Pivot to the Gates of Tears

The clash between radical Islam and modernity manifesting itself in the littorals of the Indian Ocean is an interesting subject. Recently, one of my friends currently patrolling the Indian Ocean invited my attention to book on this very topic by Camille Pecastaing, a professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS.

The title and cover jacket (a photo of a lone Aegis cruiser) of Jihad in the Arabian Sea are a bit misleading; navalists looking for a detailed account of terrorism on the high seas might be disappointed, with only one chapter really devoted to al Qaeda’s activities on the water along with a quick treatment of Somali piracy. Those interested in understanding the reasons behind AQ's operations at sea can save some time and read a more concise account of that subject here.

That said, I'd strongly recommend the book anyone involved in researching the region or preparing to deploy there. The book provides a wealth of context on the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula’s importance to al Qaeda. Detailed chapters on the violence and chaos endemic in Somalia and Yemen for decades give the reader a greater understanding of the conditions that allowed terrorism to take root there. Knowing the history and geography of areas in which policy makers and strategists are trying to devise solutions seems like common sense, but is often dismissed in favor of combing over the latest intelligence reports for "ground truth."

Rob Farley (and others) have written about the coming “pivot” of US defense focus to the Asia-Pacific. The reality is that a pivot has already occurred, especially in naval focus. As al Qaeda’s core has been decimated in South Central Asia, the network has dispersed to safe havens around the Indian Ocean and Africa where it can parasitically latch onto other insurgencies and unrest. Yet terrorism is just one of the problems driving US national interests in the region.

As Pecastaing writes, “At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the challenges for the countries on the littoral of the Arabian Sea are civil war(s), piracy, radical Islamism, transnational terrorism, and a real risk of environmental and economic failure on both sides of the [Bab el-Mandeb] strait.” Since the demise of Saddam Hussein, attention of the US Navy has shifted from the Arabian Gulf to the Indian Ocean in response to those challenges. While ground forces remain locked in a protracted nation-building effort in Afghanistan, since 2005-ish, the US Navy has dealt with a range of irregular threats from the Mediterranean to Pakistan’s Makran Coast. Quiet, but platform-intensive counter-terrorism operations, coalition piracy efforts over millions of square miles of ocean, large scale humanitarian assistance operations, and support to regime change in Libya are just a few of the missions that have driven demand and PERSTEMPO sky high for Naval and Marine Corps units of all types. Although in the long term, forecasters of a pivot to East Asia are likely correct, in the mid-term, we should expect continued requirements for naval presence in and around the Gates of Tears.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Simple Problems, Straightforward Solutions

Too often these days in the national security realm, we find ourselves over-analyzing problems consequently resulting in decision paralysis or unworkable, overly complex courses of action. Some problems truly are multifaceted and complex, such as the current situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This complexity is evidenced by a stew of insurgents, transnational terrorists, conflicting strategic interests, malign interlopers, and nuclear weapons stored amid violent Islamic extremists. It is little wonder that progress has been agonizingly slow in the wars in Southwest Asia.

But other problems are quite straightforward. Piracy is one of these problems, consisting primarily of desperate ex-fishermen with nothing to lose and everything to gain, who are led and financed by criminal thugs eager to blow their next insurance-funded ransom payment on prostitutes, khat, and luxury real estate in Kenya. Yes, Somalia's problems overall are quite complex. But they do not need to be solved in order to eradicate piracy, or at least to tamp it down to a manageable problem restricted to local waters.

Instead of rapidly implemented, simple solutions we've muddled through growing Somali piracy with unwieldy C2 architectures, extended discussion and planning, but very little decisive action. Sometimes the simplest, most elegant solution - such as when someone shoots at you, shoot them back - is also the most effective. Embarked armed security teams, which most segments of the shipping industry and flag states have begrudgingly embraced, have been 100% effective to date in stopping ship hijackings off Somalia. Even against swarm attacks, well trained, armed guards have the upper hand against pirates with small arms in open skiffs. To defeat such defenses would require a step up in equipment and tactics which probably exceed even the most competent pirates. Unlike purely defensive measures including razor wire, fire hoses, and citadels, armed response changes the risk/reward equation of the pirates. The success of simple solutions with embarked security and increased propensity to use lethal (not legal) action against pirates by CMF navies is evident in 2011's piracy statistics. “Where a year ago the Somali pirates were seeing a 55 percent success rate, in the first several months of 2011 they have seen only a 17 percent success rate…”

Yet these proactive measures are not enough. Needless to say, as long as pirate facilitation and logistical networks ashore operate with impunity, the incentive to push additional young men with weapons out to sea in search of more prey will remain. Several ways to defeat these networks are available: unilateral US or allied lethal action, international policing similar to the current AMISOM mission, or discrete deployments of allied special forces ashore in Puntland to link up with anti-piracy clan elements. Executing any of these options requires leadership on the part of the United States or one of her capable allies.

Piracy should be ended sooner, rather than later. Eventually, simple problems grow to become more complex and harder to defeat. For example, pirates and al Shabaab might see additional reasons to cooperate, such as in the recent kidnappings of European vacationers from resorts in Kenya into al Shabaab-held territory. Similarly, kidnap for ransom was a frequent crime in post-invasion Iraq and grew out of control when al Qaeda in Iraq began buying prisoners (primarily non-Iraqis) from the criminal kidnappers to raise funds for their terrorist activities and for exploitation in violent jihadi execution propaganda videos. That is, until the kidnapping networks began to be targeted with direct action by coalition forces. Moreover, the dozens of naval vessels currently tied up in countering sea criminals in the Indian Ocean can be put to much better use in the same region.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Swarm Tactics

A short story published on sina.com in late February shows four interesting photos from a Chinese convoy of ships near the gulf of Aden. The caption for each picture is quoted below each photo.

The first, from a Chinese helicopter, shows a group transit of merchant vessels, reportedly numbering 31 ships. Just guessing on the speed, I’d say they’re sailing at about 14 knots. Note how calm the seas appear to be. Prime sailing conditions for pirates.

Sina.com caption: “A helicopter of the Chinese naval fleet patrols above the Gulf of Aden to ensure ships' safety from pirates, February 25, 2010. (Xinhua Photo)”

The second picture, below, shows about 16 or so small skiffs. The caption says “50 suspected pirate vessels.” They could be fishing but that’s unlikely. It appears that least six of them have picked up speed and taken a course toward what might be the third or fourth merchant ship. Look closely at the merchant ship in this photo. It appears that the vessel may have already been alerted to the skiffs and has charged and activated fire hoses, at least near the superstructure.

Sina.com caption: About 50 suspected pirate vessels approach a ship escorted by the Chinese naval fleet in the Gulf of Aden, Feb. 25, 2010. The vessels harassed the 31 Chinese and foreign ships that the naval fleet was escorting. They were driven out soon after the fleet dispatched vessels and helicopters. (Xinhua Photo)

Nothing much to note here, except that they’re moving away. They’re not waving hello.

Sina.com caption: A suspected pirate vessel is driven out by the Chinese naval fleet in the Gulf of Aden, February 25, 2010. (Xinhua Photo)

The last of the four pictures is more difficult to analyze because it appears to be taken from the deck of a ship. The shallow angle makes it difficult to discern how close the skiffs actually are to the merchant vessel. Zooming in, it looks like there could be one or two skiffs close aboard. Again, just guessing, but the rest could be between 100 and 300 yards away. What is clear is that the merchant is using fire hoses.

