Showing posts with label LCS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label LCS. Show all posts

Thursday, October 22, 2024

The Need for a Small Surface Combatant Capability Based Assessment (CBA)

PACIFIC OCEAN (Feb. 16, 2015) Sailors assigned to Surface Warfare Detachment Four of the littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) Crew 102 prepare to board a naval training vessel as part of visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) training during an Independent Deployer Certification Exercise (IDCERTEX). IDCERTEX, led by Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet (C3F) and executed by Commander, Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 15, is being conducted Feb. 9-20 off the Coast of Southern California and Hawaii. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Katarzyna Kobiljak/Released)
The following contribution comes from Matthew Cosner.

"Without a clear capabilities-based assessment, it is not clear what operational requirements the upgraded LCS is designed to meet. The Navy must demonstrate what problem the upgraded LCS is trying to solve. We must not make this mistake again." Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), March 2015.
Executive Summary
  • The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) concept and Frigate variant (LCS/FF) trace their origins to incomplete analyses conducted in the early 2000s, coupled with flawed assumptions regarding future geopolitical, threat, technical and fiscal environments.
  • The Navy should pause any further invesments in LCS/FF program to sponsor a Small Surface Combatant Capability Based Assessment (CBA) to define the missions, capabilities, and required attributes for its future Small Surface Combatant.

Background

The decision announced by Secretary of the Navy Mabus earlier this year to redesignate modified versions of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) as Frigates (LCS/FF) and adapt twenty as to fill the Navy’s future Small Surface Combatant requirement has not diminished the debate surrounding the LCS program.  The LCS has been mired in controversy since its inception and has yielded a product which bears little resemblance to the initial concept. In short, comparing the LCS in-service today to the concept originally envisioned in the early 2000s:
  • LCS high speed requirement appears to have been met, but may have imposed severe compromises and limitations in other facets of the designs;[i]
  • Seaframes appear unlikely to meet required range (LCS-3 projection of 1,941 nautical miles (nm) versus a 3,500 nm requirement);[ii]
  • Survivability of LCS in a wartime environment has been called into question by both the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and Congress;[iii] 
  • Expected acquisition cost of an LCS seaframe approaches $470 million compared to a 2006 Congressional mandated cost cap of $220 million per seaframe;[iv]
  • The surface warfare (SUW) module with its current Hellfire missiles is significantly outranged by potential enemy ships displacing around 10% of LCS tonnage[v]
  • The Remote Minehunting System (RMS) critical to the LCS mine countermeasure (MCM) module is unreliable and has met significant criticism from DOT&E;[vi]
  • The antisubmarine warfare (ASW) module, which was rescoped from distributed offboard systems to a more conventional variable depth sonar and multi-function towed array MFTA, has not yet been delivered and is currently overweight;[vii]
  • The original concept of quickly swapping mission modules within days to allow rapid mission reconfiguration (e.g. SUW to MIW) appears infeasible.[viii]

The Patterns of the Current LCS Debate

It is important to acknowledge that LCS supporters do exist - although this author suspects that if one discounted those who are professionally connected to the LCS program, they would number in single digits.  Arguments in favor of the LCS fall into two broad categories.

The first category involves citing unit cost stabilization, reliability improvements, and increased seaframe deliveries as evidence of the LCS program “turning the corner”.  These arguments are myopic: delivering reliable systems, within cost and schedule are what program offices are expected to do.  This line of argument also relies on questionable accounting practices:  until the mission modules are delivered, any discussion of LCS cost or schedule refers to an incomplete item.  It also focuses the discussion too narrowly on production metrics while ignoring whether or not the LCS delivers actual warfighting capability.

A second line of pro-LCS arguments addresses warfighting utility - but focused on conceptual future capabilites rather than what can be reasonably anticipated.  The argument starts that the LCS modular concept allows the flexibity to introduce new capabilites as needed.   Yet it is hard to accept this claim given that it has taken the LCS program over a decade to design, acquire, test and field the first three “flight zero” mission modules - particulary when one considers that these modules are far less complex than what had been planned at program conception.

LCS proponents may then argue that even without mission modules, the LCS provides comparable capability to the recently-retired Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates. The counter is that benchmarking capability against a forty year-old frigate design with much of its weapons removed is a false comparison; if all that was required was a de-missiled, 1970s-era frigate, then perhaps there was little need for a new ship at all.

