Peacemaking: The High Seas Gunfight

In the missile age, it is noteworthy that with the exception of a single torpedo attack - we continue to see a series of gunfights of various natures define military combat at sea. Navy Times reported yesterday that just two weeks ago, the US Coast Guard engaged in one such firefight.

A boarding team from the medium endurance cutter Escanaba got in a shootout with suspected drug smugglers while attempting to board a vessel in international waters near the coast of Nicaragua Sept. 14, the service said in a statement.

The Coast Guardsmen were perusing a go-fast vessel in Escanaba’s over-the-horizon small boat and were closing in when the suspects began shooting at the team. The Escanaba’s crew members immediately returned fire while the coxswain began evasive maneuvering and continued the chase, according to the Coast Guard statement.

The suspected smugglers then entered Nicaraguan waters, and the boarding team lost contact with them.

The USCGC Escanaba (WMEC 907) seized 963 pounds of cocaine that was jettisoned from a vessel 21 miles south of Providencia, Colombia on Sept. 17, 2010 - just three days after this incident. In that incident, the suspects beached their vessel and fled on foot, evading capture.

There is a huge human centric training discussion in the action described by Navy Times that I am skipping - not because I don't recognize it exists, rather because I think the US Coast Guard actions in this case once again verifies my belief that our people are well trained to react to this situation appropriately.

But the question is do we equip them right? My favorite piece of the often maligned Deepwater Program isn't any of the aircraft or cutter programs, rather the Coast Guard's Long Range Interceptor & Short Range Prosecutor programs. I have no information regarding the specific equipment the Coast Guard is purchasing as part of these programs, but at the conceptual level I appreciate the value the Coast Guard is placing on these systems - and in my opinion, the Navy does not have a good reason not to be making a similar focus on small deployable manned boats.

It is important to note the nature of operations has not changed - but what has changed is the frequency in which maritime security operations is putting small boats of navy and coast guard personnel in close proximity to small boats with armed men. For example, yesterday it appears that Turkey became the latest nation to position their warships right off the coast of some piracy port in Somalia to intercept pirates as they departed for the sea. That operation looks very similar to what the FSD De Grasse (D 612) was doing off the Somalia coast a few weeks ago.

In all of these cases we continue to find maritime security operations using small boats - sometimes with helicopter assistance and sometimes not - in situations where a deadly gunfight can break out. Within the context of the emerging irregular warfare threat matrix to be faced by naval and coast guard forces in the maritime domain - are we putting our people in the best position to insure their safety during small boat operations?

In the context of daily activity, I think it is pretty obvious small boat operations during daily Maritime Security Operations is where our people are the most vulnerable - and the necessity to protect people becomes an even bigger challenge when our naval ships intended to specifically address the MSO function (like LCS is expected to do) are being fielded with smaller crews, because the loss of even a single sailor has greater impact to the operation of a ship.

There is a school of thought that argues unmanned surface vessels represent the solution to these issues. I don't believe that is true, and a focus on unmanned technologies would be a distraction in understanding the value of more capable small manned deployable boats.

Unmanned vessels can give naval forces at the small boat level a higher level of warfighting capability - but must do this at the cost of greater peacemaking capabilities at sea. An unmanned small boat takes up the space of a manned vessel, and when most of the activities of small boat operations require a human touch, you lose capability with an unmanned technology.

For example, how does a robot help with this problem - or put another way, how much worse would this situation have been had the US Navy been using an unmanned small boat instead of a manned small boat?

Thirteen people aboard a skiff drowned Monday in the Gulf of Aden as the crew of the U.S. destroyer Winston S. Churchill attempted to assist the disabled vessel, a military statement said.

The skiff was found drifting in a Gulf shipping corridor on Sunday.

When U.S. Navy personnel couldn't repair its engine, the ship was towed toward the coast of Somalia and assistance was offered to the 85 people on board -- 10 Somalis and 75 Ethiopians.

"While transferring humanitarian supplies to the skiff, the passengers rushed to one side and the skiff began taking on water, quickly capsizing and sinking rapidly, leaving all 85 passengers in the water," according to the U.S. Navy.

The Navy said the destroyer crew immediately began search and rescue operations. Thirteen passengers drowned and eight were missing, the Navy said. Sixty-one passengers were rescued.

Unless the small unmanned surface vessel has a gun that can shoot lifeboats and flotation devices from its stern, you have sacrificed capability by replacing a small manned craft with an unmanned vehicle.

This discussion goes to the nature of warfare evolving in the 21st century. A few observations:

Naval surface vessels are trending toward gun warfare in the 21st century. Naval surface vessels represent the only human peacemaking capability at sea - underwater and aviation capabilities can not substitute in the primary functions of peacemaking, even as the greatly contribute to the battlespace awareness in peacemaking. Peacemaking is a primarily human activity.

Naval surface vessels are the most vulnerable vessels in warfighting. Naval warfare has not changed since WWII, warfighting in the missile age at sea is still primarily done by aircraft and submarines. Warfighting is a primarily technological activity.

So I ask again... when looking at the activities our forces, do we equip our people in a way that aligns activity with capability? When I look at programs like the Littoral Combat Ship and think about what kind of Coast Guard cutters we need in the 21st century, I'm not always convinced we are aligning our technology choices with activities as well as we could be.

Navy Down Ten Commands

If the US Navy loses 10 vessels and 10 commands, does anyone in the US Navy really care? If it is the Cyclone class PC boats, in an honest moment - I don't think folks in the Navy think it is a big deal.

The Navy is pulling its entire fleet of coastal patrol ships from service, including the five forward-deployed to the Persian Gulf, to repair hull cracks and other damage associated with long service and hard use, Navy Times has learned.

Inspections turned up “significant structural damage” to the PC fleet, and “all vessels have experienced frame buckling and damage to the hull. Corrosion is also evident,” said an announcement by Chris Johnson, a spokesman for Naval Sea Systems Command.

The ships, which entered service in the early 1990s, are past their service lives, and engineers are worried about their ability to handle the full range of speeds and sea states for which they were originally designed, Johnson said.

