Priorities

A very interesting nugget in this Reuters article.

Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz said his country was examining its energy ties with Israel, but Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul said delivery of Israeli-made Heron military drones would continue.

In other words, there will be lots of rhetoric by political elites in Israel and Turkey, but it would appear the military's of Israel and Turkey intend to maintain good relations where possible.

The message by Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul suggests the perspective of the Turkish Military = Israeli Drones > Palestinians.

I cannot say I'm surprised.

More Thoughts on the Gaza Flotilla

This is a really good post at Danger Room discussing the information war of the Gaza flotilla incident. If you haven't read the STRATFOR analysis, it is truly brilliant and worth your time.

The STRATFOR analysis raises a serious question with me. If we have advanced so far as a people, and the internet has opened up information flows to the level that we celebrate how informed we are as a people, then why is it that so many smart people are able to so easily fall for what are clearly populist political infowar efforts intended to shape perception despite the facts - which are still in short supply.

For example, there were three members of the IDF commando team hospitalized. One of the soldiers was injured when thrown overboard, but I find it interesting the other two were hospitalized with gunshot wounds.

But facts really don't matter when faced with overwhelming populist agendas playing to a predetermined bias - a bias that swings both ways. A good example of how it swings both ways is the recent comments by Charles Krauthammer quoted by The Corner.

The fundamental deception here is the use of the word "humanitarian." . . . Humanitarians don't wield iron clubs, and [they] would have killed the Israelis had the Israelis not drawn their pistols in self-defense.

But there‘s a larger issue here. What exactly is the humanitarian crisis that the flotilla was actually addressing? There is none. There’s no one starving in Gaza. The Gazans have been supplied with food and social services, education, by the U.N., by UNWRA, for 60 years, in part with American tax money.

Second, when there are humanitarian needs, the Israelis allow — every day — food and medicine overland into Gaza. The reason that it did not want to allow this flotilla is because, as the spokesman for the flotilla said herself, this was not about humanitarian relief. It was about breaking the blockade.

And the reason the Israelis have a blockade is because they only want to allow humanitarian supplies and not weaponry. Look, the proof of that is the fact that if you look at a map of Gaza, you'll see that Israelis only control three sides of this rectangle. There’s a fourth side on the Egyptian side. So it is an Egyptian-Israeli blockade.

The Egyptians have the same problem with Gaza. People accuse Israeli of the blockade [saying it’s because] because they're racist, they’re anti-Muslim, anti-Arab. The Egyptians are Muslim and Arab and they’ve gone to war three times on behalf of the Palestinians. So why do they have exactly the same blockade? Because Gaza is run by Hamas, a terror entity that wants to import weaponry and resume the war against Israel.

The man who made the announcement that we saw earlier, explaining the commando raid is the defense minister of Israel. He‘s not a right-winger. He‘s not Likud. He’s Ehud Barak, who’s the leader of Labor, the party of Yitzhak Rabin, Golda Meir, the party of the left, and the man who ten years ago this summer offered the Palestinians a peace agreement that would have [provided] a Palestinian state, division of Jerusalem, and an end of the conflict.

The Palestinians said no. And Gaza two years ago declared war on Israel. That's why you have a blockade. . . .

If these people had wanted humanitarian aid, Israel offered to take the ships into Haifa, peacefully, unload all the stuff inside and to allow all the humanitarian aid immediately into Gaza, all the food and medicine. And it was refused because it was meant to be a provocation and to create an incident.

Charles Krauthammer fails when he attempts to forward the Israeli official government view of the maritime blockade. No question part of the intent is to prevent weapon smuggling - and that is certainly a legitimate purpose of a maritime blockade (indeed the UNSC has a similar maritime blockade established against North Korea in regards to arms sales).

What isn't mentioned is how the maritime blockade is also intended to be part of the economic war on Gaza. Is that a legitimate military tactic? Yep, but don't ask me to sympathize with Israel when on one hand they intentionally deny economic opportunity to a huge population then complain with the other hand that the enemy is actively fielding plenty of unemployed young men in a war against them. Israeli policy perpetuates the violence, so Israel doesn't get any sympathy from me when complaining they are constantly under attack. The war goes both ways.

But Krauthammer nails the rest of his argument, and it is a point dismissed in the populist political rhetoric shaping the perception of the Gaza flotilla event. When IDF soldiers are being treated for gunshot wounds, clearly this was not a 'peace' movement. The blockade isn't just an "Israeli" thing either; Egypt has also been a partner in the blockade until this incident. One of the more interesting results so far is the Egyptian reaction to drop the blockade. In theory, the second flotilla could approach from the Egyptian maritime zone and avoid the Israeli blockade - except that running the maritime blockade has already been announced as the intent of the second flotilla - thus Israel again already has the right to interdict the second flotilla in international waters.

