Naval Presence Shifts Towards 2020

These slides from OPNAV were passed around several months ago as an example of the pivot to Asia. Some have identified these slides as representative of the slides presented at a recent CNO press conference. The first slide begins with the expected Naval Presence of 2013.

This is basically today. Note the gold ships are the sustained, forward deployed ships and the blue ships are the rotational CONUS forces. Noteworthy how the SSGNs are counted as steady state, forward deployed operational assets.

It continues with a slide of Naval Presence of 2017.

This is where the map starts getting interesting.

South America
Note that the Navy intends to move 10 PCs, many of which are currently in the Middle East, to the South American theater in support of SOUTHCOM by 2017. I am interested to see how that works with 1 amphibious ship and no combat logistics. In my opinion there looks to be a real opportunity for Navy/Coast Guard cooperation in that theater that is not getting a close enough look, for example, why wouldn't an AFSB for MSO and logistics not be very effective in that region? Everything has short legs, and having a place to move spare parts around at sea isn't a bad thing. It also doesn't hurt to have a UAV pad in the middle of the water. Just saying... that environment isn't likely to get better anytime soon, and has a real potential to get much worse - particularly if we start seeing more legit submarines instead of semi-submersables. It is worth noting the CG/DDG/FFGs in SOUTHCOM are replaced by 10 PCs and 2 JHSVs, not Littoral Combat Ships.

Europe/Africa
Rota is now a BMD base, and sailors will be lining up for duty on those ships. It is still very much unclear what ships the US Navy intends to station there. If it is me, I send 4 DDG Flight Is with BMD so I don't have to send and pay for RW (sorry guys!). Worth noting the full time amphibious ship is now augmented by 2 JHSVs assigned to Africa, which have replaced two large surface combatants. These ships almost certainly represent engagement work the Marine Corps is working on today towards tailored Enhanced Rifle Companies and other tailored Blue/Green assets for Partnership Station type of activity. What I find noteworthy, and useful, is that these platforms are retaining their RW capabilities, and all three ships are well suited for SOF activities if tasking is necessary. These are very flexible forces, but it means UAVs will be the only assured option to provide direct fires in contingency. That's OK, but I still think putting VLS in the San Antonio class amphibious ships for long range cruise missile capability remains an important omission in the modern force, and something the Navy needs to reconsider as an important capability as the large surface combatants move away from theaters that are traditional hotspots for SOF operations.

Middle East
Worth noting the 12 PC/MCMs has become 4 LCS, 4 MCM, and 2 JHSV. Note that the SSGN and 2 CG/DDGs that had been operating down in Africa in 2013 are moved up to the Persian Gulf region by 2017, basically suggesting an assumption that all naval activities off Africa today can be replaced in whole by two JHSVs. That is a remarkable assumption that I have a hard time believing has any merit whatsoever.

Pacific
Look closely and note that by 2017 the great pivot to Asia strategy being touted by Secretary Panetta will be the massive increase in naval forces of - four Littoral Combat Ships and two Joint High Speed Vessels. It is one thing to try not to provoke China into an arms race, but when this is the massive maritime shift towards the Pacific touted at the political level as national defense strategy, one has to wonder what our allies are truly thinking about our empty words policy. I'll also make a brief point - the reason I keep jabbing the Army with a stick and pointing to the Pacific is because it is plainly obvious the Navy is talking a big game but isn't doing anything significant there, and the force is not growing in the future, so the US Army needs to expect as an opening assumption that they will be left completely ineffective as a fighting force in the Pacific if they are dependent upon the US Navy, because the US Army will never get where they need to be unless the Army can figure out a way to make the islands of the Pacific a network of forward operating bases by which the Navy has no responsibility for their limited forces to defend, because every ship defending an island is one less ship to move the Army into the combat zone by force.

General Notes
The requirement appears to be around 1200 VLS in the Middle East in 2017, and 1500 VLS in the Pacific in 2020. Also, in my opinion, with the exception of SOUTHCOM this map looks to me what a "strategy of holding the line" looks like. You know what else bothers me about this map? It is a reminder that in 2017 US forces are basically organized in traditional heavy task forces like CSGs and ARGs, and with the exception of SSGNs and the 10 PCs in SOUTHCOM, nothing about this map sticks out as having a capability that is inherently disruptive for a bad actor in any specific area. LCS and JHSVs will be useful for their limited purposes, which is ISR and engagement respectively, but the US Navy has a shortage of assets that stand out as disruptive - punching politically and diplomatically above their weight.

It conclude with a slide of Naval Presence in 2020.

Pacific
The pivot to the Pacific has completed, and this major pivot ends up being 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 2 Joint High Speed Vessels. I am very unclear how the politics of the pivot to Asia somehow became a public diplomacy centered around the maritime domain with the US Navy doesn't even move a single major surface combatant or submarine to the Pacific as part of this touted pivot.


Europe/Africa/South America
Note that in all three places the major change the primary feature is the addition of a pair of Littoral Combat Ships. What I find very interesting is that for both Africa and South America the pair of Littoral Combat Ships is replacing the presence previously filled by an amphibious ship. This is the first document I have seen from OPNAV (that I can publish anyway) that supports the arguments I have made on this blog regarding how the LCS is more of an amphibious ship capability than a surface combatant capability it is usually generally referred to as. While that is an interesting side note, I'm not convinced it means anything other than how the numbers fit together in PPT.

General Notes
Note that the suggested plan according to this PPT is for 8 LCS in the Persian Gulf before more than 4 are in the Pacific, indeed 18 Littoral Combat Ships are specifically accounted for on this graphic, but only 4 in the Pacific. Obviously this is a moment in time look at what the Navy is thinking, but they are interesting moments and time, and interesting thoughts about future force dispersion.

Pushing the Fleet to the Breaking Point, For What Exactly?

US Navy Photo

This is not how we should be celebrating the early retirement of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Bold emphasis by me.

The Navy will deploy the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis and its strike group four months early and shift its destination to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, DOD officials said here today.

The deployment late this summer is in response to Central Command’s requirement for an extended carrier presence, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little said. The move affects 5,500 sailors aboard the Stennis and the Aegis cruiser USS Mobile Bay.

Last week, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta approved a request from Central Command commander Marine Corps General James N. Mattis to accelerate Stennis’ deployment. “The decision will help support existing naval force requirements in the Middle East and reduce the gap caused by the upcoming departure of the USS Enterprise Strike Group,” Little said. “It is in keeping with our long-standing commitments to the region.”

Aircraft carrier strike groups provide commanders with ample and flexible air assets to enhance interoperability with partner nations and maintain strong military-to-military relations as well as respond to a wide variety of contingencies, Little said.

The Bremerton, Wash.-based Stennis strike group was due to deploy at the end of the year to U.S. Pacific Command. The group returned from duty in the Middle East in March.

