Observations on CS-21R

It’s taken me a few weeks to find the time to finish reading CS-21R and write up my thoughts. Overall I believe the document does an excellent job articulating how the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard intend to ‘man, train, and equip’ in this era of uneasy international peace, increasingly revisionist and adversarial great powers, dramatic technological change, and American self-imposed fiscal paralysis. The signals CS-21R sends regarding the importance of being prepared both materially and intellectually for waging major maritime war are exemplary, especially in the sense that our prospects for preventing such a war depend greatly upon that exact preparation. Likewise, CS-21R’s discussions of how the cyber and electromagnetic domains are central to modern warfare—and what steps the sea services will take to ensure their readiness to fight in those domains—are simply outstanding.

Strengths

Here are the items I found particularly commendable:

• Continues 2007 CS-21’s emphasis on international maritime security cooperation. Restates importance of working with longstanding allies, building new partnerships with formally non-aligned states, and even cooperating with competitors where possible on enhancing the security of the global maritime commons. Recognizes allies would play essential roles in major maritime combat, and that further interoperability enhancements are therefore required.

• Cements ADM Greenert’s maxim of “Warfighting First.” Sends unambiguous message that fleet design, operating concept development, platform and system procurement, and force-wide training are to be focused on developing the capabilities needed for waging major maritime war.

• Strong emphasis on maintaining peacetime forward naval presence. Details specific forces that will be deployed (whether permanently or rotationally) in specific regions for certain peacetime missions.

• Addresses the global strategic changes since 2007 CS-21. Chinese and Russian behavior called out as major influences on CS-21R. Chinese and Russian maritime warfare capabilities are clear factors (to those versed in modern maritime warfare concepts, emerging defense technologies, competitors’ orders of battle, etc.) driving the required Navy capabilities and competencies outlined in the document.

• Clearly informed by the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and Air-Sea Battle/Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). Heavy attention to measures for establishing/restoring/maintaining access to theaters of interest whether during peacetime or war. Advances idea that holistic ‘All Domain Access’ is a core Navy function on par with deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. Whether one agrees with it being a Navy function or not, it unmistakably indicates that Navy leadership is prioritizing development of capabilities, competencies, and operating concepts that will help overcome access challenges.

• Underscores expectation that future combat (especially in the event of major war) will occur under conditions of intense cyber-electromagnetic opposition. Articulates roles of cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and command and control warfare in obtaining operational access as well as in defeating adversary forces.

• Articulates the minimum overall fleet size as well as the minimum inventories of major power projection combatant types needed to execute the Maritime Strategy (and by implication national grand strategy) in peacetime and war. Note, though, that this force structure is—by definition—likely right up against the strategic “tipping point” as defined in CNA’s March 2010 study of the same name. James Holmes thoroughly dissects exactly this point in an excellent piece at Real Clear Defense this week.

• Strategic deterrence emphasized as a principal Navy mission.

• Recognizes that projection of power ashore can represent all forms of national power; it is not just physical strikes or amphibious assaults.

• Recognizes that sea control is a precondition for performing power projection tasks.

• Expands details regarding how Marine Corps and Coast Guard will be employed to execute the vision as compared to 2007 CS-21.

“Must” Statements

It is quite revealing to look at what CS-21R lists as imperatives. Unlike “Will” statements that pronounce intentions, a “Must” statement implies requirements imposed on the sea services. Of the five “Musts” in the document, three are directly related to cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare:

• “Naval forces must have the resilience to operate under the most hostile cyber and EM conditions.” (Pg. 8)

•  “…we must become more comprehensive in our offensive capability to defeat the system rather than countering individual weapons.” (refers to adversary long-range maritime strike systems, Pg. 21)

• “…the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain a fleet of more than 300 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile submarines (replaced by 12 Ohio Replacement Program SSBN(X)), and 33 amphibious ships, while the Coast Guard must maintain a fleet of 91 National Security, Offshore Patrol, and Fast Response Cutters.” (Pg. 27)

• “[Naval combatants] “must be complemented by reconfigurable platforms such as the Joint High Speed Vessel, National Security Cutter, and auxiliaries including Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships, Dry Cargo/Ammunition (T-AKE) ships, Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP), and the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB).” (Pg. 28)

• “The electromagnetic-cyber environment is now so fundamental to military operations and so critical to our national interests that we must treat it as a warfighting domain on par with sea, air, land, and space.” (Pg. 33)

Concerns

There are countless views on what CS-21R should or should not have contained, should or should not have said, and so forth. You can’t fully satisfy everyone all of the time, myself included.

In his comments on Bryan McGrath’s ID post on CS-21R, John McLain (formerly of OPNAV N51) talks about the numerous revisions that occurred while routing the draft document up the chain and across organizations for review. I’ve done my share of document development and routing, and I fully appreciate John’s point: consensus generally requires tradeoffs and compromises on content. He’s also quite correct that the process for developing a strategy, tracking its implementation, communicating its ideas, and adapting it over time as the strategic environment changes and lessons are learned is just as important as what the product document actually says.

In hopes of contributing to the next iteration of this process, I’ve listed my main critiques of CS-21R below:

• CS-21R seems to assume the reader already agrees with the assertion that forward naval presence is of vital importance to U.S. grand strategy. Though the document summarizes major benefits that flow from presence, it surprisingly does not go to the lengths previous publicly-released U.S. Maritime Strategies did to underscore the case. The 1986 publicly-released Maritime Strategy document was remarkably specific in explaining conventional deterrence’s dependence upon forward presence (examples: limited time available for mobilization, sheer distances to reach theaters of interest, immediate and short-term military balances in theater with emphasis on warfighting capabilities, and need for broad escalation management options). 2007 CS-21 did so as well, albeit to a lesser degree given the strategic environment of the time. The question of whether or not CS-21R should have been more detailed on this topic is not academic, as it is clear that many of America’s political leaders and opinion elites either do not appreciate what is at risk as forward naval presence (and domestic Coast Guard coverage) declines—or loudly refute these risks exist. I would argue that no good opportunity to increase the visibility of one’s case to those open to being convinced (especially by countering critics’ arguments) should ever be rejected. 

• Despite exceptional discussions of how forward presence will be achieved despite insufficient force structure to meet full Combatant Commander demands, there is limited discussion of how this presence will trade against the rest of the fleet’s surge readiness (even if the 2011 Budget Control Act ceilings are repealed). The Optimized Fleet Response Plan is explained, but the issues it mitigates are alluded to rather than spelled out. A non-navalist reader might come away with the incorrect impression that there were no serious trades between forward presence and fleet readiness/reset.