Sina.com caption: Suspected pirate vessels harass a ship escorted by the Chinese naval fleet in the Gulf of Aden, February 25, 2010. (Xinhua Photo)

The fact that it is difficult to make out all the skiffs in this picture is important because it demonstrates how difficult it is to see these small boats from the deck of a ship, even at close range. It highlights the importance of aircraft, such as helicopters, P-3C Orion patrol aircraft, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Also of utility in this environment would be an airborne 360-degree radar platform such as the E-2C Hawkeye. Without such aircraft patrolling the wide expanse of water to get the perspective shown in the first and second pictures above, this group transit may not have had enough warning to recognize and prepare for an attack.

CNAS Fellow Andrew Exum blogged about Iranian swarming tactics two years ago (and cross-posted here) describing the harassment of three U.S. Navy ships by Iranian speedboats near the Straits of Hormuz. In that post, Exum included an “explainer” for Iranian swarming tactics excerpted from this article. It could be argued that what we see in these photos is technically not a swarming attack because such an attack originates from several different directions at once. If what we’re seeing is an attack, however, it does appear that these skiffs are operating en masse, in coordination and attempting to use mobility to their advantage.

A book on piracy that I highly recommend to anyone wanting to know more about piracy: Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism by Martin N. Murphy.

Germany to Withdraw From CTF 150 Early

As one who continuously observes naval deployments and patterns globally, I try to keep an eye out for news that seems odd, or doesn't add up. The news that Germany is basically stopping their contribution to Task Force 150 - the anti-terrorism international task force in the Gulf of Aden - seems very strange to me. There are plenty of perfectly legitimate reasons why the Germans would stop participation in CTF 150, but the specific reason given is not one of them.

Germany is withdrawing early from a US-led operation that patrols the sea off the Horn of Africa because the terrorist threat in that area is small, Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg said Wednesday.

A German Navy reconnaissance plane and 90 military personnel will end their activity on June 30 instead of at the end of this year.

'The terrorist threat in the sea area off the Horn of Africa is limited,' said Guttenberg in Djibouti. The minister is overseeing a cost-saving review in Berlin of Germany's military budget.

Either the German intelligence office is asleep, or there is another reason and this is simply an excuse - because the reason given appears contrary to the analysis of the terrorist threat everywhere else. The threat of maritime terrorism off the Horn of Africa and specifically the Bab-el-Mandeb strait is probably at the highest point it has been since 2001, when Task Force 150 was established.

For example, back in March there was a special advisory made by the US Navy Office of Intelligence.

ONI Special Advisory, 9 Mar 10. To ensure maximum dissemination to the maritime industry and/or community, ONI is bringing to your attention the following US DOT MARAD Advisory. Please note, this advisory is not piracy-specific. This advisory is regarding terrorism and is being disseminated in an effort to promote security for those operating within the maritime domain.

US DOT MARAD Advisory: Information suggests that al-Qaida remains interested in maritime attacks in the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden along the coast of Yemen. Although it is unclear how they would proceed, it may be similar in nature to the attacks against the USS COLE in October 2000 and the M/V LIMBURG in October 2002 where a small to mid-size boat laden with explosives was detonated. Other more sophisticated methods of attack could include missiles or projectiles.

Although the time and location of such an attack is unknown, ships in the Red Sea, Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden along the coast of Yemen are at the greatest risk of becoming targets of such an attack. All vessels transiting the waters in the vicinity of Yemen are urged to operate at a heightened state of readiness and should maintain strict 24-hour visual and radar watches, and regularly report their position, course, and speed to the UKMTO. Vessels are at greatest risk in areas of restricted maneuverability and while in/near port or at anchor.

Merchant vessels are requested to report any suspicious activity to the UKMTO Dubai (ONI).

That followed disturbing direct threats from Al Qaeda in Yemen to the US Navy from the end of last year.

The Germans may have a legitimate reason to pull out of Task Force 150, but the suggestion that the reason is a reduced threat is ridiculous. National interest, economy, or a change in policy would all be valid reasons. It should be noted that the German Navy will continue to operate as part of EU NAVFOR to fight pirates off the Horn of Africa, so whatever the real reason is - the Germans are not retreating from the region.

Something is very odd here. It doesn't make much sense to reduce presence in a volatile maritime region for a reason that appears to be in direct contradiction of the facts. It leaves the question whether the reduction of forces in the region is for a good reason - perhaps too good of a reason to mention to the public?

Latest Mujahideen Threat Looks to Sea

While I am yet to see a transcript of the speech, there is audio available here containing the latest threat by Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) entitled "A Response to Crusader Aggression." The BBC has a news article up.

A Yemen-based offshoot of al-Qaeda has called on Muslims in the region to wage holy war against the US and its allies.

A purported audio statement by Said al-Shihri, deputy leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, warned "American and Crusader interests are everywhere".

"Attack them and eliminate as many enemies as you can," Mr Shihri urged...

He said the group aimed to gain control of the strategically important strait of Bab al-Mandab, which connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea.

Then militants could "close the door and tighten the noose on the Jews, because through [the strait], America brings support to them by the Red Sea", he said.

Evan Kohlmann of Flashpoint Intelligence translated a few lines on Twitter today:

AQAP to al-Shabaab: "You have offered to send forces to support us... May Allah bless you, but let us cooperate each in his own trench."

AQAP to al-Shabaab: "We both are on the banks of the Mandab Strait... and let us complement each other in our warfare against our enemies."

The Washington Post goes into more detail regarding the specific threat.

Shehri called on Somalia's Islamist al Shabaab insurgents to help block a narrow strait at the mouth of the Red Sea that separates Yemen from the Horn of Africa.

"At such a time the Bab (al Mandab) will be closed and that will tighten the noose on the Jews (Israel), because through it America supports them by the Red Sea," Shehri said.

Targeting a strategic choke point at sea specifically would suggest the strategic sophistication of Al-Qa'ida is improving, although the number of attacks that could be carried out effectively to close the Mandab Strait are very limited - in fact so limited one can only name two types of attacks that could be useful, and only one with any sustainability.

Mines.

Given the IED has become the weapon of choice for Al-Qa'ida in every theater they have fought the west, that would be the most likely capability AQAP would seek to utilize in that area. Sea mines however are very difficult to acquire, not exactly available on the black market, and require a much higher level of capability to develop and deploy than IEDs.

The other form of attack would be suicide boats, but the use of a suicide boat against a US flagged vessel might be difficult to pull off with ships actively watching for pirates in that region. One thing is clear, non-lethal force is not going to stop a suicide boat bomber, so if any US flagged ship is counting on non-lethal capabilities to prevent an attack by Al-Qa'ida with small boats in the region - not being armed to deal with an a suicide boat would seem very foolish.

This is a very serious problem that has huge ramifications on the entire region. How can one tell the difference between a pirate or a suicide boat? Shipping companies can bet their bottom line that Al-Qa'ida recognizes this confusion and is planning on exploiting it.

Piracy has been allowed to fester for over two years at growth rates each year of over 90% from the previous year, and is now in a position to add enormous tactical confusion. If you thought the problem was hard when ships were just being hijacked, wait until ships are being hijacked and attacked by suicide boats in the same seas, with nothing distinguishing one type of attack from the other until it is too late. Don't think they can sink a ship? That would be a foolish assumption, Al-Qa'ida has proven very resourceful in adding lethality to IEDs.

The question is whether the west waits and allows Al Qaeda to strike first before changing the rules of engagement dealing with small boat threats in the region. It is not an easy decision for the Obama administration, because the target could be a 50,000 ton chemical tanker that could potentially create an enormous environmental disaster in a region already struggling from drought on land and reliant on the sea for food.