The accelerated deployment to the Central Command area of responsibility is not aimed at any specific threat. “In keeping with Centcom’s requirements, this is a very important region for our defense strategy,” Little said. “We’ve had a presence in the region for decades and we have a range of interests that this extension of our capabilities will support.”

Nor, he said, is the deployment a direct response to tensions with Iran. The U.S. military is “always mindful of the challenges posed by Iran, but … this is not a decision based solely on the challenges posed by Iran,” Little said.

Currently the USS Enterprise and USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike groups are deployed to U.S. Central Command. The USS Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group is due to relieve the Lincoln group shortly. The Stennis group will relieve Enterprise.

The Navy continues to operate at a high operational tempo in order to meet U.S. security needs around the world,. “Our deployment strain is as great as or greater today than it has been at any time in the past 10 years,” a Navy official said.

Sailors and their families have been informed of the change, Little said. Navy officials looked at a wide range of options to ensure Navy commitments and combatant commander mission requirements are met and to lessen the impact of schedule changes.

The carrier strike group will be ready to deploy even given the accelerated timeline, Little said. “The U.S. Navy is well-equipped to ensure our sailors are trained and ready for this deployment,” he said.

Navy leaders understand the operational and personnel impacts this accelerated deployment will have. These include training cycle adjustments, crew and family uncertainty and reductions to quality of life port visits.

As more information becomes available, the Navy will release it, officials said, noting defense leaders are “committed to keeping sailors and their families informed about current and future deployments to the best of our ability.”

The Stennis will be deployed for eight months, meaning the original 6 month Western Pacific deployment scheduled for later this fall is now an eight month deployment in the Middle East only a few weeks away. And for a reason the DoD can't explain, except to say it's not specific to Iran, Navy families get screwed over yet again. If it really is not specific to Iran, something is very wrong.

The Kearsarge deployment last year was eight months. The Bataan deployment last year was eleven months. The Lincoln, to be relieved any day now, departed Naval Station Everett on December 7, 2011, and won't arrive in Norfolk until mid-August; eight months. Eisenhower, which will relieve Lincoln, is on a nine month deployment. Now Stennis, leaving four months early will be on an eight month deployment. I'm sure I forgot a few long deployments among those...

Someone needs to tell the President no, or maybe the President needs to tell General Mattis no. The very real issue is, if the United States is not about to fight a war with Iran, the US Navy is going to wear out their equipment pretending to fight Iran, and the toll on people is very real.We are reducing the number of carriers and amphibious ships at a time we are clearly pushing them at an operational tempo higher than at anytime ever, including the cold war? WTF? The Bataan, which returned in February, has the second longest deployment by a US Navy ship since World War II!

Hey Congress, wake up! That's a red flag!

What exactly is the Navy killing itself for? If these long deployments aren't a domestic political agenda to avoid a public spat between the President and General Mattis, then the answer must be these deployments are intended to prevent war with Iran. There really is no middle ground here, because there really can't be any other justification for this type of persistent operational tempo where Admirals are constantly bitching in public (rightfully, good for them!) about the high operational tempo - but when it comes time to just get back to a normal operational tempo, those same Admirals refuse to stand up to someone and push the fleet further down the dark path.

Bottom line, those Admirals are only saying yes for one of two reasons: either because the need for the CVN is a legitimate reason of state specific to the prevention of war, or the reason is specific for the sake of their own job - in other words they lack the guts to say no to a politician, and that probably goes double in an election year where saying no would have a political amplification impact. I guess it's better the sailors and their families bend over backwards so Admirals don't have to strain themselves, or something like that.

Or maybe we really are legitimately on the brink of war with Iran, and General Mattis is keeping the peace in the Middle East one extended aircraft carrier deployment at a time. I suppose it's possible - color me a skeptic, but that is scary if true. Either way, at what point are the tens of thousands of Navy sailors going to find a single DC reporter with the guts to ask a tough question?

US Navy Surging Vessels for Mediterranean Operations- Updated

The United States Navy has moved up the deployment of the Bataan ARG.

There's word Thursday that the USS Bataan, homeported in Norfolk, will head out on deployment later this month.

Navy officials tell WVEC.com that the Bataan is surging to replace the Kearsarge, as part of a contingency operation.

The surge is designed to give the president flexibility regarding the recent uprising in Northern Africa and in the Middle East.

There's no word on the exact time of the deployment or for how long it will last.

There are several things here.

The Kearsarge had unloaded Marines into Afghanistan, and while the ship has been reinforced with additional Marines, the Bataan ARG will represent a fully prepared MEU for operations in that theater, if called upon. If the Bataan is being called to the Med, as reported, that would suggest the Boxer ARG recently deployed from California would be sent to the 5th fleet to meet the presence requirements for Marines in that theater.

The Bataan ARG was planned to deploy later this year, but this deployment is a surge because the deployment date has been moved up in response to recent events in Northern Africa.

This deployment represents an increase in presence requirements for the 6th fleet. Once again, the operational tempo of the US Navy is being increased. The continuous and nearly annual increases in operational tempo and requirements demand by the US Navy - whether it is for HA/DR, contingency planning like North Africa, or Ballistic Missile Defense - needs to be noted as there has been no subsequent increase in funding towards the construction of Navy vessels to account for the demand increases.

Another question. There are two serious events taking place worldwide right now, in North Africa/Middle East with the protests and in Japan. When there are wartime challenges, the President is known to ask "Where are the Carriers?" When there are challenges short of war, the question is "Where are the Amphibs?" As the requirement creep continues to increase for operations other than war, the question is whether the minimal number of 33 amphibious ships the current plan budgets for is enough. It would appear 33 is not enough.

Update: Aviation Week is reporting that F-22s of the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, Va. are quietly bring readied for deployment just in case they are called upon for a Libyan no-fly zone.

The Silent Service Gets Underway

I have mentioned before how much I really do like Rhumb Lines by CHINFO. This was Rhumb Lines on December 6th, the monthly "Executing the Maritime Strategy" edition.

Executing the Maritime Strategy

"365 days a year, 24/7, Navy Installations Command provides the right shore services to support the fleet, fighter and family. More than 50% of the Navy's fleet and 16% of Navy personnel are either deployed or on an IA, and the holiday season can add to that stress. Whether supporting the deployed Sailor worldwide or families at home, Navy Installations Command is always ready to do what's needed.”

- Vice Adm. Michael C. Vitale, Commander, Navy Installations Command

Around the world, the Navy is executing the core capabilities of the Maritime Strategy - some examples from throughout the fleet in the month of November were:

Forward Presence

• The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG) flew 1,571 sorties for 4,001.5 hours of flight time supporting Operations Enduring Freedom and New Dawn; the Harry S. Truman CSG completed 480 combat sorties and 2863.3 flight hours in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
• USS Ponce (LPD 15) and Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (26 MEU) participated in exercise Edged Mallet with Kenyan military forces in Manda Bay, Kenya. Edged Mallet '10 is a two-week, bilateral military exercise designed to refine operational skills while enhancing collaboration and strengthening military-to-military relationships.

