6th Fleet Focus: African Partnership Initiative Stigma and Hypocrisy

The African Partnership Initiative (API) has begun in the Gulf of Guinea region, and Eagle1 has an outstanding summery up well worth reading in full. When I read it, I called up a doctor friend of mine who volunteers in Sao Tome & Principe in dealing with HIV/AIDS.

His organization will be working with the API, but he says not every western NGO has stepped up yet.

He made an interesting point. In that area there is a stigma from people regarding others with AIDS, and it leads to people with AIDS not getting treatments because they don't want others to know they have it.

He sees some of the other NGOs demonstrating the same stigma towards the API. While all the NGOs are trying to breakdown the stigma of AIDS, he sees some of the NGOs in hypocrisy because of their stigma over the US military.

For an example of the stigma, the media recently reported on it.

When Maria (not her real name) took the brave step of speaking to the media in Sao Tome about her HIV-positive status, she had no idea what she was letting herself in for.

Although she had her back turned to the cameras, her voice was not disguised and it did not take long for people in her community to identify her. "After that, everyone knew it was me - at least, they thought it was me," she told IRIN/PlusNews.

The stigma attached to being HIV positive in the tiny twin-island state of Sao Tome and Principe is huge. No one living with the virus has so far gone public about his or her status, and health workers say that discrimination presents the biggest challenge to curbing the spread of the epidemic.

"This is our biggest problem at the moment. If we don't start accepting that AIDS is a normal disease like others, we are going to make things even harder," said Dr Alzira do Rosario, coordinator of Sao Tome's national AIDS programme.

That story makes his point clear as day. Westerners think they can preach removing stigma's from AIDS when they are struggling with their own stigma of the military involvement in the African Partnership Initiative. Read Eagle1's summery; he takes those pinheaded hypocritical fools to task, rightfully so. API may be enabled by military power, but ultimately it is a humanitarian and security service that the region is in desperate need of.

The use of soft power enabled by military power is critical in dealing with security and humanitarian issues in troubled regions in the 21st century, but the distaste of too many regarding involvement of the DoD in anything, period, is a major hurdle in leveraging this soft power. Programs like Global Fleet Stations are designed to be a counterweight to disruptive influences in impoverished places like Africa, supplying order and opportunity through safety and security initiatives in places overrun by corruption and lawlessness enabled by violence. Overcoming that western stigma is one of the major hurdle of implementing the "Safety and Security" aspect of the new 21st Century Cooperative Maritime Strategy of the 21st century.

6th Fleet Focus: Noteworthy from Nigeria

Last week, the day after the USS McHenry (LSD 43) deployed on its African Partnership Station Initiative, Nigeria signed on. Nigeria's participation is a big deal, a huge opportunity for AFRICOM and the Navy and is an excellent example of the soft power discussed in the recently released Maritime Strategy.

The United States imports more oil from Nigeria than we do from Saudi Arabia. This puts the security situation in Nigeria very high on the interests of the United States. AllAfrica.com provides interesting insight into what the African Partnership Station Initiative is up against in Nigeria.

Chief of Defence Staff, Lt. General Andrew Owoye Azazi yesterday allayed the fears of Nigerians on the continued presence of United States military in the Gulf of Guinea.

Speaking at a forum in Abuja on Tuesday, the Defence chief said that Nigerians should not get unnecessarily worried over the matter as the troops are there just to give peace in the area. General Azazi said that US likes to have relative peace anywhere they have business interest.

"US wants relative peace to be able to undertake their business" he said pointing out that there is no other motive behind their troops presence to worry anybody.

The Nigerian public sees the US mission of "projecting stability" to the region as "exporting subversion." It is one of many stigma's the US Navy brings to the region, and it is going to take time to change perceptions. The article goes into detail regarding other challenges as well, problems ranging from corruption to HIV to security issues in the Niger Delta, including where "the Defence chief said that military have lost sizeable number of personnel in the troubled region but refused to give the exact figure of casualties." He acknowledges there isn't a military solution, there will have to be a political solution to stop the violence.

In the maritime domain, the security issues are evident.

