The Admirals Lobby

From 1972 until 1993, Dr. Vince Davis served as the Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, where I currently work.  Before coming to Lexington, Dr. Davis served as an USN aviator and intelligence officer.  In 1967, he published the Admirals Lobby, a study of the US Navy as a political and bureaucratic lobbying group.  I recently had the opportunity to pick up a copy of the book, and found this extended passage, discussing Glenn Curtiss' 1910 bombing demonstration in upstate New York, very useful:

The extreme aviation enthusiasts, beginning with Curtiss himself, made the fundamental mistake of thinking that vulnerability was an absolute quality.  It is, of course, all relative- relative to the vulnerability of competitive weapons systems that could possibly perform the same mission, relative also to the ability of the target to protect itself or be protected, and relative to the urgency of the mission that a weapons system is designed to perform even though it might be subjected to damaging counterattacks.  This last criterion might more accurately be described as the balance between vulnerability and expendability.  But the extremists seldom if ever considered that the aircraft might have some important vulnerabilities and limitations of its own, that surface forces might be needed for urgent roles even if their susceptibility to damaging counterattacks had been substantially increased, that surface ships might be better able to defend themselves against air attack than other forces with similar capabilities, or that the aircraft might add more to the offensive and defensive punch of surface ships than it would detract in increased vulnerability. 

Naval officers, curiously enough, seldom challenged the implicit (and sometimes explicit) assertion of the uninformed enthusiasts and the extremist aviation devotees that vulnerability was an absolute thing.  Their response in almost every case was to argue just as absolutely that ships were not significantly vulnerable to air attack.  It was evident from the beginning that the confrontation of opposed sides on the issue of the military significance of the airplane was not to be primarily a debate over technical questions but rather a political dispute.  The aviation enthusiasts perhaps understood that they would get nowhere by taking a moderate stand; furthermore, virtually none of them was a professional military man, and they therefore could not have been expected to appreciate important military considerations when evaluating a new piece of hardware.  The naval officers on the other hand, once the aviation enthusiasts had taken an extreme position, may have understood that a reasoned reply to extremist contentions is seldom politically effective, especially if the contentions appeal to the general public. 

A more likely explanation for the character of the officers' response was the threat they perceived in the claims of the extremists- claims which, from the officers' point of view, seemed to challenge the raison d'etre of their service and therefore challenged the continued existence of the Navy itself. 

The first paragraph could be applied to nearly any debate about the integration of new technologies into existing force structures that we've had in the last hundred years.  The point on the treatment vulnerability as an absolute quality is particularly apt for evaluating the "aircraft carrier vulnerability debate" of recent years; too much of this debate has focused on this question of absolute vulnerability, rather than on a broader (dare we say "net"?) assessment of how capabilities interact.  And I think that the political observations are also useful, although in this case we might apply them specifically to branches rather than to the service as a whole.

The US Navy and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Tuesday

YOKOSUKA, Japan (July 11, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) moves into Dry Dock 4 at Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka to continue repairs and assess damage sustained from its June 17 collision with a merchant vessel. FLEACT Yokosuka provides, maintains, and operates base facilities and services in support of U.S. 7th Fleet's forward-deployed naval forces, 71 tenant commands and 26,000 military and civilian personnel. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter Burghart/Released)

Tuesday's Senate Armed Service Committee hearing was one of the most important engagements politicians in Washington, DC have conducted publicly with the Navy in a very long time. It has been years since we have watched an important hearing between the Senate and leaders of the US Navy where the primary focus of the hearing wasn't a budget. Tuesday's hearing was about something much more important, it was about the safety of American sailors. After 17 lives have been lost in two collisions at sea in the Pacific this year, this was the moment where elected officials would evaluate and determine if the US Navy is meeting the standards expected by the American people following a series of several tragedies where lives have been lost.

To the credit of the Senators in the Senate Armed Service Committee, as an American citizen I felt well represented by the probing questions that triggered several honest responses. However, as I listened to the answers provided by the Navy, considered those answers overnight Tuesday and all day Wednesday, I am uncomfortable with some of the answers provided by Admiral John Richardson, CNO. The Navy leaders accurately testified that "organizational culture" is part of the problem, and anyone who knows squat about challenges related to "organizational culture" in a big organization like the US Navy understands that among all the challenges the Navy faces with fleet material condition problems - an organizational cultural problem is always the hardest challenge to solve. When any organization has a serious culture problem, particularly one that has results where people die, the only question that demands an answer by the US Senate is whether the Navy leaders tasked to deal with the culture problem are capable of dealing with it successfully.

That hearing did not convince me this group of Navy leaders is prepared to do that today. That can change, but as of Tuesday it's blatantly obvious ADM Richardson does not know how to address the problem, and it's questionable if he even understands the problem yet. Below are two (there were more...) of the issues and comments from the Senate hearing that, quite bluntly, should not be allowed to be said by Navy leaders in front of the Senate and the American people. These statements are not acceptable under any circumstances if the expectation is Navy leaders can successfully address the organizational culture problems in the Navy today.

An Indefensible Statement

I will quote this article over at USNI News. This paragraph is an unbelievable, indefensible statement by ADM Richardson and I was shocked on Wednesday that I couldn't find a single member of the Navy community countering such complete nonsense publicly. But privately... this was widely circulated as a huge pile of complete bullshit.

Asked if requesting a delay in deployment date would negatively affect a commanding officer, Richardson said no and added that “if I could go down and give that commander a handshake and a medal I would do that. This is exactly the type of honesty and transparency we need to run a Navy that’s safe and effective.”

The CNO would give that CO a medal? That answer is absurd at best, and is indefensible if the Senate hearings are supposed to represent serious discourse on a serious subject regarding a specific action that the FITZ or MCCAIN COs could potentially taken that could have saved lives.