Deterrence

• USS George Washington (CVN 73), with embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 5, along with guided-missile ships USS Cowpens (CG 63), USS Lassen (DDG 82), USS Stethem (DDG 63), and USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), participated in a combined military exercise with the Republic of Korea (ROK).
• Ballistic-missile submarine USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) completed its 75th Trident deterrent patrol, becoming the first Ohio-class SSBN to accomplish the milestone.

Maritime Security

• USS Momsen (DDG 92) conducted bilateral maritime domain awareness training with the Maldivian coast guard. The Government of the Maldives invited the U.S. Navy to work with the Maldivian coast guard to improve maritime domain awareness capabilities within the island nation’s exclusive economic zone.

Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response

• USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) provided assistance to Carnival cruise ship C/V Splendor, which went dead-in- the-water after it suffered propulsion failure in the Pacific Ocean about 150 nautical miles south of San Diego. Reagan facilitated the delivery of more than 4,500 pounds of food and goods.
• USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), along with Seabees attached to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7, concluded Continuing Promise 2010 (CP10). CP10 provided humanitarian and civic assistance, including veterinary, medical, dental and civil engineering support to eight partner nations.

Building Maritime Partnerships

• Military Sealift Command High Speed Vessel (HSV) 2 Swift conducted Southern Partnership Station 2011 (SPS 11) in Haiti and Chile. SPS 11 is an annual deployment in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility designed to engage the U.S military sea services with partner nations’ defense forces, police departments and coast guards.

At the bottom of Rhumb Lines this was offered as of December 1:

Ships, Submarines & Aircraft
Total deployable ships/subs 288
Ships underway 148 (51%)
Attack subs underway 25(46%)
Ships deployed 108 (38%)
Subs deployed 20 (37%)
Expeditionary forces on mission 85 (45%)
Total operational aircraft 3,700+

One of the blogs very clever readers put together an interesting chart with a trend worth following:

Date ......ships underway .....attack subs underway
Nov30 .............. 45% ................ 46%
Dec01 .............. 51% ................ 46%
Dec02 .............. 52% ................ 46%
Dec03 .............. 53% ................ 46%
Dec06 .............. 55% ................ 63%
Dec07 .............. 55% ................ 63%

According to the Status of the Navy website that 63% is made up of 34 subs. 34 / x = 0.63. x ~= 54. The previous attack subs underway was 46%. 54 * 0.46 ~= 25.

34 - 25 = 9.

So nine subs got under way over the weekend, 2 of those on official deployment. Actually the number is 10 over the period of the last week, because USS Jacksonville (SSN 699) just returned from deployment last week and USS Charlotte (SSN 766) deployed the next day. Worth remembering, ~60% of the submarines in US Navy inventory are in the Pacific.

I'm sure this activity is completely unrelated to recent events on the Korean Peninsula. Or not.

Strategic Communications and Information Operations

I have something on my mind, and open the topic for discussion in hopes the feedback is of professional quality.

Should the Navy conduct Information Operations?

I feel like they do every day, but they target the wrong people. There is an information operation taking place right now, supported by industry, and it targets Congress directly. The change to the Littoral Combat Ship program is a perfectly executed information operation intended to pressure lawmakers into a decision without debate or consideration of consequences. It really is clever, and only required a few steps.

1. Wait until after the election, the day after to be specific, to insure no public debate or discussion.
2. Apply industrial pressures on Congress, pressures the Navy forced on industry by waiting until after the election to make a selection for LCS.
3. Take advantage of the busy lame duck period to avoid public discussion and debate, which would highlight the complete absence of a TOC discussion the Navy has no answers for.

It is a clever little information operation and the target is Congress. Without showing any financial information, the Navy claims huge savings in buying 20 ships of two distinct classes with two distinct support and maintenance lines compared to the original plan of purchasing 17 ships with a single support and maintenance line. Even in Washington DC, that is unbelievable!

An information operation is a form of information warfare, and if we simply use the definition of information warfare we can ask whether this is indeed what the Navy does when it comes with shipbuilding - the LCS being an example - when one considers Congress the enemy.

Information warfare is the use and management of information in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. Information warfare may involve collection of tactical information, assurance(s) that one's own information is valid, spreading of propaganda or disinformation to demoralize or manipulate the enemy and the public, undermining the quality of opposing force information and denial of information-collection opportunities to opposing forces. Information warfare is closely linked to psychological warfare.

It is my opinion that the only information operations the Navy, under current leadership, is effective in conducting are the information operations that are conducted on the American people and Congress. I believe the DDG-1000 program history on Capitol Hill is another perfect example of a successfully conducted IO campaign against Congress. I welcome any comment and criticism of this observation.

Should the Navy conduct Strategic Communications?

The absence of strategic communications as a starting point, or even the subjects inclusion to any significant degree, is a tremendous weakness of the current Naval Operational Concept. Consider for a moment the deployment today of the USS Carl Vinson and associated strike group - here is the official Navy article in full:

SAN DIEGO (NNS) -- USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and crew members of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 will depart Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island Tuesday, Nov. 30, for a training exercise followed by a scheduled routine deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. 5th Fleet Areas of Responsibility.

As the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 1, led by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez, Vinson will deploy with USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), USS Stockdale (DDG 106) and USS Gridley (DDG 101). Embarked aboard Vinson is Destroyer Squadron 1 and CVW 17, which includes the "Red Lions" of Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron 15, the "Fighting Redcocks" of Strike Fighter Squadron 22, the "Fist of the Fleet" of Strike Fighter Squadron 25, the "Sunliners" of Strike Fighter Squadron 81, the "Rawhides" of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 40, the "Garudas" of Electronic Attack Squadron 134, the "Stingers" of Strike Fighter Squadron 113 and the "Tigertails" of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 125.

This deployment will be the first deployment for the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Stockdale.

"This will be Stockdale's maiden deployment," said Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Jeffrey Bennett. "Our team of awesome warfighters are ready to deploy, executing missions across all warfare areas and joining Destroyer Squadron 1 and the Vinson Strike Group team to be prepared to execute a full spectrum of military operations from presence and security to humanitarian assistance and disaster response."

The mission of the Vinson Strike Group while deployed will focus on maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts, which help establish conditions for regional stability.

Media wishing to cover the departure of USS Carl Vinson can embark aboard Vinson for the day as the ship departs San Diego Bay; and be flown back to Naval Air North Island at approximately 4:30 p.m.

For more information on CSG-1 and the USS Carl Vinson, visit www.cvn70.navy.mil or www.facebook.com/ussvinson. For more information on USS Bunker Hill, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/cg52. For more information on USS Gridley, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg101. For more information on USS Stockdale, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg106 or www.facebook.com/pages/USS-STOCKDALE-DDG-106/128805733826735
>
For more news from Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet, visit www.navy.mil/local/c3f/.

