Israeli Naval Forces Coastal Combat in Gaza

Global demographics shifts will increasingly drive wars towards highly-populated, urbanized coastal areas. Israel's ongoing Operation Protective Edge demonstrates a number of lessons for future littoral warfare in this environment.  As learned in over a decade of COIN operations, perhaps most important is a need for significant intelligence assets - eyes on target - required to engage aimpoints precisely in cities where the enemy is closely embedded with the population.

Despite a large volume of coverage on the conflict in Gaza, very little attention has been paid to the naval side of the war. The IDF has released some interesting combat footage, though.  The first video below demonstrates some of the unique cooperation between the ship (which appears to a be a Sa'ar 4.5 Hetz missile boat talking to its HQ) and Southern Command ground forces as the vessel engages an enemy mortar site with its 75mm gun.

An active video information campaign closely linked with combat operations is also vital in a world of instantaneous global communications where every citizen with a smart phone is a potential reporter. Something I find interesting in these videos is the dialogue.  For example, the line "mortars are being launched towards Israel" and similar language in other IDF videos seems to suggest that these units may have received some guidance on specifically articulating the threat as their footage would be used in information operations. Contrast this professional language to some of the unprofessional, profanity-laced gun-camera footage leaked early-on during OIF that embarrassed US forces.  I would hope by now that we've learned as a military that all radio/data transmissions are being recorded, at all times, and that if we do it right, communications incidental to combat can support overall campaign messaging. 

In the video below, a Hamas rocket launcher is engaged with some sort of electro-optically guided, ship-fired missile (Spike?).  Of interest is the verbal terminal guidance, "left, left, left, left" just before the missile hits its target. Clearly this sort of precise targeting - which was out of the visual line-of-sight of the ship - required close coordination with ground and air forces.  Press reporting shows that both UAVs and Israeli commandos have supported targeting for air and naval engagements during the current conflict. 

Dozens of strategic direct action missions into Gaza have been launched by the IDF's Shayetet (Flotilla) 13 naval commando force. In a politically-charged place like Gaza, occupation forces are not palatable and maritime raids, be they surgical special operations or larger scale punitive Marine operations, remain an important tool for ground-force commanders. 

The final video is a follow-up to a previous post regarding the failed Hamas naval commando unit infiltration. Apparently, Israel's Navy was also actively engaged in targeting at least some of the five intruders from the water. 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the US Navy.

Hamas' Failed Amphibious Infil

Earlier today, Israeli Defense Force helicopters eliminated at least two of five Hamas commandos who landed on Zikim Beach near an IDF Base northeast of Gaza.  The beach assault was likely an attempt to retaliate for yesterday's IDF assassination (also by air) of Mohammed Shaaban, head of the Hamas naval commando unit. 

This is not the first Palestinian foray into amphibious combat swimmer attacks.  In 2010, the Israeli Navy killed four scuba divers on a boat belonging to the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades. Hamas has fielded a naval police force since taking over the Palestinian Territories and last year, they reportedly opened a naval academy. ID readers will also likely recall the Hamas Naval Police involvement in the flotilla episodes of 2010.  A small maritime patrol force makes sense for a fledgling proto-state, especially given Israel's blockade of the Gaza coast and previous Israeli naval attacks on Gaza.

Yet a combat swimmer unit belongs in another category altogether. As we've noted, to build naval commandos into an real offensive special operations capability is beyond the reach of most non-state groups. These incidents highlight the importance of maritime capabilities to non-state actors, despite the expense and challenges associated with fielding these forces.  Israel certainly does not take these adversaries for granted, nor should other navies.  Mumbai provided the textbook example of how much damage a determined terror group can wreak with a sea-borne attack.

April 29, 2024 - Palestinian naval police loyal to Hamas inspect a boat after an explosion of unknown origin at Gaza City's port. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Of Destroyers and Doctrine: An Evaluation of Israel’s Decision to Invest in Larger Hulls

The German Navy frigate Hamburg (F220) underway in the Mediterranean Sea as part of the U.S. Navy Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group.

The following contribution is from Jacob Stoil, a DPhil candidate at Worcester College, University of Oxford specializing in military history and strategic studies.

Recent reports have appeared in both the Israeli and German media that Israel will be buying two destroyers from Germany at a cost of over two billion euros. The destroyers appear to be a part of a general plan to upgrade Israeli naval capabilities and increase the Israel Naval Service’s (INS) ability to protect Israel’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), especially the newly discovered hydrocarbon resources. The purchases represent a major break with INS doctrine and are the wrong purchases for Israel’s purposes.

Israel has a number of maritime challenges and spending significant money on an upgrade of maritime security capabilities is certainly a positive step in addressing the issue, but destroyers do not provide an answer to these challenges and may be a liability. There is often a ‘supersize-me’ impulse in naval procurement, an assumption that bigger is better and so a destroyer would naturally be better than a missile boat or corvette,an assumption which is fundamentally untrue. The doctrine of the INS has traditionally rejected this logic in favour of a doctrine built around smaller, faster, and harder to detect vessels with advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and significant offensive armament. This doctrine has served Israel well and has proved itself time and again, including during the 1973 war. Despite the success of the doctrine, a drive to supersize - of which the destroyers represent the latest iteration - has crept into the INS. Each generation of missile boats in the INS fleet has grown in size. The Sa’ar 5 is around 700 tons larger than the Sa’ar 4.5, which is 40 tons larger than the Sa’ar 4. The Sa’ar 4 itself is 200 tons larger than its predecessor. The destroyers would not be a simple continuation of this trend, they be an exponential increase in size (especially given that the smallest German frigate, a smaller class than a destroyer, is three times the tonnage of the Sa’ar 5). The additional tonnage might make for slower vessels but would definitely mean more identifiable targets, with more crew to lose if something goes wrong.

Given the cost and the break with a successful doctrinal concept,this all begs the question why destroyer? Larger ships are traditionally associated with greater power, but to what end? Naval power is not an end in itself. Israel clearly does not intend to use naval power to support land operations or develop independent strategic operations from the sea in a serious way. All of their naval procurement and training decisions over the last more than twenty years have made that impossible. This leaves several other possible motivations: controlling sea lines of communication (SLOCs), interdicting hostile SLOCs, enforcing a blockade, coastal protection, protecting the EEZ, and finally denying the use of the sea to an opponent. In the first case, Israel's primary SLOCs flow through the Mediterranean and in the past, with a less advanced fleet than the INS currently boasts, Israel has been able to protect them beyond Malta. Although destroyers could accomplish this, multiple corvettes and missile boats could cover more area simultaneously and for less money. An expanded submarine, corvette, and missile boat force can similarly accomplish the objectives of interdicting the SLOCs of potential regional rivals, including Iran, and denying them use of the sea.

Given current operational requirements (Gaza blockade, oil field protection, rapid deployment against local adversaries, etc.) there is much to recommend an expanded force of smaller vessels over larger destroyers. A ship, no matter its size, can only be in one place,meaning it can only fulfill one of these requirements at a given time. Additional smaller vessels would give the force additional flexibility in a wider variety of roles, including having spare vessels in reserve for unforeseen contingencies. Additionally, the type of threats that Israel is likely to face to its EEZ are largely irregular in their nature. Such irregular threats have in the past consisted of small craft attempting to enter an area surreptitiously before carrying out an operation.The employment of destroyers to respond to such threats would be overkill. Small vessels have proven highly effective at addressing such threats. An important aspect of the response to this type of irregular threat is fast response and frequent patrolling. As such, small fast craft provide a better response to such threats than a single larger craft. More numerous smaller craft can cover a greater physical area than one destroyer covers and therefore not only have a greater deterrent value but also respond more swiftly to threats as they develop.

There is a further factor to consider. Anti-ship missile technology has evolved significantly in the past few decades.  A direct hit by the new generation of missiles, such as the Russian 3M-54 Klub,is just as likely to disable a large vessel as a small one. While a larger vessel could theoretically contain more anti-missile capabilities, Israel has created an integrated package of missile defense capabilities optimized for smaller hulls. Additionally, if a larger vessel was lost, the impact on the INS would be more operationally significant than the loss of a smaller vessel. It is worth noting that the experience of such a loss (the INS Eilat) helped create the Israeli doctrine of investing in small, fast, high-tech, and well-armed vessels.

The addition of destroyers to the Israeli fleet is both expensive and unnecessary.  For the price of two destroyers, the INS could expand its flotillas of corvettes, missile boats, or submarines. Israel developed a successful doctrine based on such ships after unsatisfactory experiences with larger hulls. An expanded version of its current fleet would be able to continue to fulfil current operational requirements and do a better job than two destroyers of protecting the EEZ while maintaining the capability to react to unexpected contingencies and prevent regional opponents from exploiting the sea. It would accomplish this more cheaply and with less risk than two destroyers could. In short, destroyers are the wrong investment at the wrong time. Israel would do better to stick to a successful doctrine of smaller but highly capable vessels than invest in expensive destroyers that do not fulfill operational requirements.  In this case, bigger is not better but more might just be merrier.