ADM Richardson appears to understand he needs Commanders who will be honest and transparent about the true state of his force, but if Admiral Richardson believes there wouldn't be a negative affect to the career of that Commander in his Navy today, then that's a serious problem. I can't find anyone who believes that. In any large business or government culture, much less military culture of the US Navy, nobody in senior management tells executive level leadership "no" because of risk. What happens instead is the executive level leadership demands risk mitigation, and the senior manager does the job as required, and the organization accepts the risk. There isn't an option for Commanders to say "I can't deploy my ship right now" without career consequences, and at minimum it was either naive or ignorant to suggest otherwise.

Here were the follow up questions never asked. Is there a single naval officer who has made Flag in the 21st century who, when a CDR or Captain, requested a delay in deployment to their superior because the request to go to sea carried too high a risk? The answer, of course, will be no.

Is there any example of any COs of any ships in the last ten years that requested a delay in deployment because of a ships material condition? If it happened, was that CO promoted? Has anyone checked to validate the CNO's testimony?

The only legitimate answer ADM Richardson could give in Senate testimony is that "yes, that's a symptom of the culture problem in the Navy." Until ADM Richardson can get that question and answer right, he cannot and will not solve the culture problem in the Navy that led to the death of 17 sailors. If someone was to research the questions listed above, it will reveal there are zero SWO Flag officers today who delayed a deployment because of a ships material condition. They will likely find that among any officers who were brave enough to ask for a deployment delay due to a ships material condition, not a single one of those officers was promoted.

The Navy has metrics that can prove or disprove the statement made by ADM Richardson in testimony to the Senate on this topic, so I hope someone in the Navy turns the CNO's speculation on this topic into a fact finding review. The intent of getting the metrics isn't to prove ADM Richardson wrong, of course his answer in the Senate was wrong, but instead it's important for the Navy to see the context for why no one was ever promoted when the CO did actually ask for a delay - in each case - to better understand both the culture problem and the material condition problem.

CHANGI NAVAL BASE, REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (August 21, 2024) Damage to the portside is visible as the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) steers towards Changi Naval Base, Republic of Singapore, following a collision with the merchant vessel Alnic MC while underway east of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Significant damage to the hull resulted in flooding to nearby compartments, including crew berthing, machinery, and communications rooms. Damage control efforts by the crew halted further flooding. The incident will be investigated. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joshua Fulton/Released)

Misrepresentation of a Basic Organizational Leadership Principle

I am one who is skeptical of President Trump's business acumen, but... if he is the professional business leader he claims to be, this statement by CNO Richardson would represent a huge red flag. Again, from USNI News:

“We have a can-do culture, that’s what we do. Nobody wants to raise their hand and say I can’t do the mission, but it’s absolutely essential that when those are the facts we enable that report,” CNO said.

“We don’t meet more than 50 percent of the combatant commanders’ demands as it is, it’s from a force structure standpoint and a combination of that and readiness. And there have been times where I’ve spoken with my subordinate commanders where there’s just insufficient time to get a force trained and certified to meet the deployment date, and we have to go back to the combatant command and say you’re going to have to wait.”

More than a few editors leveraged the "can do" culture statement in headlines that gave the perception that CNO Richardson was somehow suggesting "can do" culture is a problem. Even the USNI News article I am citing has the headline: CNO Richardson: High Optempo and ‘Can-Do Culture’ Culminated In ‘Pervasive’ Expired Certifications in Forward-Deployed Surface Forces.

I am trying not to interpret the CNO's comment in the way the headlines are suggesting, but it's hard to agree with the CNO's comment in any context that a "can do" culture in the Navy is a problem. When the CNO made his "can do" comment in testimony on Tuesday, it immediately sparked discussion across multiple social media platforms by several of the top military observers who were watching the hearings. The commentary of "can do" being negative didn't sit well with folks, but whether it is the nature of social media or because the hearing kept moving quickly beyond the CNO's comment, no one effectively described why this comment didn't sit well with anyone.

The reason the CNO citing "can do" culture in a problematic context doesn't sit well with people is because the CNO misrepresented what "can do" culture in an organization represents. When an organization can be described as having a "can do" culture what it means is that the employees of the organization are positively motivated towards objectives in support of the organization, and are willing to work harder towards organizational goals. Within the Federal government's own civil service materials for senior management promotional exams, a "can do" culture of a department is an example cited as a reflection of positive work being done by supervised managers. In seminars that discuss organizational leadership principles, "can do" culture is a positive reflection of a good working team environment.

I have no doubt that a "can do" culture exists in the US Navy, but where a "can do" culture exists, it has nothing to do with the Navy's organizational culture problems that the CNO is responsible for fixing related to ship material condition. Leveraging "can do" culture should be part of the CNO's solution, not identified as a problem. In the very same testimony the CNO gave to the Senate, he actually discusses characteristics of a cultural problem that is well known to be toxic in organizations, and btw - ironically, these characteristics of an organization are also cited in the Federal governments own civil service promotional exam materials as representing potentially toxic managers within teams.

Asked by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) if it was “irresponsible” to allow a ship to deploy with an expired certification, Richardson likened the certifications to a driver’s license.

“What had happened in those areas, ma’am, is that the team out there was conscious that these certifications were expiring. And it’s a bit like your driver’s license expiring - it may not necessarily mean that you don’t know how to drive any more, it’s just that expired,” he said.

“However, we do need to recognize that … they need to go back and recertify. What had happened instead is that they would do an evaluation, and say hey, your certification is expired, we’re not going to get a time to get onboard and do the certification for some time, so we’ll do a discussion or administrative review to extend that. It’s called a risk-mitigation plan. That became pretty pervasive, so it was kind of this boiling frog scenario that over time, over the last two years really, became acute.”

When conducting cyber security audits in the IT industry, a good security auditor will look for persistent risk mitigation activities as part of the evaluating the hygiene of security culture within an organization. If during a cyber security audit the auditor determines the ISO is constantly taking steps for risk mitigation for a specific system or service, and there is no evidence of organizational commitment towards solving the root cause for the risk mitigation activities, it basically means the leadership of an organization is the source of the poor security hygiene for the system or service. When there are widespread examples, it's called having a "must do" organizational culture, and the organization "must do" things that carry high risk until eventually, the organization adopts high risk activities into the culture as part of normal status. At that point, even high risk mitigation activities become standard operating procedure, and once something is SOP organizational leadership becomes blind to the risk, and the risk is no longer important enough to resolve at a root cause level.