Is it a big deal? Yes. It is. The case for saying it is a big deal is not easy to make though, because it begins with ones position on how important one believes PCs are to a blue water power projection Navy. The Navy gives a lot of lip service to the respect they have for the danger that small boats can present in a combat situation, but the truth is the respect is based on potential dangers that largely are not respected as realistic. I honestly believe that part of the reason the US Navy doesn't have a high opinion of the capabilities of small vessels is that the US Navy only operates small vessels in specific situations where the requirement is absolute - like the Cyclones that are forward deployed to the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps I am naive, but I strongly believe there is a role for small combatants in the US Navy. I am not sure the Cyclones are the best example, indeed they might be the worst example, but even as expensive, lightly armed PCs they have played a critical role for the US Navy in Operation Iraqi Freedom. They were also found as necessary when the capability wasn't available and needed. Again, while the PCs may not be the best example, I still strongly believe that if the US Navy put more support behind smaller combatants there would be two notable benefits to the fleet at large - more command experience at sea and more creativity among those with more command at sea. Nothing personal to most SWOs, but I find the folks who have had command of PCs at LCDR are a little more out of the box than those who never held those commands. The experience matters.

A few points. First, I am very skeptical of the idea that the Navy can throw a few million at the Cyclone hull fatigue problem and get the Cyclones back in business. Given the way we have seen the Navy treat the big cruisers and destroyers the last few years, and the cultural disdain for small craft like PCs from big Navy, I have a feeling that once someone takes a closer look we are going to see bigger problems than has been reported. The Coast Guard thought it was a quick patch and plug job for their 110s too. That didn't turn out well, and I have serious doubt this will either.

For a few years we have discussed that the Navy is due a PC replacement program. Well, nothing ever came of it and a life extension for the small craft was chosen as the best course ahead before these new problems popped up. Down 10 hulls, it is fair to highlight that plan didn't work out - and also raises questions if the Navy could rapidly field small vessels in wartime when right now it is unlikely they could rapidly field Cyclone replacements even if the Navy wanted to. That last is one of my main concerns with the Navy in general - the current Navy leadership doesn't really believe in a "PLAN B" when it comes to shipbuilding, so if the US ever needs to build new ships to counter an emerging threat, the cupboard is remarkably bare with very limited options.

What To Do?

First, the Navy should do their patch job on the hulls and sell (or give) the Cyclones to a partner. The Cyclones are very expensive to operate and were never a good fit for the US Navy.

Second, the Navy should buy a replacement sooner rather than later. Don't get me wrong, I love the Baynunah class, Hamina class, Armidale class, and even the Visby class - but I'm not convinced that is the right direction. As much as it pains me to say this, the US Navy doesn't really need a PC and doesn't really need a corvette either - what they really could use are more JHSVs.

I've been giving a lot of thought to something reported back in February of this year - an interview by Chris Cavas of Bob Work discussing Cyclone replacements. Recall the quotes:

There was a big debate within the department on patrol craft, PCs. People said these are very good for irregular warfare. But when we looked at it we said we wanted to have self-deployable platforms that have a lot of payload space that you can take to the fight whatever you need - SEALs, Marines, [a] Riverine squadron. So we decided to increase the Joint High Speed Vessel program, at the same time SLEPing [service life extension program] the 13 PCs we have, so they're going to be with us well into the 2020s. But the Joint High Speed Vessels will take over for them, because we like their self-deployability aspects - they can be a sea base, they can be an Africa Partnership Station, they're extremely flexible.

At the time this was said - I hated the idea. Now that I have had some time to think about it, I really like this idea. This wouldn't be the same JHSVs the Navy is currently buying, but they would be similar. These would be armed with stabilized cannons, RAM, and operate UAVs while acting as a RHIB mothership, not to mention carry a bunch of other capabilities inside a high speed vessel with a helo deck. They would be designed to carry larger numbers of people at the expense of the large cargo payloads of the MSC JHSV variants, but instead of the unmanned high speed mothership model the LCS is supposed to be, this would be more of a manned capability. Put your Force Recon on one of those and go hunt pirates.

To me, that type of platform enables a truly dynamic joint sea basing capability for maritime security operations that frigates, Littoral Combat Ships, PCs, and corvettes simply cannot deliver in the 21st century; and enables delivery of the desired capabilities we want in forward operating environments in the 21st century.

So speaking for me - I'd like to this version of the JHSV get bumped up in priority to meet the need of replacing the PCs sooner than later, and see the Navy sell off (or give away) the PCs sooner than later. Indeed, when Lockheed Martin is announced the LCS winner - perhaps the US Navy can hold off an Austal GAO challenge by moving forward on navalized JHSVs sooner.

Making the Most of Small Ships: Leveraging Distributed Firepower

There appears to be a slow, but growing recognition in the defense establishment of present fiscal realities and the problems with continuing to procure exquisitely capable and expensive platforms. In the words of the VCJCS, “wake up, you’re not going to have 300, 500 ships...” Inevitably, if the US Navy is to remain our country’s premier armed force for projecting power globally while maintaining a wide variety of dispersed theater engagement missions, it will have to build a larger quantity of less expensive surface vessels to complement high end platforms such as destroyers and cruisers. [LCS cost vs. capability has been covered extensively in other places, so I won't go there...]

Coastal patrol vessels are ideal for working closely and persistently with smaller navies and coast guards - much more so than a multibillion dollar destroyer. Some will argue these ships are fine for today’s irregular conflicts but will be helpless in a major naval battle. Most advocates of this sort of force structure have accepted that reality, but counter that small ships are still necessary for today’s operations. However, we shouldn't have to take conventional wisdom at face value. In other words, we can give coastal ships (think Cyclone Class+) utility across the spectrum of operations from theater security cooperation with developing coastal nations, to maritime security operations, to support of major combat operations against the naval forces of a regional power. How could a balanced USN force structure employ numerous green water vessels against an ostensibly more powerful naval force?

The answer is to leverage distributed firepower. Special operations forces get this concept, probably more so than any other military community. I’ve heard special forces friends say they’d rather fight with a laser than a gun; meaning that they can engage the enemy at longer (i.e., safer) ranges and apply more firepower by laser designating targets for destruction by air than they can using their organic team weapons. Early in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, widely dispersed, small teams of SOF destroyed vastly larger ground forces, including mechanized armor and heavily entrenched ground formations, by controlling air power. JTACs were a valuable, but scarce commodity for ground forces, especially conventional forces. Today, they are more common, but still in short supply. Outside of ANGLICO and NSW, navy JTACs are virtually non-existent. Yes, larger combatants have personnel trained to control aircraft, but they don’t have the capability or training to visually designate surface and ground targets for destruction by airpower.