The Bigger Debate: Are We Building the Right Ship?

The premise of this article is that while it is important to monitor and hold NAVSEA and prime contractors accountable in terms of building the ship right, it is far more important for resource sponsors (with the aid of the analytic community) to determine whether the Navy is actually building the right ship.  Thus, the target audience for this article and its recommendations is the OPNAV staff who develop and manage requirements, rather than the Program Executive Office for Littoral Combat Ships (PEO-LCS) which are responsible to build to those requirements.

Despite the spirited exchanges between LCS critics and proponents on this website and others, the tenor of the debate itself misses the larger picture.  Success or failure of LCS to meet a design specification, or deliver within cost and schedule, or comparing what it delivers compared to a now-retired frigate is irrelevant if LCS is not the ship the Navy needs in the future.  Imagine a magic wand existed which would instantly correct LCS program and technical failures and deliver thirty-two LCSs, built as designed, within cost parameters, and with the currently projected mission packages. The question would still remain whether a ship the Navy envisioned in the early 2000s is a sound basis for a future Small Surface Combatant mission.

The above question can be addressed by examining the assumptions that existed when the LCS concept was formulated, how its foundational analysis was conducted in the early 2000s, and how the more recent Small Surface Combatant Study arrived at its recommendation.

Challenging LCS Assumptions

In examining LCS foundational analyses, it is first vital to consider whether the assumptions under which the original LCS concept was developed are still valid.  The simple answer is no; the technological, geographic, threat, and fiscal assumptions which underpinned LCS conceptualization do not appear to be valid in 2015.

Technology: Reliance on Unmanned Systems.  Net centric warfare (NCW) was a key technology-centric concept which informed the LCS concept and design.  NCW theorizes “…increased combat power through networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.”[ix]   NCW proponents placed strong reliance on the ability of ship-based unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface vehicles, and unmanned undersea vehicles, to provide LCS with significant mission and scouting capabilites.[x]    Yet with the possible exception of the Fire Scout UAV, the unmanned systems which were central to the original LCS CONOPS, have not matured as projected.

Geography: The Pacific Pivot.  The mid-2000s saw a renewed emphasis on the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The so-called Pacific Pivot was driven in large part by a rising China and its perceived threat to the existing economic and military order.   Statements by the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet in 2012 indicated that by 2020 over 60% of the US ships will be stationed in the Pacific.[xi]   Although the LCS was supposedly intended to operate in all global theaters, the Pacific represents a unique environment with specific challenges; notably immense open ocean distances and fairly sparse logistics support.  Logically, if one were to design a ship class to operate primarily in the Pacific, it would need to possess range/endurance, moderate cruising speed, and sufficient manpower to self-sustain.  It would be a ‘distance runner’ rather than the ‘sprinter’ which the LCS program is delivering.

Threats: Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD).  Concurrent with the “Pacific Pivot” was the recognition of the threat posed by enemy anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) operations.  A2/AD are concepts employed by an enemy intended to delay the assembly of US power-projection forces (to include their battle networks), and keep them beyond effective range of their territory, or to defeat them once they come within range.[xii]   Denial of command, control and communications, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C3ISR) networks may pose significantly challenges to the LCS concept - which relies upon access to the C3ISR network for both SA and survivability.  Similarly, an enemy which can conduct a crippling first-strike on US forward bases (via ballistic missile, cruise missiles or other methods) can impose severe logistics challenges to the relatively short-legged LCS.

Fiscal: Dwindling Resources
. The mid-2000s were an era of relatively ample fiscal resources, due in no small part to the use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) to augment the baseline shipbuilding account.  The drawdown from overseas operations reduced that funding sources, while the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011ensures little to no growth in overall defense resources.  Compounding the reduction in available resources are the pending demands for major ship construction projects including a new ballistic missile submarine (SSBN(X)) the Gerald Ford Class aircraft carrier (CVN-78) cost overruns, and DDG Flight III.  This lack of available resources has resulted in a relative decline in the perceived utility of single purpose, low-end warships (LCS) in favor of multi-purpose warships capable of operating independently against a broader array of challenges (frigates).