"Can do" cultures don't require risk mitigation plans, but "must do" cultures do. The distinction is the difference. A "Can do" culture in an organization is a bottom-up culture of productivity, while a "must do" culture within an organization is a top-down culture of productivity. The specific characteristics that distinctly identifies whether an organization has a positive "can do" culture or a negative "must do" culture is the persistent requirement for risk mitigation and the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure at the senior leadership level.

The CNO's own testimony before the Senate on Tuesday suggests that the US Navy has a toxic "must do" top-down culture, because he not only cited risk mitigation but a tremendous amount of evidence was presented in testimony that the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure is prevalent in the Pacific theater.

The CNO testimony also suggests the US Navy has a "can do" bottom up culture, and the CNO seems to believe at minimum that the "can do" culture represents part of the problem. If a positive "can do" culture of the organization is part of the problem, it is a symptom, not a cause. As a symptom it suggests the CNO has another problem, because it can lead to senior level blame gaming. A "can do" culture in the US Navy represents a positive characteristic of the US Navy culture and the CNO needs to take a hard look whether or not that positive culture is being exploited by a toxic command culture of "must do" senior leaders. Who is demanding high risk? Where is high risk institutionalized as standard operating procedure?  How is accountability for risk being determined?

If the CNO actually believes that the "can do" culture is the problem instead of a symptom, ADM Richardson may be incapable of solving the organizational cultural problem in the Navy. Correctly identifying the difference between a symptom and problem is a requirement. How can the CNO be weeks into this process, be testifying in front of the Senate, and still potentially be getting problem identification wrong? Where are the smart people on the CNO's staff?

Remember, what was the first thing Navy senior leadership did when ship material condition problems started several years ago? The Navy classified INSURVs, which virtually insured risk mitigation would become standard operating procedure when public criticism would no longer be a problem.

The CNO's own testimony suggests the problem is a "must do" culture because he testified that the two specific aspects that represent a "must do" toxic top-down organizational culture problem exist - persistent requirement for risk mitigation and the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure at the senior leadership level. There are metrics that can identify the culture challenge the Navy faces, and those metrics are not going to support the CNO's testimony that COs can delay deployments due to a ships material condition without career consequences, because that action would be counter culture. The Senate is asking the right questions. Yet some the answers by the CNO himself aren't believable.

Who suggested to the CNO that the first visible action the Navy needs to take before analysis is completed to identify the basic stuff like 'work hours and duty shifts' should be the Navy should stand up a new staff? What credible analysis has the Navy conducted that identified the first, most important, immediate step to be taken towards solving really tough organizational problems is constituting a new staff organization, rather than a manning review related to number of hours deployed sailors are working per day or week?

In my opinion, given what was said in Tuesdays testimony, the only new staff the US Navy needs is one ready to bring research skills, analysis skills, a significant increase in critical thought to some serious cultural problems in proximity closer to the CNO, because letting the CNO describe symptoms as problems in Senate testimony related to the death of 17 sailors insured Tuesday was a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad day for the US Navy. If creating new staffs and implying blame should be directed towards sailors who are obviously sacrificing themselves towards successful objectives demanded by Navy leadership is being described as the problem... I just don't see how this group of Navy leaders can be trusted to successfully grow and improve the Navy looking into the future when there are so many red flags related to how this group of Navy leaders is struggling to deal with the challenges that already exist today.

The Ship is an "Electronic" Being

            In a 19 January 2024 letter to The Times of London, the former Chief Naval Constructor (and then member of the British Parliament), Sir Edward Reed attempted to explain some of the reasons for the rapidly rising cost of British capital ships. The battleship HMS Devastation had been completed in 1871 at a cost of 361,438 pounds, but the cost of HMS Inflexible, launched in 1876 and nearing completion at the time of Reed’s letter was to cost 812,000 pounds. Parliament was naturally concerned about these apparent, skyrocketing costs. Reed, whose former position as Chief Naval Constructor, as position roughly analogous to that of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition,) explained the cost increase as this:

“Every war vessel is now a steamer, and some of our most powerful and valuable ships have not a sail upon them, but, on the contrary, are huge engines of war put into activity of every part by steam and steam alone. The main propelling engines are worked by steam. A separate steam engine starts and stops them. Steam ventilates the monster, steam weighs the anchors, steam steers her and steam pumps her out if she leaks. Steam loads the gun, steam trains it. Steam depresses or elevates it…The ship is a steam being.”

Reed went on to explain that the use of steam in so many areas of modern ship operation as a replacement for the wind and muscle power utilized in age of fighting sail warships, along with advanced products of the industrial revolution such as rifled, breech-loading cannons and compound steel armor had combined to significantly increase the cost of the modern battleship. A similar, 1877 report by the U.S. Navy’s Chief Engineer echoes Reed in that it stated, “year by year the thickness of armor and the weight of naval artillery go on increasing together. Mechanical appliances have more and more replaced manual labor, and at the same time the forms of the ships have been adapted to the work they have to do and the conditions under which they must act.”  The Royal Navy was able to slow and eventually reverse the growth in its overall budget estimates in the first decade of the 20^th century, but only through the radical actions of First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Fisher. The cantankerous and combative senior uniformed leader of the RN opted for quality over quantity and produced fewer, but larger and more powerful warships as the means to reduce the budget and increase combat capability. As a result, the RN’s budget from 1905-1911 remained less than that of 1904.

            Still, the rising costs of the British naval armaments race with Germany exceeded Fisher’s capacity for cost savings and British Naval estimates again increased in 1911.  The Royal Navy did not regain control over the escalating costs of its capital ships until the interwar period of the 1920’s and early 1930’s when a combination of naval arms limitation treaties and appalling economic conditions forced such conditions.

