US MARSEC Capability Development Programs in West Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects

US Navy Photo

The following contribution is from N.R. Jenzen-Jones &  LT Chad R. Hutchins, USN.

West Africa[1] today is plagued by a variety of serious maritime security (MARSEC) concerns. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, trafficking of persons, arms, and drugs, oil bunkering, illegal migration, and piracy have contributed to a maritime environment characterized by crime and corruption. The costs of these illegal activities are significant; the cost of illegal fishing alone is over $1 billion US Dollars annually, and an estimated 600,000 people are trafficked illegally each year[2]. Pirate attacks targeting oil product vessels in West Africa are occurring with increasing regularity, and are becoming increasingly violent[3].

Like much of the rest of Africa, the nations of West Africa have traditionally held a land-centric view of security. National navies, as well as other maritime entities such as coast guards and fisheries patrols, have never been in the vanguard of training or financial investment. Despite this, recent years have seen a renewed focus on maritime security in West Africa, driven by concerns of piracy, threats to oil production, and international programs of assistance. Many nations and organizations have strategic interests in building strong MARSEC partnerships with West African nations, most in the hopes of protecting or establishing maritime enterprise relationships. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Doctrine for 2012, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, discusses the importance of partnerships around the world, including those in Africa. This document sets forth a goal to “become the security partner of choice” in nations of interest, and advocates an “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approach”, with an emphasis on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities[4].

West Africa holds particular strategic significance for the United States, and European partner nations, and not only for its vast reserves of energy resources. The region is also an advantageous safe haven for terrorist and transnational criminal groups, a transhipment point for drugs being trafficked to Europe and further, and its ports are key components of the global maritime transportation network.

Capacity building is the most effective approach to building a sustainable, self-reliant maritime security environment in West Africa, whilst keeping to the small-footprint approach outlined by the DoD. These partnerships and training efforts allow regional nations to directly counter MARSEC threats within their domains, leveraging the vast experience in maritime operations provided by partner nations. They encourage a two-way exchange of ideas and skills, and allow participants from U.S. and European nations to get a glimpse at the problems plaguing the region first hand.

Africa Partnership Station (APS) is a U.S. Navy (USN) initiative designed to facilitate events that foster cooperation between African nations, the U.S., and European partner nations with the goal
of developing maritime safety and security capabilities on the African continent. The partners of APS work together through both sea and land based engagements, focusing on a broad range of MARSEC-related operations, joint exercises, and professional training programs. These endeavors focus on four main pillars of capability: Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Professionals, Maritime Infrastructure, and Maritime Enforcement[5].  A highly unique and advantageous aspect of APS is that it requires no permanent land base, as the ships participating act as the ‘base’ for engagements and training. This allows the USN to follow the small-footprint approach outlined in the Sustaining Global Leadership document, and leaves assets available for re-tasking if high-priority situations arise in the region.

The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) is a US Africa Command (AFRICOM) program that focuses on assisting partner nations within Africa with a view to building stronger maritime security through cooperative real-world law enforcement operations[6]. Partner nations work directly with the U.S. Coast Guard and/or U.S. Navy whilst conducting operations to counter common security threats such as IUU fishing, trafficking of weapons, people, or narcotics, and so on. This decreases the reliance of West African nations on foreign assistance to counter common MARSEC threats in the region, as well as enhancing operating cohesion, and fostering trust and confidence between partnering nations.

Private Security Companies (PSCs) also play a role in capacity building operations in Africa. One such company, Triton International Ltd., has conducted extensive training of the Somaliland Coast Guard, developing their capabilities to respond to a variety of threats in their area of responsibility[7]. Similarly, PSCs are participating in training local navies and coast guards in West Africa, and are even augmenting local coast guard and fisheries patrols in some cases. PSCs can play an important role in building maritime security capacity in West Africa, lessening the burden on the world’s navies, and allowing programs such as APS and AMLEP to target areas of specific interest or concern.

All of the above initiatives, as well as a handful of others falling outside the scope of this article[8], are innovative approaches to engaging with African nations in efforts to develop stronger local maritime presence, self-reliance, and response capabilities. However for these partnerships to be effective, especially in Africa, there exists a need for carefully structured milestones, robust oversight and accountability, and end state definitions that outline success. More can be done in order to prove that investment in African nations can provide a truly sustainable, self-reliant, and effective maritime presence. There is a common need for nations, commercial interests, private security companies (PSCs), and non-profit organizations to build cooperative partnerships with the nations of West Africa in order to develop MARSEC capacity in the region. US involvement should follow an interagency (‘whole of government’) approach, synergising the efforts of the DoD and the various services (particularly the USN and USCG), Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, and other USG stakeholders. Such interagency programs have enjoyed regional success in areas such as Colombia[9], and would be ideally suited to tackling the multifaceted challenges presented by the West African situation.

The numerous challenges of building a sustainable partnership and self-reliant West African maritime capability are widely recognized and understood. Most West African nations have a widely-acknowledged problem with corruption and nepotism, and the efficiency of military and civil command structures are often in question. Additionally, there is the challenge presented by integrating the efforts of the wide range of stakeholders seeking to promote enhanced MARSEC in West Africa. Nonetheless, much of the groundwork for achieving these goals is already in place, and it would require a comparatively modest investment to begin making a real impact. The lacking pieces of the puzzle are a unified strategic plan, and a designated body to coordinate various agencies’ and nations’ efforts.  

The U.S. State Department has already established a Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, an ad-hoc discussion group of international representatives that could provide a blueprint for the sort of collaborative body that could be established in order to implement maritime security development programs Africa-wide. The USN’s Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) has also implemented a monthly series of meetings focusing on piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings provide an opportunity for stakeholders from worldwide militaries, law enforcement agencies, and industry to coordinate counter-piracy efforts in the region. Such collaborative initiatives should be combined with the US interagency approach, in order to maximize the effective participation of all stakeholders in the region. We recommend a tiered approach to integrating these efforts:

The tactical level: Develop a cooperative training and engagement program consisting of navy, coast guard, and private security experts from around the world to continue building upon previous and current training in maritime operations, education, administration, and other relevant areas. 

The operational level: Develop a cooperative assistance program aimed at upgrading and maintaining maritime infrastructure in critical West African ports. Establish an interagency body tasked with coordinating maritime capacity building operations throughout the region, and recommending the best distribution of surplus US and European materiel gifted to nations in the region.

The strategic level:   Engage with individual West African nations, as well as ECOWAS and the African Union, through high-level exchanges across the interagency. Establish an interagency framework to organize MARSEC development at the strategic level, directly supporting U.S. and partner nations’ foreign policy goals. These engagements should focus on laying out a framework to work towards a sustainable end-state; the development of an effective, self-reliant maritime capability in West Africa.

If the U.S.’s strategic plan is to consider the benefits of West African partnerships seriously, then creating an international group that mirrors many aspects of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to fill the role as the ‘Contact Group for Maritime Security in Africa’ would be an admirable first step. Such a body should be responsible for the tiered approach outlined above, coordinating both interagency and international participation in programs to strengthen the MARSEC capabilities of nations throughout Africa, tailoring exercises, training, and operations to suit US and partner nations’ foreign policy goals, and reducing confusion and overlap between programs from different countries and agencies.




Sources
[1] Generally accepted to be the 15 nations comprising ECOWAS, plus Mauritania.
[2]http://www.ejfoundation.org/page275.html
[3]http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-04-24/global-pirate-attacks-becoming-more-violent/3967950
[4]http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
[5]http://www.naveur-navaf.navy.mil/about%20us.html
[6]www.africom.mil/fetchBinary.asp?pdfID=20100503145240
[7]http://pmso.net/PMSOSpecial%20Report_AnIndustryApproachToMaritimeSecurityInWestAfrica.html
[8]Including but not limited to the US DoD’s Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative, Maritime Liaison Officer (MARLO) programs, the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa), and programs administered by the EU’s CSDP.
[9]http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/run-through-the-jungle-colombia%E2%80%99s-jungla-commandos

Short Bios
Nic Jenzen-Jones is a security and defence industry consultant, writer, and analyst. He is the co-editor of Security Scholar and can be found on Twitter (@RogueAdventurer).
Chad Hutchins a Lieutenant in the United States Navy, currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School. He has previously served aboard ships participating in capability development operations in Africa. The opinions and views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or any other agency.