MEN of the Nigeria Navy, NNS, Delta in Warri, Delta State have seized three vessels, including a Cotonou boat filled with condensate opposite the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Refinery jetty in Warri.

Vanguard learnt that the three ships were intercepted, last Thursday, by a Naval Patrol team very early in the morning but the oil bunkerers on sighting the military men, abandoned their pumping machines, their boats and the stolen condensate.

Navy Information Officer in Warri, Lieutenant Sikiru Adigun confirmed to Vanguard, yesterday that the seized boats were with the possession of the Navy.

He said the authorities of the NNS, Delta has contacted the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) to come and dispose off the condensate.

As at yesterday when Vanguard visited the Naval Base, the three ships were seen with the anchored at the waterside while the condensate in the Contonou boat was leaking into the water with a heavy stench around the area. A source said the Navy was waiting for the SPDC to come and take the condensate away.

Crime which has led to environmental problems which is compounded by military engagements... the cycle continues. This is a small peek into the challenges facing the African Partnership Station Initiative.

This is also why the strategic thinkers who developed the new Maritime Strategy wisely emphasize a soft power approach throughout the strategy.

6th Fleet Focus: Early Victory for AFRICOM

When the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) deployed on Tuesday, the nations expecting to participate in the African Partnership Station Initiative included Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome & Principe. Other nations have been invited, but no official interest from other nations had been announced.

There are two African nations specifically that have been critical of the US efforts to stand up AFRICOM, South Africa and Nigeria. Nigeria specifically was a hopeful for the African Partnership Station Initiative to take place in Global Fleet Station initiative in the Gulf of Guinea, but as of yesterday Nigeria hadn't expressed interest. Today, we have news otherwise.

The top U.S. Navy official in the African region says Nigeria, long opposed to the slowly developing increased American military presence on the continent, has accepted an invitation to participate in a new maritime security program.

U.S. officials, as they were planning the “Africa Partnership Station” (APS) effort, extended an invitation to a long list of African nations, including Nigeria and South Africa, which have both signaled opposition to the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Both nations’ governments also have raised concern about Washington’s intention to focus more on the long-troubled continent.

South African leaders have not yet responded to an invitation “to at least send observers” for the first APS activities off the continent’s western coastline; Nigerian officials “initially showed no interest,” said Adm. Henry Ulrich, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and the Sixth Fleet.

But the Nigerian leaders recently altered course, the soon-to-retire four-star said during an Oct. 16 Center for Strategic and International Studies-sponsored forum in Washington, indicating the African nation will take part. The “level of that participation,” Ulrich said, has not yet been determined.

This comes off news earlier this month of the USS Doyle (FFG 39), already in the region, conducted exercises with the South African frigate SAS Mendi (F 148) and 4 patrol boats of Ghana. The Navy has found mutual interest with the critics and is bringing them into the fold.

Time to eat crow. I have been especially hard on Ulrich, who I have not been impressed with in affairs of Europe. However, when it comes to Africa, Ulrich continues to produce big. This blogs author, and his staff of support who is wiser than he, extends its apology to the Admiral for our unfair criticism to date. While this blogs position is the good Admiral says things that are quite disagreeable, actions speak louder than words.

All the credit here goes to Admiral Ulrich, and I would forecast that following the good PR following successful SNMG1 tour of Africa from the last few months, South Africa will ultimately be involved in some way. When you look at Ulrich's record of just the last few months, whether it is the SNMG-1 African Cruise, Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea, or this African Partnership Station Initiative the US Navy 6th Fleet is doing good work with joint, international cooperation on every level.

But it doesn't end there, the article goes on to cover this tidbit:

From Washington, Ulrich is heading to a sea-power conference featuring naval chiefs from across the globe. There, he said he wants to explain why the next ship that sails into the Gulf of Guinea for the APS effort “isn’t flying an American flag.” To that end, five European nations already have signed on, and “Spain, Italy, France are all very interested,” he said.

U.S. officials have been in early talks with nations along the east African coasts about bringing APS or a very similar initiative to that side of the continent, Ulrich said, adding nothing has yet been nailed down.

