What's Driving the Navy ?

“What’s Driving the Navy?”

Captain R. Robinson Harris, U.S. Navy (ret)

Captain Glen Sears, U. S. Navy (ret)

Mr. Michael Venn

Note from Lazarus:  Robby Harris, Glen Sears, and Michael Venn are strategic planners with Lockheed Martin’s Missions, Systems, and Training (MST) business area.  Last year they guided a yearlong study designed to gain a better understanding of the “drivers” that characterize today’s U.S. Navy and possibly will characterize the U.S. Navy of tomorrow.  In a nutshell, they sought to understand why the Navy looks the way it does today and how it may look tomorrow. This article summarizes their study.

It is something of an understatement to observe that today’s national security environment is dynamic.  To gain a better understanding of the environment and particularly the “drivers” that define today’s U.S. Navy and might impact the Navy of tomorrow, a team of Lockheed Martin strategists earlier this year launched a new assessment.  Our team sought to understand why the Navy looks the way it does and how it may look differently tomorrow in terms of overall force structure and capabilities.  Our study included detailed and comprehensive quantitative and qualitative research.  We analyzed budget documents to understand where the Navy allocates its resources.  We examined public reports where the Navy explains its programs, plans, and strategies.  We also commissioned an independent team to conduct numerous interviews with Navy leaders and defense experts. 

Our research suggests there are really only four broad categories of “drivers” that shape Navy force structure and capabilities today and tomorrow.  These “drivers” are depicted below and will be explained in more detail in this paper..

As discussed below, the Navy seems unlikely to change its Deployment/Operational Strategy. And, both the budget/fiscal and threat environments are outside the Navy’s control.  The technologies employed to effect combat capable forward presence, however, offer some agency for the Navy if they can be deployed to the fleet in a cost effective and timely fashion.

Navy Deployment/Operational Strategy

In one of the early interviews conducted by our team an academic opined that if one wishes to understand why the Navy looks the way it does, one has only to understand that at least since World War II, the Navy’s operational construct has been premised on “combat capable forward presence,” i.e., the “Away Game.”  The Navy does not operate in its own “back yard,” rather it operates continuously overseas and the fleet’s characteristics, especially the size of its ships, reflect that geographic fact.  The logic follows that although small craft and small ships may be perfectly suitable for a Navy that does not deploy far from its home waters, such ships are not suitable for the U.S. Navy that must deploy at far distances for long periods of time.  Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work has emphasized this point, “Now, the…Department of Defense has a pretty simple mission…It has one key business.  That is to organize, train, and equip an American joint force that is ready for war and is operated forward (emphasis added) to preserve the peace.”  Work continued, “We generally fight away games… So our ability to project dominant military forces across the trans-oceanic distances underwrites U. S. conventional deterrence.”[i]

DSD Work wasn’t the first to note the importance of the “Away Game.”  Founding father Alexander Hamilton was an early proponent of the Navy.  In one of his “Federalist Papers” he wrote about the benefits an American navy would afford:  “A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us…” Hamilton believed the Navy was an instrument to influence the behavior of other nations and would accomplish that goal by being forward.[ii]  To that end, the Navy normally is deployed (the away game) to be seen by nations which the U.S. wishes to influence.[iii]    Professor Robert Rubel observes that by being forward, the Navy provides, “…U. S. voice and influence…”.  Professor Robert Rubel concludes: 

“In any case, there seems to be no suitable strategic deployment option that involves keeping the nation’s sea services in home waters; the nation’s character and its role in the world require that its naval forces be forward to the extent feasible, though their exact disposition and composition will be a function of technology, threat, and cost.”[iv]   

The roots of current U.S. Navy deployment strategy can be traced to the late 1940s, when

