Israeli Naval Forces Coastal Combat in Gaza

Global demographics shifts will increasingly drive wars towards highly-populated, urbanized coastal areas. Israel's ongoing Operation Protective Edge demonstrates a number of lessons for future littoral warfare in this environment.  As learned in over a decade of COIN operations, perhaps most important is a need for significant intelligence assets - eyes on target - required to engage aimpoints precisely in cities where the enemy is closely embedded with the population.

Despite a large volume of coverage on the conflict in Gaza, very little attention has been paid to the naval side of the war. The IDF has released some interesting combat footage, though.  The first video below demonstrates some of the unique cooperation between the ship (which appears to a be a Sa'ar 4.5 Hetz missile boat talking to its HQ) and Southern Command ground forces as the vessel engages an enemy mortar site with its 75mm gun.

An active video information campaign closely linked with combat operations is also vital in a world of instantaneous global communications where every citizen with a smart phone is a potential reporter. Something I find interesting in these videos is the dialogue.  For example, the line "mortars are being launched towards Israel" and similar language in other IDF videos seems to suggest that these units may have received some guidance on specifically articulating the threat as their footage would be used in information operations. Contrast this professional language to some of the unprofessional, profanity-laced gun-camera footage leaked early-on during OIF that embarrassed US forces.  I would hope by now that we've learned as a military that all radio/data transmissions are being recorded, at all times, and that if we do it right, communications incidental to combat can support overall campaign messaging. 

In the video below, a Hamas rocket launcher is engaged with some sort of electro-optically guided, ship-fired missile (Spike?).  Of interest is the verbal terminal guidance, "left, left, left, left" just before the missile hits its target. Clearly this sort of precise targeting - which was out of the visual line-of-sight of the ship - required close coordination with ground and air forces.  Press reporting shows that both UAVs and Israeli commandos have supported targeting for air and naval engagements during the current conflict. 

Dozens of strategic direct action missions into Gaza have been launched by the IDF's Shayetet (Flotilla) 13 naval commando force. In a politically-charged place like Gaza, occupation forces are not palatable and maritime raids, be they surgical special operations or larger scale punitive Marine operations, remain an important tool for ground-force commanders. 

The final video is a follow-up to a previous post regarding the failed Hamas naval commando unit infiltration. Apparently, Israel's Navy was also actively engaged in targeting at least some of the five intruders from the water. 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the US Navy.

Hamas' Failed Amphibious Infil

Earlier today, Israeli Defense Force helicopters eliminated at least two of five Hamas commandos who landed on Zikim Beach near an IDF Base northeast of Gaza.  The beach assault was likely an attempt to retaliate for yesterday's IDF assassination (also by air) of Mohammed Shaaban, head of the Hamas naval commando unit. 

This is not the first Palestinian foray into amphibious combat swimmer attacks.  In 2010, the Israeli Navy killed four scuba divers on a boat belonging to the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades. Hamas has fielded a naval police force since taking over the Palestinian Territories and last year, they reportedly opened a naval academy. ID readers will also likely recall the Hamas Naval Police involvement in the flotilla episodes of 2010.  A small maritime patrol force makes sense for a fledgling proto-state, especially given Israel's blockade of the Gaza coast and previous Israeli naval attacks on Gaza.

Yet a combat swimmer unit belongs in another category altogether. As we've noted, to build naval commandos into an real offensive special operations capability is beyond the reach of most non-state groups. These incidents highlight the importance of maritime capabilities to non-state actors, despite the expense and challenges associated with fielding these forces.  Israel certainly does not take these adversaries for granted, nor should other navies.  Mumbai provided the textbook example of how much damage a determined terror group can wreak with a sea-borne attack.

April 29, 2024 - Palestinian naval police loyal to Hamas inspect a boat after an explosion of unknown origin at Gaza City's port. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Maritime Weapons Interdictions

As “UNIFIED PROTECTOR” kicks off, it’s worthwhile to look at some recent interdictions of sea-born smuggled weapons. The Emiratis displayed excellent intelligence fusion and interagency cooperation in last week's seizure of thousands of weapons headed for the Houthis. The last thing Yemen needs is more small arms fueling one of the three or four (depending on how you count) ongoing insurgencies there.

Here is an interesting video on Israel’s interception of weapons probably bound for Hamas. As alluded to in the video, six C-704s represent a serious sea denial capability that fortunately was disrupted before reaching the hands of terrorists.

Judging by the destinations, Iran was probably responsible for both of these shipments... And to complete the trifecta, earlier this month, the Malaysians seized possible nuclear-related cargo sailing from China to Iran.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

ASMs to Hamas

More detail on the seized ship cargo from Noah Eshel at Ares:

An initial investigation revealed the ship was loaded with C-704 anti-ship missiles - shore-to-sea missiles with a range of 35 km that could put at risk Israeli vessels at sea as well as strategic infrastructure targets near Ashkelon. Iran is known to possess and is actually producing such missiles, which, along with identifying documents (including a missile identification document, below) gives substantial evidence of Iran’s involvement in the weapons smuggling attempt...

Delivery of these would seem to have represented a major increase in Hamas' military capabilities. Targets would presumably have been IDF Navy corvettes and patrol boats, although one of these could obviously give an LCS an extremely bad day.