
We have previously covered in detail Russia's interest in purchasing an amphibious ship from both
France and the
Netherlands. Based on the details of
this Defense News article, we should have included Spain in that analysis, although there is a lot of similarity between the Dutch Rotterdam class and the Spanish Galicia class.
Russia's interest in purchasing amphibious ships isn't solely about ships though, it is really about technology and industrial development with Russia's shipbuilding sector. Picking out some of the details in
this RIA Novosti article we get a better feel for the reasons the Russians are keen on help from Europe.
First lets establish the real Russian intention here:
"The Russian side reiterated its position that it needs not just one warship but technology to enable it to build such ships at Russian shipyards," he said.
More than anything else, Russia is looking to import skilled labor from Europe's shipbuilding sector to help fix the problems Russia has with specific technical skills but also experienced project management staff within their shipyards. The human element to bring skill and talent into the Russian shipbuilding industry is the major factor here, because the domestic production element will allow Russia to attempt a rebuild at just about the same time the Russian Navy disappears.
The article goes on to discuss the Mistral class specifically:
The chief of the General Staff earlier said that Russia would decide by the end of 2009 whether to purchase a Mistral-class amphibious assault ship from France.
The Defense Ministry has said a final decision should be based on "a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of [French] technology in the framework of domestic shipbuilding program."
The assessment to determine if DCNS can build and manage a domestic production in Russia for at least 4 more of the ship class is only part of it, the technology transfer being the other part. The Mistral represents many things for Russia including technologies such as a modern command-and-control suite, combat data and management systems, automation technologies to allow for fewer crew members, and electric drive propulsion for surface vessels. While Russia has some experience with electric drive, the Mistral represents modern western naval architecture and insights into how to build better surface warships with electric drive.
All of this will be critical to Russia if they are to rebound from the impending disappearance of the Russian Navy from the worlds oceans.
Finally, lets examine the Russian view in context:
Russia's current arms procurement program through 2015 does not provide for construction or purchases of large warships, so the acquisition of a French warship is more likely under a new program, through 2020, which has yet to be developed.
This is a very important detail to the entire discussion, because it takes the long view through the prism of economics and strategy and helps us understand how this might unfold.
I am in full agreement with Alexander Khramchikhin. If you missed it, Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg translated
this article on
his Russian Military Reform blog.
[The Bulava's] effectiveness has turned out to be simply amazing. The missile has not entered serial production, and never will, but it has already destroyed the Russian Navy. Almost all the money allocated to the Navy’s development have been spent on this mindless dead-end program.
Any person who can see the real situation well understands that in a few years the Russian Navy as a whole, as well as all four of its component fleets, will cease to exist. This is already absolutely inevitable — the situation will not be changed even by mass purchases of ships from abroad.
In light of this, it is especially amusing to observe the fierce “battle for Sevastopol.” Why do we need it after 2017? To pay Kiev enormous sums to rent empty piers? By that time, at best the Novorossiisk naval brigade will be all that’s left of the Black Sea Fleet. And the discussion of whether we need a blue-water navy or a coastal one is a complete farce. We won’t even have a coastal force — the maximum that our “navy” will be able to accomplish in ten years is the immediate defense of a few main naval bases. Because we built the Bulava.
I think there is a lot of truth to the melodramatics expressed in that opinion. The Russian military budget has thrown money at the Russian Navy, so naturally one would expect the Russian Navy is on the rebound? Hardly.

Next year the Russian Navy expects to launch a single new surface combatant - a Project 20380 corvette - and
three nuclear submarines. However, I am unsure that is entirely correct information, because the only three Russian nuclear submarines ready to be completed are the
Severodvinsk, a Project 855 Yasen (Graney) class nuclear submarine, the
Alexander Nevsky, the second Project 935 Dolgorukiy (Borei) class nuclear ballistic missile submarine, and the
Nerpa, the Project 971 (Akula II) class nuclear attack submarine expected to be leased to India. Perhaps the third submarine for Russia will be the
Sankt Peterburg, Project 677 Petersburg (
Lada) class diesel-electric submarine?
Doesn't really matter though, right now the foreign investment for frigate exports to India and
submarine exports to Vietnam and Indonesia is all that is keeping the shipbuilding industry in Russia on life support, completely unable to modernize. Financing has become a huge problem for the modernization efforts to the defense industrial base of Russia, and without a significant increase in the price of energy Russia's economy is unlikely to rebound very quickly. Russia's attempts in military modernization are not going very smoothly,
indeed 36,000 officers were laid off this year alone - and it will take the better part of the next decade to build the non-commissioned officer corps desired in the Russian military reform. All of the defense equipment purchases listed by Medvedev in his State of Russia speech in November were items that are around a decade old, with no new modern aircraft, ships, or Army equipment making the list. Indeed, even the nuclear missile procurements announced included 16 Sineva nuclear missiles for Delta-IV SSBNs and some Topol-M and RS-24 ICBMs, all of which have been around over a decade.
With the
recent Bulava missile failure, the continuation of the Borei line of ballistic missile submarines may be in doubt, and no plans to purchase production Balava missiles for existing Borei submarines was mentioned for 2010 by Medvedev. Bottom line, Russia gambled with heavy investments into their strategic nuclear arm at sea with the Borei/Bulava combination, and the gamble did not pay off.
