Well That IS Interesting...

Did you check out the line up in July Proceedings yet? Did you read the article published by Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley yet?

Is Tom Ricks right or wrong with this comment?

Pretty near the top they quote Alfred T. Mahan, which seasoned Pentagoners know is a sign that the Navy is getting teed up to get hit long. (This is like when Gorby would quote Lenin, or Marc Antony would praise Julius Caesar.)

Tom Ricks is a CNAS fellow, and those CNAS folks seem to be popping up everywhere these days. For example:

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates today announced the following new members to the Defense Policy Board: Gen. (Ret) Larry Welch, former Air Force chief of staff ; Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations; Richard Danzig, former secretary of the Navy; Robert Gallucci, former assistant secretary of state; Chuck Hagel, former senator from Nebraska; Robert D. Kaplan, Center for a New American Security; Andrew Krepinevich, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Rudy deLeon, former deputy secretary of defense; John Nagl, Center for a New American Security; Sarah Sewall, Harvard University; Wendy Sherman, former special advisor to the President.

These members join the following returning members: John Hamre, chairman; Harold Brown; Adm. (Ret) Vern Clark; J.D. Crouch; Fred Ikle; Gen. (Ret) Jack Keane; Henry Kissinger; Dave McCurdy; Frank Miller; William Perry; James Schlesinger; Marin Strmecki; Vin Weber; Gen. (Ret) Pete Pace.

The Defense Policy Board provides the secretary, deputy secretary and under secretary for policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning matters of defense policy.

That quote about who gets the last laugh applies to Nagl. It also applies to Gates though, and I really appreciate what he is trying to do. A lot of folks believe Gates is trying to fundamentally change the Pentagon to fit a specific mold. That would not be correct, Gates has proven time and time again he is smarter than that, and it would be accurate to say that is exactly what Rumsfeld was trying to do, and couldn't.

Gates is simply trying to break the mold, because he knows once he gets people off the old road and on to the road, then the thinking will start and good things will happen. Once people realize that resisting change is counter productive, they stop fighting change and begin working within the new framework. In big organizations, particularly government, that process forces some of the most experienced and intelligent folks, who had been conformed to yes men, to now become idea men that the organization capitalizes on due primarily to their experience that has largely been suppressed in the ideas shaping the organization up until that point.

It is the Aristotle approach... If you want happiness, go for virtue. If you want change in the DoD, go for shift in direction, any direction will work as a starting point.

Coulda - Shoulda - Woulda - Didn't

A Type 45 article worth reading in full. Love the ending...

Reading for Critical Thinkers

Nightwatch is really good today, top to bottom.

Notes and Links

The blog will look slightly different as of Tuesday. Not much different, but I have been wanting to rearrange some stuff on the right side of the blog and hope to have time to do that Monday night.

In the spirit of some of the Marine Corps discussions I will be having over the next several days, Herschel Smith is discussing the EFV while Colin Clark is discussing the latest drama with the MV-22. The EFV could be cancelled if the Navy developed a littoral strategy that was realistic to actually infiltrating and operating in a contested littoral. Until then, the EFV may live on. As far as the MV-22 is concerned, this looks like a case where we will see a bunch of smoke, and no fire.

Don't Give up the Ships: A Look at a 200-Ship Navy at the Hudson Institute looked like a good time. I'm a huge fan of Eric Labs, so check out Colin Clark's summary of the event but also head to this link and check out Eric Lab's presentation in PPT linked from the Hudson Institute website.

The Coast Guard has a new official blog: The Coast Guard Compass. Update your RSS and bookmarks. When I went to DC back in March, one of my appointments was with LT Anastacia Thorsson who is the personality behind The Coast Guard Compass. I have more on this later.

Did anyone else notice that the House Foreign Affairs Oversight Subcommittee held testimony on efforts being developed to combat maritime piracy at the Massachusetts Maritime Academy on May 28th. I didn't see much attention given to this, which tells me this was a serious effort by Congress to look into the problem.