How the second flotilla is dealt with will tell us a lot about the policy at work in Israel. Obviously I believe Israel is going to stop the flotilla - it will not be allowed to run the maritime blockade. The only question to be asked is whether Israel treats this as a serious military operation - like it did the first time, or if Israel changes tactics to treat it as part of the global infowar campaign Hamas is trying to make it.

One final thought. My impression is that this does represent a strategic blunder by Israel, but there is a cynical alternative that does merit mentioning. It has been suggested that further isolation of Israel by the United States would give greater flexibility to Israel for undertaking unilateral military action by Israel against Iran. That isolation would need to be more than just the NPT discussions that force Israel to disclose their nuclear arsenal, and more than just a diplomatic disagreement regarding the use of UN sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. This event would seem to be in line with creating additional political separation between Israel and the US needed for Israel to act unilaterally. Time will tell, but a brute force response to the second flotilla could easily give President Obama the flexibility he needs to create additional political separation from Israel on the US end.

I'm not really a subscriber of this point of view, but I do agree further political separation between Israel and the US right now would give Israel more flexibility to unilaterally attack Iran, and as the Danger Room article notes - Israel went into this flotilla operation understanding the infowar unfolding. Israel never plays expecting to lose something for nothing, suggesting something bigger may be at work here.

Israeli Actions Are Stupid, But Legal

nGW and information warfare go hand in hand, and that is exactly what we are seeing unfold with the situation regarding the sea based protesters and Israel this morning as the discussion moves away from law and into the realm of politics. The political fallout will prove interesting, only because we are likely to learn a lot about President Obama.

The news has already gone viral, and many pundits have weighed in - many of whom have formulated their response without the facts of what happened. It is not surprising to me that much of the early press reporting has suffered from inaccuracies - early reporting of activities at sea often gets it wrong - and this incident is no different.

Was the Boarding Legal?

Under international law, the consensus of the maritime attorney's I have spoken to is that the boarding operation by Israel was legal. The coast of Gaza has been under maritime blockade by Israel, a blockade that was well known - indeed running the maritime blockade for political purposes was the specific intent of the protesters. It is why the press had been reporting all week that the situation was likely leading towards a confrontation. Is anyone surprised that Israel had an established maritime blockade and enforced that maritime blockade? I'm certainly not, Israel made clear all week that the flotilla would not be allowed to pass.

The maritime blockade is a result of the war between Israel and Hamas. Ones political position on that ongoing war is completely irrelevant to the reality that the maritime blockade was established. Knowledge of the maritime blockade by the protesters is also not in debate, and neither is knowledge the flotilla intended to violate the blockade - they made this clear themselves in the press. Once the flotilla made it clear in the press they intended to run the maritime blockade, according to international law, and even US law, the flotilla was considered to be in breach by attempting to violate the blockade.

It was at that point the IDF had legal authority - under international maritime law governing maritime blockades during wartime - to board the vessels and prevent the vessels from running the blockade. Yes, this action may legally be taken in international waters if those waters are recognized as part of the area under the maritime blockade. It is important to note that the action took place within the zone that was publicly known to be part of the maritime blockade of Gaza, and part of that zone is in international waters.

Whether it was a good decision by Israel to board the vessels is a political question, not a legal question. The outcome of the incident should not surprise anyone part of the maritime security community, indeed it highlights the inherent dangers that exist in political protests by sea. Sea based protests may be civilian political activities, but running a maritime blockade is not a political activity that engages law enforcement, rather it is a political activity against a military force exercising and activity governed by the laws of war - in other words, the protesters attempting to run the blockade could legally be argued to describe an act of war against Israel.

The Maritime NGO

What the hell was Israel thinking? I can't be the only person asking this question today, and yet I imagine there are a number of people in professional Navies around the world who have serious concerns in observing the events as they happened.

Political protests at sea cannot be legitimately compared to any protest on land, particularly when one considers any political protest situation where violent activity is likely. I think the authors on this blog made clear this week that we expected violence, because none of us are naive enough to believe close quarters situations involving Israelis and Palestinians will in any way be peaceful.

There is not a lot of space on ships, even big ships. If you have ever been on a ship, you know hallways are narrow and even something as simple as deckchairs can add to clutter on deck. When maritime security is enforced on any ship, there is an expectation of close quarters interaction with passengers and crew of a ship. One simply cannot get around this.