Optimizing APS

GAO has produced a new report on various interagency issues in AFRICOM including a focus on the Africa Partnership Stations. One item of interest is the table on page 54 listing the ships used over the 14 iterations of APS, which include US CRUDES and Amphibs, USCG cutters, and allied ships. Given the enduring nature of this mission, and others like it around the world, one wonders when the Navy will procure a vessel optimized to engage nascent navies. Certainly DDGs are overkill. If the primary goal is a platform that can hold the various training teams and interagency reps, then a JHSV will probably fit the bill. But if it's to give partners a realistically attainable platform to emulate for operations and training, then the USCG cutters, or better yet, a new green water vessel (something between a PC and FFG/LCS) would be appropriate. Maybe the right answer is a mix of the two.

Also worthwhile is the discussion of challenges involving various flavors of money in support of partner capacity building efforts, which include spending details from Nashville's APS deployment. The problems inherent with complex and inefficient funding and authorities for security force assistance have been reported consistently by multiple COCOMs for several years, yet OSD, Congress, and other relevant agencies have done next to nothing to address this critical shortfall to security cooperation.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Belgium Stepping Up: Joining Africa Partnership Station And Leading Operation Atalanta

BNS Godetia (A960) will leave for Africa on February 8, becoming the second European country after the Netherlands to join the Africa Partnership Station with the sending of a vessel.

That Belgium has become the second country to join APS really surprises me. Belgium has no real maritime tradition and only a really small navy (which isn't even called a navy, but the 'marine component') with the largest vessels being its 2 M-class frigates. So they lack larger vessels that, perhaps, are better suited for such a mission - the Godetia is only a small ship at 2,500t and therefore doesn't have a lot of room for either equipment or foreign 'trainees'.

The symbolism that another European country is stepping up is, however, more important.

But I had really expected one of the Mediterranean countries to be next since their direct interests (the large stream of immigtants) in Africa are much bigger, but maybe they'll follow suit.

Some time ago Belgium has also offered to lead EU NAVFOR operation Atalanta at the end of the year. For this they have asked the Netherlands to 'lend' them a ship, since their M-class frigates are not suitable for this.

I haven't heard any answers as of yet. But although the Netherlands has officially only announced ships for the first half of this year (HNLMS Tromp and HNLMS Johan de Witt), I have already read in an interview with a Dutch Cdr. they want to send 3 vessels this year.

Belgium will send their own BNS Louise Marie along with any Dutch ship.

Joint Maritime Operations - Engagement

This post continues the Developing Joint Maritime Operations series by examining engagement as a category of military activity within the context the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. From section 5 in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0.

Engagement activities seek to improve the capabilities of or cooperation with allied and other partners. They may be conducted as a complement to broader diplomatic or economic engagement, in aid of a friendly (and sometimes not so friendly) government’s own security activities, and even during war itself. They are the primary military contribution to the national challenge of establishing cooperative security. Engagement activities typically are long-duration undertakings, ending only when they have achieved their goals or when either the U.S. or partner government concludes that they have become unnecessary or unproductive.

The scope and nature of engagement activities can vary enormously, reflecting differing strategic relationships between the United States and partner nations. Each engagement effort will be unique and must be framed to accommodate both U.S. objectives and the concerns of and constraints on the potential partners.

Even more than other categories of joint activity, engagement is subject to a myriad of laws and regulations governing everything from limits on funding and the deployment of military personnel to legislative restrictions on the tasks to which military assistance may be applied. Given these complexities, nothing can compensate for close and continuous interagency coordination at the individual country level. The key to that coordination is the country team and the U.S. Ambassador to whom it answers. As the permanent agent of the U.S. government’s diplomatic relationship with the host nation, the country team alone can negotiate the access essential to effective engagement. And as the President’s personal representative, only the ambassador has the authority to insure synchronization of interagency operations. Above all, by virtue of its routine political contacts with the host government and its familiarity with local conditions, the country team is uniquely placed to assess the partner nation’s ability and willingness to accept military engagement and, where those differ from the U.S. appraisal, to convince the host government to modify its views. For all these reasons, the country team will be the coordinating authority in most engagement efforts, and the success of those efforts will depend on the effectiveness of the liaison between and among the regional combatant command and the country teams in its area of responsibility.

Trends suggest that engagement requirements increasingly will exceed the capacities of specialized but manpower-limited organizations such as special operations forces and permanent military assistance groups. The unique capabilities of those forces remain vital, and their capacities may well expand. But the reality is that a growing share of joint engagement tasks will fall to general-purpose forces. Accomplishing those tasks without unacceptable penalty to their combat capabilities will require innovative adjustments of joint and service doctrine, organizations, and training.

Finally, not least of the challenges associated with engagement is measuring its impact. Because engagement is for the most part a long-term undertaking, the most important results may not be visible until long after it begins. Indeed, in some cases, as for example when undertaken to help a partner nation improve its ability to deter external aggression, effects may never be clearly measurable.

Since engagement imposes both direct budget costs and opportunity costs with respect to the joint forces that conduct them, that inability to measure their impact risks undermining the legislative and political support without which no engagement is feasible. Even more than other joint activities, therefore, engagement depends crucially on the persuasiveness of the strategic narrative underwriting it, and on the active sponsorship of political, diplomatic and military leaders. In the end, however difficult its results may be to quantify, joint engagement may be the most cost-effective of the Nation’s military investments.

The US Navy is The Global Force for Good. Africa Partnership Station, Pacific Partnership, Southern Partnership Station, to name a few... have demonstrated that the US Navy can work with host nation ambassadors to develop coordination and synchronization for a joint agency and even international engagement. Global Fleet Stations is still a relatively new concept, but there are signs that something special is developing.

How do you measure the growth of a deployment designed with engagement in mind? Well, I measure it two ways. Pacific Partnership is a humanitarian deployment, and when USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE-4) was making the rounds in the Pacific islands last year, there was news about the activities everywhere (nearly 10K Google Returns for a 3 month deployment).

Anyone who claims they can't find information about that deployment never looked, because by the end of deployment I felt like CHINFO had introduced me to the entire crew, including all the foreigners. I don't know how effective it was, but there is no question the Navy did everything possible to align strategic communications to the intent and actions of that deployment, and the statistics are impressive.

But there is more than one kind of Global Fleet Station. The USS Wasp (LHD 1) returned just in time for Christmas from a three month Southern Partnership Station deployment for SOUTHCOM. Did you keep track of it? Probably not. The reason you didn't is because there was a remarkable absence of public affairs information from that deployment - and I mean almost none. Actually, that isn't entirely true. There may not have much of a CHINFO media effort associated with that deployment, but if you follow Hugo Chavez like I do, you would have noticed he spent considerable time whining about the USS Wasp (LHD 1) every week for three months.

I have a simple analyst rule. When a fully loaded LHD deploys no more than a couple hundred miles from the US for three months and Hugo Chavez complains more times than CHINFO writes feel good stories, my basement level analysis suggests sailors are doing same damn fine work. I have no idea what the specifics are, but my bet is the classified AAR is worth reading as there are engagement lessons to be learned in that report.

The CCJO discusses measuring success for engagement. I have asked this question to several Navy leaders associated with engagement opportunities, and many have admitted this is difficult. Polls of people are conducted and used to develop local impact, but so are government level responses. Should medical diplomacy missions measure the impact of immunizations of a country over time? The good news is, it should be the State Department that develops the measurements for influence. The bad news is, relying on the State Department is never a popular idea.

I do not believe Global Fleet Stations has evolved far enough yet to answer all the engagement concepts discussed in the CCJO. Remember, we have sent USS Annapolis (SSN 760) to the Ghana as part of an African Partnership Station 2007, so we know there is an innovation process associated with Global Fleet Stations and other naval engagement operations. The continuing evolution of Global Fleet Stations insures that the Navy is a leading service in executing the engagement vision outlined in the CCJO, but even since the beginning of Global Fleet Stations the discussion on force structure has existed.

