Arbiter, Enforcer, Hegemon

The talk lately of the "Post American World" is a line of thinking I simply don't agree with, for a number of reasons. I see the idea as the fallback position of those who want to retreat from the responsibilities assumed by our nation for nearly 6 decades. They may not realize it, but such a vision is an expression of desire for a world absent leadership.

In many ways it represents a position absent the context of history. For example, if we are in a recession, and I tend to believe we are heading that direction, one only has to point to the early 90s to see the last time we experienced such economic conditions. I guess that means the 90s were terrible, right?

Hardly. The world is much more complicated, and when the US took an economic hit due to Fannie/Freddie, it took all of about 24 hours for the entire world to feel it. We live in a world where your mortgage payment effects the investment economies of Europe and Asia, and somehow this is a sign of American decline to these supposed thinkers. These are the same people who claim an oil bourse in Iran would break the dollar, as if Saudi Arabia is going to look at the dollar and the Euro and come to the conclusion the Europeans will protect their investment. I'm sure European power backing their oil investments is the first thing that crosses their mind as they observe F-16s with the letters U.S.A.F. fly over the Persian Gulf as those jets maintain security.

I point this out because there were some really good reads, all pre-election, that I think are worth consideration post election. When one begins talking about national power, it must account for its association of economics and military power. Every smart foreign policy accounts for both but is based on neither. In the 21st century, the discussion must also account for shared interest and building cooperative relationships. If we have learned anything from the economic crisis facing the nation, it is that our economy now has reach into the wallets of the middle class of citizens in other countries, meaning many domestic decisions are now bigger than just us.

That leads into this interesting editorial by Robert Kagan. I recommend it is read in full, but I found this interesting as we fight the myth of decline.

Yet the evidence of American decline is weak. Yes, as Zakaria notes, the world's largest Ferris wheel is in Singapore and the largest casino in Macau. But by more serious measures of power, the United States is not in decline, not even relative to other powers. Its share of the global economy last year was about 21 percent, compared with about 23 percent in 1990, 22 percent in 1980 and 24 percent in 1960. Although the United States is suffering through a financial crisis, so is every other major economy. If the past is any guide, the adaptable American economy will be the first to come out of recession and may actually find its position in the global economy enhanced.

But economic power is only part of the basis for American power, we must also account for military power, which is done very well in this editorial by Christian Caryl as he highlights the role the US plays in maintaining regional stability in this example with the seventh fleet.

The problem with East Asia, though, is that none of its countries trust each other. If, let us say, the Seventh Fleet were to evaporate tomorrow, China would suddenly get very nervous about protecting what strategists call its "sea-line of communications." Four-fifths of China's entire supply of oil comes through the Strait of Malacca. Were China to beef up its military presence there, though, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—all dependent on the same oil—would immediately have to confront similar concerns. And because China hardly offers a model of transparent government, they would find themselves having to do a lot of guessing. Unpredictability is a very dangerous thing when the vital national interests of states are involved. Just to make it more interesting, China, for its part, has good historical reasons to worry about the motives of Japan, while South Korea is intensely paranoid about both Japan and China. Like it or not, the Seventh Fleet is a powerful insurance policy that ensures more or less stable rules of the game.

Both editorials are a must read, interesting opinion worth consideration.

Since the end of WWII we have created a world in our image. We won the cold war without a shooting war with Russia, and discovered that Levis jeans, hair band rock, coke, and Hollywood contributed to global influence just as much as American intervention. In other words, it takes both hard and soft power. The language of international air travel is English, not by accident. Are we supposed to believe that now, after we have spent decades shaping the world in our image, that as other nations improve themselves under our model this is a threat to our dominance and position? Hardly, Christian Caryl uses the word imperialism in the title of his editorial, but that simply highlights a view regarding what military power means to him.

The real term that describes the American power model at work in the 21st century is connectivity, which is taking place in the realm of information and ideas as the world continues to adopt our international liberal trade order. As we look ahead to what the future brings, I'm reminded of an article Thomas Barnett wrote last month regarding the Post Caucasian World, another very interesting editorial that rejects the decline of American power.