It will be interesting to see what types of ships European nations send to the region. Noteworthy though, because there has been some discussion that France is interested in leading the next Global Fleet Station Initiative to East Africa, specifically rumored to be willing to deploy a Mistral class. I thought that was rumor only, but maybe there is some truth to it?

The Global Fleet Station concept is an extension of the Sea Basing concept in Sea Power 21, and in my opinion the best Sea Basing idea to come out yet. What I am impressed by is how the US Navy has already influenced allies with this idea to get them on board. When one considers the potential of international Sea Bases of maneuver in maritime regions with security problems, the 1000-ship Navy vision is realized.

6th Fleet Focus: Nigerian River Delta

It remains to be seen what role the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) will play in the Nigerian River Delta when it deploys for its Global Fleet Station deployment later this year. The Nigerian River Delta problems are a mix of terrorism, internal insurgency, and maritime crime but because the issues are mostly political, not idealogical, it becomes politically complicated for external involvement, and it is questionable whether the US would assist Nigeria even if asked for assistance.

A new report is out that is calculating the cost of energy troubles in Nigeria. $14 billion dollars a year, or 600,000 barrels a day.

Nigeria loses $14 billion a year to oil theft, according to Stephen Hayes, the president of the Corporate Council on Africa.

The supposed monetary losses incurred by the oil-rich West African country were calculated based on the estimated number of barrels of lost production due to corruption and crime, said Hayes.

"If you are losing 600,000 barrels a day on oil at $70 a barrel, you are losing $12 million a day on oil theft," Hayes told Nigerian newspaper This Day.

Before stepped-up hostilities by militant and other armed groups in the Niger Delta beginning in late 2005, Nigeria claimed to be producing about 2.5 million bpd. Since then, production has reportedly decreased by at least 20 percent, perhaps even by one-third, warn some analysts.

These types of security problems are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Not only does the energy represent a loss to the larger global economic system, but the black market created from the theft tends to destabilize regional nations as well, leading to further regional insecurity and an increase in regional black market activity.

With this in mind, the SNMG1 African cruise appears to be focused on gathering information about the regional security issues. It is unclear what the information will be used for, but understanding the problem is a critical first step to acting on a solution.

6th Fleet Focus: USS Bainbridge Deploys Friday

In perhaps the quietest international naval deployment in recent memory, the departure of Standing Naval Maritime Group 1 on August 4th has produced not a single shred of news since their departure. The official SNMG1 site reported the first week was focused on training and integration, important tasks for sure, but considering Saturday the deployment will officially be 3 weeks old, it is a safe assumption they have arrived (or will have) to the Gulf of Guinea and have done so with a purpose. I'm actually encouraged a bit by the lack of media reports, if they are going to do some good, best not run around with a high profile announcing your presence, particularly when areas like the Niger River Delta continues to produce a number of challenges.

What we do know however is the USS Normandy (CG 60), which deployed on April 14th of this year will soon be replaced by the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96). As regular readers are aware, I have been looking forward to the deployment of the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96).

As I have said before, I find it more than a bit ironic that Commander Stephen J. Coughlin, the CO of the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) is a graduate of the Naval Academy class of 1988. On April 14, 2024 the USS Samual B. Roberts (FFG 58) hit an Iranian M-08 mine in the Persian Gulf during Operation Earnest Will. I find it ironic because I recently completed reading No Higher Honor (ISBN 1-59114-661-5) by Bradley Peniston, who pointed out that when the frigate was in the Gulf in 1988 it literally had no mine detection capability other than a handful of spotters.

The result of that tragic event was probably the driving factor in increasing the capabilities of destroyers in mine warfare. Nearly 20 years later, the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) represents the lessons learned from that event.

The AN/WLD 1 (V)1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS) is intended to be the mine detection system of choice in the future. While it is a primary component to the Littoral Combat Ship MIW capability, on January of this year the USS Bainbridge become the first ship the RMS has been installed to.

The second ship to receive the AN/WLD 1 (V)1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS) was the USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98) in February. The USS Forrest Sherman, currently deployed with the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group, had a little incident with a WWII era mine in Ukraine's Black Sea port of Sevastopol during a recent visit. While I haven't heard of the RMS system being involved in that incident, I think it is noteworthy the US Navy has deployed their first two DDG-51s to receive the MIW UUVs, particularly at a time of increased rhetoric between the US and Iran in the Gulf.