• On that note, there is no discussion of the steps or resources needed to reset the fleet from the maintenance/manning shortfalls of the past decade and the more recent optempo crisis. This is one of the highest priority issues articulated in Navy leadership’s Congressional testimony as well as public statements, but it is surprisingly not addressed in CS-21R.

• CS-21R acknowledges conventional deterrence has requirements, variables, and implications that are distinct from those concerning nuclear deterrence. But unlike the publicly-released 1986 document or 2007 CS-21, CS-21R doesn’t connect how everything else it articulates is informed by basic conventional deterrence principles or otherwise promotes deterrence credibility. The discussions of how naval combatants support conventional deterrence is implicitly power projection-centric; the wording creates an impression that conventional deterrence centers on strike capabilities (and land-attack at that). The importance of sea control to deterrence by denial (examples: war at sea operations, protection of vital sea lanes for allies economic sustenance as well as reinforcement of our and their forward defenses) is overlooked. Additionally, CS-21R does not explain how the forces allocated to each theater of interest will support deterrence beyond simply ‘showing the flag;’ their latent warfighting roles within a theater deterrent are left implicit.

• Beyond platforms supporting strategic deterrence (SSBNs) or heavy conventional power projection (e.g. carriers, amphibious warships), it is left unclear how the rest of the fleet’s platforms trade against each other. SSN and LCS-FF acquisitions are arguably the Navy’s highest priority non-capital combatant programs right now per Navy leadership talking point emphasis, but neither is mentioned explicitly in that context. Nor is there any allusion to what will be sacrificed or what risks will be accepted to make those procurements possible. These considerations will become increasingly important in preparing U.S. maritime strategy for the fiscal pressures that will emerge during the final years of this decade and stretch into the 2020s…regardless of whether the 2011 Budget Control Act ceilings are lifted.

• CS-21R’s discussion of sea control recognizes that the condition reflects local margin of superiority, but it does not note that this condition is generally temporary. It also does not note that sea control is not something sought in and of itself, but rather is sought for discrete operational purposes.

•  Strategic sealift is mentioned but its criticality is not underlined. America’s ability to wage war overseas depends on strategic sealift; this message should not be left implicit.

• Standing peacetime European maritime security and deterrence is clearly being left to European militaries, with contributions from the four BMD-capable DDGs in Rota and forces transiting through EUCOM en route to other theaters. This may be all that is possible given the U.S. Navy’s fleet size and the operational demands in East/Southeast/Southwest Asia. It is also likely consistent with current Defense Planning Guidance. It strikes me as odd, though, for this to be the case in the theater in which the risk of major war is presently highest and conventional deterrence credibility is accordingly most needed. In this light, it is even odder that the section defining how and why the Navy will achieve presence in the European theater does not mention the Russian threat at all (especially when Russian revanchism was mentioned in the global security environment section). Europe is primarily referred to as a bridge for projecting power into other theaters or as a locus for maritime security efforts; in other words a means to an end rather than a set of allies (and a representation of values) that we are committed to defend. Given the fact that European militaries (and especially navies) are struggling for funding and are already far less capable than the U.S. Navy, it is questionable whether this element of CS-21R will endure long if Russian coercion against NATO continues to increase. If this is the case, then there is a gap in CS-21R regarding how trades with presence/operational requirements in other theaters will be managed.

•  The 1986 publicly-released Maritime Strategy was a product of the pre-Goldwater/Nichols era, and so its discussion of how the Navy would move pieces around on the global chessboard in a general war does not carry over into the Combatant Commander-dominant era in which CS-21R resides. But the 1986 document also explained how the Navy’s basic operating concepts provided specific means for achieving strategic ends in a generic major war. It outlined how each element of the fleet would operate together (as well as with Joint and allied forces) within combined arms campaign constructs. That’s still germane today under ‘man-train-equip,’ and it can be argued that it’s a crucial missing piece for justifying the force structure articulated by CS-21R as well as explaining to non-experts (and especially some critics) how a modern combined arms maritime force works.

o   Example: strike is the single explicitly articulated mission for aircraft carriers in CS-21R, even though their roles supporting sea control are arguably just as important. The caption addressing the E-2D Hawkeye’s role in the Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air concept (pg. 20) speaks indirectly to the carrier’s central sea control roles; it is surprising that this was not echoed in the document’s main body narrative.

o   Example: very limited discussion of how the sea services are supported by the Air Force (beyond aerial refueling and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance) and the Army (beyond Integrated Air and Missile Defense), or how the Navy supports those services (beyond kinetic and non-kinetic fires, plus intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance). This could have been used to further connect how CS-21R connects with JOAC and JAM-GC.

My critiques should not be interpreted to detract from the exceptional work done by the CS-21R development team. They have powerfully communicated the message that readiness to deter—and if necessary wage—major war is once again America’s sea services’ paramount priority. They have heralded the idea that 21^st Century seapower will depend in great part on the ability to fight in the cyber and electromagnetic domains. They have upheld the notion that maritime security cooperation remains central to the functioning of the international system.

Job well done.

 

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Corvettes Belong in the Surface Force Structure

MEDITERRANEAN SEA (May 28, 2024) An Italian Navy visit, board, search and seizure team returns to the Italian Navy offshore patrol vessel ITS Comandante Foscari (P-493) after completing inspections aboard the Military Sealift Command container and roll-on/roll-off ship USNS LCPL Roy H. Wheat (T-AK 3016) during the at sea portion of exercise Phoenix Express 2010 (PE 10). PE-10 is a two-week exercise designed to strengthen maritime partnership and enhance stability in the region through increased interoperability and cooperation among partners from Africa, Europe and United States. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jimmy C. Pan/Released)

The following contribution is by CDR Phillip E. Pournelle, USN. CDR Phillip E. Pournelle is a Surface Warfare Officer and an Operations Analysts.  He currently serves as a military advisor to OSD’s Office of Net Assessment.

Lazarus’ reply to my 4 November continues an important ongoing debate within the Naval Strategy community but contains some contradictions, resurrects a straw-man to be knocked down, and takes significant confidence in capabilities which are not proven.  Lazarus is correct in stating defensive systems have matured (but as we shall see there is considerable doubt about their equality with ASCMs) but does not acknowledge many of these defensive systems can now be placed on smaller ships.  He argues larger ships “do not usually fight as single units” but does not give corvettes the same consideration, thus resurrecting a straw man.  As I stated in my last essay, no one would argue for replacing the whole fleet with flotillas of corvettes and patrol vessels, only rebalancing in the face of advancing technologies.