Although smaller and more numerous surface vessels will be essential to future littoral operations, air power and other fires called in from over the horizon will be the critical enabler of success. Smaller surface ships and combat craft must have the ability to designate and control air power to destroy targets. This airpower need not be limited to tacair from carriers or land bases, but should include larger numbers of sea and land based armed UAVs. Additionally, over the horizon, ship (or even sub) based surface to surface missiles could be employed in this manner. Along those lines, DARPA has programmed RTD&E money for the LRASM-B missile with an IOC of FY15. In addition to closing an expanding sea control gap, this VLS-launched, supersonic, stealthy, 200 km missile could be further enhanced by enabling OTH targeting from forward-engaged green water combatants. Pairing several green water vessels patrolling near shore with a large surface combatant 100 miles in the rear would create an extremely powerful tool for littoral combat.

Fleets of small, fast patrol craft and larger coastal patrol vessels leveraging fire power from distant air and surface forces would greatly complicate an enemy’s targeting problem. That said, ships without air defense systems are clearly more vulnerable to enemy air power than an aegis combatant. However, speed, size, and maneuverability will assist in avoiding enemy airpower while larger numbers of coastal craft can operate under the umbrella of air defense provided by an aegis combatant operating over the horizon. SOF use a system called ROVER to view real time imagery from manned and unmanned aircraft, share data, and designate targets. Introducing this system and complementary laser designators to the fleet would exponentially amplify the USN’s ability to engage hostile vessels, from FACs to frigates.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

What is Green Water?

Advocates of building out a balanced force structure consisting of larger numbers of smaller, shallow draft ships to complement a smaller number of higher end surface combatants often use the term "green water" to characterize the environment where a smaller vessel capability would operate. But what does green water really mean? During a recent CSBA workshop on maritime irregular warfare, a lively debate ensued on this issue, without much consensus.

The NOC delineates three categories which one might assume are included to help differentiate operating environments and steer the range of capabilities that might be required by naval forces in those areas:

"Blue water refers to the open ocean; green water refers to coastal waters, ports and harbors; and brown water refers to navigable rivers and their estuaries." The distinction is important, not just from an operating paradigm, but in relation to the spectrum of future (and current) naval force structures.

An advocate of exclusively high end ships would be quick to point out that large combatants are equally capable of operating in coastal waters. Which of course is true, as deep draft cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships frequently perform missions in areas near the OPLATs in the Northern Arabian Gulf or within sight of land off various third world coasts. Because blue water ships are capable of operating in coastal areas, one will frequently hear the argument that a force of less green water ships to complement multi-mission blue water ships isn't required.

Balanced force "green water" evangelists must challenge this logic. In an effort further the discourse, let me suggest a new definition for consideration: green water is a maritime environment in which a large naval vessel is unable to perform effectively due to any number of operational constraints. These reasons could include, but are not limited to:

Draft - The most obvious limitation of large ships in coastal areas is hydrography. For example, the LCS' 15 foot draft opens up the number of ports that the Navy can access globally from 362 to 1,111. Extrapolated from the number ports to actual of square miles of acessible waterspace, a 15-20 feet less draft makes a considerable impact and a sub-10 foot draft exponentially more so. As much as we may want to relive the glory days of WWII and Cold War naval operations, the more likely scenario is that current and future operations and conflicts will occur in the littorals. The ability to operate in nearly every square meter of water is an imperative to exercising US sea power globally.

Partner Force Overmatch - When working with nascent navies, employing billion dollar vessels that in some cases represents a significant percentage of a partner nation's GDP makes little sense. At best, utilizing larger surface combatants even in exercise roles can be patronizing or intimidating. Small navies more readily identify with vessels that are actually within the realm of the possible for them to procure, operate, and maintain.

Sovereignity Considerations - In a scenario where the US Navy operationally supports a partner nation in a FID role in coastal waters, the host nation would probably like to minimize the perception of US involvement. Large, overtly-US ships conducting MSO or other missions inside territorial waters may create a sense of illegitimacy toward the host-nation government. Ironically, the same constraint applies even to HA/DR operations in situations where host government control is tenuous. Deploying our large blue-water hospital ships in such an environment isn't advisable if a lower profile vessel with adequate medical capability is available.

Enemy Decision Cycle - In an hybrid warfare environment, a stateless enemy with only a handful of higher end, state-provided, sea denial capabilities such as anti-ship cruise missiles will likely choose his targets carefully to maximize impact at a minimal cost. A capital surface combatant off the coast makes a more tempting and high profile target than a larger number of smaller green water combatants.

Vulnerability to Sea Denial Threats - Although losing the initiative in naval warfare is always tactically unwise; recent history, culture, and ROE leads one to the conclusion that US surface ships usually take the first hit upon initiation of hostilities at sea. Given this probability, smaller, less expensive vessels should be stationed closer to shore than large ships where land-based enemy sea denial threats such as ASCMs, FAC swarm attacks, mines, or any combination of those may be expected. Although unpleasant to think about, the loss of a billion+ dollar combatant and hundreds of Sailors is much less palatable to the American people than a couple dozen Sailors and a sub-one hundred million dollar vessel. The oft-heard counter-argument is that larger ships are more survivable than smaller ships; in future posts, we'll explore that contention in more detail.

The above green water definition is admittedly imperfect; however the debate of high end only versus balanced force must take into account non-traditional constraints to blue water ship operations in the littorals. A corollary of this definition that favors maintenance of a robust force of large combatants is that smaller vessels are often unable to operate independently for any duration in "blue water" due to considerations such as range or sea state. Clearly a properly balanced blue/green/brown water naval force is in order to deal with the full range of operating environments.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Maritime Insurgents and Global Oil Disruption

While all eyes are focused on the oil pouring into the Gulf of Mexico, across the Atlantic, potentially more devastating spills threaten the Nigerian Delta. The MEND has resumed attacks on oil companies and is wreaking its own brand of ecological and economic warfare against the Nigerian government and the world's energy supplies. MEND's guerilla tactics against oil production include a combination of piracy and kidnapping on deepwater rigs, sabotage against coastal pipelines, and direct attacks on facilities. In 2009, 51 oil workers from Shell were kidnapped for ransom, an increase from 11 in 2008.

As can be expected in modern globalized insurgencies, additional groups with diverse motives and tactics have entered the fray against oil production in Nigeria. In the future one might expect the MEND to import additional tactics from other movements, including waterborne IEDs. And by the way, the US imports more oil from Nigeria than Saudi Arabia.

If tasked, would the US Navy be prepared to deal with this sort of problem? Are current force structure, training, and TTPs ready for a maritime-focused insurgency?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Seapower and Small Wars

Small Wars Journal has an article up today titled Rebooting the Discussion of Air Power and Small Wars by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong. It is an interesting read.

The Navy could use several articles on a Discussion of Sea Power and Small Wars. I'll help any officer with research or collaboration looking to write articles forwarding these types of discussions, and no credit is necessary for the help.

