Overall, DD(X) will have a ten-fold better capability against anti-ship cruise missiles than the current force, improve strike group defense three-fold, have a 50-fold radar cross section reduction compared to current destroyers (reducing total numbers of missiles required in an engagement by half), ten times the operating area in shallow water regions against mines, and improve naval surface fires coverage by a factor of three.It all began that day - the day the Navy decided to move forward with the DDG-1000. A number of people who attended that HASC hearing fully expected the Navy to announce it was dropping the DDG-1000 program and moving onto the CG(X) program. It wasn't to be, and the result was a lot of money spent to invest in the new technologies intended for what became the DDG-1000. Three years later, the Navy changed course.
Admiral Vern Clark, July 19, 2024 in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
The DDG-1000 program is developing a capable ship which meets the requirements for which it was designed. The DDG-1000, with its Dual Band Radar and sonar suite design are optimized for the littoral environment. However, in the current program of record, the DDG-1000 cannot perform area air defense; specifically, it cannot successfully employ the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), SM-3 or SM-6, and is incapable of conducting Ballistic Missile Defense. Although superior in littoral ASW, the DDG-1000 lower power sonar design is less effective in the blue water than DDG-51 capability. DDG-1000's Advanced Gun System (AGS) design provides enhanced Naval Fires Support capability in the littorals with increased survivability. However, with the accelerated advancement of precision munitions and targeting, excess fires capacity already exists from tactical aviation and organic USMC fires. Unfortunately, the DDG-1000 design sacrifices capacity for increased capability in an area where the Navy already has, and is projected to have sufficient capacity and capability.It didn't take long for this high profile written statement in a HASC hearing to get discredited though, including by VADM McCullough himself. By September he had changed his tune noting "as currently configured, DDG-1000 cannot perform area air defense.", and "Additional Research and Development investment through 2013 would be required for DDG-1000 to have these capabilities."
-- Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, July 31, 2024 in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
VADM McCullough sounded like he was trying to cover his tracks by making a point in time statement - 'DDG-1000 can't support Standard missiles because DDG-1000 doesn't exist' - which is a weird defense except that someone probably mentioned to the Vice Admiral that his testimony under oath was a false statement.
Keep in mind, in the FY2012 budget - the one Congress is about to vote on - you can still find R&D investment for Standard missiles for the DDG-1000 (see PDF page 523 here) listed in the US Navy budget. That budget item is dated February 2011 - earlier this year. If you go back, that item has been in there every year both before and after VADM McCullough's testimony. When people say the DDG-1000 won't support Standard missiles, maybe those people can explain why the Navy has a budget item that says taxpayers are spending $17 million this year on software that says otherwise.
In subsequent hearings the Navy has already stated the DDG-1000 is equal to DDG-51 in ASW, with DDG-1000 much better against quieter SSKs in the littorals and about equal to DDG-51 in blue water. The gun fire argument was complete nonsense. An Admiral will tell Congress the Marines have enough fires support from the sea during a budget hearing, but Admirals are rarely foolish enough to try that line with a Marine General around holding a microphone to refute. Finally, DDG-1000 would certainly be able perform area air defense with the proper radar, and for the record - Raytheon still says their combat system can support BMD modifications to the DDG-1000 combat system. On that last point, I'll take Raytheons word for it - but only if they can deliver the combat system for DDG-1000 on time and schedule. I'm still not sold that is going to happen.
As for the radar, because there is no official AMDR program, the Navy cannot say it but AMDR is absolutely going to replace the now cancelled S-band radar on to DDG-1000. The Navy will have some kind of AMDR on DDG-1000 before the first Flight III with AMDR is built - bank it.
The reason for this history lesson is because Michael Fabey of Aviation Week has had a series of articles all summer on DDG-1000 that have been pushing the history of Zumwalt class in a newer, more modern narrative.A few of the noteworthy articles include U.S. Navy's AMDR Program Sets Big Goals, Potential DDG-51 Flight III Growth Alarms, Navy Radar Efforts Solidify BMD Commitment, Zumwalt Destroyer Supporters Hope For Revival, DDG-51 Restart Raises Questions, Zumwalt Destroyer Remains On Course, Now May Be Time To Weigh Destroyer Options, and this weeks major news that GAO Probing U.S. Navy DDG-51 Line Restart.