Putting IDF soldiers and political activists together on the same ship is like putting protesters and riot police in your house - that is literally how close they will be to one another. It isn't like a street protest where police can prepare by giving full city blocks of space for movement and protest activities. During situations on land where protesters may engage law enforcement, the space also allows for time - something one does not get when all activities between protesters and enforcers are in close quarters - like on a ship.

What is the result? Well, once the decision was made by Israel to board the ship the question is how the IDF would board the vessel. Based on video it would appear the protesters had deployed effective techniques to prevent an over-the-side boarding. That led to Israel deciding upon the fast rope approach.

The video of the fast rope activity demonstrates the danger in that tactic. Indeed, the first IDF commando doesn't even make it to the ground before the close quarters situation - like one would find on any ship full of protesters - immediately leads to violence. It seems incredible to me that the IDF didn't see that coming. If we presume the Israeli Navy is competent, we can presume they knew this would happen. That suggests Israel knew the initial boarding would be met with violent resistance, but the political cost of allowing violation of the blockade was higher than the expected political fallout of a violent response.

One thing is clear - every Navy needs to give serious thought to how to address this situation, because fast roping onto the deck of a ship of protesters should always expect to be a forcible entry operation.

It will be interesting to see how the Obama administration reacts. The recently released National Security Strategy of the United States depends a great deal on the use of international institutions and international law as a mechanism for fostering global peace on the maritime domain. Israel can legitimately be accused of having politically tone deaf leadership that is making world class dumbass decisions - an argument I think there is plenty of evidence to support - but the actions taken are within their rights of enforcing a maritime blockade under international law.

The truly scary part is that under international laws governing maritime blockades, Israel could have outright sank the ship instead of board it as an alternative enforcement of the maritime blockade, and Israel still been within their rights under international law. Such an action could have led to war with Turkey, but even if the ship would have been sunk, Turkey would still be on the wrong end of international law in this situation. Turkey will likely find plenty of populist political support in NATO countries over these events, but if they attempt to escalate they may find that support is fleeting among their NATO allies.

No one in NATO is going to support Turkey with anything other than political rhetoric in this situation. Rhetoric is free, but if a financial cost to NATO nations supporting Turkey becomes necessary - international law regarding naval blockades will quickly become the new foundation of NATO countries, and Turkey would quickly find themselves on the wrong end of the shifting political winds. Turkey finds a political victory in the present condition, and needs to do nothing outside of political rhetoric to secure it. The likelihood of taking some meaningful action against Israel by Turkey is very low.

As far as I am concerned, any country that acts as politically stupid as Israel has in this situation deserves every political attack they get. Israel has some seriously tone deaf leadership right now who seems to look at every problem as a nail and every solution requiring a hammer.

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Those wishing to add comment are reminded this is not a political blog. Our focus should be on the tactics of the incident and the legal issues surrounding maritime law. Most Americans probably don't realize everything Israel did was legal under US law, for example. Given the level of political support the protesters are getting from the international community - despite international law - suggests we have plenty to discuss regarding this event that has nothing to do with the Palestinian | Israeli conflict specifically.

Final note. As usual the Small Wars Journal has a timely piece by Claude Berube that goes right to the broader maritime security discussion this situation represents.

Beware Early Reporting

As we are reminded time and time again, early reporting often gets it wrong. The same is true with the events involving the flotilla engaged by the IDF.

Apparently the peaceful activities of the folks on the flotilla included the stabbing of an IDF soldier in the back - for example, meaning any attempt to quickly presume anything is foolish. We won't know for a few days what actually took place.

Am I surprised people died? Nope, if you recall my comments the other day I somewhat expected exactly what has happened. 10 dead and injuries on both sides. It is hard for Americans to draw any analogies, because we don't have a relationship like the one between Israel and Palestine.

But if 1000 people from Mexico, whom our government presumed was mostly made up of drug cartel supporters, tried to sail into San Diego with the expectation of running the blockade of the Coast Guard and creating a political demonstration through confrontation - I assure you the odds of people getting killed would be pretty high.

Just like they were in this situation.

NGOs vs. Navies

Here’s a great example an asymmetric operation by humanitarian or other NGOs to overcome a superior naval force. Tactics such as these and a similar maritime flash mobs can be used to break a blockade (as in this case), hamper the movement of commercial or naval shipping, or stage a protest at sea. Of course if a boat carrying school supplies and cement can avoid a blockade in this manner, so can one carrying smuggled weapons.

