Battleground Africa: The Upcoming Siege of Kismayo

The war taking place in east Africa is very difficult to follow through the media, indeed without good background on events it might be impossible to get an accurate picture on any given day - although there are several great summery articles like this one every few days. Several reporters from news agencies across the globe are struggling to follow unfolding events due to the confusion and chaos that comes from the fog of war. There simply isn't much information outside of official sources, and it is not safe for journalists (or anyone else) to seek information themselves.

There are several factions, clans, nations, and organizations - all with different objectives, fighting on the same Somalia battlefield with different military objectives. The level of cooperation between these factions is unclear, and the degree to which any one faction will work with another is limited so far. Suggesting alliances or even assistance unifies different factions involved is an abuse of either term, and thus is the complex nature of the 2011 war in Somalia.

Kenya's military objectives have been explained as developing a buffer zone between Somalia and Kenya, with a focus of the operation on overthrowing Al Shabaab from the major port hub in Kismayo. From my perspective, taking Kismayo is the primary military objective of the operation - because over the last many months the port at Kismayo had become the primary logistics hub for Al Shabaab.

The invasion of Somalia by Kenya has been ugly to observe. The Kenyan Army is better armed and thus a very formidable force relative to Al Shabaab, but not relative to other African nations, like Ethiopia. The Kenyan Army is also a foreign military invading a country that doesn't like foreigners, and as an organization the Kenyan Army is inexperienced and not very disciplined. This is a serious concern for nations Kenya is seeking support from, because military occupation forces require discipline to be effective.

The key question facing the US is whether or not to openly and actively throw direct support behind Kenya in their ongoing military operations in Somalia. This is how the US is presenting the question diplomatically as an open, unanswered question:

Question: Would the U.S. support a request for international assistance (NATO or some other international org) to blockade Kismayo?

Answer: We are aware of the request from Kenya and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to impose a blockade on Kismayo. Blockades are generally difficult to enforce and may have unintended consequences in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. This proposal must be discussed with international partners, particularly the African Union and UN Security Council and carefully considered in the context of the overall strategy for restoring peace and stability in Somalia.

What the US is trying to say with this cryptic word puzzle of an official State Department response is that we are not yet sure we are ready to fully commit our resources in support of Kenya's military operation and objectives. It's not clear what role the US is playing in support of Kenya, but the answer at this time appears to be that we are not contributing directly in any significant way - and I've heard more than a few credible diplomatic and military folks legitimately describe the US actions in response to Kenya's invasion of Somalia as political dithering. Being that all major military decisions by the Obama administration are made on Friday, perhaps we are only hours away from announcing our policy.

While recent reporting highlights the USAF is now flying Reaper drones from an upgraded airfield in Arba Minch, Ethiopia, this activity is part ongoing military activity by the US is completely independent of Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi. Had Kenya not invaded southern Somalia, the base would still exist and still conduct the same missions. We are seeing evidence of indiect US support for Kenya, for example, detailed information related to arms shipments for Al Shabaab to the airport in Baidoa is very likely a product of US intelligence. The only Western nation that has announced they are publicly supporting Kenya at this time is France, and that support is limited to military logistics that is mostly, if not all, done within the Kenyan borders.

It is important to note that both Kenya and the US are two different sides of a multi-sided war taking place in Somalia. The completely ineffective Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which the UN recognizes as the legitimate government of Somalia, is a third side. AMISOM, the African Union military force established to support the TFG, often acts as it's own side in Somalia as well. There are also several different clans in southern Somalia, which are not really the side of the TFG or Al Shabaab, and there is a very strong pirate organization that operates out of Kismayo with 'very loose affiliations' with Al Shabaab, and by 'very loose affiliations' it is more accurate to describe that relationship in the context of blackmail.

And as always, there are innocents who are caught in the middle of these factions.

It would be inappropriate to suggest the upcoming siege of Kismayo as one of the pivital military battles in Somalia given the length of time the nation has been at civil war and following the August liberation of Mogadishu from Al Shabaab, but there is one context we can accurate describe the upcoming siege of Kismayo.

From a US national security interest point of view, the battle for Kismayo will be the most important military battle fought against Al Qaeda aligned transnational terrorist organizations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq since September 11, 2001. From the perspective of geography and logistics, not to mention financial support, Kismayo is a key holding by Al Shabaab, and the removal of AL Shabaab from Kismayo would be a strategic defeat even beyond that the organization suffered in Mogadishu earlier this year. No single military battle holds more opportunity at a strategic level for all parties involved than the upcoming siege. The question isn't whether the US gets involved in the battle - after all the US has been striking targets around Kismayo for years - the key questions are to degree the US will get involved - and to what degree can successful achievement of military and political objectives in Kismayo create genuine change in the region.