Lazarus and other place a lot of confidence in Aegis systems and anchor the US Navy’s strategy in their effectiveness.  Based on my own experience with the Aegis systems, I think it would be prudent to hedge our strategies, particularly in the confusing littoral environment.    Lazarus eschews Hughes New Navy Fighting Machine and derides its reliance on a “family of ships” concept, but fails to recognize we are reliant on a “family of ships” concept today made up of CVNs, DDGs, and soon LCS.

Evolution of Defense Systems

Cruise missile technology has come a long way and poses a significant threat to ships.  Current ASCMs feature subsonic and supersonic capabilities, advanced seeker systems, and counter-measures today.  Lazarus argues defensive systems are multiplying and keeping up with the offense.  Lazarus cites the importance of Naval Tactical Data Systems (NTDS) to allow for the development of a shared tactical picture which bolsters the effectiveness of ship defensive systems, but later states such data systems are vulnerable, contradicting himself.  In response to ASCMs, defensive weapons such as the SPY radar and associated Aegis weapons systems has been deployed.  However, these systems have not been proven in combat.  In fairness advanced cruise missiles (with the minor exception of an attack on INS Hanit) have not been proven recently either.  All the more reason to be skeptical and not make strategies reliant on these assumptions.  He further calls upon future systems such as directed energy weapons and advanced decoy systems.  Hardkill lasers effective against ASCMs will not be in the fleet in the near future.  Further due to cooling and power requirements such lasers will be restricted to larger ships such as an aircraft carrier.  Even when deployed they are not a panacea, dwell time to burn through on targets will limit the number of weapons which can be engaged in a wave.  While important to bolster other defenses they can be overwhelmed.  Advanced decoys will be increasingly important for the survival of all surface ships, however there is no evidence of resources being placed against this problem.  Further decoys are only as effective as their ability to emulate the platform they are tasked to defend.  The larger or more unique the signature of the intended target, the harder this becomes.   Smaller ships offer smaller signatures, making such decoys more effective.  Further constant active and unique signatures such as SPY-1 radars are impossible for small decoys to emulate.

Lazarus states the collective defenses of Arleigh Burke class DDGs and Perry class frigates are not accounted for in Captains Hughes and Klines’ work.  If anything the defensive systems in Hughes’ Salvo Equations over credit defensive systems, particularly collective defenses, and do not account for leakers and other factors.  But Hughes’ maxim “Fire Effectively First” remains valid, and illustrates the offensive dominant environment naval warfare continues to remain in.   Meanwhile, Lazarus ignores the illustration in the previous essay on the difficulty of an opponent to search for, identify, and keep track of a more dispersed force and the exorbitant level of effort to remove such a force without a response in a crisis.  The lack of US surface forces offensive capabilities is a separate shortfall of its own which has been recently recognized.

The Schulte Thesis

Lazarus questions the value of the Schulte thesis in evaluating the argument regarding offense versus defense.  He is correct in stating the thesis is over 20 years old and the collection of events covers manual missile launch systems and not the modern automated systems such as Aegis.  He accurately cites ships in the study lacked of secondary hardkill systems such as close in weapons (CIWS).  However, smaller ships, particularly corvettes cited in my essay (such as the Ambassador class today) increasingly have their own defensive SAM systems and CIWS.

Softkill systems have a history of wartime success.  “Softkill measures employed against anti-ship missiles were extremely successful, seducing or decoying every missile they were used against.  In every enegagment where a defender was alert and deployed softkill measures, every missile salvo was entirely defeated.” (Schulte)  Lazarus is correct the Schulte’s examples did not include modern Aegis like systems, but then we have not had a wartime environment to test them against.  But Schulte goes on to say the trend in missile development indicates more sophisticated ASCMs in the future and modern history confirms this. Prudence would then dictate the employment of a combined effort.  Using unclassified data in work by Chris Carlson and Larry Bond in Harpoon 4, there appears to be a knee in the curve where a ship is large enough to carry hardkill defensive systems and yet not be too large to negate the effectiveness of sofkill defenses such as chaff, decoys, and modern obscurants (somewhere between 350 and 800 tons).

We should not anchor our strategies on the effectiveness of hardkill systems.  We have reason to question the effectiveness of such systems.  While modeling and simulation are important tools and must be employed to update analysis on the competition of ASCM and defenses, they are only as effective as the input data.  The confidence we place in these numbers is derived entirely by the number of engagements conducted in complex electromagnetic environments.  If a ship provides a unique signature (SPY-1) it provides a targeting solution, and thus becomes extremely reliant on hardkill systems.  Should those hardkill systems not be effective (or more likely subject to leakers) we could face the loss of a lot of capabilities in one larger ship versus a proportional loss in the sinking of a ship in a flotilla of more distributed capabilities.

Deployment and Survivability

A force of more numerous smaller combatants is more survivable than one of fewer larger combatants.  I provided the comparison of cost equivalent forces of one Arleigh Burke DDG or four Ambassador class missile boats in one illustration.  (I’ll add here another comparison:  For the cost of one Littoral Combat ship with two helicopters we could deploy 14 Sentinel class patrol craft with increased firepower within the displacement capabilities of the hull design.)  But rather than address the resilience these forces bring to the fight he resurrects the straw-man argument.  Again no one would argue for the replacement of all large ships for flotillas, just a balanced force where flotilla ships represent a small proportion of the budget but a large number of hulls.  Further the flotilla ships would gain the same protections and support from an integrated fleet as each destroyer would.  They would benefit from the same data links and Airborne Early Warning (AEW), should they be available.  If such data links are vulnerable, the destroyers would be subject to the same degradation.

Flotillas of smaller ships would relieve destroyers to execute missions they are uniquely capable of doing.  Lazarus cites the placement of four destroyers off the coast of Syria.  DoD statements indicate they were placed there to conduct missile defense and strikes using tomahawk missiles if necessary.  Flotilla ships would not be capable of doing these missions, though they would contribute to their effectiveness as surface and air picket ships.  If the mission required the boarding of ships potentially carrying contraband, flotilla ships could conduct the boarding, enabling the destroyers to remain on their primary task.  The larger number of ships would also enable the fleet to meet contingencies in the face of decreasing resources.  Flotilla ships would meet the requirements for boarding operations and other tasks so a Destroyer would not have to be pulled from these high end missions.

