Sea Denial, U.S. Maritime Strategy, and Conventional Deterrence of China

In the February 2014 issue of Naval Institute Proceedings, retired U.S. Navy Commander Victor Vescovo suggested that a maritime strategy relying primarily on sea denial capabilities could be sufficient to deter Chinese aggression against America’s East Asian allies. Vescovo outlined how wartime offensive minelaying in the vicinity of major Chinese ports by U.S. submarines and long-range aircraft could severely damage the export-driven Chinese economy. Vescovo appears to endorse strategies emphasizing conventional deterrence by punishment and compellence by economic coercion, both of which can be highly problematic for reasons I’ve previously addressed.

However, the latent ability to use offensive mining to bottle People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) forces up in their home ports—and also cut crisis-surged units off from returning for rearmament and repair—could greatly buttress conventional deterrence by denial. This notion dovetails with a November 2013 RAND Corporation study that highlights how modern, highly mobile coastal anti-ship cruise missile batteries deployed in the Ryukyus, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia could pose a severe challenge to Chinese wartime passage through the key straits that would provide them access to the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans. Both the mining and coastal missile concepts are captured within the December 2013 testimony of prominent Naval War College Chinese maritime strategy expert Andrew Erickson  to the House Armed Service Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee as well as his related article in The National Interest. Erickson additionally (and rightly) argues that conventional deterrence by denial can be further reinforced via latent U.S. threats of using submarines and long-range aircraft for traditional Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) operations within contested zones in the event of a war, or if need be to pummel Chinese expeditionary lodgings upon allied territories with land-attack missiles.

These commentators are absolutely correct that sea denial is an essential element of any U.S. strategy for deterring China—and failing that, for defending America’s East Asian allies under fire. Blunting PLAN operations in the East and South China Seas, not to mention preventing effective PLAN breakouts from the First Island Chain, would go a long way towards preventing China from attaining certain types of political objectives in an East Asian war. U.S. and allied sea denial operations would indeed make it enormously difficult for China to undertake a large-scale invasion of a sizable allied territory, persist in holding any small and isolated allied territories it seized in a hostilities-igniting gambit, use surface forces (including future aircraft carriers) to blockade or conduct land-attack strikes against allied territories, sortie submarines into the Western Pacific for ASuW or land-attack tasks, suppress opponents’ submarine operations inside the First Island Chain, or protect its flow of logistical support to its expeditionary forces.

Chinese wartime political objectives might not necessarily require that the PLAN obtain or maintain sea control in these bodies of water, though. If Chinese leaders sought to coerce a U.S. ally through a maritime blockade, and their valuation of their political objectives drove them to use lethal and not necessarily discriminate force to enforce this embargo, minelaying and traditional ASuW operations by Chinese submarines and land-based aircraft might be entirely adequate. While Chinese sea denial operations might not present a major concern for the U.S. with respect to unpopulated allied territories, they would pose a critical problem with respect to populated ones. Could the southern and central Ryukyus (especially urban Okinawa) hold out indefinitely if their flow of basic foodstuffs, petroleum products, or other staple goods were heavily disrupted? How drastically might the developing Philippine economy be affected if its major ports in western Luzon were pressured? The question’s applicability to Taiwan should be obvious.

Furthermore, any U.S. or allied forces stationed in or operating from blockaded, geographically-isolated friendly territories (the Ryukyus again come to mind) would find their logistical lifelines endangered. If the sea blockade could not be breached via airlift due to insufficient cargo aircraft capacity or perhaps Chinese offensive counterair operations, then these critical lines of communications might be severed altogether. U.S. and allied forces in ‘frontline’ territories could certainly make use of ordnance, food, and other supplies stockpiled (and concealed) near their positions during peacetime—if such foresighted steps had been taken. If not, or if the conflict became protracted, how long would they be able to sustain operational effectiveness with their maritime lines of communication under such pressure? What if the U.S. and allied plan was to surge assets such as anti-ship or anti-air missile batteries to these forward territories only upon detecting Indications and Warning of possible Chinese aggression? If warning signs were missed, or if crisis-psychological factors delayed the U.S. and allied reactions to those signs until too late, could campaign-critical defensive assets warehoused in rear areas be transported to the ‘frontline’ and then emplaced while under fire? If the answers to these questions are highly doubtful or clearly in the negative, then conventional deterrence theory makes clear that it would be unlikely such a force or its associated strategic concept would be an effective deterrent. ‘Mutually-assured’ sea denial cuts both ways.

All this also says nothing about scenarios in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might employ conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles to bombard allied military, economic, and civil targets as a means of coercion. U.S. and allied sea denial operations could do nothing to directly counter such a thrust. PLA suppression of U.S. forward airbases via periodic cruise missile (and perhaps short-range ballistic missile) bombardments would additionally reduce the screening air cover available to protect sea (and air) lines of communication to the embattled ally as well as support friendly forces’ own sea denial operations.

Should the Chinese combine missile bombardment with a submarine and aircraft-enforced blockade, there would be a real risk of rendering U.S. and allied forces in ‘frontline’ territories hors de combat. The PLA might not be able to physically seize or hold those territories, but if the U.S. and its allies could not break the Chinese blockade and roll back China’s ability to continue at-will bombardment, then it is entirely conceivable Chinese leaders might be satisfied by forcibly compelling the U.S. and its allies to militarily withdraw from the territories as the price of a settlement. For instance, the prime Chinese objective in a limited war with Japan and the U.S. might very well be demilitarization and eventual political Finlandization of the Ryukyus. A U.S. conventional deterrent resting purely on sea denial would not be sufficient to prevent this kind of war, and it follows that allowing the maritime approaches to U.S. allies’ populated territories to become a de facto ‘no-man’s land’ would be self-defeating.

U.S. conventional deterrence credibility therefore not only depends upon U.S. forces’ abilities to assert maritime denial against PLA operations in the combat theater, but also their abilities to obtain and exercise localized maritime control within the approaches to allied territories. Protection of these sea and air lines of communication, not to mention the associated sea and air ports of debarkation, may be possible using Joint combined arms including sea-based and theater-range land-based aircraft, naval surface and subsurface forces, land-based air and missile defenses, and defensive naval minefields.

In a major war, though, these measures alone might not be adequate for obtaining maritime control when and where needed. The PLA’s quantitative advantages in theater combined with China’s physical proximity to the probable contested zones suggest PLA forces would be able to attain higher operational tempos than their U.S. and allied counterparts. This differential would be further aggravated if China engaged in a conventional counterforce first strike. Maritime lines of communication protection might consequently depend upon taking actions that suppress PLA operational tempo and offensively attrite the PLA forces engaged in sea denial operations.