Tamil Tigers Use Small Boat Attacks

Small-craft protection will be critical not only for self-defense but as escort capability for navies wishing to operate near 'hot' coastlines. Providing more evidence of this, Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers attacked two freighters with 'suicide boats' on Wednesday, according to Reuters:

The navy said it fired on three LTTE boats that tried ram the freighters Nimalawa and Ruhuna. Two rebel boats exploded, the third capsized and six Tigers were killed, the navy said.

The ability to swarm combatants and other ships with small boats means that whatever weapon system used to combat them must be able to put out volume fires cheaply without incurring too large a logistics penalty for reconstitution - in other words, full-up VLS rounds are out. As Galrahn and others have said here, crewed small mounts (and regular training) are probably the cheapest and quickest answer to this problem. Dedicated CIWS modes are another. If we have to have electromagnetic weapons, it would be interesting to see if one can be devised that interferes with small, cheap electronic ignitions like those used in compact outboard motors. (File photo of LTTE boat from Sri Lankan MOD via lankalibrary.com)

Observing The M-80 Stiletto OPEVAL

So what did SOUTHCOM do with its Skyship 600 leased from Airship Management Services of Greenwich, Conn.? According to a recent article in Defense Daily (subscription) by Geoff Fein, the airship has been part of a six-week test mission between Florida's southern coast and Cuba as part of the OPEVAL of the M-80 Stiletto to deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in the JIATF South area of operations.

The craft, built by San Diego-based M Ship Co., underwent OPEVAL this past summer. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducted the OPEVAL, and it included participation from the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, U.S. Coast Guard, the Army and U.S. Army South (USARSO), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and a representative from Colombia.

In September, SAIC [SAI] prepared a 72-page after action report outlining the findings of the OPEVAL, test objectives, operational issues and recommendations.

The 80-foot long Stiletto, with its unique double M-hull configuration, was developed as a test bed for new systems and technologies, ranging from unmanned surface and aerial systems as well as Augmented Reality Visualization of the Common Operational Picture (ARVCOP), built by Maine-based Technology Systems Inc.

This article is brilliantly written for those like me interested in new technologies like the M-80. The article reads like the story of a platform earning its reputation.

"During operations in the Florida Straits, Stiletto was responsible for the interdiction and apprehension of a suspicious vessel that was identified by the [Coast Guard] as a target of interest," the report said.

Stiletto's speed and ability to keep up with a go-fast boat, even pursuing it into shallow waters, proved critical for mission success, according to the SAIC report.

There is a lot of interesting material here. Essentially the airship ends up being the aviation surveillance piece directing the fast M-80 as a maritime interceptor going after "targets of interest." The article goes on to note "Stiletto's OPEVAL was successful" but "many of the participants, according to the report, believed that ship's impact could have been much more significant if several limiting factors had been mitigated."

"These factors included the fact that Stiletto was restricted to operate in international waters where the weather and sea state conditions were unfavorable; limitations of Stiletto's communications and surveillance systems, including lack of secure chat and data access, problems with voice satellite communications (SATCOMs) when Stiletto was port side, and a commercial-grade radar that was ill-equipped to identify targets of interest; and maintenance problems with Stiletto and its rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) among others.," the report stated.

Put another way, the high sea state and weather conditions issue makes the case that these platforms need a mothership for support, either in the form of a well deck or a smart dock. The advantage of this would allow the M-80 to remain sustained in forward theaters, manage weather and sea variables encountered in forward operating environments, and otherwise better sustain crew support, platform repair capacity, and extend operations beyond a land base while putting the ship in the operation zone for a longer duration. In other words, this ship needs a sea base, highlighting once again that sea basing is a strategic concept beyond the tactical capability to land Marines on a beach.

The ship also appears to need better technology for better communications integration, and a new RHIB to for its boarding parties.

Information Dissemination was able to obtain a copy of the 72-page after action report that Geoff Fein discussed in his article. The report is labeled Unclassified / FOUO. I've given some thought about this, and I have decided to post on it while being selective regarding the content. Some will say I shouldn't post any of it, and others would say I should post the whole thing. Here is my contribution to that discussion.

The blogosphere is where ideas are disseminated and shared after being born elsewhere, and I believe this blog is a public place for responsible debate and discussion about maritime issues. I believe the content below contributes to the public knowledge in a number of ways to the industry, academic, strategic, tactical, and political folks who read this blog, and serve a benefit for understanding to the public at large in understanding the challenges of small ships in an emerging 4GW environment. I don't see the content posted below as any more of an information loss than what is found here. Tonight, for the 19th time, someone asked for this PPT presentation for use in a training evolution, serving as a reminder the blog continues to serve a serious purpose for our uniformed men and women of the Navy beyond the simplistic function of your entertainment and my education. I believe the content added below contributes to the discussion without risk. With that said...

The report cites "themes" that emerged in the development of the OPEVAL report.

• The importance of using Stiletto in a more appropriate (littoral) environment
• Deploying on Stiletto was a good experience and most interviewees stated that they would deploy on Stiletto again
• The RHIB requires extensive modifications or replacement
• The deployment in itself was a major success

There is a comment early in the conclusions that I think it worth mentioning, because this is something that comes off very obvious whenever we begin talking about the quality of work observed coming from SOUTHCOM. While this might be specific to the OPEVAL of the Stiletto specifically, I think it reflects something right taking place down in SOUTHCOM bigger than a single OPEVAL, at least in the opinion of this observer.

• Most participants commented on the fact that the OPEVAL was organized, planned and successfully executed in a very short period of time. The following quotation is representative of the feedback received regarding the OPEVAL, “commands were able to throw together three teams from different pots and deploy them in a short time; and everyone got down there, joined together and made one team. This was the success. No one got hurt, and nobody got in trouble.”

When evaluating new platforms, this blog author evaluates from the position of people, ideas, then platform. As such we focus in on the issues regarding people first, the ideas that went into operation, then finally the platform itself.

Based on the reports findings, there were problems with the training process, some of which appear due to equipment failure. The lists below are partial.

• At the start of the deployment, there was only one person with more than two weeks of training with Stiletto (Stiletto civilian technician).
• Typically when training commences, the vessel(s) are prepared; however Stiletto and her RHIB were not ready / available for training when the time came.
• The crew was given three weeks to train prior to the deployment, which included time for team integration training. However Stiletto and RHIB maintenance issues, and heightened sea state, consumed most of the allotted training time.
• The crew did not receive proper or adequate training, and integration training did not occur until they had arrived in Colombia. The 1st official training was toward the end of the deployment to prepare for the DVs visit.
  