After all, it isn't just social and environmental change potential with taking a port like Kismayo and the mouth of the Jabba River, the economic potential and resources throughout that region of Africa from Southern Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan potentially adds balance to opportunity costs that come with the development of a regional port like Kismayo, and the financial opportunity is in the trillions of dollars. As Kismayo goes, so does the region. It will be very interesting to see how committed the international community becomes as the siege of Kismayo approaches, because I think Kenya is on the verge of discovering several fair weather friends if the upcoming siege of Kismayo doesn't turn into a strategic blunder for their military.

What would I do? I would send the Bataan ARG along with every FFG and PC in the region to establish sea control off Kismayo, and prepare for the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe that is almost certain to result from the siege of the city. The US has committed significant military forces in the region over the last many years with a clear understanding that this region represents a clear national security interest in the defense of the United States. Al Shabaab and AQAP represent the significant national security threats by Al Qaeda to the US, passing on the opportunity to deal a significant blow to Al Shabaab when others have committed to doing the heavy lifting would be a strategic mistake. Establishing sea control and insuring access of humanitarian assistance would be the primary objectives of the United States, and having the Bataan MEU available to insure security in those roles gives the US the best possible opportunity to achieve success in those roles. If there is any military role outside of sea control or humanitarian assistance, it would be logistical and perhaps limited fires support for AMISOM - not Kenya, in securing the infrastructure and port facilities to support the aftermath of a Kismayo siege.

The US has no business getting military engaged on the ground in any type of sustained way, but having operational flexibility at those key moments almost certain to reveal themselves in the near future for a surgical strike operation or an amphibious raid operation to insure success of key objectives could potentially be the difference in success or failure towards guiding events towards a conclusion aligned with long term US national security and foreign policy objectives in that region. The Obama administrations military approach of leading from behind but selectively engaging with minimal force has to date been a very smart adjustment in the use of US military power - and has been largely successful in guiding outcomes of ongoing chaotic events towards achieving US national objectives with minimal commitment. The same policy approach may soon be necessary in Kismayo with so many US national interests at stake in that region.

East Africa Updates

A variety of interesting, though sometimes confusing news has emerged regarding Somalia in the past few weeks. What follows is an attempt to provide ID readers some insight into these developments and amplify Galrahn’s recent post.

Kenyan Offensive into Jubaland:
Kenya’s offensive into Southern Somalia under the guise of UN Article 51 (right to self-defense) began as retaliation for al Shabaab kidnappings in Kenyan refugee camps and coastal areas (more below on those). The Kenyan air force is dropping bombs, and ground troops have captured key coastal terrain and intend to push all the way to Kismaayo. Note, contrary to some reporting, the US is not supporting this offensive. There is no shortage of of interest and discussion on Somalia in US and European governments these days, but frankly, that interest hasn't translated into a desire for action, at least on the part of policy makers.

Unencumbered by bureaucratic paralysis, al Shabaab has already retaliated in Kenya with a series of minor grenade attacks in Nairobi. A future escalation of these attacks to include some of AS’s tactics regularly used in Mogadishu, such as suicide bombers, is certainly possible. However, if the Kenyans do take Kismaayo, this will be a huge blow to one of al Shabaab’s fundraising and facilitation hubs as a major revenue source disappears. Holding the terrain is a different matter, and probably best left to one of Kenya's proxies.

The political and diplomatic responses to Kenya’s incursions have been a little bit less straight-forward. On one hand are the TFG’s contradictory positions. On the other are those of pro-TFG militias Ras Kamboni and ASWJ, who have voiced their support to the effort. These pronouncements should not be surprising as they stand to gain significantly from a capture of Kismayo and the financial windfall it would bring either group. At least one US diplomat has publically discussed the potential of future support to the operation. Western countries should seriously consider immediate assistance to Kenya - logistics, intelligence sharing, ISR, and fires support, if needed. One idea is to provide airlift or sealift for a contingent of AMISOM and TFG troops (even a token presence) to Kismaayo to extend the reach of their governance into Southern Somalia and provide a means for Kenya to gradually withdraw. The longer Kenyan troops are in Southern Somalia, the staler their welcome will become, so anything Western countries can do to speed their victory and withdrawal will increase stability there and alleviate the millions of Somalis still suffering from the al Shabaab-exacerbated famine there.