I thought this was interesting: 10 Shocking Facts About Modern-Day Pirates.

Finally, from the "taxpayer money at work" category: Navy grant to fund probe of squid and octopus camouflage. It actually sounds very interesting to be honest.

The photo above is the first I have seen with the MV-22s all spaced out on the deck of a LHD.

Photo caption: ATLANTIC OCEAN (May 23, 2024) Sailors aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) watch from the conning station as the military sealift command fleet replenishment oiler USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189), center, conducts a replenishment at sea with the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) before Fort McHenry's approach to begin her own connected replenishment with John Lenthall. Fort McHenry is on a scheduled deployment with the Bataan Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) supporting maritime security operations in the U.S. 5th and 6th Fleet areas of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kristopher Wilson/Released)

Military and State Secrets Privilege

Start here, and follow the link most appropriate to you at the bottom of that page when you get there. I thought that was an interesting read.

Monday Notes

In contrast with the scuttlebutt going around regarding the less than flattering approach to bloggers by RADM Thorp at Milbloggers 2009 conference, we have an interview with VADM Harvey on the subject of blogging.

I noted the good news for the Joint Strike Fighter VSTOL version.

"The performance level measured was absolutely exceptional," said J.D. McFarlan, Lockheed Martin F-35 Air Vehicle lead. "We demonstrated 41,100 pounds of vertical thrust against our requirement of 40,550 pounds. This means we will deliver excellent margin for the vertical landing and short takeoff performance we've committed to our STOVL customers," he said.

Now lets hope the jet fighter doesn't burn up flight decks.

Southern Partnership Station = mission accomplished. Story here.

Question. Is this what a peacetime posture looks like in the Indian Ocean, or is this a good thing?

Finally, UNITAS GOLD is the 50th iteration of the longest running multinational maritime training exercise in the world. See the US Order of Battle here. Also check out the photo gallery here.

Photo: ATLANTIC OCEAN (April 23, 2024) -- Ships from eleven countries sail in formation during the photo exercise (PHOTOEX) of UNITAS Gold, the 50th iteration of the annual multinational maritime exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alan Gragg/RELEASED) (Hi-Res)

Two Good Reads

First, backgrounder by Martin Murphy on piracy titled Somali Piracy: Not Just a Naval Problem (PDF)

The highest costs of piracy to Somalia and much of the international community are political not economic. Critically, the problem of piracy in which, as the UN reports, officials at all levels in Puntland are apparently complicit, should not blind the US government to the overriding political objective.3 The problem is to find a workable solution for the underlying political problem rather than mistakenly focusing on the narrower issue of securing sea lanes or protecting merchant shipping. The assault on the Maersk Alabama should spur greater political engagement and not be used as an excuse for reinforcing ultimately futile naval activity.

That is a great backgrounder on Somali piracy. (PDF) I think Martin Murphy nails the issue.

Second, midshipmen Jeffrey Withington takes on Tom Ricks suggestion to do away with the service academies with his very cleverly titled post My Community College Education at the USNI Blog.

What a fantastic title, damn that is funny...

Discussing Asymmetric Maritime Threats

I will be discussing this in detail on Monday. That is a great article, a lot to think about, a lot to discuss.

It got me thinking, if we went with Fred Kaplan's idea to fight piracy, the Japanese would be able to legally kill the folks on the M/V Steve Irwin.

This piracy business is going to get someone from Greenpeace killed. If the Navy doesn't figure out how to address this asymmetric maritime warfare problem at the tactical level, it is going to get a bunch of American sailors killed.