Uhm, 3rd Fleet Public Affairs - do not take this criticism personal.

What is the strategic communication in this Navy.mil article? Who is the audience? What is the context? Lets review the talking points...

• This is Stockdale's maiden deployment
• The "team of awesome warfighters" are both "ready to deploy" and will be "executing missions across all warfare areas"
• The "team of awesome warfighters are "joining Destroyer Squadron 1 and the Vinson Strike Group team" to "execute a full spectrum of military operations" like "presence" and "security" and "humanitarian assistance" and "disaster response."

The audience for this article is... unclear.
The context of this article is... not provided.
The strategic communication of this article... is not strategic.

We are left with information, provided for an unknown purpose to an unknown audience and with an unknown context. Is it even possible to be less informed by this information? Below is my version of the same article - an example of how I think the Navy needs to be thinking when deploying every single ship in the fleet.

SAN DIEGO -- USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and crew members of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 will depart Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island Tuesday, Nov. 30, for a training exercise followed by a scheduled routine deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. 5th Fleet Areas of Responsibility.

Carrier Strike Group 1 is departing on schedule despite a disruption in training schedules that occurred when USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and Bunker Hill (CG 52) supported disaster response and humanitarian operations in Haiti earlier this year. This deployment includes several firsts. This is the first major deployment for USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) after a three year nuclear refueling. Additionally, this deployment is the first deployment for Bunker Hill (CG 52) underwent Cruiser modernization, the first Ticonderoga class guided missile cruiser to complete mid life modernization. Finally, this deployment is the first deployment for the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Stockdale.

This will be the third deployment for USS Gridley (DDG 101) despite the ship being commissioned less than four years ago.

"The Vinson Strike Group is a remarkable collection of warships containing the latest technologies and capabilities," said PACFLT REAR ADMIRAL I_WENT_TO_STRATCOMM_SCHOOL. "The sailors of the Vinson Strike Group are well trained to meet multiple challenges that may be encountered during their seven-month deployment."

As the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 1, Vinson will deploy with USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), USS Stockdale (DDG 106) and USS Gridley (DDG 101). Embarked aboard Vinson is Destroyer Squadron 1 and CVW 17, which includes the "Red Lions" of Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron 15, the "Fighting Redcocks" of Strike Fighter Squadron 22, the "Fist of the Fleet" of Strike Fighter Squadron 25, the "Sunliners" of Strike Fighter Squadron 81, the "Rawhides" of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 40, the "Garudas" of Electronic Attack Squadron 134, the "Stingers" of Strike Fighter Squadron 113 and the "Tigertails" of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 125.

"This deployment comes as tensions are rising on the Korean Peninsula and our forces are engaged in heavy fighting in Afghanistan," said Commanding Officer, CAPTAIN I_KNOW_MY_STRATCOMM. "Our team of awesome warfighters are ready to meet these challenges, executing missions across all warfare areas. Carrier Strike Group 1 is fortunate to have Rear Adm. Samuel Perez, who recently took command of CSG-1 in late October. His experience as a former commander of the Japan based forward deployed Destroyer Squadron 15 will benefit the Vinson Strike Group as we cooperate with other US Navy forces already forward deployed, not to mention our South Korean and Japanese allies over the coming weeks and months dealing with tensions in northeast Asia."

The mission of the Vinson Strike Group while deployed will focus on maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to help establish conditions for regional stability.

I assure you 3rd fleet public affairs could do this better than me.

The audience for this article is informed citizens and foreign populations examining the purpose and intentions of a US Navy Carrier Strike Group deployment, primarily because the context of this article is current events. The strategic communication of this article is one of projecting American power abroad in support of our interests and resolve towards assisting our allies.

Note the strategic communications to Asia in this fictional article is delivered in context of current events even though the deployment was scheduled long ago. The strategic communication is targeted - projecting confidence for the domestic population, projecting strength towards adversaries, and demonstrating our national resolve and support for allies.

A study of the details, something we know every naval analyst in the world does, would reveal an ultra modern collection of warships in Carrier Strike Group, and also note CSG-1 commander came on late but is apparently a perfect fit for operations during a period of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. These details, by being touch early on, allow the Navy to further develop strategic communications in the future in directing messages to specific audiences. For example, projecting confidence towards Japan should the Vinson Strike Group exercise with the Japanese Navy sometime in the future is an option because Rear Admiral Perez lived and served - in Japan. Familiarity and experience represents a context that can be leveraged to engage audiences.

Want to send a signal to North Korea? Run a simple information operation by discussing the new sonar tail on Bunker Hill. This stuff really isn't complicated, and if the operational side doesn't know how to do it - they can ask OPNAV in the Pentagon for assistance - after all, they've become great at it on Capitol Hill.

I see the absence of strategic communication in official Navy information equivalent to the absence of value in official Navy information. How much value is lost when a Navy ship or fleet cannot communicate effectively at the strategic level every time the ship conducts any action, including movement? As a taxpayer and a citizen who studies the history of naval power, I think there is tremendous value in thinking about that question. I welcome any comment and criticism of this observation.

What I see today in the US Navy are information operations that target domestic audiences and a complete fail by the Navy when it comes to strategic communications. If a question gets asked about shipbuilding, the answer reads like a smoke grenade thrown by the Navy. If a question gets asked about a deployment, the answer is packaged and shipped like a brochure and often is completely void of context.

This is an organization that coined the phrase "Information Dominance?" Perhaps the scope of what is covered by such a profoundly ironic description should be examined more closely.

Carrier Deployment Issues Impact ~20,000 Sailors

The announcement that the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) will have their deployments extended by two months is "profound," according to Rear Adm. John Miller, the Nimitz strike group commander. I think his reaction is well stated.

Navy Times covered the initial news report.

Navy officials on Friday extended the deployments for two aircraft carrier strike groups - Nimitz and Harry S. Truman - by nearly two months each to cover the expected gap in carrier coverage caused by shipyard delays in the maintenance overhaul of the carrier Enterprise.

Each deployment will run just under eight months, U.S. Pacific Fleet officials in Hawaii and U.S. Fleet Forces Command officials in Virginia announced in a joint statement. “The Navy remains committed to its general policy of maintaining deployment lengths to manage personnel tempo as essential components of force readiness,” officials said.

The short-notice shift in the carriers’ schedules includes an earlier departure of the Norfolk, Va.-based Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group, which will leave on its next deployment “a few days earlier,” said Cmdr. Phil Rosi, a Fleet Forces Command spokesman, on Friday afternoon.

Truman, which is preparing to deploy with its strike group, will deploy from its Norfolk berth later than planned for its scheduled next deployment in 2010, Rosi said. He declined to specify the length of that delay before the carrier will deploy from its Norfolk berth.