Kidnappings: A series of high profile kidnappings/murders of European (and now an American) aid workers and vacationers in East Africa has occurred in the past months. At this point, these kidnappings appear to be a fundraising mechanism for various malign actors in Southern Somalia. Westerners have been valuable hostage targets for Islamic terror groups (see AQIM, AQI, AQAP, especially) the past decade. What we are seeing in East Africa seems (from my perspective) to be a mutually beneficial relationship evolving between various criminal/clan, al Shabaab, and pirate groups to capture and ransom Westerners in Somalia and Kenya. Al Shabaab has probably lost funding in the form of taxation as TFG/AMISOM have captured and held territory. Pirates are also likely seeing their revenue streams dry up as their attack success rate drops (primarily attributable to embarked armed security detachments, rather than the coalition naval presence). Larger shipping companies, which have better insurance and resources for paying ransoms, have shifted some of those resources to armed security. This leaves smaller, poorer shipping lines - and the handful of flag states who are still myopically failing to protect their crews - as vulnerable targets. Note, Somali piracy is non-traditional in that it is really kidnapping for ransom at sea, rather than cargo seizure. (The expanding piracy in West Africa is focused on profiting from captured cargoes, not crews.)

Developed countries’ inaction towards addressing shore-based pirate facilitators has left these networks intact and apparently some of them have moved onto new and potentially more profitable business. Until these actors are targeted - lethally, since there is no law enforcement reach into Somalia and mildly worded diplomatic press statements aren’t helping much - expect these kidnappings to continue, if not multiply.

Other Recent Related News:
- Al Shabaab in America Al Shabaab’s global facilitation network stretches throughout Africa, into Europe, Australia, and yes, even the United States. The tens of thousands of Somalis in America -- the vast majority of whom are law-abiding citizens -- create a challenge for law enforcement agencies who must sort out the small percentage (still probably hundreds) of bad apples in the diaspora.

- Finally, for the benefit of the random DOS person reading this blog, if I haven't already raised your hackles enough thus far - this - is a colossally dumb idea. Other agencies are still cleaning up the mess made from the last time do-good diplomats opened the floodgates to un-vetted refugees from “countries of concern.”

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Kenya Gets Help From Mystery Western Air Force

The invasion of Somalia by the military forces of Kenya does involve western help, and no matter what the reporting to date has suggested - I am fairly confident the US was not surprised this action took place. No one wants to describe what kind of help Kenya is getting from foreign powers, nor who exactly is providing the help, but US officials have been quick to highlight what our help is not.

A Kenyan military spokesman, Maj. Emmanuel Chirchir, said that “one of the partners,” possibly the United States or France, had been behind airstrikes in the past few days, killing a number of Shabab militants. The French Navy has also shelled rebel positions from the sea, the Kenyan military said in a statement.

Two senior American officials in Washington said Sunday that neither the United States military nor the Central Intelligence Agency had carried out airstrikes in Somalia in recent days. One of the officials, who follows American military operations closely, said the Kenyan offensive had forced many Shabab fighters and commanders to disperse, making them easier potential targets, but emphasized that there had been “no U.S. military strikes in Somalia at all recently.”

All we really know for sure based on the very limited reporting of military activities is that the Kenyan ground and air forces have been operating at a level of effectiveness that exceeds their organic capabilities. The New York Times knows this as well, and mentions it in the latest reporting on ongoing events.

Kenya’s military — especially compared with those of its neighbors, like Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia — has scant experience. Several military efforts over the past 20 years by other external powers, from the United States to the United Nations, have failed to deliver a sustainable government in Somalia.

Kenyan military officials say their plan is to squeeze the port of Kismayu, one of Somalia’s biggest towns and a major money-earner for the Shabab, from two sides in a pincer movement with troops massing to the west near Afmadow and to the south in Raas Kaambooni. Heavy rains, though, have literally bogged them down, and after an initial burst of activity, the Kenyan advance seems to have slowed.

Major Chirchir said the Kenyan Navy had also positioned ships along the coastline from the Kenyan border toward Kismayu.

“Any vessel that is there with a militia we will take it down,” he warned.

On Sunday, Kenyan officials said that a French naval ship had shelled the city of Koday, south of Kismayu, and that casualty figures were not yet available. The French military has also launched small, covert strikes in Somalia in the past, aimed at terrorism suspects and pirates.

