The Notable Empty Seat at Sea

Last week Bryan highlighted a new article on NATO he has written for AEI. NATO at sea: Trends in allied naval power focuses on the trends in the force structures of European naval powers, noting the numerical decline and the quality improvements. As Bryan notes, these trends do not balance one another.

Below is the section Bryan notes on the Royal Navy.

United Kingdom

The Royal Navy has dramatically declined in size by a third since 2000, but retains the desire and plans to remain a “balanced force” capable of naval airpower projection, limited amphibious operations, strategic nuclear deterrence, and sea control (see figure 1). This goal remains even in view of the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 8 percent defense budget reduction.[16]

A key question, however, is whether a balanced force is ultimately in the strategic interests of the United Kingdom, or whether such a force should be abandoned in favor of a “cruising” navy requiring a greater number of frigates and destroyers and providing more naval presence in a greater number of places than the current fleet plan can accomplish. The costs associated with fielding two aircraft carriers and the air assets necessary to equip them, in addition to the costs of replacing the current fleet of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with four new boats, will strain resources required for building surface combatants and attack submarines.[17] Considering the United Kingdom’s global economic interests and its desire to remain closely aligned with the US Navy, a force of less than 20 combatants might not suffice.

Upgrades to the Royal Navy will include fielding two new aircraft carriers carrying the F-35 Lightning II and the ongoing operation of the new, technologically advanced Type 45 destroyers.[18] Other upgrades include the continuing introduction of the five nuclear-powered, Astute Class attack submarines and the construction of the Type 26 Global Combat Ships.[19] Here as else-where in major NATO navies, numbers are being traded for capability.

When assessed against the roles articulated in the NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy of 2011—which includes deterrence and defense, crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security—the Royal Navy presents a mixed story.[20] Continuing to move forward with both an aircraft carrier development program and a ballistic missile submarine program demonstrates national resolve to contribute to collective conventional and nuclear deterrence. However, the resources necessary to achieve these goals are to some degree harvested from savings gained from a significantly smaller escort and combatant fleet.

And while the Type 45 destroyer is more capable than the Type 42s it replaces, there will be fewer of Type 45s, as there will be fewer Type 26 frigates to replace the Type 23s. This numerical decline creates presence deficits that impact the navy’s ability to perform crucial traditional naval missions such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW), which underpin both conventional deterrence and cooperative and maritime security. Adding to a decline in traditional sea-control capabilities was the 2010 SDSR decision to eliminate the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft from the inventory.

In summary, the Royal Navy continues to maintain a balanced fleet, one that looks strikingly like the US Navy, except a fraction of its size. Its contributions on the high end of the naval warfare operational spectrum (strategic deterrence, attack submarines, and antiaircraft warfare (AAW) destroyers) are notable, while a declining number of surface combatants will bedevil its ability to remain globally postured and will contribute to naval missions of a more constabulary nature.


16. Nicholas Watt “Next Generation of Nimrod ‘Spy In the Sky’ Surveillance Planes To Be Scrapped,” The Guardian, October 17, 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/17/next-generation-nimrod-scrapped.

17. In response to questions about the costs associated with the SSBN programs, British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond insists that “The government remains 100% committed to maintaining and renewing the Trident system.” See “U.S. Defense Chief Bashes Idea of Reducing SSBN Fleet,” Global Security Newswire, July 15, 2103, www.nationaljournal.com/global-security-newswire/u-k-defense-
chief-bashes-idea-of-reducing-ssbn-fleet-20130715.

18. The Type 45 is built primarily as an anti-air warfare (AAW) combatant capable of local and area fleet defense. Capable of controlling fighter aircraft, it can coordinate fleet AAW operations and should be considered roughly comparable to a US-guided missile destroyer. It is equipped with long-range weapon systems to intercept increasingly sophisticated and maneuverable missiles. The Type 45 destroyer will be able to operate an embarked helicopter.

19. Due to begin joining the fleet in 2021, the Type 26 frigates will completely replace the Type 23 frigates. The Type 26 is planned in three variants: an ASW variant, an AAW variant, and a general purpose variant.

20. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Alliance Maritime Strategy,” March 18, 2011, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_75615.htm.

There is no question the Type 45 is more capable of than the Type 42. The Type 26 looks promising, and should it ever be built I am sure it will be a great ship. But quantity only goes so far, and the reduction of sufficient quantity of surface combatants means a reduction in operations.

For example, the Royal Navy in 2013 does not have enough surface combatants to contribute to either of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, and the quiet withdrawal by the Royal Navy from the Standing NATO Maritime Groups is a feature of the decisions, both military and political, regarding Royal Navy force structure that reduces surface combatants.

This comes on top of the decision in 2012 for the Royal Navy to stop contributing surface combatants to their Caribbean narcotics patrol.

If a nations Navy force structure design is completely focused on the carrier strike groups and amphibious groups, as the design of the Royal Navy of the future is, what can their naval forces do, and what do the nation give up in that process? Under such a model for naval operations, presence consists solely of the most expensive capabilities. The contingencies of both Libya and Syria have yet to demand the requirement for a US Navy aircraft carrier strike group, and yet under the future force structure of the Royal Navy, the carrier strike group is basically the minimum capability the Royal Navy can contribute to those type of naval response contingencies.

The present and future design of the Royal Navy is the ultimate test of competing theories of seapower. The prevailing theory today - even in the US Navy - is that high end capabilities are critical and therefore must be favored over lower end capabilities because warships of excess quality can meet lower end requirements. And yet, the expense of excess quality isn't simply in design and construction, but also in operations and maintenance. Will the UK choose to use the highly capable and very expensive naval vessels of the Royal Navy for naval missions that require far less capabilities, operations that can be successfully conducted at far lower cost with less capable warships the Royal Navy does not have? The Royal Navy isn't simply reducing global presence, but the high quality force design of the Royal Navy has raised the price of global presence. On one hand the future Royal Navy is built to fight in nearly any conventional war scenario, but is also designed to be excessively inefficient towards building partnerships and security cooperation in nearly all places in the world that struggle with challenges less than contested conventional war between military forces at sea.

Today there are no valid ways politically to measure the value of naval presence by a warship,and the absence of naval presence is not evaluated objectively because highlighting the absence of naval does little more than highlight the failure of politicians who ignored unmet requirements for presence.

For example, the tragedy that took place last year on 9/11/12 in Benghazi would have almost certainly unfolded differently if EUCOM had the amphibious ready group that has long been and remains today an unmet presence requirement in the Mediterranean Sea. A single amphibious ship could have potentially responded not only with helicopter gunships, but a Marine evacuation/reinforcement force, and as a warship present offshore the US would have been clued into events with the situational awareness that comes from forward deployed naval presence. The absence of that naval presence is rarely discussed in the context of Benghazi, so there has been no lesson learned, and the requirement for a Marine presence offshore goes unmet even to this day with a stop gap response force now based in Rota (a reactive contingency force vs a proactive contingency force).

What is the political value of a Navy without the ability to sustain strategic presence to places globally of national interest? What is the strategic value of a Navy designed for high end conventional and nuclear war, and little else? These and other similar questions are important questions for the US, because sequestration will require the US Navy to make difficult force structure changes of our own. Is it in our nations strategic interest to reduce capabilities in conventional and nuclear war in favor of strategic presence and operations that support irregular warfare threats to our nations interest globally? The most recent maritime strategy claimed that preventing wars is as important as winning wars. How do naval forces prevent war in the 21st century through presence, or does the 21st century geopolitical environment demand that naval power function as primarily a reaction force, rather than proactive force?

The AEGIS Standard Towards Strategic Balance

Many years ago, and specifically the year I turned 21 years old, that uncle flew me out to his place in Los Angeles to show me a bit about his profession as a global businessman. That uncle was often referred to as the rich uncle, but that's not exactly true. He was remarkably smart and successful pulling in money like it grew on the lawn, but he equally blew through money like his wallet was on fire. In those 5 days he spent the equivalent of my annual salary at the time each day. It was obscene yet exciting, but it also explained why he never got married and never started saving a penny until he reached his late 60s.