Email From Maersk Alabama: The Maersk Alabama Facts

This email was written by one of the engineers and is firsthand account of events on the Maersk Alabama. The email was sent from the Maersk Alabama to Maersk Arkansas, another USAID ship making the same run. For those who don't know:

ECR - Engine control Room
EDG- Emergency Diesel Generator
MOB- Man overboard boat or rescue boat (small boat with an outboard engine)
E/R- Engine Room

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject: The Maersk Alabama Facts


Hey,

Everyone on here is okay. We're on our way to Mombasa with Navy protection on board. Captain Phillips is still hostage in the lifeboat with the 4 pirates. I hear they're flying out reliefs for everyone, but I'm not sure what all's going to happen once we get to Mombasa . Supposedly the FBI is coming out to investigate the crime. Maybe we'll be on the next CSI Somalia. I wanted to let you know some of the lessons we learned so you guys can better prepare yourselves for something similar. The only guys actually captured by the pirates were on the bridge: Capt, 3/M, and 2 AB's.

I don't really know why they stayed on the bridge until the pirates got up there. Then they had keys to everything and were able to unlock everyone's rooms. The pirates got up to the bridge very quickly once they were onboard. We had a locked cage door over the ladder well from main deck, but it only took a second for them to shoot it off. They then got to the bridge up the outside ladders. By that time we had taken control of the engine and steering down below. Mike stayed in the ECR and the C/M was out on deck tracking the pirates' movement. We kept swinging the rudder side to side.

The pirates' boat capsized, though I'm not sure exactly when or what caused it. After about 20 minutes the engine was killed, I don't know by whom. At that point I shut off the air bottles and Mike killed power. He was also able to get outside and trip the fuel shutoff for the EDG. I think this was critical. The pirates were very reluctant to go into the dark. We will be looking at a way to shut off the EDG from the ECR in the future. All the crew had been mustered and secured in the steering gear. Our pirates didn't have any grenades, so they would have never been able to break in there. The previous day we had welded a padeye on the inside of the hatch to the fantail so it was secured from the inside. The only problem with the steering gear was the heat and the shortage of water.

In the future we will store food and water in various spots for emergency usage. I think we will also run a fresh water line into the steering gear. We were able to make a run from the steering gear to the E/R water fountain and fill up some empty oil sample bottles we had back there. The C/M was also able to get some fruit and sodas from the galley and drop them down the line standpipe. The pirates sent the 3/M unescorted to go look for crewmembers, so he was able to get away.

One of the pirates then went with an AB down to the E/R to look for people. Mike was able to jump him in the dark and we took him prisoner in the steering gear. No one else came down into the E/R. As the day went on the pirates became desperate to get out of there. There boat was sunk, and they couldn't get our ship moving. The Captain talked them into taking the MOB boat. The three remaining pirates went down in the MOB boat with Phillips. We were then able to negotiate with them over the radio. We dropped some food, water and diesel to them. We started getting the plant back on line. Unfortunately, the MOB boat wouldn't start. A couple of guys got in the lifeboat and dropped it. They motored over and traded the lifeboat for the MOB boat. We were supposed to exchange their guy for the Captain, but they ended up keeping him. They motored off in the lifeboat.

They had no way of getting back aboard, so we followed them. The Navy showed up a few hours later. We stayed close by for some time, but then the Navy asked us to head out. I heard that several other pirate vessels were heading our way and the Navy wanted us out of the way. That's about it. I'll give you all the details some other time.

Just to reiterate the most important points:

- Have a well fortified location with food and water supply.
- Kill all the lights. Leave the alarms going, the noise helped cover our movements through the house.
- Flashlights and radios are very handy, as well as the sound-powered phone.

Anyway, it was a pretty stressful situation. I have to say I am impressed with how the entire crew responded. We didn't have anybody who wanted to give up. I'm pretty confident that Phillips will end up ok. They have to know that if they kill him they'll be done. I assume the company will be forced into taking some kind of action to assure our security from now on. Hope everything is going well there.

I'll talk to you later.

CNN is reporting on the email, and reveals the author to be crewman Matt Fisher.

Details of the Maersk Alabama Hijacking

Cmdr. Catellano, the CO of the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96), gives the full accounting of the Maersk Alabama incident from start to finish.

A very interesting article.