The question is not whether amphibious ships are capable of performing as Global Fleet Stations, because I believe the answer to that question is always yes. Amphibious ships are expensive to operate and deploy, particularly and including the Wasp and San Antonio classes which are the newest amphibious ships in the fleet. The Wasp class is over 40,000 tons while the San Antonio class is over 24,000 tons - these are big ships. Other big ships like USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE-4) are much less expensive to operate, but they can't carry a lot of people, so T-AKEs aren't really well designed for Global Fleet Stations. I need significantly more information on how a JHSV fits into the GFS picture, because as a solo ship I don't understand how that fits. Seems to me if a JHSV works, then a much cheaper merchant charter would.

Are Global Fleet Stations a priority in the Navy to the point where a dedicated ship is worth the investment? I participated in a wargame this past summer that looked at alternative fleet structures, and the specific alternative fleet structure examined included a Global Fleet Station ship. In beating around the force structure being examined, one idea emerged that a more optimal GFS ship would be a mothership/tender that would include the workshops and C2 of a tender but include the desirable characteristics of a GFS ship (including a large heavy crane) - which in my mind was like a "LPD-17 light", and by that I mean a Bay class type ship but reusing the LPD-17 hull for its size.

The idea was for the GFS ship to operate on a circuit in a region hitting each stop over a period of 7-10 days supporting multiple 250 ton ships (~170 ft types) in theater security operations with regional naval forces and multiple smaller boats (25-ft types) working with regional coast guards. The basic idea was to have these small vessels in a distributed operational model working in several countries at the same time while the GFS ship sails in circuits hitting all the stops to supply/support training, and by training the regional nations officers together on the GFS ship, with stops in each country in the circuit, the idea was it would build regional cooperation. In my concept of operations of this engagement idea, I was thinking along the lines of 4 ships of each type per engagement, and the circuit would support as many engagements per nation (CG or Navy) in different ports as possible at once. In wartime these GFS ships would be used for logistics support, harbor security, regional MSO, and where to develop Coast Guard post military operations. With the inclusion of a large heavy crane, the ship could potentially be used as a tender to reload VLS for primary fleet forces.

Should Global Fleet Stations drive requirements for future hospital ships, future salvage ships, future tenders, or other future vessel types designed and built for the MSC? Part of developing strategy on a budget is consolidating capabilities where possible. If there isn't enough money to build different types of specialized vessels, perhaps the Navy needs to examine adding specialized capabilities to a single larger ship type that is used for Global Fleet Stations. A ship built with the T-AKE hull might support several specialized capabilities consolidated from numerous specialized ships, and those large ships with diverse specializations might be well suited for GFS operations?

Are partners avoiding engagement with us because we do not have small boats, PCs, or corvettes to work with small coast guards and mid-sized Navy's for surface warfare training? An amphibious ship that deploys to the Gulf of Guinea can fill 6 months with regional engagements, as the USS Fort McHenry did, but did critical countries in that region like South Africa and Nigeria decide not to engage because we don't offer surface warfare capabilities at a similar level they operate?
Should Global Fleet Station ships be generic or specific, designed as a one-ship-fits-all vessel or specialized vessels based on the maritime environments globally? Not all maritime environments are the same. West Africa may require a greater humanitarian approach while East Africa requires a theater security cooperation approach. The global coast guard sucks, so does the US Navy need to think about a ship designed to support and deliver Coast Guard capabilities globally - perhaps a hybrid cutter tender/training ship?

These are only a handful of potential questions the Navy might consider while they continue to evolve regional engagement operations. I think the CCJO section on engagement is speaking directly to the US Navy as a primary capability, and I also think future CCJO versions can improve by learning from the Navy on this subject.

An Unaffordable Peacetime Capability

Professor Derek Reveron has an article up at the Atlantic Council's New Atlanticist blog titled Beyond Piracy: Maritime Security and Safety Challenges.

The rise of piracy and the limits of naval power underscore that maritime challenges often begin ashore where security deficits exist. Yet, this should not lead to underlying condition paralysis when thinking about transnational challenges like piracy. As discussed during a joint maritime security workshop between the Atlantic Council and the Naval War College, the international community can generate local maritime forces through capacity building; encourage more prosecutions in Europe and the United States; support judicial systems in Kenya, the Seychelles, and Yemen; reduce the financial flows making piracy profitable; and support stabilizing efforts in Somalia.

Can someone show me what it looks like to "generate local maritime forces" in a weak or failed state? What is the example, Iraq? Doesn't Rhode Island have a longer Coast Guard than Iraq, and aren't we still building that countries Coast Guard capacity?

Standing up a Coast Guards is a great idea, particularly in Somalia - so much so that Somalia claims to have recently stood a Coast Guard up. Ironically, the Somali Coast Guard operate from trucks, not boats; and they are limited to operating in Mogadishu despite suggestions they will actually operate in other places (supposedly including Somaliland and Puntland btw, which is politically not going to happen).

Fishing, piracy, environmental issues... these are problems that Coast Guards deal with every day. Should the US have the capability to stand up a Coast Guard in failed states like Somalia? Sure, it would be nice, but who pays for it? The Navy can barely afford to do the work asked of it by our government, and now they need to be able to build capacity of others? The idea of maritime cooperation is excellent, but it only works where cooperation already exists. It does not work where it is non-existent, and it never will until it is funded properly and elevated significantly in priority.

As it happens, we really have very little to offer failed states like Somalia looking towards the future. If you checked out the Atlantic Council conference, you'll see the problem. The US Navy's primary focus is on Maritime Domain Awareness as an information sharing mechanism towards building a better understanding of regional security problems. How exactly does MDA help the Coast Guard of a failed state that is likely to have massive corruption? Are we likely to share MDA information, even basic ship location information, with the Coast Guard of Somalia? Uhm, not without the shipping industry giving the US Navy the vocal middle finger objection.

Here is the bottom line. When it comes to strategic theory of naval soft power and diplomacy, the US Navy is really good at coming up with operational concepts for engaging existing partners. Global Fleet Stations, 1000-Ship Navy, Maritime Domain Awareness, etc... begin with a starting point of sharing responsibilities and pooling resources with existing, responsible states to achieve the same objectives. What we don't see are strategic theories that address building capacity where capacity doesn't exist, nor do we see strategic theories that address building partnership with countries that we lack partnership agreements with.

The US Navy has just as many "cooperative" options with the PLA Navy in the South China Sea as they do with the Somali Coast Guard in the Indian Ocean. Should the Chinese significantly contribute to a US/Japan sponsored East Asian MDA network with ship tracking information in the Yellow Sea and South China Sea, I'll stand corrected.

I do not believe the US Navy will be worth a darn building capacity with failed states or even cooperation with competitors without leadership supporting completely new strategic theories that focus on peacetime activity. Even then, we can't afford it anyway, because the Navy also needs completely new strategic theories that focus on wartime activity given the trend lines for money and resources. If the new administration wants to prevent war, then they need to add funding towards a fleet suited to meet the demands of a peacetime engagement. Based on the budget numbers I have seen for the future Navy under this administration, the future US Navy will be built solely to fight because there is not enough money to build anything else and meet the obligations that are being shifted to the US Navy. That is the political choice this administration is making, and only people who unrealistically believe that $2 billion, 9,000 ton warships can both be everywhere and do everything all the time will suggest otherwise. In the real world, it doesn't work like that.

Smart Power is Global Power

The African Partnership Station quietly represents one of the most interesting activities of US soft power today. I have got to find a way to spend a few weeks on one of these ships.

What makes the African Partnership Station so special? I'm not really sure to be honest, but they must be doing something right because once again, a major European power is sending one of their major naval assets to participate. This time its the Dutch.

The amphibious transport ship HNLMS Johan de Witt will be leaving today from Den Helder to participate in 'Africa Partnership Station' for two months. With this operation the naval vessel will offer a contribution towards the realisation of a stable coastal region in West and Central Africa.

During the tour HNLMS. Johan de Witt will operate in the waters of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana and around the Cape Verde islands. Together with these countries they will, amongst others, do hydrographic recordings of ports and do exercises. The vessel also carries, at the request of several non-governmental organizations (NGO), a large quantity of relief goods for the African coastal countries. Furthermore, Americans and Dutch on board will give training to many African sailors.