Wow. The Navy is talking about shifting schedules for three different Carrier Strike Groups, which impacts close to 18,000 sailors - not to mention their families. I'm having a hard time believing that the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) shipyard delay of 4 months can possibly have that kind of profound impact alone, and at the same time the Secretary of Defense is recommending a reduction in aircraft carriers from 11 to 10.. or fewer? The key point to be made here is that all of this is being done to support the 5th Fleet requirement of having an aircraft carrier support the war in Afghanistan - meaning this major change is essentially the first major Afghanistan war requirement on the Navy since 2001.

If you think of each CSG consisting of 5-6 ships and 6500 sailors, the impact can approach 20,000 sailors when deployment times change for 3 different strike groups.

The timing is noteworthy. The Navy has known about this for awhile. We have consistently been told of the cost increases to the work being done on USS Enterprise (CVN 65), so the Navy has known about the delay. The reason we don't find out until now is because the Navy was waiting until both the Senate and the House had completed their FY2010 bills, which includes a provision for the early retirement of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). After all, this is exactly the kind of unexpected event lawmakers asked Navy folks under oath about, the "what if.." we need that 11th carrier question. The Navy's reply was, essentially 'don't worry about it, we got it covered.' Clearly...

It is not unreasonable that the ~48 year old Enterprise would run into issues in a major maintenance period. Those types of problems can pop up in very old ships like Enterprise. I also don't think this event makes a case against the early retirement of Enterprise. If anything, it validates the decision because Enterprise is clearly too old and too expensive to keep on life support. What this issue does do though is directly raise questions about how many aircraft carriers the Navy needs to operate, and whether numbers - and not cost - needs to be a more significant factor in aircraft carrier planning. ADM Roughead is on record saying 11, while Gates is saying 10. Congress is going to have to decide, because 11 only happens with more money.

There are at least two alternatives that need to be looked at. The first is the ever popular but incredibly expensive option of moving to smaller carriers, what some like to call a mix. Tough call because this option is not a replacement for CVNs, simply an augmentation and would need to be part of a broader consideration to fleet design. That is not easy for the Navy today due to the lack of vision in fleet design.

The other option would be for the Navy to change the way they operate today. The plan behind the reduction to 10 aircraft carriers suggests that 10 is the minimum number necessary for the Navy to maintain 2 aircraft carriers forward deployed; one to 7th Fleet in the Pacific and one to 5th Fleet in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. We'll be like the Navy, and avoid the word "attrition."

The question is, how do you replace the influence of a CVN? I think there are a couple of different ways. One approach would be to build an organizational grouping around a LHA(R), and build 4 LHA(R)s to maintain one forward deployed. Keep in mind that I believe this option would be best done by reducing the number of ESGs to 8, but increasing the ESG to 4 ships (5 ships for the forward deployed ARG). In other words, if the Marine Corps requirement is 33 amphibious ships, then the future amphibious force should be 8 LHDs and 25 LPD-17s. On top of that the LHA(R) contributes airpower, for either the Marines or the Navy but always with the F-35B version. It isn't a full aircraft carrier, but it might be enough for supporting operations like Afghanistan if the F-35B is reliable.

Another option would be building the sometimes proposed 22,000 ton ballistic missile defense battleship. A ship with rebust BMD capabilities might be a very effective way conduct naval presence operations at the high end in the Pacific as opposed to a CVN, and may prove to be a better alternative than the CVN for the Navy in responding to the ballistic missile threat globally when a country begins to act belligerent towards its neighbors. A CVN is clearly an offensive force, while a BMD battleship could be seen from allies as a defensive platform.

A more widely discussed option is to get optimized in Green water for regional influence. It is unlikely that in my lifetime, the arrival of a LCS in support of a friendly nation is going to be very influential politically. If Russia and Georgia were to get into a political dispute, the arrival of LCS-1 and LCS-2 in support of Georgia isn't going to influence the Black Sea Fleet much. However, what if the Navy pulled into the Black Sea with 4 LCS and 16 small corvettes, each armed with 4-8 ASMs? Do you realize that if the corvettes were less than 1000 tons, the 20 ships would fall under the 30,000 tons in article 2 of the Montreux Convention. This is one example where numerous smaller ships in the littoral can have a significant influence on an area without an aircraft carrier strike group.

The development of these types of organizations for Africa and South America may be the way the Navy can avoid the pitfalls of reducing aircraft carriers to 10. Regardless, this is a conversation that Congress clearly needs to have with the Navy, because even with 11 aircraft carriers the lives of 18,000 sailors and their families are being adjusted to support the loss of just the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) for only 4 months to maintenance.

For those interested in the status of US aircraft carriers:

Norfolk, Virginia
USS Enterprise (CVN 65) - drydock until November 2009
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) - late 2009 deployment
USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) - unavailable until at least November 2009
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) - unavailable until September 2012
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) - Early 2010 deployment
USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) - Unavailable until at least early 2011

San Diego, California
USS Nimitz (CVN 68) - Deployed July 31, 2024
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) - Deployed May 28, 2024

Bremerton, Washington
USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) - Returned from deployment July 10, 2024

Everett, Washington
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) Unavailable until early 2010

Yokosuka, Japan
USS George Washington (CVN 73) - Returned from summer deployment September 3, 2024

McCullough: Retire the Frigates

The lack of consistency in talking points is disturbing. Our collective memories can't be this short, can it?

The Navy has few small-ship options if its littoral combat ship program continues to lag behind schedule, the service’s top requirements officer said Tuesday, because the fleet’s frigates are too old or maxed-out on equipment to upgrade further.

Vice Adm. Barry McCullough told lawmakers at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s seapower subcommittee that the fleet’s Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates’ hulls were rusting and wearing thin, that the ships couldn’t bear the weight of additional weapons or sensors, and that it generally wouldn’t be worth trying to extend their lives to have them around in place of the planned LCS platforms the Navy thought it would have by now.

I might be mistaken, but wasn't there a frigate symposium in Mayport just a few weeks, or maybe a few months ago? Wasn't the topic something regarding the options to upgrade weapon systems and how to SLEP the frigates? It doesn't make much sense to me that US frigates cannot support additional weapons or sensors, but every foreign ship of the exact same ship type can.

Feel free to flame me, but I believe Vice Adm. Barry McCullough takes the longest and perhaps hardest to believe route to finally making the point that should have come first. Investing money into the frigates at this point wouldn't be "worth" it, and the value decision can't be undersold.

When operating helicopters, we are still putting over 200 people on frigates being deployed, and that ends up becoming a ship too expensive to operate for the capability being provided. Manpower costs will sink the Navy long before spending money on programs like the LCS.

The whole idea of value, highlighting a discussion of whether or not the gains outweigh the costs, is the key point in the frigate discussion. I'm not sure anything else Vice Adm. Barry McCullough said is even believable, but no one can fault the Navy for whatever decision they make on the value argument because quite honestly, it is very difficult to make the counterargument to value in a time of constricted budgets.