Jacob Stoil is a DPhil candidate at Worcester College, University of Oxford specializing in military history and strategic studies.  His dissertation explores indigenous forces in the Middle East and Horn of Africa during the Second World War.  As part of his DPhil research Jacob conducted fieldwork in Somaliland, Israel, Ethiopia, and the West Bank.

Prior to his Dphil Jacob completed his MA and BA at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies.  His recent publications include, ‘Martial Race and Indigenous Forces’ in The British Indian Army: Virtue and Necessity published by Cambridge Scholars Press and ‘Structures of Cooperation and Conflict - Local Forces in Mandatory Palestine’ published in Ex Historia.  Jacob’s research interests include irregular forces, peripheral campaigns, military adaptation in the developing world, and Middle Eastern military history.  Jacob is a member of the British Empire at War and Second World War Military Operations Research Groups as well as the Society for Military History.

Five Points

The National Security Discussion has entered a political phase as the election approaches, and both parties are attempting to make political points about National Security in the context of a policy discussion that appeals to their respective voter bases. The lack of detail distorts these discussions almost as much as the absence of context, and very few politicians know how to educate voters with their public speech talking points - particularly in the context of national security. Below are 5 7points of thought I believe are important to keep in mind while observing the political rhetoric related to National Security for the duration of the election season.

1) A bigger Army is not necessarily a better Army. The same theory of overwhelming force used in the 1991 Gulf War was remarkably effective the last decade of the 20th century, but the United States had evolved beyond that theory of warfare by 2001 when it took ~1/1000 the number of troops to overwhelm Afghanistan and 1/5 as many troops just 12 years later to defeat the entire organized Iraqi military in 2003. Over the last two decades the Joint Force of the US military has rediscovered that it takes fewer military personnel to be lethal and effectively destroy an enemy in war, but it takes significantly more resources to stabilize territory towards peace. This isn't some new theory of war, but the disparity gap between the resources necessary to kill and destroy with conventional military power and to stabilize the territory of a defeated enemy after using such power has expanded considerably over historical norms, and this gap has yet to be rationally demonstrated in a US Army force structure policy plan. The bottom line is this - to defeat enemies of the United States, a larger Army is not needed - indeed the US Army could afford to shrink in terms of manpower quite a bit and actually become a far more lethal military service. With that said, if the US Army will be called upon to occupy territory outside the United States after fighting the next war, a larger US Army is indeed needed. The future is hard to predict, but circumstances that will require occupational Armies can be predicted, and it is time to start discussing those circumstances in theory to forward a legitimate discussion for the Army regarding what we - as a superpower - want the US Army to be capable of doing, thus be.

2) The Pivot to Asia is not about shifting military power to Asia as many falsely describe it, rather the Pivot to Asia is actually about the modernization of military infrastructure capabilities in the vast Pacific region. Despite what very vocal critics like Thomas Barnett claim in various articles, there is no evidence at all of any significant military shift outside the CONUS to the Pacific region, unless those critics are now somehow suggesting that the replacement of minesweepers and old frigates with the Littoral Combat Ship is a major military power shift, or replacing existing older aircraft with new aircraft is a surge. The strategic pivot can be described as a move away from concentration of force towards geographical distribution of force, but the increases to the Pacific region represent little more than an expansion of infrastructure, not an increase in total force. I tend to think the Pivot to Asia is one of the most hollow, hyped political Foreign Policy slogans we have seen since the cold war, because there simply isn't anything specific one can point to from the DoD that suggests a significant increase in capabilities - as every migration of military force to the region is simply a replacement for a retiring infrastructure or system. To quote another slogan, where is the beef? The lack of specific details regarding the Pivot to Asia is intentional, because the power in the policy is only truly increased via political diplomatic rhetoric - not substance represented in force. In many ways, because the policy is rhetoric and not substance, the Pivot to Asia is evidence of effective Strategic Communications - which makes the Pivot to Asia more about diplomatic shifts rather than military shifts. It surprises me folks like Thomas Barnett have failed to recognize the distinction between rhetoric and reality when it comes to this over hyped political policy, but at some point during this election my sense is folks will reset Pivot to Asia in a more diplomatic context.

3) The Pivot towards Persia in 2012 is the most under reported major military buildups in modern media history, which is ironic considering the amount of hype in the media regarding Iran every day. The media has gone out of their way not to cover with any real attention the significant US and European military forces operating in the Persian Gulf region. The US Navy is now forward operating between 50-66% of all deployed aircraft carriers in the Gulf region. The US Navy is currently operating 66% of all US Navy minesweepers in the Persian Gulf. The US Air Force is now continuously rotating several of the most advanced aircraft squadrons in their inventory, including the F-22, to the Persian Gulf region. Nearly the entire training, workup, and deployment routine of every single East Coast Aircraft Carrier, Cruiser, Destroyer, Submarine, and Amphibious Ship is specifically tailored towards operating around the Middle East. Nearly all of the major defense budget adjustment increases for FY12 to date for the Air Force, Navy and SOCOM involve increasing capabilities or sustaining infrastructure in the USCENTCOM AOR. At the same time, the Europeans are reducing deployments to the Pacific and Western Hemisphere to focus naval forces for deployment to the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East regions. Despite the rhetoric that suggests there are numerous National Security issues facing the United States, there is only one national security question facing voters in 2012, and it is who they want their President to be during the hot and likely costly, bloody war between Israel and Iran that every measurable indicator one can use observing military force movements by European countries and the United States suggests is coming very soon.

And because predictions sure to go wrong can be entertaining thought exercises for bloggers, I'd wager a high quality Belgium wheat beer pint that if Israel attacks Iran before the election, with a 2 day margin of error I would say the date is October 13th.

4) The single most important element of United States national power related to National Security in need of increasing in both size and capability lies not in the Department of Defense, nor in the Department of State, but in the US Coast Guard. China is fighting a cold war in the South China Sea using their civilian agency maritime security forces backed by the implied support of military power. Unless the US intends to get asymmetrical in dealing with these tough diplomatic issues - which is sure to create unnecessary tension in the region; the appropriate symmetrical response would be to increase the presence of the US Coast Guard around the world to engage and assist towards the quality improvement of the regional maritime security forces. Whether one looks at Africa, South America (including the US coast), or Asia - the national security solution to most state diplomatic challenges and nearly all non-state security challenges facing the global economy lies at sea, but these are not solely a naval centric challenge. If we really believe the 21st century is going to be a maritime century - and I believe this 100% - the first step is to increase the size of the Coast Guard, and that starts with doubling the size of the large, deployable National Security Cutter fleet that can be sent forward to engage with civilian agencies globally and help improve the capabilities of our partners in Africa, Asia, and South America. I am not opposed to reducing the budget of the DoD, but it only makes sense as long as the civilian agencies needed for peacetime maintenance are funded to increase their capabilities to actually maintain the peace - and that beings with expanding the US Coast Guard. The peacetime Global Fleet Station of the 21st century might be a US Navy amphibious ship in certain situations, but it should also be the National Security Cutter. The maintenance of peace is a manpower intensive, thankless security role that ALSO belongs to the civilian security agencies, not solely the DoD. It is past time the US government forwards national security of this country by recognizing this reality, and balances the reduction of DoD capabilities with an increase in US Coast Guard capabilities for the offshore engagement role the US Coast Guard has a long history of performing. This needs to start now - not later - because while today's challenges might be piracy and illegal oil bunkering off Africa, territory disputes in the Pacific region, the global narcotics trade that is creating significant challenges off our own southern border, or the polar regions of this planet - there are several regions that are going to get more competitive sooner than later, and the offshore economy is expanding at a pace far greater than maritime security forces globally are adapting. While Mitt Romney wants to reconstitute the US Army by 100,000 and grow the US Navy, President Obama would be wise to counter by expanding the US Coast Guard - because the lesson of 10 years of war has taught us that if the objective is peace, the nation needs strong civilian security capabilities. It is time to apply the lessons of the last war towards the future being shaped.

