DDG(X) replacements, and fill out the rest of the force with a formidable amphibious force of at least 19 LPD-17s for the 9 ESGs, transition the existing LSDs to primarily Navy use, and build surface combatants between 500 and 1500 tons in large quantities.

However the challenge of small surface combatants isn't building them, it is sustaining them in forward theaters and keeping them relevant in the conditions of war and peace. It is also why we start with the high value unit, the mothership that bridges the sea with land and littoral in between, rather than the small combatant, because by embracing the high value unit mission profile all the possible mission profiles for small combatants become self evident.

5" 62 Munition, Part 2

We see this as a great sign for naval fire support.

BAE Systems and Lockheed Martin are teaming to develop long-range guided munitions for the U.S. Navy. The new 5-inch, precision-guided Extended Range Munition (ERM) will address the current void in affordable and reliable long-range naval surface fire support.

The 5-inch ERM builds on BAE Systems/Lockheed Martin’s success with the Navy’s 155-mm Long-Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) program. The LRLAP has the capability to precisely engage targets at ranges in excess of 72 nautical miles, delivering lethal force in support of military operations ashore with minimal collateral damage. Much of the proven technology used with the LRLAP program is being applied to the 5-inch ERM program.

If you recall, earlier this year the Navy dropped the ERGM Raytheon was developing, mostly because it was too expensive and it didn't work. The only current competitor in the market we are aware of is Alliant Techsystems, which is developing a ballistic trajectory extended-range munition (BTERM). The BTERM has had some problems though.

If the new ERM is like the canceled ERGM, it will only be available for the 5" 62 caliber gun fielded on DDG 81 and forward. Something to keep an eye on for the DDG-51 modernization. BAE has a solid reputation with the LRLAP. Hopefully BAE and Lockheed Martin will be able to capitalize on that success for the ERM.

They Make Excellent PSYOP Tools

Submariners are the first to make it clear, we do not talk about submarines. Well, that may be policy, but someone forgot to tell the US Navy. We have been observing excellent PSYOPs being utilized through the media when it comes to the SSGN, and as we have suggested before, this probably has some folks in the Middle East sleeping uneasy.

The Blue Crew departed Kings Bay April 26 for the first portion of Florida's first SSGN mission. Now the Gold Crew will be flying out to Diego Garcia to meet the boat and turn over with Blue Crew. This type of crew exchange is new to many submariners and Florida has gone the extra mile to make sure their crew members are prepared.

An Atlantic based SSGN doing a crew change in Diego Garcia pretty much tells everyone which theater the USS Florida (SSGN 728) is operating in, and that is absolutely intentional.

The only accurate way to describe the Ohio class guided-missile submarine is as a first strike weapon. While it can do so much more, in the context of a Middle East deployment the submarine is wasted as a submarine patrolling the coast of Africa. With slightly more than 100 UGM-109Es, able to all be launched in less than 4 minutes, the SSGN is intended to rain at least 100,000 lbs of heavens fury down on its intended targets from point blank range.

As we observe the public attention the SSGNs get, we can't help but think the SSGNs have become a favorite tool of Pentagon PSYOPs. As one of the most deadly conventional weapon systems in the world, and considering the difficulty in finding the platform at sea (we believe even with active sonar on full blast it would be very difficult for even the most sophisticated systems in the noisy waters off Iran), the SSGN represents the battleship and the ghost. Nobody wants to chase a ghost, but nobody can ignore the battleship.

What a brilliant concept, the Navy should build a dozen more.

A Masterpiece of Asymmetrical War?

It must be a slow news week when UPI dedicated not one, but two articles to the "asymmetrical" merits of the Varyag. No, not that Varyag, the old Soviet era Slava class Red Ukraine cruiser which has been renamed Varyag. Martin Sieff exaggerates with this analogy.

But in strategic terms, the Slavas, especially the Varyag in the Pacific, are the heirs of the major battleships and battle-cruisers of the German navy during World War II. Leviathans like the Bismarck, the Tirpitz and the Scharnhorst were never capable by themselves of disputing British command of the sea: The main threat to Britain's survival came from Nazi submarines, or U-Boats, sinking the convoyed cargo ships bringing the feed and oil from North America to keep Britain in the war.

But the big German battlewagons earned their keep by tying up far larger forces of the British navy to prevent them breaking out and wreaking havoc. The mere fear that the Tirpitz was on its way led Britain's top naval commanders to panic and scatter the Arctic convoy to the Soviet Union's PQ-17 in 1942. Many ships were sunk and hundreds of sailors killed.

