The Navy’s Small Surface Combatants lack the long-range cruising capabilites needed for the Pacific theatre.
Distance and the Pacific Theatre
The recent Department of Defense Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy affirms the importance of the Pacific theatre to national and international security, and establishes it as the primary maritime theater. Among other requirements, the strategy stresses the need for “…operational flexibility and maximizing the value of U.S. assets despite the tyranny of distance.”1
The ‘tyranny of distance’ and its impact on the Pacific theater cannot be overstated. The Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) occupies over half of the world’s surface and a similar percentage of its population.2 Naval bases are separated by thousands of nautical miles (nm), with ship transits measured in multiple days or weeks as shown in Figure 1.3
The strategy devotes several pages to how the US military will support the Pacific Pivot by “… investing in new cutting-edge capabilities, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these capabilities more widely across the region.”4 For the Navy, the list of capabilities is impressive and includes: “…replacing the aircraft carrier USS GEORGE WASHINGTON in 2015 with the newer USS RONALD REAGAN; sending our newest air operations-oriented amphibious assault ship, the USS America, to the region by 2020; deploying two additional AEGIS-capable destroyers to Japan; and home-porting all three of our newest class of stealth destroyers, the DDG-1000, with the Pacific fleet.”5 The strategy indicates that over 60% of naval and overseas air assets will be homeported in the Pacific by 2020.6
Improving offensive capability for the Pacific and other theatres has been a key topic of discussion, notably the recent direction from Surface Navy leadership to add weapons payloads in support of the ‘Distributed Lethality’ concept.7 Yet very little discussion has taken place on whether the platforms it intends to acquire possess the range to overcome the Pacific’s ‘tyranny of distance’. New weapons grab headlines, but they are irrelevant if the platform lacks the range to get them to the fight. This tension in ‘platforms’ versus ‘payloads’ is not new: much of the Navy’s focus in the decades leading up to the Second World War was in ensuring its warships had not only modern weaponry, sensors, and armor, but also oil-burning powerplants and oversized fuel loadouts for an expected long-range naval conflict against Japan.8
Threats to Pacific Bases
If presented a map of the PACOM AOR, the General Board which guided Fleet development prior to the Second World War might intuitively recognize the challenges. Political boundaries, country names, allies, and likely aggressors have all changed; geography has not. Explaining how the revolution in precision strike systems has ‘redrawn the map’ would be more difficult.
A detailed discussion of Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) threats is well beyond the scope of this analysis. Suffice to say, land-based weapons such as the Chinese DF-21 ballistic missile (range of up to 1,070 nautical miles (nm)), and the H-6K land-based bomber equipped with land-attack cruise missiles (range of up to 1,780 nm) place many existing US and allied naval bases in the region within strike range.9 Figure 2, taken from the Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC (2015), shows the published ranges of Chinese conventional strike systems.10
Redrawing the Map
Adversary precision strike capability has redrawn the map in the Pacific. Secure basing within close proximity to the Asian landmass can no longer be guaranteed. As an illustration of the problem, Table 1 below shows a selection of naval bases and the two-way distance (transit and return) from the bases to two likely points of contention in the South China Sea: the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.11 The far column notes whether the bases lie within the threat envelope of Chinese strike systems.12
As can be seen, the naval bases which are closest to these likely flashpoints are also well within the potential adversary’s ability to hold-at-risk. In a South China Sea crisis, should China conduct or threaten to conduct conventional strikes against existing ‘close-in bases’, the Navy may need to operate from ‘distant bases’ with voyage distances approaching or even exceeding 4,000 nm.
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| Table 1 Two-Way Distance and Threats to Bases |
Analyzing Battle Force Cruising Characteristics
It is clear from the paragraphs above that the Navy, if it chooses to remain relevant in the Pacific, faces a significant distance challenge. In order to illustrate changes in Surface Combatant range over time and how this may impact future scenarios in the Pacific, two comparisons were conducted. The first examines the average unrefueled range, cruising speed and other metrics for the Large Surface Combatants from the years 2000-2030. The second does the same for Small Surface Combatants.