Such actions might include cyber or electronic attacks that disrupt, deceive, or exploit PLA maritime surveillance/reconnaissance systems and networks, command and control networks at the operational and tactical levels, or logistical support networks. They might also include offensive maritime operations designed to lure PLA maritime forces into battle on terms that strongly favored the U.S.; an example might be an attempt to draw PLA maritime strike aircraft into an aerial ambush with a convoy or a U.S. Navy task group approaching the First Island Chain serving as bait. In the event China did set the escalatory precedents of unleashing a conventional first strike against U.S. and allied forces and bases, the U.S. could conceivably (and with legal, moral, and operational justification) respond with conventional strikes against equivalent PLA targets on Chinese soil.

It is clear, then, that just as U.S. and allied sea denial capabilities would curtail the PLA’s ability to invade and occupy allied territories, U.S. and allied maritime control capabilities—plus the latent threats posed by U.S. long-range strike capabilities—would be necessary to prevent ‘frontline’ East Asian territories and the friendly forces defending them from withering on the vine. The region’s geography, the PLA’s ever-expanding maritime and land-attack capabilities, and the plausible spectrum of Chinese political objectives and conflict scenarios make it so. Indeed, a conventional deterrent must be designed such that it can cover this full spectrum if it is to enduringly prevent war; one that covers only a narrow range of contingencies risks catastrophic failure if it cannot match up to the unique circumstances of a crisis or the political objectives of an intelligent and determined opponent. U.S. conventional deterrence of China (and U.S. maritime strategy) accordingly must embrace sea denial, but cannot solely rely upon it.

Armed Maritime Lawfare with Chinese Characteristics

Photo from a Kyodo News aircraft shows the Chinese marine surveillance ship Haijian 51 (front) in Japanese territorial waters near the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea on Sept. 14, 2012. China also claims the islets and calls them the Diaoyu Islands. At back is a patrol ship of the Japan Coast Guard. (Kyodo)

China's policy of armed lawfare for control of island territories continues, this time with Japan.

Japan says six Chinese patrol ships have entered its territorial waters near disputed islands in the East China Sea, further heightening the tensions over the uninhabited archipelago claimed both by Tokyo and Beijing.

Japan's Coast Guard said two Chinese vessels entered Japanese waters early Friday, and four more vessels arrived soon after.  The Coast Guard says it has issued a warning for them to leave.

China's official news agency, Xinhua, Thursday quoted the Ministry of Agriculture as saying the vessels would be dispatched on routine patrol near the islands to assert China's sovereignty and protect fishermen.

The rocky islets, known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, have been the focus of recurring flare-ups between the two sides.

Additional reading material...

Down South at Scarborough Islands near the Philippines

3 Chinese ships seen in Scarborough - PCG
Philippines ready to redeploy ships to Scarborough Shoal—PCG

A few important opinions from China

Unity brings power: this concept holds good today
Diaoyu Islands baseline announcement significant: Chinese diplomat

This map in Google Earth may help with geography to understand which islands Japan is claiming.

There is a Typhoon expected in Okinawa by Sunday night, so that may impact the ability of Japan to sustain vessels in the area. The use of civilian maritime security agency vessels has consistently been a successful tactic by China in staking claims to maritime territories, and no one appears to have a credible idea how to standing up to China's provocations. This is the new normal, and apparently a very successful way China continues to discredit the US Pivot to Asia policy rhetoric as it relates to disputed territories.

Everyone needs new ideas towards managing China's aggressive presence with government maritime agency vessels, because all indications are China has stumped the diplomats with this tactic. Secretary Panetta will be in China and Japan this weekend. He should have plenty to discuss.

BMD and Theater Stability in Northeast Asia

This is another interesting development in the context of the upcoming North Korean rocket launch. It would appear it isn't just South Korea and Japan preparing to shoot the rocket down if necessary, but Taiwan as well.

A military spokesman yesterday refused to comment on media reports alleging that two advanced anti-missile systems — the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Tien Kung-III “Sky Bow” (TK-III) air defense systems — had been deployed in eastern Taiwan to deal with the possible launch of a North Korean rocket later this month.

Ministry of National Defense spokesperson David Lo (羅紹和) said the military was collecting information about Pyongyang’s anticipated rocket launch and added that the military had requested its anti-missile units monitor and respond to the situation as appropriate.

Something has been on my mind, and it goes back to something discussed on the blog last week by Bryan McGrath. A lot of people were up in arms about the President making the comment that he would be better positioned to negotiate with Russia on nuclear issues after the election - because he won't be running for reelection. In a democracy we elect our leaders to represent us, and we bestow upon them through that election process the trust to make decisions for the people in scenarios like a nuclear agreement with Russia. Some are really bent out of shape that the President would suggest this issue would be easier to manage after an election. I am not one of those people, the exchange itself didn't bother me, what bothered me was what Bryan quoted in the speech given the next day by President Obama in his attempt to address the issue. Specifically:

"I don't think it's any surprise that you can't start that a few months before a presidential and congressional elections in the United States, and at a time when they just completed elections in Russia and they're in the process of a presidential transition where a new president is going to be coming in in a little less than two months.

So it was a very simple point, and one that essentially I repeated when I spoke to you guys yesterday, which is that we're going to spend the next nine, 10 months trying to work through some of the technical aspects of how we get past what is a major point of friction -- one of the primary points of friction between our two countries, which is this whole missile defense issue. And it involves a lot of complicated issues. If we can get our technical teams to clear out the underbrush, then hopefully, in 2013, there's a foundation to actually make some significant progress on this and a lot of other bilateral issues.

So I think everybody understands that -- if they haven't they haven't been listening to my speeches -- I want to reduce our nuclear stockpiles. And one of the barriers to doing that is building trust and cooperation around missile defense issues. And so this is not a matter of hiding the ball, I'm on record. I made a speech about it to a whole bunch of Korean university students yesterday. I want to see us, over time, gradually, systematically, reduce reliance on nuclear weapons."

Bryan McGrath is right, the two issues of Russian nuclear weapons and Ballistic Missile Defense cannot be linked, and the President needs to seek better advice regarding Ballistic Missile Defense if he has somehow confused it with an issue he appears to care a lot about - which is a nuclear free world. I appreciate that President Obama has high goals regarding nuclear weapons, but I am not convinced at all that President Obama appreciates Ballistic Missile Defense and the strategic role it is playing in the 21st century that has absolutely nothing to do with cold war era nuclear exchanges.