Large ships do not take much more damage than smaller ships.  Lazarus cites the recent sinking exercise (SINKEX) of  ex-USS Buchanan (DDG14) to show modern warships are able to take more resilient to attack than I contend.  This one example is contradicted by multiple studies employing larger data sets of much more armored ships in actual combat (See The Application of the Sochard Ship Damage Model to World War II Ship Damage by Brzozowsky and Memmesheimer, published by Naval Surface Warfare Center 17 June 2024 or Warship Damage Rules for Naval Wargaming by Richard L. Humphrey of the Naval Surface Warfare Center presented to TIMS/ORSA in May 1990.)     Further the SINKEX example may speak more to the lack of offensive punch on the US Navy’s part than the resilience of the specific ship.  What clouds the issue further is when ships are prepared for a SINKEX all fuel, ordnance and other flammables are removed and machinery is not operating, effectively removing what makes a warship a warship.  As weapons become more accurate and employ anti-radiation systems, they will nullify the effectiveness of armored systems.  For a warships to be effective, it must perceive the outside world either directly or by third parties.  The means to perceive the outside world is very soft in comparison to any armor.  Accurate attacks on these soft parts would render a warships out of action.  Therefore in this offensive dominant, numbers matter, and distributing capabilities becomes crucial to ensure the robustness of the entire force, not just a single element.

The sinking of a vessel is a bit of a red herring as the studies show a ship will take far more damage to sink than to be rendered out of commission.   The ratio of ordnance to sink a ship vs knocking it out of action, has a ball-park factor of about three to one, the bigger the ship the bigger the difference.  But a damaged large ship poses a much greater challenge than a lost small ship.  With all the monetary and emotional capital tied up in the larger ship, there will be significant impetus to rescue and recover the ship, tying up an enormous amount of resources to protect it, tow it, etc. The advantage of small ships with small crews is that they can be more readily abandoned after taking off the crew. That is why the smallest tactical formation should be a complementary pair of warships. The second ship not only fights synergistically (if practiced) but it is there to nourish the cripple. If the cripple is big, the consort protects the wounded beast, if small then the consort saves the crew and kills it.

The New Navy Fighting Machine

Captain Hughes’ The New Navy fighting Machine (NNFM) is a seminal work in the start of the discussion of the Flotilla concept.  It starts with the impact of the offensive dominant environment naval warfare has been in since its inception with rare and short-lived reversals in the offense-defense competition.  As more and more capabilities are concentrated into fewer and fewer ships, the loss of a single ship represents a loss of considerable capabilities.  When a destroyer is lost to a torpedo launched by a submarine, the fleet loses its strike and missile defense capabilities along with its unsuccessful anti-submarine capability.  With this in mind, Captain Hughes and his compatriots illustrate the need to distribute capabilities and remind fleet designers we do not have a limit in the number ships we may deploy, but a limitation in the amount of money for their total ownership.  While larger ships are marginally more efficient than smaller ones, extremism in pursuit of that efficiency creates a brittle fleet.

Historically the fleet has quickly discovered the value of large numbers of small ships integrated into a family of ships in wartime.  Among the ships built during World War II were 349 destroyers, 420 destroyer escorts and numerous sub chasers to provide the numbers required to meet the threat.  If such ships were of little historical value, why did the US Navy build so many and divert such resources away from ships of the line?  Because numbers mattered.

I have my own disagreements with Captain Hughes and company in NNFM, but agree with the general principle.   For example, I think there will be a need for amphibious operations, particularly because of the threat of shore based missile batteries hidden like the Hezbollah battery in 2006.  The US Navy-Marine Corps Team must address how we will get forces ashore and root out such threats in littorals and chokepoints.  Second, I think his cost figures are optimistic and rely too much on foreign built ships, which is why my own analyses are based on US built ships.  But the general principle of distribution of capabilities is critical to the future survival of the fleet.  Further we must be prepared to examine how we build ships as technology is quickly changing ships characteristics.  I agree with Rear Adm. Thomas Rowden we must be prepared to quickly update our combat systems to keep abreast of the threat.  However, additive manufacturing, nano-technology, and other trends will have as great of an effect on propulsion, ship forms, Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) in the future as combat systems.  Such effects may overtake current ships designs and we must be open to the possibility our hulls may have to be replaced just as quickly as our combat systems, possibly around twenty years, to be able to stay ahead of any competition.

We are on the precipice of radical changes in naval warfare and must be prepared to understand them and embrace them to stay ahead.  Lazarus argues the concepts and principles of the NNFM are unlikely to survive professional, operational, and public review, that such broad concepts seldom emerge intact from the Planning, Programming and Budgetary system.  If such things were always true, we would still be operating Battleships and never have adopted Aircraft Carriers, Nuclear Submarines, or Aegis Destroyers.  Fortunately, the United States Navy has institutions such as the Naval War College and the Naval Post Graduate School to challenge the status quo and explore the possible futures.  At one time we had a Cycle of Research to explore these possibilities through a series of wargames, analyses, and fleet exercises overseen by the General Board. (Nofi’s To Train the Fleet for War)   We need to return to these bold experiments now in peace time or we will forced to in time of conflict, with much more at stake.  To dismiss even the exploration of such concepts due to perceived organizational barriers is intellectual malfeasants.

Hidden Costs and Limitation in Deployed Small Combatants

There are additional costs to flotillas but they are manageable and cost effective in light of potential threats.  The need for assigning warships to counter Chinese aggression is not unique to the Flotilla concept but to any fleet we deploy.  The difference is whether we are present to shape events or not.  To borrow Captain Hendrix’s theme, we need to “be on base,” we need to be there if we wish to influence events.  Sentinel class fast response cutters have an endurance on par with the LCS, but far more can be acquired for the same price.  Further as stated in my last article, if we develop these platforms and associated doctrine, we can expect others who truly need them to follow suit and/or purchase such vessels from us.  If enough vessels are in the area, we can drive the level of effort to remove such a force to a point where an opponent would have to mobilize considerable strength to execute such a mission.  Such would provide considerable opportunity to gain indications and warnings to respond, thus reducing operational level surprise.

Such a force should be paired with an equally distributed logistics system.  Lazarus cites the vulnerability of infrastructure to support flotilla operations and states such bases are vulnerable to air attack and blockade.  However, such vulnerabilities are not unique to the flotilla.  In fact our current reliance on large, deep draft combat logistics ships limits the number of ports they can operate from.  If flotillas are combined with a mobile land logistics component and the use of offshore supply vessels, they can distribute the logistics nodes and remove the brittleness of overly centralized logistics enemy ballistic missiles are designed to take advantage of.