Kenyan military spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir confirmed to the Kenyan newspaper The Daily Nation that the port city of Kismayu was under persistent air attacks, but denied those attacks came from the Keyan Air Force.

“It is confirmed that Kismayu has been under aerial attacks, but it is not our troops, it must be one of our allies.”

This is believable, the only fighter aircraft the Kenyan Air Force has are F-5s, and it is hard to imagine they would be successful in precision target runs against terrorist fortifications in Kismayu.

So who is the mystery airpower bombing terrorists in Somalia? The US has two carrier strike groups - the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) and the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), and an amphibious readiness group - the USS Bataan (LHD 5), in 5th Fleet region that includes the Somali port of Kismayu. Until it is determined who is doing the airstrikes (and I am skeptical it is us, I think our role is ISR/logistics), the US is the obvious nation to be accused of conducting those strikes.

But if we assume it isn't the US military bombing targets in Somalia, and we also assume it is not the Kenyan Air Force, it makes more sense to presume the strikes are either French military or contracted out. One possibility is that the French are launching strikes from a few bases in the region, which is the most plausible scenario. There are a handful of private security outfits these days that operate UAVs for hire in Africa, which is another reasonable, but unlikely possibility.

Either way, this assault has the potential to be 'end game' for Al Shabaab. It does appear the US is playing a limited, supporting role in the background of these Kenyan military operations (mostly ISR and C2 it appears, but logistics is possible), and I for one support the US helping Kenya clean up their Somali backyard. None of Somalia's other problems will ever see the resources needed to build solutions until Al Shabaab is dealt with, and the unfolding situation in southern Somalia appears to be the first legitimate opportunity to deal the death blow to the organization in many years.

French Military Operating in Somalia

From STRATFOR here.

French military troops discovered suspected members of the al Shabaab Islamist militia attempting to cross the Kenyan-Somali border in two boats at Raas-Kaambooni in Lamu, Kenya’s The Standard reported Oct. 10. According to unnamed sources, the French military cornered the militants’ boats in the deep sea, exchanging gunfire with the militants. Four militants were arrested after disembarking the boats but six others are presumed to have drowned. Lamu West District Commissioner Stephen Ikue confirmed that the French military was involved in an operation that occurred inside Somali waters but declined further details. French security teams have joined their Kenyan counterparts in battling militancy in Lamu, according to the sources.

The French military is probably operating in Somalia following the abduction of a French citizen from Kenya in an attempt to track down her whereabouts and rescue her, but there may also be more to it than that. Either way, the French military is on the ground in Somalia, armed and apparently ready to use force.

Noteworthy this week we hear about British special forces rescuing a pirated ship off Somalia, and now French special forces inside Somalia. While the US special forces are apparently everywhere else, the Europeans appear to have stepped it up inside Somalia.

Notes From Around Somalia

It was strange to watch news reports filter in on Tuesday afternoon, and several hours later it is still very much unclear what happened, or what is happening. Before we get caught up in current events, this Guardian article reviews recent events to explain why fear is gripping Northern Kenyan coast.

On Saturday morning a 66-year-old disabled French woman was kidnapped from her beach house in the Lamu archipelago by Somali gangsters who bundled her into a speedboat and escaped to mainland Somalia. The attack came two weeks after a British woman was abducted while on holiday further up the coast in Kiwayu, close to the Somali border. Her husband was killed. She is still missing.

On Tuesday events became very difficult to follow as fear apparently struck the region again. It began with Sky News reporting that evacuations were underway on Manda Island in Northern Kenya due to reports of approaching skiffs from Somalia filled with armed men. According to TV news reports from Sky News, authorities were evacuating tourists from the regional resorts due to threats from armed attackers by the sea, and those reports included details like 5 skiffs with 5-7 armed men in each skiff. Given the recent kidnappings and murders from the resorts, such a report on Sky News sent a panic through the resort region as foreigners fled.

It is worth noting that advisories of closings like this one are popping up online for resorts along the Lamu Archipelago. It is also worth noting that there has been no confirmation yet that 5 skiffs filled with armed men even existed, because this could be nothing more than a rumor spread through fear.

Regardless, the UK Foreign Office issued the following travel to Kenya warning on Tuesday. The US State Department has not issued a similar warning, but this US State Department warning on Kenya from December 2010 remains in effect.

