A Most Interesting Debate

The Germans are talking about military reform and to be honest, it is actually a very interesting issue to follow. This article can bring you up to speed on some of the issues if you are interested, but for more depth to the debate you'll need to look elsewhere (and most of it is in German). There are two main points that I think are worth noting.

First, Germany is ready to discard their conscripts.

The rationale behind this bold yet highly controversial push to suspend the draft is two-fold. First, the Bundeswehr needs far less conscripts than are theoretically required to serve in the armed forces, thus raising serious concerns about a lack of “Wehrgerechtigkeit” (“draft equity”). After all, how can the government justify drafting tens of thousands of young men for a nine-month military service while simply letting many of their friends off the hook? Second, the Bundeswehr’s conscription-based system is not only more expensive than a purely professional/volunteer force, but has also proven to be ill-equipped to deal with the growing demand for expeditionary military action in countries ranging from Afghanistan and Sudan to the coast of Lebanon.

Second is the idea that Germany would become more expeditionary in structure than its current cold war era territorial defense structure.

The proposed Bundeswehr reforms (including a suspension of the draft) are not only better suited to deal with today’s complex security threats, ranging from terrorism and WMD/missile technology proliferation to global crime networks and piracy. They would also be welcome news for Berlin’s allies, who could, in principle, count on the support of a militarily more capable Germany, both within NATO and within the EU context (the required parliamentary approval for each Bundeswehr deployment abroad notwithstanding). In the wake of the recent economic crisis, huge fiscal deficits are putting severe pressures on defense budgets across Europe, especially France, Germany, and the UK (London might be forced to cut its annual defense spending by up to 20 percent). If Germany can lead the way in terms of adopting politically controversial yet ultimately indispensable military reforms - thus generating more bang for fewer bucks - there is indeed at least some hope that European/NATO members in general can create much-needed synergies in defense procurement and force restructuring based on the notion that not all allies require the full spectrum of defense (industrial) capabilities.

The United States is too interconnected to the global security environment to ignore military reform debates in other countries, and this debate in particular represents one of the few reforms in Europe where a military power is expanding its capabilities to forward deploy, even as the total number of military personnel would be reduced. Regardless of country however, the trends for 21st century military reform seem to take on the same character: expeditionary.

We will have to wait and see what Germany ultimately decides to do, but in reading military reform arguments from various nations across Europe, including Russia, the 21st century Army models of expeditionary forces most often include discussions regarding amphibious lift capacity and numbers of medium and heavy lift helicopters. In other words, the capabilities that most mimic the US Marines are more desired by the rest of the world than the capabilities of a large standing Army.

It is a noteworthy contrast of strategic thinking how in the US, we seem to have this in complete reverse as we debate what the US Marines will be in the future while speaking of the enormous challenges towards recapitalizing the Army in DoD budget discussions. With Iraq combat operations now over, it is time to keep an eye on what narrative emerges in Washington.

How long before think tanks start talking about recapitalizing the Army, and how long before those think tanks that have been Army focused due primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan are ready to examine broader strategic alternatives for the future that include an emphasis on airpower and seapower? These will be interesting time tables, because the think tank community in Washington is packed with Army strategic thinkers right now - and if the conversation stops being about the Army, their job might be in jeopardy.

Yep, it is parochial, but it needs not be. I consider the 101st Airborne Division as an airpower capability in dire need of a maritime enabling component, and the US Marines represents both an airpower and seapower capability that needs better options for forward deployment. On this blog we cannot limit our viewpoints to the parochial traditions of inter-service rivalry (even if they do in Washington).

Germany to Withdraw From CTF 150 Early

As one who continuously observes naval deployments and patterns globally, I try to keep an eye out for news that seems odd, or doesn't add up. The news that Germany is basically stopping their contribution to Task Force 150 - the anti-terrorism international task force in the Gulf of Aden - seems very strange to me. There are plenty of perfectly legitimate reasons why the Germans would stop participation in CTF 150, but the specific reason given is not one of them.

Germany is withdrawing early from a US-led operation that patrols the sea off the Horn of Africa because the terrorist threat in that area is small, Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg said Wednesday.

