The US Navy's PF-109 "Patrol Frigate" Program

From 1968 to 1977 the number of surface combatants in the US Navy dropped from 304 ships to 182 ships. The 120 ships were unofficial casualties of the Vietnam war, an unpopular war that carried with it a heavy price tag at the time. In the early 1970s, Admiral Zumwalt Jr. recognized the decline in the surface fleet and put his ship engineers to work designing a "patrol frigate," basically a lightly armed escort capable of sustaining 20 knots intended to provide ocean escort of ships ranging from amphibious ships to logistical ships to merchant ships. The strategy was apart of a larger shipbuilding Hi-Low mix strategy that included very large aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and guided missile cruisers at the high end, and a large number of relatively inexpensive ships low end ships.

During the design of the "patrol frigates" Zumwalt was ruthless in maintaining cost controls by cutting both the weight and the systems on the ships multiple times until it reached his price goals. There were many sacrifices made in the design of the patrol frigate, among them:

• Half inch plates of High-tensile alloy was replaced with medium steel three quarters as strong

• Aluminum hull instead of steel to conserve weight

• A single rail Mk13 missile launcher instead of a two rail launcher

• Reduced capability SQS-56 sonar instead of the new at the time SQS-53

• A reduced capability SPS-49 air-search radar instead of a "three dimensional radar, making it the only USN missile ship that couldn't determine a targets altitude

• Other postponed or deleted equipment included a recovery assist securing and traversing (RAST) control station, the SQL-32 Nixie, a MK 36 Super RBOC, and an ASROC launcher.

Source: No Higher Honor (ISBN 1-59114-661-5)


The result was the PF-109 class, which Zumwalt sent out to industry competition to complete the design. A struggling shipyard in Bath, Maine bid the job, and eventually won a contract of 92.4 million. In the Navy effort at the time to ensure more than one shipyard could build new ships, a second design award went to West Coast Todd Shipyards. The Oliver Hazard Perry class was born, and with a second award to Bath that was slightly longer to support the new LAMPS III, the FFG 7 came in two versions (known as short and long).

Some of the major cited capabilities of the FFG 7 was it's reduced crew, sporting 70 fewer sailors than other frigates of comparable size of that era, and a gas turbine propulsion plant instead of the steam power used by other combatants at the time. While some critics at the time pointed out the reduced weapons capability of the frigate with its "one armed bandit," many within the Navy generally accepted the frigate would never perform long patrols, that other ships would always be nearby, that its helicopters would bridge the gap in ASW, and the ship would never be used in a front line role.

The rest of the story isn't just history, it continues today...

This tale should sound eerily familiar to anyone remotely familiar with the current Navy Littoral Combat Ship program. Where the FFG-7 constituted part of the low end of what developed into the 600-ship plan, the LCS constitutes the low end of the 313-ship plan. The FFG 7 introduced new propulsion with gas turbines, like the LCS breaks ground with all electric engineering. The FFG 7 had reduced weapons, sensors, and capability because it was never intended to be a front line ship of action, which is how the LCS is introduced and sold. The FFG 7 was designed to reduce cost of ownership by reducing crew, just like the LCS is designed today by reducing its crew to 60% fewer sailors than even the FFG 7. The FFG 7 was thought to be able to bridge the gap in its weaknesses by participating with larger vessels with more capability, but without the endurance to sustain such operations without extensive logistical support. The LCS mimics this bad example. There were two versions of the FFG 7, just like there are two versions of the LCS. The FFG 7 has an aluminum hull to make it light and fast, just like both versions of the LCS have an aluminum hull to insure its littoral access and speed.

One could almost think these two stories are the same, except they aren't, in fact not even close, because the story of the FFG 7 ends differently.

In December of 1978 George Wilson of the Washington Post wrote a story about the Oliver Hazard Perry titled "Destroyer Built on Time, Under Budget." Vice Adm. Joseph Bulkeley who was president of the navy's Board of Inpection and Survey at the time personally conducted the Sea Trials of the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG 7), and reportedly was so satisfied with the ship it returned 2 days early from its first trial. He was quoted as saying the ship was "magnificent" and "The Best Ship in 20 Years."