For the foreseeable future, America appears certain to lean in the direction of more regulation, after a three-decade streak of deregulation that was pivotal in fueling globalization's rapid expansion. In many ways, this course correction will feel like a rerun of our turn-of-the-20th-century Progressive Era -- in effect, first shaming and then taming a capitalist market that's become too rapacious and uncontrollable.

Pursued with real vision, our example should trigger similar policy innovation and clean-up efforts on a global scale, meaning a "league of democracies" constitutes an insufficient quorum for making globalization's future consolidation both sustainable and far more just.

Instead, it is a league of capitalist great powers that must be immediately called to order, but with the clear understanding -- unclouded by fear -- that globalization comes with rules but no ruler.

And that is a most American world.

In every challenge there is opportunity, and right now the nation is facing many challenges that give a sense of pessimism. I reject the pessimism, and the associated "Post American World" as one and the same. We began the 21st century with a serious challenge from non-state forces who reject a world building itself on connectivity. We have resisted that challenge, and with a new government forming and General Petraeus taking over at CENTCOM, we are a nation regrouping for the next phase of dealing with these challenges.

Yes, it is a dangerous world, but it is trending towards a better world, a safer world, as we find shared interest globally with rapidly growing nations that desire connectivity to the American world that already exists today. This process of emerging powers like China and India still leads to a world where the United States remains the arbiter, enforcer, and hegemon in the rising order. The words chosen aren't unintentional, after all, we must keep in mind that hegemony is a Greek word that means leadership.

Another Hijacked Ship, Another Mysterious Cargo

The pirates of Somalia have hijacked yet another ship off the high seas, this time a Ukrainian RoRo (See Eagle1 for picture) that reportedly has some interesting cargo. IHT has a story reported by the AP from the Ukraine.

The Foreign Ministry says pirates have seized a Ukrainian-operated ship off Somalia.

The ministry says the Faina was sailing with 21 people on board under the Belize flag, though it is operated by Ukrainian managing company Tomax Team Inc.

This is how the Associated Press reported the cargo.

The ministry had no information on the ship's cargo. But the Interfax news agency cited an unnamed source as saying the ship was loaded with about 30 T-72 tanks and spare parts for them.

Like all early reports, be skeptical. The MV Iran Deyanat story has been out there a month, consistently reporting the same thing from the mainstream media in both Europe and Africa (and ignored in the US MSM btw), so at least with that story there is some consistency making it worth keeping an eye on. Who built the T-72s? Where were they going? 30 T-72s off the coast of Africa with an unknown destination raises a lot of questions, and skepticism without more information is warranted.

However, what is noteworthy is yet another ship has been hijacked, this time with Russians part of the crew, and the day after the Russian Navy is deploying to the Somalian coast. Anyone else now see why we believe the Russian deployment to Somalia is more interesting than the deployment to see Hugo Chavez? The French killed one pirate and took 6 prisoners the second time they took military action, the Russians will shoot to kill, and it will be interesting to see if prisoners are optional with the Russians.

If the Russians take prisoners, will the Guardian write a story about prisoners being held for months in a shit hole prison cell on a very old Russian warship? Unlikely. But if we are being intellectually honest, that is the international detainee issue of our time.

On Friday night the presidential candidates may or may not have a debate about foreign policy, and if we are looking for the international legal issue in need of a discussion at the presidential level, or the missing rule set in the maritime domain that requires presidential level attention, the issue of detaining and prosecuting pirates on the high seas is the issue no one is talking about, and the global system needs.

Where is the UN on this international legal issue? Why don't we have an international court for dealing with pirates? Where is the political leadership on this issue in the United States? Where are the legal discussions of this issue in the blogosphere, besides EagleOne? Is the legal blogosphere so small that only one lawyer sees the most obvious missing international legal framework in the 21st century?

After all, when the Danes release 10 pirates they capture at sea to the beach of Somalia because there is no legal system to manage piracy, when the Canadians and British refuse to capture ppirates for the same reason, and when the US Navy gets accused of floating prisons when they do take prisoners at sea, there is a missing rule set in the global system.