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Admirals Forrest Sherman, Arthur Radford, and others deployed what became the U. S. Sixth Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea and later a re-born U. S. Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, as combat-credible forward presence forces.  At the end of the 1970s, a third combat-credible forward presence "hub" - was created in the Arabian Sea. Meanwhile, precedents of intermittent forward presence were established and maintained in other forward seas, and continued in America's "near abroad" in the Caribbean.[v]

A recent Center for Naval Analyses study emphasized the continuing validity of a forward deployed Navy. “A major transformation of the Navy's deployment strategy does not appear to be on the horizon. There have not been recent or contemporary changes in the three important variables - domestic interests, international environment, and naval capabilities - revolutionary enough to change U.S. Navy deployment strategy…”[vi]

Writing about the sea services new strategy “A Cooperative Strategy for 21 Century Seapower:  Forward, Engaged, Ready” (CS-21R) the Commander of the U. S. Sixth Fleet, VADM James Foggo states,

“Distinct from CS-21, forward presence is not just articulated as an essential function of the Sea Services.  In fact, in CS-21R, forward presence is in a category all its own.  It is an ‘enabling function’, one that makes possible all the rest.” [vii] (Emphasis added)

Thus, the characteristics of the fleet designed for the “away game” are unlikely to significantly change any time soon.  The “Away Game” operational concept, “Operate Forward” per former-CNO Jonathan Greenert, seems to be the foundational “driver” for force structure characteristics impacting both capability and capacity.  Those characteristics include an ability to self-deploy across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, to remain deployed for lengthy periods of time, and to possess combat credible capabilities that ensure the transmission of U. S. “voice and influence.”  Small craft and small ships do not seem to meet those requirements although some experts argue that they might be more affordable and increase Fleet size and effectiveness.[viii]

Threats

Our interviews demonstrated that military threats also “drive” the Navy’s force structure and capabilities.  In a recent USNI Proceedings article VADM Tom Rowden, and RADMs Peter Fanta and Peter Gumataotao reflected on “threats” and how those threats affect Navy’s capabilities,   

“First, when the Cold War ended, our Navy emerged unchallenged and dominant.  No power could match us at sea and that dominance allowed the Navy to focus on projecting power ashore…The surface force began to shift its expertise to launching Tomahawk missiles from uncontested sanctuaries at sea.  If U.S. naval power is to reclaim maritime battlespace dominance in contemporary and future anti-A2/AD environments, the surface Navy must counter rapidly evolving  missile, air, submarine, and surface threats that will challenge our ability to sail where we want, when we want.” [ix]

As discussed by Admirals Rowden, Fanta, and Gumataotao, the Navy is transitioning from a predominantly threat-free post-Cold War maritime environment in which support of land operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was the rule to a new environment with challenging Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) threats posed by near-peer competitors.  China’s aggressive activities in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands, and Iran’s actions in the Arabian Gulf have awakened naval strategists and planners for warfighting technologies and operational methods to counter A2/AD and asymmetric threats. 

Rowden, et al. continue,

“…the shift to the offensive responds to the development of increasingly capable A2/AD weapons designed specifically to deny U. S. naval forces the freedom of maneuver necessary to project power…it is important to remember that as our interests lay thousands of miles from our own coastlines, sea-based power projection is both our main competitive advantage and an absolute necessity to retain influence and to exercise global leadership.”[x]

Admirals Rowden et al clearly consider “threats” as a “driver” which will influence capability and operational concepts for the surface Navy. 

The development of the Air Sea Battle operational concept, now called the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)[xi] demonstrates the growing shift in the maritime threat environment which is leading to fresh thinking regarding needed capabilities for the Fleet.  The Navy has embraced former Chief of Naval Operations’ Greenert’s number one tenant, “Warfighting First”, and there is a notable shift in the naval dialogue to lethality and offensive capability with added emphasis on survivability and operating  in denied environments.