            A similar process may be underway in the increased costs of U.S. surface warships over the last four decades at a rate greater than inflation. A 2006 RAND Corporation study suggests that key indicators for modern warship cost center on a vessel’s ratio of electrical power generating capacity to its light ship (with no fuel ammunition, stores or other consumables aboard) weight. It appears that just as the industrial revolution’s steam and steel products drove up warship costs in the 19th and early 20th centuries, today’s rapidly advancing electrical and electronic equipment now account for significant increases in 21st century warship costs. The rapid advance of electronic equipment and its operating software, as well as new technologies like rail guns and directed energy weapons suggests that ship cost increases will continue for the foreseeable future as they did during the Industrial Revolution. Given this data, today’s warships might echo Reed’s comment and can be construed as “electronic beings” with electrical and electronic systems and associated software just as integral to the rising costs of 21^st century warship as steam and steel products were to its 19^th century counterpart.

            The RAND study’s potential solutions for reducing these costs include keeping ship designs less complex, more stable over time, and a consideration to physically separate expensive capabilities in the form of modular components to the main hull. The study also emphasized the unstable nature of U.S. naval shipbuilding, starting: “Many shipyards have a monopsony relationship with the government—that is, the government is their main, if not only, customer. At the same time, fluctuating ship orders from the Navy, with initially forecast orders typically exceeding what is ultimately purchased, discourage shipyards from making investments that could ultimately reduce the cost of ships.” RAND noted that unless these costs are brought under control that the U.S. would be hard-pressed to field even 260 ships by 2035.

            The RAND study was released in 2006 and now the U.S. struggles to maintain its current fleet of 287 ships. It is vital for the U.S. to reduce these costs moving forward into the middle 21^st century. A 2015 RAND report on surface ship maintenance suggests that the current readiness crisis is just the beginning of potential troubles, as deferred maintenance and mid-life upgrades in existing warships will grow over the next twenty five years. Unlike Admiral Fisher, the U.S. cannot now afford to reduce its overall number of ships, and solutions to qualitatively increase fleet firepower such as rail guns and directed energy weapons require significantly more, expensive development.

            What can the U.S. do to slow the growth of its own “electronic being” fleet? It should develop a Maritime strategy that is a worthy successor of its 1980’s-era predecessor. That strategy product was put “on the shelf” by then CNO nominee Admiral Frank Kelso in June 1990. It was replaced by the “From theSea/Forward from the Sea” concept that assumed an extended period of operational maneuver from the sea against rogue and in support of failed states around the greater Eurasian littoral. That time where great power competition was a relic of the past is gone and has been replaced by a hybrid period of both great power competition and growing non-state actors. Concepts like “Defeat one / Deny or Deter another” are not strategy and represent operational art raised to strategic levels. A Maritime Strategy with operational characteristics that can be activated from phase zero start to a phase 4 conclusion needs to be in place. It will help shape global naval force deployment, and fund the units needed to carry out the strategy and its operational elements. Great Britain’s Royal Navy had a clear strategy from the age of “fighting sail” through the end of the Second World War. It was the shield of imperial trade and commerce and the sword that attacked those of its enemies and enabled the operational maneuver of British ground combat forces from the sea. The U.S. Navy does not have a similar clear purpose that can be easily articulated to Congress, U.S. allies, and potential opponents. Instead, the U.S. speaks of strategy in terms status quo, the 30 year shipbuilding plan and other force structure management processes. The Navy needs a product and not a process to shape the size, design and operation of its 21st century force and perhaps prevent the technological creep that has contributed to the price increases on Navy ships as documented in the RAND report.

            The littoral combat ship (LCS) class tried to affect some of the changes suggested by the RAND. LCS was supposed to be less complicated than other combatants through the separation of its major capabilities in surface, subsurface and mine warfare into modular components bought and developed separately for the class. “Teething” issues in the first four experimental LCS units and the shipyards that produce them caused significant program delays, including an outright pause from 2007-2009 and the cancellation of the original LCS 3 and 4. The shipyards producing LCS have matured as have the designs and LCS has made significant progress in terms of capability and production cost maintainability since being placed under program executive officer (PEO) management in 2011. Despite those successes, troubles with the first four LCS units, uncertainty over operational costs, and a deep-seated Congressional and naval culture that believes that a frigate must be a “light destroyer” to be successful have combined to make LCS the defense press’ poster program for poor acquisition management.

                Despite widespread dislike, the LCS program still offers to solve some of the problems that dogged both the British Navy of the 19^th century and the U.S. Navy in the present. Admiral Fisher combined the functions of the battleship and the armored cruiser into the hybrid battlecruiser that had the speed and range to overhaul and destroy surface raiders, and the firepower and advanced fire control needed to engage any opponent at long range. LCS still offers the ability to combine multiple small ship functions of patrol, mine warfare and the traditional combatant surface and subsurface warfare missions as interchangeable capabilities on one hull. LCS also supports unmanned vehicles and other off-board systems much better than the conventional frigates proposed to replace it. One LCS frame, like that of the World War 2 Sherman medium tank, that supported multiple variants is a better choice than building new, separate, separate mine warfare, patrol, and small surface combatant units, which will need to happen if the “frigate” category is taken by a high end design.

            The RAND study touted the benefits of stability in design as a cost saving measures. One of the reasons for the selection of an LCS hull as the basis for the new frigate class is an attempt to improve stability through the use of the same basic hull, much as the DD 963 hull was used as the basis for the CG 47 class. If seen through to the construction phase, this choice would support the shipyards that produce both LCS and the projected frigate. The U.S. elements of the firms that produce the LCS have a “monopsony relationship” with the U.S. government as described in the RAND report and have little civilian business as compared with more traditional shipbuilders who also construct warships. The maintenance of stability in construction might allow these companies to avoid the layoffs that happen when the U.S. cannot make up its mind about which design to accept. This is not “corporate welfare,” but a vital issue in the maintenance of an effective industrial base to support the Navy in both peace and war.