Playing out before our eyes in Asia is politics of the highest order with North Korea, and it is almost certain that the President's own National Security Council has warned him by now that under no circumstances can North Korea be allowed to launch the rocket planned for launch sometime during the next 2 weeks. The Obama administrations policy for North Korea has been to break the cycle of North Korean provocations and specifically to get North Korea to stand by agreements made within the six-party talks framework. By every definition the rocket launch will repeat a cycle of breaking agreements within the six-party talks, and if allowed to be successful will signal to regional partners that the US policy for North Korea has failed - again. Given the amount of attention without detail that China is putting into North Korea over the last few weeks, it appears that China is becoming increasingly frustrated with Pyongyang like everyone else.

The US is pulling back food aid to North Korea because the US claims that the food deal agreed to last month included a moratorium on long range missile tests, and the rocket launch is seen as a long range missile test. North Korea sees the suspension of US food aid as us breaking the agreement first. Whether you agree or not that the US should be pulling back food aid, it is very hard to claim the US has broken the cycle of provocation with North Korea, and many experts are suggesting that no matter what happens - North Korea will simply test another nuclear weapon at the end of this current diplomatic dustup - which is the very definition of repeating the cycle of provocation the Obama administration policy for North Korea claims to be aimed to prevent.

All we are learning is that the Obama administration is not having any more success than the Bush administration or the Clinton administration did, and that US diplomacy with North Korea is struggling to be relevant in curbing North Korean provocative behavior under any internationally agreed upon process model. It is unknown what impact shooting down the North Korean rocket may have, although it is noted in several circles that taking aggressive action like this with North Korea is in itself a way for the US to attempt to break the cycle of provocation by North Korea - by being provocative ourselves.

I think the US should allow nations in the region deal with the rocket, and the US should simply sit back and provide support for those nations - any and all support requested, but no more or less.

Bigger Picture

Consider for a moment what it looks like if the North Korean rocket goes over Japanese soil. Would a successful shoot down of a North Korean rocket make it more or less likely that Japan would develop nuclear capabilities? What happens if Japan tries to shoot down the rocket and fails? How many scenarios exist in the upcoming North Korean launch where the outcome leaves the Japanese public asking whether they need nuclear weapons to protect themselves? I imagine the Chinese are studying the various possible answers to that last question with considerable detail.

Ballistic missile defense is playing out in Northeast Asia in front of all of us as a major strategic capability bringing allies together against a common foe. South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are all fielding US Ballistic Missile Defense technology to - perhaps - be used to shoot down the North Korean rocket. At its core, Ballistic Missile Defense is the strategic capability in play right now that forms the foundation of our regional alliances dealing with the regional threat of North Korea, and most importantly (and something President Obama needs to apparently get a briefing on) strategic Ballistic Missile Defense is acting as an alternative for Japan to developing nuclear weapons to counter North Korean nuclear and ballistic weapons development. As a capability, the diplomatic value of Ballistic Missile Defense at this moment in time may be higher than it has ever been in the capabilities history, because BMD serves as a visible reminder of what it means to be in a working strategic relationship where United States is in full support of a nation.

I believe the scenario playing out leads to an important question and discussion - could China or Russia shoot down the North Korean rocket even if they wanted to? Short of the rocket turning towards the Chinese mainland, I am not certain even if under those conditions China could shoot the North Korean rocket down. As for Russia, they have the capability to shoot the missile down, but whether that capability is deployed, trained, and ready to respond in immediate crisis is certainly questionable - and it is important to note that the naval forces of both nations is currently not capable of deploying for purposes of strategic protection from a ballistic missile attack against a partner, friend, or in support of allies.

Both Russia and China have some of the most sophisticated ballistic missiles in the world, but neither country has a credible defense from ballistic missiles that is fielded within the context of an alliance like the US capabilities are, nor are they globally deployable like the BMD capabilities of the US Navy. BMD is a strategic capability that neither Russia nor China has as an offering to friends as a protection in a time of need. When you consider the enormous advantage legitimate Ballistic Missile Defense gives the United States at the strategic and geopolitical level with our Asian allies today, it strikes me as remarkably foolish that on any level the President could potentially be considering conceding that advantage to any competitor for any purpose in a diplomatic negotiation.

The United States should not take for granted the strategic advantage of Ballistic Missile Defense, nor how Ballistic Missile Defense capability translates throughout our alliances to our friends and allies. With all due respect to the President, the suggestion that Ballistic Missile Defense is in play in negotiations with Russia related to nuclear arsenals is a serious miscalculation on his part.

In 2012 Ballistic Missile Defense has become one of the big puzzle pieces that is keeping several of our allies (like Japan and Saudi Arabia, to name a few big ones) from developing their own nuclear arsenals, and removing that incentive from our allies in an effort to simply reduce Russia's nuclear stockpile is counterproductive towards efforts of curbing development of nuclear weapons, and potentially destabilizing in the specific parts of the world the US defense strategy is specifically committed to maintaining stability.

Ballistic Missile Defense Takes Center Stage in the Pacific

News broke yesterday that North Korea has been stepping up Air Force training and has begun fueling their rocket scheduled for launch next month. South Korea has already claimed they will shoot the rocket down if it crosses into their territory, and now Japan is saying the same thing.

Japan will shoot down any part of the long-range rocket that North Korea plans to launch next month that enters its territory, the Japanese defense minister, Naoki Tanaka, said Friday.

Speaking at a news conference, Tanaka said he had issued the official order after instructing the Japanese military earlier in the week to prepare the country's missile defense shield against the planned rocket launch.

North Korea announced earlier this month that it would launch a rocket carrying a satellite between April 12 and 16 to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung, the founder of the Communist state.

I have no idea how South Korea could shoot the missile down. Patriot 2 missiles and SM-2 missiles simply don't have the range except under the most optimistic circumstances to shoot down the missile, but Japan fields better technology and has more capabilities like SM-3 to shoot it down.

The US Navy put the X-Band Radar Platform to sea last week, and from everything I hear - the West Sea is getting crowded with naval forces.

The launch is expected in two weeks. The US is rightfully leading from behind on this issue, supporting Japan and South Korea side by side but staying out of the spotlight. With USS Enterprise (CVN 65) soon to be heading towards the 5th Fleet AOR, I expect the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) to rotate back to the Pacific, and sometime over the next 2 weeks I suspect we will see the USS George Washington (CVN 73) get underway.

Tokyo Naval Treaty?

