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| PACIFIC OCEAN (Feb. 16, 2015) Sailors assigned to Surface Warfare Detachment Four of the littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) Crew 102 prepare to board a naval training vessel as part of visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) training during an Independent Deployer Certification Exercise (IDCERTEX). IDCERTEX, led by Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet (C3F) and executed by Commander, Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 15, is being conducted Feb. 9-20 off the Coast of Southern California and Hawaii. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Katarzyna Kobiljak/Released) |
"Without a clear capabilities-based assessment, it is not clear what operational requirements the upgraded LCS is designed to meet. The Navy must demonstrate what problem the upgraded LCS is trying to solve. We must not make this mistake again." Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), March 2015.
Executive Summary
- The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) concept and Frigate variant (LCS/FF) trace their origins to incomplete analyses conducted in the early 2000s, coupled with flawed assumptions regarding future geopolitical, threat, technical and fiscal environments.
- The Navy should pause any further invesments in LCS/FF program to sponsor a Small Surface Combatant Capability Based Assessment (CBA) to define the missions, capabilities, and required attributes for its future Small Surface Combatant.
Background
The decision announced by Secretary of the Navy Mabus earlier this year to redesignate modified versions of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) as Frigates (LCS/FF) and adapt twenty as to fill the Navy’s future Small Surface Combatant requirement has not diminished the debate surrounding the LCS program. The LCS has been mired in controversy since its inception and has yielded a product which bears little resemblance to the initial concept. In short, comparing the LCS in-service today to the concept originally envisioned in the early 2000s:
- LCS high speed requirement appears to have been met, but may have imposed severe compromises and limitations in other facets of the designs;[i]
- Seaframes appear unlikely to meet required range (LCS-3 projection of 1,941 nautical miles (nm) versus a 3,500 nm requirement);[ii]
- Survivability of LCS in a wartime environment has been called into question by both the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and Congress;[iii]
- Expected acquisition cost of an LCS seaframe approaches $470 million compared to a 2006 Congressional mandated cost cap of $220 million per seaframe;[iv]
- The surface warfare (SUW) module with its current Hellfire missiles is significantly outranged by potential enemy ships displacing around 10% of LCS tonnage[v]
- The Remote Minehunting System (RMS) critical to the LCS mine countermeasure (MCM) module is unreliable and has met significant criticism from DOT&E;[vi]
- The antisubmarine warfare (ASW) module, which was rescoped from distributed offboard systems to a more conventional variable depth sonar and multi-function towed array MFTA, has not yet been delivered and is currently overweight;[vii]
- The original concept of quickly swapping mission modules within days to allow rapid mission reconfiguration (e.g. SUW to MIW) appears infeasible.[viii]
The Patterns of the Current LCS Debate
It is important to acknowledge that LCS supporters do exist - although this author suspects that if one discounted those who are professionally connected to the LCS program, they would number in single digits. Arguments in favor of the LCS fall into two broad categories.
The first category involves citing unit cost stabilization, reliability improvements, and increased seaframe deliveries as evidence of the LCS program “turning the corner”. These arguments are myopic: delivering reliable systems, within cost and schedule are what program offices are expected to do. This line of argument also relies on questionable accounting practices: until the mission modules are delivered, any discussion of LCS cost or schedule refers to an incomplete item. It also focuses the discussion too narrowly on production metrics while ignoring whether or not the LCS delivers actual warfighting capability.
A second line of pro-LCS arguments addresses warfighting utility - but focused on conceptual future capabilites rather than what can be reasonably anticipated. The argument starts that the LCS modular concept allows the flexibity to introduce new capabilites as needed. Yet it is hard to accept this claim given that it has taken the LCS program over a decade to design, acquire, test and field the first three “flight zero” mission modules - particulary when one considers that these modules are far less complex than what had been planned at program conception.