The littoral environment is dangerous for high profile ships such as destroyers and aircraft carrier to operate in.  However, they can provide support to flotillas which do operate in the clutter of the littorals and prevent an opponent from gaining lodgment within them.  If forced from the littorals due to the threat, even more effort will be required to fight our way back in.  An opponent will have more time to hide ASCM batteries, mines, and other weapons while we are away.  This is why we must “cede no water,” particularly littorals, to an opponent.  A combined force can enable this objective.  The flotillas operate in the littoral while the carrier and destroyers operate further back.  They provide support such as AEW, helicopters, and long range missiles to prevent bombers and other aircraft from picking off the flotilla ships at their leisure.   Our own or allies’ shore batteries provide support with UAVs, ASCMs and other capabilities to the flotillas.  Then as we shape the environment and can choose the timing, flotillas can conduct raids to prevent an opponent from being able to exercise sea control and consolidate their gains.

Strategy Before Force Structure

Lazarus and I are in violent agreement the US navy must determine what naval strategy it will employ, both in the pacific and throughout the world, before another keel is laid or operational concept is employed.  But we must signal to potential opponents we will “cede no water.”  They cannot push us out employing anti-access or area denial weapons and platforms.    Lazarus overstates the desired goal with the straw-man these flotillas will operate alone and unsupported.  The truth is quite the opposite, flotillas must be integrated and we must explore the proper doctrine to enable a balanced combined arms fleet to overcome these arising threats.   Lazarus argues we cannot afford to divert even a small portion of our resources away from our diminishing number of high end warships such as DDGs and LCS.  This reminds me of the rhyme of how a kingdom is lost for the want of a nail.  If our fleet of small numbers of large ships is so fragile it cannot afford the loss of a single ship due to budgeting, how will it survive the inevitable losses of combat?

The flotillas operate to support a larger strategy.  To influence events, the United States Navy must be present.  In the offensive dominant environment of the sea, such presence particularly during a rising crisis, must be resilient enough to operate given the tight rules of engagement likely to arise in just these circumstances.  To be an effective deterrence ships must be visible to the enemy and in the areas of dispute which are likely to be cluttered and cramped.  Therefore, the time or space high end vessels require to be effectively defended will not be available.  A flotilla as part of a combined arms force at sea can provide the on the scene presence backed up by higher end assets further out in the room they require.  Such a flotilla requires relatively small expenditures, but return a remarkable number of hulls for just this kind of environment.

Much more work is needed to explore these concepts.  We successfully employed a Cycle of Research between World War I and World War II.  We must revive this cycle and examine many new concepts including flotillas.  We must understand how such forces will be integrated into the larger fleet.   We must understand the concept of combined arms in the littorals.  Technology is rapidly changing the world, especially naval warfare.  We must be bold and thorough in our exploration of all the possibilities.  We cannot be timid because these ideas do not neatly fit into current paradigms or budgeting processes.
 
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official view, policy, or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.

Of Destroyers and Doctrine: An Evaluation of Israel’s Decision to Invest in Larger Hulls

The German Navy frigate Hamburg (F220) underway in the Mediterranean Sea as part of the U.S. Navy Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group.

The following contribution is from Jacob Stoil, a DPhil candidate at Worcester College, University of Oxford specializing in military history and strategic studies.

Recent reports have appeared in both the Israeli and German media that Israel will be buying two destroyers from Germany at a cost of over two billion euros. The destroyers appear to be a part of a general plan to upgrade Israeli naval capabilities and increase the Israel Naval Service’s (INS) ability to protect Israel’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), especially the newly discovered hydrocarbon resources. The purchases represent a major break with INS doctrine and are the wrong purchases for Israel’s purposes.

Israel has a number of maritime challenges and spending significant money on an upgrade of maritime security capabilities is certainly a positive step in addressing the issue, but destroyers do not provide an answer to these challenges and may be a liability. There is often a ‘supersize-me’ impulse in naval procurement, an assumption that bigger is better and so a destroyer would naturally be better than a missile boat or corvette,an assumption which is fundamentally untrue. The doctrine of the INS has traditionally rejected this logic in favour of a doctrine built around smaller, faster, and harder to detect vessels with advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and significant offensive armament. This doctrine has served Israel well and has proved itself time and again, including during the 1973 war. Despite the success of the doctrine, a drive to supersize - of which the destroyers represent the latest iteration - has crept into the INS. Each generation of missile boats in the INS fleet has grown in size. The Sa’ar 5 is around 700 tons larger than the Sa’ar 4.5, which is 40 tons larger than the Sa’ar 4. The Sa’ar 4 itself is 200 tons larger than its predecessor. The destroyers would not be a simple continuation of this trend, they be an exponential increase in size (especially given that the smallest German frigate, a smaller class than a destroyer, is three times the tonnage of the Sa’ar 5). The additional tonnage might make for slower vessels but would definitely mean more identifiable targets, with more crew to lose if something goes wrong.

Given the cost and the break with a successful doctrinal concept,this all begs the question why destroyer? Larger ships are traditionally associated with greater power, but to what end? Naval power is not an end in itself. Israel clearly does not intend to use naval power to support land operations or develop independent strategic operations from the sea in a serious way. All of their naval procurement and training decisions over the last more than twenty years have made that impossible. This leaves several other possible motivations: controlling sea lines of communication (SLOCs), interdicting hostile SLOCs, enforcing a blockade, coastal protection, protecting the EEZ, and finally denying the use of the sea to an opponent. In the first case, Israel's primary SLOCs flow through the Mediterranean and in the past, with a less advanced fleet than the INS currently boasts, Israel has been able to protect them beyond Malta. Although destroyers could accomplish this, multiple corvettes and missile boats could cover more area simultaneously and for less money. An expanded submarine, corvette, and missile boat force can similarly accomplish the objectives of interdicting the SLOCs of potential regional rivals, including Iran, and denying them use of the sea.

Given current operational requirements (Gaza blockade, oil field protection, rapid deployment against local adversaries, etc.) there is much to recommend an expanded force of smaller vessels over larger destroyers. A ship, no matter its size, can only be in one place,meaning it can only fulfill one of these requirements at a given time. Additional smaller vessels would give the force additional flexibility in a wider variety of roles, including having spare vessels in reserve for unforeseen contingencies. Additionally, the type of threats that Israel is likely to face to its EEZ are largely irregular in their nature. Such irregular threats have in the past consisted of small craft attempting to enter an area surreptitiously before carrying out an operation.The employment of destroyers to respond to such threats would be overkill. Small vessels have proven highly effective at addressing such threats. An important aspect of the response to this type of irregular threat is fast response and frequent patrolling. As such, small fast craft provide a better response to such threats than a single larger craft. More numerous smaller craft can cover a greater physical area than one destroyer covers and therefore not only have a greater deterrent value but also respond more swiftly to threats as they develop.