However, to be more realistic, when one goes down the road of studying the level of sophistication Al-Qa'ida has demonstrated in major attacks, one can't stop at simple threats. That 50,000 ton chemical tanker may not be the real target, rather could be hijacked by Al-Qa'ida and become the weapon against something much more important... like the Yanbu' terminal in Saudi Arabia.

Our failure to study history will soon catch up with us. Piracy was treated as more than a crime for thousands of years for very valid reasons, and yet we have treated it as nothing more than a crime preventing the international community from dealing with a few dudes in speed boats with AK-47s. Recognizing our inability to deal with simple problems at the policy level, once again Al-Qa'ida looks to exploit our political blind spot - specifically our 'enlighted' western non-lethal policy towards piracy. The consequences are unlikely to be very pretty.

Hopefully point defenses will be effective, because every other type of defense against small boat threats in that region under current policy has been largely ineffective to date.

Ramadan Ends, Here Come the Pirates!

There are several private advisories of attacks off Somalia this morning suggesting several small boats are armed off the Horn of Africa. So far, no details have hit the news, except this one.

Iranian warships opened fire on suspected pirate boats in the Gulf of Aden to prevent an attempted hijack of three Iranian commercial vessels, a navy commander said on Saturday.

"After the boats ignored warnings, the pirates were sent fleeing by our shooting and they left the area," state radio quoted Fariborz Qaderpanah as saying. He said the incident took place on Friday.

The international naval forces are expecting a busy weekend. The alerts and warnings are coming from just about everywhere, suggesting coalition observation assets are doing their job offering early warning.

I spoke with Rear Adm. Scott Sanders, vice commander for U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, and British Royal Navy Capt. Keith Blount, the task force’s chief of staff, during a bloggers roundtable back on September 11th. Talking to the CTF-151 folks, it is impossible to measure the international coalitions influence in curbing piracy. They are clearly doing good things intercepting armed boats and donating the guns and grenades to the Indian Ocean deep, but they don't give any statistics for comparison regarding frequency of intercepts that would allow an observer to compare to the number of attacking vessels there were this time last year.

Still, I came away from that conversation very encouraged. There is evidence that coordination, trust, and cooperation is building among the international naval forces on station. That confidence and trust in each other can't be surged, as CS-21 notes, it is developed over time. In that regard, the Navy strategy is unquestionably working.

Did the vast majority of pirates take Ramadan off from pirate activity? Hard to tell, the weather before Ramadan prevented pirates from operating in their small vessels. The surge in attacks this morning off Somalia would suggest the pirates simply waited until the first morning after Ramadan to return to business as usual. Will a pattern develop, and will the international community successfully prevent hijackings? Time will tell, and this is when all of the efforts of the last several months by all the international partners gets tested.

Look for the news reports to break over the next few hours with details of the attacks.

Leverage the Economy of Violence to Build a Somali Coast Guard

In 2008 the United Nations tracked 180 reported incidents of piracy off Somalia. This breaks down to 65 suspicious approaches, 69 attempted hijackings, and 46 successful hijackings, a success rate of 40%. Through April 15th, 2009 pirates have attacked around 80 ships and have hijacked 19 of them, with a success rate of 20%. There are currently 17 ships with over 300 mariners being held hostage off the coast of Somalia.

With a second attack in a week against an US-flagged vessel, and hijackings occurring in the region at an astonishing rate, it is unlikely this is issue is going to go away quietly. The big question on everyone's mind seems to be, what can we do? Well, we have a lot of options actually, the question is what should we do. Piracy is a problem, but has not risen to the level of a strategic or economic threat yet.

If I was working this problem, this would be how I approach it.

Buy Time

If I was President Obama, I would tell the press that one thing holding up action on piracy is the confirmation of Ray Mabus and Bob Work, thus shift the attention to the Senate. I know it makes no difference, but piracy is a complex problem, and right now time is on the side of the United States. Anyone who has read this blog for several months has noted how limited action by the US Navy has paid huge benefits towards the goals of the United States regarding piracy. The problem continues to create pressures in Europe, and every increase in insurance premiums will hit the consumer in Europe harder both on the shelf and in terms of energy imports from the Middle East. If you are an American who doesn't want a war in Somalia, you want the Europeans to continue to get screwed by pirates until they get fed up. Nothing builds mutual support than when their political needs meet up with our political capacity. I think Obama would be quite smart to let the pressure build on Europe, so they come to us looking for a solution.

I noticed Mullen has called for an evaluation of strategy, which is exactly right. ADM Mullen knows this is going down on his watch, and he is going to be engaged. I was not a fan of ADM Mullen the CNO, but ADM Mullen the CJCS has been excellent. For the first time since the late 80s, the Navy SWO is being asked to come up with new ideas that are cheap. I bet they rise to the occation. May I recommend reviewing the lessons of Wimbrown VII and Hercules as a way to deal with small boats, and talking to some old vets how they dealt with this low level crap at sea. The extra insights may come in handy in framing the mind for the challenge. There are several tacticl options the Navy can look at, beginning with spending more time focusing on US flagged ships and coordinating convoys to buy time for the President.

The Economy of Violence

The last economic impact study I saw regarding piracy costs influencing the United States said it was something like 1 cent for every 6 gallons of gasoline. We can certainly manage the 2 cents per fill up. The real costs are being passed on to consumers in Europe, which puts pressure on their governments for more action and a more engaged policy. Mariner Unions in Asia are very powerful blocks in nations like India and the Philippines, and since we have spent considerable resources building the capability of the Philippines, this may come in handy. As EagleOne noted, the connection between Somali piracy and the Philippines is not trivial.

Piracy is not expensive in the grand scheme of things (PDF), for example, the 2,700 extra miles around the Horn of Africa can increase the cost of operating a 300,000 DWT tanker or a 5000 TEU container ship around $3.5 million annually, primarily because it decreases the number of annual trips those ships can make from 6 to 5, and increases the fuel and labor costs of the ship. The thing is, a 300,000 ton DWT delivers half a billion in oil annually, and a 5000 TEU container ship is also big time money in shipping. $3.5 million is just slightly more than a rounding error in the operation of these vessels. Besides, these costs get passed on to the European consumer, so this condition only helps US strategy in getting Europe to take a more active role.

Maritime traffic is already down considerably due to the global economy, which is why it has actually helped the maritime industry for ships to take the long trip around Africa. Fewer trips per ship means more ships get a charter, thus more work for the industry.

Ransoms are still being paid, with a Greek cargo ship released in the past week reportedly earning the pirates over $1 million. The average Somali earns $600 annually, while the pirate who hijacks ships is paid around $10 a day by these pirate cartels, plus any cash they may steal while looting a ships crew. There are plenty of operational costs, including fuel for the boats used to hijack and rent to fisherman to tow them out to sea (act as a mothership), but often pirates will steal a fishing vessel from another country (the two Egyptian fishing ships hijacked this week for example) and will use them as motherships, so these costs are not considerable. Ultimately, between equipment, maintenance, and payroll for hundreds of folks the total cost of an operation is probably often less than 50% of the earnings, meaning lots of profit to go around for a million dollar ransom payment.

Latest news reports are suggesting War Risk Insurance premiums for Somalia may rise to $30000 per day for ships, and with the attacks shifting east of Somalia and further offshore in that area, it is only a matter of time before that area gets declared a war risk zone. Maritime traffic in the region is down due to the global economy. The transit through the war zone area in the Gulf of Aden is usually 1 day, while the transit through a war zone area in the Indian Ocean east of Somalia, if it happens, will be around 2.5 days. For 20,000 ships in the Gulf of Aden, that adds up to around $600 million in war insurance annually at the very high end, not including rebates given when no claim is exercised on the policy, or the reality that not every ship actually buys war risk insurance. The actual figure is probably between $300 - $400 million annually. Should war risk insurance be required in the Indian Ocean region, it will influence fewer ships, but the costs will be 2.5x higher. That decision could push total war risk insurance for the region to approach $1 billion for 2009.