5) It is often suggested that the US needs to help foster some sort of alliance in the Pacific similar to NATO, but it is my hope that long before that rhetoric is explored towards some reality the US gets more deeply engaged and serious with South America. In a global economy, the Monroe Doctrine doesn't work for us anymore for the same reason the Monroe Doctrine with Chinese characteristics is failing China in the Pacific - there are too many interconnected economic relationships in today's global economy for security interests to be conceded by great powers. China, among others, is coming to South America as we speak, indeed I fully expect China's first carrier deployment to be to South America in early spring of 2016 - namely Brazil, not the Middle East as is commonly speculated. Brazil, India, China, and Russia are all poised for difficult, but productive decades ahead. The rise of the BRIC nations combined with an impending era defined by energy and resources - including water - of the next two decades will change the national security landscape globally. Unfortunately, every Powerpoint I have seen produced by the DoD fails to reflect what that change means to force posture, and ignores the key role South America is going to play regarding the national security landscape of the mid-term future. The time is now to start thinking about the BI in BRIC, and what they truly mean to national security for the United States in the 21st century.

Israel and Iran

I listened to the discussion on Iran by Matt Duss and Ben Birnbaum tonight and thought it was interesting, but I am not sure what criteria Israel would use setting a date for a surprise attack by against Iran. Indeed, when someone says it is almost certainly not a specific date (they said April 13), my first instinct was to check the moon phases that night. Both Matt Duss and Ben Birnbaum seem to think the criteria for an Israeli attack hinges on the ongoing diplomacy. I'm not sure I believe that, as I tend to think Israel is making calculations on actions alone - like the effectiveness of oil sanctions against the Iranian economy or their military capability options against Iran we don't know about.

I recently read this very interesting CRS Report titled Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (PDF) by Jim Zanotti, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Jeremiah Gertler, Specialist in Military Aviation, and Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense dated March 27, 2012.

It is a very interesting read, but I think they missed some pretty important details, and I think those details may have been omitted on purpose.

A few thoughts.

The report is missing a realistic discussion of cyber capabilities and what the first 3 hours will look like. Let me be clear, the Command and Control capabilities of Iran (and potentially Syria) will not survive the first 3 hours, and there may not be a single bomb delivered during that period. The cyber smart bomb that Israel has likely prepared and potentially already placed on the networks of the Iranians is going to make Stuxnet look ATARI grade. We have been openly discussing the possibility of Iran being bombed by Israel for years - with that kind of lead time, the Israeli's can open a can of whoop ass in cyberspace unlike anything the world has ever seen. Expect it.

An attack by Israel is likely to originate from Israel, but the question is where will the Israeli Air Force go and refuel after finishing the bombing. It could be anywhere, and the bottom line is wherever that place is, the Iranians will struggle to field any credible capability against that target within 24 hours because of C2 problems Iran will be struggling to deal with, and the Iranian Air Force will find that their pilots lack the courage necessary to conduct an airstrike against any air field protected against the Israeli Air Force. Fortune won't favor the brave, the IDF Air Force is one of the very best in the world and even the United States Air Force would have its hands full trying to fight past the Israeli Air Force trying to bomb an airfield protected by the Israelis.

It is entirely possible that Iran could try to rain down dozens, maybe even hundreds of ballistic missiles down on Israel. I'll put my money on the ballistic missile defense capabilities of Israel against the destructive and accurate targeting of the Iranians in that fight. Iran's capabilities would be modern in the 20th century, but this is the 21st century and Iron Dome has proven that Israel is way ahead of everyone when it comes to defensive systems that shoot bullets to hit bullets. I do not see conventional ballistic missiles being anything other than a terror weapon, and ultimately it will be a weapon more likely to kill civilians than military targets. Also noteworthy, the report analysis concludes Bushehr is an unlikely target. I agree with that analysis, and think that is an important detail that might play in the broader diplomacy both before and after any military action - and I do believe that is a specific detail the Obama administration needs to mention more frequently in public as it goes to the heart of the issue that the nuclear power program is not the issue - the nuclear weapons program is.

Finally, there is a train of thought that if Israel attacks Iran, the first thing Iran is going to do is attack the US or other Arab nations in the region. If there was ever wishful thinking from a neoconservative perspective, that would be it. I guess it is possible that Iran could try to mine the Strait of Hormuz and claim they didn't do it, but the first mine that hits a supertanker heading to China - even China is going to call Iran on their bullshit. Iran is almost certainly going to play the wounded Persian role in public in an attempt to rally the Arab world behind them - specifically Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. Attacking the Arab world is not going to forward that agenda, and the retaliation by the Arab world following an Iranian attack on them could potentially be much more dangerous and damaging to Iran than limited airstrikes by Israel.

I have no idea if Israel is going to bomb Iran this week or this year. If Israel is going to attack, I think they will wait until June because that is when the US will have the MIW equipment being moved from CONUS in the Arabian Gulf, because while most calculations don't matter to Israel - insuring the US has had time to position major equipment to be used in defense is one consideration Israel is likely to account for.

I personally believe the Obama administration sanctions on Iranian oil is a huge deal, and could be a golden bullet over time. The oil sanctions strike at the economy of Iran, and if sanctions start getting painful to the people - that could change events inside Iran quite a bit. It would be a mistake to compare sanctions against North Korea with sanctions against Iran, as those nations really have almost nothing in common at the street level. I think Iranians will support a lot of stubbornness from their leadership in support of the nuclear issue, but given the shakeup we have seen in the Arab world over the last 15 months, the tolerance of the people as a whole when it comes to the national economy likely has limits, and the oil sanctions is the first real biting blow to the Iranian economy that will actually test those limits a bit.

Like I said, sometime after June when the naval equipment arrives. Regardless of where negotiations are at (and they have almost no chance at all of success by themselves), that gives a few months for the sanctions to start adding stress to the economy inside Iran.

Israel's Regional Future

My WPR column this week takes a look at Israel's regional strategy:

Combined with the longstanding enmity between Israel and Iran, this means that Israel faces a potential future in which it has acrimonious relationships with its three largest and most powerful neighbors. Israel has never faced this situation before: During the period of constant conflict with Egypt, Israel maintained cordial relations with Iran and Turkey, while the Camp David Accords that secured peace with Egypt roughly coincided with the Iranian Revolution that installed a hostile regime in Tehran.

Such a situation would seem to demand a strategic rethink on the part of Israel. But thus far, there appears to be little coordination in Israel's strategic approach to each of the "Big Three." Hostility with Iran, tension with Turkey and uncertainty with Egypt have not thus far produced hedging behavior, in the sense of Israel trying to repair relations with one partner as a defense against a collapse in relations with another. Rather, the Netanyahu government appears to be treating each of the three as separate, distinct foreign and security policy problems. It also appears to have rejected the idea that the pursuit of a comprehensive accord with the Palestinians could modify either the character or the depth of hostility from any of the Big Three.

To the extent that Israel has any coordinated strategy for facing the unremitting hostility of the three largest countries in its neighborhood, it appears focused on maintaining and increasing the support of extra-regional allies, primarily the United States and Europe.

Matt Duss and I discussed the same topic a couple days ago:

Diplomacy Can Be Ugly

The friction between Turkey and Israel is a diplomatic problem being expressed in the media as a naval confrontation. This article by Reuters is a great example how the problem is being exaggerated.

Raising the stakes in Turkey's row with Israel over its refusal to apologize for the killings, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Al Jazeera television that Turkey had taken steps to stop Israel from unilaterally exploiting natural resources in the Mediterranean.

"Turkish warships, in the first place, are authorized to protect our ships that carry humanitarian aid to Gaza," Erdogan said in the interview, broadcast by Al Jazeera with an Arabic translation.

"From now on, we will not let these ships to be attacked by Israel, as what happened with the Freedom Flotilla," Erdogan said.

The resources at sea being discussed in the article are actually claimed territorially by Greece, Lebanon, Turkey, and Israel. There is no impending drilling about to create a confrontation, that is still well off into the future and the diplomatic process has plenty of time to work itself out. The resources issue is also a side show to what this is really about - Turkey flexing some regional muscle over Israel for political points towards being seen as a regional leader in the Muslim world.

If you read the Reuters article in full, you will note that Turkey is mentioned as a member of NATO no less than three times - indeed it sticks out as something the article author is trying to emphasize for impact to the reader. What isn't said in the article is that according to international law, if Turkey runs the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza, Turkey would be committing an act of war against Israel and would forfeit the privileges for mutual defense in the NATO charter. A NATO nation can't conduct an act of war against another nation then invoke the mutual defense clause of the NATO charter for assistance.

While the naval blockade may or may not be an act of war against Gaza under any legal definition (because Gaza isn't recognized as a state), a naval blockade is in itself an act of war by legal definition. Turkey simply doesn't have much legal ground to stand on should Turkey provoke a military conflict, and it is difficult to see a scenario where anyone in NATO comes to the military aid of Turkey if they intentionally provoke Israel like Erdogan describes.

But the bigger point is that Israel doesn't want to fight Turkey, and despite the public rhetoric, it is hard to believe Turkey would risk a major military incident with Israel over the Palestinians or has any desire to engage in a military contest with Israel.