Range analysis was accomplished via a weighted average, taking into account the capabilities of each ship class ‘weighted’ by the number of ships in the inventory during a given year. Additional analysis was conducted to determine what percentage of the force were capable of the previously established 4,000 nm cruising range. Ship performance data was collected from multiple sources including the Naval Vessel Register13 ; Navy fact files14 ; and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) Fiscal Year 2014 report.15 Force structure information was extracted from: the Naval Vessel Register; Navy’s Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2016 (March 2015)16 ; and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan (October 2015).17
It should be noted that significant uncertainties in both ship capabilities and future force structure permeate this dataset, leading to the following assumptions:
- TICONDEROGA CG. There is limited information on plans to retire TICONDEROGA cruisers. It was assumed in this analysis that CGs would be phased out as newer DDGs join the Fleet.
- ZUMWALT DDG. Limited data was found on the ZUMWALT class destroyer, other than an expected range between 4,500-6,000 nm.18 Similarly, an unofficial reference cites a cruise speed of 20 kts.19
- AVENGER MCM / CYCLONE PC. It was assumed that these ships would be retired by 2020, as the LCS enters service in numbers and take on the mine countermeasures and patrol combatant roles.
- FREEDOM LCS. A cruising range of 1,961 nm at 14.4 kts was assumed for FREEDOM class, based on DOT&E test data for the USS FORT WORTH (LCS-3). 20
- INDEPENDENCE LCS. A cruising range of 3,500 nm at 14 kts was assumed for INDEPENDENCE, based on Navy threshold requirement.21 Navy sources predict significantly better performance (4,300 nm at 18 kts), however there is no evidence that this has been tested or proven.22
Large Surface Combatants, 2000-2030
The Navy does not provide a standard definition for a Large Surface Combatant in its Annual Shipbuilding Plan, although the CBO describes its roles and missions as follows:
“Large surface combatants, which include cruisers and destroyers, are the workhorses of the fleet. They provide ballistic missile defense for the fleet and for regional areas overseas. They defend aircraft carriers and amphibious warfare ships against other surface ships, aircraft, and submarines, and they perform such day-to-day missions as patrolling sea lanes, providing an overseas presence, and conducting exercises with allies. They also can launch Tomahawk missiles to strike land targets. Most of the Navy’s surface combatants displace about 9,000 to 10,000 tons.”23Table 2 shows data for Large Surface Combatants from 2000-2030. Speed remains constant at 20 kts, however range decreases every year from 2000-2030, eventually regressing towards a value slightly higher than that of its principal asset: the BURKE DDG. The driver is the retirement of the long-ranged SPRUANCE DD and the eventual replacement of TICONDEROGA CGs with BURKE DDGs. Total reduction in average range over the examined thirty-year period is 819 nm (-15%). However, even with this reduction in average range, all Large Surface Combatants in 2015-2030 are capable of unrefueled ranges of 4,000 nm.
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| Table 2 Large Surface Combatants, 2000-2030 |
Small Surface Combatants, 2000-2030
The Navy has only recently begun using the term Small Surface Combatant, and has not provided a standard definition in its Annual Shipbuilding Plan. The CBO describes a Small Surface Combatant as follows:
“Small surface combatants include frigates and littoral combat ships. Frigates are used to perform many of the same day-to-day missions as large surface combatants. Littoral combat ships are intended to counter mines, small boats, and diesel electric submarines in the world’s coastal regions. More routinely, they also patrol sea lanes, provide an overseas presence, and conduct exercises with allies. They range in size from 3,000 to 4,000 tons.”24For this analysis, the Small Surface Combatant definition includes legacy AVENGER MCMs and CYCLONE PCs, both of which displace significantly less than 3,000-4,000 tons ascribed by CBO. Since the roles of the AVENGER and CYCLONE will presumably be filled by LCS in the coming years, it is germane to include these smaller ships in the analysis to show the impact on average force range.