US ships have not seen an increase in insurance premiums while transiting the area as of February 2009 according to CRS, but the primary reason given by CRS is because no American ships have had cargo's stolen or had damage. It is unclear how the recent incidents may influence insurance rates on American flagged vessels. For understanding more about maritime insurance costs, I encourage reading that CRS report, it is useful. It also reviews options for the US government to take a more active role in insurance, which could be helpful in developing revenue models to pay for security in that region.

Yes, I think instead of security contractors, we should seriously consider our options regarding insurance premiums, potentially even renting out the US Marine Corps as a war risk insurance premium policy to safeguard our insurance investments. I highly doubt a squad of Marines are going to be disappointed they may have to blow a Somali pirate to hell so Uncle Sam can earn a few bucks towards a regional security solution.

With insurance premiums a cost effective means of protecting shipping companies from piracy, and the ransoms paid by the insurance companies feeding the cycle of violence, I think the US should consider injecting themselves into the economy of violence to get it working towards the goals of regional maritime security. Is there any way to encourage global shipping companies to pay war risk insurance to the US, who would underwrite the war risk insurance as a means of developing an income model towards regional security, and insure the policy with a squad of Marines through the war zone? Simply put LPDs at an entry and exit point, and we don't need to escort each ship, the Marine squads can provide on the spot security.

There seems to be a lot of money floating around the insurance costs here, money that if it could be obtained by the US, could be used to procure the necessary equipment and fund the training for a Somali Coast Guard.

Somali Coast Guard

I see three maritime problems off the coast of Somalia: illegal fishing, illegal dumping, and lack of security. These are three problems that every professional Coast Guard in the world can fix off their nations coast, so instead of doing a nation building exercise on land, why not look at Somalia in the context of developing a national maritime security capability at sea. There are all kinds of ways to help the emerging Somali government without western military power on land, but there are very few options regarding standing up a professional Somali Coast Guard without foreign military assistance. This is where Europe and the Philippines can add capability for training to share the manpower costs that will be required in the development of skills necessary to meet the challenges of the Somalia maritime domain.

I look at this as a "Sons of Somalia" model in the spirit of "Sons of Iraq" except with direct training and military equipment assistance, plus a long term cooperation commitment. If the Somali Coast Guard is paid a wage of $10 - $20 dollars a day, plus using better equipment that interfaces with the modern technology of international naval forces, that job becomes appealing for the Somali kid looking for a way ahead. It would also keep costs low.

A 2000 man Somali Coast Guard earning $10 a day, and a 400 man officer corps making $20 a day (officer pay would scale from say $12 up to $15 a day), the estimated high number for manpower costs would be $10.2 million annually. If we built and supplied 30 M-80s, for example, at $15 million a piece, worked in conjunction with the local security forces to build expertise for say, 5 years, the total equipment cost would be $450 million, but operated in conjunction with international forces for 5 years we would actually be looking at $90 million annually in procurement amortized over the 5 years, plus one would figure $1 million per vessel maintenance annually, so $120 million annually.

That comes in at a cost of around $130.2 million annually to build a 30 modern vessel Coast Guard with 2000 Somali Coasties and 400 officers.

The way I see it, that is around what the total number of ransom payments could be in 2009 given the current rate of piracy, and well below even the lowest estimates the war risk insurance premiums are costing the industry. The goal would be to find $250 million annually for developing a Somali Coast Guard with a sustained and supported 5 year program, using the rest of the money annually for larger chartered command vessels (motherships) to cover the operational requirements of the M-80s, but also deal with problems like environmental cleanup or forward sea basing. In conjunction with international forces already operating in the region, a long term maritime security capability could be stood up.

Clearly this idea needs a lot of work to flesh out, but this is the general overview of how I would approach building a national maritime security capability for Somalia. It seems to me that $1.25 billion over 5 years could do a lot of good, particularly considering war risk insurance premiums over the same period by the shipping industry would be higher, and potentially much higher if war risk premiums become required off the eastern coast of Somalia for the big ships making the trip around the Cape of Good Hope.

I'd Have Paid To See This

Three rounds of ammunition: $0.30

One day's pay for three SEAL snipers: about $400

The value to the taxpayers of a "swiss army knife" warship for one day: $91,000.

The look on the last Somali pirate's face when he learned his compatriots were dead, his hostage was free and he was still aboard BAINBRIDGE: priceless.

Nice shootin', Sailors.

Why We Don't Hang Pirates

Fabius Maximus has a sound review of the rationale behind how we deal with pirates in these times. In short, the answer is:

1. Modern pirates seldom kill passengers or crew, or commit the other crimes for which their predecessors were infamous (e.g., rape, ransom). See these Wikipedia lists: piracy, somali pirates.

2. Developed nations today have few or no capital crimes. Theft is seldom one, and rarely for first-time offenses.

The more basic problem in dealing with pirates is piracy hasn't been a serious problem in over a century and the law has had no real need to catch up. Now would be a good time, though....

Interesting Report on Regional Iranian Military Expansion

I'm not the biggest fan of Reza Shafa, his record isn't perfect, but he has reported similar information in the past that has turned out confirmed accurate at a later date. Either way, this is certainly worth noting if true.

According to intelligence reports, in recent weeks, the mullahs’ regime has installed long-range and anti-aircraft missiles, and has deployed a number of members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the outskirts of Eritrea’s Port of Assab near the Red Sea. This initiative by the mullahs takes place in the context of agreements the regime had signed in Asmera with the government of Eritrea.

These forces and equipment have been transferred to the region using the regime’s submarines. The agreement and the deployment of forces and long-range missiles in the Port of Assab have been carried out under the guise of renovating the port’s oil refinery (which is an old facility). The mullahs’ regime is operating there under the cover of refining crude oil in the port’s refinery. It has also crafted phony documents in this regard.

I have no idea if the specifics are true or not, but it does match the operational style of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and why the United States lists them as a terrorists network. The IRGC is an excellent example of a state sponsored organization with autonomy that has tremendous impact with our nations policy towards Iran, even as virtually every action by this group is ignored and often denied by the Iranian government.

They are hardly unique as an organization of this type, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is another example, an example many will become more familiar with over the next several months as the Obama administration begins looking at long term solutions for our national challenges in Afghanistan.

I don't know if I buy into the use of submarines for smuggling military arms to Eritrea from Iran, but it is certainly possible and very much worth noting. Considering the pirate activity of the last year sending it by ship wouldn't have been very bright. The article goes on with some analysis.

But, the question remains: What does revamping an old refinery have anything to do with the deployment of missiles? This was the question that prompted doubts and suspicions regarding the regime’s actions. Some intelligence sources indicated that by installing military equipment and forces in Eritrea’s Port of Assab, the mullahs’ regime actually intends to exert control over the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, situated 3 km from Eritrea and Yemen. The Bab-el-Mandeb strait (“Gate of Tears”), is the closest spot to the Gulf of Aden, which connects the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, and is in fact the passageway for oil tankers and cargo ships in the African and Southwest Asian regions. As such, this area is of exceptional strategic importance. The regime’s objective is to cause disturbances and sabotage oil tankers of oil-rich countries of the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and African countries, in the event that during a potential military conflict, the Strait of Hormuz is closed off to oil tankers of the Persian Gulf.