I had recently started a new company at the time, and he wanted to show me what he did. His plan was simple: I was going to sit beside him for several days as he met with some of the world’s top bankers. Keep in mind this was in 1997; the US economy was booming, and the biggest concern in terms of global shock came from unknowns like Y2K. Y2K was the topic of these meetings, and in every meeting I was introduced as his Y2K expert (which was true).

I learned a lot, no question, and many things I learned that week have stuck with me through the years, but there was one 3 hour meeting I attended where those gathered discussed the shift in the late 70s away from the gold standard towards the global economy today, and over time I have come to accept their argument as a quiet truth understood by those on the global side of big money: The Gold Standard was replaced by the proverbial F-16 Standard in 1979 to save the world during a global energy crisis. It was at that time America's debt economy was born.

Because of overwhelming US military power and because the US was willing to use force when necessary to protect interests, it was believed that no competitor to the US dollar would ever emerge until a competitor to the proverbial F-16 emerged first. Keep in mind, these are bankers and strategy consists mostly of risk management in their world. The only safe bet in the emerging global economic order that included many new players participating as resource contributors was the raw power of the United States to back the US currency by force.

After watching the banking crisis of the last few years and the war of the last decade, I frequently wonder if the proverbial F-16 standard even exists in the minds of global bankers anymore.

I thought about this as I read Robert Kaplan this morning in the Financial Times.

The financial world is obsessed with stock market gyrations and bond yields. But the numbers that matter in the long run are those of U.S. warships. Asia has been at the centre of the world economy for decades because security there can be taken for granted, and that is only because of the dominance of the U.S. navy and air force in the western Pacific.

Because 90 per cent of all commercial goods traded between continents travel by sea, the U.S. navy, which does more than any other entity to protect these lines of communication, is responsible for globalisation as we know it.

There is no guarantee that this situation will last, however. In the 1980s era of high Reaganism, the U.S. Navy boasted close to 600 warships. In the 1990s, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, that number fell to about 350. The U.S. Navy’s current strength is 284 warships. In the short term that number may rise to 313 because of the introduction of littoral combat ships. Over time, however, it may fall to about 250, owing to cost overruns, the need to address domestic debt and the decommissioning of ageing warships in the 2020s. Meanwhile, the bipartisan quadrennial defence review last year recommended that the U.S. move toward a 346-ship navy to fulfil its global responsibilities.

There is a big difference between a 346-ship U.S.navy and a 250-ship navy - the difference between one kind of world order and another.

The very next statement Kaplan writes in this article is important. Kaplan says "Armies respond to unexpected contingencies, but it is navies and air forces that project power." This is similar to something I believe to be a constant of 21st century national security policy; which is that armies project force, but it is navies and air forces that project power.

In my opinion, this is where Malcolm Turnbull and Hugh White lack detail in their arguments for strategic balance in East Asia. Both suggest the best and most realistic strategic outcome for East Asia is one in which the major powers are in balance, but the term balance is used in generic terms and without context. Balance does not mean equal, and it is where things aren't equal that matter the most in the strategic balancing equation.

Does a world where China becomes the worlds largest economy strike me as a strategic concern? Honestly, by itself; nope. China is the most important trading partner to the United States today, and I see that achievement for China in alignment with US economic advancement in the 21st century, and economic advancement by the US has historically also driven social and technological advancement for the United States as well. With that said, the brilliant and creative Stan Lee was right - with great power comes great responsibility.

What concerns me much more is if China fails to mature within the liberal global order over the next few decades and simultaneously attempts to achieve primacy of the global oceans through naval power. If indeed the best and most realistic strategic outcome for East Asia is one in which the major powers are in balance, then it must also be stated that the strategic balance Turnbull believes is best cannot be achieved should China achieve primacy over US Naval power, and I would go further to suggest US naval primacy is today the single condition that allows strategic balance between the major powers if/when China achieves primacy in other areas of national power like economy.

As the global economic trade winds shift from the Middle East to Asia, other shifts are taking place as well. With the emergence of alternative energy, the proverbial F-16 standard - once the replacement for the Gold Standard that placed the US dollar at the center of the global energy currency market - is itself slowly being replaced by the proverbial AEGIS Standard that protects the global trade lines-of-communication towards insuring global currencies can exchange in the spirit of commerce in the 21st century market.

To use a simplistic and imperfect historical analogy as bloggers tend to do, I would suggest strategic balance in East Asia is achieved as long as the US emerges as Athens and China emerges as Sparta, and the global security environment and global economy is managed better than it was by the ancient and modern Greeks respectively. If that happens, the 21st century has an opportunity for a prosperous and promising future. However, if China strives to become Athens and US policy continues to be driven by the Spartans in the DoD; Australia, everyone else in the Pacific, and Washington, DC should not only be preparing for, but expecting war.

US Launches a WTO Nuke Towards China's Great Firewall

While foreign policy experts in the United States are busy proclaiming the death of the Gaddafi family lineage as some big foreign policy moment, Wired News was quietly reporting what is - in my humble opinion - the single biggest foreign policy uppercut in quite some time by the US Government. With all do respect to the Arab world, the death of another jackass dictator ranks slightly higher than a can of beans in the big picture of United States foreign policy compared to this Texas sized sirloin.

In the emerging 21st century competition between China and the US, this political move represents President Obama ordering the Great Firewall of China nuked from orbit with a brilliant free speech, free economy WTO lawfare chess move. A MUST READ.

The Obama administration publicly admonished China Wednesday for its vast online censorship policies, for the first time officially complaining that blocking U.S.-based internet sites creates “barriers” to free trade.

The administration, citing World Trade Organization rules, is demanding that China explain its censorship policies. U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk’s office made the demands after a three-year lobbying campaign by the First Amendment Coalition.

“This development is important because it signals the U.S. government’s implicit acceptance of FAC’s position that censorship of the internet can breach the international trade rules enforced by the WTO,” said Peter Scheer, the group’s executive director.

U.S.-based websites blocked in whole or in part by the so-called “Great Firewall of China” include YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Vimeo and even the Huffington Post.

In response, China on Thursday blasted the administration.

“We oppose using internet freedom as an excuse to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said.

This is a very big deal and the Obama administration is exactly right - this is a big boy money move to open up the Chinese market - and I can tell about ten great personal small business stories on how it will impact the US economy, but I'll focus in on one simple, specific example readers of this blog should be able to easily understand.

For as long as I have written on Information Dissemination, most pol-mil Blogger blogs have been blocked by China. For me - this was never good, because we talk a lot about China. I have many hundreds of Asian readers these days (India 800+ daily, Japan 500+ daily), far more than Europe actually, because believe it or not; it would appear rising maritime powers like to read and comment on websites that discuss maritime issues every day.

In June of 2009, I purchased the Domain Name for informationdissemination.net transitioning from the core Blogger server farm to a private host. The day the transition was made was the day before I attended the Current Strategy Forum in Newport, RH, and while I was getting some email from folks saying they were having website problems (caused by DNS host propagation among US ISPs), I was also seeing booming web traffic on this blog.

From my old Blackberry I was unable to really tell during that first day of the conference where all this web traffic was coming from. I figured maybe it was me passing out cards and mingling with a bunch of smart sailors and civilians at Newport. The real story was not as I thought.

That evening after the first day of the conference, I had accumulated over 2,000 unique visits from China, because for the first time ever - Information Dissemination was not being blocked and I was being ranked in Baidu. That lasted nearly a month until July 13, 2024 when Feng posted this article and ruined the party. Apparently, whether Feng knows it or not, he is blacklisted by the Chinese censors, because as of at least 3 months ago both his blog and mine apparently had a content block (vs the normal procedure of a total Chinese DNS block).

Oh well.

Some time passed and I didn't really think about it much, until last year when I got an email from a maritime attorney based in Hong Kong who works with the shipping industry there. He sent me a link, which was blocked by every US and European ISP I tried, that was basically a Hong Kong web host with an RSS feed of Information Dissemination republishing this blogs content using language translation software. Using a little network voodoo, I was eventually able to see the page - and I was pissed! One of the recent posts had 40+ comments - this Hong Kong thief had ads all over his site and was stealing my content!