The LCS-1 is already overbudget by about 60% and still doesn't have a commission date set, not to mention one of the original 4 funded ships canceled completely. The FFG' 7s limitations have hurt the class over time, in both the USS Stark and USS Samuel B. Roberts incidents in the Persian Gulf. The FFG 7s expectations were shattered, as it did become a front line ship, despite being the low end of a shipbuilding plan intended to produce 600 ships. The LCS is also not intended to be a front line ship, but is sold as operating beside front line ships on the front line, while actually making up the entire low end (thus most affordable) of a 313-ship plan that stretches the budget to the seams.

These shipbuilding programs are similar stories that take two distinct roads heading into the last chapters. The FFG 7 story is about a cost effective ship program able to meet its requirements and perform its role effectively, even after the ships era passes the ship by, and sometimes going beyond its intended role despite its reduced weapon systems, reduced capability in electronic systems, and reduced crew.

The LCS story is about a program way over budget, being produced for a new role in an uncertain era of naval competition, with such limited on-board capability that it lacks even the potential to overcome its limitations in filling gaps for defensive roles in mildly contested seas. The LCS doesn't just have a reduced weapon payload, it has a bare minimum self defense load out that makes it legitimately questionable whether the LCS can intimidate even smaller 3rd world navy corvettes operated by potential adversaries, not to mention such a reduced crew compliment that the LCS is unlikely to overcome any potential disaster that it does accidentally encounter.

While some may think this story told of the FFG 7 sounds similar to the LCS, to me it is like comparing apples, and lemons.

The LCS Drama Continues

NavyTimes has an article that describes the damage of a fire that erupted onboard LCS-1 back in April. According to the Navy investigation, the cause was accidental. This is understandable, shipyards are fire hazards, and it appears the damage estimate is only 3.5 million, although it is a contributing factor to the delayed construction of LCS-1 which is now due to join the Fleet in 2008. Who will pay the cost is yet to be determined. The cost question of the LCS is included in the NavyTimes article:

As of June 21, the Navy has yet to determine total construction costs for either the Lockheed or General Dynamics ships and continues to characterize the cost growth as “between 50 percent and 75 percent depending on the basis of comparison,” although unofficial estimates are higher for both designs.

That is interesting, because 50% increase of the original 470 million for LCS-1 would be 705 million, while 75% would be 822 million for the first ship. DID is claiming, based on what has been reported, the best case cost estimate for a single LCS is around 427 million.

Now comes another announcement reported by NavyTimes, LCS-5 is now being estimated to cost 460 million. This is a fairly high number, well above the DID estimate of 427 million per. If you look at the DID cost increases, it is broken down by estimating a sea frame cost of 297 million + 50 million to each hull for NVR changes + 80 million for a single mission module for 427 million, which doesn't include the 25 million for a MH-60S/R. If I am reading the NavyTimes report correctly, the Navy is now including a single mission module in the its 460 million cost estimate for LCS-5, It is unclear from the article if the cost includes a single helicopter, but odds are good it does not.

This might be good news, or not... If the estimate is being made for LCS-5 is accounting for building only a single ship, it is possible the Navy can get down to the originally estimated 400 million per hull + module if building 6 per year. Possible, not likely. More likely the cost of the LCS would only drop about 10% per hull if building 6, meaning each LCS + a single mission module will be around 425 million per. While it certainly hurts the LCS program and the Navy to fail to get multiple mission modules per hull, at least there is a light at the end of the tunnel suggesting the Navy will be able to afford more than a handful of LCS.

That is of coarse assuming the Navy doesn't get its act together and realize the LCS may not be the best platform for the mission it is designed to conduct. I won't hold my breathe, but the LCS program won't be shaken out until the next presidential administration in FY2010, meaning it is possible a new administration will help the Navy see the light, and force the Navy to go in a new direction more suitable to the proposed mission profiles.

The Littoral Combat Ship: History and Future Outline Two Different Visions

In reviewing the recent history of the Littoral Combat Ship, including reading how it is often referred to as a platform intended to fill gaps in the current fleet, I continue to be amazed at how the LCS concept is explained, particularly in comparison to what the LCS actually is.

For example, this months Proceedings edition is the submarine edition, one of my annual favorites. It highlights various submarine activities throughout its pages, including a decent articles on SSK vs Nuke and one particularly interesting read on the SSGN. At the end of the day though, I am left empty thinking about the US Navy's own ASW capabilities. Even while reading the submariners discuss submarines, it feels as if they are resigned to the reality that when it comes to ASW for the US Navy, they are just about the only show in town.