There is a further factor to consider. Anti-ship missile technology has evolved significantly in the past few decades.  A direct hit by the new generation of missiles, such as the Russian 3M-54 Klub,is just as likely to disable a large vessel as a small one. While a larger vessel could theoretically contain more anti-missile capabilities, Israel has created an integrated package of missile defense capabilities optimized for smaller hulls. Additionally, if a larger vessel was lost, the impact on the INS would be more operationally significant than the loss of a smaller vessel. It is worth noting that the experience of such a loss (the INS Eilat) helped create the Israeli doctrine of investing in small, fast, high-tech, and well-armed vessels.

The addition of destroyers to the Israeli fleet is both expensive and unnecessary.  For the price of two destroyers, the INS could expand its flotillas of corvettes, missile boats, or submarines. Israel developed a successful doctrine based on such ships after unsatisfactory experiences with larger hulls. An expanded version of its current fleet would be able to continue to fulfil current operational requirements and do a better job than two destroyers of protecting the EEZ while maintaining the capability to react to unexpected contingencies and prevent regional opponents from exploiting the sea. It would accomplish this more cheaply and with less risk than two destroyers could. In short, destroyers are the wrong investment at the wrong time. Israel would do better to stick to a successful doctrine of smaller but highly capable vessels than invest in expensive destroyers that do not fulfill operational requirements.  In this case, bigger is not better but more might just be merrier.



Jacob Stoil is a DPhil candidate at Worcester College, University of Oxford specializing in military history and strategic studies.  His dissertation explores indigenous forces in the Middle East and Horn of Africa during the Second World War.  As part of his DPhil research Jacob conducted fieldwork in Somaliland, Israel, Ethiopia, and the West Bank.

Prior to his Dphil Jacob completed his MA and BA at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies.  His recent publications include, ‘Martial Race and Indigenous Forces’ in The British Indian Army: Virtue and Necessity published by Cambridge Scholars Press and ‘Structures of Cooperation and Conflict - Local Forces in Mandatory Palestine’ published in Ex Historia.  Jacob’s research interests include irregular forces, peripheral campaigns, military adaptation in the developing world, and Middle Eastern military history.  Jacob is a member of the British Empire at War and Second World War Military Operations Research Groups as well as the Society for Military History.

Future Uncertain

NORFOLK (Nov. 7, 2013) The amphibious transport dock ship USS San Antonio (LPD 17) returns to Naval Station Norfolk after completing an eight-month deployment. San Antonio was part of the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th and 6th Fleet areas of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Julie Matyascik Released)

No ship returns from deployment looking good, but every once and awhile we get to see the 'other' side of a ship returning home from deployment - and by other side, I'm talking about the side that doesn't face the pier.

USS San Antonio (LPD 17) was designed for regular six month deployments. The ship is less than eight years old, and the ship is returning from only her second deployment. The deployment was eight months, not six. Longer deployments are becoming increasingly common for all amphibious ship deployments.

The San Antonio class amphibious transport docks are designed to be optimally manned compared to the Austin class LPDs. Basically that means USS San Antonio (LPD 17) has 60 fewer sailors than the Austin class LPDs, even though USS San Antonio (LPD 17) is over 7000 tons bigger than the Austin class LPDs.

The San Antonio class LPDs are designed for a 40 year service life. The most recent US Navy shipbuilding plan is based upon these ships serving 43 years, not 40 years.

So in summary, at less than eight years old USS San Antonio (LPD 17) is looking pretty rough after returning from only her second deployment. At 25,000 tons the ship is optimally minimally manned, is expected to last three years longer than designed, and is being deployed for longer periods than originally designed. To pay for pushing the ship harder and longer with fewer sailors, the best idea of the DoD is to cut benefits and pay for those sailors.

I lack confidence in this the plan to keep USS San Antonio (LPD 17) and her sister ships in service until 2049. It's hard to believe that any Navy and Marine Corps leaders actually believe this is a legitimate and workable plan.

We Need a Balanced Fleet for Naval Supremacy

The Swedish Visby class is representative example of a small combatant the author argues might work as part of a balanced US Navy force structure.

The following contribution is by CDR Phillip E. Pournelle, USN. CDR Phillip E. Pournelle is a Surface Warfare Officer and an Operations Analysts.  He currently serves as a military advisor to OSD’s Office of Net Assessment.

Lazarus’ essay entitled Naval Supremacy Cannot be ‘Piggybacked’ on Small Ships attempts to rebut essays of Captains Hughes, Kline, Rubel and Admiral Harvey (here and here) advocating the employment of small missile combatants operating as flotillas in the littoral environment.

Technological changes underway today will increasingly challenge the way we conduct business today.  The United States will have to adapt to retain its lead.  In order to adapt, debates such as these must be part of a larger Cycle of Research, an ongoing iteration of wargames, analysis, and fleet exercises.

Lazarus has constructed a straw man to knock down, because no one has suggested a flotilla of small combatants can replace the big ships in the current fleet, which was designed to either dominate the open oceans or project power efficiently over the land when the sea is a safe sanctuary. The proposals favor supplementing the fleet—as have most dominant navies since the onset of torpedoes, mines, and submarines—with smaller combatants that can fight in cluttered and dangerous littoral waters without risking big warships’ great value in terms of procurement costs, lives, and multi-purpose combat capability. The small combatants should comprise only a small part of the fleet value in terms of displacement tonnage and cost but a large fraction of the fleet in terms of numbers of ships.

Lazarus argues the original authors have neglected critical concepts such as historic effectiveness, geography, strategy and logistics.  Lazarus’ arguments against the flotillas are drawn from history and historic analogies centered mostly on the time periods before and during World War II.  However, he neglects to address the significant technological changes which have occurred in the missile age and now in the robotics age.  He also neglects the significant number of such vessels which can be employed for a modest budget and the impact of numbers in the increasingly offensive dominant environment of the ocean today and in the future.  We will address each of his arguments and show why the addition of the Flotilla concept is far superior to the all big ship strategy currently being pursued by the US Navy.  But in the end the United States Navy is not building a balanced fleet, but one of few large vessels risking a potential catastrophe.