LCS proponents may then argue that even without mission modules, the LCS provides comparable capability to the recently-retired Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates. The counter is that benchmarking capability against a forty year-old frigate design with much of its weapons removed is a false comparison; if all that was required was a de-missiled, 1970s-era frigate, then perhaps there was little need for a new ship at all.
The Bigger Debate: Are We Building the Right Ship?
The premise of this article is that while it is important to monitor and hold NAVSEA and prime contractors accountable in terms of building the ship right, it is far more important for resource sponsors (with the aid of the analytic community) to determine whether the Navy is actually building the right ship. Thus, the target audience for this article and its recommendations is the OPNAV staff who develop and manage requirements, rather than the Program Executive Office for Littoral Combat Ships (PEO-LCS) which are responsible to build to those requirements.
Despite the spirited exchanges between LCS critics and proponents on this website and others, the tenor of the debate itself misses the larger picture. Success or failure of LCS to meet a design specification, or deliver within cost and schedule, or comparing what it delivers compared to a now-retired frigate is irrelevant if LCS is not the ship the Navy needs in the future. Imagine a magic wand existed which would instantly correct LCS program and technical failures and deliver thirty-two LCSs, built as designed, within cost parameters, and with the currently projected mission packages. The question would still remain whether a ship the Navy envisioned in the early 2000s is a sound basis for a future Small Surface Combatant mission.
The above question can be addressed by examining the assumptions that existed when the LCS concept was formulated, how its foundational analysis was conducted in the early 2000s, and how the more recent Small Surface Combatant Study arrived at its recommendation.
Challenging LCS Assumptions
In examining LCS foundational analyses, it is first vital to consider whether the assumptions under which the original LCS concept was developed are still valid. The simple answer is no; the technological, geographic, threat, and fiscal assumptions which underpinned LCS conceptualization do not appear to be valid in 2015.
Technology: Reliance on Unmanned Systems. Net centric warfare (NCW) was a key technology-centric concept which informed the LCS concept and design. NCW theorizes “…increased combat power through networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.”[ix] NCW proponents placed strong reliance on the ability of ship-based unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface vehicles, and unmanned undersea vehicles, to provide LCS with significant mission and scouting capabilites.[x] Yet with the possible exception of the Fire Scout UAV, the unmanned systems which were central to the original LCS CONOPS, have not matured as projected.
Geography: The Pacific Pivot. The mid-2000s saw a renewed emphasis on the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The so-called Pacific Pivot was driven in large part by a rising China and its perceived threat to the existing economic and military order. Statements by the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet in 2012 indicated that by 2020 over 60% of the US ships will be stationed in the Pacific.[xi] Although the LCS was supposedly intended to operate in all global theaters, the Pacific represents a unique environment with specific challenges; notably immense open ocean distances and fairly sparse logistics support. Logically, if one were to design a ship class to operate primarily in the Pacific, it would need to possess range/endurance, moderate cruising speed, and sufficient manpower to self-sustain. It would be a ‘distance runner’ rather than the ‘sprinter’ which the LCS program is delivering.
Threats: Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD). Concurrent with the “Pacific Pivot” was the recognition of the threat posed by enemy anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) operations. A2/AD are concepts employed by an enemy intended to delay the assembly of US power-projection forces (to include their battle networks), and keep them beyond effective range of their territory, or to defeat them once they come within range.[xii] Denial of command, control and communications, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C3ISR) networks may pose significantly challenges to the LCS concept - which relies upon access to the C3ISR network for both SA and survivability. Similarly, an enemy which can conduct a crippling first-strike on US forward bases (via ballistic missile, cruise missiles or other methods) can impose severe logistics challenges to the relatively short-legged LCS.
Fiscal: Dwindling Resources. The mid-2000s were an era of relatively ample fiscal resources, due in no small part to the use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) to augment the baseline shipbuilding account. The drawdown from overseas operations reduced that funding sources, while the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011ensures little to no growth in overall defense resources. Compounding the reduction in available resources are the pending demands for major ship construction projects including a new ballistic missile submarine (SSBN(X)) the Gerald Ford Class aircraft carrier (CVN-78) cost overruns, and DDG Flight III. This lack of available resources has resulted in a relative decline in the perceived utility of single purpose, low-end warships (LCS) in favor of multi-purpose warships capable of operating independently against a broader array of challenges (frigates).