The use of the sea to circumvent the Army at the border between Somalia and Kenya is not new, but the recent leverage of the sea by those in southern Somalia to raid and kidnap foreign tourists right off the beach has sent fear through the area completely disrupting the tourism season just as it is beginning in northern Kenya. It is very much unclear if Kenya has the Coast Guard and Navy resources to protect their northern shoreline, but it is very probable the nation does not.

What I believe is important to watch for here is whether we are seeing the early stages of Al Shabaab naval operations, specifically in the form of amphibious raids., or if these are random attacks. The kidnapping of the French elderly woman was reportedly done by the Marehan clan under the leadership of Aadan African. The hostage was reportedly originally being held captive between Dhobly and Kismayo, but there are reports that a French special forces team failed in a recent attempt to rescue her and her whereabouts are now unknown. As she is disabled and thought to be in poor health, it is unclear how long she is expected to survive.

Piracy Update

While I completely agree with CDR Chris Rawley's assessment that simple solutions are the best approach to maritime problems off Somalia, it is worth noting that the problems are getting more complex with each season. The monsoon season is over, and while it is true that fewer ships are being hijacked per attack, it is also true that 2011 is on pace to be another record year for number of piracy attacks in the region. For examples of everyday events I encourage folks to keep an eye on the IMB Live Piracy Report, for example, which highlights no shortage in the number of attacks and has become an activity log regarding the true value of security forces on merchant shipping in the region.

Something else worth noting... NATO has redesigned their piracy site yet again for Operation Ocean Shield (the anti-piracy patrol off Somalia) and this time is giving a daily briefing of updated threat information. Consider today's briefing.

Recent Activity

The monsoon season is over, resulting in pirate activities noticeably increasing.

There is a mothership approx. 300nm due east of Socotra Island, and two recent attacks within 200nm of the mothership off Socotra Island within the past week. A whaler Pirate Attack Group (PAG) has been reported approx 200nm off the Southern Somalia/Kenya coast. Masters are advised to proceed with extreme caution when transiting these areas and report any suspicious activity to UKTMO.

Current Situation

Due to the favourable conditions for small boats, the Bab Al Mandeb (BAM), Southern Red Sea (SRS) and the Gulf of Aden (GOA) remain Areas of Concern. Three alerts in this region over the last week (Alert 219, 220, 223) confirm the presence of pirates in these areas.

A Shu’ai type dhow with a brown fibreglass hull, the FV DEER, was reported pirated off the north east tip of Somalia, and is likely being used as pirate mother ship in the Arabian Sea and / or the northern Somali Basin. We assess that 3 dhows are operating as mothership in the Arabian Sea and the Somali Basin.

The weather in the Central Somali Basin/Arabian Sea has improved, and previously pirated dhows are operating in this area as motherships. There was a piracy attack against a fishing vessel on 03 October in position 04-59N 058-00E. Shots were fired from the skiffs before the fishing vessel evaded being pirated (Alert 225). This attack occurred within 120nm of a previous attack (Alert 222) and indicates there may be a PAG working in this region. Masters are advised to proceed with extreme caution when transiting in the Arabian Sea, especially in the region of 060 E and west towards the Somali Coast.

At least one Jelbut style dhow is believed to be operating in the central Somali Basin, and is described as having a red and brown hull with white superstructure. Any information or photography regarding this dhow can be sent to the NATO Shipping Centre at [email protected] for improved warnings to other ships in the area.

As the weather improves, more attacks are expected. Increasing activity along the coast also indicates that additional pirated dhows and whalers are preparing to head out into the central Somali Basin. It’s assessed that there are 3 dhows operating as mother ships in this area, one of which may be the FV DEER (see picture).

At least 2 or 3 PAGs are operating off the coast of Kenya (Mombasa/ Dar es Salaam approaches). A whaler PAG is in this region, in vicinity of 01-50S 044-54E (approx 200nm off the Southern Somlia/Kenya coast), and at least one Jelbut dhow is acting as a mothership for one of these groups.

Latest reports from vessel that have been attacked indicate that some of the pirates make use of sunrise/sunset to approach from the direction of the low sun (skiffs may also be painted dark blue) in order to gain extra time for surprise.

If Masters encounter suspicious activity (such as stationary radar contacts or skiffs laden with ladders or other piracy equipment), please report as much detail as possible, including photographs of skiffs and possible mother ships, to UKMTO Dubai or NATO Shipping Centre.