Small combatants are and will continue to be the bane of capital ships daring to enter the littoral environment.  Lazarus argues small combatants with capital ship killing weapons, with the possible exception of submarines, have historically never lived up to their reputation and larger ships’ adaptations neutralized their effectiveness.  He cites the poor performance of torpedo boats which were only successful in night or stealth conditions.  Later in the essay he returns to the topic and cites the poor performance of the US Asiatic fleet, including torpedo boats and submarines, in the opening days of World War II.  What he leaves out is that the “big gun” navy neglected the Asiatic Fleet (a recurring theme) and the ineffectiveness of their primary weapon, the torpedo.  Admiral Richardson has often cited the badly flawed torpedo combined with the risk adverse personalities of fleet submarine commanders as greatly reducing their effectiveness [comments before the Center for Naval Analysis in 2012].  Once both factors were addressed, the effectiveness of submarines increased greatly.  The same might have been said of torpedo boats, but there weren’t any in the Asiatic Fleet.

The value of missile boats is not necessarily in their effectiveness against capital ships but in their effectiveness in sea denial missions, particularly against commercial and amphibious operations.  In WWII, PT boats and other light craft were noted for their defectiveness against German and Japanese resupply efforts.  Further PT boats were employed to screen against their German counter part (E Boats) during landings at Normandy.

Lazarus neglects to address the significant technological changes of modern times and differences between torpedo boats and missile boats.  To start, even with advances in the range of torpedoes in WWII, they still required the boat to close well within the range of the rapid firing weapons of their targets, and the screening torpedo boat destroyers.  Modern Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) are very effective when fired from over the horizon.  Large warships operating with their very unique electronic signatures make it easy for an opponent to locate, track, and identify them.  In contrast the small combatants are much harder to locate in the clutter of the littoral environment. 

Modern missile technology has made small combatants very lethal and their continual improvement will make them more so in the future.  Lazarus cites the poor performance of early missile armed combatants such as those which sank the Israeli Navy Ship (INS) Eilat, (a destroyer) in October 1967.  He further points out the historic ineffectiveness of missile corvettes in the Falklands, Libyan, Iranian, and Iraqi conflicts.  In particular he cites the effectiveness of air power in neutralizing these ships.  In all of those cases those fleets never sailed in force or made a concerted effort to fight.  He leaves out the large number of successful ASCM engagements and their increasing effectiveness over time particularly by the Israelis who were willing to fight.[“An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare” NPS thesis by John C. Schulte 1994. (PDF)]

Another striking conclusion of the Schulte study is its historical review of the ineffectiveness of hard kill systems in combat against ASCMs.  The increasing effectiveness of ASCMs, as their sensors capability increases, reinforces the already offensive dominant tactical environment of the sea.

A force of smaller combatants is far more survivable than those made up of larger combatants.  Lazarus accurately notes a smaller combatant when hit with a large weapon such as an ASCM is likely to be lost, probably with all hands.  These smaller combatants are more likely to take with them a larger proportion of their crew when struck, but their crews are on the order of 20 to 40 in comparison to modern destroyers with upwards of 500.  When such ships, such as the HMS Sheffield were struck they lost 20 ratings and officers.  He further cites the arguably flawed and biased study by Secretary Lehman stating the larger the ship (the secretary was addressing aircraft carriers, not ships in general) the less vulnerable to attack it is.  However detailed analysis presented by Captain Hughes in Fleet Tactics and Chris Carlson’s Variable Damage Effects (PDF) in Naval Wargames 2008 demonstrate very vividly ships gain very little resiliency to damage as their size (and costs) grow.  Further the larger a ship is, the larger its radar cross section and other signatures, increasing the probability of being hit.

Finding the ships of a flotilla is far more challenging than a cost equivalent force of larger ships.  To illustrate this we will compare the cost equivalent force of one Arleigh Burke destroyer (DDG), and four Soliman Ezzat class missile patrol craft (PCM).  We will assume the ability to track and detect a destroyer and a PCM are the same 50%, despite the fact the PCM probably has a smaller radar cross section.  The probability of locating the entire destroyer force is 50% while the probability of detecting the four PCMs simultaneously is 6.25%.  Finding, tracking and planning an engagement against four PCMs is similarly challenging.

Numbers in naval warfare matter.  Lazarus misapplies one of Napoleon’s maxims regarding the value of large battalions.  What Napoleon was citing was the importance of numbers in the offensive dominant environment he was fighting in.  The same is so at sea.  To illustrate this point we will compare two cost equivalent forces the US could deploy today.  The first is a new Arleigh Burke destroyer (DDG), and the second four new Soliman Ezzat class PCMs.  The destroyer costs about $1.5B to acquire while each PCM costs less than a quarter that.  We will assume optimistically the DDG can take three Exocet missile equivalents to be rendered out of action while each PCM would only take a single hit.  An enemy force desires to have an 80% confidence it can wipe out the entire force.  We will assume the enemy has ASCMs each with a 50% probability it can hit either a destroyer or a PCM.  The probability of hitting the destroyer is actually greater than that of the PCM due to its larger RCS, but we will credit its hard kill systems with making up the shortfall (though history does not support this theory).  To have an 80% confidence at least three missiles will hit and take out the destroyer an opponent would have to launch at least eight.  To have an 80% confidence of taking out the PCM force, an enemy would have to have sufficient confidence in striking each of the four to meet the total confidence.  The fourth root of 80% is just shy of 95%.  The enemy commander would have to have a 95% confidence of hitting each PCM to have an 80% confidence of wiping out the entire force.  To have a 95% confidence of hitting each PCM at least once would require 5 apiece.  Thus an enemy commander would have to devote 20 missiles to the PCM force, vice just 8 to take down the destroyer; a significant increase in resources and a much tougher coordination effort.  Disbursing combat capability across several platforms greatly increases the resilience of a combat force and modern combat networks enable them to mass force effectively when necessary. [See Distributed Networked Operations by Jeff Cares, 2005]

The resilience of a flotilla is a strategic advantage in a crisis situation.  The level of effort and coordination required to destroy the flotilla significantly reduces the first mover advantage of an opponent.  Quite simply numbers matter in this kind of environment.  This is what Napoleon was talking about.

With proper doctrine and preparation geography and logistics favor flotillas of smaller vessels.  While in general logistics do favor larger ships, technology and ship designs have improved the endurance of smaller ships.  The Sentinel class coast guard patrol boat (WPC) of 353tons has a long range endurance enabling it to cross the Pacific Ocean in the same manner as the LCS and its design makes such a journey easier on the crew.  Further advances in ship stability systems, navigation, engineering, and weather avoidance have markedly improved the effectiveness of smaller vessels in the open ocean.