I toss out a couple of thoughts on modern naval arms limitation in my latest WPR column:

China, India and Japan do not appear to be on the verge of breaking the bank in an effort to match each other's construction. Still, from a vantage point of 10 or 20 years out, it might make sense for the Asian powers to think in terms of regulating their naval competition. India, China and Japan can all accomplish their national goals with a limited number of carriers. At some point, additional construction would simply spur the competitors to overbuild. A well-designed treaty on naval arms limitations would recognize economic and power imbalances between the three, take into account strategic realities and try to hold competition to within certain parameters. The motivating logic behind such a limitation runs as follows: India, China and Japan would each be as secure with four carriers as they would with eight, so long as they are assured that the others will not build eight themselves.

The JMSDF's Amphibious Future

Kyle Mizokami has a fine piece up at the Diplomat about the prospects for a Japanese amphibious fleet:

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief missions are typically supported by naval vessels. The March Tohoku emergency, as well as the January 2010 Haitian earthquake, saw multinational fleets sortieing to the assistance of island nations. In both instances, natural disasters disrupted local airports and port facilities, slowing the flow of relief into the disaster zone. The design of naval vessels, such as the USS Essex in Tohoku and the Italian aircraft carrier Cavour in Haiti, made them key to opening up affected areas. Self-sufficient in food and power, and designed to serve a large expeditionary force, such ships are designed to project large amounts of military force abroad into less than ideal conditions. If one substitutes aid and assistance for force, the usefulness of naval designs is readily apparent. It’s no wonder then that Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief missions are typically carried out by naval vessels.


A large ship of a naval design would be an ideal platform for responding to Japan’s natural disasters. Japan is an archipelago of 6,852 islands, and more than a third of Japan’s population lives within ten kilometers of the coast. Although most islands are connected in one way or another, earthquakes and tsunamis can incapacitate those connections, damaging bridges and ferry docks. A disaster relief vessel could simply sail from one island to the next to provide assistance. Furthermore, Japan's terrain is mostly mountainous, with communities often connected by roads and railroads cutting through rugged terrain. While a disaster might close such routes to emergency traffic, a HA/DR vessel could simply sail around them.

The Patterson team in Thomas Barnett's Wikistrat competition played Japan, and advocated extending the Hyuga production line in order to further develop the JMSDF's relief assistance capabilities. Of course, larger purpose-built amphibious ships would work even better.

Guam on Pause?

Major natural disasters typically carry with them strategic consequences. With that in mind, I think this is interesting news out of Australia.

Japan has decided to put on hold $US3 billion in funding it had promised for the military expansion in Guam.

The US Navy says the suspension of funding means the bidding process for the contract, which involved establishing new headquarters for the naval base, has been suspended indefinitely.

Sunday Book Review: A War it Was Always Going to Lose

Jeff Record's latest book traces the road to war between Japan and the Western Allies in 1940 and 1941. Record's recent work, much of which has been very critical of modes of thinking prevalent in US foreign policy, has probed the analogies and misperceptions that dominate US security thinking. In this case, Record wants to challenge the idea that Japan was somehow "crazy" to launch a war in 1941 that it thought it would quite likely lose. Part of Record's account has to do with Japan's pursuit of "glory" and domination over Southeast Asia. However, Record also takes account of the role that miscommunication played in forming misconceptions in both the American and Japanese governments.

Japan's decision to go to war in December 1941 remains a puzzle for political scientists. Deterrence theory suggests that states don't go to war when they have a negative expected utility for the decision; in other words, when the likelihood of defeat and the cost of defeat exceed the likelihood and fruits of victory. War is also unlikely when states agree about the probabilities for victory and defeat; if the presumed loser understands that it is likely to lose, it will come to some accomodation rather than fight. The Japan case is puzzling because there is ample evidence that both the Japanese and the Americans judged Japanese victory as unlikely. The most common solution, such that it is, to this problem has been that Japan regarded its international position in late 1941 as untenable, and believed that its capabilities would swiftly decline relative to the US, the USSR, and the UK. A low likelihood of success in war in 1941 was better than no chance of victory in 1943, so the Japanese leaped into the void.

Record doesn't exactly dissent from this conclusion, but he does give us a more process oriented account of the dynamics of the decision for war in Washington and Tokyo. Neither Japan nor the United State really wanted war with the other. Japan would have preferred to seize British, Dutch, and French positions without interference, and in any case regarded both China and the USSR as greater long term threats. The United States remained focused on Europe, and would have preferred to maintain a tolerable trade relationship with Japan until issues with Germany were settled. Both states tried, in clumsy and not-so-clumsy ways, to indicate their preferences to the other. Record suggests that Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was intended to deter the United States, and that the Japanese leadership was surprised by the hostile American reaction. On the other side, the graduated escalation of trade pressure on Japan was supposed to deter further Japanese aggression. Neither move had the intended effect, of course.

There's nothing radically new in Record's account of the path to war. Most of what we get is nuanced reinterpretation of information that was already available. Nevertheless, there are some productive insights, including most notably Record's account of the extent to which American demands increased over the course of 1941. Following the occupation of French Indochina, the United States effectively demanded a Japanese evacuation not only of FIC, but also of China. Record suggests that this move probably wasn't well thought out in US policymaking circles, but that it did accord with the general US perspective towards East Asian politics.

The question of what might have happened if Japan had limited itself to attacking UK/DEI, or even just DEI and French possessions, remains interesting. The Roosevelt administration viewed this prospect as a critical threat to US national interests, but in the absence of a direct attack on the United States it would have been difficult to mobilize support. If the Japanese had refrained from attacking British possessions, it would have been difficult indeed for Roosevelt to argue for war. On the other hand, seizure of just French and DEI possessions would have left the Japanese in an exceedingly precarious military position, as the British and the Americans would have plenty of time to fortify bases along critical Japanese supply routes. With the Allies in possession of Singapore and the Philippines, the Japanese would effectively have been at the mercy of a Western threat of war. Japanese awareness of this strategic problem, combined with their belief that war was inevitable, made a limited attack less attractive.

What lessons for today? As always, the message we send is not necessarily the message that the other side receives. The enemy is free to draw his own conclusions about whatever we do; there is no message that is so clear that it cannot be willfully misunderstood. Both the Americans and the Japanese felt that they were communicating clearly and forcefully with the other, yet it turned out that neither actually appreciated the other's perspective. To be sure, clear communication might not have prevented war, especially given Japanese belief in the inevitability of such conflict. The Pacific War wasn't "accidental" in any meaningful sense. Nevertheless, we shouldn't expect too much communication, either in its military sense ("they only understand the language of force") or in its diplomatic sense ("we need to create a common understanding"). Foreign policy actors have powerful reasons to misunderstand even the clearest of messages.