Also interesting to note are the Hamas Naval Police, pictured here, preparing for this encounter.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

From Future Projections to Present Reality

Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah let fire an interesting threat in his speech to followers today. Given he has more credibility on the use of anti-ship missiles than say - even the United States - it is worth paying attention to.

"If you launch a new war on Lebanon, if you blockade our coastline, all military, civilian or commercial ships heading through the Mediterranean to occupied Palestine will be targetted by the Islamic resistance," said Nasrallah in a speech transmitted via video link to thousands of supporters massed in Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs.

"Whether along the northern or southern Israeli shore, we can target ships, bomb them and hit them God willing," he added, speaking on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon after a 22-year occupation.

"When the world sees how these ships are destroyed, no one will dare go there (Israel)," he added. "And I am only speaking about the Mediterranean, I haven't reached the Red Sea yet."

If Hezbollah has been resupplied anti-ship missiles from Iran, which is the unspoken implication being made by this threat, then anti-access / area denial is no longer the threat of the future...

It has become the threat of the present.

Brookings Iran-Israel Wargame

Up to about step 8, the Brookings simulation of an Israeli strike on Iran seems to have run very much like the Patterson simulation. The major difference is in the Brookings sim, the Iranians decide to attack Saudi oil facilities and mine the Strait of Hormuz after playing it cool for several days. I'd be curious to learn why the Iranian team decided to respond after such a delay; their early strategy was very similar to the of the Iran team in the Patterson sim, which was to stay quiet and try to drive a wedge between Israel and the US. This seemed to be working (Israel's only activity after the first strike was to launch an assault against Hezbollah) in the Brookings simulation, and it looks as if the strike on Saudi oil solved a lot of diplomatic problems for both the Americans and the Israelis.

Libya Complains

Germany is suffering a touch of blowback for its naval deal with Israel. A critical letter was released by Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam Alqadhafi, who, according to FP, is increasingly influential in shaping Libyan foreign policy. There's no indication that the Germans plan to take this complaint seriously, although I wonder if the naval cooperation might become a major anti-German jihadist talking point.

Israel, Germany Expand Naval Procurment Deals

According to Defense News, Israel and Germany are close to cutting a deal on an additional Dolphin class submarine, and on two stretched A-100 corvettes. The latter has been in the works for some time now. Interestingly, the deal depends on German financing (up to a third of the total price) and on US permission to use part of the annual military aid budget on acquisition of the ships. The corvettes will provide the core of Israel's future surface capability, while the additional Dolphin will, upon delivery, give the IDF a total force of six submarines. The German interest in financing would be to hold together its moribund ship-building industry while maintaining good relations with the Israelis. Merkel and Netanyahu apparently hammered out the details in a summit meeting last week.

Incidentally, the Defense News article reports that the two Dolphin class submarines contracted for in 2005 will be delivered in 2012.

Israeli Smoke Signals

Well this is an interesting news story.

Israel will find itself diplomatically sidelined and militarily muzzled as the United States pursues a nuclear deal with Iran next year, according to a closed-door wargame at Israel's top strategic think-tank.

You really should read the full Reuters report on a classified November 1 wargame at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Here are the questions I am left with:

1. Do we examine the wargame conclusions reported?
2. Do we examine the reasons a classified wargame conclusions were given to Reuters to be reported?

Giora Eiland does not talk to the media about a classified wargame without approval. No chance of that. I'm at a loss to the purpose of public disclosure, meaning it could mean anything (and several will find the meaning they are looking for).

I have to give the Israeli's credit, they play a clever game of poker. On one side we have a wargame that comes to rational conclusions of a probable future, and on the other we have obviously odd behavior of public media coverage of an important classified wargame. The key here is that the Israeli government doesn't reveal anything - ever - without a reason.

So is this a signal Israel is ready to go along with the US on an eventual path of Iranian nuclear weapons? Is this a signal that Israel has no confidence in the Obama administrations management of the situation? Lots of smoke signals here, but for me, something is lost in translation.

Iranian Trouble and Mischief

It was interesting news this morning when the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Sayissa reported that Iran has urgently summoned Syrian leaders and Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah to Tehran. The report goes on to say orders will be given regarding what action to take should Iranian nuclear sites be attacked. The Jerusalem Post has an English language report with a few more details.

Interesting now that Drudge has his Red Banner out reporting Iranian forces take over Iraq oil well. It sounds like this is not necessarily a random action thought.

"What happens is, periodically, about every three or four months, the oil ministry guys from Iraq will go ... to fix something or do some maintenance. They'll paint it in Iraqi colours and throw an Iraqi flag up.