Just as the US Navy is going to experience rapid retirement in the near future due to our rapid naval buildup in the 1980s, what is left of the Russian fleet is about to experience its own rapid retirement. They are clearly getting desperate for working hulls when making serious comments about
modernizing old Kirov class cruisers, but the truth is Russian naval officials are out of other alternatives. They can't afford new construction because the yards need modernization, and the yards that can produce ships are on life support filling export orders. That leaves Russia with few options other than to look to Europe, and France in particular would be the ideal place to start.
The reason appears to be French Prime Minister Francois Fillon, who is quoted in
this Jamestown Foundation article discussing the Mistral deal.
French officials are now also starting to speak about a Franco-Russian “modernization partnership.” This seems designed for France to emulate Germany’s officially declared “modernization partnership” with Russia and to catch up with Germany in Russia’s estimation at least politically, if not in overall capability. During Putin’s visit, French energy companies announced intentions to join Gazprom’s Nord Stream and South Stream projects. For its part, Renault is prepared to rescue Russia’s insolvent automobile producer AvtoVaz (Interfax, Le Monde, Le Figaro, Les Echos, November 25-30).
Fillon has emerged as a leading figure in France’s rapprochement with the Kremlin, on the intertwined tracks of strategic security policy and business deals. At the 2008 NATO summit, Fillon publicly opposed the Georgian and Ukrainian membership action plans, arguing that their approval would upset the balance of power to Russia’s detriment. At present, Fillon actively promotes the Mistral sale to Russia, which could dramatically tilt the balance further against several NATO countries, Georgia, and Ukraine. The French discussions with Russia, under way for several months, ignore NATO and EU procedures on military equipment exports.
According to Fillon and other French officials, “It would be impossible to call for continental stability in partnership with Russia if we refuse to sell armaments to Russia. A refusal would amount to contradicting our own discourse” and obeying “the old reflexes” (Le Figaro, November 26; Agence France Presse, November 27).
The Republicans in the Senate apparently read the Jamestown Foundation's analysis, because their action today adds yet another element to the ongoing discussions by Russia to partner with France to build amphibious ships.
The Cable has
an outstanding article that covers the political happenings.
The friction between top GOP leaders in Congress and the French government is over the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship, which the French are considering selling to the Russian Federation. As the biggest potential arms sale from a NATO country to Russia, U.S. lawmakers are worried this could set off a chain reaction of NATO arms sales to Russia. Plus, they share the concerns of Georgia and the Baltic states that the ship could allow Russia to increase its aggressiveness in its near abroad.
So what does this have to do with Iran sanctions? Well, The Cable brought you exclusively the story of how the State Department wants changes in the Chris Dodd Iran sanctions bill that's currently pending in the Senate. Basically, the Obama administration wants exemptions for countries that cooperate with American sanctions against Iran. France presumably would be at the top of the list.
But a senior GOP Senate aide told The Cable that Republicans negotiating over the Iran sanctions language would not allow an exemption for France or French companies if the Mistral deal goes through.
"Whether or not France gets an exemption could very well depend on whether France decides to sell this ship to Russia," the aide said, explaining that "it's possible to draw that exemption narrow enough so that the president could not possibly exempt France."
The Cable obtained a copy of the
letter by French Ambassador Pierre Vimont responding to Republican concerns to the French Mistral sale. However,
The Cable article goes on to note "France won't go by the
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls or the
European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, as the Senators had wanted."
Maybe I am missing something here, but it does not appear that France is out of line regarding the procedures for military exports as outlined by either the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls or the European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports. Indeed, one of the more remarkable characteristics of this deal is how transparent both Russia and France have been.
With the Russian Navy about to disappear entirely, it is very difficult to say that even a half dozen Mistral class ships would somehow create a balance of power issue with Europe. It is very much unclear what national interest the Senate Republicans are protecting here. Are the Senate Republicans honestly putting the possibility of a Russian Mistral amphibious landing against Georgia in 2020 ahead of the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon in 2010? Well that's stupid, why not simply have
a Georgian aircraft import some illegal North Korean anti-ship missiles and ruin Russia's day without all the international political blow back?
Regardless of any potential political maneuvers by Republicans in the Senate, or the US government in general, France is almost certainly going to make the deal with Russia, as the deal carries economic value to both countries. The only thing the Senate Republicans can do is disrupt relations between the US and 2 other security council members right before the UN votes on Iranian sanctions. The absence of strong UN sanctions is almost certainly going to make everyone jittery about the potential for a military confrontation between Israel and Iran, which is sure to make energy prices climb above the
forecasted $60-$70 range. Given that Russia's economy can only improve with higher energy costs, can someone please show me the strategic logic of US involvement in the Mistral deal here?
At some point, the old cold war crowd needs to accept that the cold war ended, and we won. It is time to build a better future already, one where we don't have to fear the once mighty Russian conventional weapon capacity, rather build a stable world where the once mighty Russian doesn't feel compelled to rely upon their quickly diminishing nuclear weapon capability.