This is why we like our modern rating system for surface combatants, it allows us to transcend eras of maritime power in these types of high level discussions.

Under our modern rating system, the Slava class is armed with 16 SS-N-12 Sandbox nuclear-capable supersonic anti-ship missiles, 64 SA-N-6 Grumble long-range SAMs, and 40 SA-N-4 Gecko short-range SAMs. Under our rating system, the short range SA-N-4s do not get counted, so the Slava class rates with 80 battle force missiles as a 3rd rate battleship. The Bismark was hardly a 3rd rate battleship in the WWII era. The second article concludes like this.

Like those famous German warships, the Varyag and its sisters are no paper tigers: Their destructive power is very real. But like the old German ships, the Varyag's larger, strategic purpose is to deter U.S. carrier battle groups from operating freely in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by the very threat of its presence. The Varyag is a masterpiece of asymmetrical war.

The Varyag was recently modernized, currently representing the most powerful surface combatant in the Russian Navy, and yes we include the Pyotr Velikiy which may or may not be capable of a long range deployment. However, the attempt to sell the Varyag as the pearl of the Pacific, much less representing a Bismark battleship of our era, is a bit too much exaggeration for us.

Indeed if we ignore the US Navy in the Pacific completely, we note the two Atago class first-rate battleships and four Kongo class second-rate battleships in service with Japan. Furthermore Taiwan has 4 third-rate battleships with the Kee Lung class, while South Korea will soon have 3 King Sejong the Great class third-rate battleships in the near future.

For some, the cold war will never end. Even in some hypothetical future conflict between Russia and the US in the Pacific, even if the tasking for the Varyag was to sink a US aircraft carrier, the primary concern for the Varyag wouldn't be an air attack from carrier aviation, it would be avoiding contact with US submarines.

The Varyag is a great warship, but teh Varyag is not the masterpiece of asymmetrical war at sea. In the modern naval warfare era it is hard to imagine any warship over 11,000 tons is a masterpiece of asymmetrical war. If one is looking for an asymmetrical weapon at sea, you start by looking to the submarine.

Naval Technology is Not a Tactic, Rather One Aspect of Tactical Conditions

Wired is discussing the Russian built "sizzler". The angle taken by Wired is that the Chinese now have this daunting weapon and the US Navy has no defense against it. Here is the gist of what is being said.

The U.S. Navy can't stop China's most sophisticated anti-ship missile -- and won't even start testing a defense until 2014.

The Sizzler starts at subsonic speeds. Within 10 nautical miles of its target, a rocket-propelled warhead separates and accelerates to three times the speed of sound, flying no more than 10 meters (33 feet) above sea level. On final approach, the missile 'has the potential to perform very high defensive maneuvers,' including sharp-angled dodges, the Office of Naval Intelligence said in a manual on worldwide maritime threats.

The Office of Naval Intelligence report is from last year. In fact the Bloomberg article Wired linked to was from last year, but we are taking their word that some new article has been written along these same lines. That another article would be published is very believable.

Of all anti-ship missiles, we admit we like the discussed characteristics of the SS-N-27 "sizzler" (also known as the 3M-54 Klub) the most, it appears to have all the characteristics of a very deadly weapon system. The subsonic approach offers a low observable, low altitude over-the-horizon attack that combined with electronic means can make the system very difficult to detect or track. The supersonic nature of the terminal flight within 10 nautical miles of target offers defenders very little time for self-defense engagement. We are less impressed with sharp angled dodges at Mach 3+, but it isn't impossible. The suggestion that there are no counter systems is one I'm not buying.

This is not an attempt to downplay the threat or capability of the missile system in question, but when I see overhyped media reports claiming "unstoppable" weapon systems, I ask myself at what point any weapon system at sea became unstoppable. The mindset requires a focus on bullet vs bullet intercept scenario's in a vacuum, and almost never accounts for conditions. When it comes to naval war, any discussion that attempts to shape capabilities of any weapon system in a vacuum pretty much invalidates the merit of the discussion, environment and conditions matter. We have highlighted this reality of weapon systems in the past when we explained why we really like the latest Harpoon and Exocet missiles because they adapt to the conditions better than most weapons at sea.