A wise precaution given current events if you ask me.

While the local media report states the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) is heading to the Med, this is another example of an ignorant reporter. It was released in European news the ship will replace the USS Normandy (CG 60) as flagship of SNMG1 during the African deployment, sometime during its Cape Town leg, and will be with SNMG1 as it patrols off Somalia and the Horn of Africa before returning to the European theater in early October.

6th Fleet Focus: 1000 Ship Navy, From Rhetoric to Response

Standing NATO Maritime Group ONE (SNMG 1) has deployed for its circumnavigation of Africa. Consisting of the Flagship USS Normandy (CG 60) the group also includes, HNLMS Evertsen (F805), HMCS Toronto (FFH 333), NRP Alvares Cabral (F331), HDMS Olfert Fischer (F355), and FGS Spessart (A1442). This is going to be an interesting deployment to watch, not only for its efforts later next month in Somalia, but also in its efforts over the coming weeks in the Gulf of Guinea.

This blog has covered the various US Navy activities in the Gulf of Guinea region, starting with the donation of the Automatic Identification System to Sao Tome and Principe ($18 million maritime radar system) to the SeaBee construction for the Sao Tome and Principe Coast Guard to the excellent work frigates like the USS Kaufman (FFG 59) and USS Doyle (FFG 39) as they prepare the way for the USS Fort McHenry Global Fleet Stations deployment.

Back on June 25th Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the current president of Liberia, wrote an OP-ED that ran on the popular allafrica.com news site titled Africa: Africom Can Help Governments Willing to Help Themselves. In the OP-ED, she makes the case for US engagement to Africa.

Since the announcement of the creation of Africom, a new unified American combatant command responsible for Africa, there has been much skepticism over its intent and what it will be able to achieve on the continent. Africom should be seen for what it is: recognition of the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security interests, as well as recognition that long-term African security lies in empowering African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, building security capacity, and developing good civil-military relations.

The Africom charter specifies that the new command will focus on conflict prevention, rather than intervention. It will work with African states and regional organizations, such as the African Union and Ecowas, in coordination with other donor countries, to improve security capabilities and promote military professionalization and accountable governance.

In July the Congressional Research Office updated its report on "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa" where it outlines how the United States got to the point of creating AFRICOM. One of the most interesting aspects of AFRICOM most people are not aware of is where the political support comes from. As it turns out, the key politician that has been pushing for the creation of AFRICOM is Senator Russ Feingold. On January 10th, 2007 he used his time on the Senate Floor to outline his expectations for AFRICOM, which turns out, is very much in line with what the Global Fleet Station and the other deployments listed above are.

We have to be strategic and forward-thinking as we create this ne diverse and complex. We have a number of security-related concerns there, ranging from terrorist organizations and safe havens to large-scale corruption, regional conflicts, and the disruption of global energy markets. Continuing to establishing firm and productive military-to-military relations with a number of African nations is also critical.w organization, though. Because we are making such a profound change to our posture on the continent, we need to ensure that the new organization will contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government's overall strategy and objectives for the continent. We also need to make sure that the U.S. military's activities and involvement on the continent do not overshadow, skew, or otherwise hinder our Government's other key objectives.

It is clear that challenges in Africa are

But we have learned that the way to address the underlying causes of the security challenges throughout the continent is not generally through military power. In fact, the best way to address the full range of security-related concerns in Africa is to focus on the underlying conditions that plague governments and societies throughout the continent. Security threats and instability stem from corruption, absence of human rights, poverty, disease, lagging economies, and joblessness. Weak governments are incapable of addressing the dynamics that often contribute to lawlessness or violence, and are often left without any capacity to help defeat trans-national threats.

Bi-partisanship in Washington DC is mostly dead, but through a military effort in a mission other than war there is a chance for bipartisan support to AFRICOM if the DOD is successful early in its "missions other than war" focus. That won't be easy, piracy is an enormous problem in Africa, and local forces simply do not have the capabilities to deal with the problem. Engaging with local maritime forces will be a big part of improving the security situation.