Monday Reading

Dr. Martin Murphy specializes in maritime irregular warfare. His Summer 2007 Naval War College Review article Suppression of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, A Suitable Role for a Navy? (PDF) is probably one of the best articles regarding maritime irregular warfare written on the internet. Last week his new book was released called Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism. I haven't read it yet, but would love to hear from anyone that has. This book is #1 on my must read list, previously held by Thomas Ricks The Gamble which I should finish this week.

David Meerman Scott writes a blog called Web Ink Now. I have followed David Meerman Scott for as long as I can remember for my own professional purposes, but I was pleasantly surprised to see he had recently engaged with the US Air Force regarding their social media implementation. His comments are noteworthy:

I was impressed with how deeply the smart people at the Air Force have thought about social media and how quickly they have jumped in. I hope that people from all organizations, particularly executives in large corporations who are often fearful and dismissive of social media, can learn from Colonel Caldwell and the examples here.

There is tons of value in social media for the military services. I have one thing to add though. In my mind anyway, one would expect I am part of the target audience for the Air Force, primarily because I am interested in what they are doing. While I do follow the Air Force Live blog, it is updated so infrequently it doesn't rank very high in my 'must read' category. While the Air Force may know what they want out of social media, it is not clear to me they have fully developed a game plan to get what they want out of it. I also wonder who their target audience is, because it could be that it is not readers here, although that would seem very strange to me. Maybe it is just me, but PACAF Pixels is the most interesting Air Force blog right now. I'm picky though.

This essay titled US Multilateralism: G-2 Must Precede G-20 written by John Komkov at The Bellum: A Stanford Review Blog is a very interesting read. It easily could be the most interesting, thought provoking thing you read about the G-20 conference. Australian PM Kevin Rudd's comment is interesting.

Dr. Steven Metz has some observations from a recent Department of Defense symposium that discussed the future strategic environment twenty years out. In a Small Wars Journal update titled Trends, Threats, and Expectations he came to an interesting conclusion.

This led me to predict at the symposium that 20 years hence, the U.S. Army's role in promoting American security will decline precipitously.

My problem with Dr. Steven Metz's conclusion is that I don't believe he is getting the geography right. This is the core of what led him to his conclusion:

The Army's core function has always been to seize and control territory. That made sense during all of human history to this point since threats were geographic in essence. They arose from an identified place, and if we could control that place, we destroyed or minimized the threat. But if you buy the notion that future threats will not be linked to a particular piece of geography--enemies can mobilize resources and undertake operations from almost anywhere--then seizing and controlling terrain will no longer be the essence of security.

First, I don't buy into the notion that future threats will not be linked to a particular piece of geography even while I agree with him that enemies can mobilize resources and undertake operations from almost anywhere. Anywhere is still somewhere, and somewhere has geography. Clausewitz said "the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows." Even if we are not seizing or controlling territory to hold it, we may seize and control territory to deny it from our enemy. This is not a radical change, but it is subtle. While I don't think Dr. Metz is off by much in his analysis, I do hope someone uses the QDR to rethink how we develop force structures, let me explain.

The New York Times reported last week that the Pentagon was rethinking old doctrine on the 2 war metric for force structure. Sounds good to me, I hate the 1-4-2-1 and 10-30-30 metrics, they never made sense and we never really built our military to support those metrics, as Iraq and Afghanistan have proven.

When I look at ground forces, I note the current Army plan is to have 70 combat brigade combat teams and 212 support brigade combat teams by 2013. The Marines will have about 7 total MEBs, and MEBs are much bigger than BCTs. We currently have 4 Airborne and 2 MEBs (at a time) that are forcible entry. 6 of around 77 of our combat brigades are forcible entry, and only 2 have heavy equipment. That is less than 8% of our total force ready to take action, and the ratio of heavy to light is 1:2.

For context, in WWII the US had 90 total divisions, 13 were Marines and 5 airborne. In other words, during WWII nearly 19% of the total US military force had forcible entry capability, and of that the heavy to light ratio was over 2:1.