After developing plans over a few days, what I ended up doing was purchasing one of the Flash advertisement spaces through the web ad company the Hong Kong site was using, and wrote my own Flash ad which passed their testing and was allowed In the advertisement, because it was Flash - I was able to embed a bit of code that basically tracked visit and hit counter information to another offshore server (accessible to all of China) from all (and only) IP addresses inside China so I could track how many Chinese users this Hong Kong thief was getting per day. To my surprise, and honestly to my frustration, the guy was getting an average of 6,000 Chinese viewers per day for my content.

Now for those who don't know, at bare minimum, 6,000 viewers per day would amount to well over $100 a month on the highly unoptimized ad service ID is using - Google AdWords (I'll start caring about my ads one day, just don't hold your breath). At the very minimum, this Hong Kong thief was basically stealing $1200 a year from me using his little RSS trick to supply my content to Chinese readers that I don't have access to. Earlier this year, my ad expired on that host - and after calling in a few favors, I used the data I had collected and forced that host to no longer host my content. To the best of my knowledge, today only a tiny handful of Chinese read my blog, and I can only presume those specific folks are somehow immune to the content rules of the Great Firewall.

For Information Dissemination alone, access to a public Chinese reader market is (potentially) worth, at minimum, $1200 a month - and potentially much more. That $1200 could potentially represent gross taxable income, and ID is but a rain drop in the cyber ocean in the context of the entire US internet - most of which makes far more money in far more productive ways than my horribly optimized use of Google AdWords.

So while this WTO move by the Obama administration may politically represent a nuclear attack against China's Great Firewall censorship of free speech, the economics of this move is not trivial at all in the internet driven economy of the US today. For years China has systematically attacked the United States with lawfare, including attacking the US Navy indirectly through maritime environment related lawsuits. It is really nice to see the US government turning the tables and now doing the same to China for a change. I want to send a heart felt well done to someone in the State Department!

Remember, the largest English reading nation in the world is China. While unlikely, an additional 5,000+ new Chinese readers interested in maritime affairs on this blog - particularly if they actively engaged in the comments - would be one very interesting open source experiment, and that experiment would likely be repeated throughout the US pol-mil web. If given that opportunity, ID will definitely attempt to support such an experiment in the global naval discussion. I don't know if the Obama administration can effectively get rid of the Great Chinese Firewall, but I do know that if they indeed do get rid of the firewall - we can expect an unpredictable, legitimate impact in the US-Chinese relationship. Social connectivity has proven again and again to be a very powerful cultural influence in 2011 - both here in the US and everywhere else in the world. There is no legitimate reason to expect social connectivity wouldn't also have a cultural influence on the Chinese people.

Securing American Maritime Boundaries

When I started my blog Information Dissemination in 2007, I made the conscious decision to use a pseudonym from my days as an iRCop - Galrahn. The intention behind using a nickname was to focus the readers attention on the content of what was being written, rather than who was doing the writing. The maritime services - and indeed topics like maritime strategy and maritime security - are topics where the details are important to insiders but can sometimes be boring to average Americans. The citizens of our country no longer feel the same connection to the ocean as it relates to our livelihood as Americans once did in the early years of our country. I can be a long-winded writer though, and my tactic was to suck people into my message with just enough information to be insightful, educational, and hopefully interesting and entertaining. Like all bloggers - my success rates may vary.

My inspiration behind using a nickname was my favorite founding father and fellow New Yorker Alexander Hamilton, who along with James Madison and John Jay published the Federalist Papers from fall of 1787 until the spring of 1788. On September 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia had approved a new constitution and sent it to the Continental Congress, which ten days later sent it to the states for ratification. It was a difficult period for America in those first years after the Revolutionary War - the country was broke and heavily in debt; and Congress under the Articles of Confederation had no power to raise funds. Our founding fathers believed the federal system under the Articles of Confederation was fatally flawed, and the country would not survive without a stronger federal system.

It was Alexander Hamilton's idea to publish a series of essays urging ratification of the new Constitution, and he threw himself into the work producing 51 individual essays in four months. James Madison added 29 and John Jay wrote 5. All were published under the pseudonym "Publius." The Federalist papers, as they are known today, were printed in four New York newspapers between October 1787 and May 1788.

In his book Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy, Ian W. Toll describes how the Federalist papers revealed the importance of maritime security in the minds of our founding fathers.

Hamilton's Federalist essays made a ringing case for "active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine." (No. 11) It was America's destiny to trade by sea, and "the little arts of the little politicians" could never "control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature." The major Europeans powers were determined to suppress the growth of American trade -- to "clip the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness." If America was serious about asserting her maritime rights and protecting her hard-won independence, "we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy." (No. 24) Madison pointed to the vulnerability of the nation's long, unfortified coastline. Those living near the sea, north and south, should be "deeply interested in this provision for naval protection." (No. 41) Without a navy to defend them, they were vulnerable to the "predatory spirit of licentious adventurers," and would sooner or later be "compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders."

Today these words are even more applicable, indeed with 90% of the worlds trade taking place by sea today - there remains an inherent bond between freedom and access to the sea and the United States of America. Today is the first day of Homeland Security 2020: The Future of Defending the Homeland conference at the Heritage Foundation. The panels for the day will include:

1000-1100: Defending Domestic Waters: U.S. Maritime Security Policies

Mr. Michael Barrett, President of Diligent Innovations and former Director of Strategy, Homeland Security Council, White House

Mr. Adam Salerno, Senior Manager, U.S. Chamber of Commerce

1100-1200: Programs, platforms, and People: Public Sector Capabilities for 2020

VADM Terry Cross, USCG (Ret), Vice President for Homeland Security Programs, EADS-NA, and former USCG Vice Commandant

Dr. Steve Bucci, Associate Partner and Cyber Security Lead, Global Leadership Initiative at IBM Global; former DASD for Homeland Defense and Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

America's Maritime Challenge

The CIA World Factbook lists the land boundaries of the United States as 12,034 kilometers (7,477 miles), and the coastline as 19,924 km (12,380 miles). The CIA World Factbook breaks down the land boundaries further to include 8,893km (5,526 miles) for Canada (including 2,477 km or 1,539 miles with Alaska), and 3,141km (1,951 miles) for Mexico.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration lists the US coastline as 12,383 miles. Most organizations who use geography figures of the US coast line cite the numbers provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration instead of the CIA Factbook, but maybe the CIA knows something about those 3 miles that the rest of us don't know?

The Learning Network has a breakdown of coastline length by state using the 12,383 mile coastline figures of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The 12,383 miles of United States coast line includes 2,069 miles of Atlantic coastline, 1,631 miles of Gulf coastline, 7,623 miles of Pacific coastline, and 1,060 miles of Arctic coastline along Alaska's northern border.

Following 9/11 the US government gave priority to port security as the maritime defense layer in most need of security. While Congress has passed legislation to protect America’s ports, it’s important to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation passed, as well as that of intelligence measures taken since 9/11. 90% of the worlds trade is transported by sea, and an attack on a major port would have serious economic impacts to America. In every maritime security conference I have been to, port security is usually the first and foremost topic.

But in the conference at the Heritage Foundation today I hope to learn more about three other topics that I believe requires the constant attention of our national political leaders if they are to truly address the dynamic change of the maritime security environment around our nations maritime borders.

The Coast Guard

The United States Coast Guard is a national treasure, but it is also taking on water at a phenomenal rate. The material condition of the Coast Guard has long passed the tipping point, and the funding necessary to provide the manpower and training for the US Coast Guard to address the emerging roles and missions of the 21st century has not been provided. It is a real credit to the men and women of the US Coast Guard that they are able to do what they do, because every single day they are - in my opinion - carrying more responsibility with less money provided than any agency in the Federal government today.