Considering resources, the cost of LCS/FF modifications are currently estimated at $75-100 million per unit.[xiii] Adding this amount to the seaframe cost of an LCS ($479 million) and the expected unit cost of a mission module ($100 million) yields a total cost of $654-679 million.[xiv] As a point of reference the FFG-7 unit cost in FY77 dollars was $168 million, equating to $677 million in FY15 dollars. While it is admittedly problematic to compare shipbuilding costs based purely on inflation, this should at least raise the question as to whether comparable or even better-value options exist for the Small Surface Combatant than the LCS/FF.
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| PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 15, 2015) Sailors assigned to Surface Warfare Mission Package Detachment 2 prepare to be hoisted out of the water by the littoral combat ship USS Coronado's (LCS 4) twin-boom-extensible crane following a visit, board, search and seizure training exercise. Coronado conducted predeployment assessment and evaluation on the performance of shipboard equipment during a week-long underway off the coast of California. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Debra Daco/Released) |
Baseline LCS: Incomplete Analysis
As an analyst, challenging an acquisition program’s requirements often becomes a tautological exercise. When questioned, a typical response from program officials and resource sponsors is that the requirements are the requirements because they were at one time signed by leadership. The fact that leadership may not have fully understood the analysis basis for the decision, was responsible for many decisions involving multiple acquisition programs, and has by now moved on to another assignment (or even retired) is often overlooked.
The LCS program emerged in late-2001 as an element of the now-defunct future surface combatant program - which included the LCS, a land-attack focused destroyer (DD(X)), and an air-defense focused cruiser (CG(X)) Conceived at a time in which the Navy perceived limited near or mid-term challenges to its ability to conduct operations in the open ocean (‘blue water’), the LCS was intended to counter asymmetric threats to action in the littoral waters (‘green water’): notably sea mines, small boats, and diesel-electric submarines.
Underlying the LCS concept were the theories of “transformationalism” (an influential 2004 paper on the LCS used the term no less than sixteen times[xv] ) and “net centric warfare (NCW). NCW theorized “…increased combat power through networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.”[xvi] Proponents of NCW also placed confidence in the capabilities of largely unproven ship-based unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) to provide significant situational awareness (SA) and mission capabilites to the LCS.[xvii]
LCS enjoyed strong backing from Navy leadership and thus proceeded rapidly from concept to reality. Indeed, by mid-2003, Navy leadership was confident enough in its need for a small, fast, modular surface combatant (as well as the capability/capacity of industry to manufacture the ship and its modules) to undertake a number of critical steps. It established an LCS program office; developed a draft concept of operations (CONOPS); funded several industry led trade studies on the designs, and released a request for proposal (RFP).[xviii]
Remarkably, the above steps were conducted by Navy prior to any of the formal studies expected in a major defense acquisition program to identify and validate capability gaps, and assess a wide array of potential solutions. Neither the exact nature of the “littoral combat” problem to be solved, nor the presumption that a small, fast, modular surface combatant was the best and only solution to the “littoral combat” problem were tested via rigorous, structured analysis.[xix] Indeed, VADM Johnathan Nathman (then-Vice Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements) admitted in Congressional testimony in April 2003 that more rigorous mission-level analysis of the LCS was only conducted after the decision was made to acquire LCS.[xx]
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| PACIFIC OCEAN (April 30, 2024) An MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter and an MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned helicopter, both assigned to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35, conduct coordinated flight operations with the littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Joan E. Jennings/Released) |
The Small Surface Combatant Study: Putting the Cart before the Horse