"They'll hang out there for a while, until they get tired, and as soon as they go away, the Iranians come down the hill and paint it Iranian colours and raise an Iranian flag. It happened about three months ago and it will probably happen again."

He added that the Iraqis are "very concerned about the Iranians pulling oil out of fields underneath Iraq."

This looks to me like mischief, not trouble. The report in al-Sayissa - that looks like trouble.

Rift Between Turkey and Israel Genuine, Serious

To be clear, there's no question that there's been a serious deterioration in defense ties between Turkey and Israel over the last several months. Last week's Defense News article details the drift, and includes explicit argument by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to the fact that popular pressure is limiting the extent to which Turkey can cooperate with Israel. The issue, rather, is whether the rupture represents a dispositional shift in Turkish foreign policy (Turkey abandoning the West for the camp of radical Islam), or whether it's simply the result of Turkish dissatisfaction with Israeli military and security policy. I lean rather heavily towards the latter interpretation; whatever the sins of the AKP, Turkey internally operates much more like a Western liberal democracy than any state associated with "radical Islam," and indeed Turkey's internal politics are more in line with liberal democracy (including especially reform of the role delegated to the military in a liberal democratic state) than they ever have before. The error made by Glick and others, in my view, is in the effort to derive domestic regime type from foreign policy; it is possible for Turkey (or France, or Germany) to be simultaneously democratic and queasy about the Gaza operation. Indeed, in Turkey's case I think that achieving any other outcome would be difficult.

Now, in the short run this means that military dominated regimes may be easier for the United States (and certainly Israel) to deal with. In the long run, however, I don't see that this policy has much of a future. You don't need to be a neoconservative to be deeply skeptical about a policy of maintaining authoritarian allies of convenience; such a policy is far more likely, in my view, to lead to events like the Iranian Revolution than is tolerance of parties like the AKP.

What to do with Turkey?

Jerusalem Post contributor Caroline Glick asserts that Turkey has moved into the camp of radical Islam; she's troubled by a lack of Turkish support for Operation Cast Lead. The merits of this argument aside (and I think it's bat**** insane), what would the policy implications of such a shift be? This is to say, if Turkey really did join Tehran's camp (and, given Turkey's massive military and economic superiority over Iran, it would shortly become Ankara's camp), what policy changes ought the United States conduct? I must admit that the question is animated, in large part, by the last chapter of Wayne Hughes' Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat; replace Greece with Israel, and replay?

The Response Problem

Galrahn makes a really good point here:

A lot of people describe really scary scenarios, and they tell you to be afraid should Israel attack Iran. We should be concerned, a lot, but Israeli concerns on that issue are not the same as our concerns. Israeli concerns are specific to Israel. I also see a fundamental flaw in the analysis that the Persian Gulf will burn if Israel strikes Iran by the same people suggesting Iran would be a responsible actor with nuclear weapons. If Iran lashes out in retaliation of an Israeli strike against other countries, including the US and their allies in the region with any conventional military weapon, then Israel is proven correct and Iran really is led by insane madmen who shouldn't be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. I do not understand the logical argument that Iran would be responsible as a nuclear power, and that Iran would irresponsibly respond to attack by Israel by directly attacking numerous other nations by closing down the Persian Gulf.

The discussion thread to this post is quite good, but I do want to add a couple of points. First, I don't altogether agree with Galrahn that an... energetic Iranian response to an Israeli strike would indicate that Iran would play fast and loose with nukes; launching an unprovoked nuclear attack without regard to the retaliatory capacity of the enemy really is a different level of crazy than trying to mine the Strait of Hormuz or some such. That said, an Iranian response to Israeli strikes really will tell us a lot about how the regime thinks about the interplay of strategy and operations. The Iranians have to do something; if they simply let the strike go, they risk losing domestic support, and undermine the future credibility of their conventional and nuclear deterrent. At the same time, as Galrahn suggests, they really run the risk of overplaying. At this point, the only way that I see the US getting directly involved is if the Iranians engage in an over-the-top military response in the Gulf or in Iraq. This may, in fact, be what the Israelis are hoping for.

If I had to guess (and really, why not speculate?) I'd say that the first reaction of the senior leadership will be caution, combined with moderate escalation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Gaza. They will want to indicate that Iran has the capacity to hurt, but won't want to provoke a US response or a more extensive set of Israeli strikes. However, Iran isn't a unitary rational actor, and the IRGC often seems capable of carrying out its own foreign and military policy. I don't think that the IRGC is either insane or suicidal, but I do think that some within the IRGC might see a more intense confrontation with the West as a boon domestically. This is to say that if the IRGC believes its domestic position will improve in case of war, it may have incentive to get adventurous.