            The electronics revolution that has driven up the cost of U.S. warships over the last half century bears a remarkable resemblance to that of the Industrial Revolution, whose steam and steel products so substantially increased the cost of British Navy units in the 19^th and early 20^th centuries. The 2006 RAND study on warship costs suggested ways the U.S. might slow that growth. LCS was one possible solution, but problems with early units, and opposition from Cold War cultures of ship size, lifespan, manning, sustainability, and intra-service parochial interests have combined to make LCS less of a success. While visions of larger, very capable fleets for the future may dazzle they eyes of some, the realities of rising fleet maintenance costs, the budget deficit, and internecine political warfare on Capitol Hill effectively combine to strangle such visions in their think tank cradles. The Navy will likely have to make due with a smaller force for the time being, and effective strategy, not massive firepower, could determine victory in the event of significant naval conflict. Like the Royal Navy of the mid and late 19^th century, the U.S. must mitigate the accelerating costs of technological revolution and develop cost effective, operational solutions in support of defined Maritime strategy. Some of the concepts pioneered in the LCS program can aid in that endeavor and should be given a chance to succeed. Given current challenges, LCS and its frigate variant are likely to be the only small surface combatants the U.S. Navy will receive for the foreseeable future.

Thoughts on Syrian Strike

USS Porter launching cruise missiles towards Syria.

I watched Nikki Haley's speech in the UN on social media this morning, and I quickly realized two things:

1. America was pissed off.
2. The world was now aware America was pissed off.

If you haven't seen that video yet, the stare she gives the Russian ambassador makes it must see viewing. I was impressed.

When President Obama gave Syria a red line on chemical weapons back in 2013, and Assad crossed that red line, you may remember I was quite uncomfortable with how everything had gone down. I was uncomfortable with the President giving the red line, and I was uncomfortable with the idea the US would have to attack Syria. President Obama took a lot of criticism for addressing that incident in 2013 with diplomacy, but the United States ultimately removed a considerable amount of chemical weapons from Syria via MV Cape Ray and over time I came to appreciate the decision by President Obama. Until this past week, there had been no clear evidence of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime in Syria against civilians, including for the entire remainder of the Obama administration. In my mind, what President Obama did at the time was the right thing.

But when news broke about chemical weapons use in Syria this week, particularly in the context of what is happening on the Korean peninsula, in my mind President Trump had a very serious choice to make. He either attacked Syria for breaking their agreement with President Obama, or the United States retreated from the role as the leader of the global security construct the world has enjoyed since the end of the cold war.

Assad left Trump no choice, and actually gave the Trump administration exactly what they needed in many ways. The strike by the United States against Syria on Thursday checks multiple strategic boxes that needed to be checked given the checkered beginning of this Presidential administration. In one stroke, President Trump was able to:

1. Support a policy championed by President Obama with a limited use of military force thereby proving that domestic political disagreements do not represent a weakness in US foreign policy.
2. Send a clear signal of US resolve to the dictators globally like Bashar al-Assad and Kim Jong un that the US is not to be tested.
3. Reassert US influence in a region of the world dominated by Russia at this point and time.
4. Send a clear message to world powers like China, at a time Trump is meeting with Xi Jinping, that the US led by President Trump will use military force when forced to.

These are not small things. President Trump's action reinforces the security framework rule sets led by the United States that many, including myself, have been concerned that President Trump might not be willing to stand up for under his administration. I'm not really sure what actual tactical military impact 60 Tomahawk cruise missiles may or may not have had hitting some random targets in Syria, and my gut tells me the tactical impact is probably very little.

But sending 60 Tomahawks into Syria isn't about tactical effects, the way to measure this military action will be to observe strategic effects. I'm sure in the near future cable TV will find some political science mouth breather ready to do battle damage tactical assessments on use of Tomahawks as if the military action taken Thursday has something in common with trying to win some battle against Syria. Firing Tomahawks into Syria isn't about winning a battle though, it's about shaping the conduct of a war, which is a continuation of the policy set forth by President Obama specific to chemical weapons and a necessary escalation in response to Assad for challenging the agreement Syria made with the last administration.

Only time will tell if the strategic communication sent on Thursday was sufficient, or whether a new challenge to President Trump is forthcoming to test the US resolve on this issue.

As this event relates to naval strategic theory, I will be observing this event as an early test of the Trump administrations naval focused offshore balancing strategic theory. The ability to send an effective strategic communication with the execution of a tactical missile strike was a staple of both the Reagan and Clinton administrations, but both of those President's enjoyed a large US Navy capable of acting globally in massive force in response to any incident. Today's US Navy is significantly smaller than the Navy of those two Presidents, and while an Arleigh Burke class destroyer can send the initial volley of cruise missiles to send a strategic message, I am not as confident regarding how things might unfold if there was blow back from this type of military action.

On the Navy and Oversharing

Earlier this week I attended the Navy League's annual "Sea-Air-Space" Symposium, and among the thousands of attendees were a number of my friends in the Navy trade press. Quite independently, three working journalists each brought up what one of them called the "CNO's gag order"--recently released guidance by the CNO to Navy Leadership discussed yesterday by Sydney Freedberg in a piece that also features the CNO's memo. I was unfamiliar with the memo, but not with the sentiments CNO expresses in it. His dissatisfaction with the amount of information getting out has been a popular topic of recent conversation, but I wasn't in on the memo.  But now that I am, I have a few thoughts on the subject.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Navy is "oversharing". There is also no doubt in my mind that it is "undersharing". There is furthermore, no doubt in my mind that the Navy is "inefficiently-sharing". The plain truth is that the Navy is incapable of figuring this out because it is not organized to address it. So when Freedberg opines in the column above that "many of my fellow reporters here at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space conference said they’d felt a chilling effect from the CNO’s memo", no one should be surprised at the wholly foreseeable reaction that CNO's memo caused among his flag and civilian leaders--even though he stated that "....I am not asking you to throttle back engagement with the media or with the public." In the absence of actual, specific guidance, their instinctual reaction is simply to clam up. This is how one avoids running afoul of the CNO, but this is not in the long-term interests of the Navy, American Seapower, or national strategy. Ultimately, the CNO must take responsibility for this and begin to advocate for necessary change. And that change must occur within the staff of his boss, the Secretary of the Navy, and within the OPNAV Staff.