Future of the JSDF

My WPR column this week is on the future of the JSDF:

The improved experience and capabilities of the JSDF hardly make up for the damage inflicted by the Tohoku quake and tsunami. However, Japan remains in a unique position to take advantage of the growing demand for "soft power" military operations. The constitutional prohibition against offensive operations and offensive weapons creates the opportunity to focus training and procurement around non-offensive tasks. Discomfort with offensive operations also makes possible the encouragement of a military culture focused on operations other than war. Although a "pacifist military" is a contradiction in terms, military organizations can vary in terms of their comfort with "hard" and "soft" defense tasks, and Japan's is more at ease with the latter. Finally, the deployment of the JSDF in relief and peacekeeping functions fits well with an image of Japan as a good international "citizen." A well-maintained global commons benefits Japan enormously, due to its global trade profile, and the sense that Japan is doing its fair share to contribute is an easy sell to both domestic and international audiences.

Operation Tomodachi: Fukushima Plant Still Struggles

Luis Martinez of ABC News is reporting that a US nuclear emergency response team of Marines is being sent to Japan.

Approximately 155 Marines from the Marines' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) received their deployment orders for Japan earlier today and are scheduled to arrive on Friday.

The team is being sent as what a Defense Department official calls "an initial response force" because they are only a portion of the much larger CBIRF unit.

Based at the Indian Head Naval Surface Warfare Center in Maryland, CBIRF is a Marine unit specially trained to counter the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident. Usually, that entails being available to assist local, state and federal agencies with domestic emergency responses to CBRNE incidents.

The unit's deployment to Japan "will provide the U.S. on-scene commander a rapid response capability and, if requested, [allow the commander to] assist Japanese authorities by providing advice and expertise in the areas of agent detection and identification, casualty search, rescue, personnel decontamination and emergency medical care," a defense official said.

The deployment of the initial response force is not of an emergency nature, but more as a precautionary move in case they are needed, another defense official said.

The report goes on to note they will operate from Yokota Air Base outside of Tokyo, which is outside the 50 mile exclusion zone. Also reported today was news that seawater around the Fukushima plant is 4,385 times more than the legal limit, and radiation is potentially entering directly into the seawater from an unknown source.

Also important, Wednesdays update from Operation Tomodachi.

Seventh Fleet forces continue support of Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) in Operation Tomodachi. With Sendai airport now open for military flights - and soon to be opened for commercial flights as well -- 7th Fleet’s focus has shifted to harbor clearance, consolidating relief supplies at airfields ashore, and preparing to assist with clean-up of debris.

USNS Safeguard (ARS 50) and USS Tortuga (LSD 46), Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 1, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 5 and Underwater Construction Team 2 conducted additional surveys in preparation for port clearance operations at the port of Miyako. Visual surveys show extensive damage including commercial and pleasure craft sunk, concrete pier supports washed ashore and a permanent pier destroyed. Tortuga launched a Landing Craft Unit (LCU) equipped with side scan sonar to survey additional areas of the port. The side scan sonar provides detailed visuals of the harbor bottom to identify and prioritize dive sites for clearing. During today’s survey, the dive team discovered the remains of a victim of the tsunami of March 11. The Navy team immediately communicated the discovery to the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, whose divers retrieved them.

Sailors and Marines from the USS Essex amphibious ready group and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are planning for Operation “Field Day”, a clearing and clean up mission on the remote island of Oshima off the coast of Kessennuma. In conjunction with the Japan Ground Self Defense Force, the effort will include clearing the port, and clearing debris from local schools and government buildings. The island is dependent upon ferry service to and from the mainland, is the primary method for travel to/from the island and clearing the port allows this vital lifeline to resume. Clearing and opening of schools and government buildings is a significant step towards restoring the island to normal.

Helicopters from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 moved an additional 13 pallets of relief supplies from USS Essex (LHD 2), USS Germantown (LSD 42) and USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) to Misawa, where they will moved via C-130 aircraft to Sendai. From there, JGSDF and civilian relief authorities will able to distribute the items to disaster areas as needed. The JGSDF has opened most roads in the disaster areas, and are able to move most goods to displaced persons via ground transportation.

USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204) and USNS Pecos (T-AO 197) arrived at the port of Yokosuka today. The Rappahannock transported 312 pallets of water it picked up from the port city of Gwangyang, South Korea. The water will be used by Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC) to support ongoing relief efforts. USNS Carl Brashear (T-AKE 7) arrived in Sasebo. Both Pecos and Carl Brashear are taking on fuel and ships stores prior to returning to the fleet to support relief operations.

A P-3 “Orion” aircraft from the Skinny Dragons of Patrol Squadron Four (VP-4) conducted a search and rescue flight down the east coast of Japan to search for debris or objects at sea that could interfere with shipping. The P-3 returned to Kadena Air Force Base (AFB) upon completion of the mission and will stage from there for continued relief efforts.

The first of two U.S. Navy barges containing 500,000 gallons of fresh water from Commander, Facilities Activities Yokosuka (CFAY) was moved to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant today. The second will arrive tomorrow. Japanese authorities will use the fresh water to replace salt water currently in some of the reactors.

USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10) conducted resupply at sea (RAS) activities with USS McCampbell (DDG 85), USS Preble (DDG 88), USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Mustin (DDG 89), USS Cowpens (CG 63), and USS Shiloh (CG 67), ships of the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) Carrier Strike Group (CSG), supplying fuel and additional supplies. Most of the relief supplies on these ships have been moved ashore to airfields in Misawa or Sendai where the JSDF can better access them to deliver to people in need.

Currently 16 ships, 130 aircraft and 13,076 personnel are actively engaged in operation Tomodachi. Those ships include USS Tortuga (LSD 46), USNS Safeguard (T-ARS-50), USS Essex (LHD 2), USS Germantown (LSD 42), USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49), USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS McCampbell (DDG 85), USS Preble (DDG 88), USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Mustin (DDG 89), USS Cowpens (CG 63), USS Shiloh (CG 67), USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10), USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19), USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54) and USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4).

Since Operation Tomodachi started, U.S. 7th Fleet forces have delivered more than 250 tons of relief supplies to survivors of the tsunami and earthquake in support of Japan Self Defense Force efforts.

A few thoughts.

1) I am still blown away by the magnitude of the disaster in Japan. It isn't just the regional damage that has probably killed more than 20,000 people. The ongoing struggle at the nuclear reactor adds uncertainty to just about everything. Radiation concerns apply to their food sources, water supplies, and the wind has been blowing radiation all over their land. Many people are still struggling for electricity, and oh btw it's been snowing. Yet, the people of Japan move forward. The picture above reads "To everybody in the U.S. 7th Fleet: Thank you. The Japanese people will not be beaten."