I think there is some truth to that.

Over the last several months, the LCS has had its fair share of problems, from delays to cost overruns, and in many circles the LCS continues to be seen as a platform looking for a mission. I think the mission has become clear, the LCS is a small boat killer.

As I pointed out on Sunday night, the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) (FY2008-FY2013) lays out the LCS program like this:

32 LCS hills
16 SUW modules
11 MIW modules
6 ASW modules

In other words, small boat warfare is the focus of the LCS program. The ASW module purchase for the first 32 LCS ships is only 6 modules, less than 20% of the total number of modules purchased.

The problem is, that doesn't follow the logic behind the LCS concept in the first place. Duncan Long and Stuart Johnson recently reviewed the program history of the Littoral Combat Ship:

The LCS program quickly gathered steam. Analysis from the Office of Secretary Defense, a task force at the Naval War College, and the LCS Program Office (established in February 2002) contributed to developing the ship’s basic attributes. Key points of debate included whether the ship should embark a helicopter, whether it needed to reach speeds of 50 knots, and whether it needed to be capable of self-deploying across the Pacific. A ship that had no helicopter and had no need of self-deploying could be quite small and reach speeds of over 50 knots. This description most closely matches early Streetfighter designs, although some Streetfighter-type proposals had included a helicopter and left questions of endurance to future designers. A self-deploying, helicopter-carrying ship would have to be larger and slower.

Analysis in N-81 and in OSD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E;) strongly supported a self-deploying ship that, primarily for ASW and MIW purposes, embarked a helicopter. This was later echoed by a study team at the Naval War College. The Navy’s Surface Warfare (Requirements) Directorate (N76) tasked the Navy War College to study what the LCS should be able to do and what technologies it should incorporate. A LCS Task Force used a series of workshops to analyze these questions. The Task Force identified three primary missions and three secondary missions for LCS.

The primary missions matched the capability gaps identified by earlier Navy analysis:

1. Anti-submarine warfare
2. Mine warfare
3. Surface warfare (SUW) against small boats

The secondary missions were:
1. Maritime interdiction
2. Special operations forces (SOF) insertion and support
3. Tasks related to command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)

This Analysis of Multiple Concepts was done in place of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) typically required of weapons procurement programs. The Office of the Secretary of Defense determined that the analysis done for the LCS was adequate, the program was faulted for not rigorously considering non-ship alternatives to the LCS missions and for completing the Analysis of Multiple Concepts well after the Navy released the initial request for proposals to industry. This approach created the sense that LCS analysis (or at least the formal Analysis of Multiple Concepts) was being done after the answer had been determined.

In other words, as far back as 2002 the Navy identified ASW as the first primary reason for a new small surface combatant, and MIW as the second primary reason, and small boats the 3rd reason. Why then did the Navy program 16 ASuW modules first, and 17 combined ASW and MIW modules in the first 5 years if ASW and MIW were the priorities? The priorities somehow went from 1)ASW 2)MIW 3)ASuW to 1)ASuW 2)MIW 3)ASW

I though the LCS was supposed to fill the capability gap in ASW. At this rate the US Navy is going to be able to field a total of 6 additional ASW surface assets while retiring somewhere between 20 and 30 current FFGs currently able to conduct that role over the next decade. Why is that important? Because over the same time period...

Navies in the Asia-Pacific are expected to spend 108 billion US dollars to boost submarine and other maritime defences over the next 10 years

Regional countries are expected to acquire a total of 841 vessels by 2016, they said.

Of these, 83 will be submarines, with the most orders coming from emerging Asian power China. This would include five nuclear-powered missile submarines and 30 attack submarines to add to its current fleet, figures released by the organisers showed.

That doesn't even include the recent announcements by Venezuela, which btw, wouldn't be littoral ASW anyway considering the water off Venezuela is fairly deep. The Navy is facing small boat threats today without the LCS, is the threat of these small boats so disruptive they drive the first 5+ years of the LCS program?