The report also gives a lot of credit to the Army personnel by Fort Eustis, noting the "Army has a long history of training high-speed craft crews." Indeed, this was an interesting note in the details. I'll let John or Brad carry this football.

• The Army typically employs small crews, though the Navy might have 20 guys in a crew. In the Army, there are typically only two rates: deck-side rate or engineer; the Navy uses many other rates. On an Army vessel, anything that needs to be done deckside, the deck personnel do it; same for engine side. Army personnel subsequently have a broader spectrum of training, and they are used to working in small crews. There are not as many problems of a crew with six or so; can still get the job done.

This was also an interesting detail, an issue we need to get right as we move ships with small crews into the littoral. Any desk jockey whose experience is sailing the deep blue that gives a LCS CO shit for the handling of a ship in 10 meters of water needs an asskicking. I get the feeling the future desk jockey I'm talking about was somewhere in this process.

• There were multiple reports of uncertainty with regards to whom the team should provide feedback to, and who to turn to for support. As one example it was reported that “there were times we wanted to make tactical recommendations” for Stiletto missions. The team would email one agency and then later learn that the agency was not informing others with OPCON and TACON authority. Additionally others reported that some within a particular agency were not receptive to the feedback the crews were providing.

If this wasn't so common in just about everything new, I'd probably make a deal of it. Truth is, this happens every time you do something for the first time. This is the kind of thing that gets sorted out with ownership of a program. Like I said above, the focus stays on the people.

• During the beginning of the deployment, the sea state was too rough for the quick transit that Stiletto had expected. Another person explained why the rough sea state impacted the crew: “in that environment [Stiletto] can’t go fast without wearing on combat effectiveness.”
• Crew sustainability, due to the rough sea state, was limited. One person explained that, “when Stiletto is at high speed (40+ kts), it is not cutting through the water, it is hitting the water very hard. This is tough on the crew and fatigue was a real killer.” Another person explained the impact constant vibration had on the crew: “vibration and movement of the ship was very rough on the crew. After constant battery, the body gets tired. And once a person gets tired or exhausted, you begin to break into and cut down on endurance - and then it is a down-ward spiral.”
• The crew had an “abnormally high rate” of sea sickness. While some sea sickness is to be expected, the crew members were all maritime veterans and most of them experienced sea sickness during this deployment. One person suggested that employing a simulated horizon device in the galleys may be effective at combating sea sickness in those passengers riding below the bridge.
• The crew reported that they had a contract technician on the boat, who “did everything in the world to keep up with the boat.” Another person explained that the technician did not ride onboard Stiletto during missions, but that he could be reached via cell phone to assist. Additionally once Stiletto docked, the technician provided any “on-the-spot repair services” that were needed. Another individual said that the technician provided guidance on fixing issues, but not actual support.
• Several individuals explained that there must be more discussion about the role of the technician, who acted as an advisor. It was suggested that one area that could be reviewed is how engaged mariners should be in Stiletto maintenance. While there were never any problems during the deployment, there were conflicting viewpoints at certain times.
  

The report goes on to note some injuries occurred during operations of the ship, mostly contributed to rough seas and the RHIB that nobody was happy with.

Just as important are the ideas behind using the Stiletto.

• All explained that while Stiletto was not able to participate in any interdiction opportunities in the Colombian area, if Stiletto was employed in an area with littoral waters - that would be the prime location to be most effective. This was evidenced by Stiletto’s involvement in an interdiction in the Florida Straits. As one individual stated, “two days in the right area is better than 45 days in the wrong environment.” Many individuals suggested new locations to include the Bahamas, Florida Straits, and areas surrounding Cuba, northern Antilles and Puerto Rico. Each of these areas offers a lower sea state, and provides a prime environment for targeting suspected drug traffickers.
• All interviewees explained that Stiletto should not be used as a patrolling vessel; rather Stiletto should be used for response and intelligence queuing only. One person explained that Stiletto should “be used like a sniper rifle or missile” i.e., aimed at a specific target rather than patrolling.
• Several interviewees explained that it would be good to add additional port stops or ports to a future Stiletto deployment. Adding additional stops would require extra logistics support, but many agreed it would be worth it for several reasons including ability to replace/exchange crew members, provide multiple opportunities for crew rest, potential opportunity to work with new partners etc.
• Several interviewees explained that for Stiletto be an effective vessel, she must have ballistic protection and an organic weapons and/or defense capability, or at the very least her current on-board weapons and sensor systems must be expanded. Though these factors have drawbacks such as additional weight and issue of who has authorization to control weapons, it was agreed this is imperative.
• Multiple interviewees agreed that Stiletto must be able to deploy for several days at a time, rather than just for eight hours at a time. In order to be self-sufficient for several days, this would require additional changes such as: berthing, a mess facility, and the ability to refuel at sea which could be facilitated by moving the refueling location from the starboard side to a more accessible location on the vessel.
• All agreed Stiletto’s communication suite must be upgraded to include, at a minimum, more secure SATCOMs, a secure fax, and ideally secure chat. It was imperative to many that Stiletto must have a SIPR terminal if she is to be an effective node in the counter-narcotics environment.
• Many recommended that the radar onboard Stiletto be updated to a “better” radar package; Stiletto must have military grade radar on board, and not one used by commercial fisherman. One person suggested the best method of finding the most appropriate radar is to “take a look at the operational environment and pick the radar that works best in that particular environment.”
• Many agreed that Stiletto should be more light-weight, and a common recommendation was to purchase a new more lightweight RHIB. An additional recommendation was to utilize, in the future, a multi-task crew or for the crew to hold multiple roles in order to reduce the forward footprint

The report cites a recommendation to add a UAV in addition to the radar system, and improve the platform for night operations with a number of recommendations. Since Stiletto was only able to operate in 8 hour intervals, it could be argued the night-ops upgrades were not necessary for this operational test.

The report concentrates on three areas where I've decided not to quote much information. The first is the specific electronics and technology issues the Stiletto faced during its operational test. This is cited throughout the report as a major limitation, particularly during the ships deployment to Columbia. The second aspect is the RHIB. The report has a laundry list of reasons that sums up the RHIB as a "piece of shit that floats" and it was an ongoing problem from the beginning. The third aspect of the report discussed in detail, enough detail I'm hesitant to publish details..., regarding the operations in Columbia. While there is probably some great discussions there, the Navy is still uncomfortable with blogs so I'm going to refrain from posting those details, for now.