The mistakes made in the LCS analysis of the early 2000s were largely repeated a decade later, following the decision by then-Secretary of Defense Hagel to halt production of baseline LCS at hull 32 and examine alternative concepts to provide a Small Surface Combatant. In February 2014, Secretary Hagel directed Navy leadership to:
“…Submit to me, in time to inform the PB 2016 [President’s Budget for FY2016] budget deliberations, alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate. Options considered should include a completely new design, existing ship designs (including the LCS), and a modified LCS.”[xxi]The Navy’s Small Surface Combatant Task Force (SSCTF) were given approximately six months to complete the study. However, rather than conduct an up-front assessment to determine gaps and examine system-of-solutions beyond the frigate to meet those gaps, the SSCTF relied on surveys of fleet commanders for expert judgement. According to Robert O’Rourke of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) this approach has disadvantages:
“One potential disadvantage of this approach is that it deprived the Navy of a chance to uncover the kind of counter-intuitive results that a formal analysis can uncover…. another potential disadvantage is that fleet commanders can be focused on what they see the Navy needing today, based on current Navy operations, which might not be the same in all respects as what the Navy will need in the future...”[xxii]The SSC Study considered completely new designs, existing ship designs, as well as modified LCS designs. The recommendation briefed to and approved by Secretary Hagel in late 2014 was to acquire 20 modified LCS with an improved air defense radar; air defense decoys; a new, more effective electronic warfare system; an over-the-horizon anti-ship missile; multi-function towed array sonar; torpedo defenses; and additional armor protection.[xxiv]
While the decision to adapt a modified LCS over other potential concepts has been subject to significant discussion, it is difficult to argue the decision since the SSC study itself is not available to the public. However, what can be openly debated is the deeply flawed analytical path by which the decision was arrived, and the manner in which it is being implemented.
The SSC Study yielded a detailed modified LCS designed to satisfy current shortfalls - yet lacked the analysis to determine whether it will meet future requirements. The modifications recommended will undoubtedly make the LCS “better”, but no study was done as to whether they will make the LCS “good enough” to meet the Navy’s future threats.
Further confusing the issue is Congressional testimony by Mr. Sean Stackley (Ass’t Secretary for Research Development and Acquisition) which indicates that the Navy had not even begun the LCS-FF requirements development and staffing process until after it had selected the LCS-FF design. It thus appears that the Navy is attempting to make the question fit the answer.[xxv]
The Need for a Capability Based Assessment
It should be clear from the above paragraphs that: the assumptions which existed at LCS conception are largely outdated; the baseline LCS conducted in the early 2000s had an incomplete foundational analysis; and the recently completed SSC Study essentially selected a ship design to meet current gaps with no analysis of future mission requirements.
An analysis method which could address these myriad of flaws exists and is referred to as a Capability Based Assessment (CBA). A CBA is required by the Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) prior to selecting a material solution. It provides recommendations on whether to pursue a materiel solution to an identified capability gap that meets an established need.
A CBA assists Navy decision makers in determining the problem, whether or not it needs to acquire ‘something’ to address the problem, and what requirements for that ‘something’ should look like. A CBA is often confused with an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) - in fact they are separate but interrelated efforts with the CBA occurring first. The general steps of a CBA are:
- Define the mission;
- Identify capabilities required;
- Determine the attributes/standards of the capabilities;
- Identify gaps;
- Assess operational risk associated with the gaps;
- Prioritize the gaps;
- Identify and assess potential non-materiel solutions and;
- Provide recommendations for addressing the gaps[xxvi]
What Should Be Done and What It Will Take
It is imperative for the Navy to determine the capabilities it needs in a future Small Surface Combatant which will serve the fleet well into the middle half of this century. The recommended course of action is to immediately ‘pause’ the ongoing LCS/FF capability improvement effort, reconsider the decision to acquire LCS/FF hulls 33-52, and conduct a Small Surface Combatant CBA in accordance with JCIDS.