I've been suggesting Somalian piracy is costing the global economy half a million dollars a day since doing the math here. I got an email today from a ship owner in Europe, who says the actual figure is more like a million and a half US dollars just in insurance costs, and that doesn't account for rising costs due to labor concerns among unions, and a list of other costs. Meanwhile, absent political action and an international legal framework, this fire continues to burn despite international naval efforts. Al Qaeda is watching us dither.

Russia - Georgia Analysis We Can Support

Mark Safranski, also known as Zenpundit, has an article out on Pajamas Media regarding the Russian - Georgian conflict called Lets Not Rush Into Cold War II. Mark nails every point perfectly, scores on every possession, and generally educates at a level even the politicos should be able to understand.

From administration to administration, we zigzag with the needs of the moment in our dealings with Russia without a clear vision of what America’s vital interests in the former Soviet states actually are.

Georgia is a textbook case. While America has a legitimate concern in encouraging former Soviet states to develop into market democracies, there is no intrinsic economic or strategic American vital interest in Georgia per se and even less in South Ossetia. Georgia is our ally for only two reasons: Tblisi was enthusiastic to send troops to help in Iraq in return for military aid and it occupies a strategic location for oil and gas pipelines that will meet future European energy needs. In other words, Georgia’s role is of a primary strategic interest to the EU, not the United States. Which is why European and British companies have such a large shareholder stake in the BTC pipeline and why European FDI in Georgia exceeds ours. Yet it will be American troops in Georgia handing out bottled water and MREs, not the Bundeswehr or the French Foreign Legion. Something does not compute here.

Exactly, our policy with Russia is a step by step tactical approach absent a comprehensive strategic approach. Slam and Dunk. So what do the politicos do? The commenter's claim the Zenpundit is a liberal infiltrator. However, had the Zenmaster posted the same piece on DailyKos I'm betting he would have been nailed with the neocon label. In my book, what is missing is a clearly stated foreign policy from either side of the isle of politics, so any clearly stated strategic discussion of foreign policy commentary from an economic first perspective that doesn't follow a traditional ideological mindset will be rejected by both sides until we collectively find our national strategic vision articulated by a President.

While Mark got my blood pumping, the adrenaline gave me a natural buzz when I followed up Mark's piece with Thomas Barnett's 3000 word passion statement. When I use the F bomb, it means I'm having an emotional moment and care about a topic, and that is generally how I see it when the bombs drop on other blogs. Quoting any part of the 3000 words to summarize the whole is futile, so go read it and come back.

Russia and the US are not equals, but can be in their approach to the gap. I would also include other major powers in this equation. I love that piece by Tom, because in a great many words, he is essentially invoking our Yin Yang theory for strategically approaching our national interests.

When any major power exercises power in the gap, it ultimately represents an opposing (competitive) and, at the same time, complementary (completing) application of power towards the ends of shrinking the gap. Tom found the Yin Yang.

In this case, Georgia, which has a relationship with the United States is being consumed by Russia, and ultimately will be regardless of what the United States does. This represents a loss of influence for the United States and Europe, a gain of influence for the Russians. BUT this also represents a long term complimentary action to the strategic goals of everyone in the core. Why? Because successful military intervention by a core nation into the gap shrinks the gap.

Apply the same theory to Iraq. The US military intervention there represented a loss of influence by Russia and Europe, and a gain of influence by the United States. The result is an action that is complimentary to the strategic goals of other core nations (think China and energy here), and the effects of this intervention are broad. Consider what we see in the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait and we have movement towards more shrinking of the gap. There is no reason to believe that Russian intervention in Georgia couldn't have a similar effect on regional nations, including Ukraine.

The major powers in competition with the United States can be described as 7 primary regional powers (US makes 8, and is unique because it is the only true global power). In no particular order.

1) Europe
2) China
3) Western Pacific Nations (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia)
4) Russia
5) India
6) Brazil and South Africa
7) Canada and Mexico

Those seven power bases represent the "core" of where the focus of American strategic interest lies in globalization. If the State Department backed by the president can manage the competing relationships the US has with these 7 powers, the DoD can then manage the threats that emerge in the gap. If we do not maintain a good relationship between the United States and those 7 powers, the United States cannot guarantee the global system that currently governs economics. Those 7 major power regions represent the map for the State Department.