It is still unclear if Nigeria will be exercising with SNMG1 as it approaches the Gulf of Guinea, but the Nigerian Navy deployed NNS Aradu (F89) and NNS Nwamba (???) for the time period SNMG 1 will be in the area. The Nigerian Navy deployment appears to include stops in Monrovia, Liberia and Dakar, Senegal before proceeding to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil for its bicentennial of Joaquin Marques Lisbon, the Marquis of Tamandaré on September 8th.

The NNS Aradu (F89) is a Meko 360 class warship that is returning to sea after a long absence. What does it say for the security of the Gulf of Guinea that the most powerful warship of all the regional nations is returning to sea for the first time in over 12 years? The NNS Nwamba on the other hand has been active since it was acquired. It is the former USCGC Firebush (WLB393), one of four coast guard cutters turned over to Nigeria in 2003 and commissioned into the Nigerian Navy in June of 2004. In 2005, the vessel proved it still has it, despite being 59 years old at the time when it traveled to the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar.

For those who are interested, the other three Cat class ships the US gave Nigeria are the NSS Ologbo, NSS Obula and NSS Kyama. If you have read this far, your probably wondering "why all the detail, what's your point? My point is this.

In 2005 the US Navy sent a single ship to the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar, the USS Saipan (LHA 2), a major diplomatic blunder in my opinion. Personally, I thought it nothing short of embarrassing. This type of blunder can't be made again, and an opportunity is approaching to insure this type of nonsense doesn't happen again. On the east coast of Africa, a natural regional partner in maritime security is emerging with India, and the US appears fully engaged.

The same is also true of the wast coast of Africa, where another natural regional maritime partner is emerging. Just like on the eest coast, the west coast partner is not an African nation, rather South American, and the US can ill afford not to be fully engaged with an emerging Brazil. As blogger Gallant of the Brazil Naval blog (English Link) points out, the SNMG 1 deployment to east Africa should be commonplace for the Brazilian Navy, but it isn't yet for a number of complicated reasons. That doesn't mean Brazil won't be engaged in the Gulf of Guinea region in the future, and the US needs to be ready when Brazil is ready by bringing Brazil into its 1000 Ship Navy model for the region sooner rather than later.

Pulling into Rio de Janeiro to celebrate Brazil's bicentennial in early September with a large Task Force would be a good place to start, hopefully the Bush administration isn't sleeping on South America and will realize such a deployment is anything but a bad investment for an east coast Strike Group at sea on training.

African Safari Deployment for SNMG1

With the news of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah recently holding meetings in Damascus, the US and Iran trading new barbs over Iranian claims of ownership of Bahrain, and predictions of another Israel-Hezbollah conflict later this summer, NATO has decided to send Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) on a 12,500 nautical mile circumnavigation around Africa for 2 months.

The African tour is planned to start on August 4th and sail to the West African Coast and Niger River Delta. SNMG1 will then proceed to South Africa to conduct exercises with the South African Navy at the end of August. The final phase of the deployment puts SNMG1 off the coast of Somalia for more exercises, including a visit to the Republic of the Seychelles in mid September. The voyage concludes with a return via the Suez Canal.

One has to wonder, is this in response to this UN call for assistance?

I think this is a really good idea. It puts NATO forces in two hot spots for piracy, and due to its international nature provides support to regional interests the right way. The only part of this plan I question is the timing. It seems a bit odd to me that NATO will move its standing force in the Mediterranean area of operation (AOR) out of the region during a time period where signs are pointing to increased activity of a military nature. Last year there was a big meeting in Damascus between Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah prior to the Lebanon-Israel war, why then should such a meeting this year not imply a similar result?

Hopefully the timing of such an important mission won't burn NATO, because it would be ridiculous for SNMG1 to be needed in the Mediterranean while performing exercises in South Africa.

Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) forces expected to make the deployment include:

USS Normandy (CG 60) - US - Flagship
HNLMS Evertsen (F805) - The Netherlands
HMCS Toronto (FFH 333) - Canada
NRP Alvares Cabral (F331) - Portugal
HDMS Olfert Fischer (F355) - Denmark
FGS Spessart (A1442) - Germany

6th Fleet Focus: Navy Continues Gulf of Guinea Preperations

While the United States is fighting the war today in the Middle East, the US Navy is looking to win the war of tomorrow without firing a shot. The battleground for that war will exist in various hot spots around the globe, some as near as South America and some as far as the South Pacific. Foremost among the future economic interests of the United States is the Gulf of Guinea. Like the Middle East, it is difficult to look around and find open, honest governments worthy of Ivory Tower partnerships, which in my opinion, makes it a critical region the US needs to get more engaged with sooner rather than later. While some complain the US interest in the region is centered around oil, as someone who thinks the US could be doing a better job taking care of its economic interests, I'd respond "it better be about oil" or our economy is going to go down the toilet.

Amid concerns that weak government controls in some West African states has made the region fertile for drug cartels, people smugglers and Islamist groups, the U.S. navy command in Europe has focused its activities southward.

"The clear majority of shipping coming into the United States is coming off the coast of West Africa into the Gulf of Mexico," Vice-Admiral John Stufflebeem, commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet based in the Mediterranean, said on Saturday.

"So we are interested in this (region) from a security perspective from our own homeland, and ... in commerce and quite frankly, oil is one part of it," he told Reuters.

The Gulf of Guinea, which includes oil producers like Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria, is central to U.S. efforts to reduce dependency on Middle Eastern exports.

It currently supplies around 15 percent of U.S. oil consumption, and that is forecast to rise to 25 percent by 2015, although resource-hungry China is also looking to corner oil supply from the region, notably in Angola.

With the upcoming Global Fleet Stations deployment of the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), the US has already begun setting the stage in the region to insure a long term commitment. With Nigeria in political chaos, Sao Tome and Principe is an ideal location for a future naval base in the region to promote security. The new $18 million Automatic Identification System (AIS) radar system in Sao Tome and Principe was the first step, and the Navy Seabee's arrived this week to repair the countries Coast Guard facilities.

The equipment delivered by Endeavor will be used to renovate the boat ramp at the city of Sao Tome’s coast guard base. Currently, the base’s only boat ramp is unable to launch patrol boats due to erosion and shallow slope into the water. During their three-month project, the Seabees will widen and steepen the slope of the ramp.

While in Sao Tome, the Seabees will also build a guard house for the base.

Both of these building projects are aimed at strengthening Sao Tome and Principe’s ability to contribute to maritime safety and security in the region. Increasing regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is one of the U.S. Navy’s top priorities in their growing engagement with Africa.

The US Navy and allies are quietly in action behind the scenes in the Gulf of Guinea region setting the stage for the upcoming Global Fleet Station deployment, but there are still several questions that will need answers to determine the entire concepts effectiveness. Will the US be able to achieve the political cooperation to help with the Niger River security problems? Will the US have enough assets, including the right assets, to take on the piracy in the region, or will we see another pirate encounter involving a LSD? Is the State Dept ready to go? If the answer to any of these questions is 'no' then the plan is flawed. You only get one chance to make the right first impression, and the first impression on this mission can have serious ramifications for the US and the region over the next decade.

The potential for kinetic operations is high in the region, and the ability of the Global Fleet Station to respond to these events is going to be critical. The media is going to ignore all the good will and progress, but is going to be all over the kinetic stuff this time. It is entirely possible the HSV Swift Global Fleet Station deployment has all kinds of kinetic activities happening behind the scenes, but the reality is, nobody actually cares about the drug trade in South America, but oil is on everyones radar, so the quiet stuff is more likely to make headlines.

I am encouraged by the soft power information leaking out. Working with NGOs is important, and creating the right environment for private investment, combined with sustained US Navy presence are good starting points for providing the type of Phase 0 operations Global Fleet Stations is designed for. The United States needs to be focused on leveraging economic power in the region to counterweight the historical forces that contribute to the regional chaos. The GWOT is termed the Long War, well if that is true, the Navy needs to term Global Fleet Stations as a vehicle for the Long Peace. A long term commitment to security, economic growth, and education has the potential to transform the region, but management, creating political cooperation, and fostering relations needs to be both precise and productive. Thinking small will result in small gains, thinking big means setting big goals, leading to the potential of big strategic gains in the region.