I don't care if we have a one war standard, a two war standard, a long war standard, or a total war standard, the fact is, we have a 6 brigade standard for war without allies. In my opinion, that is where the QDR discussion begins for setting strategic expectations for the Army, because if we are going to deliver "well-directed blows" as part of our strategic defense, the Army needs to be more mobile than it is today.

Finally, Captain Cynthia Thebaud, USN, Commodore for Destroyer Squadron 60 aboard the USS Nashville did a bloggers roundtable recently regarding the African Partnership Station. The USNI Blog and David Axe both have good reading up regarding the Navy's activities off West Africa. David Axe is heading that way, so if you have a few dollars to spare, support independent journalism by donating to David Axe for his trip. He will probably be the only member of the media who covers the Navy's soft power engagement to Africa, meaning if you believe in more soft power for Africa, donate.

Photo Caption: PACIFIC OCEAN (March 17, 2024) An SH-60B helicopter stands by on the flight deck of the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) after making an emergency landing due to poor visibility. McCain is one of seven Arleigh Burke-class destroyers assigned to Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 15 and is permanently forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Byron C. Linder/Released)

Norman Polmar on the State of the Navy

A good read.

Two points. I agree with almost everything, but he represents the LPD-17 program as a broken program because the first ship had problems. I disagree, it is stable and the ship is useful. Bashing the ship because of a CAD software error of the contractor doesn't make sense all these years later.

Second, I really like this comment.

The Navy's leadership -- military and civilian -- must develop a reasonable and affordable program that will be saleable to Congress. As important, the program must be articulated properly so that all "players" understand the future importance of naval forces in this uncertain era.

The Navy needs a communication strategy at least as much as it needs a shipbuilding strategy.

Uncertain Transitions

This is a great article. I understand that it is written specifically for newspapers and journalism, but it applies on a larger scale to how technology is changing many aspects of society in ways that make the future uncertain and difficult to prepare for.

The military services are in a period of transition from one era, the cold war, to a post cold war era we know will look different, but we aren't really sure what it will look like. I think this article has application for thinking about the future in that context as well, particularly if we are in an information age fighting information wars.

I believe folks will find this is worth your time.

Future Surface Combatants: A Royal Navy View

A new article was released by the Royal United Services Institute on Thursday titled FUTURE SURFACE COMBATANTS: A Military and Industrial Challenge By Commodore Steve Brunton.

I found it an interesting read on the Royal Navy struggling with challenges that sound very familiar. This is the forward:

Appointed as Director Equipment Capability (Above Water Effect) (DEC AWE) in July 2007, Steve Brunton is the UK MoD’s Director responsible for complex warships and their associated systems. At the RUSI Maritime Conference in June 2008, he set out the future challenge of delivering and sustaining the Future Surface Combatants for the Royal Navy. This article brings his presentation up-to-date and sets out the challenges for the UK MoD, Royal Navy and industry in delivering this essential capability.

Read the article from the link provided here.

Perspective of the Day

CDR Brian Fort, Commanding Officer of USS Gonzalez (DDG 66) weighs in on his blog regarding the accident on the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) and the grounding incident involving the USS Port Royal (CG 72). Why is this a good read?

The Commanding Officer of SAN ANTONIO is a very good shipmate of mine, and I am a former Executive Officer of PORT ROYAL.

Because it's personal. His advice is spot on.

Also check out the GONZALEZ Year in Review - 2008. As far as I know, CDR Fort is running one of the very few CO blogs in the US Navy today, and has been updating it regularly throughout the year.

It is a blog worth keeping an eye on.

Monday Morning Reading

I define stealth on the sea as cover, just as Captain Hughes does. This isn't what I meant, but interesting nonetheless.

Cutting money for defense will not be easy.

Joel at TSSBP will be in my prayers this week. Be sure to remember him in your prayers as well.