Measuring military power of various nations isn't really my style, but let me be clear - the Israeli Air Force is elite. Any nation in the world that fights the Israeli Air Force is going to take enormous punishment for it in a war, and by 'any nation' I am absolutely including the United States. Erdogan might be stupid enough to think otherwise, but no one in the Turkish military is that stupid.

What I am watching for in this political clash is whether this turns into a real escort operation for the Turkish Navy. If it does, the next question becomes whether Turkey will send more than one warship. If Turkey sends more than one warship, the situation has the potential to get ugly. If Turkey only sends one warship, it is unlikely anything happens and if something does happen, it will be against the flotilla ship and Erdogan will get embarrassed. I can't imagine Turkey would send more than one warship in support of Erdogan's political agenda though - the political gains simply aren't there for Turkey to push Israel into any kind of military conflict.

The problem Erdogan faces is that it is hard to imagine any Turkish Navy Captain would be foolish enough to take a warship into the territorial waters of Gaza, which under the Interim Agreement is considered Israeli controlled waters. Once inside those territorial waters, Israel would be within their legal rights to sink the Turkish Navy vessel. That won't happen.

Once the flotilla vessel enters those territorial waters though, Israel will seize the ship. Because Israel will have a huge show of force present, the Turkish Navy would be forced to watch from outside territorial waters. The result of any confrontation will be plenty of very loud international political outrage against Israel, but because the flotilla ship will never reach Gaza, Erdogan would find himself drowning under the political pressure of starting an incident with Israel he couldn't win, and at the same time he would find himself without any international support except in words only.

If Turkey sends more than one ship... well, everything I have said is nonsense. That would be a situation ripe with miscalculation and I am never surprised anymore by anything Israel does. My sense is that with the recent agreement with the US to install the X-Band BMD radar in Turkey - Washington intends to give Turkey plenty of political space in their dealings with Israel - right up to but not beyond the point where confrontation turns into conflict.

Unfortunately, that is also usually the point where miscalculations tend to occur. We'll see. This emerging possible naval confrontation has the right stuff to generate a lot of noise in the media, but when it is over I suspect very little will actually happen.

Israel Intercepts French-flagged Blockade Runner

Lots of news this morning regarding the Israeli Navy enforcing their blockade of Gaza. A French vessel named Dignity-Al Karama was seized this morning. This is the IDF statement put out on the IDF blog.

In accordance with government directives, after all diplomatic channels had been exhausted and continuous calls to the vessel had been ignored, IDF Navy soldiers boarded the Al-Karama in an effort to stop it from breaking the maritime security blockade on the Gaza Strip.

Upon expressing their unwillingness to arrive at the Ashdod port, it was unequivocally necessary to board the vessel and lead it to Ashdod.

The soldiers operated in line with procedures and took every precaution necessary while using all operational tactics determined prior to the operation, and avoid causing harm to the activists on-board while ensuring the safety of the soldiers. Following the boarding, the passengers’ health was examined and they were offered food and beverages.

There is also some video there, which will become more common as video has become the primary weapon in disputes involving states and non-states. Curious though, the French vessel didn't have any humanitarian cargo aboard, meaning the vessels purpose and intent was solely to run the military blockade for political purposes.

As incidents go, there isn't much here. No violence, no humanitarian aid, and the only news to report is that a ship was seized peacefully for trying to run the blockade. As news events go, this is not the big political splash Flotilla organizers were hoping for.

Israeli Soft Power Crushing Free Gaza Movement

Have you heard from the Gaza flotilla much lately? Probably not, unless you are looking for information. Gaza is 1.5 million people denied legitimacy for self-governance who are basically caged in by what can be described as prison walls on all sides. One would think this is one group of people that could find sympathy, particularly when the oppressor is Israel.

Nope! Not with friends like the Free Gaza Movement. Israel is putting on a soft power clinic in dealing with non-governmental organizations attempting to make political splashes from the shadow zones, and the whole world would be wise to learn from the approach Israel has taken against the second flotilla. Israel has turned the Gaza flotilla into a flotilla flop in a remarkably systematic way. This summary of events posted by Melanie Phillips on June 29th is a MUST READ.

Already, the number of flotillistas has been whittled down from 1500 to 350, and the number of boats from 15 to ten. Most of the credit should surely go to the Israeli activist law firm Shurat haDin which believes in bankrupting terrorism through a creative use of the law. Here are some of the legal challenges to the flotilla which Shurat HaDin has initiated with seismic effect.

• It sent letters to all the maritime insurance companies in Europe and Turkey, warning them that if they provided the flotilla boats with insurance (a necessary component in the effort to smuggle contraband to the terrorists) that they themselves would be legally liable for any future terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas.
• It filed an unprecedented lawsuit to seize the flotilla boats. The lawsuit was filed on behalf of an American terror victim injured by a Palestinian suicide bomber.
• It sent warning letters to a French insurance company warning it not to insure a boat that was to be launched from Marseilles. The company accordingly decided not to provide the French boat with insurance.
• After the main Turkish boat the Mavi Marmara pulled out of the flotilla, the New York Times reported that one reason (along with political pressure) was the boat’s inability to obtain maritime insurance.
• It sent warning letters to the UK and US based global satellite company INMARSAT, stating that it might be liable for massive damages and criminal prosecution if it provided communication services to ships used by suspected terror organizations in the flotilla. Then a resident of the southern Israeli town of Sderot filed a legal suit asserting that, under US law, Inmarsat was aiding and abetting terrorism by providing satellite services to the flotilla vessels.
• This week the New York Times reported that Greek authorities had detained two of the ships docked in Greece, including an American vessel, after Shurat haDin complained to the Greek Coast Guard suggesting that seven of the ships might be lacking insurance or were improperly registered.

Since that post it has only steadily got worse for the flotilla as ship after ship has dropped out, including the US flagged Audacity of Hope which tried to leave port without permission and ended up with the vessels American Captain thrown into jail temporarily. Not surprisingly, the US State Department didn't help the flotilla folks when they ran into trouble in Greece.

Last year, on the same day that Israel took on the first flotilla directly with their hard power approach that ended in spectacular public political failure, LCDR Claude Berube published an article on the Small Wars Journal titled The Ship is the Visual, Even in the Shadow Zones. While the SWJ article focused on other non-governmental organizations like Sea Shepherd and Women on Waves (WoW), the article suggested a series of recommendations on how nations can confront non-state actors in the maritime domain to stay ahead of NGO political activities at sea. The article recommended an approach of Adapting, Adopting, and Adeptness.

First, opposition to these entities must mean adapting faster than them in operations and tactics. This will mean, in part, establishing ROEs that permit effective responses rather than restrict operations from achieving success... WoW, for example, encountered Dutch law when the government found that the license to carry the A-Portable did not mean that the organization had a license to convey abortion pills on a sailboat. Finding similar avenues for pirates or other entities might be as beneficial as remembering that the gangster Al Capone was not imprisoned for murder or violating prohibition laws - he was jailed for tax evasion.

Second, although U.S. interest groups may be averse to doing so, the Navy should adopt a more flexible and innovative force structure that, in addition to traditional warship might include less obvious commercial platforms...

Third, it must be adept in public relations at countering potential propaganda or challenges early and clearly. The battle plan, even in the maritime environment, must include the airwaves, or the 21st century equivalent. Winning the war of ideas will be as important for maritime incidents or potentially prolonged engagements in the littorals to get the message out.

Israel appears to have operationalized the Adapting, Adopting, and Adeptness model with the latest Gaza flotilla. As Melanie Phillips laid out, by targeting INMARSAT and maritime insurance companies with advisory letters ahead of the flotilla, Israel set the bar very high on the issue of compliance to law. Israel has essentially leveraged a lawfare model often effectively leveraged by NGOs against states back against the Free Gaza Movement. The media has frequently discussed the behind the scenes pressure by the United States and Israel, but they have been short on details regarding the pressure points. You see, the Israeli's and US are pressuring Europeans to rigidly enforce their own laws. That puts a lot of pressure on organizations like the Greek Coast Guard not to make any mistakes, and the resulting red tape is burying the flotilla every time a vessel makes port. Pardon me while I laugh that the most leveraged weapon by Israel against the flotilla so far is European government bureaucracy.