2) The PAOs in the Pacific are doing a fabulous job. Seriously... they have been outstanding in their efforts in matching the efforts of those in field. There is only one example of stupidity by a PAO on Facebook, and it has been scrubbed from all official sites although not before the poor guy was torn a new asshole on SailorBob. It was a good story (see Google cache here while it lasts), but the guy made an error by speaking in an official capacity with those opinions regarding Americans - even if they aren't necessarily disagreeable opinions.

3) It was controversial when the Navy elevated humanitarian assistance and disaster response to a strategic priority in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Does anyone still have any lingering doubts about that decision? I've been thinking about how many officers there are in Navy Medicine, perhaps one of the most underrated Federally funded health care organizations in America. I've been thinking about the Continuing Promise deployment of USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) and the Pacific Partnership 2011 deployment of USS Cleveland (LPD 7), and I think about Haiti, the Pakistan floods, and now Japan...and I think the maritime strategists got it right. HA/DR is strategic, HA/DR is influence, and HA/DR is one of the best peacetime defense investments per dollar the United States government is making today.

An At Sea Working Model

I think this is worth highlighting. From the GW Facebook page:

PACIFIC OCEAN (March 29, 2024) -Aviation Boatswain’s Mates (Fuel) aboard the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) accomplished an unprecedented undertaking at sea by moving a massive fuel purifier seven decks below with help from Puget Sound Naval Shipyard workers, March 29.

The 4,000 lbs. jet propellant five (JP-5) fuel purifier being moved is responsible for separating the usable, raw fuel from water and sediment. JP-5 is repeatedly refined via the purifier to remove contaminants that have accumulated while the fuel sits in storage containers for later use.

The JP-5 fuel is extremely important to the functionality of an aircraft carrier. The fuel is used to perform a variety of functions including controlling the ship’s balance; fueling the fighter jets on the flight deck and the tractors that move stage them; and running the emergency diesel engines and auxiliary generators.

“We are replacing this critical piece of equipment while at sea because we did not have an opportunity to do it in port,” said Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Fuel) 1st Class (AW/SW) Nelson Lubin, leading petty officer of George Washington’s Air Department, V4 division. “Under normal conditions, the unit would be replaced by qualified shipyard workers while the ship is in port. A large hole in the ship is generally cut to facilitate the installation of the unit—so us getting it done at sea, on our own, is an incredible feat.”

George Washington recently deployed from her homeport of Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka due to complex nature of the natural disaster that struck Japan on March 11. The turnaround time from under maintenance to fit for sea occurred in just five days. This resulted in some open projects and installations to be postponed until she was first safe and sea-worthy.

“I continue to be amazed each and every day we are at sea by what our Sailors and these civilian craftsmen are accomplishing,” said George Washington’s Commanding Officer, Capt. David A. Lausman. “They are working around the clock, putting their heart and soul into their work and I couldn’t be prouder to call them shipmates.”

The team of Sailors and their Shipyard counterparts successfully relocated the now-disassembled fuel purifying unit— similar in size to a Volkswagen Beetle—from the ship’s open hangar bay, down seven decks to a pump room via a ladderwell in less than eight hours time.

“I’m really proud of what our team did today. It might be the first time something like this has ever been attempted—at least for us it is,” said Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Fuel) 3rd Class Richard Bell from Syracuse, N.Y.

“I really have to hand it to the civilian riggers. Without their help we would not have been able to accomplish this,” said Bell.

George Washington is the Navy’s only permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier, ensuring security and stability across the western Pacific Ocean.

-GW-

The first thing I thought of when I read this story was how much work is being accomplished at sea vs at port. Japan isn't a war zone, but it looks like one, and while the USS George Washington (CVN 73) isn't exactly a causality of war... given the work being done on her, she might look like one.

I suppose I am wondering if what is being done on the USS George Washington (CVN 73) translates into a model for battle damage repair in the future. I don't see a scenario where battle damage can be done on an aircraft carrier at sea without civilian counterparts, so I do wonder if there are lessons here for developing an at sea battle damage recovery capability for our nuclear aircraft carriers.

Because quite honestly, in a major war where carriers are being damaged, I don't think the US is going to be in a position return a carrier to the US to put in dry dock for any length of time, and most battle damage will have to be repaired very quickly while the ship is avoiding the enemy at sea.

Operation Tomodachi update - 21 March

This was the Navy update yesterday for Operation Tomodachi.

Residents of Hadenya load essential supplies delivered from a MH-60 helicopter from HS-4.

A total of 12,750 personnel, 20 ships, and 140 aircraft of U.S. 7th Fleet are continuing to participate in Operation Tomodachi. Today, utilizing 14 helicopters, the fleet delivered more than 47 tons of relief supplies bringing the total of aid delivered to Japan since the beginning of the crisis to 227 tons.

USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49), USS Germantown (LSD 42), USS Tortuga (LSD 46) along with USS Essex (LHD 2) and the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit are off the coast near Hachinohe to assist humanitarian aid efforts along the affected northeastern coast to reach people in remote areas where the tsunami hit hardest. Ships of the Essex ARG conducted underway replenishment today with the USNS Matthew Perry.

Helicopters with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (Reinforced), 31st MEU, flew two CH-46 helicopters from the USS Essex to deliver humanitarian aid supplies including blankets and fresh water to Miyako city. The pilots also conducted aerial surveys of 200 miles of the affected coastline between Miyako and Ofunato.

A P-3 from VP-4 deployed to Misawa conducted reconnaissance of coastal areas to continue the search for displaced people and to find new landing zones to service them.

USS George Washington got underway from Yokosuka today to assure the ship can sustain a state of readiness in the long term for the defense of Japan. The forward deployed carrier is scheduled to remain in the local waters off Japan. Moving USS George Washington is a precaution given the capabilities of the vessel and the complex nature of this disaster. USS Lassen also departed Yokosuka today.

The USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group to include USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Preble (DDG 88), USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), USS McCampbell (DDG 85), USS Mustin (89) and USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54) along with USS Cowpens (CG-63) and USS Shiloh (CG-67) continued operations north of Sendai. Strike group helicopters carried 17 tons of supplies to 24 separate sites, and identified 16 additional sites where groups of people are isolated to be serviced with supplies in the coming days. Aircrews report that people on the ground are particularly interested in receiving shipments of gasoline, kerosene or diesel fuel.

USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19), flagship for the United States Seventh Fleet, conducted a connected replenishment with USNS Pecos today in the vicinity of Nagasaki.