A German Navy reconnaissance plane and 90 military personnel will end their activity on June 30 instead of at the end of this year.

'The terrorist threat in the sea area off the Horn of Africa is limited,' said Guttenberg in Djibouti. The minister is overseeing a cost-saving review in Berlin of Germany's military budget.

Either the German intelligence office is asleep, or there is another reason and this is simply an excuse - because the reason given appears contrary to the analysis of the terrorist threat everywhere else. The threat of maritime terrorism off the Horn of Africa and specifically the Bab-el-Mandeb strait is probably at the highest point it has been since 2001, when Task Force 150 was established.

For example, back in March there was a special advisory made by the US Navy Office of Intelligence.

ONI Special Advisory, 9 Mar 10. To ensure maximum dissemination to the maritime industry and/or community, ONI is bringing to your attention the following US DOT MARAD Advisory. Please note, this advisory is not piracy-specific. This advisory is regarding terrorism and is being disseminated in an effort to promote security for those operating within the maritime domain.

US DOT MARAD Advisory: Information suggests that al-Qaida remains interested in maritime attacks in the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden along the coast of Yemen. Although it is unclear how they would proceed, it may be similar in nature to the attacks against the USS COLE in October 2000 and the M/V LIMBURG in October 2002 where a small to mid-size boat laden with explosives was detonated. Other more sophisticated methods of attack could include missiles or projectiles.

Although the time and location of such an attack is unknown, ships in the Red Sea, Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden along the coast of Yemen are at the greatest risk of becoming targets of such an attack. All vessels transiting the waters in the vicinity of Yemen are urged to operate at a heightened state of readiness and should maintain strict 24-hour visual and radar watches, and regularly report their position, course, and speed to the UKMTO. Vessels are at greatest risk in areas of restricted maneuverability and while in/near port or at anchor.

Merchant vessels are requested to report any suspicious activity to the UKMTO Dubai (ONI).

That followed disturbing direct threats from Al Qaeda in Yemen to the US Navy from the end of last year.

The Germans may have a legitimate reason to pull out of Task Force 150, but the suggestion that the reason is a reduced threat is ridiculous. National interest, economy, or a change in policy would all be valid reasons. It should be noted that the German Navy will continue to operate as part of EU NAVFOR to fight pirates off the Horn of Africa, so whatever the real reason is - the Germans are not retreating from the region.

Something is very odd here. It doesn't make much sense to reduce presence in a volatile maritime region for a reason that appears to be in direct contradiction of the facts. It leaves the question whether the reduction of forces in the region is for a good reason - perhaps too good of a reason to mention to the public?

Uruguay-Germany Rift

It appears that the saga of the Graf Spee isn't over:

In 2006, divers salvaged the huge bronze eagle with the swastika at its base from the waters off the Uruguayan capital. It's the swastika that is causing the trouble. The German government, as represented by its ambassador in Uruguay, is opposed to the display of the eagle with the Nazi cross. Germany, understandably enough, is sensitive about the ultimate symbol of National Symbolism. Public display of it is generally illegal in Germany although exceptions are made for historical and educational purposes.

There now seems to be some uncertainty about the ownership of the eagle. Germany believes the ship to be part of its cultural heritage. According to Uruguayan law, sunken ships predating 1973 in their waters are generally considered property of the Uruguayan state. Uruguayan businessman Alfredo Etchegaray has the rights to salvage the wreck and he doesn't believe that Germany even has the right to express an opinion on the matter. He points out that Germany has its own share of historical relics from other countries, including the head of Nefertiti which Egypt would very much like back. Uruguayan newspaper El Pais notes that Germany contributes money to the preservation of concentration camp Auschwitz, in modern-day Poland.

According to Wikipedia, earlier this decade there were plans to raise Graf Spee, restore her to original condition, and turn her into a tourist attraction. This work was apparently suspended by Presidential decree. While the idea of refloating and restoring the wreck seems far-fetched, I think that I would feel almost compelled to visit if the project ever came to fruition. Other German World War II vessels have been turned into tourist attractions, and the wreck of Graf Spee is not a war grave. Nevertheless, the technical challenges of restoring a ship sunk seventy years ago in shallow seawater would be extraordinary.