If you have been following the progress of the flotilla, you will note that every vessel in the flotilla has a tail. The Gaza flotilla folks are very smart to call those vessels "commando ships" and other usefully inciting terms, but in several cases they are glorified small yacht type vessels with Israeli monitors tracking the progress of each Free Gaza flotilla vessel. The US Navy could learn a lot from Israel in how to adopt a different force structure quickly to address low intensity threats to maritime security, like piracy. The international coalition can't afford enough warships to track all the pirate motherships while staying focused on other regional commitments, but the international coalition can afford much less expensive vessels that can perform the role of tracking motherships. Security forces that included Navy, Marines, and a CG representative could be spread around to provide defense for the many smaller vessels and would be more than sufficient security against pirates. The key point here is that Israel was willing to adopt a new force structure to meet the Free Gaza flotilla challenge. The US Navy has not, at any point in the 21st century that I can tell, demonstrated such nimble flexibility to make those kind of tactical adjustments to maritime security threats. Attention Congress - that IS a red flag.

Israel adeptness in the information domain is remarkable. On the diplomatic front, Israel has successfully made the case that at this time, there is no humanitarian "crisis" in Gaza - and this point has been reported in many media articles discussing the flotilla. Furthermore, Israel has publicly made clear that anyone who wants to provide supplies to Gaza can do so through Israeli and Egyptian land routes. Israel has emphasized the changes to the blockade policy made last year following the first flotilla, which is actually a clever approach because it suggests a public diplomacy message that Israel has already conceded to international demands on the blockade issue. Israel has also successfully framed the second flotilla as a provocation thanks to broad distribution of comments made by Adam Shapiro, co-founder of the International Solidarity Movement and a board member of the Free Gaza Movement. In the same article by Melanie Phillips quoted above, the video later in the article shows Mr. Shapiro saying this followed by applause.

Free Gaza is but one tactic of a larger strategy, to transform this conflict from one between Israel and the Palestinians, or Israel and the Arab world…to one between the rest of the world and Israel.

Adam Shapiro is clearly an idiot, because his comments have cleverly been used by those sympathetic to Israel to frame the perception of the second Gaza Flotilla as nothing more than a scam with alternative objectives to the stated objective of delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza. The Free Gaza flotilla isn't finding public sympathy except by people who are already sympathetic to Gaza, and only with new people actively engaged and sympathetic to the flotilla cause can the Free Gaza Movement win the media. Without gaining public support and sympathy high ground in the media, the Gaza flotilla is a failure.

The media coverage of the flotilla has been remarkably good in my opinion. As events unfolded, the media have been reporting on the activities of the Free Gaza movement, and because all of those activities have been setbacks to their objectives, there are no successes for the media to report. From the beginning, the objective of the flotilla as an action was the political message, and every message to date has made the Free Gaza movement look like clowns in a circus, and I think some of the frustration that is being posted online suggests that even people sympathetic to Gaza and opposed to the Israel blockade see the Free Gaza movement as clowns. The control by Israel of the information domain has been thoroughly demoralizing for the Free Gaza Movement, hitting their supporters harder and harder with each consecutive setback.

Consider how thoroughly Israel has whipped the Free Gaza movement... when the flotilla became a flop, many activists attempted a "Flytilla", which itself has been ineffective due to blocks by airline companies in Europe. What are the odds those airline companies have threatening letters from Israeli lawyers in hand? The "Flytilla" is such a flop on it's own that very few major newspapers have even bothered to report the stunt. Israel has so thoroughly dominated the Free Gaza Movements messaging that Israel now drives the narrative, and when Israel controls the narrative, that often means no broad media coverage for those competing in the information domain against Israel.

As information wars go, the humiliation of the Free Gaza movement by Israel has been a masterpiece of soft power strategic communications. There is a lot to learn here.

What to Watch For This Week

There are six big issues this week I will be watching closely.

South Korea will be conducting military exercises all week near the city of Paju near the DMZ. While South Korea conducts exercises along the DMZ all the time, I keep thinking we are going to see another North Korean action in the very near future. The reports of the Army struggling with malnutrition is particularly troubling, and on Tuesday the US women's soccer team is going to kick the snot out of the North Korean women's soccer team at the Women's World Cup in Germany. If you get a chance, look for photo's of the two teams side by side before the game. It is going to look like a competition between the women and the girls, and the North Korean soccer team isn't malnourished like the rest of that nation.

Russia will continue testing the Bulava missile on June 28th. One of the really interesting aspects of this launch is that Russia intends to stream the launch live on the Russian Defense Ministries website. That is either a sign of confidence in the missile program after very difficult development pains or political desperation given how much money has been spent. I am less concerned than apparently most of you regarding the conventional military power of Russia, but I am concerned about Russia's nuclear inventory. Nuclear weapons remain Russia's most influential and most leveraged political weapon.

There is diplomatic movement in the territorial dispute between China and Vietnam. The Wall Street Journal is reporting that there is a resolution, while the New York Times is reporting that both sides have agreed to sit down and discuss the issue. I tend to think the Wall Street Journal mistook the announcement for talks about the issue as an actual resolution to the territorial dispute, and the New York Times reporting is more accurate. Regardless, the possibility the US could get diplomatically involved is one of the factors driving a diplomatic solution from China. I would suggest Hillary Clinton has once again positively influenced the region with her speech last year regarding US policy of South China Sea territorial disputes in ways that most people do not truly appreciate.

It is unclear what will happen with the "peace" flotilla that sailed to run the Gaza blockade. Egypt is playing a positive role, and other nations have also played positive roles in preventing a confrontation. Much of the international will ignore how running a naval blockade is an act of war, but Israel's naval blockade of Gaza is an act of war, which makes whining about rockets into Israel nothing more than a complaint by Israel that the enemy is fighting back. The big difference here is that the war is between Israel and Gaza, not those of the blockade who make themselves enemy combatants in a war zone intentionally. Israel isn't only within their right to stop the flotilla, but also within their legal rights under international law to sink the ships outright. Yeah that would be the height of political stupidity, but Israel will stop the flotilla at any cost.

The TFG in Somalia is making things harder for everyone on the piracy issue. On May 24 six private security personnel were arrested and $3.6 million intended for paying a pirate ransom was seized by the TFG in the name of anti-piracy efforts. While the six people have been released due to Presidential pardon (read external political pressure), the bottom line is ransom money will now have to be delivered in ways that get around the TFG. This comes as it is reported that London insurance companies now pull in more than $120 million a year from Somali piracy, while the United Nations reports ransoms last year totaled just over $110 million. The areas where piracy insurance is required in the Indian Ocean have expanded, so expect a much higher figure than $120 million for insurance companies this year. Bottom line, governments everywhere are part of the problem because none of them are willing to commit to a real solution, and the shipping industry is caught trying to manage their own interests against an assault of some kind from all sides.

Finally, ex-Varyag goes to sea trials on Friday. No need to discuss this one, I'm pretty sure everyone will be watching and there will be plenty of things said. The aspect of this event I am watching for is what China says about it.

A bonus thought:

People have long asked where Somali pirates are getting all of their good intelligence from. They seem to know where the easy to hit ships will be, by name and all. There is ample evidence that Somali pirates are not working with Iran and they also do not appear to work in coordination with any Al Qaeda affiliated groups. One of the biggest questions that has popped up as a result of several different events over the last several months is how much influence and apparent connectivity ISI Chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha has with Somali pirate leaders. My sense is the relationship between Somali pirates and the ISI is the next big pirate story on the verge of busting into the media.

(Picture at the top caught my attention. Some will get it, some won't. Click for more information.)

Gaza Flotilla - Round II and Navy IW

The US Department of State has condemned Hamas and friends’ upcoming attempt to provoke the Israelis into a confrontation. If the flotilla happens, and I see no reason why it won’t, look for evolved tactics, both operational and informational, on both sides. The Israelis will not let their naval commandos be surprised or overwhelmed this time.

State versus non-state clashes at sea have become more prevalent in recent years. In addition to the Flotilla, Greenpeacers have tussled with the Danish Navy, the pirate saga in the Indian Ocean continues, and the USN routinely faces numerous interactions with various sorts of refugees and detainees. Although not as glamorous as preparing for war at sea, irregular population-centric encounters should be a routine part of unit and advanced level training for USN surface and air forces. The Navy should consider utilizing culturally appropriate role players in these scenarios, much as the Army and NECC have done in their training. The first time Sailors deal with some of the human dynamics in these situations should not be in an environment where the wrong move could create an international incident. There are a lot of unemployed Somalis in the US diaspora - let's put some of these young men who are vulnerable to radicalization to work for Team America, provide some stellar role models for them, and give the Navy's front line forces some realistic training.


The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Thud

This is the transcript of the President's speech yesterday about the Middle East and North Africa.

I thought the speech was too long and poorly crammed two different issues into one speech, and the speech never really found a way to link the different issues effectively.

The Arab Spring is a unique event, and the White House needs to be smarter and understand that it is a big enough event that it doesn't need to tie into Israel and Palestine. Had these two issues been treated separately, the President would have resonated with more people on each issue. Instead I believe the message intended got lost.