While AIS becomes a standard Maritime Domain Awareness tool, the tool won't be effective unless sustained presence is established. Nations like Nigeria are soon to hold a higher importance than Saudi Arabia as a US energy supplier, so establishing credible security early in the region is critical to making the type of economic and political change necessary to insure long term improvements in the region. If the Gulf of Guinea does become the strategically important region predicted, this Global Fleet Station deployment could carry significant long term ramifications for the US Navy's role in peacetime.

Global Fleet Stations: Gulf of Guinea

The US Navy has announced the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) will represent the 2nd phase of the Global Fleet Stations pilot. While the pilot with the HSV Swift represents a coast guard training deployment with other civil and humanitarian efforts, this Global Fleet Station deployment has an opportunity to truly address Maritime Security issues surrounding the Gulf of Guinea.

The Fort McHenry, homeported in Little Creek, Va., is expected to sail the Gulf of Guinea, working with representatives of participating African nations from Ghana south to Angola. It will also work with representatives of Senegal and Cape Verde.

“Part of the beauty of the Global Fleet Station is that it can be tailored to respond to the needs of the region,” Greene said. “Based on our interaction with the emerging partners and friends, it can be responsive to those [individual nation] desires, in terms of knowledge skills and abilities that they request.”

Back in 2005 the Gulf of Guinea became a focus again for the United States, when apparently someone realized Nigeria imports almost as much oil to the US than Saudi Arabia does. That year the USNS Emory S Land (AS 39) made a 2 month deployment , followed up with another deployment from the USNS Emory S Land (AS 39) in 2006. After the second deployment, there were several professional papers written about the contribution a ship like a sub tender was able to make in the region, ranging from its repair facilities to offshore logistics. One item cited in virtually all the professional papers on why the submarine tender was more successful than other US Naval vessels in maritime training was because the USNS Emory S. Land (AS 39) had 6 small boats. In the end the small boat sailors in foreign Navies related better to small boat sailors of the US Navy, imagine that.

In many ways, the Global Fleet Station in both its pilot and 2nd phase reflects the lessons learned from those two sub tender deployments. With the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), the Global Fleet Station deployment to the Gulf of Guinea will probably look much different than the one currently conducted by the HSV Swift. If it is anything like the last time a LSD deployed to the region, specifically the 2005 West African training cruise, the GFS will probably be more detailed towards security.

In 2005 the USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44) and the HSV Swift deployed Marines on a six-week deployment to Ghana, Senegal, and Guinea on board USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44) and the high speed vessel Swift (HSV-2). The Marines trained their African counterparts on riverine operations, ambush, counter-ambush, combat patrol, jungle-warfare tactics, and night-vision techniques. Additionally, Navy Seals and special-boat crews embarked on board Swift for riverine and boat handling training.

A background of current Maritime Security issues in the Gulf of Guinea can be found here. but in summery this quote sums up the maritime focus.

Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the centerpiece of the U.S. Navy’s strategy in the Gulf of Guinea. MDA is a broad term that refers to the situational awareness of anything in a nation’s waters or territorial or economic exclusion zone, and anything that could affect the nation’s security, safety, economics, or environment.

Last October, the US donated to Sao Tome and Principe an $18 million radar system to help them keep track of activity in their territorial waters and nearby ocean areas. The system, known as the Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) is a relatively cheap way to track shipping. The Global Fleet Station intends to utilize this system to fight piracy in the Gulf of Guinea during the deployment. It is noteworthy that in comparison to economically ravaged Somalia, the US Navy is taking a proactive role in fighting maritime crime in the economically critical Gulf of Guinea region.

A Whidbey Island Class Dock Landing Ship is essentially a mothership, except normally all that well deck space is required to carry ship-to-shore connectors for Marines. In this deployment however, the Marine requirement for ship-to-shore connectors is minimal, meaning the well deck can be loaded with Naval equipment instead of amphibious gear.

The Navy has a real opportunity in the upcoming Global Fleet Station to simultaneously deploy Marines for extended, detailed training beyond what was offered in the 2005 West African Training Cruise, but additionally deploy a large number of smaller navy vessels for maritime training and security.