Finally, some platform observations:

• The crew covered 6,000 nm while underway on Stiletto.
• When the seas were calm, Stiletto could transit very quickly; they were able to “get somewhere very fast.”
• The range of operations was shorter than expected because Stiletto’s top speed was less than they originally anticipated. A mission typically requires eight hours. However onboard Stiletto in this deployment, it “took two hours to transit out and two hours to RTB, leaving four hours to patrol.” Crew members suggested that four hours to patrol is not enough time on-station to have success.
• Most of the deployment time was spent patrolling with Stiletto 12 miles offshore in an area with 4 ft seas, which reduced Stiletto’s speed advantage.
• Stiletto became a “responsive” asset, due in part to lack of secure data which limited mission planning at sea.
• The Stiletto team reported that they had “RHIB launch/recovery down to a science.” The crew reported that RHIB recoveries always present risk, and they were able to successfully launch and recover the RHIB.
• The team conducted the RHIB launching in 6-8 ft seas, and another in occasional 8-ft seas. They reported that while it is typically too risky to conduct RHIB launch / recoveries in sea states this high, it could be done onboard Stiletto in “life or death” situations.
• There was one particular mission where the Stiletto had a go-fast target; Stiletto was in port and launched. After transiting out and seeing the rough sea state, the Chief made a decision that the water was too rough and to turn back - a decision that the LEDET team supported. At the same time, other COL support and military vessels, including a Midnight Express, turned back as well.
• In regards to the Florida Straits mission: USCG Sector Key West (KW) “got Stiletto for two days to conduct patrols.” During that time, the Army mariners work with four USCG groups, two from D7 TACLET and two from Sector KW. On the second day, another two came from the USCG operations center. In the morning of Day One Stiletto participated in a demo with the evaluation team and other DVs, and in the afternoon it patrolled the area. The morning served as integration training for the mariner crew and USCG members. On Day 2 Stiletto went northwest toward Williams Island, capitalizing on its shallow draft capability; during that time, Stiletto used D7 for law enforcement, not Sector KW. Stiletto was approximately five miles offshore Andros Island when the crew visually spotted a target; they then found it on FLIR (never saw the target using the radar). They chased this vessel in the shallow waters for approximately 15-20 minutes. When the suspect could not lose Stiletto, he then turned north toward Marathon in the open waters. However the waters proved to be too rough for the go-fast. The sea state was approximately 2-3 feet, and Stiletto was moving at 42.4 kts. At this rate and in these conditions, Stiletto was able to apprehend go-fast within two hours. Also involved in the apprehension was Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) aircraft; the aircraft had been flying overhead when it saw the Stiletto chase. After contacting Stiletto and learned it was not training they were watching, CBP assisted with the interdiction. Additional assistance came from Sector KW, OPVAC (USARSO Counter-Drug program) and three USGC members. There was also another go-fast on scene that other USCG officials apprehended. Once concluded, DEA officials said that the individuals apprehended were actually TOIs that had been identified earlier.

Finally we conclude with this.

• Several reasons for the lack of interdiction and counter-drug activities in the Colombian area were given by interviewees. Some suggested that Colombian police and Navy vessels were in the region at the same time, either warding away potential suspects or apprehending them without Stiletto’s assistance. Others suggested that people in Colombia knew Stiletto was in the area because of information leaks. As an example, the crew stated that one could “Google Stiletto and find updated data, pictures etc. The Saturday evening before Stiletto deployed [we] painted the roof a white color; by that Monday, pictures of Stiletto with a white roof were on the internet.” When the crew researched Stiletto, they found deployment dates and port stops listed online. Additionally others suggested that the lack of interdictions may be due to the stealth-like appearance of Stiletto because it attracts a lot of attention. “It was impossible for Cartagena citizens to not know about Stiletto. To pull into port there, you have to pull by all the high rises. We deployed at all hours, day and night; it was too cool looking for people not to know we were there.”

Welcome to 4GW at sea. This last part was one aspect I nearly didn't post, except to add context to the discussion. This is a good example why these platforms would be better suited for operations from a sea base. Stiletto is a stealth ship, but by the testimony of the ships own crew the stealth advantage was impaired in part by the MK 0 eyeball, the bane of stealth for any surface ship at sea.

Small Combatants To Fight... China?

We will always give priority to the strategic thinkers, and Captain Wayne Hughes is one of our favorites. Everything he writes is solid gold in our opinion, because it forces readers to think critically about both strategy and tactics, and his words always encourage professional debate regarding the best ways to conduct the work of naval forces at sea. If you are looking for his credentials, the book on the right that will remain a constant on this blog is a great place to start, because it is the bible of modern naval warfare.

In a recent interview with Inside the Navy's Rebekah Gordon, Captain Hughes weighs in on the Littoral Combat Ship.

“I think we’ve got to get on with building an inshore Navy, a green-water Navy component, and LCS isn’t it,” said Hughes, the former dean of the school’s Graduate School of Operational & Information Sciences. “At $500 million plus module costs, it’s not going to hack it.”

"We can’t afford to lose billion-dollar DDGs, but we can afford to lose $50- or $100-million inshore combatants,” he said. “And instead of having a crew of 350 or 400, have a crew of 12. A combat crew of 12 people so that if the ship gets hit, you just save the survivors and leave the ship as a burning derelict as opposed to having to do damage control and create more casualties.”

Captain Hughes, unlike many who believe building small ships in the US Navy is specifically for fighting the "small wars" at sea, has a different vision for how these ships can contribute to the total naval power of the US Navy.

“The Chinese are getting so that they can give us trouble with our small number of big aircraft carriers and Aegis ships because they’re concentrating on confronting those ships specifically, and they’re developing really good sea-denial capabilities and anti-access capabilities,” Hughes said. “So we’ve got to beat them with something that upsets and gives them new problems to think about.”

The United States must influence China into thinking it never wants to go to war with the “big Navy” by having an effective presence and capability in the green waters, Hughes said.

If he had his way, offensive strike missiles would come off of destroyers and instead the Navy would build reasonably priced small missile ships “so the DDG can concentrate on blue-water operations again and we’d have these little guys to deploy wherever they were needed to provide the cheap firepower to support the land war.”

The idea of small, fast ships with credible offensive combat power is rarely discussed, instead defaulting to the position that small, fast ships in the littorals are for fighting pirates and other bandits of the sea. Captain Hughes is discussing the idea of bringing back small ships with kill weapons for combat at sea. Considering most anti-ship weapons have already been removed from the AEGIS battleships in the US Navy today, building the small ships to carry anti-ship weapons is not much of a reach. At the end of the day, the suggestion is interesting for discussion because it requires critical thought regarding how one believes naval warfare will be conducted in the future.