Before I get to this weightier subject, some vignettes. In February of 2015, I had my hip replaced, and I was convalescing in an opioid-induced fog at home rolling through my Twitter feed, when I came upon this press release from the Naval Air Systems Command announcing that "Navy demonstrates synthetic guidance technology with Tomahawk missile". Had I been physically capable, I would have jumped out of my chair. In this test, what had previously been solely a long range land attack missile had demonstrated the capability to act as a long-range anti-ship missile targeted against a moving target. Having been involved in the creation of the concept of "Distributed Lethality" within the Surface Force, I found myself wondering how it was that this important component thereof found its way into the open press. Who made this decision? Why was it made? What was the process that created it?

Nearly a year to the day later, I was again at home rolling through my Twitter feed (ok, I spend too much time on Twitter) when I came across tweets from the OSD account announcing that the SM6 missile was being modified to provide a supersonic anti-ship capability. Knowing that -- or at least thinking that -- this information was classified, I began to write to some of my friends in the Pentagon wondering what was happening. Why was this capability being announced? Why now? As I watched my timeline roll on, more and more information ensued. Here is USNI's story on the subject from the very next day. 

Now, back to the problem and what to do about it.

The bottom line here is that we are re-entering a period of great power contention, but the Department of the Navy is still acting like it is 1996 and there aren't any real threats--at least at the level of how to communicate strategically.  In a post here on ID a little over a year ago (and just days before Secretary Carter spilled the SM6 beans), I advocated for a series of reforms of the Navy Secretariat, one of which was to bring some rigor to its strategic communications efforts. Clearly, if the Secretary of Defense decides he wants to declassify something, it is likely within his authority to do so. In this case though, there was no Service position from which to advise him. And this is because there is no formal or organizational method of achieving such a position.

If the Navy were serious about actual strategic communications, it would begin to think deeply about what it means to do so. The CNO's well-intentioned memo is the antithesis of effective strategic communications--in that the wholly foreseeable outcome of it is for the service to simply clam up, and in the process miss out on important opportunities to shape behavior of both potential adversaries and friends alike.

Effective strategic communications planning would necessarily involve (at a minimum) public communcations (CHINFO), legislative communications (OLA), executive communication (OSD), capabilities (SYSCOMS) and operational objectives (FLEET). This function would have a modest staff to serve as an administrative tool for teeing up subjects and tracking decisions to completion. The bottom line here is that a concerted effort to achieve message alignment requires both organization and action, and in their absence, lurches in unanticipated directions will disturb the illusion of calm created by enforced silence.

Every single program manager has a list of milestones for his or her program. Those milestones include tests and demonstrations of new or innovative capabilties. Every single one of these tests is an opportunity to communicate a message--yet we have no effetive mechanism for determining which ones should be released, which ones shouldn't, how information should be shared, what should be stressed, to what end, and how will that end be measured.

We need to get serious about this end of the business. There will be times where we want to rock our contenders back on their heels. There will be times when we wish to be coy. There will be times when we wish to remain silent. How we distinguish among these times should not be left up to chance. It is time for the Navy to get its strategic communications act in gear, and it isn't going to happen without the CNO making it so.

A Brief Update

When I restarted the blog, I was serious. I really do intend to write a lot in the near future. The hick-up in consistency is completely my fault... basically, work came to me the first week of February and said they would spend a whole bunch of money for me to take a certification exam on March 10th if I was interested.

I said yes.

Then the rule of three came fast and furious. Basically, three different family members had three very different, serious health problems over a three week period. Things are better now, but I am cramming for a test I will either pass because I'm both lucky and brilliant, or fail because I did not commit the time one would normally commit to be successful. Given the circumstances, I choose to be thankful health has returned to my family, and I'll live with the test results.

So forgive me while I cram work and studies through Friday, and appease me just once as I rant in the other post today. Things will get back to normal next week, or at least that's the plan.

Thank you for your patience.

V/r,

Raymond

Question of the Week February 27 - March 3, 2024

Each week Information Dissemination will present a Question of the Week for professional consideration and discussion. The question will remain at the top of the blog from Monday at 12:00am until Friday 5:00pm. Please scroll down for new contributions. This weeks question:

How should reduced manning concepts on ships and the move to unmanned aviation platforms impact graduating classes of USNA that currently graduate 1,200 students to fill pilot/NFO billets that will be directly impacted by reduced manning concepts being deployed to the fleet?

SECNAV Search Continues

The United States Naval Institute News service was the first to report that President Trump would appoint financier Philip Bilden to be nominated for Secretary of the Navy. USNI News was among the last to report Philip Bilden would drop out.

Financier Philip Bilden has withdrawn himself from consideration to be the next Secretary of the Navy, he said in a Sunday statement.

In the statement, Bilden said he would be unable to meet the requirements of the Office of Government Ethics requirements for the position without “materially adverse divestment” of his family’s financial interests.

“I fully support the President’s agenda and the [Secretary of Defense James Mattis’] leadership to modernize and rebuild our Navy and Marine Corps, and I will continue to support their efforts outside of the Department of the Navy,” he said in the statement.
“However, after an extensive review process, I have determined that I will not be able to satisfy the Office of Government Ethics requirements without undue disruption and materially adverse divestment of my family’s private financial interests.”

In a Sunday statement, Mattis said the withdrawal “was a personal decision driven by privacy concerns and significant challenges he faced in separating himself from his business interests. While I am disappointed, I understand and his respect his decision, and know that he will continue to support our nation in other ways.”

Mattis also said, “in the coming days I will make a recommendation to President Trump for a leader who can guide our Navy and Marine Corps team as we execute the president’s vision to rebuild our military.”