Apparently an activist organization called Knitting for Dolphins (R U F-IN KID-N ME!) is against the use of dolphins to protect nuclear powered submarines because it might harm the dolphins or the ecosystem of Washington state. What is interesting is that the activists act like the Navy, who spends a lot of money and time training the dolphins to do this task, is somehow not interested in the well being of the dolphins. It is also noteworthy the apparent harm to the rest of the marine life and ecosystem in the area that would result from a terrorist attack isn't that big a deal. Lex has more.

I'll post more on this in detail... Here comes the MLP!

Picture of the day: PACIFIC OCEAN (Feb. 12, 2009) A P-3C Orion from the "Mad Foxes" of Patrol Squadron Five (VP) 5 patrols as the Seawolf-class submarine USS Seawolf (SSN 21) participates in an under sea warfare exercise involving the John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. The John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group is on a scheduled six-month deployment to the western Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elliott Fabrizio/Released)

Understanding the Moment is Now

Over at the Small Wars Journal they are hosting “Ten Questions with Thomas P.M. Barnett” (PDF) by Mark Safranski regarding his new book Great Powers: America and the World after Bush.

In Chapter 6, you discuss the evolution of the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual in detail and favorably cite such figures as Gen. Wallace, Gen. Mattis, Sarah Sewall and John Nagl. I know that you have been following the ongoing debate over COIN between Col. Nagl and Col. Gian Gentile. How important is this debate and where do you stand?

The debate is crucial because, unless we get off this additive mindset by which we add terrorists on top of regional rogues and then add that mess on top of “near-peer competitors” and then add that mess to undue fears of nuclear proliferation, we will underserve the market that most needs our attention right now—subnational violence. Globalization is simply remapping a lot of fake states out there, so we need to get good at dealing with failed states and insurgencies. When we do, the world will invariably present fewer and fewer locations where transnational terrorists and global insurgents can find sanctuary. The inevitable re-mapped world will be far more easily integrated into the global economy, meeting the needs of the rising great powers of our age. If we manage that process badly, though, eventually those rising great powers will be forced to make those interventions on their own. If that happens it will likely trigger competitive rivalries that will serve nobody’s long-term purposes.

Inside our own military, you want a shift of resources to the small wars world (SysAdmin duties, I call them) away from our big-war Leviathan force, because the more that history forces that mis-equiped big-war force to engage in such activities, the weaker that force becomes and the more it invites rivalry from other great powers. So I argue that a shift to a small-wars focus (not totally, of course, but suitably given the current and future workload staring us in the face) is actually what saves the Leviathan instead of “ruining” it, as some claim.

I want that Leviathan to stay strong and maintain a high barrier to entry to the marketplace called great-power war. I see the current environment, and the workload presented, as endangering this unique asset. Thus, the need to switch sufficient resources to the small-wars crowd. But this notion of keeping our powder dry and playing down our participation in globalization’s advance and the many small-war situations it engenders . . . that, to me, is a dangerously self-fulfilling prophecy—as in, if you want great-power war, then go ahead and ignore your current SysAdmin duties.

So no, it’s not some binary choice but a reasoned balancing that today says, “favor the small-wars crowd. Give them what they need to do the job.

The Navy doesn't have a Col. Nagl or Col. Gian Gentile, or TLC Yingling, or any such mid level officer willing to play the role of the modern A.T. Mahan; which I believe in the 21st century would represent an evangelist advocating a vision that the Navy needs an Economy B force.

I believe one of the great side effects of globalization is how the major interconnected global economies act as a buffer against the tendency towards major power war, much like how MAD theory of nuclear war did the same during the cold war. The debate regarding what Gates means when he says "balance" and what the word means to the Navy is overdue. Balance doesn't mean balancing available budget resources, it means balancing capabilities to meet with the spectrum of challenges facing our nation: both ends of the spectrum. I believe when it comes to the Navy, high intensity conflict will always be more expensive in terms of costs for technology, but low intensity conflict will require a higher cost associated with manpower.