There are numerous qualified, highly-skilled, analysis organizations available to lead such a CBA including but not limited to the Center for Naval Analysis, RAND and the Institute for Defense Analysis. However, under no circumstances should PEO-LCS be allowed to lead the study since by definition this would represent a conflict of interest. PEO-LCS should instead focus on addressing the many issues associated with ‘baseline’ LCS - particularly in developing an alternative course of action for the failing (but critically needed) MIW mission module.
Multiple other organizations would need to play roles to the CBA. An Executive Steering Group (ESG) consisting of OPNAV, NAVSEA and Commander Naval Surfaces would provide high-level guidance. Naval Warfare Development Center would assist in identifying scenarios, tasks and metrics. The Office of Naval Intelligence would identify threats and enemy CONOPS. Fleet subject matter experts would provide inputs CONOPS - although their near-term, qualitative inputs would not be viewed as a substitute for the actual analysis.
At its core, the Small Surface Combatant CBA will be a scenario-based assessment focused on likely missions and threats in the post-2030 timeframe. The missions and scenarios would be identified by the ESG and refined during the CBA but would likely include:
- ASW. Escort in the open ocean;
- SUW. High-end, surface action group;
- Counter-piracy;
- Maritime Interdiction Operations;
- Visit Board Search and Seizure;
- Support to Navy Special Warfare;
- Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response and;
- Global Presence.
The CBA would be resource informed, meaning that any materiel solutions would need to be considered against an assessment of available shipbuilding dollars in the 2030-40 timeframe. Given the many competing priorities in that timeframe (including SSBN(X), continued CVN-78 cost overruns, and the DDG Flight III) cost-effectiveness and affordability should feature heavily in the assessment. However, care should be taken to not simply identify and recommend the lowest-cost solution; capability should be the dominant measure.
Critics may argue that such a Small Surface Combatant CBA would jeopardize the ongoing LCS/FF program; would be too expensive, and would take too long. The first point is germane only if the LCS/FF is in fact the optimal solution to meet future missions; since a proper CBA was never conducted this is impossible to determine. As to the second and third points, if one thinks analysis is expensive and time-consuming, they should try ignorance.
_________________________________________________
[i] http://nation.time.com/2012/10/05/the-navys-new-class-of-warships-big-bucks-little-bang/
[ii]
“DOT&E Report for Fiscal Year 2014”, published January 20, 2015.
[iii] “ibid
[iv] “Navy
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for
Congress,” CRS, September 2015.
[v] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_022_missile_boat
[vi] https://news.vice.com/article/the-us-navys-new-ships-are-supposed-to-hunt-mines-but-cant-actually-find-them
[vii] http://news.usni.org/2015/07/30/lcs-anti-sub-warfare-package-too-heavy-3-contracts-issued-for-weight-reduction-study
[viii] http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20120714/DEFREG02/307140001/LCS-Quick-Swap-Concept-Dead
[ix]
“Network Centric Warfare”, DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 2002.
[x] “Naval
Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship,” Robert O. Work, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004.
[xi] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2158343/U-S-Navy-shift-60-PER-CENT-fleet-Pacific-China-builds-military.html
[xii] “Why
Air Sea Battle?” Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, 2010.
[xiii] Navy
information paper dated April 22, 2015, referenced in CRS report, dated April
22, 2015.
[xiv]
Seaframe and mission module costs per CRS report on LCS.
[xv] See
“Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship,” Robert O. Work, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004.
[xvi]
“Network Centric Warfare”, DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 2002.
[xvii] “Naval
Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship,” Robert O. Work, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004.
[xviii] ibid
[xix] “Navy
Littoral Combat Ship(LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for
Congress,” September 2015
[xx] “Admiral:
Most LCS Requirement Analysis Done After Decision To Build,” Inside the Navy,
April 14, 2003.
[xxi] “Navy
Littoral Combat Ship(LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for
Congress,” CRS, September 2015
[xxii] ibid
[xxiii] ibid
[xxiv] Statement
by Secretary Hagel on the Littoral Combat Ship, December 11, 2014.
[xxv]
Testimony by Mr. Sean J. Stackley to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March
18, 2015.