Table 3 shows the data from 2000-2030 for Small Surface Combatants. In 2000, the mode speed (i.e. most frequently occurring) is 18 kts - since the most common ships are the relatively fast OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class FF. This falls to 14 knots by 2030 for an overall decrease of 4 kts (22%). This reduction is attributable to LCS emphasis on short-range/tactical “sprint speed” over long-range/operational “cruising speed” of the PERRY class FF. A counter-intuitive finding is that the widescale introduction of a “fast, agile, focused-mission platform…”25 yields a future Small Surface Combatant force that at Pacific-scale cruising distances will be significantly slower than its predecessors.
Average range in 2030 falls well short of what was achievable in 2000. The driver is the introduction of the FREEDOM LCS, which according to DOT&E, has a shorter cruising range than the ship classes it replaces (AVENGER and CYLONE). The FREEDOM class accounts for half of the Small Surface Combatants by 2030, and its introduction drags range down considerably. Total reduction in average range over the thirty-year period is 794 nm (-23%). More than half of Small Surface Combatants were capable of cruising ranges of 4,000 nm in 2000-2010; none will be capable of 4,000 nm cruising ranges in 2015, 2020 or 2030.
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| Table 3 Small Surface Combatants, 2000-2030 |
It is difficult to accept that this steady reduction in Small Surface Combatant cruising capability supports the Navy’s strategic objectives - particularly a Navy which according to some views its mission as providing “…combat capable forward presence (i.e. the away game).”26 A Navy whose principal forward presence assets (LCS) lack the range to operate at relevant distance from base, and are significantly slower than the frigates they replaced does not appear to prioritize “the away game” in the Pacific.
Range provides flexibility and options. If the Navy remains committed to its shipbuilding plan, it may well transform from a Fleet that could choose to station itself forward or remain at arm’s length as conditions dictated, to a Fleet which due to its limited cruising range has little choice but to routinely station itself forward. This short-legged Fleet must either base itself within the adversary’s strike envelope and risk exposure to a decapitating first strike; or rely upon refueling support from a globally committed and already overtaxed Combat Logistics Force (CLF) to “buy back” what it lacks in cruising range.
The introduction of the LCS may lead to a “bifurcated” Battle Force, in which the Small Surface Combatants, because of their limited range and speed, are relegated to the sidelines in a Pacific-scale conflict. As an example: it is unclear how an LCS cruising at 14 kts can provide as an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) escort for a Fleet Replenishment Oiler at 20 kts.27 Similarly, given that an LCS would have to refuel approximately every 2,000 nm, its presence may actually complicate the ASW escort commander’s task by adding another “hungry mouth” to refuel. As a Fleet commander, the only reasonable option may be to substitute Large Surface Combatants (i.e. destroyers) for Small Surface Combatants (i.e. LCS) in the vital ASW escort role - when in earlier times a longer-ranged frigate could have sufficed.
Recommendations for Leadership
Collect empirical data on the cruising capability of both LCSs. Navy has committed to acquiring an additional twenty-four LCS of two variants (twelve FREEDOMs and twelve INDEPENDENCE). 28 Yet according to both DOT&E and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) there is a profound lack of empirical data regarding the performance of either ship types. 29,30 This knowledge gap should be remedied as soon as practical by evaluating both LCS types capability to operate at Pacific-scale distances (i.e. 4,000 nm).
Modify the current LCS acquisition plan. Preliminary test data on a FREEDOM class variant predicted cruising capability which fell short of the LCS threshold requirement (3,500 nm at 14 kts); and thus well short of the even longer ranges expected in Pacific operations.31 If operational testing of the INDEPENDENCE class shows that it can achieve this threshold, consideration must be given to altering the somewhat arbitrary ‘50/50’ split of FREEDOMs and INDEPENDENCEs. However, if the INDEPENDENCE does not prove capable of the required ranges, consideration should be given to pausing further LCS production and determine if engineering changes can feasibly increase their range.