The article ends by saying:

Africa Partnership Station
The Africa Partnership Station operation is part of the U.S. global maritime strategy for the 21st century. Part of that strategy is to strive for a safe, stable and prosperous West and Central Africa, through good coastal management. This is done by setting up fishery inspections, combating illicit trade in commodities and trafficking. Moreover, the focus will also be on the creation of a good 'Search and Rescue' organization and the protection of drilling platforms and combating environmental pollution.

In order for this to succeed, Africa Partnership Station promotes cooperation between countries and between various maritime authorities and organizations.

The US Navy is clearly doing something right with APS, because the Europeans have bought in. We have seen consistent presence with the French, and it is hard to call HNLMS Johan de Witt (L 801) anything other than a major contribution from the Dutch. With the efforts of the European nations combined with our efforts, all of the activities create sustained presence and increased efficiency for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The participating nations in the region benefit by getting training and exposure with different tactics and techniques from the various professional participants.

African Partnership Station is beginning to represent a unique convergence of the two big US Navy strategic concepts of the 21st century: the 1000-ship Navy and Sea Basing, or put another way: a cooperative international global fleet station.

It is interesting to observe what the (East) African Partnership Station is doing, but lets examine the question differently. Have you considered where (East) African Partnership Station is going? What does the Gulf of Guinea look like in 10 years? What does it look like in 20 years? What does this mega cooperation of US and European nations with regional partners in the Gulf of Guinea lead to? I can't say I know yet, but there is clearly a 21st century form of naval diplomacy here many nations find quite attractive.

It may not be self evident, but somehow the naval vessel used for amphibious assault in wartime has become one of the most important soft power tools in the arsenal of major naval powers during peacetime. The flexibility of amphibious ships continues to represent an investment that politicians globally can agree with. This is something the Navy and the Marine Corps needs to get their head around. It is commonly said the LPD-17 is a well designed ship built poorly. To be fair, only the first two ships of the class have the reputation of being built poorly, the rest of the class suffers from being very expensive, although I don't know how we make a 24,000 ton combatant any cheaper without quantity increases (which I recommend for LSD(X)).

I would like to know if the QDR asked the question whether the Navy should built a Global Fleet Station ship, and what the arguments were for and against. When you start thinking about the smaller, inexpensive LPD hull one would want for a GFS ship, it is easy to see how a commercial specification vessel operated by the MSC could coordinate with DHS domestically and State internationally for humanitarian assistance and disaster response. With a range of options including acting as a C4 node following disasters that typically stress communication networks, an offshore medical facility, or a station ship able to support coastal vessels and Coast Guard cutters, such a ship appears to be very flexible and suitable for current requirements. An inexpensive, commercial specification vessel also wouldn't be a bad way for the US shipbuilding industry to get in on the amphibious ship export market, which one would expect to increase as climate change becomes more and more of a global political issue.

The success of the African Partnership Station can now be validated by the 'buy in' of major European powers who see the political value of such soft power operations. In my mind, that is a much larger validation of the strategic concept than taking public opinion polls from the population in areas of activities and attempting to understand the results will ever be.

HT: Gijs!

Soft Power Conducted Two Ways

When ADM Roughead brags about the Arleigh Burke class destroyer as a soft power instrument, I think it sounds rather absurd. I won't back down from that position, because even if it makes perfect sense the argument simply does not sell, and it opens up the Navy to unneeded criticism because the argument is an obvious distraction absent honest transparency in our intentions and actions. With that said, let us stop and examine what it looks like on the big board when you examine the chess board.

We begin in the Black Sea.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was shown around the guided-missile cruiser Moskva, the flagship of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, at the southern port of Novorossiisk on Tuesday.

The Russian cruiser Moskva is a cool ship, but I know of one that is better.

The guided missile destroyer the USS Stout on Tuesday anchored off Batumi, where its commander, Mark J. Oberley, was welcomed ashore with Georgian music and wine.

"This visit and the combined training demonstrate the U.S. and Georgian commitment to work together, to cooperate and maintain maritime security," Oberley said.

USS Stout (DDG-55) isn't just some Flight I Arleigh Burke class destroyer, she is a BMD capable Arleigh Burke destroyer that just happens to be in the Black Sea, the best sea location to track any ballistic missile attack that originates from Iran. Sure the visit functions as a bit of gunboat diplomacy, but tell that to the Russian Air Force - which for the record, wouldn't want a piece of USS Stout (DDG-55) either.

Russian warplanes, meanwhile, conducted mock bombing runs in exercises just a few hundred kilometers northwest.

That is a lot of Black Sea friendly relations just a week after the conference in Moscow. USS Stout (DDG-55) will be working with two Georgian Coast Guard vessels in training exercises over the next few days. USS Stout (DDG-55) is 9000 tons of ass kicking, while the combined displacement of both ships may be around 900 tons. It is absolutely rediculous that ADM Roughead calls this soft power, and at the same time, deep in my heart - I honestly do admire him so much for doing exactly that!

The 6th Fleet isn't done conducting naval diplomacy though, because several thousand miles south of the Black Sea, in South Africa, the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) is conducting another soft power deployment, sometimes referred to as the East African Partnership Station. Again, even though South Africa has the largest naval force on the African continent, it just seems ridiculous that an Arleigh Burke class is acting as a Global Fleet Station. GFS is supposed to be a purely soft power naval engagement activity. The ship has already made port visits in Djibouti and Kenya and is scheduled to continue similar port visits to Mauritius and Tanzania in the coming months. The USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) probably displaces more than the entire Coast Guards of Mauritius, Tanzania, and Djubouti... although I admit in South Africa a Burke can be a productive vessel for engagement.

"It's always great when two partner nations can schedule meaningful and productive events such as these," said Captain James Tranoris, Commander, Task Force 363. "It not only enhances the professional element of each of our navies' ability to work with one another for a safer maritime domain, but renews the strong ties of partnership we have with South Africa. For some of our Sailors, this will be their first time interacting with the South African Navy. It's a superb opportunity for them to make new friends and learn how another foreign navy operates."

The 6th fleet is currently operating two very powerful DDG-51s in partnership and engagement activities with countries that the ships are complete overmatch. OK, so I concede South Africa, but I won't concede Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Djubouti.... or Georgia for that matter. I think the Navy needs to clearly state, and find some agreement with Turkey, the intention to operate an AEGIS BMD capable ship in the Black Sea as often as possible. Unless Turkey wants to pay for BMD capabilities, that is where the NATO BMD shield belongs.

I still say the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) is just a bad fit for an African Partnership Station. If anything, that is probably the best argument yet to SLEP the Figs, which are much better suited for engaging an African military, particularly if combined with a MSC charter. Sending a Burke to Africa to build coast guard capacity is like sending a logistics ship to hunt a submarine. Given the activities between Israel and Iran, there is probably a legitimate unstated reason why USS Stout (DDG-55), USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), USS Laboon (DDG 58) and USS James E Williams (DDG 95) basically form a line respectively from the tip of Africa to the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea to the Black Sea.

Now compare these engagement activities with others taking place globally.

First there is CARAT 2009 going on, currently engaged in Thailand.

Since 1995, the CARAT bilateral exercise series has provided the U.S. and six other Southeast Asian nations - Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia - the opportunity to exchange knowledge and expand and sharpen maritime security through shared training, equipment and manpower.

Ships and aircraft from both Thailand and the U.S. comprise the combined CARAT task group, under the leadership of Royal Thai Navy Rear Adm. Chaiyot Sunthornnak, Commander, Frigate Squadron 2, and Commodore William Kearns III, Commander, Task Group 73.5.

Task Group 73.5 consists of the amphibious dock landing ship USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49), guided-missile destroyer USS Chafee (DDG 90), guided-missile frigate USS Crommelin (FFG 37) and rescue-salvage ship USNS Safeguard (T-ARS 50).

Other units participating in CARAT Thailand include P-3C Orion and SH-60 Seahawk aircraft, U.S. Navy Seabees, a U.S. Coast Guard training team and a U.S. Navy mobile security squadron.

By any definition, that is a well balanced force using an amphibious ship, a salvage ship, and a Fig to engage a broad spectrum of capabilities within the level of regional partners. Balance. Task Force 73.5 has a broad spectrum of capabilities for engagement, an obvious reflection the folks planning the annual CARAT exercise are on top of their game.

Then there is the Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4) conducting Pacific Partnership 2009, the medical diplomacy deployment in the Pacific.