If you read the Navy Times article, the key point isn't really whether or not the Navy should SLEP the frigates. The key point of the article is the deteriorating material condition of the ships, including the minesweepers. It fits in with vague discussions of other platforms, suggesting a broader pattern that should be of concern to Congress.

Keeping the Fleet in Fighting Shape

Some of this I understand, but some of this is bigger than just a few ships that have had accidents.

The Navy estimates it will need a total of $163 million to repair the cruiser Port Royal, which ran aground Feb. 5, as well as the attack submarine Hartford and the amphibious transport dock New Orleans, which collided March 20 in the Strait of Hormuz.

But the Senate Appropriations Committee plans to fund only $155 million in ship maintenance in the supplemental. The Navy would need a total of about $580 million to erase its current maintenance deficit of $417 million and pay for the repairs to its three damaged ships.

The math suggests the Navy is in the red $163 million last year on maintenance costs. I think the Navy has a serious problem, and I think it is time to ask tough questions.

As I walk around the Joint Warfighter Conference I see plenty of training simulation software. The software looks impressive, but what about the results? Cost savings on the front end training maintenance for ships is not a substitute for working on a ship, doing something for real, and getting experience during training instead of on the job. The INSURV report that reviewed 2008 was not pretty. Is the problem shipboard maintenance or shoreside maintenance of our ships? Either way, the problem looking forward doesn't get easier as we reduce crew sizes as a desired metric for new ships in the fleet.

How many sailors on a Burke are specifically there to fight the ship vs there to service the operations of the ship? If more than half the crew is intended to service the ship, why are ships in the fleet failing INSURVs? Why is the Navy under maintenance budget $163 million? Something is wrong, and it suggests the problem is broad, from the training model all the way down to the service model.

Despite COTS, ships continue to get more complex, not less. All electric engineering does not simplify the operation of a ship, it increases the complexity thus increases the required knowledge of a sailor and an officer. Are we asking chiefs to make up for inexperienced sailors who come into the fleet trained? Are simulators effectively training sailors for the maintenance of the fleet?

The fleet we have, the 22 cruisers and 62 destroyers, will be the core of the US fleet for at least the next 25 years. If we are unable to keep these ships in fighting shape, how do we intend to maintain new ships that are more complex and have fewer crews. The Navy needs to get their hands around this problem, and make fixing the problem a top priority.

Impeccable Escort and Global Observations

The Navy has dispatched a destroyer to escort the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23). Washington Post:

The U.S. Navy has dispatched a guided-missile destroyer to the South China Sea after Chinese ships allegedly harassed an American ship operating there last weekend, a Pentagon official said yesterday.

The USS Chung-Hoon, armed with torpedoes and missiles, is stationed in protection of the USNS Impeccable, an ocean surveillance ship.

The USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) is part of the Boxer ESG, or was... which is interesting. Latest news puts the Boxer as the new command ship of CTF-151. This has to be driving the Obama administration crazy.

The Stennis has had to stay north, specifically near North Korea because of the upcoming missile/satellite launch. Japan and South Korea are both a bit nervous and the US Navy presence there keeps allies from making threatening gestures to their neighbors. It is a better than average bet most of our Pacific fleet assets currently at sea are that direction or in some position to track the launch. Remember, our ballistic missile defense ships are mostly in the Pacific.

But the Boxer ESG was also going to the Middle East to replace the Iwo Jima ESG currently in the Med. The Iwo Jima ESG has been out for 6 months, time to come home. The Roosevelt CSG is still in the Middle East, but is supporting Afghanistan and Iraq. The Eisenhower CSG has already deployed to relieve that group in a few weeks.

The Navy has had several very busy years in a row thanks to the Iraq surge, and is still hoping to get more done with fewer ships this year as to get back onto a supportable rotation. Bottom line, the Navy has ships, but is on a rapid tasking schedule and didn't need this off China. Ultimately, it was either the USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93), or the Navy was going to be forced to pull a major asset from the North Korea region to do it.

This is what bothers me though. Why aren't we sending our frigates to Somalia. Seems to me that we should be doing that job with the Perry's so that our AEGIS ships can be over helping our ships getting harassed by China. I guess my question is, why can't the Perry's do piracy, why do we need battleships to fight speedboats?

Just asking...

Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group Deployment

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group deployed over the weekend, and if the news reports are accurate the ship is being deployed to the Middle East to, among other things, fight pirates. The Eisenhower CSG is made up of the following ships:

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64)
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)
USS Halyburton (FFG 40)
USNS Big Horn (T-AO 198)
USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE 2)

Also getting mention as part of the deployment is the USS Stout (DDG 55). News reports are suggesting the ship will be deploying at a later date. It is unclear why the USS Stout (DDG 55) is delayed in deployment, but it is noteworthy that USS Stout (DDG 55) is one of two AEGIS ballistic missile defense ships on the East coast, the other being the USS Ramage (DDG 61) currently forward deployed with the Iwo Jima CSG.

There are currently two strike groups forward deployed to the Middle East region (5th Fleet AOR), the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group and the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group. The TRCSG deployed September 8th, 2008 while the Iwo Jima ESG deployed on August 6th, 2008. The Pacific based Boxer ESG deployed back in early January and is in the Indian Ocean, and should replace the Iwo Jima ESG sometime over the next week or two, and the Eisenhower CSG should arrive to the 5th Fleet region sometime in late March to relieve the Roosevelt CSG.

Also forward deployed at this time is the Stennis CSG in the Pacific, which made news last month when it was revealed the strike group was carrying a large number of modern helicopters, which one would presume is to fight piracy. That was before North Korea decided to test the patience of the new administration.

The Eisenhower CSG deployment is unusual. This is the first time an east coast Carrier Strike Group has deployed in the first 6 months of the year since the George Washington (CVN 73) carrier strike group deployed to the Middle East in January 2004 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Over the past 5 years, carrier strike groups would deploy from the Pacific theater in the first 6 months of the year while the Atlantic fleet carriers would deploy in the last 6 months of the year, but this deployment breaks that pattern.

While the Eisenhower CSG deployment appears aligned with schedule, it does highlight the difficulties the Navy is facing in regards to keeping East coast aircraft carrier availability up. The Navy currently lists six aircraft carriers on the East coast; USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), and USS Enterprise (CVN 65); however numbers are decieving. The USS Enterprise (CVN 65) will not complete its current extended docking availability until at least August. The USS Carl Vison (CVN 70) is still undergoing her nuclear refueling downtime, which will keep the ship unavailable throughout the rest of the year. While there was good news from the builders trials of the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), the ship was commissioned before she was ever tested at sea, and will not actually be available to the fleet for her first deployment until either late 2010 or early 2011.

The results mean the east coast actually only has three aircraft carriers available, and with the deployment of USS Eisenhower (CVN 69) to replace USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), two of those three aircraft carriers are currently on deployment. That leaves only the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) on the east coast available, and that is somewhat misleading as well, since it was only last week that USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) completed its first sea trials after being in the drydock for 7 months. In other words, it will be no sooner than 6 months before Truman is ready to deploy again based on traditional training schedules.