A lot of people give me lip service when I discuss Iran, sometimes for good reason, but I want to offer a counterpoint so readers better understand where I'm coming from. Of all the countries in the Middle East, and I include Israel, I think Iran demonstrates strategic thinking in action consistently at a higher level than anyone else, and often runs circles around their competitors including the US. Iran really does plan and execute plans well, and whether the topic is nuclear weapon development or Iraq, I think the results validate it.

It would not surprise me at all to learn Iran is dispersing a regional military capability, particularly with states like Eritrea who the United States does not have very good relations with. With that said, submarines are moving long-range missiles? Hmm, what kind? I don't buy submarines are moving ballistic missile parts, I'd have to see evidence (Google Earth anyone) first, but I do believe it is possible Iran could be moving anti-ship missiles which is kind of a scary thought.

After all, Iran did give them to Hezbollah. I think the type of missiles is important towards the verification and accuracy of this report, because if they are anti-ship missiles, considering all those international frigates operating in the region, it might be a good idea to go public with that information as a public service... assuming its true.

Counter-Piracy: The Drug War On Steroids

I wrote something off-handed the other day over at USNI's new blog that appears to fit more and more: "The piracy problem in the Horn of Africa looks more and more like the drug smuggling problem on the American coasts every day. The application of maritime forces can change the way pirates operate and influence to pace of pirates’ operations, but as long as there’s money to be made and the risk of death or arrest is acceptable, the pirates will be there".

This just helps confirm my suspicions:

Ahmed Dahir Suleyman is cagey as he talks about the global network that funds and supports piracy off the coast of Somalia.

"We have negotiators, translators and agents in many areas ... let me say across the world," said Suleyman, a pirate in the harbor town of Eyl, where scores of hijacked ships are docked.

"These people help us during exchanges of ransom and finding out the exact person to negotiate with," he told The Associated Press. Before cutting off the cell phone call, Suleyman snapped: "It is not possible to ask anymore about our secrets."

The dramatic spike in piracy in African waters this year is backed by an international network mostly of Somali expatriates from the Horn of Africa to as far as North America, who offer funds, equipment and information in exchange for a cut of the ransoms, according to researchers, officials and members of the racket. With help from the network, Somali pirates have brought in at least $30 million in ransom so far this year.

"The Somali diaspora all around the world now have taken to this business enterprise," said Michael Weinstein, a Somalia expert at Purdue University in Indiana. He likened the racket to "syndicates where you buy shares, so to speak, and you get a cut of the ransom."

Weinstein said his interviews with ransom negotiators and Somalis indicate the piracy phenomenon has reached Canada, which is home to 200,000 Somalis.

John S. Burnett, a London-based author working on a book about hijackings off the Somali coast, said there is no doubt Somali pirates are part of "transnational crime syndicates." He said information from sources, including people involved in ransom negotiations and payouts, indicates the money goes as far as Canada and capitals in Europe.

"Places like Eyl are getting only a portion of the millions in ransom being siphoned off," he said. "The Somali diaspora is huge."

Sheik Qasim Ibrahim Nur, director of security at Somalia's Interior and National Security Ministry, said evidence points to Somali expatriates in Kenya and the United Arab Emirates, but declined to give further details. He said there is "no doubt" the pirates have links outside Somalia.

The French Have It Right On Piracy

The commander of French naval forces in the Horn of Africa understands where the piracy problem must be solved:

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden will only be defeated by a strong government in Somalia, the commander of the French naval operation in the Indian Ocean said on Sunday.

"We will not end this phenomenon unless we have a Somali government that has the means to act on its territory to fight piracy," Vice-Admiral Gerard Valin said on the sidelines of a regional security conference organized by Bahrain and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
...
Valin also hailed the European Union naval mission in the Gulf of Aden as a major step in battling the surge in attacks and hijackings by ransom-hunting Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, a crucial trade route used by 12 percent of the world's maritime trade and 30 percent of its oil.

"It is really a leap forward, since this is the first time that a coalition has been formed with the mission of fighting piracy," he told AFP.

The EU mission Atalante, a coalition that groups eight EU countries, began operations off the coast of Somalia on December 8 to try to stem the growing piracy, including the hijacking of a Saudi supertanker last month.

America seems to understand, too, but the proposed solution is a little perplexing:

The Bush administration will mount a last-ditch push this week to muster international backing for a relatively small U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia, in an effort to help stem piracy and prevent the resurgence of Islamist militants in the lawless East African nation, according to State Department officials.
...
The United States has already begun informal negotiations on a resolution that would authorize the transformation of the existing African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) -- which includes 3,400 Burundian and Ugandan peacekeepers -- into a somewhat larger U.N. mission. The peacekeepers would be restricted to Mogadishu and other parts of southern Somalia, according to U.S. officials.

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon concluded last month that even a larger and better-equipped U.N. peacekeeping force of 22,000 blue helmets would not be capable of stabilizing Somalia and that a much more powerful multinational force was needed.

But a spokeswoman from the U.S. mission to the United Nations, Nicole Deaner, rejected Ban's proposal Friday, saying it is not a "viable option" since no country is prepared to lead or finance such a mission. "AMISOM is an effective peacekeeping force and will provide a good starting place in developing and deploying a future U.N. mission," she said.

Perplexing, that is, until you read on to the end of the story:

The Bush administration has received support from China and key African countries, including South Africa, which have pressed the United Nations to mount a large new peacekeeping mission in Somalia. "All the experts who know Somalia say the chance of everything falling apart is great," said South Africa's U.N. ambassador, Dumisani Shadrack Kumalo. "Unless something is done immediately, the radical Islamic groups will be running Mogadishu again tomorrow with very harsh Islamic principles that they want to impose."

So, what this looks like is a piece in the War on Terror pie portrayed as the kernel of a piracy solution. Perhaps that's true, but just how long does the administration believe it will take?

Quick Math For Anti-Piracy Operations [Update 3]

Observing the first phase of Operation Atalanta, I've run through some of the numbers to get a feel for the economic price taxpayers in the EU will be incurring to stem the tide of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Here's what I came up with:

Each group of ships involved will spend approximately 120 days on station and another 15 days transiting to and from the region. With 10 frigates, three smaller combatants, one support ship and a small staff involved, I estimate there are about 1750 sailors in the force. Picking an average cost rate of $40k per year in pay and another $10 per day in food, the personnel costs run approximately $28.4 million for each phase, or $85.1 million for the entire year-long operation.

Then, looking at fuel costs, a group this size will run through around 1,400 barrels of fuel per day while transiting and perhaps 800 barrels per day on station, which at $125 per barrel yields a cost of $14.6 million per phase and $43.9 million for the entire operation.

So, not even considering maintenance, ordnance, flight operations, logistics and port and canal costs, the starting point to estimate the cost of the whole operation should be around $129 million. Other costs associated with a heightened operational tempo could increase the cost by another $20 million or more.

As of the first part of October this year, pirates have collected an estimated $30 million in ransoms in 2008.

[Update] Looks like costs may be increasing by a factor of two:

The European Union is urging nations from outside the bloc to join the EU’s anti-piracy naval force off Somalia, the fleet’s commander said.

“We are in talks with countries that want to contribute that have the potential to double the size of the force,” Admiral Philip Jones said today at a news conference in Brussels.

[Update 2] Reader Antonio comments: Also in your comparison to the $30M in ransom they've collected, you also need to look at the increased costs of insurance for ships transiting the region, as well as the economic impact of some vessels taking other, slower routes. I'm sure there are a host of other second and third order effects making the $129M+ expenditure seem more reasonable than just accounting for $30M in ransom.