Captain Hughes goes on to explain why opening these important debates is important today.

Part of the Navy’s problem, Hughes said, is its feeling of being obligated to “be able to do anything it’s called upon to do,” which has created a culture of cramming as many capabilities onto ships as possible.

“There’s a spirit of the Navy which has said we’ve got to be able to go anywhere and do anything, and therefore I’ve always got to hedge my bet and add system X, Y, and Z, as well as its original mission which was to perform A, B and C,” Hughes said.

“Have a primary mission and don’t cost yourself out of business by then adding other capabilities. It has a primary mission and you count to 10 before you add another capability,” Hughes said. Capabilities “have to be carefully thought through and be complementary. And not try and have all the ships be able to go anywhere, anytime. That’s where it gets dangerous.”

We find it hard to disagree with Captain Hughes assessment of the Littoral Combat Ship, the latest press reports claim the FY09 conference has confirmed there will be 2 Littoral Combat Ships in FY09, and the cost cap of $460 million will not be enforced for those ships. The necessity to include language that allows the ship to cost more than $460 million implies a reality the ship cannot be purchased for that price, a development that insures the Littoral Combat Ship is far from the affordable "low end" of the shipbuilding plan it was promised to be.

We also find it hard to disagree with Captain Hughes assessment of the "requirement creep" culture in the Navy. Lets face it, the DDG-1000 has got to be one of the biggest oxymoron in the history of the defense industry. Lets review. The requirement for stealth has driven up the total displacement to around 14,500 tons, while also imposing a design that engineers have raised questions regarding its seaworthiness. This enormous ship, intended to be stealthy, is billed and sold as a littoral warship, operating in the worlds most densely populated areas of sea. Now, years after the Navy has pushed for this primarily land attack ship, the primary reasons the Navy wants to truncate the purchase is because of anti-ship missiles from land, while also claiming the ship cannot support the primary area anti-aircraft missile system of the US Navy. Whether the Navy's claims are true or not, it is clear that both the Navy and Congress agree the DDG-1000 is a complete disaster of a program, and yet both agree to fund a third ship before construction even begins on the first two.

If truck mounted missiles and lack of sufficient air defense explains the reasons why the DDG-1000 is the wrong platform, why doesn't this same argument apply to the Littoral Combat Ship given that platforms bare minimum capabilities in defenses against both threats?

Ultimately, the discussion we see is whether Captain Hughes is advocating the right vision for what future naval warfare will be like. How will small ships threaten blue water forces of the PLA Navy? If air superiority is contested, what prevents a peer competitor from sinking these small fast attack craft being advocated? How do numerous very small, very fast ships help against nuclear submarines? If the Littoral Combat Ship is to be replaced by smaller, dedicated purpose hulls intended to fight forces at sea, what becomes the platform for forward deploying unmanned systems that are critical scouts for the green water force being advocated?

Small ships can be successful against the PLA Navy if air superiority is maintained against the Chinese, and if ASW capabilities exist that can take on enemy submarine forces. Note the use of the word "if."

Finally, how does a logistical model work for very small, well armed combatants? The smaller size implies reduced endurance, so how is that issue addressed?

Clearly there are a lot of questions, but it doesn't mean the discussion isn't important. I don't disagree with the idea, I am just not sure I see how the small ships case is made against China. The DDG-1000/LCS combination of ships in the current plan is a complete disaster, a system of broken assumptions that is costing the Navy hulls and the taxpayers money during a time of limited resources. Why is a small, agile force of missile attack craft a more credible option?

As much as I like the idea of small ships, I still believe the Navy needs capabilities that can self deploy quickly to all points on the globe. To do that with very small, specialized combatants requires a system of systems approach, and after seeing the system of systems approach to Sea Basing, I can't say I believe the strategic thinkers in the acquisition office would come up with a cost effective solution for very small ships. I'm also worried that shifting towards small, manned platforms will ignore the necessity to build up the unmanned technology that will be critical in the next period of war.

That is why on this blog, we believe a small multi-mission frigate and large mothership is the better bet, but we don't dismiss one aspect of this idea that should be considered... In peacetime, the necessity for manpower cannot be overstated. This idea does present the capability to saturate the maritime domain with distributed, credibly armed manpower. That cannot be underestimated as a major capability for fighting the challenges of peacetime.

Littoral Dominance Requires a Broader System of Systems Battle Force Approach

Building upon yesterdays discussion on corvettes we want to add something a bit different to the discussion. The lines have become blurred between what a modern battleship, cruiser, destroyer, frigate, and corvette is, so we thought we would try to break down what we see as a frigate and what we see as a corvette in the modern era, and discuss another corvette option.

Using our modern rating system for warships, we see a modern frigate as a fifth-rate warship armed with 20-47 battle force VLS cells, and/or 20-47 battle force missiles. That means by our rating system, both LCS MMC versions would constitute a frigate. As we have previously discussed, the Lockheed Martin version of the multi-mission combatant offers 16 strike length VLS cells while the General Dynamics version of the multi-mission combatant offers 16 tactical length VLS cells. Both also feature at least 4 Harpoons, qualifying them both as fifth level frigates in our modern rating system.

Using the same rating system, we see a modern corvette as a sizth-rate warship designed specifically for the protection of shipping role, armed with either VLS cells or legacy missile systems, and armed with local air defense SAMs and anti-submarine and anti-ship cruise missiles for convoy defense; or a seventh-rate warship optimized for a single role, usually either anti-submarine or anti-surface warfare, or for general-purpose naval missions. The distinguishing feature of these ships is that they carry only terminal missile defenses—either in the form of rapid fire guns or short-range terminal defense SAMs.

The Perry class of today and the existing Littoral Combat Ship design both qualify as seventh-rate corvettes. Only the US Navy would operate ships between 3000-4000 tons with a weapons payload equal to or below a modern corvette.

However, just because the US Navy doesn't understand what a frigate or a corvette is, confusing the concept with a mothership in fact, and is demonstrating strategic absence in regards to the cruiser role, it doesn't mean the rest of the world is. In particular we go back to a July 13, 2024 article in Janes called TKMS unveils new reconfigurable patrol ship by Alex Pape, in which the Meko Class evolved into a modular platform. What is different? On a platform level, the payload is very different:

Planned mission modules incorporating existing naval systems into the modular architecture include the BAE Systems Bofors 57 mm gun, Saab Bofors Dynamics RBS 15 anti-ship missiles, as well as the latest generation of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) from Atlas Elektronik and Saab Underwater Systems.