The commander, U.S. Pacific Command, directed that precautionary measures be taken due to the potential of future radiological exposures, including directing the distribution of potassium iodide (KI) tablets to military personnel and their families in Yokosuka and Atsugi. Personnel in Yokosuka and Atsugi will not actually take KI unless advised to do so by U.S. or Japanese authorities. Seventh Fleet personnel conducting disaster relief missions inside of 100 nautical miles from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi plant continue to take KI as a precautionary measure.

Families of Seventh Fleet Sailors are continuing to voluntarily depart Yokosuka and Atsugi as part of the Military Assisted Departure for Department of Defense personnel.

If you have not seen it, you should also check out this dispatch over at the US Naval Institute blog.

Whiskey Tango Foxtrot in Japan

This popped up today on Facebook.

Good morning PSNS & IMF family,

I would like to share with you a recent update from U.S. 7th Fleet. USS George Washington (CVN 73) got underway from Yokosuka last night to assure she can sustain a state of readiness in the long term for the defense of Japan. The forward deployed carrier remains in the local waters off Japan. Moving George Washington is a precaution given the capabilities of the vessel and the complex nature of this disaster.

PSNS & IMF has more than 460 project personnel onboard George Washington, nine of whom are our Yokosuka Detachment workers. This team continues to perform work on her Selected Restricted Availability. I have every confidence our team will accomplish this availability despite the additional challenges presented over the last week and a half.

Also as a precautionary measure, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, ordered that Potassium Iodide (KI) be available for all DoD personnel and dependents currently located at Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Ikego Housing Detachment, Negishi Housing Detachment, and Naval Air Facility Atsugi in case a need is identified. People are being directed not to take any KI until official notification is given, and then only to take the recommended dosage; there is enough KI for all personnel. Medical personnel will be standing by at each distribution location to answer any questions and explain about possible side effects from KI.

To those of you still in Japan, and to the many of you onboard George Washington—know you have the support, respect and admiration of your Command family. We are all proud of you working through the disaster that hit Japan and the resulting transitional challenges of shifting location and, in some cases, your families.

To those of you stateside—it’s because of your tremendous support, planning and flexibility that we are able to continue our work to meet the fleet’s needs.

We continue to monitor the situation in Japan, and it is still our top priority to look out for the safety and well-being of our workers and their families.

R/CAPT Mark Whitney
Commander, PSNS & IMF

Followed by this on Facebook.

There will be a Town Hall meeting tonight, Tuesday, March 22, 2024 at the Benny Decker Theater. The meeting begins at 1730. Taking your questions will be Admiral Patrick M. Walsh, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. We hope to see you there.

Followed by this by CNN.

The U.S. military is considering the mandatory evacuation of thousands of American troops and their families in Japan out of concern over rising radiation levels, a senior defense official tells CNN.

The official, who did not want to be on the record talking about ongoing deliberations, says there are no discussions to evacuate all U.S. troops across the country. The talks have focused exclusively on U.S. troops in Yokosuka, just south of Tokyo, the official said. Yokosuka is home to America's largest naval base in Japan. The military is monitoring radiation levels on a constant basis.

As of Monday, the U.S. Navy had no more warships in port at the base. The aircraft carrier USS George Washington, which had been undergoing maintenance in Yokosuka, left port Monday in order to get away from the plume of radioactive particles that could blow over the base. Because it left port with a much smaller than normal crew, the George Washington will not take part in the Japanese relief effort.

No organization on the planet has more experience and expertise with all things nuclear than the United States Navy. No ship in the world is better equipped in a nuclear emergency than a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. When the US Navy and US Navy aircraft carriers start leaving Japan, something serious is happening. The US even contemplating pulling out of Japan right now would represent an extraordinary shift in the balance of power in the Pacific, and yet that they are even considering doing so suggests the seriousness of the situation at Fukushima.

It is going to take someone near the very top of government, at minimum Secretary Gates, to interrupt the maintenance of the nations only forward deployed aircraft carrier and put her out to sea with a skeleton crew while still undergoing maintenance. USS George Washington (CVN 73) isn't just some warship, it is one of the 10 most expensive and capable strategic assets on the planet run by an organization with a thorough understanding of the dangers of nuclear radiation. Simply moving the carrier out of dry dock and out to sea during an emergency is no small thing.

When combined with news that ADM Walsh and ADM Willard, the two most senior Navy officers in the Pacific, addressed the families of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) what are we supposed to think? That meeting is followed by news reports concerning a potential mandatory evacuation from Yokosuka in the works?

If the US Navy pulls their families out of Yokosuka, the carrier won't be returning there for a long time, if ever. The question is, where can the US Navy move the forward deployed ships? A few destroyers to Guam? Would GW be pulled all the way back to Pearl Harbor? Would South Korea, Australia, or Singapore be interested in hosting a US Navy DESRON?

What is the message being sent to Japan? Tokyo is on the other side of the bay from Yokosuka; Tokyo is closer to Fukushima than Yokosuka is. Our national decision makers are considering all options with a full understanding that once the US Navy leaves Japan, the political fallout most likely will be we will never be allowed to return.

Operation Tomodachi: Following USS Tortuga (LSD 46)

This story continues to interest me. USS Tortuga Loads Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Vehicles By Task Force 76 Public Affairs.

Sailors aboard USS Tortuga (LSD 46) and soldiers from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Northern Army loaded vehicles and trailers pierside in Tomakomai Ko, March 15, in support of earthquake and tsunami relief efforts.

Tortuga’s crew loaded 13 jeeps, 10 utility trailers, six water trailers and three humvees via crane onto the flight deck and additional equipment via landing craft into the well deck, totaling 90 vehicles and 300 JGSDF soldiers.

"This is an extraordinary opportunity for us. Seeing these vehicles on our ship really demonstrates the bonds between the U.S. and Japan," said Cmdr. Adrian Ragland, commanding officer of Tortuga.

Tortuga’s visit to Tomakomai Ko, though brief, marks the first time a Navy ship has ever pulled into the port. After the ships brief stay, Tortuga will offload the equipment in Ominato, which will be used to transfer supplies, personnel and water to areas affected by the earthquake and tsunami in northern Honshu in support of Operation Tomodachi.

US amphibious ships have conducted exercises for years with the men and material of other nations embarked on our ships, but I am curious... is this the first time it has been done during a real operation? I really don't know, I keep thinking it has happened in other humanitarian operations before, but I am not sure.

Can anyone educate us?