The report by Duncan Long and Stuart Johnson does a good job of following the history of the LCS from Concept to Program, but for me they didn't make enough of a case for what I see as the real long term solution (but at least they mention it):

Mothership. One innovative idea for a new class of small ships was to make use of a mothership, from which small combatants would sortie, just as aircraft sortie from aircraft carriers. By adopting such a concept, which was proposed by Hughes and others, the Navy would have been able to build smaller, individually less expensive ships for use in the littoral. Because these ships did not have to self-deploy or sustain themselves for long periods, naval architects could have designed increased speed and payload fraction in place of the endurance needed for transoceanic deployment but not needed for tactical mission execution. Their low cost, low manning, and higher numbers would have made such combatants less costly to lose in combat.

I believe that when it is all said and done, various types of motherships will change Naval warfare in the 21st century similar to how Aircraft Carriers changed Naval warfare in the 20th century. What amazes me is that anyone who is involved in simulation already knows the unique capability motherships add to virtually any scenario, but in fact, nobody bases more decisions on simulation than the Navy does... which makes the LCS push even more puzzling to me. In this months issue of Proceedings, the case is made that SOCOM could use the Sea Fighter (FSF 1) today as a mothership for SOF. It is an interesting idea, one more in many that the Navy ignores while it pushes through the "medium" frigate sized LCS as its "small" combatant.

Senate Bill Slams the Navy and LCS

When I read a NavyTimes article earlier this week titled "Admiral confident of LCS despite setbacks" I thought maybe the Senate was going to fully fund the LCS project for FY08. The House has already passed its bill, and it reduced the presidents request for the LCS from $910.5 million to $710.5 million, which is below the presidents request enough that it became very unlikely the Navy was going to build anywhere near the 3 ships they were hoping this year.

The Senate, not to be outdone by the House, has taken the entire matter a step further. The emphasis in bold is mine.

Littoral Combat Ship

The budget request included $910.5 million in Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN, line 15) for the construction of three Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The Navy intends this to be a relatively smaller, more affordable vessel that carries modular payloads. The Navy concept is that, on one day, an LCS might be configured to operate as an anti-submarine vessel. However, as a mission needs to change, it could rapidly change the whole mission payload, within a day or so, and operate in an anti-surface warfare or mine warfare mode.

Each of the two prime contractor teams had contracts to build two ships. The prime contractors have teamed with smaller shipyards in both cases in order to keep LCS costs lower than would be possible in one of the major yards that normally build Navy ships.

The first ship (LCS-1) was scheduled to deliver in late 2006. The Navy is now estimating that the first ship will deliver sometime in the middle of 2008. The LCS-1 contractor team had barely started on their second ship (LCS-3) when the program ran into major cost problems earlier this year. The Navy then issued a stop work order on LCS-3 in order to reduce expenditures and limit further cost exposure on the program while it separately re-evaluated program cost estimates.

The Navy entered into negotiations with the LCS-1 team to sign up to a fixed price contract on the two ships or face outright cancellation on the second ship. These negotiations occurred during this past spring. When the stop work order was nearly ready to expire, the Navy announced that it and the LCS-1 contractor team were unable to reach an agreement and that the Navy was terminating the contract for LCS-3 for the convenience of the Government. It is too early to precisely estimate the termination costs, but the Navy has reported that significant funds for LCS-3 are on hold pending completion of the termination negotiations.

The second contractor team has a contract to build two LCS vessels of another design (LCS-2 and LCS-4). The Navy awarded this contract later, so LCS-2 is roughly 1 year behind the LCS-1. Unfortunately, it appears that this team is experiencing similar cost problems. The Navy has not issued the same ultimatum to this contractor team, but has claimed that the Navy will do so if the cost of LCS-2 continues to grow toward the Navy's estimate. Meanwhile, the Navy is proceeding with the start of construction on LCS-4, although it is not clear that the root causes for early cost growth on LCS-2 have been addressed.

The committee is disappointed that the cost of the lead ship has more than doubled and the delivery schedule has slipped several times.

The committee commends the Secretary of the Navy for exercising oversight and for trying to bring cost and schedule discipline to this troubled program. The committee is also interested in supporting the Secretary's efforts to improve the Navy's acquisition process. Reviewing this LCS situation will undoubtedly result in a new set of `lessons learned' that the acquisition community will dutifully try to implement. However, the committee has previously expressed concerns about the LCS concept and the LCS acquisition strategy. The LCS situation may be more a case of `lessons lost.' Long ago, we knew that we should not rush to sign a construction contract before we have solidified requirements. We also knew that the contractors will respond to incentives, and that if the incentives are focused on maintaining schedules and not on controlling cost, cost growth on a cost-plus contract should surprise no one. After the fact, everyone appears ready to agree that the original ship construction schedule for the lead ship was overly aggressive.