From that last article:
GAO is trying to determine the underlying basis for the Navy decision to select DDG-51 as the “best hull form to meet future surface combatant requirements” Belva Martin, GAO director of acquisition and sourcing management for a variety of programs, including Navy ships, tells Aviation Week.It goes on to note:
GAO’s acknowledgment of the investigation comes in the wake of recent Aviation Week news articles and analysis about the impact of the restart decision and updated Navy plans for the Arleigh Burke and DDG-1000 Zumwalt destroyer—the ship-class type whose fleet was truncated to accommodate the additional DDG-51s (Aerospace DAILY, June 28, Aug. 1).
Still, the program remained on cost and schedule—until the latter half of the last decade when the Navy brass abruptly changed course, truncating the Zumwalt buy to three ships and restarting Arleigh Burke production with an eye toward a redesigned Flight III DDG-51 to accommodate, among other things, AMDR. Indeed, Navy officials say the main impetus behind the destroyer acquisition change was the growing mission need for AMDR and ballistic missile defense (BMD). Citing a “hull-radar” study, the Navy brass said the Aegis defense system-equipped DDG-51s offered the most affordable and quickest way to get BMD-capable ships into the fleet. Zumwalts, they said, would not be able to accommodate the standard missiles used for BMD.Let me add a few points. First, the Navy kept talking about an Analysis of Alternatives when it came to truncating DDG-1000 in favor of DDG-51. Here's a tip - that AoA doesn't exist. The AMDR radar study was later cited as the Analysis of Alternatives, but that study came long after the Navy had already changed from DDG-1000 to DDG-51. GAO can look all day, but I don't believe they are going to find any sort of requirements process that was followed prior to the switch that dropped DDG-1000 for DDG-51. Alot of folks might have a 'gut' feeling that this was a good move, indeed today I believe this was the right decision, but when this much of the shipbuilding budget is on the line, I just don't believe the Navy can easily justify going with ones gut feeling. That really wasn't the best process to follow for the future surface combatant of the Navy, and the GAO is likely to reveal that in their investigation.
But Navy and industry sources familiar with the hull-radar study say it was narrowly focused and molded to support a Navy preference for Aegis-equipped Burkes. Further, Navy and industry documents and sources say the launching equipment on the Zumwalts can be tweaked relatively easily to accommodate any standard missile. Further, the Zumwalt was designed to support new technological developments for BMD and other missions, while the older DDG-51 design does not.
Navy officials say they want the DDG-51s to be redesigned for technology improvements, but there are no cost projections. As a production model ship, the Zumwalt now will cost about $3 billion and a Flight III DDG-51 less than two-thirds that amount; but analysts expect the DDG-51 projection to grow significantly, especially with the desired technology accommodations.
GAO’s probe will focus on the cost, schedule and other related issues associated with the restart program, Martin says. The report, expected in January, also will examine the DDG-51’s projected ability to integrate new technology, she says, especially AMDR.
Personally speaking, I hope the GAO can dig up is where VADM McCullough got his data that supported his written and stated testimonies on July 31, 2008. Was that an CNO memo to N8 that was nothing more than a judgment call, or a legitimate course change based on some unknown and never previously cited researched study?
I don't think the GAO will cite any Navy leaders by name in their investigation, rather it will stay very generic when pointing fingers. It is impossible to believe that the House, Senate, or GAO would ever say anything negative about an Admiral or General even when their decisions cost tens of billions of dollars - after all the F-22 didn't fly for over 4 months and none of our elected or appointed officials appeared to care. Oversight of military Flag and General officers today doesn't exist, because oversight of military leadership is only exercised for the most parochial of politically correct reasons anymore. If an O-6 grounds a ship, his career is ruined. If an O-8 oversees a strategic level dumpster fire with a major portion of a military service, more often than not that guy will get promoted again.
But in the end, the Navy needs only to be open and honest with GAO why they have picked an alternative path forward than DDG-1000, and they will be OK. I think the honest answer starts by saying it loud and proud - DDG-1000 doesn't use AEGIS, and AEGIS is the combat system of the US Navy. AEGIS is not a Lockheed Martin owned product, as much as Lockheed Martin's public relations folks want you to believe otherwise. The US Navy owns AEGIS, and when Raytheon decided to write a new combat system from scratch at enormous cost to the US Navy (and taxpayers), and didn't build the DDG-1000 combat system leveraging government furnished software - AEGIS - the DDG-1000 becomes worthy of sacrifice in my opinion.