Similarly, A2/AD threats are influencing Navy’s air and undersea capabilities and operational concepts.  A number of the interviews our team conducted pointed to the need to integrate unmanned air and undersea vehicles to counter A2/AD threats.  Other interviews pointed to the need to accelerate fielding of the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) capability.[xii]

Navy has limited ability to control threats, but possesses far more control over the types of capabilities required to respond, manage, and possibly deter threats with the careful application of affordable technologies.  The challenge in a constrained budget environment centers around threat risk management.

Technology 

Our research revealed that technological innovation also “drives” the Navy’s current and future capabilities. 

The Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) program was highlighted in our interviews as an example of a technology paradigm shift for the submarine Navy.[xiii]  The ARCI process started in the 1990s as the Submarine Force’s innovative answer to maintaining acoustic superiority in the face of severe cost pressures and the lessening of the U. S. Navy’s acoustic advantage.  ARCI continues to be exemplar of efficient, effective, and rapid acquisition response to emerging submarine warfighter needs.  Testifying to Congress Navy Acquisition chief Sean Stackley commented,

“The Navy is pursuing fair and open competition in the fielding of open, modular, and extensible systems.  This strategy enables the Rapid Capability Insertion Process (RCIP) and the integration of new technology without costly software changes, helps to manage COTS obsolescence, and encourages commonality and reuse.  The RCIP builds off the successful submarine Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion program.”[xiv]  (Emphasis added)

The ARCI program’s flexible methodology enables the rapid introduction of new fleet requirements and capabilities via an alternative biannual hardware and software modernization process.  This continuous modernization process transitioned all classes of Navy submarines to a common baseline and provides the submarine force with enhanced warfighting capabilities while avoiding significant research, design, acquisition, obsolescence, and training costs.    

Congressional Research Analyst (CRS) Ronald O’Rourke writes,

“The ARCI program was instituted to reverse deterioration in the submarine force’s acoustic edge over improving foreign submarines that had occurred by the mid-1990s…The continuous improvement in capability among existing submarines achieved through the ARCI program might be considered equivalent to adding some number of boats to the force...”[xv]

The first ARCI installation was completed in 1998.  Under the ARCI program 10 to 12 submarines are updated each year.  O’Rourke observes, “The ARCI program can be viewed as an early example of ‘walking the walk’ on open architecture.” 

Technology also impacts surface warfare capabilities.  Precision guidance technology in the Tomahawk Cruise Missile in the 1980s led to a dramatic new role in land attack for the Navy’s surface combatants.[xvi]  Before the advent of Tomahawk, the Surface Navy existed principally to protect (AAW, ASW, etc.) other assets like Carrier Strike Groups ((CSG) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) and to transport Marines to the fight.  Before Tomahawk the surface Navy had no strike role.  Discussions of maritime strategy and naval force structure in the 1980s reinforced the perception that the only general purpose naval forces with strategic significance were carrier aircraft and nuclear-powered attack submarines. Surface combatants were simply considered integral parts of larger, carrier-dominated forces.  The fielding of new Tomahawk-armed cruisers and destroyers, however, provided an unprecedented offensive anti-ship and land-attack capability.  Tomahawk provided unique warfighting capabilities and new possibilities for force employment not resident in a carrier-dominated force.  Tomahawk transformed the Surface Navy.  Thirty years later, precision tracking and weapon technology once again is transforming the surface Navy with Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability.  The ability to station a ship off the coast of any nation and neutralize a number of ballistic missile threats to the region not only reinforces U.S. regional relationships but also makes the region overall more secure from rogue regimes.

More recently, the “modularity” concept has been identified as a new enabling technology.  After a tour of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) USS INDEPENDENCE in Florida earlier this year, former CNO Greenert remarked, “The thing that is of value about the LCS is that she has great volume, high speed, and is modular (emphasis added). What that means is you can change out packages to perform different missions.”[xvii]   The recently updated CS-21R also emphasizes modularity as an example of force employment innovation to, “Employ modular designed platforms that allow mission modules and payloads to be swapped instead of entire ships, saving time and money.  Littoral Combat Ships…are an example of this capability.”[xviii]

Our interviews suggest that modularity, open architecture, directed energy, and cyber/electronic maneuver warfare technologies are ascendant.  Moreover, the technology driver is the one in which the Navy has the most control over, and which offers the potential to mitigate the negative effects generated by budget and threat environments.