The Navy is in a unique position to wipe the slate clean, and go forward with a new force structure and a new approach to solving 21st century problems at both the low and high end of conflict beginning in FY 2010. Will they seize the moment?

Great Powers: America and the World after Bush is the book for people looking to understand why now is the moment to inject a grand vision into our nations future. America is a great country, we should be seeking to prove it again and again.

Great Powers: America and the World After Bush

I have only one perk as a blogger, people tend to send me their books. I intend to do a book review at the year end of the blog (June) of the various books I’ve been sent or have read over the past year. It is kind of a cool perk actually, I love reading and sometimes I end up reading a really interesting book that is otherwise obscure. Of the many, one book I've read in the last year really resonated with me though.

I really don't know how Thomas Barnett does it, but he has a way of taking complexity and making it both interesting and easy to understand, and as a fan of history I absolutely loved this book. I've been waiting for the release, which was officially yesterday, because there are many aspects of the book I want to discuss in context of the naval discussions usually found here.

Great Powers: America and the World After Bush is the book for those who want to learn what thinking strategic means. It is quite unconventional, and that is what makes it excellent. A must read in uncertain times.

This book will be discussed quite a bit on the blog in the near future.

The British Military at a Crossroads

The Economist has a really important article on the state of the military in Great Britain, Britain's Armed Forces, Losing Their Way describes a military at the crossroads of history, with choices over the near term determining the long term standing of Great Britain regarding where they intend to be in the world.

British forces have been at war for the past seven years. But it is only recently that, following the example of American parades, the public has been encouraged to honour them. Such displays are a surprise to many soldiers who, for decades, were largely hidden from view in Britain, coming out of their barracks in civvies in order to avoid attack by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Television documentaries and a quick-fire burst of books with titles such as “3 Para: Afghanistan, Summer 2006. This is War” have also publicised the deeds of Britain’s fighting men and women. Despite the qualms about Iraq and Afghanistan, and instances of soldiers being abused, support for the troops is high. According to an Ipsos MORI poll published in November, 81% of Britons regard them favourably; most agree with their prime minister, Gordon Brown, that Britain’s armed forces are “the best in the world”.

But are they? For all the public recognition, the armed services are going through unusually difficult times. This is challenging Britain’s belief in itself as a fighting nation with an important role in the world. The severe strain of waging two wars in faraway countries has been aggravated by undermanning and equipment shortages. More serious still is a new mood of self-doubt. The invasion of Iraq was controversial and its occupation inglorious; the campaign in Afghanistan is going badly. British commanders have belatedly realised that they have much to learn, or rather relearn, about fighting small wars in distant lands. “We have lost our way,” says one general.

Read the whole thing.

Five Good Reads on Friday

Admiral Stavridis has a Fourth Fleet review on his blog worth a look. I am particularly impressed with the statistics given regarding Continuing Promise 2008.

I've been wanting to post a link to William S. Lind's On War #285 for at least a month now. If you read it, you may find it to be one of the most thought provoking things you read today.

Eagleone highlights China Plays maritime chess from the Japan Times Online.

Observing the details of the 26 MEU and CTF-151, even as USS San Antonio (LPD 17) acts like a CTF-150 ship. Meanwhile, CTF-152 gets a new warship.

I've talked about evangelists on the blog. The Navy doesn't have one, but I think the Army does. I think Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling is like a young 21st century version of A.T. Mahan. Thomas Ricks has Yingling's latest open discussion sure to remind the Army why he is both an asset, and a threat... just how Mahan was seen when he was seeking instatutional change in the Navy over a century ago.

GULF OF ADEN (Jan. 17, 2009) An HH-60H Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the "Tridents" of Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron (HS) 3 takes off from the amphibious transport dock ship USS San Antonio (LPD) 17 during a vertical replenishment with the Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199). San Antonio is the flagship of Combined Task Force 151, a multinational task force established to conduct counter-piracy operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class John K. Hamilton/Released)