Message to American Citizens from Ambassador to Japan John V. Roos

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy and other technical experts in the U.S. Government have reviewed the scientific and technical information they have collected from assets in country, as well as what the Government of Japan has disseminated, in response to the deteriorating situation at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant. Consistent with the NRC guidelines that apply to such a situation in the United States, we are recommending, as a precaution, that American citizens who live within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant evacuate the area or to take shelter indoors if safe evacuation is not practical.

We want to underscore that there are numerous factors in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami, including weather, wind direction and speed, and the nature of the reactor problem that affect the risk of radioactive contamination within this 50 mile (80 km) radius or the possibility of lower-level radioactive materials reaching greater distances.

The U.S. Embassy will continue to update American citizens as the situation develops. U.S. citizens in need of emergency assistance should send an e-mail to [email protected] with detailed information about their location and contact information, and monitor the U.S. Department of State website at travel.state.gov.

The United States is continuing to do everything in its power to help Japan and American citizens who were there at the time of these tragic events. To support our citizens there, the Embassy is working around the clock. We have our consular services available 24 hours a day to determine the whereabouts and well-being of all U.S. citizens in Japan and we have offered our Japanese friends assistance, including disaster response experts, search and rescue teams, technical advisers with nuclear expertise, and logistical support from the United States military.

Comment:

I'm curious what people think. We are clearly sending a message that is different than the government of Japan, who insists 12.5 miles (20km) is the appropriate evacuation zone. Whether this undermines Japanese government statements about the risk of radiation and fallout is entirely up to how the Japanese interpret the meaning of the difference in opinions between the US and Japanese government.

Is this the US government being abundantly cautious in protecting US citizens? Is this the US being paranoid? I personally believe it is the responsibility of governments to make independent assessments based on the facts as they know it, and in this case I believe the Obama administration is taking a prudent and responsible action that they believe will protect the lives of US citizens.

I am curious how others see it though.

Operation Tomodachi Update

The Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group has become one of the largest collections of US naval firepower deployed globally. Having been directed to provide humanitarian assistance to Japan, the Strike Group is also the largest US naval task force for disaster recovery since the earthquake off Haiti last year.

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76)
USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
USS Cowpens (CG 63)
USS Preble (DDG 88)
USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62)
USS John S. McCain (DDG 56)
USS McCampbell (DDG 85)
USS Mustin (DDG 89)
USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54)
USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10)

The Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group is conducting relief operations off the East coast of Japan. Assuming the aircraft carrier is supporting operations points north of Sendai, the aircraft carrier is a minimum of 50 miles (and likely more) away from the Fukushima nuclear plant suffering from radiation problems.

As if debris in the water and winds with nuclear radiation didn't add enough hazards to the relief operations from sea, a winter storm added visibility problems and impacted flight operations yesterday. Specifically, the USS Ronald Reagan was unable to fly any sorties yesterday due to visibility problems, although other ships in the Strike Group were able to conduct relief operations.

Have you ever been involved in one of those wargames where the challenges being thrown at the players started to feel completely unrealistic? First an earthquake, then a tsunami, then radiation and potential nuclear fallout, then a blizzard, etc...

Welcome to Japan.

Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations off northeast Japan are being conducted in remarkably difficult conditions. There are always enormous challenges with disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations, but the environment of the disaster zone has elevated the challenge in Japan considerably.

USS Essex (LHD 2)
USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49)
USS Germantown (LSD 42)

We will start hearing about operations from the Essex ARG within the next 24-48 hours, and this will have the look and feel of serious business. Aircraft carriers are great and can do a lot of things, but when you really need helicopter operations - what you want is a LHD.

The Essex ARG is expected to take position off the coast of Sakata on the western coast of Honshu and has already been tasked a primary mission to assist in the reopening of Sendai airport for operations. This gives me the impression that the Sendai airport is soon to become a major hub for international relief, at least until the port of Sendai can be restored for taking goods from sea.

USS Tortuga (LSD 46)

The ship was last reported loading equipment and supplies in Tomakomai, Hokkaido. The ship is expected to transfer personnel and vehicles of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force from there to Onimato tomorrow. The operations of USS Tortuga (LSD 46) will be an important story when this is over regarding the flexibility of amphibious ships, as the vessel has primarily been used to move Japanese supplies, personnel, and equipment around instead of US Marines. It may be hard to find a better example of international cooperation when this is over than the activities of the USS Tortuga (LSD 46).

USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19)

The Flagship of the Seventh Fleet is expected to arrive near Okinawa tomorrow and begin taking on quite a few people and equipment for delivery north. The ship is expected to spend a few days around Okinawa while loading on many reserve duty specialists whom I presume are being flown in from CONUS.

USNS Safeguard (T-ARS 50)

The ship reportedly delivered high-pressure water pumps to Yokosuka last night and delivered to Yokota Air Force Base for further transfer to the Government of Japan for employment at the Fukushima power plant. Four additional pumps were delivered from Sasebo this afternoon.

MV Westpac Express (HSV 4676)

This ship has been busy. On March 14 the ship moved a FARP (Forward Area Refueling Point) from Okinawa to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni where it was moved forward to Yamagata Air Field, which allowed aircraft and ground transportation vehicles to refuel while delivering support to those affected in the Sendai region.

---

The US Navy and Marine Corps response has been given high praise so far from the Japanese government, and there are already dozens of photographs that are beginning to tell the story. The US and Japan have had an interesting relationship over the past few years as both nations have wrestled with political differences on specific issues. With so many US citizens living in Japan, specifically from the military services who are at this time providing relief and support, it is going to be very interesting to see how that political relationship develops after this crisis.

Japan is the home of the 31st MEU. This relief operation will represent a very rare occasion where US Marines - best known for storming foreign shores - are involved in a major relief operation in support of their home. This is different than most relief operations, because in the case of many Marines and Navy personnel supporting this relief operations in Japan - their families live in Japan too.

As one email put it, "This is not like Indonesia. I have friends who live near Sendai. I have a friend whose family is still missing. Japan is where our kids go to school. Japan is our home."

Murphys Law at Fukushima

Just followed the press conference from Japan that updated the situation.

As of this writing, there is a fire around reactor 4. There is no fuel on fire, yet, but this will not be an easy fire to put out.

There is a leak in reactor 2. The extent of the leak is being hid in the TEPCO translation.

These are the figures passed around:

30mSv/h (30,000 uSv) near Unit-2 & 100mSv/h (100,000 uSv) near Unit-4.

This is legit contamination. The fire is producing higher contamination, and we will know more about that once the fire is out.

Pray for those firefighters. That is one fire no firefighter wants to ever fight in their life.

This is not a meltdown yet, but there is a contamination problem at Fukushima and it will contribute to making everything else hard. The government is advising total evacuation 20km away and stay indoors of 30km.