The additional software overhead costs of a new combat system and hardware costs found in the 14,500 ton stealth hull combines to form a lethal combination that kills the DDG-1000. ADM Roughead should be praised for truncating the program, because he did the right thing at the right time even if GAO finds he did it the wrong way.
People sometimes ask, "Why is the US Navy building three Zumwalts?" First, the US Navy cannot ignore the industry component - they are building three to insure the nations best shipyard - Bath Iron Works - has legitimate work. That isn't the only reason though.
The DDG-1000 is going to be fantastic. There are technologies in the DDG-1000 the Navy needs in the future surface combatant force of the US Navy, and the DDG-1000 has become an umbrella for a massive R&D program for surface warfare in the early 21st century. It's a legitimate program that allows the Navy to develop some critical technologies that will be found in every single naval ship in the future - starting with all-electric drive but also the AMDR and other technologies. During a time of potential rising peer competitors where our nation enjoys a great lead but technology of war is rapidly changing, not to mention during a time of tight budgets where R&D funding is scarce, an R&D program for building a small number of big ships like DDG-1000 that will be operational assets makes a ton of sense strategically to reset a new series of technology baselines to build 21st century surface combatants from. Is there any smarter way for the Navy to use our lead in naval capabilities than to evolve towards the next generation?
There is also historical precedent. USS Long Beach, USS Bainbridge, and USS Truxtun represented a very similar approach in the 1960s when the US Navy was looking at guided missile technologies and nuclear power on ships. But other technologies were evolving at the same time - greater use of helicopters on ships for combat roles, for example. The decade of the 1960s was a period of innovation for the Navy, and the decade of the 2010s should be too.
So this is what I would do if I was the US Navy knowing a potentially embarrassing GAO investigation is coming - I'd embrace it as the genuine opportunity it is. I have heard a number of people quietly suggest the DDG-51 Flight III is undergoing a major redesign to incorporate a number of technologies from DDG-1000, including all-electric drive. If this is true, I'd give the GAO all the information for their investigation and more. I would talk about how AEGIS baselines and new Standard missiles combined with AMDR and all-electric drive and new VTUAVs etc. etc. etc... ideas that a large DDG-1000 has spawned potential for, and leverage the DDG-1000 as a program that is leading the Navy into a new century with a similar hull form to that of the existing fleet. Maybe it isn't really a Burke, but maybe it is also close enough in hull form to be a Burke. It really doesn't matter if it is or isn't a Burke as long as the final product for DDG-51 Flight III is forward thinking.
The real point is to give the GAO a ton of new information not currently known to the public, which should be easy for NAVSEA since they are pretty terrible about telling the public what they are doing anyway. Giving a bunch of new information will mean the GAO report breaks so many new news items about the Navy's future major combatant force that any bad news in the GAO investigation will likely get buried by new details - because lets be honest, the embarrassing news that the GAO will probably find regarding the DDG-1000 requirements process will be old news, and DDG-1000 isn't very popular due to it's high cost anyway.
Finally, in addition to all of the new details on the DDG-51 Flight III, I would also advise including a smartly written letter from the soon to be new CNO, ADM Greenert, that basically spells out not only how DDG-1000 has evolved over the last ten years but what it means to him going forward as CNO. ADM Greenert is a submariner, so I believe this GAO report offers him a unique opportunity to include a vision statement for how he sees DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Flight III in the context of his vision for surface warfare as CNO.
If the Navy gives the GAO everything they want - plus a whole bunch of new details that shape the history of DDG-1000 into a narrative for the future of surface warfare, this GAO investigation becomes nothing more than a communication tool by which the Navy can move their agenda publicly through an alternative medium. If the narrative is good, but the GAO craps on it, then the Navy might find people are questioning the GAO instead of the Navy.
The Navy probably won't take that approach, but that is how I'd handle this GAO investigation of DDG-1000, because in reality the process by which the ship class was truncated was really not good at all - and I have already documented a lot of it here on the blog if you want to know what to expect.