Observing RW in CVW-9

According to Navy Times, we have 75+ aircraft deployed on one of our aircraft carriers. CVW-9 is setting a new standard.

When the John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group left Jan. 17, the Navy began testing a new air wing configuration that features two MH-60 Seahawk helicopter squadrons, rather than one.

Previously, carrier air wings typically deployed with 12 helicopters, which included a squadron and a small detachment, while a small command element remained back on the beach. The rotary-wing aircrafts’ missions were often limited to search-and-rescue and logistical missions.

The new wing configuration has two full squadrons for a total of about 19 aircraft, with their leadership aboard, all under the carrier air wing and strike group commander. These helicopters are heavily armed and will take over missions such as anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and supporting SEALs or other special operations troops.

My list might be outdated. I am guessing the RW squadrons are HSM-71 "Raptors" and HSC-8 "Eightballers". Other squadrons for CVW-9 are listed below.

VFA-154 “Black Knights” (12 F/A-18F)
VFA-146 “Blue Diamonds” (12 F/A-18C)
VFA-147 “Argonauts” (12 F/A-18E)
VMFA-323 “Death Rattlers” (12 F/A-18C)
VAW-112 “Golden Hawks” (4 E-2C)
VAQ-138 “Yellow Jackets” (4 EA-6B)

Read the whole article, it suggests where JCSCSG is heading and why there might be more helicopters than usual.

I have plans to speak with RADM McKnight on Thursday, and if my read of the tea leaves is good, we are going to see some real creativity being used by the Boxer and Stennis Strike Groups once they replace the East coast folks in the near future.

Observing the Atlantic Fleet Rotations

The Navy is shaking things up with the deployment of the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group. Not much, but at least it is something different.

Unlike the usual cruise from Hampton Roads, Va., that proceeds through the Mediterranean and into the waters of the Middle East, the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group — which began deploying Monday — is expected to make its first port call in South Africa in the coming days.

“We have been invited and the planning is in progress,” said Rear Adm. Frank Pandolfe, strike group commander, speaking to reporters on the pier before the ship departed.

This could be happening for any number of reasons, but to increase the presence of US Naval forces off Africa is hardly a bad reason. We need to be more visible, interact as often as possible with local naval and coast guard forces, and in general be present just in case, even if it is just passing through the western coast of Africa.

Of coarse, there could be another legitimate reason. The Iwo Jima ESG is already moving towards, and soon to move through the Mediterranean Sea, and already will be moving through the Suez Canal. Carrier strike groups move faster, and there is no reason to bottle up an ESG adn CSG in the Med at the same time, it sends the wrong messages and can make people nervous. On top of that, we will also soon see Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 move through the Suez Canal as well.

We discussed the window about 11 weeks ago. Well, by this time next week we will see three major strike groups moving towards the Middle East. We do not see this as a US attack on Iran, but we note the timing should Israel decide that is what they want to do. We also expect a number of media outlets to cry the alarm as they do everytime naval forces deploy. The three strike groups are as follows:

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USS Springfield (SSN 761)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)

Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)

Standing NATO Maritime Group 2

NMM Durand de la Penne (D560)
USS Barry (DDG 52)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
TCG Gokova (F496)
GS Karlsruhe (F212)
HS Kountouriotis (F468)
FGS Rhon (A1443)

All are regular rotations. The Theodore Roosevelt CSG is expected to replace the Reagan CSG, which will be conducting exercises with India in October. The Iwo Jima ESG is expected to relieve the Peleliu ESG, and SNMG-2 has exercises planned with Kuwait and UAE.

Hurricane Gustav Response Preparations

As Hurricane Gustav approaches the Gulf of Mexico the DoD is preparing its response. This article lays out all the DoD preparations, but we note the last paragraph is the naval response being prepared.

Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, Va., has given direction to three amphibious ships -- the USS Bataan, the USS Nassau and the USS Ponce -- to be prepared to sortie if needed. The command also has at its disposal additional communications, engineering, and aviation units.

It is an interesting combination of ships. The USS Nassau (LHA 4) just returned from deployment a few weeks ago, while the USS Bataan (LHD 5) is probably the next Atlantic fleet LHD to forward deploy. USS Ponce (LPD 15) returned earlier this year with the Kearsarge ESG.

There are reasons why we constantly call for more amphibious ships, the op-tempo doesn't match the priority. The LPD-4s are getting very old, very fast and the LPD-17s are coming online very slow. The USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) and USS Peleliu (LHA 5) are both on scheduled deployments, while the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) is on a soft power mission for SOUTHCOM. The USS Tarawa (LHA 1) is currently under way in the Pacific after completing Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX 2008 military exercises on Aug. 22.

We only have 10 LHA/LHDs in inventory. With the Essex ESG fall cruise to begin in about a month or so, if the three ships named above have to deploy for hurricane response, that would mean 6 of the ten LHA/LHDs would be on deployment, leaving the forward deployed Essex, the USS Boxer (LHD 4), and the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) available. The USS Wasp (LHD 1) is still in dry dock, being fixed up to support MV-22s.

This is another example why we believe Robert Farley has it exactly right, the amphibious ship is the dreadnought of this era. Presidents in the 21st century no longer ask "where are the carriers" because we currently do not face foes at sea that will compete against our naval forces, instead we face challenges on land that require maneuver by sea capable of putting boots on the ground.

Oh that's right, Russia is the big naval threat now... not. Show me evidence Russia wants to go to war with the United States, and I'll entertain the idea.

The Navy, Oil Prices, and Iran

We got about 15,000 new visitors last week when we observed the Navy's Fleet Response Plan assembling aircraft carrier forces at an unusually high availability leading into the summer. Our observations were made prior to the deployment of the Reagan Carrier Strike Group on Monday. A large number of those hits came within the context of whoever posted the link, which resulted in our relaxed commentary of the topic to set expectations for the reader to 'fill in the details' within any context. We observe one such new reader apparently works for Fox Business channel, and decided to pump up the price of oil with a discussion of Iran and the US Navy.

The facts as spoken are not inaccurate, but the context is. The US Navy does currently have 6 aircraft carriers on deployment, and while that number will reduce to 5 with the return of the Truman, it may very well go back up to 6 again this summer.

As for a strike against Iran? Not likely. Only the Abraham Lincoln CSG will be in the Middle East region over the next several months, and we do not expect to see a second carrier in the region until the Theodore Roosevelt CSG deploys this summer. We observe half of the carriers currently counted among the 6 deployed intend to replace the other half of carriers also counted among the 6 deployed. The USS George Washington (CVN 73) is replacing the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) in Japan, while the recently deployed USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) is replacing the USS Nimitz (CVN 68). The fifth and sixth carrier currently deployed is the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), which was last spotted near Greece on what is basically the return home after spending 5 months in the Gulf after being relieved from station by the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72).