Via Alterdestiny.

Libya Complains

Germany is suffering a touch of blowback for its naval deal with Israel. A critical letter was released by Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam Alqadhafi, who, according to FP, is increasingly influential in shaping Libyan foreign policy. There's no indication that the Germans plan to take this complaint seriously, although I wonder if the naval cooperation might become a major anti-German jihadist talking point.

Israel, Germany Expand Naval Procurment Deals

According to Defense News, Israel and Germany are close to cutting a deal on an additional Dolphin class submarine, and on two stretched A-100 corvettes. The latter has been in the works for some time now. Interestingly, the deal depends on German financing (up to a third of the total price) and on US permission to use part of the annual military aid budget on acquisition of the ships. The corvettes will provide the core of Israel's future surface capability, while the additional Dolphin will, upon delivery, give the IDF a total force of six submarines. The German interest in financing would be to hold together its moribund ship-building industry while maintaining good relations with the Israelis. Merkel and Netanyahu apparently hammered out the details in a summit meeting last week.

Incidentally, the Defense News article reports that the two Dolphin class submarines contracted for in 2005 will be delivered in 2012.

Israel Expands Submarine Force

There have been rumors that Israel has been pressuring Germany to finish the 2 submarines under construction. I guess the rumors are true.

Israel has taken delivery of two German submarines ordered four years ago, a military spokesman said on Tuesday...

The submarines, called U212s, can launch cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads, although when it confirmed the sale in 2006 the German government said the two vessels were not equipped to carry nuclear weapons.

The subs were ordered in 2005 and delivery was initially expected in 2010.

Including the two new ones, Israel has five German submarines — the most expensive weapon platforms in Israel’s arsenal...

According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the U212s are designed for a crew of 35, have a range of 4,500 kilometres (2,810 miles) and can launch cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads.

Very interesting timing. Worth noting, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has 4 U-214 submarines almost completed that were intended for Greece, but were never paid for. Last I heard all 4 were launched, and laying around looking for a new owner.

A good deal for someone. If they are for sale cheap, I think the US should buy them. I'm sure the folks down at Newport News could do something with them to get them to sea.

Then again, maybe Israel will buy them?

Greek Submarine News

Greece has decided not to pay Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmbH and Hellenic Shipyards SA dockyards 524 million euros ($775 million), so ThyssenKrupp AG, the German shipbuilder and steelmaker, canceled contracts with Greece yesterday for the construction and maintenance of all submarines.

ThyssenKrupp is reducing its workforce and seeking to sell or spin off units after the global economic slump slashed demand for products from raw steel to yachts. Greece’s dispute with the company prompted the opposition socialist Pasok party to accuse the New Democracy government of “indifference and inability” as the nation gears up for elections next month.

The Greek state “can’t pay, won’t pay, or has other priorities,” said Dirk Nettling, a Commerzbank AG analyst who recommends investors buy ThyssenKrupp stock. “It’s not a pretty event, that’s clear.”

Hellenic Shipyards, the largest in the eastern Mediterranean, was awarded the contract to build four class U214 submarines in February 2000, according to the company’s Web site. It got an additional contract to upgrade three class 209 submarines in 2002. ThyssenKrupp said the Greek Defense Ministry now “is in default of its contractual obligations.”

Hard to tell what is happening here. Greece had recently come up with a plan for the Hellenic Navy that appeared to include payments to ThyssenKrupp for all but the first U-214 built, which reportedly has problems. By canceling the contract it is unclear if ThyssenKrupp is attempting to renegotiate, or is simply telling the Greeks to 'work with someone else.'