My response: There are certainly costs associated with increased insurance and delayed shipments, but the only estimate I've seen of costs to the shipping industry is in the $16 billion range. That was sourced to an industry group and seems enormously inflated to me.

With approximately 20,000 ships transiting the Gulf of Aden every year, that would mean an increased cost of $800k per ship. Considering the hijacking rate is less than one in 300 and traffic through the region hasn't dropped off significantly, I find it hard to believe a shipper would pay an extra $800k in insurance per ship to avoid a 0.3% chance of having to pay a couple of million dollars in ransom.

If the annualized payout rate is $36 million in ransoms distributed over 20,000 ships insured, one would expect insurance to go up by about $1,800 per ship plus costs to the insurance companies processing claims. So what other costs are shippers incurring that must total around $798k per ship to raise the total cost to shipping into the $16 billion range?

I suspect someone did some quick math of their own to influence policy makers by assuming every ship transiting the Gulf of Aden diverted in one way or another and every shipping company paid the increased insurance rates. If my assumption is true, the "garbage in, garbage out" principle applies.

I need to see the numbers and assumptions to thoroughly evaluate the claim.

[Update 3] After doing a little research, the $16b claim seems to be sourced to Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan, quoted in a 2004 Foreign Affairs article by Gal Luft and Anne Korin, titled "Terrorism Goes to Sea".

Stefan Eklöf, a research fellow, Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden, also calls this estimate into question in his book, Pirates in Paradise, and concludes a more reasonable estimate of the cost of piracy is $70m to $200m (p. 100).

The Times reports the average insurance rate for ships transiting the Gulf of Aden is $9,000, which is a more reasonable figure.

Send Them To Davy Jones... Maybe Not

Why don't we just arm up commercial ships and fight back? I've been reading several blogs associated with the maritime blogger community thinking maybe opinions are changing with all the piracy, but all indications are the idea of arming commercial ships remains unpopular despite all the piracy. For those armchair gunners who think putting force on ships is the answer, this is an interesting read.

Also interesting, Kennebec Captain notes that the incident the other day where the British security professionals abandoned ship when the Biscaglia was being taken by pirates has an interesting twist, the security folks were unarmed, but were using a LRAD. I guess it was not effective? LRAD is not a new system, it could be that pirates have adapted and it is losing its effectiveness

That really is part of the issue here. Firearms are not on commercial ships, and most captains don't want them on the ship because it can create more problems than it can solve. What happens when a ship fights back, kills someone, and pirates still hijack the ship? Will they seek revenge on a crew member? Think about all the legality issues here, if ships start fighting back, what happens when a Japanese whaler shoots someone from the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society during a TV scene? If I owned the Japanese Whaling Company under assault in that show, I'd sue both the organization and the Discovery channel itself for funding piracy, because the Discovery channel is clearly funding acts on that show that can be accurately described in Article 101 (PDF).

If pirates are now overcoming non-lethal means of piracy deterrence like LRAD, is arming up commercial shipping the next step? It is going to be very interesting to see what the EU does when their ships deploy, particularly with the Germans deploying so many troops, and it sure would be nice if we could get someone in the media to actually ask one of our elected officials about piracy.

It amazes me how so many political pundits in this country will spill ink discussing piracy, often without the slightest clue what the hell they are talking about, but these same folks don't seem to care our nations elected leaders have still not been required to answer a single question on the piracy issue, despite all the media attention. Am I the only person who thinks that is odd?

Keep Somalian Piracy in Perspective

Piracy is a side effect of the problems in Somalia, but the problems off the Horn of Africa produce many side effects. While piracy gets the headlines, it is a problem centric to money. There are so few deaths annually as a result of piracy I can't find statistics online that actually track the number.

The side effect of the problems off the Horn of Africa that is serious in regards to loss of life is the refugee and human smuggler problem. Think about the task facing international naval forces there, they can either position themselves to fight piracy, or be in position to save people being smuggled into Yemen. What kind of people do this?

"On Sunday, as the boat was within sight of the Yemeni coast but still in deep water, the smugglers demanded more money from all of the passengers, who had already paid $100 each prior to departure," Redmond said. "The survivors said those who did not or could not pay were severely beaten by the smugglers and up to 40 people, mostly Ethiopians, were thrown overboard despite their pleas for mercy."

The article goes on to note UNHCR has counted over 38,000 people crossing by boat from Somalia to Yemen through October in 2008, which according to the article "is nearly 10,000 more people who made the same journey during the whole of last year."

The article also says more than 600 people have been reported dead or missing so far this year in the Gulf of Aden, compared to 1,400 for all of last year. That could be a result of increased naval activity, something the UN should look into.

Consider and contrast. Pirates seize ships and collect millions of dollars, but very few people die as a result of piracy. That article is about a boat full of 115 people trying to flee as refugees across the Gulf of Aden. Each paid $100, which comes to $11,500 total for the trip, and when the smugglers couldn't get more money (probably less than the $100 originally paid) for their efforts, 40 were thrown out into the deep water to drown.

40 lives for what couldn't have been more than $4000 total. Want to hang pirates? I'm OK with that, but lets hang these human smugglers first, and if there is no rope I'm sure someone in Africa can spare both a gun and bullet.

5th Fleet Focus: September in Somalia

September began with news that pirates were demanding $8.2 million ransom to free two Malaysian tankers and a Japanese-managed bulk carrier. Malaysia responded by sending three ships; the 2,270 ton Frigate 2000 class KD Lekiu (30), the 1,650 ton MEKO 100RMN class Patrol Ship KD Pahang (172), and the Newport class Landing Ship KD Inderapura (1505), ex-USS Spartanburg County (LST 1192). The next day news reports alerted that a French yacht was hijacked by Somalian pirates and taken to the semi-autonomous northern region of Puntland, specifically the port of Eyl.

The next day, Hassan Muse Alore, the minister for minerals in northern Somalia's Puntland region, told Reuters that the Egyptian dry cargo ship Al Mansourah had been hijacked and also taken to Eyl, where it was claimed 10 ships were being held for ransom as of September 4th. Hassan Muse Alore was in Eyl to confirm the existence of arms on an Iranian ship that had previously been captured by pirates.

On September 6th, it was announced the French couple taken hostage by pirates on the yacht Carre D'as IV are being held for an extraordinary random sum of $1.4 million AND the return of the 6 Somali prisoners taken by French Commando's earlier this year. There was also an announcement that pirates are using the French yacht as a mothership for launching piracy on regional traffic.

However, this past Sunday, coalition forces fought back. The Norwegian tanker Front Voyage on its way to Singapore when the alert crew of 25 Russians and Filipinos spotted a pirate boat approaching the vessel. The crew, which had reportedly trained to fend off pirates, used water cannons to keep the pirates from climbing up the tanker while waiting for the arrival of HDMS Absalon (L16). News reports indicate the pirates were captured by the Danes, and transferred to an US Navy warship.

The latest news is that a South Korean ship has been taken by pirates. The seizure of the South Korean vessel brings the total number of vessels being held by Somali pirates to 11, all of which are thought to be held in the port of Eyl. Over 150 crew members are currently being held hostage. Also noteworthy, a Greek vessel narrowly escaped being captured after assistance from coalition forces, no word regarding what happened to the boat with a machine gun that attacked the Greek ship.

This is the Somalian piracy activity reported in just what has been reported and observed by Eagle1 the first 10 days of September, and doesn't include the refugee problems that plagues Somalia as people flee across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen.