Is Fox Business Channel telling us something new? If so, we don't see it. We do not expect to see the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) or USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) to deploy this summer, as carriers in surge status they would only deploy due to emerging contingencies. We could be missing something though, wouldn't be the first time. We note this video as yet another media report that observes the high availability of aircraft carrier forces this year and links it to the strange events taking place with oil prices. Consider the reporting, even the video discussions note the reduced demand worldwide, the stockpiling for oil in the Middle East which many have been discussing, which together mean increased supply with less demand while price speculators continue to pump the price up.

Two final thoughts, what language has become a primary focus of study in the DoD right now? Answer: Farsi. What do almost all reservists drills for the Navy and Air Force resemble? Answer: A war with Iran.

Food for thought.

Pacific Carrier Strike Group Deploys Next Week

The Navy announced today that the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group will deploy on Monday May 19th. This is a scheduled deployment, part of the excellent availability the US Navy has achieved with its carrier forces this year. The timing has very little to do with ongoing events, specifically by departing on May 19th, the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group will be home by Christmas.

The Ronald Reagan Strike Group has five escorts:

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76)
USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
USS Gridley (DDG 101)
USS Howard (DDG 83)
USS Decatur (DDG 73)
USS Thach (FFG 43)

Strategically this gives the US Navy a number of short term and long term options. In the short term, this deployment will free up 2 aircraft carrier strike groups, the Kitty Hawk and the Nimitz, both currently operating in the western Pacific for a possible response to Myanmar for humanitarian operations.

Over the long term we observe that for the next 5 months, the Navy will have two of its west coast carrier strike groups, the Reagan and the Lincoln, forward deployed and available for contingencies in the Pacific throughout the Olympic games. The Lincoln CSG is currently the only aircraft carrier operating in the Middle East, but will be relieved of those duties later this summer (likely August) by the Roosevelt CSG when it deploys from the west coast. This should provide the Navy with plenty of regional coverage while the George Washington replaces the Kitty Hawk in Japan this summer.

While it is possible the Reagan CSG conducts exercises with India, we do not expect the Reagan Carrier Strike Group to deploy to the Middle East.

5th Fleet Focus: Knowing Which Ships To Observe

You have to hand it to the Navy, the USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) gets new orders, and the ship gets a new website. We haven't seen anything online yet, but the USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) supposedly departs today for the 5th Fleet to replace the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) whose 6 month tour is coming to an end.

While it is commonplace for those who read the Navy tea leaves that talk about the deployments of the big strike groups and what it might mean for someones political agenda, this blog continues to observe the deployment of the amphibious ships to the 5th Fleet theater of operations as the most important and interesting so far this century, deployments that strike to the purpose of a peacetime Navy. We observe that if an officer or sailor wants to be on the front line of the action of the surface fleet in the US Navy today, serving on a LSD in the Atlantic fleet continues to be the most likely place to get combat experience at sea.

Prior to the launching of Tomahawks by a submarine recently, the previous two naval ships to fire weapons at a hostile was the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) at pirates off Somalia and USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) in the Strait of Hormuz at some idiot acting aggressively. We wish good luck to CDR Heidi Agle and her crew as they head into the 5th Fleet region, based on the history of these types of deployments, the USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) is the ship most likely to make a positive impact to commercial traffic off east Africa in the next 6 months, and the ship most likely to engage in a firefight in the next 6 months. In other words, the ship is most representative of the scope of roles as outlined in the Maritime Strategy.

In our book, that makes the USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) deployment the most interesting to watch for the next 6 months of 2008.

Observing 2008 Scheduled Deployments

The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group has been given their orders.

Three locally based Navy warships from Everett and a Navy air squadron from Whidbey Island will depart Mar. 13 for a six-month deployment to the Western Pacific, the Navy said Thursday.

The USS Abraham Lincoln, based at Naval Station Everett, will lead Carrier Strike Group nine, grow its own crew to nearly 5,000 as it takes on pilots and crews of nearly 10 air squadrons.

Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group

USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)
USS Mobile Bay (CG 53)
USS Russell (DDG 59)
USS Shoup (DDG 86)
USS Momsen (DDG 92)
USS Curts (FFG 38)

CVW-2 USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)
VFA-2 F/A-18F Bounty Hunters
VFA-137 F/A-18E Kestrels
VFA-151 F/A-18C Vigilantes
VFA-34 F/A-18C Blue Blasters
VAQ-131 EA-6B Lancers
VAW-116 E-2C Sun Kings
HS-2 HH-60H/SH-60F Golden Falcons
HSL-47 SH-60B Saberhawks
VRC-30 Det 2 C-2A Providers

The March CSG Pacific deployments for the last few years has been one of the most active, most interesting to observe, and I'd bet one of the better deployments one could make in the Navy. On top of all of the exercises the Strike Group will participate in, they are also going to be at sea during the Olympic Games in China this year. We also note they will be at sea during the usual periods we see North Korea try to grab headlines with their nonsense, usually in the early summer when the humidity is high and the power is low.

Among other scheduled deployments upcoming this year we continue to observe is the USS George Washington, which will put to sea in April for its move to the Pacific to replace the Kitty Hawk in Japan. We also expect to see the Reagan CSG deploy in the spring to replace the Truman CSG in the Gulf, and the Peleliu ESG will be making a deployment later this year from the Pacific as well. Also later this year we expect to see both the Roosevelt CSG and Iwo Jima ESG deploy from the Atlantic. The Iwo Jima ESG in particular will be one to watch for, because it will be the first deployment for the USS San Antonio (LPD 17), sometime in the Sept/Oct time frame.

Among other deployment activities we continue to look for, it is unclear which ship if any will replace the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) as her tour approaches completion. The combination of delays into service of the first few LPD-17s and the busy schedule for LSDs, from operations in the fifth fleet to security cooperation exercises like Global Fleet Stations, POA 2007, and CARAT, the amphibious fleet has been working overtime.

From what we understand, there will be a Global Fleet Station mission to east Africa in a few months, but we are yet to see an announcement regarding which ship will fill that role. We also remain curious if the Navy will both conduct a GFS in east Africa, and also continue the single deployments of amphibious ships to the 5th fleet, or continue the GFS off West Africa after the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) mission completes.

Given the rotation schedules and observing the amphibious ships working up for the ESG deployments, it looks to us that one of the next ships in line for one of these independent amphibious ship deployments, at least from an availability perspective, might be the USS New Orleans (LPD 18).

Could we see both the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) and USS New Orleans (LPD 18) both on deployment by the end of the year? Probably not, but the lack of availability for amphibious ships due to their heavy usage is noteworthy, and we observe that when the Navy dips into its bag of ships, they will probably pull out another LSD. It is going to cost a fortune to support the LSD fleet in the future as LSDs continue to be in use more average days annually than any other platform type by percentage. Want to live at sea in the US Navy? Serve on an LSD.