Pacific Partnership 2009 departed Samoa July 10 after working alongside Samoans and other partners and friends, delivering a variety of humanitarian civic assistance programs.

"When we first arrived, our goal was to grow in friendship, learn from one another and build skills that will allow us all to respond in the event of any future humanitarian crisis," said Commodore Andrew Cully, Pacific Partnership 2009 mission commander, during his speech at the closing ceremony at National Hospital in Apia.

"There is no question that we have accomplished that and so much more."

A big MSC ship with a large medical detachment. Was intended to be an amphibious ship, but all signs suggest the Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4) has been doing fine, and I do wonder if the Navy is conducting the operation at a lower cost using the T-AKE instead of the amphibious ship. Would be interesting to know what the cost difference was, because it could be higher.

What about USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) conducting Southern Partnership Station (SPS) 2009.

USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) conducted joint maritime exercises with the Uruguayan Navy in the Atlantic Ocean July 9 as part of Southern Partnership Station (SPS) 2009.

Oak Hill participated in a mine-sweeping exercise with several Uruguayan ships. Uruguayan pilots were also given the opportunity to land their helicopters on the Oak Hill's flight deck during flight operations.

Capt. Brad Williamson, commodore, Destroyer Squadron 2 said the exercises were important because they embodied the spirit of SPS 2009.

Finally, there is a West African Partnership Station soon to begin, with an appropriately sized vessel for developing regional security.

Departing from Portsmouth, Virginia July 1, 2009, Coast Guard cutter Legare is on its way to the African continent to conduct maritime safety and security exchanges with countries along the west and central coast.

During the three-month Africa Partnership Station (APS) mission, the 270-foot cutter and its crew will visit and work with countries to include Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Cape Verde.

I think the contrasts are interesting. It is possible to say the USS Stout (DDG-55) is in Georgia as a form of gunboat diplomacy with Russia. I can buy that, indeed, I think the Obama administration will bring back gunboat diplomacy (something progressives might find shocking). The fact is, I see President Obama as a remarkably creative diplomat. Gunboat diplomacy can be offensive, but it has a reputation of preventing conflict, not actually starting a conflict. President Obama doesn't strike me as the type of guy who says "Nope, I don't want to use that diplomatic option for quiet, yet apparent diplomatic escalation."

One can even say the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) activities in South Africa makes sense, although that argument doesn't really apply to Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Djubouti. The fact is, a Coast Guard cutter, a Littoral Combat Ship, or a Fig could do what the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) is doing, and actually be better sized for that role. Is optimization for these types of engagements important? I think so, yes.

We highlight and take time to explain in depth the limit of our resources (ship numbers) for conducting a security operation like anti-piracy off Somalia, and yet the Navy will publicly promote sending a $2 billion, 9000 ton Burke for the stated purpose of exercising with the Mauritius Coast Guard or the Georgian Coast Guard? Does the Navy realize the perceptions at work these kinds of talking points?

I don't want to suggest the Burke can't do the job, but at $2 billion, I am not sure this is efficient manage of these low end activities. The Burkes can do work for the fleet better in tune with the capabilities of the destroyer, specifically securing US interests in the maritime spaces the bad guys are operating in today.

Soft Power From The Sea

The African Partnership Station is the model for the United States approach to Africa. It remains offshore; it has no footprint on land; it is cooperative in nature; and it is conducted on an invitation only basis. Anyone who disagrees will do so in ignorance, not because they may be wrong or right, but because they simply don't know. The truth is, I only know what the Navy has told me through news articles like this one from Navy.mil

U.S. Coast Guard International Training Division (CGITD) instructors recently trained sailors from Ghana, Mozambique and Cape Verde on basic visit, board, search and seizure methods as a part of Africa Partnership Station (APS) Nashville.

The training, which continues until March 5, was colocated aboard USS Nashville (LPD 13) and a Ghanaian navy ship on Sekondi Naval Base during Nashville's 18-day port visit.

For the class, students received instruction on proper boarding and searching techniques, along with lessons on how to search suspicious personnel and weapons handling. The training will give the countries the tools needed to help in the fight against smuggling contraband and piracy - part of an ongoing effort to keep international waters safe.

Here is the hard truth about our world. Long boring efforts towards training, education, and cooperation with other countries are not sexy, thus do not get much attention. The flip side is, if we drop a bomb in a hut in some desert land, depending upon how many people the bomb kills the story could potentially make the front page of any newspaper in America. Media is profitable if it grabs an emotional response, but information is valuable if it makes an intellectual contribution.

I have no idea how much money it costs the United States to send USS Nashville (LPD 13) to Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and who knows where else, and you are unlikely to know either unless someone goes to Africa to ask the question. This very visible effort in outreach and building ties to African nations is not associated with AFRICOM, which may be why nations have opened their doors for our sailors to make a difference. How effective is this program, how valuable are these efforts, and is the African Partnership Station an effort that requires expansion and attention from Congress?

The truth is, it is hard to know because very few people there to see it, but if I had to guess who those people are who are getting a first hand perspective on what the Navy is doing, their names would be Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Matthew Bookwalter, Mass Communication Specialist 2nd David Holmes, Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Charles L. Ludwig, and Lt. j.g. Ellen Bock. Those are the four people to date who have written articles for the Navy regarding events taking place with the USS Nashville (LPD 13).

The Navy is so desperate to have someone cover this story the Navy actually asked me to go. Uh, while I'd love to go, I'm not a journalist, I worked on server farms all day today. Going to Africa would be too expensive for a young middle class father or two like me, and my list of sponsors numbers fewer than 1. There is one journalist who wants to go though, too bad Chris Albon was right when he blogged today that David Axe has the worst financial strategy towards earning a living I have ever seen. I couldn't agree more, but I admire him for his desire. David goes where the story is because he understands which stories have value.

David Axe needs a camera, and he could also use money for expenses. If you can spare the change, buy David a happy meal, $5 in New York (hey its a taxation state!). Support journalists who will go to Africa and cover the stories of value, the stories and perspectives that will eventually end up being evaluated as part of the research of those who study such trivial things like National Strategy and Strategic Communications. The public affairs folks apart of APS are fantastic, no question about that, but the Navy needs other journalists there to insure that Navy soft power connects to a broader domestic audience. These programs are important, but are largely understood by the masses. Journalists like David Axe makes the difference in telling the story of naval soft power to the masses, the same masses that would otherwise never know our international outreach even happened.

African Partnership Station 2009

I am really looking forward to this, and if I get a chance I would love to find a way to get a PAO on that ship I can email continuously and get updates. This is a powerful strategic pacetime initiative that deserves more attention, because it is a model to continue building leading into the future.

Janes is discussing the upcoming deployment of the USS Nashville (LPD 13) in January 2009 as part of the continuing African Partnership Station.

Nashville will be the second small deck amphibious vessel to join APS following the deployment of USS Fort McHenry in late 2007. However, the mission of the ship will be very different to its predecessor as it will provide advanced training in a select number of countries.

Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon will host the 17,244-ton Austin-class ship, which has onboard training teams available to give lessons in basic seamanship, small boat handling, VBSS (visit, board, search and seizure) techniques, search and rescue, data management and how to run an operations centre.

People have asked on the blog what I think Obama is talking about when he discusses the necessity for a well funded civilian corps on par with our military. I don't subscribe to political paranoia, and while I have no evidence to support my assumption, I think Barack Obama is talking about building on the capabilities best outlined in the Global Fleet Station and other Navy soft power strategic initiatives.

Essentially, I think he is talking about Thomas Barnett's SysAdmin function as outlined in his writings. I got an advanced copy of Dr. Barnett's upcoming book Great Powers: America and the World after Bush over the weekend, and while I haven't read it completely yet when I saw this article in Janes it triggered something I've been reading about in that book.

One of several tenets for crafting Grand Strategy Dr. Barnett discusses in his upcoming book is security. Barnett outlines how Grand-Strategic analysis starts with security, which is always 100% of your problem until it is reasonably achieved, and at that point it becomes at most 10% of your ultimate solution. Without going into detail, it is not difficult to see how that idea has direct application to the Gulf of Guinea. I will let the book come out in final copy before expanding on that thought, but with this deployment to take place around the same time as Barnett's book release in January, don't be surprised if I draw several associations between what we are seeing here and how this soft power approach is part of the larger strategic utility belt in the arsenal of a nations smart policy.