Budget/Fiscal Climate 

Nearly every Navy official testifying to Congress in 2015 emphasized the unstable fiscal environment and its negative effects on current and projected Navy capabilities.  As CNO Greenert testified before the Senate Armed Forces Committee on 10 March 2015;

“But, Mr. Chairman, as I have testified before, the continuing resolution and the sequestration of 2013 degraded our readiness and our capabilities, and we have not recovered.  Budget reductions have forced reduction of afloat and ashore operations, generated maintenance backlogs, and have compelled us to extend unit deployments…this degraded readiness has reduced our ability to respond to contingencies…We’ve been forced to slow Navy modernization.  The overall impact of the budget shortfalls in the past three years has declined our relative warfighting advantages in several areas, notably anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, air-to-air warfare and what we call Integrated Air and Missile Defense…”[xix]

More recently the leaders of all three maritime services stated in CS21R that they will:

 “Prioritize affordability in every aspect of our acquisition process by controlling costs throughout the system lifecycle.  For example, we will expand Open Architecture initiatives to improve the use of intellectual property and increase competition.  This will drive down total ownership costs, improve warfighting capability, and lead to sustainable future programs.”[xx]

Moreover, a recurring theme emerging from our team interviews was the importance of budget constraints as a “driver”.  The following comments are highly representative: 

“…the principal threat is our inability to control costs.  We are pricing ourselves out of business.  We need to find the right mix between the cost to modernize and life cycle costs.” 

“… the lack of resources is the principal threat to the U.S. Navy.” 

“…the biggest disruptor has been costs of US weapon systems - out of control and forcing a ‘straight jacket’ on how Navy tries to acquire.” 

“We have become a military in which budget drives policy which impacts force structure.” 

 “…the biggest disruptor or disruption in the next 20 years will be budget pressures in an environment of diminishing industrial sources.”   

Once again, our interviews identified the ARCI program as a successful example to control the cost of modernizing the force while significantly enhancing submarine and undersea warfare capabilities.   O’Rourke opines, “The (ARCI) program can be viewed as an example of a Service responding to a reduction in funding by finding a new and less expensive approach to accomplishing its objective.”[xxi] 

Modularity also was often cited as an approach to control costs.  By specifying common standards and interfaces the modularity approach provides navies with benefits in mission flexibility, upgradability, and overall costs.  The benefits range from the ease of technology refresh to decreased total ownership cost, to increased operational readiness. The Navy’s LCS program leverages the modularity approach with its flexible, reconfigurable space and stern ramp for launch/recovery of mine countermeasures unmanned vehicles, swimmer delivery vehicle, and special operations forces. Former-Rear Admiral Don Loren summarized it several years ago:

“Its (LCS) modular design will allow for mission modules to be replaced without putting the ship in dry dock, cutting holes in the side of the ship, or running lengths of cables, and piping throughout the ship…this plug and play process will facilitate incremental upgrading of installed systems, but will also enable complete change out of entire systems.  Such an approach will reduce the risk of investing in new technology by not jeopardizing an entire acquisition program on the success or failure of a single technology or developmental capability.”[xxii]

The Adaptive Force Package Concept is another example of how cost and affordability are influencing the characteristics of the Navy.  Adaptive Force Packages make it possible to provide warfighting capabilities on ships and aircraft that typically are not considered combatants.  The three maritime service chiefs state in CS21R that they will, “expand the practice of employing adaptive force packages which tailor naval capabilities to specific regional environments, thereby ensuring that our assets are located where they are most needed….We will provide naval presence in Africa with adaptive force packages such as the Joint High Speed Vessel or Afloat Forward Staging Base with embarked Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.”[xxiii]

Although the Navy has limited control over the budget/fiscal environment, by emphasizing affordability, cost controls, and employing innovative approaches such as the ARCI model, open architectures, and expanding the use of modularity, it can better manage the impact of the budget/fiscal environment driver.