The President tried to spread it around too much, and my sense by the reactions I have read by those in the Middle East and North Africa, this speech hit with a resounding thud of 'ho-hum' to many target audiences while leaving the President exposed politically on Israel.

I find some of the Israel related political criticism by the Presidents political opponents very legitimate, and I believe that criticism could have been avoided. It is hard to be Presidential in credibility when the President issues hollow warnings of possible UN sanctions to government leaders in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria regarding the killing and imprisonment of their own civilians when the only real substantial action advised to Middle Eastern nations by the President was his instruction to Israel to concede land for peace.

Threatening governments with possible UN sanctions that may not even be attainable politically is hardly the stuff of a bully pulpit by the President of the United States in the defense of people seeking freedom and liberty from tyrannical regimes, and yet that was the substance of the speech to the Middle Eastern government leaders dealing with the Arab Spring by killing or rounding up their own people. I was underwhelmed.

There were so many mixed messages in the President's speech that it is difficult to believe the message communicated was the same message delivered. What exactly is the message to the Middle East when on one hand the President asks Arabs to quit blaming Israel for their problems, and on the other hand the President tells Israel the path towards peace with a neighbor that rejects the existence of Israel as a starting point is land concessions of major population centers?

Everyone knows Israel must make concessions for peace, but if the policy of the United States in addressing the issue doesn't begin with the concession by Palestine for 2-state, peaceful mutual existence with Israel as a starting point - then any US policy related to Palestine and Israel is going nowhere.

While I think the part of the speech that focused on Egypt and Tunisia was very well done, I'm not sure the rest of the speech did much to forward American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East or North Africa, nor did much to build American credibility with the various folks engaged in the Arab Spring movements throughout the Middle East. I wouldn't call the speech a strike out, but with that speech the President never made it to first base.

Surgical Strike in Sudan - Updated

It sounds like a scene right out of the movies. You can basically pick your Hollywood plot line that leads to this incident today in Sudan.

An air strike on a car on Sudan's Red Sea coast killed its two passengers and destroyed the vehicle on Tuesday evening, the head of the state assembly told AFP.

"A plane bombed a small car which was coming from Port Sudan airport to the town... There were two people in the car and both were killed. The vehicle was completely destroyed," Mohammed Tahir said by telephone.

The unidentified plane, which struck at about 10:00 pm (1900 GMT), flew in from the Red Sea, to which it then returned, Tahir added.

There was no immediate word on the identity of the two dead passengers or on whose aircraft carried out the strike.

In a statement broadcast on Sudanese radio, a police spokesman confirmed that a missile was fired at a vehicle 15 kilometres (9 miles) south of Sudan's main port city, killing two, and that a team had been sent to investigate.

It has not been announced who was killed, but without any other details I think it is safe to assume this was an Israeli hit. I for one will not shed any tears, because whether it is Hollywood or the real world, when this type of thing happens it means the target was worth the political risk - which also means some evil dude was killed today.

BTW... it was not the US Navy, our aircraft carriers are off the coast of Pakistan, no longer in the Red Sea.

Update1: Maybe it was us after all, because this is an interesting new detail from Reuters (also other news agencies reporting)

The plane came in from the Red Sea and flew back after the bombing, Tahir said. The Sudanese Media Centre said the army responded with missiles that the foreign plane managed to evade.

"We heard three loud explosions," a source at Port Sudan airport told Reuters. "We went outside to see what was happening and eye witnesses told us they saw two helicopters which looked liked Apaches flying past."

A few thoughts here. If we are talking fighter jets, my money is still on Israel, but if helicopters were involved that means it could be the United States.

One possibility is that Cobra attack helicopters from the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) conducted the strike. Operations of the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) have been very quiet over the last few months, with sporadic reports the ship was in the northern Persian Gulf for a few months. It is relatively common these days for the US to keep a LPD in the region with attack helicopters on board, so the potential for Cobras on the LSD fits a historical pattern even if I do believe it would be slightly unusual.

Another real possibility though is that in the night sky what they really saw were MH-60S Knighthawks with Hellfires on the wings deployed from one of any number of potential Navy ships off Sudan. Looking up in the dark it is easy to see how MH-60S's would look a lot like Apache gunships. USS Mason (DDG 87) has been operating in the Gulf of Aden and could have made the trip to the Sudan fairly quickly.

Maritime Weapons Interdictions

As “UNIFIED PROTECTOR” kicks off, it’s worthwhile to look at some recent interdictions of sea-born smuggled weapons. The Emiratis displayed excellent intelligence fusion and interagency cooperation in last week's seizure of thousands of weapons headed for the Houthis. The last thing Yemen needs is more small arms fueling one of the three or four (depending on how you count) ongoing insurgencies there.

Here is an interesting video on Israel’s interception of weapons probably bound for Hamas. As alluded to in the video, six C-704s represent a serious sea denial capability that fortunately was disrupted before reaching the hands of terrorists.

Judging by the destinations, Iran was probably responsible for both of these shipments... And to complete the trifecta, earlier this month, the Malaysians seized possible nuclear-related cargo sailing from China to Iran.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

ASMs to Hamas

More detail on the seized ship cargo from Noah Eshel at Ares:

An initial investigation revealed the ship was loaded with C-704 anti-ship missiles - shore-to-sea missiles with a range of 35 km that could put at risk Israeli vessels at sea as well as strategic infrastructure targets near Ashkelon. Iran is known to possess and is actually producing such missiles, which, along with identifying documents (including a missile identification document, below) gives substantial evidence of Iran’s involvement in the weapons smuggling attempt...

Delivery of these would seem to have represented a major increase in Hamas' military capabilities. Targets would presumably have been IDF Navy corvettes and patrol boats, although one of these could obviously give an LCS an extremely bad day.

Israeli Navy Seizes Arms Smuggling Vessel

Is it coincidence that several weeks ago the Iranian Navy docked two ships in Lattakia, and today the Israeli Navy seized a ship from Lattakia full of arms heading for Hamas?

The Israeli navy intercepted the Liberian flagged ship 200 nautical miles from Israeli coast. Israeli Army Spokesman said that the “Victoria” originated from the Lattakia port in Syria and sailed to Mersin, Turkey. It was seized while on its way from Turkey destined for the El-Arish port in Egypt.

Israeli Navy commando unit took control of the ship early Tuesday morning, without a struggle, when it was around 200 nautical miles off Israel’s coast and towed it to the port in Ashdod. According to the IDF Spokesman Unit, the ship was carrying “tons” of concealed weapons that are allegedly destined for Hamas in the Gaza Strip

Security source told Fox News that the ship was monitored and tracked for the past few days, and while the time was right, on Monday night, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu authorized the operation.

A joint statement from the IDF and Israeli Foreign Ministry said that German officials have been alerted of the ship’s seizure, as the ship belonged to a German company. Liberian officials have also been alerted due to the Liberian flag on the ship. The operating company of the ship was from France, and thus French officials were also made aware of the situation.

Are the two events connected? Without a future Wikileaks, we are unlikely to ever know.

It boggles the mind that there is an armada of NATO ships in the Mediterranean Sea supposedly enforcing a UN resolution by blocking arms smuggling into Libya, and yet the tiny Israeli Navy is intercepting a shipment of arms heading to Egypt without any problems.

It highlights how NATO uses naval power to demonstrate the potential of political power, while Israel uses naval power as an extension of political power. If Libyans really wanted help, they would be pleading for help from Israel, not NATO.

Iranian Navy Set to Cross Suez Canal

The Associated Press has confirmed when the Iranians will cross the Suez Canal.

Suez Canal officials say two Iranian naval vessels are expected to start their passage through the strategic waterway early Tuesday.

Canal officials say the ships are expected to pay a fee of $290,000 for the crossing. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they aren't authorized to speak publicly about the matter.

If the ships make the passage, it would mark the first time in three decades that Iranian military ships have traveled the canal that links the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.

It seems pretty clear that from the Iranian point of view, this is a communication exercise. Timing for Tuesday, they are hoping for maximum impact to make the headlines on Tuesday as folks get back to work after a three day weekend.

The question isn't if anyone will do anything - the US Navy guarantees freedom of the seas to the world, including Iran. The question is whether people will overreact politically to news of the transit. Keep in mind, it is to the advantage of Israel and Iran for the US markets to overreact, because impacts to our markets give cover to politicians who support Israel's claim the Iranian Naval movements are bad for the US. I

don't see any scenario where the US Navy reacts to the Iranians in any way. I will never to presume to know what Israel will do when it comes to Iran.

For those who are curious, yes, I do believe the purpose of the Iranian naval force is to deliver weapons for Hezbollah in Lebanon. This voyage is expensive for Iran, so I am thinking there must be a payoff in it somewhere otherwise it wouldn't be done.