H/T: Axe

Observing The Navy's Global Soft Power Deployments

Captain Bob has brought sexy back to Civil Service Mariners (as the photo highlights) and as the first comment highlights his wife would agree. The blog for the USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) is a really good daily read. Yesterday the Mercy spent her last day in Vietnam and is on its way to Singapore. As we have been observing the deployment of the USNS Mercy (T-AH 19), we have found a tremendous amount of media attention given to Operation Smile in Vietnam. It took us a little while to figure out why, but it turns out Cindy McCain, leveraging some of that celebrity status she has during the presidential campaign, helped promote it. In fact, the Miss Universe contestants also helped promote it. Whoever is responsible for the marketing for the deployment is doing an ace job! Meghan McCain has some very good pictures of the work Operation Smile did there, about half way down on that link. Meghan, next time take a few pictures of the ship!

The ship that will execute the second SOUTHCOM Global Fleet Mission deployment departed Norfolk on Friday. We have previously discussed the creativity taking place under Admiral Stavridis's command. First it was using HSV Swift as a Global Fleet Station platform, then it was using Stiletto for chasing down drug runners, then it was the use of airships for surveillance, and now it deploying a Rescue and Salvage Ship, specifically the USNS Grasp (T-ARS 51), for what is being called Navy Diver-Global Fleet Station 2008. The divers are from the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command's Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit Two and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group Two. Good luck to Capt. Jose Delfaus, we look forward to news from the Caribbean during this deployment.

The USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) is helping out following the Tsunami destruction in the central Philippines. I've read in some places this is overkill for a Carrier Strike Group, but I think that is a bad read of the situation. Does it require an aircraft carrier? Nope. However, it sends exactly the right signal regionally, that the US Navy will be there when they are needed, in force if necessary and with help when possible. Given the conditions right now in the Pacific, with a massive naval force involved in RIMPAC and North Korea blowing up their nuclear coolers, one wonders where else the strike group should be instead?

Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) is in Singapore in the middle of an 11-day exercise that will focus on anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare and security operations. While we aren't certain, we believe the exercise ends Thursday and these sailors will get the 4th of July off. The exercises includes 13 ships and 1 submarine. US forces for the exercise include the coast guard cutter Morgenthau (WHEC 722), USS Jarrett (FFG 33), USS Tortuga (LSD 46), USS Ford (FFG 54) and USS McCampbell (DDG 85). The USNS Safeguard (T-ARS 50), which had been expected to participate in the exercises, was sent to the Philippines to help with the ferry that overturned and killed several hundred. You can follow the news from CARAT on the Commander Task Force 73 news website, which is frequently updated with news believe it or not.

Finally, there are some discussions and observations that suggest elements of the USS Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group are on their way to the Gulf of Guinea, in fact already in the Atlantic Ocean. Due to press coverage in that region being limited at best, while we believe this is a planned aspect of the Nassau ESG deployment, given recent security concerns regionally one never knows if the mission profile has changed. The Coast Guard cutter Dallas (WHEC 716) is in the region as part of the ongoing U.S. Naval Forces Europe's Africa Partnership Station (APS) initiative. There has been no media coverage of the Dallas since it completed an exercise with the Cape Verde Coast Guard on June 17th. A lot of stuff happened in the region after June 17th.

Observing the Shift of Naval Strike Groups Towards Africa

We are observing a shift of naval operations that originate from the Atlantic fleet, and all indications are the shift may be permanent. For the past decade the Atlantic fleet has provided what is essentially a token presence in the Atlantic Ocean, with the majority of deploying forces heading for the Middle East. While Kosovo represents an exception, compared to the cold war, naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea had almost completely disappeared by 2005, activity that has included closing the Naval base at La Maddalena, Italy a few years ago.

However, there are several signs that the US Navy is reducing its naval presence in the Middle East, or put another way, beginning the process of more widely distributing the activity of its forward deployed Atlantic based strike groups. The current deployment of the empty ESG, the Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group, appears to be the first candidate executing this shift in naval deployment strategy. Rather than a return to a cold war posture of naval forces in the North Atlantic, it appears the Navy is making its shift from the waters of the Middle East towards the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and all points around Africa including and probably specifically the Gulf of Guinea. The Nassau ESG for example, spent several weeks in the Mediterranean Sea early in its 6 month deployment, then moved to the 5th Fleet AOR for a few months, and has pulled out of the region back into the Mediterranean Sea. Another example is the USS Ashland (LSD 48), which is part of the Nassau ESG, spent almost its entire time after crossing the Suez Canal in the Southeast African region building partnerships with regional nations. While not a unique mission profile, it has happened infrequently enough that it is worth noting.

Everyone is skeptical of AFRICOM, and to be honest, we are too. It simply is not popular to Africans and is having a very difficult time building an image that can be embraced. We believe there is only one solution for stopping the violence and improving the conditions in Africa, and it is economic power, not military power, although we acknowledge there is a role for military power to improve security conditions long enough for economic power to take its course.

We have read what amounts to whining from some circles that big foreign business wants to go to Africa and strip the land of its resources. While that is one way to phrase it, we certainly hope that is exactly what happens, because nothing would improve the conditions in Africa better and faster than the arrival of business interests that bring stability to governments, jobs to the people, and connection (thus interest) with the rest of the world. People who genuinely care about Africa want more economic investment there, people who don't care actually complain about the influx of opportunities that would become available to Africans if big business invests, as if the alternative of spontaneous economic combustion is likely to occur and change the culture instead.

The naval approach to Africa is not similar to AFRICOMs approach. The Navy is only going where it is being invited, specifically to train domestic security forces and improve the domestic security capacity to foster commerce. While these naval projects include humanitarian assistance and volunteer work to build infrastructure, the focus is to improve security capabilities to facilitate private sector investment.

For example, Naval engineers help build up a decapitated dock while a local contractor dredges a port. This leads to the port being able to accept deeper draft ships for commerce, thus kick starting the capacity of commerce by sea. The commerce is protected by the security forces (read coast guard) that are being trained through assistance programs set up by western navies. The trained security forces keep the commerce free of piracy, thus keep the lines of commerce open. These steps improve the conditions for foreign investment, and builds the domestic economic conditions towards a favorable conclusion. Everything is one step at a time, and the process will take years to get all the pieces in place, but the objective is not to build from the inside out (which is sort of how we see the AFRICOM approach), rather create multiple avenues in and out (read connectivity) thus expanding markets and economic oppertunity. We note the US Navy has been building a networked approach for working with regional nations at sea for years.

The next step in this process is presence by the US Navy to build partnerships in the region, and we observe forces like Expeditionary Strike Groups are an excellent way to do this. As large, shallow draft vessels with virtually every littoral capability, these ships can enter port in many places where a surface combatant cannot, and if there is security in the port and places to spend money, well hello economics! Consider the potential... the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) is entering Hong Kong today, and estimates are the visit will result in a minimum $1,000,000 boost to the local Hong Kong economy.

Now scale that potential to a ship like the USS Nassau (LHA 4) (crew slightly over 900) making port at Sao Tome while the USS Nashville (LPD 13) (crew of around 400) makes port in Santo Antonio. If 65% the crew of each ship takes liberty and spends $100 each day for 3 days in each port, that would be $253,500 for the local economies, and that is just two ships making a 3 day liberty. For perspective on local impact, $253,500 is nearly .1% of the GDP of Sao Tome and Principe. If the US Navy made 4 similar visits in one year, the GDP of Sao Tome and Principe would grow .4% on tourism by the US Navy alone.

From a force posture perspective, the shift of naval forces will essentially reduce the time an Atlantic fleet strike group tours in the Middle East thus increasing the naval presence off Africa. There will be some who are skeptical of motive, they are the ignorant. This is a smart move by the US Navy, not only to improve our image in Africa, but it connects the US national economic interest in Africa with military power, an alignment long overdue, and does so through presence without footprint allowing us to build relationships without imposing them, and has a nice side effect of boosting local economies to boot.