Thanks to Major Garrett's twitter account, this wasn't exactly unexpected news. Basically, that was the moment the financial conflict of interest was discovered and it was only a matter of time before he withdrew his name from the nomination. Political activists, both on social media and the media, may try to make this into something it isn't, but the bottom line is that it was going to be very difficult for Mr. Bilden to divest himself from the wealth the gentleman had accumulated over his career in International Finance in order to meet the government ethics requirements related to financial conflict of interest.

Having personally run into similar ethical requirements related to financial interests and working for government, it's very hard for me to see this as a big deal. Someone like me who had a few thousand dollars invested in activities that created an ethical financial conflict has nothing in common with someone like Philip Bilden who likely had millions of dollars to deal with. Most people who comment on this stuff have never actually dealt with the issue.

In the end Philip Bilden's nomination and subsequent withdrawal has everything to do with the process working as designed. Philip Bilden's nomination came from the well attuned voices in both the Naval War College Foundation and the United States Naval Institute, both of which have very influential naval insiders who know the man as someone actively engaged and interested in naval affairs, and willing to put his money where those interests are. In that context though, it was unlikely Philip Bilden's supporters saw any potential private financial conflicts of interest as ever being an issue that would prevent his appointmnet, so when credible people recommended him to the President, it isn't hard to see President Trump appreciating the recommendation of an outsider with big name endorsements who General Mattis was also endorsing.

The Navy undoubtedly needs more people like Philip Bilden in their corner, but that can't override how the government undoubtedly needs people who can get through the financial ethics requirements related to offshore investments, and that goes double for this administration. From everything I have seen and heard, Philip Bilden is a great American, but the government financial ethics requirements are not really flexible when it comes to people with global investments. This would be true for most of the wealthy stars super of Hollywood, like George Clooney or Angelina Jolie, who have extensive  foreign investments likely disqualifying them from ever being Secretary of State, for example, just as it is true for Philip Bilden. Bottom line, in American government you are considered far more qualified if you blow trillions of dollars of taxpayer money on government garbage than if you have effectively earned and invested your own wealth resulting in a portfolio showing foreign holdings. Amusing how that requirement for government service is both logical and remarkably pathetic.

I look forward to seeing who General Mattis recommends for the new Secretary of the Navy. While Randy Forbes would have to be the top safe pick on everyone's mind, I'm still hoping the President's team throws the 102 mph fastball right over the strike zone and picks from among the top folks in the next generation who didn't sign that War on the Rocks memo... folks like Mackenzie Eaglen, Jerry Hendrix, or Bryan Clark.

Question of the Week February 13 - February 17, 2024

Each week Information Dissemination will present a Question of the Week for professional consideration and discussion. The question will remain at the top of the blog from Monday at 12:00am until Friday 5:00pm. Please scroll down for new contributions. This weeks question:

CSBA's new report Restoring American Seapower: A New Fleet Architecture for the United States Navy calls for smaller conventionally powered CVLs of 40,000 to 60,000 tons that would provide power projection and sea control capabilities at the scale needed for day-to-day operations and for SUW, strike, and CAS as part of initial combat, freeing CVNs to focus on high-end integrated multi-carrier operations. How much money would be too much money for a 40,000 to 60,000 ton CVL? Why?

"The Trump Navy: Getting to 350 Ships" Event at Hudson Center for American Seapower 1 March

Former Navy Under Secretary The Honorable Dr.  Janine Davidson, and CSBA Senior Fellow Bryan Clark will join Hudson Center for American Seapower Director Seth Cropsey and me for a conversation about the Trump Navy midday on March 1.

Details can be found on the Hudson Center for American Seapower webpage.

The Biggest Issues Facing Our Navy And Military Strategy Across The Seas

I did an interview with The Federalist Radio Hour recently that may be of interest to readers.

Rep. Conaway Introduces the "12 Carrier Act"

Representative Michael K. Conaway (R--TX11) has introduced the "12 Carrier Act" in the House. The bill can be found here.

The best bit is here;

SEC. 4. INCREASE IN NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS OF THE NAVY.

(a) Increase.—Section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking “11 operational aircraft carriers” and inserting “12 operational aircraft carriers”.

(b) Effective Date.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on September 30, 2023.

I am of course, very supportive of this measure. Both the Navy's recent Force Structure Assessment and the CSBA Fleet Architecture I assisted on call for 12 carriers.

Question of the Week February 6 - February 10, 2024

Each week Information Dissemination will present a Question of the Week for professional consideration and discussion. The question will remain at the top of the blog from Monday at 12:00am until Friday 5:00pm. Please scroll down for new contributions. This weeks question:

The Navy awarded Newport News Shipbuilding $25.5 million to begin advanced fabrication of of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise CVN-80 this week. Should CVN-80, the third Ford-class aircraft carrier, be the last big deck aircraft carrier the US Navy builds?

Why? Why not?

CSBA Fleet Architecture Talking Paper--Why the Current Force Structure Assessment Process is Flawed

During the work last summer on the CSBA Fleet Architecture Study, I would occasionally write short summaries of things we were thinking about for the team lead, Bryan Clark. The one below is a condnesed version of some thinking on why the way FSA's are done today is flawed.

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There is a fundamental weakness in the manner in which the Navy conducts fleet architecture and force structure inquiries. That weakness derives from the tension between the near-term nature of the “demand signal” as represented in the numbered war plans, the GFMAP, and security cooperation force requirements, and the far-term nature of the 30 year shipbuilding and aviation plans that are required of it by the Congress. These 30 year plans are a manifestation of the fleet architecture in place and planned, such as it is. Because the main inputs to it are 1) the near-term demand signal extrapolated forward into the future and 2) the perceived need to “replace” force structure that reaches the end of its service life, a classic “self-licking ice cream cone” situation is created. An explanation follows.