According to UNHCR, almost 24,270 people have made the dangerous voyage across the Gulf of Aden this year aboard smugglers’ boats. More than 177 people died, and 225 people remain missing. At the same time last year, there were 9,153 arrivals, 267 dead and 118 missing.

Coalition naval forces have established what is called a Maritime Security Patrol Zone to help protect maritime traffic through the regions dominated by piracy, but clearly results from the first two weeks have been mixed, at best. On Monday, the Canadians will turn control of Task Force 150 over to the Danes, who will lead the coalition naval force from HDMS Absalon (L16). The Canadians did a good job, but were overwhelmed by the increased frequency of attacks.

Around 20,000 ships per year, an average of around 55 ships per day, travel through the Gulf of Aden. At 55 ships per day, this news report can help us calculate the costs Somalian piracy is adding to the global economy.

A dramatic increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia and a ten-fold increase in insurance premiums has sent the cost of sending ships through one of the world's busiest transport routes, soaring, shipping experts said yesterday...

Insurance companies have increased premiums for sending a cargo shipment through the Gulf of Aden to about $9,000 from $900 a year ago.Meanwhile, the pirates, who use speed boats and are armed with rocket propelled grenades and assault rifles, have become increasingly sophisticated in their attacks. Ships are typically held for at least three months before a ransom, which averages $1 million, can secure their release.

Lets estimate insurance costs have risen $8000 per ship. By my math the cost of Somalian piracy is now $440,000+ a day, or $160+ million dollars a year, just in insurance costs alone. The Times article is very informative, and goes on to note the trends.

“It's not just a growing frequency, there is also a growing cost of piracy, kidnap and ransoms,” he said. “The size of the ransom, depending on the vessel and its cargo, is growing. The time these things are lasting is also increasing. Before, they were quick in and out events. Now, the bad guys are a bit more sophisticated.”

The evolution in technology used by pirates isn't just communication coordination and improved weapons, but appears to also include new techniques and capabilities to get aboard ships. Also noteworthy, there are lessons from action taken by the French earlier this year, hijacked members of crews are being moved off the ships and taken to a pirate hideout in the Xaabo mountains.

Piracy in Somalia appears to be specific to Eyl, a city of around 20,000 in Somalia's Putland state, near the Hafun peninsula. Pirates have attacked 50 ships so far this year, and have successfully hijacked more than 30 ships.

As we have highlighted in the past, pirates claim to be acting in a coast guard role protecting the fishing community of Eyl, and there is some truth to that. For all of the problems in Somalia, it is without question one of the best fishing locations in the world. A full boat can haul catches that run 50% to 150% more than fishing in other areas. Fishing may sound trivial to those who don't know much about it, but it is a major industry worldwide. Earlier this year, Russia, who does not recognize Norway's exclusive right to the 200-mile economic zone near Spitsbergen, deployed warships to protect the Russian fishing industry working in that region.

Illegal fishing and dumping are part of the local problem of Somalia, but piracy and replaced fishing as the local industry. With an average ransom of $1 million per ship, the 30+ ships hijacked to date are potentially worth $30 million to the local economy, while the entire fishing industry of Somalia today is estimated around $1.5 million. $1.5 million is nothing, 4-5 boats fishing illegally in the hot spots of the Somalian coastal waters, assuming those ships overcome the risks of piracy, could easily haul that much in yellowfin tuna and shark alone.

The piracy issues off Somalia will get worse, not better. Ransoms are improving the capabilities of pirates, and there is clearly a political issue behind the decision process of the United States in dealing with policy. This is speculation, but we tend to believe this is a "ghosts of the father" issue with George Bush, who in the last days of his administration doesn't want to involve the United States in a Somalian military incident the way his father did. It is also very unlikely any European nations, who are taking the blunt of the economic loss due to piracy, would contribute.

But we could be wrong, and perhaps action is brewing behind the scenes. With Malaysia sending the LST KD Inderapura (1505), with the Danes taking charge of Task Force 150 with HDMS Absalon (L16), and the Iwo Jima ESG heading into the region with the Peleliu ESG already in the region, the number of troops at sea is on a steady increase. There is a clear target for action on land, the city of Eyl, and there appears to be a clear secondary target as well.. the secret pirate mtn base. By my math that is 2 Marine battalions with at least two coalition partners, and SNMG-2 is expected to come through the region soon.

No, we don't expect military action against Eyl, just highlighting what is possible. $440,000 per day is a lot of money, but even $12+ million a month of global economic costs doesn't rise to the level that demands military action on the ground. However, if piracy continues to increase, and insurance rates continue to go up, the cost to the European economy (if not the global economy) could elevate the problem to that point.

The next step that we see is a shoot first, kill as many as possible RoE change to send clear messages that piracy will not be tolerated. It may not be politically correct to say, but it is time to kill as many of the pirates as possible, and those who don't die during military action can make their case to the sharks off the Somalian coast. At least under that theory we can fill the sharks bellies with pirates instead of refugees for a change.

5th Fleet Focos: Establishing Deterrence for Piracy

We do not believe it will make much of a difference, but hope to be wrong. Navy Times is discussing the new Maritime Security Patrol that Task Force 150 is establishing in the area of the Gulf of Aden between Somalia and Yemen. We look forward to seeing whether this will make a difference.

Cmdr. Jane Campbell, public affairs officer at 5th Fleet, said the patrol area could be described roughly as a rectangular shape over the Gulf of Aden, with a constant allied naval presence. “The number will vary, but we’ll have ships on station,” she said. “This is not a long-term solution; it’s a short-term, focused operation.”

Along with surface patrols, shore-based aircraft, shipborne helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles also will keep a weather eye on the Gulf of Aden.

Convoy information in support of the Maritime Security Patrol Area can be found at Noonsite, who is cooperation with Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is looking for all information available to better coordinate patrols.

Click the image above for a high resolution look at 2008 piracy in the area as of April 24, 2008. Stopping piracy will not be easy. Even if we assume the rectangle described is only 200 by 50 nautical miles large, that is still 10,000 square miles of water to cover. Figure 5 coalition ships, and maybe, possibly 5 US Navy ships and between the 10 vessels each ship is responsible for 1000 square miles for each ship. Even spacing the ships within the grid, response time at 25 knots within a grid would likely be measured in hours not minutes.

While aircraft and UAVs can assist in scouting, without a change in the RoE we don't see this making a significant impact to the patrol beyond scouting, so early detection will be their only true value to the program. Early detection, particularly in regards to attacks that originate from pirate motherships, has proven difficult in the past.

Update: Eagle1 has more, and very useful information on the sea lane being established.

5th Fleet Focus: Naval Forces Ordered To Horn of Africa

Navy Lt. Nate Christensen, a spokesman for the 5th Fleet, spoke to the press on Monday and suggested that 5th Fleet naval forces will be moving towards Somalia to fight pirates. In reading the several press reports on the topic, we had a good laugh at the suggestion. Despite the rhetoric otherwise, allow us to speak to the realistic position that the US Navy does not have the resources to manage the pirate problem off Somalia short of dedicating a major strike group to the effort, which they will not, and even then we don't believe the Navy would be that effective in much else than deterrence. The US Navy is built to fight a war, and is not structured well at all to manage peace.

While it is the understatement of the year to suggest the US Navy can sweep the seas of every pirate they can find, the suggestion that the US Navy is going to saturate the coast of Somalia with sufficient resources to actually find pirates in the several million square miles of threatened waters is laughable. Besides, it is unlikely piracy is the only reason the US is moving naval forces towards Somalia anyway.