If you can find it, there is also an excellent sales brochure called Modular Security Ships for Littoral Supremacy, which is sometimes available by this link (PDF), that details both of the MEKO Fusion concepts.

• The MEKO® Combat Ship for the Littorals: 108m, 2750 t, >40 kts, steel hull, composite superstructure, up to 21 MEKO® Mission Modules.
• The 84m MEKO® FUSION: 84 m, 1500 t, >40 kts, composite hull & superstructure, up to 15 MEKO® Mission Modules.

We don't highlight the MEKO Fusion because we think it is a better ship than the Littoral Combat Ship, this isn't about one ship vs one ship, rather we note the biggest difference here is that ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) is taking a total battle force network approach to littoral dominance with modularity. A ship compatible in a modular network doesn't necessarily have to be as big of a frigate to be effective, or small as a corvette even, rather it is about meeting requirements and metrics beyond a single purpose ship capability, even if the ship is modular.

Network-Centric Warfare in Navy terms was intended to get people thinking about ship designs as system of systems approaches to solving complex maritime problems, and modularity was one result. One of the questions we would pose is why modularity became the only result when the US Navy was thinking about a system of systems approach to the littorals?

When we think about the littorals, we don't believe one shoe in many colors can fit all, rather we believe we need to be looking at different sizes and styles of ships to fit all. The US Navy uses strike groups for naval aviation and expeditionary warfare, but chose to take a single system approach to what has been described as the most difficult challenge facing maritime forces today: the littoral. If the challenge really is as big as the US Navy claims, why did the Navy throw an unrated mothership at the problem?

We keep thinking a truly modular, interchangeable approach to the littorals will include a large ship, preferably an amphibious ship, as the command node within a modular system of systems network. The mothership will be able to both support the modules itself, but also distribute modules to other platforms of all sizes. Modules don't have to be a complete set of systems, rather the set of systems is part of the distributed modular network. The idea of using amphibious ships in a modular naval network approach to the littorals isn't a unique thought, we note the existing LCS modules will be tested on Amphibious ships rather than Littoral Combat Ships, due to delays of the LCS platforms under construction.

Maybe the LCS should be another platform in the littoral battle force network, but we expect the LCS is ultimately both too big and too expensive to truly distribute and dominate the littoral battle network that is required for the littoral challenges of war and peace, and the LCS is certainly not well armed enough to dominate enemy naval forces in any but the least threatening environments. Information dominance is critical to success, but it doesn't do the Navy any good if the Navy has complete information dominance but lacks physical presence due to lack of manned vessels necessary to follow up and engage for both war time and operations other than war.

The real advantage we note in regards to the MEKO approach over the US approach to modularity isn't the design characteristics of the corvette platforms themselves, nor the broad approach to the modular options per platform (even though it shows more creativity), rather the advantage of the MEKO approach to modular, system of systems networks is the concept of introducing more than one platform to contribute to the littoral challenge, and we really appreciate the total system of systems approach towards the strategic ends of littoral dominance.

After all, it is worth noting that when TKMS designed their modular corvette force, they just happened to design a mothership capable of supporting the modular battle force at the same time.

The Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100)

I'm thinking the Green Water Navy discussion yesterday got off track a bit, but like champs a few commenter's laid down the wood and reset the discussion on the right track. Well done.

The 100 ft metric discussed in the ISN article discussed brought to mind a concept introduced in 2005 as part of the Congressionally mandated Analysis of Alternatives for Fleet Constitution mandated by Congress. Because we all know the Navy would demand a platform be built from scratch, that using an existing platform would simply not happen, we think perhaps this idea would scale very nicely into the technology set and desired requirements for a green water platform.

Admiral Cebrowski's Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100)

Small, fast, modular surface combatant craft
Carried to theater by large support ship
Payload capacity increased as less fuel carried
Full Load Displacement: 100 tons
Speed: 60 knots; Crew: 3
Limited capacity for fixed systems, carries one module at a time
Operated as a unit or in flights of two or more craft
Modules:

• ASW-1: Variable depth sonar
• ASW-2: Towed array, torpedoes, fire control system
• Strike-1: 6-cell launcher, fire control system
• Strike-2: 3 UAVs (for targeting)
• Mine Warfare: 1 UUV, acoustic MCM system, mine neutralization system
• SOF: 2 rigid-hull inflatable boats
• USV: 2 unmanned surface vehicles
• SUW-1: 8 Surface-to-surface missiles
• SUW-2: Close-In Weapon System
• AAW: Launcher, missiles, multifunction radar
• UUV: 12 medium UUVs

Sensors: small sensors for acoustic detection

If the VSC-100 platform was designed to from a Global Fleet Stations host ship, we think this is exactly the type of thing that makes sense for addressing the green water requirements for peacetime operations. Keep in mind, the Navy finds itself in a period of fiscal competition, so any budget resources committed to a peacetime platform must find usefulness in a wartime scenario to justify investment. With weapon centric modular payloads as a core design factor, the Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100) does exactly that.

One other thought. We have linked that OFT report twice tonight. I've been thinking about some commentary regarding Admiral Cebrowski's ideas that highlights just how tuned in his concepts were to the time we were in. From Thomas Barnett:

Cebrowski pushed my work, to include the SysAdmin stuff, like crazy throughout the bureaucracy as early as 2002--eventually right up to Rumsfeld himself. I briefed all of Rummy's senior aides, as I describe in PNM, in the summer of 2002.

Tell me, how can Art be a champion of both NCW and SysAdmin stuff at the same time?

Dr. Barnett reminds us that the ideas that Streetfighter is associated with are far more complex than the criticism allowed. The Navy was very resistant to the version of change introduced by the ideas being floated in the late 90s, but that a two star Admiral is talking about building 100 ft ships for green water operations to support Global Fleet Stations today is a sign that change does happen, but at a snails pace.

Regardless, it is very difficult to read that OFT report and not recognize that those ideas in 2005 had evolved in line with the requirements of today. The revolt led by Admiral Cebrowski, Captain Hughes, Thomas Barnett, and many others continues to prove that the ideas really were todays solution. Ask yourself a question: Would the Navy be better off today had it built a bunch of Streetfighters instead of the LCS and DDG-1000s over the last few years? We think so, but we also ask ourselves this question.

If the Navy builds a bunch of 100 ft green water boats instead of 5 DDG-1000s will we find ourselves wishing we had the 5 battleships a decade from now?

We think it depends, if 50 Very Small Surface Combatants (VSC-100) at $100 million per and with modules are produced instead (essentially 50 VSC-100s for the cost of two DDG-1000s), I think the Navy gains more with the numbers.