Summary

Our study discovered that four “drivers” have and will continue to define the characteristics of the U. S. Navy:  Deployment Patterns (the “Away Game”/ Combat Credible Forward Presence), the Threat Environment; Technology; and the Budget/Fiscal environment.  These four “drivers” are all interrelated, but as pointed out, foundational is the emphasis on combat credible forward presence which influences the size of platforms.  Because size affects the cost of platforms, the deployment patterns driver also affects the number of platforms in the fleet and therefore capability and capacity.  That is, because larger platforms are more expensive than smaller ones, fewer larger platforms can be acquired than would be the case for smaller less expensive platforms.  With the exception of the number of “hubs” serviced, e.g., 6^th Fleet, 7^th Fleet, 5^th Fleet and the level of presence in each hub, the U. S. Navy’s deployment pattern seems unlikely to change. So, one might conclude that the “Deployment Pattern” driver is a constant. 

Similarly, given concerns for the national debt, annual budget deficits, demands of federal entitlement programs, and support for an aging population, one might also conclude that the budget/fiscal climate driver is also a constant and unlikely to improve barring another “9/11” like tragedy.

One might also conclude that the “threat” driver is a constant, but if not a constant, it is a strong “driver” that is likely to become more challenging, especially because of the growing concerns for cyber warfare.  Thus, threat as a driver is unlikely to make life easier for Navy planners and programmers.  Rather, in a constrained budget environment, Navy must manage threat risks.

That leaves the last driver, technology, which need not be a constant, and which may mitigate some of the challenges posed by other three drivers. Technology has proved to be able to impact both capability (e.g., improved processors to maintain acoustic advantage; data fusion for improved situational awareness) and capacity (e.g., precision weapon technology makes it possible to service more targets per sortie; netted forces result in a force in which overall capability is greater than the sum of its parts, directed energy may provide “bottomless magazines”).  Moreover, technology has proved to offer both cost avoidance (e.g., ARCI model for submarine modernization) and as well as increased costs (new platforms cost more than the ones replaced, as a rule).  Given the expected fiscal environment, the emphasis today must be to use technology for cost avoidance and to improve both capability and capacity.  The submarine community’s ARCI model would seem to be worthy model worth revisiting in a more comprehensive strategy.

---

[i] Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “The Third U. S. Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Partners and Allies”, 30 January 2015, War on the Rocks Blog.

[ii] Publius [Alexander Hamilton], “The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy,”  Federalist No. 11, available at Library of Congress, thomas.loc.gov/.

[iii] Robert Rubel, “National Policy and the Post-Systemic Navy,”  U. S. Naval War College Review, October, 2013.

[iv] Robert Rubel, op cit., p.27.

[v] Unpublished Center for Naval Analyses research paper re deployment patterns of the U. S. Navy.  Alexandria, VA, 2012.  Available upon request.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] VADM James Foggo and CDR Philip Rosi, “Putting CS-21R to Work,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May, 2015, p.22.

[viii] Captain Wayne Hughes, “Cede No Water:  Strategy, Littorals, and Flotillas”, USNI Proceedings, September, 2013.  In this article Captain Hughes argues for the advantages of the “Flotilla Concept.”

[ix] VADM Thomas Rowden, RADM Peter Gumataotao, and RADM Peter Fanta, “Distributed Lethality” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings,  January 2015, p. 19.

[x] Rowden, et al, Ibid.