It is true nations operating flotillas of smaller vessels close to home gain significant advantages in the employment of interior lines of communications and logistics in both the operation and support of such a force.  This is why Captain Hughes and company advocate the development of forward operating bases and related capabilities to support such a force overseas in countries under threat.  Given China’s bellicose behavior of late in the South China Seas, countries in the region have been and should continue to explore the opportunity to make themselves a harder target to intimidate or attack.  This hedgehog strategy reinforces the main concept behind Colonel Hammes distant Blockade strategy of local nations only having to protect themselves in a crisis or conflict.  However, other maritime nations take their cue from the United States Navy and would be more likely to employ these effective platforms if the US Navy took them more seriously and trained with them.

Flotillas of smaller vessels are more survivable in the ballistic missile environment.  China has developed long range missiles which can target fixed ports and airports.  They have also been developing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) reportedly designed against Aircraft Carriers.  They do not have an unlimited supply of such missiles, particularly long range versions.  Therefore the ability to disburse logistics capabilities increases survivability just like that of the combat force.  If the United States continues to concentrate logistics capabilities in few large ports able to take the few large Combat Logistics Fleet (CLF) ships, then it will continue to make itself vulnerable to long range ballistic missiles, similar to what occurred in WWII.  PCMs have a 2 meter draft and are able to operate in a wide range of small ports, fishing villages, protected anchorages, etc.  If flotillas are combined with a mobile land logistics component and the use of offshore supply vessels, they can distribute the logistics nodes and remove the brittleness of overly centralized logistics enemy ballistic missiles are designed to take advantage of. [“Rethinking Littoral Logistics” by Captain David C. Meyers and Commander Jason B. Fitch, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy, Proceedings August 2012]

Modern weapons development makes combat in the littorals too dangerous for carrier or land based aviation assets against a near peer competitor.  Airfields in a contested environment are increasingly becoming vulnerable to precision strike regime weapons such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unconventional forces armed with guided rockets, mortars, and artillery (G-RAM).  Further ASBMs, ASCMs and other proliferating weapons are increasing the risk of Aircraft Carriers to operate in the littorals.  Aircraft Carriers have an extremely large signature making them vulnerable to attack from over the horizon or the clutter of the littorals.  Further the loss of a few patrol vessels is less likely to trigger existential angst to the American public than a burning aircraft carrier.

Flotillas are more survivable in the littoral environment as commerce raiders than larger ships when there is a loss of air cover.  Lazarus questions the survivability of flotillas given the threats from the air cover as described in the previous paragraph. If the Chinese were to eliminate our land and carrier based aviation capabilities in their initial attack, the flotilla would be more likely to survive if operated correctly.  Open ocean commerce raiding missions without air cover against an opponent who has air superiority became dangerous and ineffective in World War II, but employment of flotillas in littoral environments in a contested air environment was common then and can again work to their benefit.  Properly employed to take advantage of the clutter of the littorals the effectiveness of air launched ASCMs would be greatly neutralized.  Meanwhile advances in shipboard weapons such as the rolling airframe missile give corvettes an effective weapon to neutralize the flight profiles most aircraft require to employ bombs, rockets, etc.  Further, combining the use of modern obscurants with missile boats’ small size will make them a challenging target in any engagement.  In contrast large combatants are far less capable of hiding in the littoral environment.  Due to their high profile and small numbers, they raise their profile higher by constant radiation, making them more likely to be attacked and more likely to be hit by weapons with dual seekers employing anti-radiation modes.

The current and potential proliferation of advanced cruise and even targetable ballistic missiles makes the use of flotillas even more important than ever.  All ships are increasingly at risk from attacks like the C-802 which hit the INS Hanit in 2006.  As described earlier, larger ships are not able to take much of a hit in relation to their size and cost.  Further larger ships are more likely to be hit in such a circumstance.  Left out of most discussions was the fact two C-802 missiles were fired in the INS Hanit incident in 2006.  One of the missiles hit and sunk a much larger Cambodian-flagged freighter.  Unalerted and not employing decoys or other electronic techniques INS Hanit was struck by only one missile.  Had she been a larger ship in similar circumstances, she might have been struck by both weapons and sunk.  More importantly the INS Hanit incident marks the proliferation and possibility of surprise by such weapons.  This creates an offensive dominant environment, the logical response to which is numbers.  Similarly Republic of Korea Ship (ROKS) Cheonan incident of 2010 demonstrated the willingness of some opponents like North Korea to attack without warning.  ROKS Cheonan was struck by a torpedo which a larger vessel such as an Arleigh Burke would not have survived either.   This is not the environment for a small number of large vessels.  Larger numbers provides the ability of a force to absorb such an attack and still be able to respond.

The ability to produce large numbers of smaller vessels would give the United States a significant strategic advantage in a potential conflict.  Having built, operated and developed proper doctrine for the use of flotillas the US would be in a position to take advantage of rapid production in the event of a conflict.  Smaller, cheaper, and easier to build than their larger cousins, missile corvettes and missiles boats can be built in a much larger range of shipyards and factories, many not adjacent to the ocean, far more rapidly than destroyers and larger vessels.  This would signal to a potential adversary the ability of the United States to reconstitute its forces in an extended conflict, a critical element in the calculus of anyone planning such a move.

Lazarus argues for a balanced fleet.  However, the United States Navy is not a balanced fleet.  It is unbalanced towards a small number of large ships.  The LCS promised as a replacement for PCs, frigates, and minesweepers has too large of a signature to survive in the littoral environment of the future.  Captain Hughes and his compatriots in the seminal work A New Navy Fighting Machine describe in great detail how a modest portion of the shipbuilding budget (about 10%) can produce a large number of small but lethal missile boats.  These vessels, if properly employed, can have an outsized impact on maritime strategy and give the United States strategic stability necessary in a very dangerous future environment.

The United States needs to employ a cycle of analysis to properly address these issues and many others.  The power of flotillas of small ships and other concepts require serious analysis and research.   The alternative analyses presented by Captains Hughes, Kline, Rubel, Admiral Harvey, Lazarus and others is but one element of the Cycle of Research codified in Dr. Peter Perla’s The Art of Wargaming (Page 288).  The other elements include extensive wargaming and fleet exercises.  The iteration of cycles of wargaming, analysis, and fleet exercises conducted years after year between World War I and II were critical contributions to the success of the United States in World War II (See Kuehn’s Agents of Innovation and Nofi’s To Train the Fleet for War).  The technological changes underway today demand the recreation of the Cycle of Research to prepare the fleet for the future.  There are changes underway today just as radical, if not more, than occurred during that previous interwar period and they demand serious exploration.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official view, policy, or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.