The budget and size of the Coast Guard is out-of-sync with the responsibilities being tasked. According to a recent tally by Rep. James Oberstar, D-Minn., in the past 35 years Congress has handed the agency at least 27 new responsibilities. Prior to the BP oil spill in the Gulf, the Obama administration planned to cut Coast Guard personnel by 773, decommission five large cutters, retire four HU-25 Falcon medium-range surveillance aircraft, retire five HH-65 Dolphin search-and-rescue helicopters, and dissolve five 90-person marine safety and security teams next year. Following the BP oil spill, Congress has added minor increases to personnel end-strength for offshore oil monitoring, canceled the elimination of around 1,100 billets, and decreased the number of ships and aircraft scheduled for decommissioning. These adjustments are token changes and fall well short of what is necessary to strengthen the Coast Guard.

The FY 2011 budget for the Coast Guard is $10.1 billion (PDF) - 4% less than the FY 2010 budget. The Acquisition & Construction budget in FY 2011 for the entire Coast Guard is $1.536 billion - about 70% the shipbuilding cost of a single US Navy destroyer. The material condition of the US Coast Guard is not good by any standard. The US Coast Guard operates 250 cutters 65' or more, and the average age of those cutters is 41 years old.

“No amount of maintenance can outpace the ravages of age,” retired Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen said in a recent speech. “The condition of our fleet continues to deteriorate, putting our crews at risk and jeopardizing our ability to do the job.” Of the 12 major cutters assigned to Haiti relief operations, 10 of the cutters (87%) suffered mission-altering breakdowns. In the immediate hours following the explosion on DEEPWATER HORIZON, no less than 3 Coast Guard aircraft were unable to respond due to maintenance problems. In February of 2010, Mackenzie Eaglen of the Heritage Foundation made an applicable analogy:

The mismatched demands of the nation and the President’s budget cuts for the Coast Guard are unacceptable. One can only imagine the outcome—and outrage—if 83 percent of the fleet assigned to the Battle of Midway had to return to Pearl Harbor for emergency repairs. The Coast Guard should not be held to lower standards.

The DEEPWATER HORIZON explosion is only one symptom of a larger problem related to the Coast Guard being able to meet the responsibilities they have been tasked by our national leaders, and the Gulf oil spill is only a taste of the real economic disaster that awaits any nation with insufficient capabilities in maritime security and protection.

Technology Evolutions

In November of 2006, a Coast Guard cutter operating 100 miles off Costa Rica observed a strange blur in the water. Upon investigation, spotters on the cutter observed what appeared to be several snorkels poking up out of the water. It turned out to be a self-propelled, semisubmersible built in the jungles of Colombia carrying 3 tons of cocaine. Nicknamed "Bigfoot" the simisubmersible is now on display at Truman Annex, Naval Air Station Key West in Florida.

In 2009 officials estimated that 70 such simisubmersibles are now being constructed every year, and it is estimated only 14% are interdicted as they transfer narcotics from source to destination. In 2009 simisubmersibles were believed to carry 30% of Columbia's total cocaine exports. The cost to build a drug smuggling simisubmersible is around $500,000, and simisubmersibles are only used for a single trip. However, it is a remarkably affordable way to smuggle drugs into the United States.

The street value for 1 kilogram of cocaine in the United States can be averaged at $20,000. These simisubmersibles can transport between 3 and 7 tons of cocaine, and one short ton contains about 907 kilograms. That puts the street value of one simisubmersible full of 3 tons of cocaine at just over $54 million. At $54 million the transport costs using simisubmersibles with a 3 ton payload from South America to the United States is below 1% of the total street value.

In the 21st century, the rate of technological change drug cartels and other non-state actors have demonstrated is remarkable. In just the last 10 years, the drug trade has gone from go-fast speed boats to simisubmersibles to - as recently discovered in July 2010 in Ecuador - full midget submarine technology. Leveraging tides that ebb and flow through the rivers and tributaries in South America, simisubmersibles and submarines are being constructed well away from the coast in swamp areas sometimes as much as a hundred miles inland.

At roughly 30m long, the drug smuggling midget submarine found in Ecuador is roughly the same size as the midget submarine suspected of sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan, albeit far less sophisticated than its North Korean counterpart. Leveraging off the shelf technologies like the Hummingbird depth finder and GPS technologies, Jay Bergman, Andean regional director for the DEA, told CNN the submarine costs about $4 million to build. As a fully submersible submarine capable of carrying 10 tons of cocaine and reusable unlike its simisubmersible counterparts, one can see how the full submarine approach would be more cost effective - thus more likely to be used - by drug cartels in the future.

Now that midget submarines have transitioned from a theoretical capability used off the US coast to an actual capability to be used off the US coast, how does this influence the resource and training plans of the US Coast Guard? If the drug cartels are already using submarine technologies, what happens when organizations with more nefarious plans than smuggling narcotics develop these capabilities to use off the shores of the United States? The United States is not only unprepared for these types of challenges, there is little evidence that Congress is taking the rapid technological evolution of maritime threats seriously. Asking tough questions about US Coast Guard sonar technologies and training highlights the significance of the challenge the US faces today - much less the near future.

America's Arctic Problem

In September of 2008 the MV Camilla Desgagnés, owned by Desgagnés Transarctik Inc., transported cargo from Montreal to the hamlets of Cambridge Bay, Kugluktuk, Gjoa Haven and Taloyoak through the Northwest Passage. The transit marked the first time supplies were delivered to communities in western Nunavut from an Eastern port.

In 2009 two German ships, the Beluga Fraternity and the Beluga Foresight left the Russian port of Vladivostok with cargo picked up in South Korea bound for Holland. The traditional route for the ships would have been through the western Pacific towards the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean over to the Suez Canal, and out through the Strait of Gibraltar up to Holland for a total of roughly 11,000 nautical miles (12,658 miles). Using the Northeast Passage over Russia, the ships cut ~4,000 nautical miles from that trip and saved roughly $300,000 - of which $100,000 was in fuel savings alone. With permission from Russia to make the trip, the nuclear powered icebreaker 50 Years Since Victory escorted the two freighters through the Northeast Passage.

Last week the Barents Observer reported that the 100,000 ton tanker “Baltica” left Murmansk loaded with gas condensate for China escorted by 3 nuclear powered icebreakers. This is the first time a high-tonnage tanker will take the Northern Sea Route from Europe to Asia. The Northeast Passage will cut ~5,000 miles from usual route taken around Africa, as a 100,000 ton tankers are too large for the Suez canal.

As the Northwest and Northeast Passages open up new sea trade opportunities, it is important to note that regardless of which route is taken, both routes will increase the number of ships transiting in US waters - as both routes require ships to pass through the Bering Strait. Alaska has 1,060 miles of Arctic Ocean coastline of which any vessel utilizing the Northwest Passage will transit through. What the United States does not have today is any operational heavy icebreakers to escort and insure safety of navigation in those icy waters.

The Coast Guard has two heavy polar icebreakers — Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11). The Polar Star is not operational and has been in what is called "caretaker status" since July 1, 2006. Congress has provided funding to repair Polar Star and return it to service for 7 to 10 years, and the Coast Guard expects Polar Star reactivation to be completed by 2013.

On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an unexpected engine problem and consequently will likely be unavailable for operation until at least January 2011. That leaves the United States currently without any operational heavy polar icebreakers.

The Coast Guard also operates a third polar icebreaker — Healy — which entered service in 2000. Compared to Polar Star and Polar Sea, the medium polar icebreaker Healy has less icebreaking capability but more capability for supporting scientific research - and is primarily used supporting scientific research in the Arctic.

With 1,060 miles of Alaskan Arctic coastline, and by international law the United States claims out to 200 miles of that coastline to be part of the American economic exclusion zone; how can our nation afford to have ZERO operational heavy icebreakers today? If I had a penny for every time I have heard a news anchor or politician say "Global Warming" on Television, our nation could buy 10 heavy icebreakers - and yet in 2010 we have none.