Everything else represents the map for the DoD. Part of the role of State and the DoD is to remember, when any of the above 7 engage militarily in the gap, while it is factual to say it is in our competing interest, it is also factual to say it is in our completing interest.

One point here I'll expand on later... we have been talking about operational capabilities and strategic environment a lot on the blog since this post. We firmly believe the DoD must maintain acquisition focus against the operational capabilities developed by nations in the core, but align those capabilities in a way that gives them creditable capability in the gap. Why? Because the market for military technology in the gap is the core, which means we must expect to see core capabilities in the gap.

Anyway... Mark and Tom are both on the money here. The driving force behind both our political and strategic national interest is economic. The other seven major powers we describe above represent the stakeholders in that economic system, and the system is key. While the US faces major economic challenges in the near term due to debt issues, long term stability of the economic system is also the solution to that problem as the gap becomes the emerging consumer market.

And while i shouldn't have to say it, the competition between the powers of the core is obviously about one thing: Resources, including energy. This is why bio-diesel, and other alternative energy sources not named ethanol should be a national security priority, which takes enormous priority over a climate issue. Georgia isn't the first gap nation to see military intervention by the core, it is essentially the same strategic choice the US made in Iraq except from a Russian interest point of view. It also represents the beginning of what will be a century of interventions throughout Africa by core nations, after all, that is ground zero for the future competition in the 21st century.

If Mark is the liberal, and Tom is the neocon, I must be the globalization nazi. So be it, in my realist world, world peace requires tough men with guns defending a global economic system where all regional powers are stakeholders, and in my academic world, economic prosperity requires measured cooperation as part of the competition of major powers.

Observing Some New PLAN Discussions

There are a few discussions regarding China we want to highlight. First, we won't be spending time listing all the reasons why this article is inaccurate. We thought we gave anonymous writing on naval issues a bad name, but feel better knowing Strategypage will always be around to make us look good. It is hard to take an article discussing the Type 039C seriously when the author does not appear to be aware it is in the water already.

For high quality reading on the PLAN we want to highlight a pair of articles we very much enjoyed in the latest edition of Joint Force Quarterly. Both are PDF.

China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities By Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes

Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization By Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase

We think everything Andrew S. Erickson writes is fantastic, and this piece is no exception. We had just finished reading these two articles when we came across this interesting report. We should add a disclaimer here, the author of this article is Peter Navarro who has a book called The Coming China Wars. The book makes a case how China's emergence as an economic super power is creating all manner of conflicts with the rest of the world over jobs, oil, natural resources, etc.. The article observes...

In yet another skirmish over oil rights in the South China Sea, China has fired a stern warning shot across the bow of ExxonMobil Corporation. China is miffed that Exxon is seeking to enter into a deal with PetroVietnam to explore for oil in waters surrounding the disputed Spratly and Paracel island chains.

China has warned Exxon to pull out of the exploration deal, describing the project as a breach of Chinese sovereignty, according to the South China Morning Post at the weekend, citing unnamed sources close to the US company.

The article goes on to suggest that this event could be what triggers some revelations regarding the maritime strategy of China for the South China Sea. We aren't sure we see that level of action on China's part occuring because ExxonMobile works with PetroVietnam, but if it is true we think that would be a good thing. The lack of transparency of the Chinese military is not a trivial issue, and in our opinion is the single largest impediment to building a meaningful government level relationship between the US and China.

It is worth noting China will soon be drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, and there really isn't anything the US can do about it. These events are part of globalization.

Interesting Article on IRGC Smuggling

In March of 2007, there were a number of unofficial reports from our excellent maritime sources in Iran that the IRGC had set up a major smuggling operation from the northern tip of Oman to Bander Abbas. We were told the program is basically an export market that goes through the Oman export house, loads materials on fast speed boats from the northern peninsula of Musandam and crosses the Strait of Hormuz to Iran. Many of the items in the smuggling operation are blocked by UN sanctions.