The Iran Questions

I think The Atlantic deserves a lot of credit. They have effectively leveraged the reputations of their intellectual capital towards bringing about a serious and constructive discussion on the issues related to the Iranian nuclear program. It started with two contributions in the most recent edition - this article by Jeffery Goldberg and this article by Robert Kaplan.

Impressive is the follow on articles here, here, here, here, here, and too many other places both on the site and around the web to link. What we are seeing is fantastic journalism being leveraged to generate a Web 2.0 model for the collaboration and debate of serious issues and ideas on the web, and it is so rare in American politics today that I think some folks are overreacting and believe the sky might be falling. Hardly, the discussion is both healthy and informative - something that has been missing in regards to serious national security debates in the 21st century.

There are three key questions emerging that I think are worth a blog post.

1. Will there be military action against the Iranian nuclear program?
2. If military action is inevitable, who will take that action against the Iranian nuclear program?
3. What is a legitimate plan C that doesn't involve military action?

My answers are sure to piss someone off.

The answer to the first question is - probably, yes. I do not believe the current US diplomatic effort has a chance in hell succeeding. I'm old school when it comes to diplomacy, I firmly believe Roosevelt's model was exactly right, and in particular with the Middle East - every approach must be speak softly and carry a big stick. I think the US does a terrible job speaking softly, because in my opinion all we do is loudly offer sanctions as a solution to every problem. I also think that when it comes to the diplomacy of carrying a big stick, the US instead brings a tiny twig of bamboo. This is a discussion about nuclear weapons, and our stick is a conventional military confrontation that the whole world believes would do little to hurt the government of Iran.

Both Progressives and Conservatives will argue that President Obama is somehow different than President Bush when it comes to Iran. I don't see the difference - and if it exists - it is too nuanced for the Iranians to notice. At the end of the day both presidents used sanctions as the carrot and a twig represented by conventional military power as a stick. I don't think that model has a chance in hell of working. Want results - ditch the sanctions and work on issues that actually mean something to Iran - like investment and trade with a focus on economy. We didn't have to kill the Iranian economy with sanctions - it was already dead.

But we also need a bigger stick. We are talking about a nuclear weapons program - one that the national security establishment of this country has significant concerns with (enough that Presidents imply the threat of military action). The stick needs to be proportional to the threat - and if the threat is that Iran would allow the use of nuclear weapons under any conditions - then perhaps we need to imply the use of nuclear weapons against Iran. I'm not a big fan of MAD, nor am I a fan of preemptive strike - but I think a hint of both would be constructive towards making our twig look a bit more like a Louisville Slugger. It will also do wonders for getting the attention of anyone in the world who doesn't understand how serious we take this issue.

Conventional military power is not a threat to Iran. Invasion is beyond silly to contemplate, and beyond the capacity of the DoD when forces are engaged in Afghanistan. Conventional air strikes would have to be over a long period of time if they were going to be effective towards the objective - and even then I think most people agree that is simply a delaying effort with no tangible impact on the calculations of the Iranian government. Threaten to put a nuclear bomb on target in Tehran - and the whole world will sit up with attention. I know folks think it is crazy to suggest that nuclear weapons should be used as a stick in foreign policy - but remember that is the exact threat this whole issue is about to begin with. We are either serious people with serious solutions to serious problems - or we are not. I don't think most Americans are as serious about this issue as they pretend to be, and the vast majority have white lines and red lines they simply won't cross because they fear being judged by their peers. Yes, I truly believe that politically correct peer pressure no different than what one might find on an American high school playground is a player in international politics - and it why those who don't give a shit about peer pressure get their way in the 21st century. Iran, and North Korea, and even China to a large degree - don't give a shit what us Westerners think.

Since sanctions will not be removed, and the chances of Barack Obama making a threat to Iran with nuclear weapons is very near nill - I suspect diplomacy will fail and there will be a military confrontation with Iran over their nuclear program.

Which leads to the second question...

A recent poll of opinions in the Middle East conducted by the University of Maryland in conjunction with Zogby International is a must read, because the results are remarkable. In virtually every category the Obama administration has effectively lost every single gain made with his speech in Cairo, Egypt - meaning there has been no progress at all by this administration shaping opinions in the Middle East. Even more remarkable, the poll reveals a spectacular failure on the part of the Obama administration in regards to the Iranian nuclear program issue. The question I have regarding the results is whether the poll represents legitimacy for Iran (in the eyes of Iranian leaders) on the Arab street regarding their pursuit of nuclear weapons? I do not know that answer.

Consider the following two fictional news stories:

The United States Air Force bombed several Iranian nuclear facilities last night in a daring middle of the night raid that destroyed several dozen nuclear facilities across Iran. In response to the attack, Iran attacked several neutral flagged ships in the Persian Gulf and destroyed an oil terminal in Kuwait near where US cargo ships were docked in support of Iraq war operations. A Saudi super tanker was still burning in the Persian Gulf this morning as US Navy vessels were on the scene to extinguish the fire. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait launched a protest against the actions of the United States in the United Nations this morning, blaming the United States for the attacks against the Sunni nations around the Persian Gulf.

The Israeli Air Force overflew Saudi Arabia and bombed several Iranian nuclear facilities last night in a daring middle of the night raid that destroyed several dozen nuclear facilities across Iran. In response to the attack, Iran attacked several neutral flagged ships in the Persian Gulf and destroyed an oil terminal in Kuwait near where US cargo ships were docked in support of Iraq war operations. A Saudi super tanker was still burning in the Persian Gulf this morning as US Navy vessels were on the scene to extinguish the fire. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait launched a protest against the actions of the Israel in the United Nations this morning, blaming _____ for the attacks against the Sunni nations around the Persian Gulf.

Fill in the blank. Tell me, how exactly does Iran attack anyone besides the United States in the region in retaliation for the Israelis attacking Iran? If Iran attacks Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait, or any regional country other than Israel - how do they justify the attack to the Arab street? Is the average Sunni Arab going to accept the Iranian line that the Persians attacked their country because Israel bombed them first?

It is difficult to imagine how Iran can lash out against any of the Arab nations in the region after an attack by Israel without flushing Arab street opinion down the toilet. It isn't difficult to see how they might come after the US - that is believable, but the whole 'region up in flames scenario' doesn't quite register with me.

There is no doubt in my mind that the US can absolutely crush Iran. The Iranian naval and air force capabilities are only capable of achieving a major surprise attack - not of achieving success in a direct confrontation. There is no military reason why Iran couldn't be destroyed by conventional military power, but there are very serious and important political reasons why it is a very, very bad idea that the US would even think about starting a war with Iran. If we start the war, we put every one of our partners in the region at risk. The same is, to a large degree, not true if Israel starts the war - because the Sunni Arab will not accept that a Shia Persian can kill a Sunni Arabs simply because the Israeli Jew gets militant. That ain't how politics in the Middle East works.

So I firmly believe that the US will not, under any circumstances, put our Arab allies at risk to retaliation by attacking Iran. That also means the US won't be coming to the aid of Israel if they attack Iran. The only way the US enters into a war with Iran is if 1) Iran attacks us directly, or 2) if Iran attacks one of our Arab allies. Because Israel already knows this, I believe they are doing everything possible to convince us to start the war so they don't have to take the blunt of the consequences. With the latest polls showing Iran has the backing of the Arab street, I think it is a legitimate possibility that Iran wouldn't attack the US or Arab nations in the region and prefer instead to fight Israel only and primarily via proxy with Hamas and Hezbollah.

Which leads us to the final question.

Of which I believe this and this discusses an option that is not outside the realm of possibility.

Israel Bags Divers

This is not the first foray into combat swimmer attacks by wannabe terrorist frogmen. In 2003, DHS warned of an Al Qaeda-based scuba threat and ASG explored underwater attacks in 2004. Fortunately, successful swimmer attacks require a higher level of experience and competence than the typical terrorist can muster. And the complete failure of this attack is probably a better deterrent than any other counter-measures against future attempts.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Hezbollah Threatens Unrestricted Naval Warfare Against Israel

Just in case you were wondering what Hezbollah's opinion of Israeli naval capabilities are, we get a clear picture from Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah himself in his latest speech.

Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah said on Tuesday that his militants were capable of wiping out Israel's navy and any other ships heading to Israel in the event of a new war with the Jewish state.

"If you launch a new war on Lebanon, if you blockade our coastline, all military, civilian or commercial ships heading through the Mediterranean to occupied Palestine will be targetted by the Islamic resistance," said Nasrallah in a speech transmitted via video link to thousands of supporters massed in Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs.

"Whether along the northern or southern Israeli shore, we can target ships, bomb them and hit them God willing," he added, speaking on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon after a 22-year occupation.