As a final point, I'd like to suggest that there is, in general, too much of a willingness to throw around the term "irrational" in discussing Iran's foreign policy. I'm not exactly wedded to the neoclassical economic/rational actor/neorealist decision-making model, but in general I tend to think that leadership groups do what they believe is in their own best interests, and that the behavior of the bureaucratic organs of foreign policy tend to make internal sense. That may not go very far, but it should dispel a bit of the "wild eyed fanatic" model of Iranian decision-making. Iran is at loggerheads with Israel and the United States because it has genuine disputes with both about the international structure of the Middle East. It's entirely reasonable to believe that the Iranian vision for the Middle East would be bad for the US and Israel, while at the same time believing that the Iranian approach to foreign policy is essentially rational.

One other thing; there's been some frustration in the comments when I haven't responded quickly, or at all, to questions and critiques. I apologize, and will try to do better, but life intrudes...

Misunderstanding the Problem

I think Glenn Greenwald has this mostly right on Iran. I think Scott Ritter has it mostly right too. I think the UN has it mostly right. If you are looking for a smoking gun on the Iranian nuclear program, you will be disappointed in your search. There is no such thing as a smoking gun as seen by the IAEA in regards to the Iranian nuclear issue.

I also think all of those who are claiming that the media frenzy over Iran looks like the same kind of media frenzy that happened shortly before the war in Iraq have it right too. It has a very similar look and feel, and it is primarily because there are some very, very smart people of all political sides who are worried war is looming.

The problem is, none of what these folks are saying is actually relevant to events unfolding in regards to Iran, because they misunderstand the problem. They believe this is about UN weapon inspection results or it represents some American political problem that can be debated reasonably on information available to the public, and that this will somehow produce a right and wrong answer on the nuclear issue that suggests a course of action that can resolve the problem. They are wrong, the Presidents choices are very limited, and at this point it appears that political damage control has already begun. The only good news is that the President appears to have a clear sense of the real problem, and is on the same page with Germany, France, Great Britain, and Russia who all appear to have a good sense of the problem too. China is, as usual, difficult to take a read from based on public statements.

Nobody in the DoD, and I mean absolutely nobody... wants to fight a war with Iran. The DoD already has nearly a quarter of a million soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the Middle East fighting two wars. The DoD does not want a third war, no matter how limited. The DoD absolutely does not want more problems in either war they are already engaged in. If you ever read anyone who suggests that the US wants war with Iran, the writer is either ignorant, or stupid.

The President of the United States, the Congress, and the vast majority of the American people do not want to fight a war with Iran. Any statement suggesting that the US government is about to start a war with Iran is false. You cannot find evidence of warmongering in the US government with the exception of a very small minority of neoconservatives. It should also be noted that everyone mentioned who doesn't want to fight a war with Iran, also does not want to see Iran get a nuclear weapon.

It does not matter that British and French intelligence have both concluded that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon. It does not matter that the Russians and Chinese don't see evidence of Iranian nuclear weapon development. It does not even matter what a US National Intelligence Estimate on the Iranian nuclear program says, either in 2007 or today. The intelligence of those countries does not matter, it really doesn't.

The only thing that matters is what Israeli political leaders think, and what the assessment of Israeli intelligence is. Nothing else matters because no one is going to start a war with Iran, well... no one except Israel.

There is a real sense in the Pentagon that Israel is preparing to attack Iran, and people who spends serious time in and around the folks in the building; from reporters to contractors to bloggers like me, etc... can sense it too. There is a very real tension in the building that time is trending towards military action from Israel against Iran. The feeling is that Israel is making strategic assessments of risk, and the risks from their point of view are trending towards a calculation that military action is worth it to them. Can Israel risk attacking Iran without US approval? Can Israel mitigate the risks to Israel from an Iranian counter-attack? Slowly the answer to both questions is trending, yes, from their point of view.

The general feeling is, Israel believes they can dish out a hell of a lot more than Iran can throw at them, and they are probably right. Hezbollah and Hamas have excellent asymmetrical defensive capabilities, but other than a finite number of rockets they really don't have good offensive options.

In a war between Israel and Iran, there will be no flights to Syria from Tehran bringing supplies to Hezbollah, and there will be no ships delivering supplies to Hamas through Egypt from sea either, as planes will be shot down and Iranian ships that try to get into the Red Sea will find a watery grave. The strategic calculus in Israel is that they have to be able to defend against about 50 conventional ballistic missiles, and that is not much different than the Saddam Hussein scenario in 1991.