The Arctic policy of the United States has no political leadership at all, because there isn't a single US politician who would take responsibility for a policy we have no capabilities today to enforce policy with. There is significant global economic potential should either the Northwest or Northeast Passages become a viable sea trade route between Europe and Asia, which means the shipping industry will be exploring these trade routes over the next few years. While politicians in America will openly discuss scientific theory related to global warming, there is a tangible economic and maritime boundary issue for the United States taking place in plain sight today related to climate changes impact to global maritime commerce trade patterns that could result in US territory - the Bering Strait - becoming a crowded sea trade choke point in the very near future. The US economic exclusion zone off the Alaskan coastline is a marine resource, a potential energy resource, and a possible economic trade resource that the United States must be prepared to protect.

The condition of the United States Coast Guard, the technology evolutions by non-state actors and criminals in the 21st century, and the missing-in-action US Arctic Policy represent three homeland security concerns along our nations maritime borders that are evolving at a pace greater than our nations political leaders in Washington are adapting. I look forward to the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security 2020 event today in hopes that these issues are discussed thoughtfully and inform our national leaders on how the United States can best address these and other emerging challenges off our nations shorelines.

Sea Trade Sea Change

This is a not so trivial sea trade change that needs to be noted.

The 100,000 tons tanker “Baltica” left Murmansk on Saturday loaded with gas condensate for China. This is the first time a high-tonnage tanker takes the Northern Sea Route from Europe to Asia.

The tanker will be followed by no less than three nuclear powered ice breakers on the journey, Vesti reports. During the two weeks long sail, the crew will gather information on ice conditions in the area. This data will be used to estimate the commercial benefit from using this route compared to the more traditional routes in the south.

The transport is ordered by the company Novatek, Russia’s largest independent gas producer.

Sailing along the Northern Sea Route is seen as increasingly attractive by shipping companies because of the retreating ice and subsequently longer shipping season.

This route will cut ~5,000 miles from usual route taken, and avoids all the trouble spots in the world. If this turns out to be successful, the question is how much can the Europeans save by sending ships around Canada to Japan and China - and thus open a new, less expensive trade route between northern Asia and Europe.

Maritime Insurgents and Global Oil Disruption

While all eyes are focused on the oil pouring into the Gulf of Mexico, across the Atlantic, potentially more devastating spills threaten the Nigerian Delta. The MEND has resumed attacks on oil companies and is wreaking its own brand of ecological and economic warfare against the Nigerian government and the world's energy supplies. MEND's guerilla tactics against oil production include a combination of piracy and kidnapping on deepwater rigs, sabotage against coastal pipelines, and direct attacks on facilities. In 2009, 51 oil workers from Shell were kidnapped for ransom, an increase from 11 in 2008.

As can be expected in modern globalized insurgencies, additional groups with diverse motives and tactics have entered the fray against oil production in Nigeria. In the future one might expect the MEND to import additional tactics from other movements, including waterborne IEDs. And by the way, the US imports more oil from Nigeria than Saudi Arabia.

If tasked, would the US Navy be prepared to deal with this sort of problem? Are current force structure, training, and TTPs ready for a maritime-focused insurgency?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Open Source Warfare - Navy Style

John Robb over at Global Guerrillas uses the term Open-Source Warfare to describe a shift in the monopoly of violence from state to non-state actors. This transformation is empowered by globalization and the Internet’s spread of the knowledge required to wage war into the hands of individuals. OSW in effect enables small groups or even individuals to wage war against nations. Since USS Cole was attacked by Al Qaeda nearly a decade ago, we’ve seen the entrée of a wide variety of non-state actors operating in the maritime environment. Among others:

- Lebanese Hezbollah attacked an Israeli corvette with anti-ship cruise missiles
- Drug traffickers employed stealthy semi-submersibles
- Ferocious Tamil Sea Tiger suicide attacks sunk Sri Lankan navy vessels
- Somali pirates ran amok in the Indian Ocean
- Hamas laid improvised mines near Israeli Beaches
- MEND guerrillas utilized boat swarms in the Niger Delta to disrupt oil infrastructure
- Lashkar-e-taiba high-jacked an Indian fishing vessel to infiltrate clandestinely for the Mumbai attacks

These are all tactical actions, but as special operations raids often create strategic impacts, so do some terror attacks.

So what will the next ten years of OSW bring to maritime conflicts?
- A proliferation of sea and beach-launched small (read model airplane size) UAVs utilized by non-state actors to help target their water-borne IEDS and anti-ship cruise missiles
- Small, randomly strewn maritime IEDS (mines) through vital commercial choke points - think the Verrazano Narrows between Staten Island and Brooklyn vice Strait of Hormuz. Really, the whole “E” component isn’t necessarily, just some sinister looking boxes and an emailed threat alone is enough to disrupt traffic for a while in any given port
- Commercially available UUVs designed for oceanography converted into torpedoes
- Cell phones and social media used to agitate “flash mobs” of local fishing vessels in order to block the movement of navy or merchant vessels

Those are some of less nefarious unconventional threats… What is the role of sea power in waging the kind of warfare our ground components have been fighting the past decade?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

A Good Thing

Drudge has made this his overnight headline. Sounds so scary, but it confirms for me what many Americans already believe - namely, that economic education as it relates to the global economy today is just terrible.

In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history, Gulf Arabs are planning - along with China, Russia, Japan and France - to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council, including Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar.

Apparently these folks don't know their own history. These same people traded the Gold Standard for the F-16 Standard over 30 years ago, and uhm, every change has only made that decision stronger. I hate to say it, because it sounds like a conspiracy theory, but I think someone in our government has figured out a clever way out of our economic debt without inflation.

A simple example that an Ivy League Keynesian economist should easily understand:

Which currency can support the Arab oil baron looking for a loan to transport his $200 million super tanker to China through the Strait of Hormuz while Israel is bombing Iran? You see, someone in a bank someplace is going to have to make a loan in order for that business to happen, and that banker isn't going to be risking his $200 million credit investment on anything except dollars, because the US is the only country that can protect his investment with military power.

Give it a bit of thought, you'll eventually figure out why the US isn't scared of this move at all, and why our British allies would be sitting very pretty with their pound, instead of the Euro. I think a new unified currency will be promoted, because I don't see the Chinese or Japanese risking their currency with this scheme. The issue? When shit happens, inflation for someone will rise, assuming the currency that replaces the dollar holds any value at all in its time of need.

This was, and has always been, the problem with the oil bourse theory. It should be clear to oil bourse promoters as evidence of the global economic crisis that when you exclude banking from global economic theory (which the oil bourse theory does), you have failed to account for one of the key economic influences of the global economy.

If you are suggesting that a massive regional conflict in the Middle East is good for the US should the US dollar be replaced as the oil currency, you would be right. Cynical, yes... but true.

Thinking About Trends and Changes

There is a clear information and political perception war taking place in the Middle East. The current trend in the war can be framed quoting from this Esquire magazine article by Thomas Barnett, who I believe has captured the essence of the trends very effectively for violent extremism.

Radical Islam has overplayed its hand again, creating popular resentment escalating to political backlash. We're the ones winning this struggle across the board, and not only should Obama ignore the offer of a truce as we press forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (it would only allow Asia to step in for the oil money) — he should make explicitly clear to Al Qaeda that we'll never acquiesce to their desire for civilizational apartheid between the West and the Arab world, even as isolationists and defeatists on our side would just as soon erect a fence around the whole Islamic world to let them fight it out amongst themselves. Why? Because the penetrating embrace of globalization is doing the truly profound damage to Al Qaeda, and we are globalization's bodyguard. The flow of proliferating networks that offer ideas and conversations and products and expressions of individualistic ambition — especially with regard to women — offer radical Islamic groups no hope of gaining permanent political control.

This is an example why I believe an Arabic MTV network acts as a force multiplier against Al Qaeda more than several brigades in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda has been so shattered over recent years that they are struggling to win hearts and minds in one of the most isolated places in the world, Northern Pakistan and disconnected southern Afghanistan. The disconnected places of the world, whether it be Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, or even the increasingly disconnected Venezuela seems to be where the trouble is usually coming from. This is not coincidence.

As Tom Barnett notes, "We're the ones winning this struggle across the board" and are doing so by connecting opportunity to places where opportunity has rarely existed in any form, much less on a global scale. While there is a hint in the truth that by fighting them over there we aren't fighting them over here, there is also a bit of truth in suggesting that fighting the soft war is more important, and achieves a more attainable containment strategy than fighting the hard war in those disconnected places ever will.