Reestablish the initial LCS range requirements for the LCS-FF. The initial LCS concept of employment emphasized “forward deployment vice forward basing”, and placed a premium on “self-sustaining” operations.32 As such, the initial threshold cruising range requirement for LCS was 4,300 nm at 16 kts - fairly close to the cruising capability of the legacy PERRY class FF. This was subsequently reduced by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to 3,500 nm at 14 kts.33 Today, there remains uncertainty as to whether the FREEDOM or INDEPENDENCE will meet the 3,500 nm requirement - which this analysis has shown may be insufficient for the Pacific. Consideration should be given to reestablishing the 4,300 nm at 16 kts requirement for the modified LCS-FF. In addition, further decisions to increase the “lethality and survivability” of the LCS-FF should be examined against the impact on cruising range.
Recognize that platforms matter, and that the Pacific requires platforms purposefully designed for long distance operations. The current mantra of ‘payloads over platforms’ misses the mark. Platforms do matter. The Navy must come to terms with the fact that the LCS platform (seaframe) is ill-suited for operations in the vast Pacific. There is evidence that this realization may be taking place: comments from Seventh Fleet during the initial deployment of USS FREEDOM (LCS-1) expressed uncertainly on the ship’s utility, and stated to GAO interviewers that it might better be employed in the much smaller Fifth Fleet area of responsibility.34
It is perhaps too late to drastically redesign the LCS for the Pacific. However, the proposed LCS replacement (LCS(X)) - which according to the Navy’s Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2016 will not enter the Fleet until 2035 - should be assessed against Pacific-scale scenarios to determine its required cruising capabilities.35 Navy preference for variants of the current LCS designs should not steer the outcome; the study focus should be on rationally and objectively identifying a clean-sheet or existing design that meets the requirements. Continuing on the current path of adapting the LCS - envisioned decades earlier for operations in the short-ranged littorals - will prove expensive, time consuming, and unlikely to lead to the warship the Navy needs for the Pacific Pivot.
[1] “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 2015.
[2] “PACOM Issues and Challenges”, Brief, USPACOM, Accessed at http://www.slideshare.net/MatthewPopkin/pacomassessment
[3] Figure 1 from “2015 Index of Military Strength”, Heritage Foundation, Accessed at http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/
[4] “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy”.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] See “Distributed Lethality”, Rowden et al, USNI Proceedings, January 2015.
[8] See “Agents of Innovation”, John Kuehn, Naval Institute Press, 2009.
[9] Threat ranges per the “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC, 2015”. Department of Defense, 2015.
[10] Graphic from the “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC, 2015”. Department of Defense, 2015.
[11] Transit distances per Google Earth.
[12] Threat ranges per the “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC, 2015”.
[13] http://www.nvr.navy.mil/
[14] http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact.asp
[15] “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015.
[16] “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2016”, OPNAV N8, March 2015.
[17] “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan”, Congressional Budget Office, October 2015.
[18] http://defense.about.com/od/Navy/a/Ddg-1000-Zumwalt-Class-Destroyer.htm
[19] http://www.deagel.com/Destroyers-and-Cruisers/DDG-1000-Zumwalt_a000550001.aspx
[20] “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid. “DOT&E still has no data to assess the core mission capabilities of the Independence class variant seaframe.”
[23] “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan”, Congressional Budget Office, October 2015.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Navy Fact File, Littoral Combat Ships, accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1650&ct=4
[26] See “What’s Driving the Navy?” Sears et al, December 1, 2015, Accessed at http://www.informationdissemination.net/
[27] Navy Fact File, Fleet Replenishment Oiler, accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4400&tid=600&ct=4
[28] “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, November 6, 2015.
[29] See “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015.”
[30] “Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions”, GAO 16-201, December 2015.
[31] “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015. LCS-3 predicted range of 1,981 nm.
[32] “Littoral Combat Ship Concept of Employment Update”, http://faculty.nps.edu/jekline/docs/LCS%20CONOPS%20brief%2011-15pt1.ppt.
[33] “Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments”, GAO-14-749, July 2014
[34] Referenced in GAO-14-749 “Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments”, Government Accountability Office, July 2014.
[35] For a discussion on the proposed CBA, see “The Need for a Small Surface Combatant CBA”, Information Dissemination, October 2015.