Israel has superior cyber warfare capabilities over Iran, who had trouble with the cyber attacks of non-military political activists after the recent Iranain election. Israel has superior naval capabilities than Iran outside the Persian Gulf, not to mention superior air force capabilities and superior space technology. Pay attention folks, we have already started seeing the disinformation campaign from anonymous sources inside Israel.

A lot of people describe really scary scenarios, and they tell you to be afraid should Israel attack Iran. We should be concerned, a lot, but Israeli concerns on that issue are not the same as our concerns. Israeli concerns are specific to Israel. I also see a fundamental flaw in the analysis that the Persian Gulf will burn if Israel strikes Iran by the same people suggesting Iran would be a responsible actor with nuclear weapons. If Iran lashes out in retaliation of an Israeli strike against other countries, including the US and their allies in the region with any conventional military weapon, then Israel is proven correct and Iran really is led by insane madmen who shouldn't be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. I do not understand the logical argument that Iran would be responsible as a nuclear power, and that Iran would irresponsibly respond to attack by Israel by directly attacking numerous other nations by closing down the Persian Gulf.

That is a serious strategic problem for Israel though. Restraint by Iran, either constrained by Israeli military success or restraint as an Iranian political calculation, could legitimately be the defense by Iran that Israel would have the most strategic and political problems with. That type of defense by Iran would result in enormous political pressure on Israel and directly attack Israeli credibility which in turn would limit the number of shots Israel takes to destroying the Iranian nuclear program. If Iran restrains following an attack, each shot taken in the attack must be 100% effective, because tolerance by anyone in the region for more attacks will not be there.

Why is the President saying things that suggest war is impending? Why is he working so hard on sanctions if the UN really has a weak hand with intelligence assessments? Why is he building a sense of concern in the US, intentionally setting the groundwork politically for the mood of the American people against the Iranian nuclear program? This political rhetoric from the Western powers is preemptive damage control, we have even seen Russia do a bit of this recently, which is why Russia is likely to play a key role in the negotiations. I think Obama is on the same page as everyone else, and all parties are trying to hold Israel back from attacking Iran. I don't think anyone is sure if Israel can be held back.

Anyone who believes Israel would never attack Iran without permission from the US is historically ignorant, Israel did it in 1967 in what the Arabs call "The Setback," or what we call the Six Day War. How does the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) get attacked by Israel? Easy, in that war the Israelis weren't telling us what they were doing, and we were sending our spy ships in to find out what they were doing. Fog of War sucks, and we should expect thick fog if Israel attacks Iran because Israel may not trust our President much right now.

The general sense in the Pentagon is that Israel will attack unless the international community comes through with this last diplomatic effort. The President absolutely knows this, and my read of the Russian political approach to Iran is that they are aware too, which is why folks like Glenn Greenwald, Scott Ridder, and Mohamed ElBaradei can be right on the technical issues of Iranian nuclear weapon inspections all day long and it does not matter a lick. Absent a smoking gun, the only thing that matters is what the Israeli's think, because they are the one preparing to pull the trigger.

Obama's political opponents are having a field day over the decision of the IOC. The President earned all the political flack he takes on that, but losing an Olympic bid means absolutely nothing compared to the Iranian nuclear problem which is bigger than everything else happening right now. Nobody, including the Presidents political opponents domestically, will be better off if Obama doesn't get the Iranian nuclear issue resolved correctly, and these people who are casually suggesting talking to Iran is a waste of time are insane. We try everything possible to avoid another war right now, whether people believe it will work or not. The President should leave nothing untried.

When I see the story saying "President Obama has reaffirmed a 4-decade-old secret understanding that has allowed Israel to keep a nuclear arsenal without opening it to international inspections," I read it as not only protecting Israel's right to have nuclear weapons, but Israel seeking assurances in writing that they have the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary... perhaps on a well protected nuclear facility.

After all, if Israel is willing to accept the risk of attacking Iran knowing full well a few conventional bombs could very easily cost the United States its strategic objectives in both Afghanistan and Iraq, efforts paid for with 8 years of American blood; Israel will make damn sure they destroy what they intend to in an attack on Iran. This whole issue is about whether Israel assesses that Iran will use nuclear weapons against Israel. If the defensive purpose of nuclear weapons is to defend a country from being attacked with nuclear weapons, and defending Israel from potential Iranian nuclear weapon use against Israel is the issue here, then I think Israel use of nuclear weapons must be considered as part of the calculus.