The Navy has said that the capability that this vessel will bring to the fleet is of the utmost urgency for responding to asymmetric threats. The committee believes that if the Navy really believed that the threat were that urgent, it might have taken more near-term steps to address it. For example, the Navy might not have cancelled the remote minehunting system (RMS) capability on a number of the DDG-51 class destroyers, ships that will be available to the combatant commanders much sooner than LCS. The Navy might also have taken this modular capability slated for the LCS and packaged those modules to deploy sooner on ships of opportunity. Rather, the Navy is waiting on a shipbuilding program to deliver that capability (in a useful quantity) at some future date.

The Navy now proposes to use the funds requested in fiscal year 2008 to award contracts for two LCS vessels, rather than the three originally envisioned. Given the uncertainty about what is happening with the earlier ships in the program and uncertainties about the options for an acquisition strategy that will remain available to the Navy next year, the Navy does not intend to award these two contracts until late in fiscal year 2008.

The Senate Bill text is as follows:

1. a high degree of cost uncertainty will continue to overshadow the LCS program until the two lead ships execute test and trials, starting late in 2007.
2. the Navy's current estimate is that the approximately $1.6 billion appropriated for the first six ships will be required to complete the three ships currently under contract, with significant additional funding being held for termination of a fourth ship.
3. if the Navy's estimates are correct, or low, then the Navy will be engaging in fixed price negotiations with the second prime contractor for LCS-2 and LCS-4 late in 2007, with the distinct possibility that LCS-4 would be terminated.
4. if the Navy's estimates are high, then sufficient funding from within previous appropriations should be available for a newly procured LCS.
5. the Navy has yet to formulate its acquisition strategy for the LCS program, however, the challenges inherent to fair competition between two dissimilar ship designs have become significantly more complex in light of the recent termination of LCS-3 (or potential termination of LCS-4).
6. the Navy has announced a delay for conducting a program downselect decision until 2010, at which time it also plans to revise the LCS combat system, which raises concerns regarding the infrastructure and life cycle support costs for the three or four ships of the LCS variant not selected for `full rate production.'
7. program delays have pushed the next notional contract award until late in fiscal year 2008.
8. termination negotiations for LCS-3 will likely be proceeding at the same time the prime contractor is being solicited for a proposal to build another LCS ship, in which case the material procured for LCS-3 would likely revert back to the contractor for this new procurement. The net effect is that the current LCS-3 obligations that are fenced for termination costs would sufficiently cover the contractor's fiscal year 2008 obligations for a newly procured LCS.

The committee recommends $480.0 million for LCS in fiscal year 2008, a decrease of $430.5 million. We cannot relive the early days of the LCS program and remember `lessons learned,' but we have the opportunity to take positive steps now to right the program. Before awarding contracts for additional ships in the LCS program, we need to maintain focus on delivering the most capability possible for the $1.6 billion invested thus far for six ships. This would require that we impose accountability for the quality of program estimates; halt further changes to program requirements; and ensure that the contracts provide effective incentives for cost performance.

The Secretary of the Navy has advised the committee that the Navy's estimates appear to be quite conservative based on contractor performance over the past quarter, as measured against recently revised baselines. Although further risk is acknowledged, the Navy has expressed confidence that the program will be able to improve on the Navy's worst case estimates and avoid further termination action. If the Navy and industry are successful in managing costs going forward, this should allow four ships to be delivered within previously appropriated funds.

The committee notes that the LCS-1 contractor was awarded a lead ship contract that targeted a significantly lower price and a significantly more aggressive schedule for starting construction. The risks inherent in this aggressive schedule were exacerbated by changes to Navy requirements. These factors may have contributed to the decision to terminate LCS-3--an outcome referred to as `winner-loses.' The resultant imbalance between the two competing shipbuilders jeopardizes the Navy's ultimate goal for a competitive downselect in 2010, followed by full and open competition for the winning LCS variant.