For example, if a missile is 33ft above sea level and makes a sharp-angled dodge at even 1 degree down, the missile just hit the water in less than 1 second after the dodge attempt. If the missile really does make sharp-angled dodging turns, it will almost certainly make it a much easier target for point defenses to intercept, not less difficult, because it will make tracking easier due to the larger RCS.

The underlining suggestion of all discussions is that SM-2 will have difficulty intercepting a supersonic missile at close range. Makes sense to us, without going into the particulars, SM-2s are better at ranges outside of 15-20nms. Guess that is why the Navy puts point defense weapons on our ships, including our CVNs. SeaRAM, RAM, CIWS, etc.. are all capable of intercepting supersonic weapon systems, not sure why they are not discussed in the Wired discussion.

While it may not be appropriate for attacks against very large ships, I'm thinking this weapon system is going to have a hard time taking out a major warship. The best way to defeat missile systems is with a soft kill, it has been the most effective way to defeat missile systems for decades and as both have improved, soft kill still has the advantage. A HVU screen is likely to be out at least 10nm from the threat vector, meaning if a submarine or whatever launches a "sizzler" at the HVU, the escorts will likely have an opportunity to detect and engage the weapon long before it reaches supersonic mode. If the weapon is targeting the escorts, it will go super sonic and be available for a soft kill, without the range at supersonic mode to reacquire a new target and engage.

Conditions, conditions, conditions. Eagle1 once said "amateurs discuss capabilities, professionals discuss conditions." I love that phrase, because it is very accurate regarding war at sea. If the Navy is looking for better ways to fight peer competitors at sea, improving an individual weapon system is only going to get the Navy so far. In the end, the threat isn't one specific weapon system; it is the application of all weapon systems. Such a war in the future will ultimately be a battle of attrition, which highlights the most important aspect of fleet defense is more ships, not better weapon systems. A single missile system that is 'superior' in a vacuum may sound threatening, but wars aren't fought in a vacuum. The "sizzler" is manageable in a layered defense network, the issue is as the network takes attrition, and will enough ships be present to keep the networked defense in tact. In our opinion, the longevity of network cohesiveness will decide the war, and whether one particular weapon system used by the enemy finds success in battle is completely secondary.

Sunday Photos: Observing the Little Things

It is very rare you can get good photography of two ships of the same class at nearly the same angle other than the front within 3 days of each other, but we have some good looking photo's here for comparison. Can you spot the differences? I see many, all very interesting,

YOKOSUKA, Japan (March 27, 2024) Line handlers assigned to the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) heave on the aft mooring lines as large harbor tugs assist the guided-missile destroyer USS Stethem (DDG 63) as it moors at Fleet Activities Yokosuka. McCain and Stethem are two of seven Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers assigned to Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 15. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nardelito Gervacio



PEARL HARBOR, Hawaii (March 24, 2024) The guided missile destroyer USS Russell (DDG 59) departs to join the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group. The strike group is deploying in support of the global war on terrorism in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication 2nd Class Michael A. Lantron

Click the pics for links to High Resolution.

Naval Gunfire For The Rich

Navy Times is reporting tonight that there are signs Raytheon continues to fall short developing its reliable rocket-powered munition for 5" guns already deployed on US Navy Cruisers and Destroyers. There is nothing good about this news.

The end for ERGM, if it is imminent, would come just weeks after multiple munitions flunked test shots, according to an industry source.

A Raytheon spokesman insisted that the tests in February were not failures. He said Raytheon was testing for “specific functionalities, not testing for overall functionality” of the rounds.

Cancellation of the ERGM would leave the Navy with only one other source for a long-range, precision 5-inch round — Alliant Techsystems, which is developing a ballistic trajectory extended-range munition (BTERM). The BTERM is similar to ERGM but has had serious test problems of its own.

Both munitions were intended to give Navy ships the ability to strike targets with great accuracy from more than 50 miles away. If they worked, they would give some cruisers and destroyers long-range precision fire support from the sea for Marines ashore.

The article goes on to say the price of the Raytheon ERGM has risen from $45,000 to $191,000 per round. Ugh.

If it doesn't work, and at that cost, it makes a lot of sense to cancel the program. Perhaps the Alliant Techsystem BTERM will work out, but as the article says it has had problems. This isn't good news at all though, because NGFS is important, and there was a lot of hope that the ERGM would turn out to be successful. A successful ERGM would have given the 106 5" guns already on the 22 CGs and 62 DDGs a huge new capability with an existing weapon system.