I don't want to give the impression I am celebrating globalization as a saving grace, because globalization has a whole set of challenges that needs fixing beginning with very few meaningful global rule sets that are consistently effective. What can be celebrated though is that even in the anarchy of what is globalization today, that chaos of inconsistency is better than what the disconnected despots are selling as an alternative, and more nations (which can easily include just about every major economic power) can claim it as an official political position. Contrary to popular conventional wisdom, I do not see military action in the Middle East under the 21st century tactical application of people centric strategies 'creating more enemies to fight' as the 20th century military actions in the Middle East did.

Ultra conservatives crying for brutal violence have it as wrong as ultra liberals who reject the need for violence against extremist, because in the broader Middle Eastern society violence in some form is as much a part of society as free speech is in American democracy. These aspects of society cannot be stomped out, but they can be molded and channeled, and used effectively to produce broader norms that improve a society. While people reject any infringements of free speech as a violation of rights, most Americans support infringements of free speech against hate speech against minorities, and that anti-free speech has become a government policy, to the benefit of American society I think many of us would agree.

The same is true of violence in the Middle East. Careless, meaningless vengeance and cruelty is eroding as an attractive appeal to Islamic culture, particularly when 'some' emerging national military forces in places like Iraq represent a positive object when they fight, the positive object being protection of family and security for community.

Due to political bias, popular opinion often omits the macro level side effects of events even when those side effects carry powerful consequences to the course of history. In the case of the Middle East, the side effect of a clumsy invasion of Iraq was a massive swelling of economic growth in the greater Middle East, an almost overlooked evolution of greater opportunity that has broad positive long term consequences both economically and politically for the greater Islamic society and peoples. When opportunity exists, the natural flow includes choices other than violent vengeance or cruelty.

The economic growth in the Middle East, most of which is a direct result from military engagement by US and coalition members over the last many years, has combined with greater connectivity to the rest of the world and hurt the extremist movements much more than it has helped. Given the choice of violence and death or a job and a family, job and family apparently wins the vast majority of the time. This is why whatever our military goals are in the Middle East, they must be towards a positive object from the point of view of the Middle East citizen that promotes job and family. When our military goals no longer favor these positive objects for the Iraqi or Afghan citizen, it is time to leave.

Observing China's SSBN Developments

The Jamestown Foundation offered a quick overview of China's efforts to expand its fleet of SSBNs yesterday that's worth reading in whole. Here's a thumbnail of what's inside:

China’s undersea deterrent is undergoing a generational change with the emergence of the Type-094, or Jin-class, which represents a substantial improvement over China’s first-generation Type-092, or Xia-class, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Launched in the early 1980s, the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) single Xia-class SSBN (hereafter Xia) has never conducted a deterrent patrol and is equipped with relatively short-range (1,770 km) JL-1 SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles). In contrast, China may build five Type-094 SSBNs, which will enable the PLAN to conduct near-continuous deterrent patrols, and each of these second-generation SSBNs will be outfitted with 12 developmental JL-2 SLBMs that have an estimated range of at least 7,200 km and are equipped with penetration aids. Although the transition to the new SSBN is ongoing, recent Internet photos depicting at least two Jin-class SSBNs (hereafter Jin) suggest that the PLAN has reached an unprecedented level of confidence in the sea-based leg of its strategic nuclear forces. Indeed, China’s 2008 Defense White Paper states that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is enhancing its “nuclear counterattack” capability. With the anticipated introduction of the JL-2 missiles on the Jin and the deployment of DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), China is on the verge of attaining a credible nuclear deterrent based on a 'survivable' second-strike capability.

Analysts present five possibilities to explain China's expansion of their sea-based nuclear forces:

• Improve the 'survivability' of China’s nuclear forces.


• To enhance the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent.


• To complicate U.S. missile-defense interception efforts.


• As symbols of China's emerging great-power status.


• Inter-service politics.

The Jamestown piece then goes on to provide a sound analysis of the operational challenges China faces over the next decade in effectively deploying the Jins. I suspect all the motives suggested in the Jamestown piece are at play. China has clearly mapped a path to make itself the dominant influence in the Asia-Pacific region, is taking steps to play a significant role in the Indian Ocean basin and has shown increased interest in having a say on global issues.

In addition, contrary to most American analyses of these developments, it's not all about us. While most U.S. analysts tend to take an American-centric view of these developments, it should not be forgotten that four other nuclear powers are within the operational reach of Chinese territory--Russia, India, North Korea and Pakistan--and that Chinese territory is within reach of systems being developed by Iran. What's clear is that China's marching towards becoming a Great Power for reasons beyond merely having the largest population in the world. Their goal is to position themselves to be able to exercise influence across the DIME spectrum.

Some Thoughts On The Suggested PLA Navy Expansion

About a month ago I came across several PLA Navy sources suggesting that a major buildup of naval forces was coming after the 60th anniversary of the PLA Navy. Feng and I discussed the topic a bit in private, but instead of posting I decided to ask some questions of the folks at the Naval War College whom I have found to be the very best people in the US focused on PLA Navy shipbuilding. The answer was they had not seen enough evidence to support the theory that a major build up was coming.

I don't know what China is doing, the lack of transparency makes it difficult to see plans until 2-3 years later, but it wasn't an accident that the ex-Varyag was moved right after the 60th PLA Navy anniversary celebration, and there are strange photo's coming out of the Chinese shipyards suggesting very large hulls are being built that do not appear to match any existing design. With that in mind, we have the upcoming China Defense Mashup blog (I suggest if you have not, you add this website to your feed reader) with full details of what the Chinese shipyards are up to.

To bring people up to speed, several Chinese shipyards have recently completed some investments and are upgraded, open for business. One problem, the global demand on the private sector has all but dried up, with supposedly hundreds of ships massed in the South Pacific empty, waiting for the global economy to rebound so they can get back to work. Capacity is well above demand, and the number of orders for new ships is down. Speculation has been that this means that for the next three years, to keep the Chinese shipyards at peak performance, military orders would make up the difference. This article is suggesting this theory, but well grounded theory, is in fact what is happening.

Nobody deny that Chinese Navy will definitely be a powerful marine force with the rising of China. But the question is the time line and scale of the ambitious building plan of PLA Navy. Varyag Aircraft Carrier, Type 052C “Chinese Aegis” and Type 093/094 submarines are always the focus point of western analyzers. However, will China depend these ship to get the advantage position in western pacific. The answer is obviously “No”.

Some resources in Chinese Defense Industries indicates that China will continuously push its huge Navy construction in world economic crisis. In next 3 years (2009-2012), the hardware construction of Chinese Naval Force is going to enter an higher climax.

It goes on to lay out in detail what will be built in each yard. For the record, I have seen other information that matches up exactly to everything mentioned here, so this could just be a well organized post of bad information. The following is suggested to be expected new work orders for the shipyards over the next 3 years.

Dalian Shipbuilding Corporation
ex-Varyag upgrade
1 New Aircraft Carrier
Large Air-Defense Destroyer (rumor is Type 051D)

Shanghai Jiangnan Changxing Shipbuilding Base
1 new Aircraft Carrier
Large Air-Defense Destroyers

Huangpu Shipbuilding Corporation
Large Air-Defense Destroyers (rumor is Type 052D)
Type 054As

Hudong Shipbuilding Company
Landing Transport Docks
Type 054As

Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co.(formerly known as Huludao)
Nuclear submarines

Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Co.
Type 041 improved conventional submarines (Yuan class)

I don't want to leave the impression I believe this is 100% fact, only that the information posted to the China Defense Mashup blog is information that is being discussed in other places. The same information can be found through other sources although some of those sources are not always reliable sources.

Will official confirmation be coming out soon? I doubt it, the Chinese are not transparent about their naval shipbuilding, even in the big parade they made a big deal about showcasing their nuclear submarines only to produce all of their old model nuclear submarines. The 2009 DoD report on the Chinese Military (PDF) goes so far as to ignore ships under construction where pictures confirm the data in the DoD report is old, although I do think the 2009 Chinese defense report was better than in previous years.