We have seen very little evidence this actually existed, with an item popping up on Pat Dollards blog later that month and linked to by Eagle1. The article is no longer on Pat Dollard's blog, however the story did pop up again over the weekend, this time by Reuters. From the Washington Post:

Smugglers pile boxes high on their speedboats, covering them with tarpaulin before zipping off into the sunset on the short but dangerous journey across the strategic Strait of Hormuz from Oman to Iran.

They return in the early morning, their empty fiberglass boats ready to pick up more cargo at the small Gulf port of Khasab, in Oman's isolated northern peninsula of Musandam.

Trade with Iran is as ancient as the settlements overlooking the Strait of Hormuz, gateway for a third of the world's oil shipments. In 2005, Iran's police chief said some $6 billion worth of goods such as computer parts, tea or cigarettes were smuggled into the country each year from the Gulf.

The Reuters article does not mention the link to the IRGC, but the Senate Hearings last year that led to the vote of HR1400 did note the connection. The reason we trust the Senate as a good source for links to the IRGC is because they would know, in that case they were going after the money. Never get between a Senator and money. We see the Reuters story as confirmation to what we had originally been told, as many details fit exactly.

I admit I've never been a big fan of Pat Dollard's blog, I simply have different philosophies in approaching international challenges. He deserves credit here though, he had this story exactly right back then.

The Reuters article is a good read regarding how the people doing the work are really just hired help, with no perspective of the greater game at play with the smuggling operation. In that regards, it should be noted that is a sign of a well financed, sophisticated smuggling operation. When we read the article, we note the ending was very interesting, perhaps an unintended side effect of the global economic situation worldwide? The effects of a weakening dollar combined with incredible growth in wealth in the Middle East... outside of Iran, has not been good for the smuggling business. The article notes:

Inflation in the UAE and beyond has eroded profits and the global rise in food prices is also pinching.

Of three trucks that once sold tea, snacks and toiletries to the smugglers in Khasab, one remains. The other two are boarded up, having been priced out of business by inflation.

"Before, there were many Iranians. Now, it is less," said Jaafar Zelabzi, an Indian who runs the still-open truck and accepts Iranian currency. "Prices in the UAE are too high."

We think that is an interesting side effect in to the conditions being applied to the global markets.

Australian Leadership Looking to Slash and Burn Defense

Under the Howard government, Australia made a number of defense purchases to upgrade a military that has been in heavy use and in need of replacements. Of the projects that made a lot of sense to us included the Air Defense destroyers, the LHDs, and new Abrams tanks, all of which are important warfighter capabilities that fit very well within the trends of globalization and expeditionary forces. We were never very impressed with the Super Seasprite deal, the F/A-18 Hornet purchase, nor did we ever fully understand the thinking behind purchasing the F-35A, which would not be capable of utilization on the new LHDs.

The Rudd government has decided that some of this doesn't make sense, and it appears they aren't happy with the direction of defense, or defense spending, and some major changes are in the works for Australia's military. The news starts with a study.

Work will begin this week on the 2008 defence white paper, the biggest review of Australia's defence priorities since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. It will reassess the Howard government's policy of spending $50billion to build a defence force that fits seamlessly into the US military machine.

In many ways this is smart, the Howard government was all over the map with its priorities, and did a very poor job of delivering a public intellectual basis for expensive programs. The purchase of the F/A-18s is an excellent example, Eric has blogged the history for awhile and the Howard approach consistently begged the question, where is the strategy?

We observe this report uses the phrase "white elephant" a lot. Apparently it escaped the Howard government that if you cannot match defense funding with purpose, your program can be said to be lacking of purpose.

THE Federal Government will launch a major cost cutting assault on multi-billion dollar defence projects established by the Howard government, with the controversial $6.6billion Super Hornet jet fighters first in its sights.

Other defence white elephants in the Government's target include the Abrams tank, three massively expensive air warfare destroyers, two huge amphibious carrier ships, dud Seasprite helicopters, unnecessary flying drones and $16billion worth of undeveloped F-35 joint strike fighters.