We are left with one unknown that will be interesting to observe. While amphibious ships can make port in more places than a surface combatant, it will be interesting where the CSGs go when they spend time off the African coast later this year. We believe it is very possible one side effect of this shift of naval forces from the Middle East could be a greater presence in the South Atlantic, and that could lead to more Carrier port visits to South American nations like Brazil. Very little was said about the liberty by the USS George Washington (CVN 73) crew in Rio earlier this year, but we imagine the local economic effect of four days liberty for ~4000 sailors was very positive. At $100 a day for 3 days, that potentially had a $1.2 million dollar local impact.

So what will the US Navy be doing off Africa when it's not in port? We won't speculate in detail, but this is an example of the kind of nonsense that will hopefully be put to an end with more US Navy presence:

If you read the news even casually, you have probably heard of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and his violent crusade for power. A couple months ago, a Chinese ship loaded with weapons was prevented from unloading those weapons in South Africa. The ship eventually left port an sailed around for a week before reportedly heading back to China. However, with no naval presence, the ship was able to do its thing unobserved, and reportedly made port in the Congo where the weapons were unloaded and eventually delivered. These same weapons are almost certainly being used in the violence we are seeing today. This is the Chinese naval approach to Africa, something that needs to be highlighted more often if the violence is to stop. Yes, we suggest they were PLAN, because middle of the night underway refueling at sea isn't the stuff of average mariners.

With the US Navy's attention focused on supporting the wars in the Middle East and piracy off Somalia, while the Europeans manage refugee problems in a number of places including the Mediterranean Sea while also shrinking their naval forces, and with most of the growing Navies condensed to the Pacific, the simple fact is if the US Navy isn't there, nobody is. Presence by the US Navy matters, and off Africa it is part of smart strategy towards the ends of improving the security conditions.

Accounting for the capabilities of Amphibious Ships not discussed, we note this is one of many reasons why we believe smart 21st century naval strategy for resources increases the number of amphibious ships as an emphasis. The US will do more with a LPD or a corvette flotilla off Africa in 2020 than it will ever possibly be able to do with a reduced crew, invisible, warfare centric first-rate battleship. The Strategic Maritime approach for Africa calls for metrics like visibility, manpower, and operational flexibility. Just saying...

The Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100)

I'm thinking the Green Water Navy discussion yesterday got off track a bit, but like champs a few commenter's laid down the wood and reset the discussion on the right track. Well done.

The 100 ft metric discussed in the ISN article discussed brought to mind a concept introduced in 2005 as part of the Congressionally mandated Analysis of Alternatives for Fleet Constitution mandated by Congress. Because we all know the Navy would demand a platform be built from scratch, that using an existing platform would simply not happen, we think perhaps this idea would scale very nicely into the technology set and desired requirements for a green water platform.

Admiral Cebrowski's Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100)

Small, fast, modular surface combatant craft
Carried to theater by large support ship
Payload capacity increased as less fuel carried
Full Load Displacement: 100 tons
Speed: 60 knots; Crew: 3
Limited capacity for fixed systems, carries one module at a time
Operated as a unit or in flights of two or more craft
Modules:

• ASW-1: Variable depth sonar
• ASW-2: Towed array, torpedoes, fire control system
• Strike-1: 6-cell launcher, fire control system
• Strike-2: 3 UAVs (for targeting)
• Mine Warfare: 1 UUV, acoustic MCM system, mine neutralization system
• SOF: 2 rigid-hull inflatable boats
• USV: 2 unmanned surface vehicles
• SUW-1: 8 Surface-to-surface missiles
• SUW-2: Close-In Weapon System
• AAW: Launcher, missiles, multifunction radar
• UUV: 12 medium UUVs

Sensors: small sensors for acoustic detection

If the VSC-100 platform was designed to from a Global Fleet Stations host ship, we think this is exactly the type of thing that makes sense for addressing the green water requirements for peacetime operations. Keep in mind, the Navy finds itself in a period of fiscal competition, so any budget resources committed to a peacetime platform must find usefulness in a wartime scenario to justify investment. With weapon centric modular payloads as a core design factor, the Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100) does exactly that.

One other thought. We have linked that OFT report twice tonight. I've been thinking about some commentary regarding Admiral Cebrowski's ideas that highlights just how tuned in his concepts were to the time we were in. From Thomas Barnett:

Cebrowski pushed my work, to include the SysAdmin stuff, like crazy throughout the bureaucracy as early as 2002--eventually right up to Rumsfeld himself. I briefed all of Rummy's senior aides, as I describe in PNM, in the summer of 2002.

Tell me, how can Art be a champion of both NCW and SysAdmin stuff at the same time?

Dr. Barnett reminds us that the ideas that Streetfighter is associated with are far more complex than the criticism allowed. The Navy was very resistant to the version of change introduced by the ideas being floated in the late 90s, but that a two star Admiral is talking about building 100 ft ships for green water operations to support Global Fleet Stations today is a sign that change does happen, but at a snails pace.

Regardless, it is very difficult to read that OFT report and not recognize that those ideas in 2005 had evolved in line with the requirements of today. The revolt led by Admiral Cebrowski, Captain Hughes, Thomas Barnett, and many others continues to prove that the ideas really were todays solution. Ask yourself a question: Would the Navy be better off today had it built a bunch of Streetfighters instead of the LCS and DDG-1000s over the last few years? We think so, but we also ask ourselves this question.

If the Navy builds a bunch of 100 ft green water boats instead of 5 DDG-1000s will we find ourselves wishing we had the 5 battleships a decade from now?

We think it depends, if 50 Very Small Surface Combatants (VSC-100) at $100 million per and with modules are produced instead (essentially 50 VSC-100s for the cost of two DDG-1000s), I think the Navy gains more with the numbers.

Fleet Constitution Evolution For 2009 QDR

Inside the Navy has an article today called Navy Looking at Potential Requirement for "Green Water" Vessel (subscription only) that discusses the Navy looking into a new ship class. This is the first time we have observed a two-star Admiral discussing a new ship class since the release of the 313-ship fleet.

“We’re contemplating a green water craft of some kind,” Rear Adm. Bruce Clingan said in a May 19 interview at the Pentagon. “That’s one of the things that we will explore” in the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

The concept is to field a ship for low-intensity conflicts, irregular warfare, increasing maritime security, and dealing with issues such as human trafficking while connecting with partners who have small navies for cooperative training. Specifically regions like the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa and Latin America are cited as locations where such a ship could have immediate impact to the maritime domain.

“We begin to speak to the green water requirement with [the] Littoral Combat Ship, but it’s a pretty big ship,” Clingan noted. The two LCS hulls under construction, one by Lockheed Martin and the other by General Dynamics, are over 300 feet long.

“There’s a rule of thumb, not scientific, that says a ship can coordinate well with another ship twice its size and half its size,” the admiral said. “And there’s an awful lot of our potential partners with ships from 45 feet to 150 feet. Do we need to look at a ship that’s somewhere around 100 feet, that’s cost-effective, that will help us build these meaningful partnerships working in conjunction with the Global Fleet Stations? Those are the types of things we have to consider as we move forward.”

As they plan for the future, Navy decision-makers are looking at the fleet and evaluating the utility of fielding an additional, smaller boat for use in places such as the Gulf of Guinea.

“To effectively build partnerships -- you know, an awful lot of our partners find it hard to work with a cruiser-size combatant capability -- one of the things in this 313-ship ‘floor’ that we’ll be looking at through the QDR process will be: Does the mix merit refinement? Do we have the right set of capabilities in these multimission ships?” Clingan explained. “This is an ongoing effort.”

What a Navy green water craft would look like remains unclear, the admiral said.

The article then turns towards a technical report released late last year from students at the Navy Postgraduate School called A Systems Engineering Approach For Global Fleet Station Alternatives in the Gulf of Guinea. Is the Navy looking for a high-low mix for peacemaking? For those who haven't read the report, the GFS ship design calls for a ship between 5,000-10,000 tons with a draft of 15 feet or less, a top speed around 15 knots, a minimum 5,000 nautical mile range, and a crew of no more than 50 with additional berthing availability.

One aspect of the NPS report we found interesting is that it recommends and cites metrics why the LPD-17 class is the best existing platform for conducting this role if a new ship was not to be developed. Metrics for measurement included size, cargo-carrying capability, aviation and small boat capability, speed, communications, and command and control, which we find very interesting because with the exception of high speed, we have used the same measurements to describe the requirements for a large mothership.