In the end, following the Chinese PLA Navy shipbuilding programs comes down to how much you believe open source sources until you see photographic evidence yourself.

Based on the numbers provided by China Defense Mashup blog, it looks to me like the PLA Navy will be building at least 10 major warships and submarines annually for the next 3 years. That would assume 3 aircraft carriers (1 is ex-Varyag), 7 LPDs, 14 destroyers and frigates, 3 nuclear submarines, and 3 conventional submarines (an all-time low production of only one nuclear and one conventional submarine a year). In other words, it could be more like 12-13+ ships per year if submarine production is higher and depending upon the number of logistics ships built.

There are several ways to look at a rapid PLA Navy build up. One is to suggest this marks the beginning of a cold war between the US and China, and that would suggest the US needs to look at the PLA Navy buildup in a way that compares what we are doing to what they are doing. In a budget year, that can be expected of China hawks.

For example, for the three years FY08-FY10 (FY10 is this budget year), the US Navy would build 1 CVN, 3 SSNs, 1 DDG-1000, 1 DDG-51, 5 LCS, 2 LPD-17s, 4 T-AKEs, and 2 JHSVs (+1 more JHSV for the Army) for a total of 19 total ships. That isn't great, that comes in at only 6 capital ship combatants with the other 13 ships being of the flotilla. When those numbers are compared to the PLA Navy, China is producing 3x as many aircraft carriers, 2x as many submarines (potentially 3x or even 4x), 7x as many frigates and destroyers, and before we start celebrating the LCS construction it should be noted the DoD report lists as many as 70 missile armed fast attack craft including several dozen Type 022s to offset the LCS/JHSV construction the US is undertaking.

I don't like this type of comparison though, because it doesn't really tell the story. It is an industrial centric view that ignores operational readiness, skill, experience, existing capabilities, emerging capabilities, strategy, doctrine, and tactics. For the record, I am not a 'China hawk,' although I do subscribe to the theory it is entirely possible the US and China will have a skirmish in the next few decades, but my thoughts on this is historical in nature. The War of 1812 was necessary to bring about a partnership between the US and Great Britain who at the time, were major trading partners. It is entirely possible a similar 'feud' will be necessary for the US and China to find their mutual interest. Churchill likened the War of 1812 to a spat between brothers, and that may be how the US and China finally get on the same page. For my part, if any such 'spat' is to occur, I'd much rather play the role of the existing superpower (Great Britain) than the rising power (the US of 1812). It doesn't have to be that way though.

My concern is what a major naval buildup means for people like Taiwan, India, Japan, and/or South Korea. We have already seen Australia make their decision, and I think they are making the right decision but solely for their interests, regardless of China's direction. I have no idea what the future holds, but the relationship between the US and China must steadily improve for the next few decades regardless of whether the US decides to match China's naval power development or not.

If someone was to ask to me to list the potential adversaries of the US in the 21st century, I still believe we are more likely to go to war with several countries, including some existing NATO allies, in the 21st century before I think we would go to war with China. Lets face it, we are a commercial people and so is China. We are their biggest customer, and they are our biggest customer. I thinkTom Barnett is right on target with his "transaction" narrative that describes the China-US relationship. This relationship is unlikely to change anytime soon if our economic policies are smart, particularly when we see companies like GM run to China to survive. Economically, we have more in common with China than we do with the Europeans today.

The 'fear communist' narrative suggests China is the red menace out to get us, but I don't see this as anywhere near the reality of the US-China relationship. The irony is the conservative capitalists in the US will be the first ones who make this point to "China Hawk" the US into preparing for the next cold war, when in fact, China is one of the premier capitalist societies in the world today which is why we are so tied to China in terms of economy.

In other words, I see China's rise as a reflection of our own rise, and the coming China rise could very easily be a combination of their Mahan moment with their own Great White Fleet, but also their Teddy Roosevelt moment of great expansive influence without war. I've been reading a really good book called Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century on that time period written by CDR Jerry Hendrix, and I hear Evan Thomas is soon to publish a book about the Spanish-American war that looks at the same time period. Both of these books are timely, because that time period reveals the lessons of the past needed to guide us through the present.

If you want to understand why China is developing itself into a major naval power in the 21st century, know your history, because China's coming rise and the dynamics involved and challenges we are likely to face as a result can be found in history... our national history just over 100 years ago.

Notes From Last Thursday's House Subcommittee Hearing

America must significantly widen its definition of strategic allies going forward. As the combination of an over-leveraged United States and a demographically moribund Europe and Japan no longer constitutes a quorum of Great Powers sufficient to address today's global security agenda. In short I want allies with million man armies who are having lots of babies, rising defense budgets, and are willing to go places and kill people in defense of their interests.

Testimony by Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett, HASC Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, March 26, 2024

With that statement by Dr. Barnett, Maine Congresswoman Chellie Pingree (D) gave a face like she had just swallowed a giant spoon full of wasabi with her eggroll. It was one of several memorable moments in the very clever hearing scheduled by Representative Gene Taylor (D-MISS), who really deserves a lot of credit for putting together the hearing. The subcommittee hearing turned out to be very different from my expectations, and yet very informative to see a variety of opinions emerge that would otherwise never see the light of day in the Navy discussion on Capitol Hill. Anyone suggesting this hearing wasn't a useful exercise or very insightful simply wasn't paying attention.

I thought Dr. Thompson eloquently set the context of the moment in his opening statement (PDF) when he said:

The biggest concern will be that our economy is in decline and the federal government is out of money.

How broke is the federal government?

-- So broke that during the two hours we are meeting this morning it will spend $400 million it does not have.

-- So broke that the federal debt has doubled to $11 trillion in just eight years, and threatens to double again in the next eight.

-- So broke that we are sustaining our defense posture in part by borrowing money from the same country our military planners are preparing to fight.

There is no time in living memory when US finances have been in such bad shape, and therefore all the things we thought we knew about the future availability of funding for the joint force are suspect.

Both Dr. Barnett and Dr. Thompson agreed on two interesting points. First, if we build an interoperable national fleet in the spirit of the Navy's maritime strategy we will get good results. Second, the fleet is not likely to get larger without smaller, cheaper warships. I enjoyed the way Dr. Barnett puts it in his written testimony:

To conclude, the U.S. Navy faces severe budgetary pressures on future construction of traditional capital ships and submarines. Those pressures will only grow as a result of the current global economic crisis (which—lest we forget—generates similar pressures on navies around the world) and America's continued military operations abroad as part of our ongoing struggle against violent extremism. Considering these trends as a whole, I would rather abuse the Navy—force structure-wise—before doing the same to either the Marine Corps or the Coast Guard. Why? It is my professional opinion that the United States defense community currently accepts far too much risk and casualties and instability on the low end of the conflict spectrum while continuing to spend far too much money on building up our combat capabilities for high-end scenarios. In effect, we over-feed our Leviathan force while starving our SysAdmin force, accepting far too many avoidable casualties in the latter while hedging excessively against theoretical future casualties in the former. Personally, I find this risk-management strategy to be both strategically unsound and morally reprehensible.

As this body proceeds in its collective judgment regarding the naval services' long-range force-structure planning, my suggested standard is a simple one: give our forces fewer big ships with fewer personnel on them and far more smaller ships with far more personnel on them. As the Department of Navy finally gets around to fulfilling the strategic promise of systematically engaging the littoral … from the sea, doing so in complete agreement—in my professional opinion—with the security trends triggered by globalization’s tumultuous advance, I would humbly advise Congress not to stand in its way.

Say what you want, but the man is consistent. I am a GenXer, so I tend to love the bold attitude that sounds macho when folks like Dr. Thompson and Dr. Barnett say what they believe and believes what they say. Alpha male types who see black and white while telling people what is and isn't in their opinion are so uncommon these days. I'm tired of the more common CYA approach of hedging comments and trying not to say anything that isn't quite filtered through every screen in the kitchen, which I think is what had me enjoying both Dr. Thompson and Dr. Barnett so much in this hearing. These are men who tell people what they think for a living, all you have to do is ask. The opposite of coarse is the average American politician, who doesn't tell you what they really think without first taking a poll.