If I was a citizen of Australia, I'd be a little concerned when almost every major defense program is labeled a white elephant. We note that only the Collins class and Collins class replacement are not mentioned. Is every single program actually a white elephant, is that really the world we live in where a nation should in fact invest in no new defense programs? I'm not sure the phrase white elephant applies, but in a nation loaded with resources in a region of increasing competition for resources, I think the word "Ivory Tower" best describes the white elephant approach to defense. Rather than a military "that fits seamlessly into the US military machine" this article is painting an ever scarier picture, because it sounds a lot like a plan for Australia to be as dependent as possible upon the United States for defense in the future. There has to be a wise approach somewhere in the middle.

That isn't to suggest there shouldn't be a review, or cuts, in fact we believe both should be done. From our perspective, Air Defense destroyers are hardly white elephants for an island nation. Without the ability to defend shipping, you better be ready and willing to produce everything, without any imports, because only with the proposed Air Defense destroyers will Australia have the capability to defend its sea lanes. ANZACs and Adelaide frigates cannot fill that role in the Pacific, too many contenders.

The LHD is also very important, in fact we would suggest one of the most important military programs for Australia. One of the pillars of Australia's defense lies on its option for intervention in the South Pacific. Without that capability, Australia eliminates that pillar of regional defense, and is just begging for other powers to assume that role. The power most likely to assume that role in the region, in protection of its own interests, is China. I have a hard time believing the sacrifice of that pillar of defense to China is in the best interest of Australia, but that is the road being paved by the elimination of the LHDs. The Abrams tanks, which can be carried on the LHDs, is an important part of that defense strategy.

As for the aircraft purchases and frigate modernization, I believe this is something for the Rudd government to take a serious look at. The Super Seasprites are a disaster, Howard lacked the guts to call a spade a spade and do what is required. Rudd should take action there. If the modernized frigates can't deploy to forward theaters, they aren't of any use. The replacements for the F-111s also raises questions, and is tied directly to the F-35A purchase. The problem is two fold, first what is the strategic purpose of ground based aircraft, and two what considerations are required within the scope of the strategic purchase of future aircraft for expeditionary deployment. The Howard government never answered those questions, and it is unclear if the Rudd government is even asking those questions. Until strategic purpose is identified, it is premature to believe any platform is right for Australia, which is why the cross-hairs are on the aircraft purchases.

This will be interesting to observe unfold. Will Australia go the way of Europe, basically rely on the US for its defense, and if so, what does that mean for the US? The lack of defense spending in Europe is creating a greater reliance on the US for defense, will we have to do the same for Australia in the future? This is why a rising India is so appealing to many in the US, it is a lot easier to partner with nations, specifically democracy's. that take their national defense and regional security responsibilities seriously.

Expeditionary Warfare, Soft Power, and Naval Strategy

The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the U.S. the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation and deterrence of conflicts.

The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a range of options for responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity.

United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance.

-- Cooperative Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century

The Cooperative Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century defines the Maritime Strategic Concept to be one of strategic defense in the spirit of Julian S. Corbett. Corbett's writings and perspectives on Maritime Strategy focused primarily on the strategic defensive instead of the decisive battle or strategic offensive, but he emphasizes within the context of his strategic defense concept that one must go on the offensive at the operational level as opportunity allows.

In The Long War, we observe the major surface combatant fleet and underwater service have taken a posture based on a strategic defense. This defensive posture enables potential competitors to build naval forces that can potentially challenge for Command of the Sea in the future, or build a future maritime environment for Uncommand of the Sea in the spirit of Corbett. This is natural in peacetime when there is strong maritime competition among the nations with the worlds largest economies. With the major war forces operating in a strategic defensive posture, we observe Expeditionary Warfare forces being configured as the offensive force at the operational level, and we also observe this is directly in line with the expeditionary spirit of the new Cooperative Maritime Strategy.

In particular, and by name, we observe the new concepts attributed to Sea Basing emerging as the tip of the spear for the offensive at the operational level in The Long War. What we have not observed is an offensive strategy, including an official definition and requirement for these Sea Basing operational concepts that defines the objectives of the offensive at the operational level.