There is a force structure in place at any given time that reflects the extant fleet architecture. Combatant Commanders (COCOM) request forces (or sometimes capabilities) to service their requirements from the forces that are available. To the extent that there are either unavailable forces or capabilities to service these unmet needs, the COCOM generates need statements—urgent operational requirements or inputs to their integrated priority lists. Generally speaking, these needs are reflective of in-situ/near term needs. The Navy then—within its capability to do so—attempts to meet these needs with (again, generally speaking)—short term or nearly immediately available solutions.

Put another way, the COCOMs ask for what is available, and the Navy builds its fleet around what the COCOM’s ask for. What the COCOMs ask for is conditioned by a set of pre-existing expectations of what can and will be provided. Our fleet looks like it does because of an aggregated response over time to what is asked of it by the competing requirements of COCOMs obsessed (by design) with the near term.

In our approach to this assessment, we take as our main idea the conventional deterrence of great power war. We assess the current fleet architecture (to include its posture and basing) to be at best, sub-optimized to meet this mandate and at worst, a slow, methodical undercutting of such deterrence. This is due to the fact that our forces providing everyday peacetime presence are the same forces that would be relied upon for war-fighting—just a smaller subset thereof. The demands of great power warfighting create a requirement for a level of response that cannot be adequately prepared for given the needs of maintaining point-station deterrence day in and day out from among the same forces. This Alternate Fleet Architecture is based upon a radically altered “demand signal” that is closely aligned with the needs of a regionally aggregated approach to great power deterrence focused through the instrumentalities of a number of emerging naval operational concepts.

CSBA Alternative Fleet Architecture Study

In the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, DoD was directed to conduct a group of studies on Alternative Fleet Architectures. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) was selected to perform one of the studies, and its fearless leader Bryan Clark asked me to pitch in.  The study has finally been released to the public, and it can be found here.

The Fleet in Being Strategy

PACIFIC OCEAN (Jan. 20, 2017) Aircraft from Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 conduct flight operations aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). The carrier is currently off the coast of Southern California conducting carrier qualifications. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Bill M. Sanders/Released)

The US Navy has dealt with the fiscal controls of sequestration put in place by Congress and the Obama Administration over the last few years by making a strategic choice that favored new shipbuilding activities over the maintenance of ships and aircraft - among other things. Budgets are zero sum, and Defense News is reporting the consequences of that strategic choice.

The U.S. Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet strike fighters are the tip of the spear, embodying most of the fierce striking power of the aircraft carrier strike group. But nearly two-thirds of the fleet’s strike fighters can’t fly — grounded because they’re either undergoing maintenance or simply waiting for parts or their turn in line on the aviation depot backlog.

Overall, more than half the Navy’s aircraft are grounded, most because there isn’t enough money to fix them.

Additionally, there isn’t enough money to fix the fleet’s ships, and the backlog of ships needing work continues to grow. Overhauls — “availabilities” in Navy parlance — are being canceled or deferred, and when ships do come in they need longer to refit. Every carrier overall for at least three years has run long, and some submarines are out of service for prolonged periods, as much as four years or more. One submarine, the Boise, has lost its diving certification and can’t operate pending shipyard work.

Leaders claim that if more money doesn’t become available, five more submarines will be in the same state by the end of this year. 

The article has plenty of details, but the eye popping quote comes after the article cites "$6-8 billion" in immediate needs. There is only one way to describe what this means.

The dire situation of naval aviation is sobering. According to the Navy, 53 percent of all Navy aircraft can’t fly — about 1,700 combat aircraft, patrol, and transport planes and helicopters. Not all are due to budget problems — at any given time, about one-fourth to one-third of aircraft are out of service for regular maintenance. But the 53 percent figure represents about twice the historic norm.

It doesn't matter how many ships are in the US Navy's shipbuilding plan, the unequivocal truth of the situation is - the US Navy today is a hollow force. When the fleet cannot leave port and has been degraded to the point it cannot maintain it's own resources, it is a fleet in being. It was an intentional choice, by both Navy leaders and Congress - they all own the situation as it is today. This has been the strategy of the last several years to insure new construction and new ships. No one, whether a civilian in either political party or an Admiral in the Navy today, can claim they are not accountable. Priorities get funded, and a lot of priorities that have nothing to do with the maintenance of naval power have been funded over the last many years.

Consider for a moment that it is very likely the training squadrons are probably among the squadrons actually getting maintenance funding, which means it is very likely the US Navy couldn't field more than 4, and probably not even 5 aircraft carriers with functioning combat aircraft today in response to a national emergency. I don't know what percent of the F-18s force is grounded, but I bet the percentage of helicopters grounded is much higher, because if there is one thing we can make a safe bet on - it is that naval aviation leaders will have prioritized the F-18s and done only the minimum everywhere else.

Last week the Question of the Week asked whether the US Navy was prepared for combat at sea. My answer to this question would be, "Yes the US Navy is prepared to fight, at least initially, and while the tip of the spear is very sharp - it's the shortest spear the US Navy has represented since the 19th century."

In 2010 I remember listening to fleet leaders who were very concerned that the US Navy was on the verge of being a hollow force, and today in 2017 the US Navy is absolutely hollow. There are entire squadrons of aircraft that cannot fly today, and ships that not only can't get underway - but it is unclear when they next could get underway. When I read articles discussing the size of the US Navy in 2017 I roll my eyes wondering if they have any idea how meaningless the numbers they use actually are. Numbers on paper have nothing in common with reality. The CNO telling any and all who will listen that the state of maintenance in the force has already passed critical levels - that's the reality.

Question of the Week January 30 - February 3, 2024

Each week Information Dissemination will present a Question of the Week for professional consideration and discussion. The question will remain at the top of the blog from Monday at 12:00am until Friday 5:00pm. Please scroll down for new contributions. This weeks question:

Is the US Navy prepared for combat at sea? Why or why not?

Q and A: On Technology and the Defense Acquisition System (Segment 10)

Q and A: Recent Events of Iranian Harrassment of US Navy (Segment 9)

Q and A: On Allies and Burden Sharing (Segment 8)