[xi] “Pentagon Drops Air Sea Battle Name, Concept Lives On”

By: Sam LaGrone, January 20, 2024 2:21 PM • Updated: January 20, 2024 3:41 PM

[xii] Jeffrey McConnell, “Naval Integrated Fire Control Counter Air Capability-Based Systems of Systems Engineering, Navy Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, 14 November 2013, NWSCDD/PN 14/019

[xiii] For an overview of the ARCI program, see Captain Jim Stevens, “The How and Why of Open Architecture,”  Undersea Warfare, Spring 2008  available on line http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/spring08/HowAndWhy.html

[xiv] Statement of Sean J. Stackley before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Shipbuilding, 11 September 2012.

[xv] Statement of Mr. Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service before the House Armed Services Committee on Case Studies in DOD Acquisition:  Findings What Works.  24 June 2014, pp 4-5.

[xvi] R. Robinson Harris and Robert McFall, “The Transformation (Again) of the Surface Navy,”  U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings,  January 2012.

[xvii] Michael Fabey, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, April 3, 2015.

[xviii] “Forward, Engaged, Ready:  A Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower,”  Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, March, 2015.

[xix] Testimony of Admiral Jon Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2015.

[xx] Op Cit, p.29

[xxi] O’Rourke, Op Cit

[xxii] RDML Don Loren, USN, former Director U. S. Navy Surface Combatant Requirements, quoted in Unmanned Systems, Vol 20, Nr 5, Sept/Oct 2002, p. 26.

[xxiii] CS21R, op cit, pp 16, 21.



It's Time to Consider Raiding, Again

Jon Solomon's note: When we think of expeditionary operations, we tend to picture the insertion of a ground force to seize and hold some territory for a relatively long period of time. My SPA colleague Jonathan Altman points out below, though, that short-duration raids can be just as strategically useful under the right circumstances. In this piece he examines the potential use of small-scale raids as a means of signalling and compellence outside of major war. I've asked him to write a follow-up piece as his time permits examining larger-scale raids in major war, as I believe that such operations in some scenarios might be highly useful for disrupting or rolling back an adversary's localized maritime denial capabilities. 

The term “raiding” seems like an anachronism upon first reflection. For the average person, it's as likely to conjure up images of Vikings as anything else, and even serious students of military history are challenged to come up with a more recent example than WWII of an effective raid (discounting small scale Special Forces actions in the Middle East). Nonetheless, in the current security environment, where large scale maritime and land forces can be held at risk by A2/AD systems, and inter-state disputes seem to be increasingly playing out on the lower rungs of the escalation ladder, raiding operations hold terrific promise. Compared to a ‘permanent’ insertion of ground forces in some area, brief hit-and-run raids offer increased flexibility and decreased resource needs—as well as options under certain circumstances for plausible deniability. These inherently interconnected qualities and their attendant impact on conflict management suggest a future in which the practice of raiding is likely to once again become an indispensable tool for planners and policymakers alike.

A quick note on definitions is needed. For the purposes of this discussion, a “raid” is defined as a military operation by amphibious and/or airborne forces to temporarily seize enemy territory for some operational purpose. Raids in this article should be considered to be solely directed against territory-holding actors (normally recognized nation-states but a limited set of sub-state actors would also fit such as ISIS or FARC in Columbia) on a scale from a platoon to battalion size effort. Most counter-terrorist operations are accordingly outside the focus of this paper. Larger scale raids that could enable or buttress full scale military campaigns will be covered in a follow on post as these are qualitatively different operations from the smaller-scale raids described in this one.

Because they are by definition intended to be temporary actions and need not incorporate many personnel, smaller-scale raids can often be plausibly deniable. While certainly some media may correctly identify the raid as such before it is complete (especially if the raid lasts longer than a few hours), at least broadly speaking, with respect to the public and third party nations many raids should be generally deniable. This confers tremendous advantages in conflict management.