The terminology has changed rapidly. It was only 3-4 years ago I would blog about an attack as an uncommon event and describe the simple tools and techniques exploited, but now we actively discuss operational and tactical details like the last known locations of multiple pirate action groups, motherships, amphibious raids, geographic distribution, time of day tactics, and even the color of camouflage paint being used in specific areas for specific purposes. The biggest difference between then and now though was that back then, nobody was getting killed. Now death is much more common, although I think people are generally desensitized from it.

Given the evolution in maritime activities we have seen off Somalia over the last 3-4 years, what should we expect in 3-4 years from now should policy not change?

Politics

I don't know what to make of these comments by David Ignatius.

But in recent weeks a subtle limit has emerged in drone policy: Despite calls by some U.S. officials for drone attacks against the training camps of AQAP and al-Shabab, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia, neither has been targeted. That’s a deliberate policy decision — aimed partly at preventing the spread of a Taliban-style insurgency to new theaters, such as Yemen and Somalia.

He goes on to frame it like this.

A senior administration official explains the policy this way: “If individuals target us, if they are in the chain of command for attacks against Americans,” then the United States will authorize “direct action” — putting such individuals on the “capture or kill” list that triggers a drone attack. But, the official cautions, “We don’t want to get involved in a domestic confrontation inside Yemen or Somalia, or increase anti-U.S. sentiment” in those places.

There is a deterrence formula implicit in this policy: So long as Somalia’s al-Shabab remains an insurgent movement fighting the Transitional Federal Government, the United States — while supporting the Somali authorities — won’t use drones. That weapon is reserved for those who directly threaten the United States.

If this is such an informed comment, then why was the biggest news over the last week a drone strike in Yemen? Why has STRATFOR (and other sources) been reporting consistent drone strikes (by the US) in Somalia over the last two weeks? David Ignatius appears to have swallowed someone's political spin on the rules of engagement in the US global drone war.

The argument that drone warfare target selection criteria is tied to a master deterrence theory doesn't appear very credible to me. Drone warfare is many things, starting with a politically low risk, offensive form of warfare intended to strike key leadership and infrastructure of the enemy. With all due respect to a number of scholars who have suggested or still believe otherwise, the network theory that suggests surgical strikes at leadership and infrastructure can't destroy disconnected networks appears to have been thoroughly discredited in Iraq where bomb makers and popular resistance leaders were targeted by SOF and taken out. In both Afghanistan and Yemen, where popular leaders of Al Qaeda have been taken out, Al Qaeda has lost much of their capacity and most of the violence in those areas is now led by domestic organizations with domestic objectives.

The Bush administration perpetuated the myth that you couldn't kill leaders to disassemble an Al Qaeda disconnected network, but the Obama administration has provided ample evidence that simply isn't true. As it turns out, in an era of globalization there is really no such thing as a disconnected network; we simply never had a good enough understanding of the links between different networks to fully understand the impacts of targeting leadership and infrastructure within those networks prior to doing it.

My sense is Admiral Mullen recognized that the network theories that argued against targeted strikes on leadership were inaccurate late in his term when he called out the ISI as the source to target for dealing with the Taliban.

I am certainly not a big fan of the global drone war being conducted by the United States, but I do admit the more I observe it used in various theaters the more convinced I am that it is remarkably effective at destroying the enemy networks being targeted. With that said, I sense there are legitimate and serious political and economic costs to conducting a global drone war that are going to come back and haunt us in the future, because our nations drone war approach to terrorism is like trying to kill a hydra by chopping off heads.

Indeed, we are chopping off the heads of terrorist organizations globally with our nations global drone war, but chopping off heads isn't how one kills a hydra. Chopping off the heads of a hydra may look like some skillful and intelligent deterrence theory to people speaking to David Ignatius, but to me, our nations global drone war looks more like short term solution to contain - not solve - a long term problem that we appear to believe can only be solved through generational development.

Which takes me back to Somalia. The US doesn't use drones for dealing with pirates, as drones are too busy dealing with true threats in the region like Al Shabaab. To be totally honest, the US Navy rarely has more than one drone (if that many ) for maritime surveillance in that region.

However, just because we do not use drones for anti-piracy doesn't mean we couldn't use them. Drones are not going to solve the piracy problem nor the Al Shabaab problem, but like every other theater - drones can contain those problems more effectively while we look for actual solutions. I'm not saying nations should fly armed drones around the Gulf of Aden blowing holes in any skiffs that are hauling guns and ladders, but I am saying armed drones would be an effective way to contain the problem of piracy by blowing up pirate skiffs (like it has contained the problem of terrorism in other places) while we continue to look for a way to employ a real solution.