We believe the importance of expeditionary forces has increased with globalization and due to the current environment of dispersed, well funded violent extreamlism, but in the process we observe the prominence of amphibious assault within the context of expeditionary forces has decreased. The reason for the decrease in prominence of amphibious assault has nothing to do with the requirement for assault from the sea, rather is due to the nature of the offensive being developed at the operational level to fight The Long War. In the Cold War, maritime expeditionary forces were tailored and deployed to deliver major war firepower to perspective enemy forces.

In The Long War, maritime expeditionary forces are being tailored and deployed to deliver soft power to prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises. The forces for offense in The Long War are completely different, they include traditional amphibious platforms for Global Fleet Stations and Afloat Staging Bases, but also introduce new platforms in Humanitarian Ships and Logistics ships supported by other non-combatant forces. The combination of traditional and non-traditional maritime forces form the material resources required for the offensive in The Long War at the operational level. The new force structure for the required operational level offensive explains why amphibious assault has lost its prominence in expeditionary warfare, but it requires a new definition set to explain how amphibious assault forces and Global Fleet Stations are equal offensive concepts at the operational level within a defensive strategy. This graph is a work in progress that we are tinkering with to establish the relationship.

We contend this graph represents Expeditionary Warfare's emerging role within the context of 21st century challenges. At the far right of the curve, we observe a soft power requirement for phase 0 operations being met by the Global Fleet Station and other nontraditional naval deployments like the use of Hospital Ships. Global Fleet Stations, what has been defined within the context of Sea Basing in the past, is a presence mission conceived as an affordable ship for "engagement" operations up and down a coast and as a springboard for humanitarian and small scale military operations.

We have also observed an "at-sea" aspect of expeditionary warfare emerging, which has also been described as Sea Basing, which I have termed using the historical based term "Afloat Staging Base". An example is the system of platforms that helped conduct the pirate operations off the coast of Somalia at the end of last year, and represents a presence mission at sea and into the littoral for the Navy similar to the presence operations on land that Global Fleet Stations provides. We predict that as both concepts evolve, the Afloat Staging Base will become the Sea Based logistics and support for the Global Fleet Station in certain theaters.

As is illustrated by the graph, we see both Global Fleet Stations and Afloat Staging Bases as part of the Strategic Defense Strategy of the US Navy today in the spirit of Corbett, however both also represent the offensive at the operational level aspect in the Long War that Corbett discusses. We see these operational level offensive concepts as on par with other offensive concepts like Amphibious Assault and the proposed Transshipment Dock that General Conway believes is Sea Basing. The major difference of coarse is scale of conflict, from Phase 0 all the way up to and including Major War. We also note that as the line on the graph goes higher, the cost for operations goes up.

Cost creates the largest challenge facing the US Navy and Marines today in developing Expeditionary Warfare for the 21st Century. Major War requirements demand both the Navy and Marines plan and fund the highest requirements, particularly in the budget constrained environment of today. This raises the challenge of finding platforms at very low cost for anything on the right side of the graph, and indeed anything that is high cost contributing to missions on the right side of the graph must contribute to its cost level all the way to the top of the left side of the scale.

We note that the challenge is philosophical as well, the question becomes whether the Navy will invest in the low end of expeditionary warfare to create the capability to influence more regional areas simultaneously for peacemaking, or will they choose to spend the bulk of budget funding on the Transshipment Dock to support the highest end requirement of Expeditionary Warfare for the warfighter. Under a constrained budget, the Navy will not be able to afford both, so it will be interesting to see at what level of war, major war vs soft power, the Navy decides to invest their limited material resources.

This is also why we see a naval humanitarian response to disaster, or a hospital ship deployment, as a means of grabbing the initiative and going on the offensive at the operational level within the Strategic Defensive context of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century. Just as the method and means of war has changed for the Army on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we observe the method and means of war has changed at sea for the Navy as well.

Perspective

I work too much to stay hip on entertainment aspects of the web, specifically anything related to Myspace or Youtube. My wife tells me this is why we have kids. My 12 year old passed this on, which ironically, had me watching and thinking of my two year old.

Shift Happens

Food for thought.