As we discussed over the weekend, the World Food Programme is screaming for assistance in protecting their food shipments for delivery to UN aide workers in Somalia, and absolutely no one is coming to help. According to the International Herald Tribune, the recent increase in violence has aide workers leaving town... and the country.

At a time of drought, skyrocketing food prices, crippling inflation and intensifying street fighting, many of the aid workers upon whom millions of Somalis depend for survival are fleeing their posts - or in some cases the country.

They are being driven out by what appears to be an organized terror campaign. Ominous leaflets recently surfaced on the bullet-pocked streets of Mogadishu, Somalia's ruin of a capital, calling aid workers "infidels" and warning them that they will be methodically hunted down. Since January, at least 20 aid workers have been killed, more than in any year in recent memory. Still others have been abducted.

The warlords are sending clear messages, and this is a sample of the violence taking place as a new power struggle in Somalia appears to be developing momentum.

The attacks on aid workers - including Westerners, Somalis working for Western organizations and Somalis working for local groups - have escalated this month. Two weeks ago a high-ranking UN official was shot as he stepped out of a mosque. Last Sunday, a trucking agent in charge of transporting emergency rations was killed. On Thursday, three elders who were helping local aid workers distribute food at a displaced persons camp were shot and killed.

The health situation is already critical, a recent measles outbreak in southern Somalia has already killed 18 infants, and threats hundreds more. The vaccination treatments cannot be delivered due to the violence, which also makes the trip to nearby health clinics, some of which are dozens of miles away impossible for parents with sick infants. UNICEF says only 5 percent of infants in Somalia have been immunized against measles and other life threatening diseases.

With aide workers packing up, food shipments halted, health care disappearing, and violence increasing it would not appear the US Navy is reacting to piracy, rather the developing situation in Somalia that in the past has triggered a humanitarian crisis, resulting in a migration of people fleeing Somalia towards Yemen. People smuggling to Yemen is big business.

If you look at the latest IMB piracy maps, you'll note the same areas where the highest concentration of piracy is located just happens to be the most likely place where a humanitarian situation develops. The US Navy may claim they are moving forces in to fight piracy, but we think that is just coincidence, the real reason the US Navy is moving forces is likely to prevent the potentially massive humanitarian disasters that occur whenever large numbers of people flee Somalia. After all, with the well known problems of piracy in the region, if the western Navies don't help the people, no one does, and people die... sometimes by the thousands.

5th Fleet Focus: An Old Mission Expands

It took awhile, but the UN Security Council has organized itself for fighting pirates off the Horn of Africa and coast of Somalia. From the BBC:

The UN Security Council has unanimously voted to allow countries to send warships into Somalia's territorial waters to tackle pirates.

The resolution permits countries that have the agreement of Somalia's interim government to use any means to repress acts of piracy for the next six months.

This is a big step. The Naval coalition in the area has rarely been able to intercept a hijacked ship prior to the ship reaching the 12-mile exclusion zone. This has been both a blessing and a burden to the fight against piracy. The blessing has been the international naval forces haven't had to make difficult decisions under hostage situations. The burden has been that in some cases, they couldn't engage targets of opportunity in the zone, a problem that is eliminated with the new UN measure.

There will be several dynamics of this story worth keeping an eye on.

First, what will the structure be? The Canadians assumed Command of CTF 150 from the French Navy today. What is the role of CTF-150 now; does it change, evolve, or operate independent of the UN? We don't expect CFT-150 to remain independent. We do not have a good feel for what will evolve here, but we note partners outside of the existing coalition engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom is likely, with Russia suggesting they want a piece of the action.

Second, will this adjust the ROE? Eagle1 has a must read on this topic, not only regarding this weeks activity, but a very important contribution with relevant portions of the UNCLOS. The ROE against pirates is a big part of the discussion here, because this mandate may not mean as much as could be assumed. Today the Canadians barged in on some pirates attempting to hijack a ship. Apparently, the Canadians never fired a shot. Which nation is going to take action against a hijacked ship with several hostages? The conditions as they exist today, and how they will exist until a much larger naval force fills those seas, imply that the naval force will remain reactionary. Due to the reactionary nature of naval forces, they might have the green light to take action, but in most cases the green light will come only after the situation makes it difficult to take action without putting hostages in danger.

Third, how serious are countries about fighting piracy? The reported Canadian passive approach today isn't a good early sign. Somalia is a big country of problems. We operate several ships around Somalia that aren't spending all of their time watching pirates, as there are plenty of threats well beyond what piracy represents coming from the region. For centuries, piracy has always been background noise to serious issues, and in a time of radical extremists who exploit ungoverned areas like Somalia, the threat and even reality of piracy isn't really a primary focus. How serious will the US Navy take the piracy issue? The pattern is really tough talk, but the reality has been a token contribution. Will the Navy organize convoys? Will the Navy establish Sea Bases to fight piracy? Will the European or Asian nations contribute to an international force? We suspect there will be some tough talk, but in the end unless there is a national interest, for example Russia who has a need to get operational experience for its Navy, we won't be surprised if all this tough talk results in token action.

Finally, keep an eye on India and China. This is exactly the scenario the Naval leadership of India has discussed as the reason for a powerful naval force. India has long expressed desire to lead as a regional power, to work within international cooperation frameworks in events that take place in the Indian Ocean. This is one of those moments that could signal their emergence. India will either seize the opportunity to be the glue to international forces operating under a UN mandate and step up, or they will be small player in this activity, reminding us they are still not where they want to be. If India choses to go small, don't be surprised if China seizes on that moment.

There will be a number of national strategies in play here, because while the discussion may be Somalia, the reality is presence is required to build connectivity. We would be fools not to acknowledge this view from the perspective of the potential players, building better connectivity with African nations could be seen as a prize here by many.

This is one vision of a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Seapower. I'll be interested to see how it works, and if it works.

Somalian Pirates Back To Sea

We mentioned on Saturday to expect the pirate activity to pick up quickly, as they usually do after ransoms are paid. Be wary of speedboats if your in the Gulf of Aden. There were two new incidents on Monday, and it looks like the Italian Navy assisted in the first incident.

The Italian Navy appears to have prevented another pirate attack on commercial shipping in the Gulf of Aden over the weekend, after the 2004-built, 32,300-dwt bulk carrier Africa Ibis called for help in warding off a group of five speedboats which were approaching the vessel.

The Italian ship was the ITS Commandante Borsini (P491). The second incident off Somalia involved a South Korean bulk carrier.

In another incident in the Gulf of Aden, off Somalia, a South Korean bulk carrier came under pirate attack on Monday at about 0940 GMT, he said.

Choong said pirates believed to be from Somalia attacked the ship for about 40 minutes with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.

"The ship was hit by a rocket and bullets," he said, adding that the captain took evasive measures "to prevent the 10 pirates in two speed boats from boarding," he said.

Choong said the ship was still sailing to its destination in Europe despite the damage suffered in the attack.

In observing the piracy off the Horn of Africa, it is pretty clear how little respect the pirates have for the presence of coalition forces. Given pirates are running around in speedboats with RPGs and Machine Guns, they also have a fairly sophisticated intelligence network too, because it is worth noting how often they attack 'close' to coalition ships, but never close enough to be hunted at sea until after they hijack a ship.

They will attack again over the next few days. One thing we are observing is the Somalia pirates appear to be going after larger ships lately. They haven't had success yet, but they are shooting up a number of large commercial ships on a weekly basis. Insurance rates will soon be going up, which means shipping costs will increase, which means we will soon be paying even more for the stuff we import. If the pirates strike at or even steal a tanker with fuel onboard, expect gas prices to jump big like they did when the pirates attacked the empty Japanese tanker.