The result of this news is sure to bring the NGFS debate back to the DDG-1000, which has long been a strong selling point of the DDG-1000. While the DDG-1000 is sold as a number of things it does have its Advanced Gun System with the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) developed by BEA that has been successful to date. The LRLAP is not cheap either though, the last price tag I saw was $35000 per round. With a fire rate of 10 shots per minute, and a payload of 900 rounds, the DDG-1000 will be able to empty its entire magazine in 45 minutes with two guns, at a total cost of $31.5 million, roughly the same cost as 78 tomahawk cruiser missiles.

Clearly accurate naval gunfire is for the rich. It will be interesting to see how long it takes the Navy to equate the cancellation of ERGS to the requirement for the DDG-1000. My bet is when they make that case, they ignore the costs.

Reflecting Upon US 193

Today was a great day for the Navy. If you are feeling proud of your Navy, make sure you drop an email to say thanks to the good folks on the USS Lake Erie (CG 70).

This event is a reminder that the United States Navy is the most capable, smartest, most educated Navy in the world. The US Navy is an all-volunteer service, conscripts and draftees won't do. This event, particularly with the media attention and success, is a reminder that the US Navy remains very capable to the challenges that face our nation. In this case a unique mission presented itself, and yet the Navy was able to overcome the technical challenges in a short amount of time to hit a small piece of a school bus sized target, a fuel tank, which was reportedly only 40 inches wide, and hit it at around 133 nautical miles above the ground while it was racing across in orbit at a speed of over 4.7 miles per second.

Regardless of intentions or politics, that is a powerful capability no other country in the world can accomplish. While this isn't a capability that scales into a naval tactic, it highlights extraordinary flexibility of US naval forces at the high end of warfare. The inventive spirit of Lt Col James Doolittle is alive and well today in our armed forces.

In the context of the Maritime Strategy, we believe this event sends a powerful signal of deterrence to those who threaten with ballistic missiles, indeed it could be said a signal was sent that these new unsophisticated ballistic missiles like those being deployed by North Korea and Iran were highlighted as obsolete upon delivery. This doesn't mean the Navy can let down its guard or pull back its research and development, but we see an opportunity for the Navy to reassess its capabilities on a comprehensive level.

Based on the success of this event, particularly with the media attention focused on the event, conventional wisdom implies the Navy should move full speed ahead with more of this type of capability. The existing program for AEGIS ballistic missile defense will produce 18 capable warships by 2010, and follow that up with AEGIS ballistic missile defense modernizations on all 62 Arleigh Burke class destroyers. In our opinion, this builds an extraordinarily capable fleet, and unless the Missile Defense Agency would like to increase funding for the Navy, we see no need to adjust these plans.

What we do observe however is the need for the Navy to insure its capabilities in other areas of warfare are as flexible and capable in facing the nations challenges as the surface fleet proved it is today. As we look around, we are not so sure we believe that is true. The nation is at war, and we observe the naval capabilities required to fight the nations current war are woefully inadequate.

Take brown water capabilities for example, we continue to hear about the Riverine forces and their importance to the Navy in the 21st century. We observe the rotation of squadrons to Iraq, and how these rotations get plenty of media attention in the Navy, but few realize a riverine squadron is only 12 boats and around 200 sailors. The Navy has the expectation to control a river in a country the size of Iraq with a single squadron, with its 12 old reused boats, and hypes this as a priority capability?

We would suggest to the Navy to recognize the incident with US 193 demonstrates that the high end of the fleet capability mix has an amazing degree of flexibility. We believe the Navy should utilize its sizable technological lead over competitors to build up other aspects of the force that lack the same flexibility. We find the argument that this demonstration validates the investment of more large destroyers as counter to logical application of what we witnessed, as the existing force appears quite capable.

We see this demonstration as an opportunity for the Navy to invest in the low end of its capabilities mix, which clearly lacks flexibility. We believe this investment will help 'polish the edges' in dealing with other aspects of the Maritime Strategy, many of which focus on the low end of the warfare spectrum and are more likely scenarios in the near term. A few years of resource dedication at the low end of capabilities can go a long way, in fact for the cost of a single DDG-1000, the Navy could upgrade existing Riverine squadrons and actually build many more with modern equipment.

Roughead has been using the word balance often with the media recently, but we observe that there is no balance within the force, as everything weighs towards the most capable aspect of the existing fleet, and away from the forces that require a few years of attention with budgetary resources in a sound way that reflects the desires of the new Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.