The New Somali Navy

This article on "commander" of the Somali Navy is kind of interesting from both a policy and a theoretical point of view. On the policy side, resurrecting the Somali Navy would seem to be one important component of the effort to end piracy off the Horn of Africa. There's a fair bit of absurdity, of course; he has no men, no boats, and virtually no coastline. Then again, the prospects for an ocean-going Somali Navy are probably a touch better than those for the Bolivian Navy. On the theoretical side, the idea of resurrecting or reinventing military organizations fascinates me. The next Somali Navy will bear almost no resemblance to the last Somali Navy (which was no great shakes), or to the navies of Somalia's colonial rulers. The Somalis won't have to reinvent the wheel, however; they presumably will have the support of the international community in building up material stocks and in building an officer corps. The issue interests me because "inventing" a navy isn't at all unusual. Apart from the great powers of Europe (Spain, Portugal, Britain, France, Russia) very few navies have emerged organically. The Royal Navy, for example, emerged from a series of different institutions over the course of several centuries. I recommend N.A.M. Rodgers' Safeguard of the Sea and Command of the Ocean on the history of the RN. For most navies, however, it's not difficult to identify an inception date.

Historically, states have had two broad options for inventing a navy. On the one hand, states can essentially invent their own institutions, perhaps borrowing from their other military organizations. On the other, states can import institutions from other navies. The latter is less expensive, less time consuming, and I think far more common than the former. There are also hybrid models. Characterizing very crudely, Japan is essentially a borrower, while Germany and the People's Republic of China are essentially inventors (I've done some reading on this topic, but not a ton, so feel free to dispute these characterizations). The Imperial Japanese Navy had native historical antecedents, but was basically built around the model of the Royal Navy (with the assistance of British officers) during the Meiji Restoration. The Kaiserliche Marine was cobbled together from the small fleets of a number of German states, with a big assist from the Prussian Army. Both methods can, apparently, be somewhat successful. The IJN lost to the USN and the RN, but gave a good show. The Kaiserliche Marine went toe-to-toe with the RN and Jutland and lived to tell about it; indeed, German training and doctrine in some areas seem to have exceeded British standards.

Of course, the German and Japanese experiences have limited utility for thinking about post-colonial navies, although most seem to pursue the "borrow" path. Borrowing tends to be a two way street, requiring some cooperation from the state that's being borrowed from. This means that the USN has the opportunity to influence the institutional development not just of the Somali Navy, but also of the various other navies of East Africa, and the rest of the world. The same goes for the USCG, which would probably be better as an exemplar for East African navies. The USN, the USCG, and other relevant actors are, of course, aware of this; foreign military assistance means more than just creating a market for US defense products. This is a way in which "soft power" operates, and in which soft power is replicated and enhanced. I'd also hazard to say that there's great potential for enabled borrowing/foreign institution building within the Cooperative Maritime Strategy framework.

Why Germany is Worth Watching

EagleOne has long been the best source for Somali piracy online. He comes through today with this article, a very interesting peek into German military activity in the Horn of Africa region.

The German soldiers aboard the remote naval reconnaissance plane (top speed of 745 km/h, range of 9,000 km) must not do more than making films and taking photographs. The only weapon that they can use in line with current laws is the camera. However, if they were permitted, they could also fire with precision, because Orion is heavily armed. It carries, warheads, missiles, tube artillery, torpedoes, mines, and bombs.

"Over the past two months we have been able to film four pirate attacks on merchant ships," says Commander Michael Potthoff (42), who commands the 65-men German Orion contingent in Djibouti. "Eight attacks were prevented because of our presence."

This raises two questions. What is the point of Germany sending a huge number of troops to Somalia to fight piracy if the current laws only allow camera's to be the weapon? Can one of our German readers explain either via email or the comments the events taking place over there regarding the governments effort to open up the RoE for the German Navy, because I think that would be an interesting discussion. If the government changes the RoE for piracy, how does that effect German military RoE in Afghanistan?

Seems to me that if Germany adjusts its laws for piracy, there could be some downstream benefit in Afghanistan. That would be nice...

Second, what is the difference between the way the P-3C described here conducting its pirate fighting efforts and any scenario involving an unmanned aviation systems contribution? As this blog continues to point out, if you need a warfighter, build an unmanned system and arm it up.

If you need a peacemaker for piracy, and unmanned platform is a glorified camera. If you really want a peacemaker, send in the manpower of the Coast Guard, Navy, and Marines, and send them in armed for action.