First, deniability allows the raiding nation to avoid criticism from third parties while sending a desired message of resolve and/or punitive punishment to the state or substate actor being raided. It is likely that the nation being raided will at least have an idea of who is conducting the raid and why based on the target selected, which should be enough for them to understand what brought on the attack. In this sense raiding is an excellent medium to encourage compellence, where an adversary is given a face-saving method to deescalate a conflict without being forced to publicly admit they've been compelled. Consider a scenario where the United States wished to compel a rogue nation not to continue on a path of supporting terrorism. A raid could be used against a target of military significance or symbolic value to the rogue nation's support of terrorism, whereby its seizure and/or destruction by “unknown” forces would directly retard their efforts and convey a level of seriousness that sanctions or diplomatic censure simply cannot. The willingness to spill blood through a plausibly deniable attack against a symbol of an adversary's offending behavior cannot be overstated as a demonstration of earnestness.

On a related note, the deniability of a raid also assists in ending conflicts at the lowest possible levels of escalation because it allows an adversary to potentially save face. Without a smoking gun linking the raid to a nation, the targeted nation will have a better chance of tamping down internal pressure to respond to the raid, providing an off ramp to additional escalation. Again, even if an adversary was aware of who conducted the raid with a reasonable degree of certainty, so long as they do not want war and can keep that information from firing up a domestic base then de-escalation is feasible. In any case, the nature of a raid’s target (against which actor, what sort of specific target, etc.) can be calibrated to minimize the chance of starting of a tit for tat raiding exchange. While not a certainty, de-escalation is a much more likely outcome from a deniable action than one that is not.

The other key quality associated with raids is their flexibility. While the size of a raid will vary inversely with its deniability; this too can be used to a nation’s advantage. Want to offer an adversary an escalation off-ramp? A smaller-scale raid makes sense. Want to send a message of resolve not just to the targeted adversary but also a deterrence message to other potential adversaries? Then a larger-scale raid probably is a better fit. Raids are also flexible in their duration and objectives. A longer raid may send a different message than a shorter one, and the choice of objective can be a message unto itself. For example, deliberately limited objectives may be used to showcase capabilities that could be used in a much more destructive fashion should offending actions continue, while more ambitious efforts may be used to show a commitment to not only threaten that which the adversary holds dear but also demonstrate that the raider is already prepared to (publicly) risk as many lives as it takes to stop the targeted nation. While the difference in messages is subtle, the ability to calibrate them so carefully gives raiding enormous messaging utility.

Operationally speaking, raids are a more useful tool than others because they require only a limited logistics tail and lend themselves to the element of surprise. Since raids by definition do not intend to hold territory permanently and last at most a matter of days, the supplies and supporting forces needed to execute them are comparatively minimal. One only needs a method of raiding force insertion, some small amount of supplies to support the operation, and perhaps some combined arms supporting fires if the circumstances dictate. Since the scale of resources is relatively small (for short operations raiders may simply carry on their bodies all that they need), it is likely that the preparations for a raid can be kept secret, and a range of platforms not available to larger operations can be used. For example, “white shipping” (unmarked, non-military flagged ships) or relying exclusively on airborne insertion and exfiltration can be effective in facilitating successful raids. Beyond supply needs, because a raid by definition is a relatively small operation, the number of people and computer networks needed to plan and execute the raid can also be small, making the potential for adversary discovery of the raid before the fact much less likely. Thus because the preparations for a raid can be done in a highly secure manner, raids are much more likely to maintain the element of surprise than other military operations with similar objectives; thereby lowering the risk to the raiders themselves and amplifying the chance of mission success.

Looking out to a future where inter-state conflict continues to take place at lower levels of the escalation ladder, and where obfuscating one's own military actions will be important to achieving national objectives, raiding would seem to be an essential part of a military planner's toolkit. Raids convey national level resolve at a minimum risk of friendly loss of life, and provide an adversary with either escalation off-ramps and/or clear direction that a behavior will not be allowed to continue. It's time to think about raiding less from an historical lens and instead consider how it can best be used for strategic effect in the modern world.

Jonathan Altman is a Program Analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. who holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the Korbel School at the University of Denver and an undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis Inc., and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.