In his testimony Dr. Barnett makes two good points in addition to what is quoted above.

First he suggests we need to be building capabilities at the low end that can be given away, an idea that was floated by Bob Work with the Littoral Combat Ship in his recent CSBA report (PDF). This idea is making the rounds, and it is a very good idea. In my opinion, if we are going to build towards protecting against an unstable maritime domain where irregular challenges can disrupt the global commercial system, the necessity to build the global coast guard needs to be integrated into our nations maritime strategy. I don't necessarily agree with Bob Work that the LCS is the platform for this, but I am open to it if the LCS costs come down. Seems to me a small ship that can be developed for $100 million, operated by the US Navy in conjunction with regional coast guards as part of a global fleet station squadron or other influence squadron for 10 years (which makes our investment $10 mil a year), is an idea whose time has come. I think a 10 year old small but capable $100 mil new PC is a fantastic investment. Several have been quietly pushing these ideas around the email, it will be useful to publicly push these ideas more often for consideration as part of coherent strategic packages.

Second, Barnett describes maintaining development, at a slow pace he suggests, the very high end capabilities to hedge against potential threats. This is an idea that used to be popular in Navy's, but appears to have lost favor, although give the Navy some credit because building 2-3 DDG-1000s would represent a modern version of this idea. I am talking about the idea of real prototypes and test vessels.

We have not built a nuclear powered surface combatant in a very long time. Perhaps before forcing the Navy to execute the laws that have forced nuclear power upon the Navy, Congress should fund, as a prototype, one of these giant 22,000+ nuclear powered cruisers for ballistic missile defense as a test platform rather than moving quickly for an entire class. Use the LPD-17 hull if necessary to do it, the point being lets actually test the theories before we make them standards.

I am looking at the next decade, and quite honestly I don't see good things for the DoD unless someone in government finds a reason to protect our strategic interests. The priorities on new domestic programs and the seeming acceptance that we will fund all these new domestic programs with even more borrowed money suggests that something has to give. It is unclear just how much creative bookkeeping will be needed to fool the world into believing we can afford all these new programs through their loans, but my guess is we will borrow too much too quickly, get told no sometime over the next few years, and the results will be devastating for the United States economy and people.

Assuming the rest of the world climbs out of the economic hole by 2011, which is what all signs point to right now, the global middle class is going emerge larger than ever. At the same time, energy is going to be at its highest demand in human history. It is noteworthy that countries like Russia are retooling their military industry so they can implement enormous numbers of projects when that time comes. As all the little men globally find themselves swimming in cash from enormous energy demand of the resurgent global economy, we will find our defense budgets in free fall and our domestic debts mounting at record speeds during a time everything costs more thanks to higher energy costs. Any casual study of little men in the energy economy nations globally will find they tend to spend their excess cash on military systems, and rarely reinvest it into their other domestic economy sectors. My prediction is next decade will be defined by two things:

1. The largest global growth of military construction and exports since the 1930s
2. The most painful period of domestic economic turmoil in the US since the 1930s

Everything is pointing to next decade being definitive for the next several generations in terms of the future strategic environment. Despite the views of theorists attempting to caution our political leaders of the near term future, it is clear we are bogged down strategically on the present (Iraq and Afghanistan) with no real congruity in our strategic vision and political policies looking to the future. Indeed, domestically, our minds are collectively on borrowing more money, raising more revenues with individual and creative tax and income concepts, all so we can create even more expenses in a federal budget that is already swimming in interest payments it already can't afford, and that is before the Baby Boomers start collecting social security money the federal government has already spent.

The Obama administration has kept two primary policies of the Bush administration: the current war policy and the "over borrow/over spend" economic model policy. If this continues, my prediction is Obama becomes a one term president because he intentionally kept the two worst possible policies one could pick from the Bush administrations bag of broken ideas. For its part, the Navy needs to get what it can while it can, because the money for the fleet we need simply won't be there.

Very Interesting Russian "Soft Power" Strategic View

Matt Armstrong has found a gem of an article. I do not jest when I suggest in the hands of someone clever this article could fuel talk radio shows on either side of the political isle for a month. This is a really interesting Russian analysis of how to attack the United States with soft power.

I will ask up front that you please not be the asshole in the comments who suggests this Russian analysis is targeting just liberals or conservatives, because if you read it in full you will learn it is very thorough in exploiting the political tendencies of both sides of the political spectrum.

This is a short summary of the post by Paul Goble on Window of Eurasia regarding the article.

Having discovered that economic power does not immediately translate into political influence and may in fact alienate those it is supposed to attract, the Russian government needs to identify new ways to influence the West but finding that its options are not nearly as good as many in Moscow had thought, according to a Russian analyst.

And the most effective way to do that, Andrey Pronin writes in an essay posted today on a Moscow State University portal that has often served as a source of foreign policy ideas for the Russian government, is for Russia to deploy what he calls its "soft force" against American "soft power".

"In the 1940s and 1950s," the Moscow analyst continues, "a significant part of the most respectable Western intelligentsia held leftist views and openly sympathized with the USSR, and English aristocrats worked for Soviet intelligence services on the basis of their convictions in this regard."

Today, he says, Russia needs to find "allies interested in itself within America" and to "form a pro-Russian lobby, a circle of influential people who respect and support Russia and who will exert an ever greater pressure on the political establishment of the United States" on behalf of Moscow. ...

Moscow needs allies, and the two most obvious ones are India and China, neither of whom Pronin suggests is comfortable with American-style globalization. If such a "union of the three giants" is formed, he concludes, Russia will occupy the leading role of a scientific and innovative center and the developer of humanitarian technologies and standards."

There are some money quotes in Andrey Pronin's paper. This paragraph is just a sample.

The situation in American society favors the implementation of these plans. In many ways the United States today is reminiscent of the Soviet Union period of stagnation under Brezhnev. Militarism, foreign adventures, attacks on freedom of speech and human rights, censorship, the presence of the official ideology are evident. Multinational and multiracial American society does not have a common history and defines itself in terms of ideology, which is a more fragile foundation of national unity, rather than a common culture and history that binds cultures. If you choose to continue the comparison, the U.S., as in the Soviet Union, should be a peaceful ideological and cultural revolution. The challenge for Russia is to give impetus and direction to the process. Russia should contribute to the U.S. situation in a way similar to how the US promoted the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, namely by injecting quarrel into the most creative layer of Soviet intellectuals with Brezhnev nomenclature. Russia needs to formulate such a cultural project that, first, develops influence over American intellectuals, and secondly, leverages against the American political system that is out of balance, and split the American artistic and intellectual elite in power.

In other words:

• Exploit the worlds global perception of America against America
  
• Exploit sympathy within American intellectual and artistic communities
• Exploit diversity as an unbinding individualism rather than binding common interest
  
• Exploit the ideological partisan political divide to create a disenfranchised American political culture

The paper goes on to form a high level strategy of building an environment in Russia favorable to American intellectuals by exploiting the ideological divides in the American education system. One such example cited is the education divisions found between human science and religion, but another divide is how creativity is becoming more limited in US education due to how education leaders are exercising ideological control along partisan political divisions in creative debate. The aim appears to be to court the elites who dominate education to help shape the information studied by younger generations while dividing the elites and religious Americans. Russia sees religion as a source of weakness in America, and is looking for allies among Americans who believe this as to promote further divisions between religious Americans and non-religious American elites and artists.

The paper suggests building a unified "soft force" strategy with India and China so together the three nations can beat back what is labeled a failed western neo-liberal globalization economic model, so a new model can be reinvented in a form more favorable to Russia.

I believe the paper qualifies as a must read, and I admit doing it an injustice by not translating the whole thing. There is already a bit of intellectual commentary on the paper among Russian bloggers and elites, much of which is interesting as well. Hopefully, someone will translate the whole thing into English, because it deserves study and further intellectual discussion.