Therefore, the committee directs that funds authorized for a fiscal year 2008 LCS ship may only be used when combined with LCS SCN funds appropriated in prior years, to solicit, on a competitive basis, bids for two fixed price LCS ship construction contracts, one for each of the two competing LCS variants. The Secretary of the Navy may waive this requirement only if: he determines that there is only one acceptable LCS variant, based on completion of acceptance trials on the two LCS variants; and he notifies the congressional defense committees 30 days before releasing a solicitation based on that waiver determination.

The committee believes that the history of the LCS acquisition strategy has been one of documenting decisions, rather than guiding and informing decisions. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense is directed to submit a report on the approved acquisition strategy for the LCS program at least 90 days prior to issuing any solicitation or requests for proposal, but no later than December 1, 2008.

The Senate goes on to address the Mission Modules:

LCS modules

The budget request included $80.3 million for assembling and outfitting Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) mission modules. The Navy intends the LCS to be a relatively smaller vessel that carries modular payloads. The Navy concept is that, using these mission modules, an LCS might be configured to operate as an anti-submarine vessel on one day. On the next day, the Navy might change the whole mission payload and operate the LCS in an anti-surface warfare mode.

As described elsewhere in this report, the LCS program has run into serious problems. The committee sees no particular reason to acquire mission modules at the pace planned by the Navy, since there have been significant delays in the ship program. The committee recommends a decrease of $65.0 million for LCS modules.

For background on LCS problems, you can check this out for the Navy statements after the stop order on LCS 3, and here for the Industry statements for the cost problems of LCS 3. Both statements hit home on several points, from the problem obtaining HSLA-80 steel (a topic for another time, but an important topic nonetheless), but more importantly it highlights the LCS priority of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) (FY2008-FY2013). Specifically:

32 LCS hills
16 SUW modules
11 MIW modules
6 ASW modules

In other words, small boat warfare is the focus of the LCS program. The ASW module purchase for the first 32 LCS ships is only 6 modules, less than 20% of the total number of modules purchased. Next time someone says the Littoral Combat Ships is about ASW, tell them that according to the numbers, the Navy respectfully disagrees.

Its ok though, thanks to earmarks, Duncan Hunter wants the Navy to operate a Littoral Combat Ship, specifically Sea Fighter (FSF 1) that the Navy wants nothing to do with. Maybe the Senate version will push it through, and the Navy will end up with 4 LCS hulls after all. I'm not a fan of earmarks, but at the end of the day Sea Fighter (FSF 1) can do more to fight small boats today than the LCS will be able to anytime soon.

The House Bill and Senate Bill still have to be worked out in committee, but no matter what it would not appear the LCS is going to survive FY08 without a bloody nose, or if some of that Senate language makes the bill, a swift kick in the nuts.

Finally, the 313-ship Fleet is dead on arrival. The Navy needs a new plan, so far they have lost 1 LCS in FY 06, 2 LCS in FY07, and at least 2 so far in FY08, and the only gain to offset this is the Sea Fighter (FSF 1) which the Navy doesn't want. Hopefully the next 12 months produces results, because according to the 313-ship plan, next year the Navy buys 12 ships, 6 of which are supposed to be Littoral Combat Ships.

In other words, it not only can get worse for the Navy, things most likely will.

LCS Mission Module Production to Slow

Mission Modules will be delayed? Who would have thought? Pretty much everyone last I checked. This will no doubt raise costs on the modules (thus the cost of the whole LCS project), which is sad since costs on the modules is about the only thing the LCS had going for it until now.

Capt. John Sorce, the Navy’s deputy director for surface ships in the chief of naval operations’ office, said May 31 that Navy officials are in the process of redesigning the module program because of delays with the initial LCS ships.

Sorce did not detail what changes would be made because decisions are yet to be approved. Nonetheless, he said the changes would be released in service’s outyear budget plan known as “program review 2009.”

Lt. Cmdr. John Schofield, a spokesman for Navy acquisition chief Delores Etter, said the service continues to evaluate mission package procurement, but was unable to give specific numbers.

Landon Hutchens, a Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman, said the program office has “a plan that is interdependent with other mission system program offices to field ever increasing capability until each of the three mission packages reach a full operational capability” in 2012.

In 2001, the LCS was proposed as a hull and 2 mission modules for $440 million. I'll be impressed if the hull without any modules costs less than $440 million per now.