Disbelieve Israel would go nuclear all you want, but Israels short, modern history is one of Israel consistently taking enormous risks, both politically and militarily. It is the rule rather than the exception, something we should not forget; particularly considering that the new buried and concealed nuclear site everyone is discussing is in Qom - a Shi'a Islam holy city.

The stakes for the President regarding Iran are very high, much higher than the political rhetoric of his domestic political opponents suggest. The consequences are too high for political games, something the Presidents opponents would do well to keep in mind, indeed, something his political supporters should keep in mind too. Iran may not have a nuclear weapon, but we may be closer to nuclear war today than many imagine possible, and the seriousness which most political analysts outside government are taking the issue is somewhat troubling to me. There are good reasons the President is holding his cards close regarding Iran, the stakes are too high for mistakes.

Israeli Submarines - Maybe Not?

This AFP story is what started the list of news stories claiming Israel had accepted two new submarines.

Now I am hearing from a friend at Janes that "HDW confirmed to us that construction is still in progress and no deliveries have taken place."

I'll take the word of the folks at Janes over the word of AFP every time. I can't imagine Israel would complain about the news article though, this type of military disinformation propaganda is what they do to keep everyone else guessing.

Israel Expands Submarine Force

There have been rumors that Israel has been pressuring Germany to finish the 2 submarines under construction. I guess the rumors are true.

Israel has taken delivery of two German submarines ordered four years ago, a military spokesman said on Tuesday...

The submarines, called U212s, can launch cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads, although when it confirmed the sale in 2006 the German government said the two vessels were not equipped to carry nuclear weapons.

The subs were ordered in 2005 and delivery was initially expected in 2010.

Including the two new ones, Israel has five German submarines — the most expensive weapon platforms in Israel’s arsenal...

According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the U212s are designed for a crew of 35, have a range of 4,500 kilometres (2,810 miles) and can launch cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads.

Very interesting timing. Worth noting, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has 4 U-214 submarines almost completed that were intended for Greece, but were never paid for. Last I heard all 4 were launched, and laying around looking for a new owner.

A good deal for someone. If they are for sale cheap, I think the US should buy them. I'm sure the folks down at Newport News could do something with them to get them to sea.

Then again, maybe Israel will buy them?

Israel

This is just a bunch of political rhetoric, but I agree with both of them.

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I don't base my assessments on the political rhetoric. I get the sense the military thinks a strike by Israel is better than 50/50, and these guys are simply reflecting that opinion to Chris Matthews.

He Said That?

Interesting comments when considering the source. Discussing a possible Israeli attack on Iran.

"This would be very dangerous, unacceptable, this would lead to an explosion of terrorism, increase the influence of extremists," he said when asked about the possibility of an attack.

"I doubt very much that such strikes would achieve their stated goal.

"The Iranians should show restraint in their nuclear programme. We have told Iran that it has the right to a civilian nuclear programme but that it should understand what region of the world it is in," Putin said.

"This is a dangerous region and Iran should show responsibility, especially by taking into account Israel's concerns, all the more so after the absolutely unacceptable statements about the destruction of the state of Israel."

There is a game of chicken developing between the world economic and military powers, and with Israel regarding Iran. Israel is starting to work their political mojo to get the world thinking they are about to attack Iran. The US has stayed very quiet while other world leaders have weighed in.

Putin's comments are interesting because he makes it clear he understands the powder keg here, but appears to direct his comments at Iran who would be attacked instead of Israel who would be the attacker.

Reads to me like a signal Russia has no plans to help Iran if they get attacked by Israel. Kind of an odd comment really, and it is entirely possible he said much more and the media simply didn't report it. On the other hand, might be we are seeing all there is.

People Can Get Jumpy When

Lets see, the US has rejected the Iranian nuclear proposal, Russia's Kommersant paper quotes an 'informed Israeli' source that Netanyahu flew to Russia to inform them about an impending Israeli attack on Iran. Interesting rumor, because if true it wouldn't be Netanyahu's first secret trip out of town this week, if the rumors are to be believed.

Ramadan ends on September 19th. When the sun sets on Eid-al-Fitr, it will be the night after a new moon, so it will be a very dark night over Tehran.

Gates comments about Iran this week didn't hint to urgency, rather it sounded to me like he was trying to be an arms salesman to the region. Maybe it's all part of a conspiracy to export of the F-22 to Israel?

Or maybe Israel is getting ready to strike.