"When the world sees how these ships are destroyed, no one will dare go there (Israel)," he added. "And I am only speaking about the Mediterranean, I haven't reached the Red Sea yet."

The most common capabilities discussion in the naval circles today involves anti-access / area denial (A2AD). These discussions often speculate what the constitution of A2AD networks might be on the modern and irregular naval battlefield, and the capabilities necessary to penetrate and defeat enemy A2AD networks. In the case of the US Navy, I believe the US Navy has been too narrowly focused on what will constitute the modern A2AD of a peer competitor like China - and indeed our force structure is budgeted almost entirely focused on that capability. For its part, the US Navy would suggest the same capabilities can effectively address both modern peer A2AD networks and IW A2AD networks - a suggestion I have not been convinced is accurate.

Battle Network Theory Addressing IW A2AD Networks

For the US Navy, the Littoral Combat Ship has been touted as the capability that will give the US Navy an edge against irregular warfare A2AD capabilities at sea - for example, dealing with small boat swarms or tactics similar to those exercised by pirates off the Somali coast. The truth is a bit more subtle - as it is actually the platforms (in particular the naval helicopter today) that is expected to be the capability to prevail against irregular warfare threats at sea - the ship is actually nothing more than the vehicle carrier.

The prevailing theory of the US Navy today to defeat irregular warfare threats at sea is that ships with flexible payloads able to field a variety of capabilities simultaneously - UAVs, UUVs, USVs, manned boats, RHIBs, and helicopters - will represent a transformational capability for the US Navy on the next maritime battlefield to defeat emerging irregular warfare capabilities.

I do subscribe to this theory - indeed I believe these "motherships" will be in the 21st century what the aircraft carrier has been to Naval forces in the 20th century. It is why I have often compared USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2) to the USS Langley (CV 1). Just as the USS Langley (CV 1) represented an imperfect initial version of the aircraft carrier, the two Littoral Combat Ships represent imperfect motherships. The aircraft carrier hid in plain sight as a support capability to the almighty battleship until WWII, when the war proved that aircraft carriers had indeed replaced battleships as the major combat capability. Aircraft carriers were transformational, despite being around for 20 years. It is unclear how many years we will develop motherships, nor how many generations and styles will be developed over that period, but I strongly believe those platforms that deploy from motherships will prove transformational on the next maritime battlefield - and motherships represent the next transformational capability in naval warfare. Just like the aircraft carrier, they will hide in plain sight until proven.

I'm sure that many will disagree, but there were plenty of critics of the aircraft carrier before WWII as well. For the record - since I've never really been clear on the topic - the larger payload and storage mission bays is why I favor USS Independence (LCS 2) over USS Freedom (LCS 1), because for these first generation motherships - reconfigurable payload space is, for me, the most important factor.

Under this emerging mothership theory of naval warfare in the US Navy - each deployable vehicle, whether unmanned or manned, represents a battle node in the battle network, and quantity of platforms carried by each mothership is proportional to the available bandwidth for each ship in the battle network.

But Israel deploys under a different theory of naval warfare against irregular threats - a variation of the theory of naval warfare that several of the top maritime strategist in the US do subscribe to. This battle network theory is centered around small, fast, well armed corvettes capable of delivering lots of firepower in small packages. These corvettes are also deployed on a network theory of combined arms naval warfare, but the network looks different.

In the Israeli Navy, each corvette represents a battle node in the battle network, and the available bandwidth is determined by the number of missiles available on each corvette. The Israeli Navy is expected to operate in a battlespace near to its own shores, so land based aviation acts as a force multiplier for the number of nodes in the naval battle network, and operational air bases represent additional bandwidth in the network.

One can compare the strengths and weaknesses of the two network theories. The Israeli model makes each node independently strong, and allows for nodes to remain fully operational when disconnected from the network. The amount of bandwidth per node diminishes over time, however, as the ship must resupply its payload at port. There are also fewer nodes in any naval battle network that make ships the primary battle node at sea. The emerging US model is intended to leverage large quantities of battle nodes able to battle at greater range, and is scalable to the available bandwidth available within the network (the size of the ships able to deploy systems). Because vehicles are reloaded or replaced much easier than ships, the diminishing returns of bandwidth over time are expected to be much lower. Under the US model however, the nodes rely on the network itself - and stresses to the network could potentially greatly reduce bandwidth.

Against irregular warfare A2AD networks, the mothership model works good because network reliability is much higher. Against peer competitor A2AD networks the mothership model may not be effective should the network be stressed or become unavailable. This condition is why I am not a believer of the Navy's suggestion that capabilities that address peers can be used to address IW challengers - indeed I see the US Navy developing a battle network theory that will be highly effective against IW challengers using equipment best suited for peer competitors.

The IW A2AD Network

We can only speculate the capabilities of Hezbollah that would be leveraged to deny the Israeli Navy access to the shores of Lebanon, or give Hezbollah a strike capability to ships bound for Israel. We know Hezbollah would deploy shore based anti-ship missiles from mobile vehicles - they did this in 2006. These mobile systems would be difficult to detect prior to their engagement, and could potentially be very easily concealed. Based on the data collected from studies of the 1006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, these mobile truck based missile systems would likely be utilized from and concealed within civilian neighborhoods to insure any capability lost would insure collateral damage to civilians. What is very much unclear though is whether the targeting capabilities of these missiles are advanced enough to track an Israeli corvette without external electronic detection systems.

For example, the INS Hanit attack by Hezbollah in 2006 is a case study in the questions that still linger over what naval warfare would look like today. The dirty secret on that incident is that the ship had no early warning detection system online, no electronic countermeasure system utilized, was moving at relatively slow speed with the broad side of the ship facing the shoreline, and took no defensive action whatsoever - which means INS Hanit was in the most exposed position it could have possibly been in during the attack. INS Hanit was protected only by the inherent stealth of the ships design, no other factor whatsoever, and still almost avoided being hit by the anti-ship missile.

You see, the part of the little Israeli corvette that got hit was the crane, the only non-stealthy part of the ship. At the time of the attack, the crane was deployed over the flight deck. The reason there were so few causalities and relatively so little damage to the ship is because most of the crew was in the mess eating dinner, and the deployed crane took the direct hit. This suggests that just about any defensive capability could have potentially protected the Israeli corvette from the anti-ship missile. It also suggests that stealthy designs that reduce the RCS of smaller corvettes may actually be much more of a capability than is given credit in public discussions - particularly in the US where corvettes in naval circles are almost considered a cuss word.

One wild card threat Hezbollah could have up their sleeve is the use of unmanned, incendiary centric kamikaze vehicles against ships. The tactic is to deliver by air fire bombs to civilian commercial vessels. It is a legitimate question how effective any Air Force would be in detecting and shooting these vehicles down, because they would likely fly at low altitude and are unlikely to be very large. It is unclear how sophisticated this type of capability could be, because a lot would depend on the guidance capability of the unmanned vehicle, the degree of damage that could be delivered by a single payload, the cost effectiveness of any such attack, and the effectiveness of Israel to detect and destroy these UAVs before they could do any damage. There used to be a Russian blog that mostly discussed military capabilities in the context of Science Fiction, but would speculate on this type of military capability as a type of poor mans dive bomber. Is this a serious military capability? It doesn't necessarily have to be, if used effectively onceit would then represent a capability that consumes resources of the Israeli Air Force for defensive purposes.

It is possible Hezbollah may have developed some kind of underwater warfare capability. Small simi-submersibles are really not that difficult to build - indeed it is the tool of choice for drug runners from Central and South America to smuggle drugs into the US. It isn't hard to imagine Hezbollah developing a vehicle to be a type of inexpensive maritime BM-21 delivery system, whether by fast boat or simi-submersible. Considering how inexpensive those type of weapons are and depending upon the number of vessels able to be swarmed with that capability, it is unclear how effective any Navy is in neutralizing these type of small, mobile close range capabilities. Swarming small boat tactics and defenses are mostly theory and exercise, because there has only been one serious live test in wartime - and combat in that case ended almost as quickly as it began (Nightstalkers has a good account of that action).

A Threat or a Feint

These unknowns discussed and many other unknowns of modern naval warfare make threats like this one Hezbollah effective. Is Hezbollah a real naval threat to Israel? Maybe, but I think in this case Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah is mostly being intentionally bombastic, and the rhetoric represents more bark than bite. It is the role of Hezbollah to be a deterrent to an Israeli attack of Iran, so speaking up now about Hezbollah's mysterious but serious capabilities of naval power implies to me he is simply taking advantage of current events in his rhetoric, not legitimately bragging about any substantial increase in Hezbollah naval capabilities.

Still, no one saw the attack on the INS Hanit coming, and it should be expected that if there is a next time - both Israel and Hezbollah will introduce something new to the maritime battlefield.