Naturally we believe the developments being discussed are a move in the right direction, but it requires some critical thought prior to moving forward. While Global Fleet Stations is an important mission, and nobody on the internet has given more attention to Global Fleet Stations than we have, we observe there must be proper consideration for balance and alternatives built for the Global Fleet Station design must justify the costs of peacemaking. An inexpensive armed 100 ft Corvette makes a ton of sense, but a 10,000 ton ship intended solely for peacemaking is a rather large investment that simply cannot be justified for the Navy unless it brings needed capabilities to the warfighter.

Is it possible the Navy is reading and listening? While the NPS design is very interesting, in fact we like it a lot, we observe that major investments towards soft power must also scale towards a hard power profile to justify costs. For us, that means amphibious ships are the best investment for Global Fleet Station mission profiles, even if they aren't perfect for the role. We note that if the Navy can sustain the existing AEGIS fleet until 2020-2025 time frame, the shipbuilding budget is well positioned to invest in peacemaking over the next decade while also building redundancy and options for the joint warfighter in planning for a future challenger.

Should the cancellation of the DDG-1000 occur, the Navy could choose to take an interesting step towards aligning resources for the Maritime Strategy by moving up the replacement date for the LSD(X) to now and building LPD-17s to fill that role. By doing so, the existing LSDs can then be utilized for the emerging requirements of motherships for unmanned combat systems and peacemaker roles including MDA and GFS. By using the existing 12 LSDs as motherships, this allows the Navy to go with an often discussed Flower/Fletcher model for small surface combatants, essentially a new 100 ft fast corvette and reuse the existing LCS hull for a fast frigate. While this may sound like a cost nightmare, it really isn't if you think about it. The Navy would essentially be trading the existing budgets for the remaining 5 DDG-1000s, 51 LCS, and the planned 12 LSD(X) for what amounts to 12 LPD-17s and a mix of frigates/corvettes.

The Navy would also have 8 of the existing LSDs as motherships until 2030, when the planned Littoral Combat Ships would start needing replacement anyway. This approach would ultimately save the Navy money in shipbuilding while allowing the Navy to use the 12 existing LSDs to further develop important 21st century strategic concepts, including Motherships, GFS, and MDA on a Sea Based platforms. By focusing all shipbuilding resources towards the small surface combatant, amphibious force, logistics force, and submarine force the Navy becomes well positioned to focus its shipbuilding budget to replace the existing large surface combatant force and SSBN force when that time arrives.

Details of the Sea Basing Evolution Off Monrovia

The full transcript is here (PDF). This was the question I've been wanting to ask since we first observed the evolution, because the answer tells the story of a capability that expands the possibilities for addressing disaster relief and humanitarian operations in the future.

Galrahn: This is a great conversation. I want to talk about the evolution of Liberia, which has got a lot of attention. It seems that -- five ships, sounds like $3.4 million worth of equipment, $100,000 worth of humanitarian. Can you describe in detail a little bit of the why you did it, how you did it, and what you accomplished there?

CAPT. NOWELL: Sure. And that is a really good question.

There's some elements of Liberia that probably have not gotten as much exposure as they could. But first of all, certainly we believe that Liberia has a special relationship with the United States. And I probably don't need to expand any more than saying that with you, because I'm certain that you get it. And they are eager to continue that partnership.

And so as we look -- one of the things that we talk about with APS is that we're not just engaging with folks wearing navy uniforms or coast guard uniforms, because maritime safety and security is very, very broad. Now, right now Liberia does not have a coast guard, but they are in the process of kind of conceptualizing and looking at how they are going to here, near-term, start their coast guard back up. But what they do have is a very -- you know, some very positive progress from the Armed Forces of Liberia side with respect to their soldiers.

So the ambassador had asked us to engage with Africa Partnership Station as a show of partnership, had asked us what areas we might be able to do training for those soldiers that the U.S. government has been working very hard. And as you look at some of the training that we're able to provide, such as noncommissioned officer leadership training, officer leadership training, logistics or the martial arts -- there were many areas where we able to provide training and in fact did for about a hundred AFL students, as well as the ability to take this multi-agency and multinational team and talk to some of the ministries that were there in Monrovia, like the ministry of fisheries or customs, about what they needed to key on as they look at the refurbishment of the port, as they look at putting protocols in place, you know, for environmental protection, for protection of the fisheries and as they look at forming a coast guard.

Now, the other piece that we executed, while off of Monrovia, was a seabasing demonstration. And the Navy has a new system. It's called the Navy's Improved Navy Lighterage System.

And in simple terms, this is a floating dock, that you can build offshore and you can then use to take stuff off, maritime prepositioning ships, and then get them on to, you know, connectors, high-speed connectors notionally to then get them to the beach. And so we wanted to do a demonstration there, where we also use that capability to get some of this humanitarian assistance type of equipment inland.

And so just to expand on that a little bit for you, we pulled two maritime prepositioning ships, plus Fort McHenry and Swift. We all converged -- it was right around Easter -- off of Monrovia. The prepo ships offloaded this floating -- these floating dry-docks. We put them together.

And then the day before Easter Sunday, we moored one of the maritime prepositioning ships. And we had the Bobo and the Wheat there. They were the MPS ships. But we offloaded seven Marine vehicles, humvees and trucks onto -- they call it -- an RRDF, which is really just a -- now that I'm saying it, I can't think of what the acronym stands for.

But the bottom line is, it's a roll-on, roll-off discharge facility, so RRDF. And we then take them, using a powered section of that, into the well deck of the Fort McHenry. We put those vehicles together, married them up with their Marines, who had flown into Senegal and then come down on the prepo ships. And we sent the Swift up to get them.

So we then finished putting the vehicles together, married them up with their Marines and then took them back out, got them on the RRDF. Swift pulled up to the RRDF. The vehicles went onboard Swift and went into the Port of Monrovia.

And then the next morning, we did a convoy to four different sites, hospitals and schools there in Monrovia, to drop off this equipment.

So we think that it's a great example of a capability that you could use in an austere environment. Again, if you had a -- some kind of a natural disaster, you know, or any other event that made the ability to bring things like the prepo ships into port, the ability to do that seven miles out worked and it worked well. And so we layered that as part of the whole APS engagement there.

And so as we look at that in general -- again the, you know, more than 100 AFL soldiers trained, $3.4 million worth of, you know, HA equipment. You know, we had the president -- President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf actually came out and spent a half-day on Fort McHenry and had the chance to participate in the graduation ceremony for her soldiers. And in fact, she said it was the first time that she'd ever seen her country from the sea.

So we're pretty proud of what we did in Liberia. Again, it shows you that the inland reach that you can get from something like an APS effort is pretty substantial. I mean, I just kind of gave you that example. In some other places we might have Fort McHenry or Swift at anchor or in-port. And for instance, in Cameroon we did maritime law training in the capital of Yaounde, which is more than five hours inland from where the ship was anchored in Limbe. So a lot of flexibility there.

But at any rate, those were some of the details from the Liberia piece. Does that help a little bit?

Galrahn: Very much. Those ships couldn't make port in Monrovia; is that true?

CAPT. NOWELL: The Swift could. The Fort McHenry could not, nor could the MPS ships.

Monrovia has about half a million people, no port facilities for large ships, and yet the Navy became the logistical enabler for a non-governmental organization that delivered massive loads of material, including the vehicles for distribution of the material.

This evolution highlights an interesting technology and technique towards the ends of connecting to otherwise disconnected large coastal cities and populations. In this case the Navy prepared the materials that were delivered in Monrovia by HSV Swift 7 miles off the coast.

The application of this technology for military purposes is interesting on its own, but the seven vehicles could have just as easily not been military, and the materials were prepared and donated by a non governmental organization, being both medical and humanitarian in nature. The potential for using sea power for this type of proactive engagement is limited only by the imagination, desired payloads, and available skill sets of the planners and participants for each specific evolution.

It has been suggested the NGOs only participate with the Navy so they can use the Navy for their logistics capabilities. My answer to that is... so what? The Navy doesn't need credit, the NGOs do because their donations are primarily driven by accomplishments. The Navy's objectives are met if the NGOs are effective, not whether or not credit is duly given to the Navy for being the logistical enabler.