Considering resources, the cost of LCS/FF modifications are currently estimated at $75-100 million per unit.[xiii]    Adding this amount to the seaframe cost of an LCS ($479 million) and the expected unit cost of a mission module ($100 million) yields a total cost of $654-679 million.[xiv]   As a point of reference the FFG-7 unit cost in FY77 dollars was $168 million, equating to $677 million in FY15 dollars.  While it is admittedly problematic to compare shipbuilding costs based purely on inflation, this should at least raise the question as to whether comparable or even better-value options exist for the Small Surface Combatant than the LCS/FF.
PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 15, 2015) Sailors assigned to Surface Warfare Mission Package Detachment 2 prepare to be hoisted out of the water by the littoral combat ship USS Coronado's (LCS 4) twin-boom-extensible crane following a visit, board, search and seizure training exercise. Coronado conducted predeployment assessment and evaluation on the performance of shipboard equipment during a week-long underway off the coast of California. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Debra Daco/Released)

Baseline LCS: Incomplete Analysis

As an analyst, challenging an acquisition program’s requirements often becomes a tautological exercise.  When questioned, a typical response from program officials and resource sponsors is that the requirements are the requirements because they were at one time signed by leadership.  The fact that leadership may not have fully understood the analysis basis for the decision, was responsible for many decisions involving multiple acquisition programs, and has by now moved on to another assignment (or even retired) is often overlooked.

The LCS program emerged in late-2001 as an element of the now-defunct future surface combatant program - which included the LCS, a land-attack focused destroyer (DD(X)), and an air-defense focused cruiser (CG(X))  Conceived at a time in which the Navy perceived limited near or mid-term challenges to its ability to conduct operations in the open ocean (‘blue water’), the LCS was intended to counter asymmetric threats to action in the littoral waters (‘green water’): notably sea mines, small boats, and diesel-electric submarines.

Underlying the LCS concept were the theories of “transformationalism” (an influential 2004 paper on the LCS used the term no less than sixteen times[xv] ) and “net centric warfare (NCW).  NCW theorized “…increased combat power through networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.”[xvi]   Proponents of NCW also placed confidence in the capabilities of largely unproven ship-based unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) to provide significant situational awareness (SA) and mission capabilites to the LCS.[xvii]

LCS enjoyed strong backing from Navy leadership and thus proceeded rapidly from concept to reality.  Indeed, by mid-2003, Navy leadership was confident enough in its need for a small, fast, modular surface combatant (as well as the capability/capacity of industry to manufacture the ship and its modules) to undertake a number of critical steps.  It established an LCS program office; developed a draft concept of operations (CONOPS); funded several industry led trade studies on the designs, and released a request for proposal (RFP).[xviii]

Remarkably, the above steps were conducted by Navy prior to any of the formal studies expected in a major defense acquisition program to identify and validate capability gaps, and assess a wide array of potential solutions.  Neither the exact nature of the “littoral combat” problem to be solved, nor the presumption that a small, fast, modular surface combatant was the best and only solution to the “littoral combat” problem were tested via rigorous, structured analysis.[xix]     Indeed, VADM Johnathan Nathman (then-Vice Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements) admitted in Congressional testimony in April 2003 that more rigorous mission-level analysis of the LCS was only conducted after the decision was made to acquire LCS.[xx]



PACIFIC OCEAN (April 30, 2024) An MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter and an MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned helicopter, both assigned to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35, conduct coordinated flight operations with the littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Joan E. Jennings/Released)

The Small Surface Combatant Study: Putting the Cart before the Horse

The mistakes made in the LCS analysis of the early 2000s were largely repeated  a decade later, following the decision by then-Secretary of Defense Hagel to halt production of baseline LCS at hull 32 and examine alternative concepts to provide a Small Surface Combatant.  In February 2014, Secretary Hagel directed Navy leadership to:
“…Submit to me, in time to inform the PB 2016 [President’s Budget for FY2016] budget deliberations, alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate. Options considered should include a completely new design, existing ship designs (including the LCS), and a modified LCS.”[xxi]
The Navy’s Small Surface Combatant Task Force (SSCTF) were given approximately six months to complete the study.  However, rather than conduct an up-front assessment to determine gaps and examine system-of-solutions beyond the frigate to meet those gaps, the SSCTF relied on surveys of fleet commanders for expert judgement.  According to Robert O’Rourke of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) this approach has disadvantages:
“One potential disadvantage of this approach is that it deprived the Navy of a chance to uncover the kind of counter-intuitive results that a formal analysis can uncover…. another potential disadvantage is that fleet commanders can be focused on what they see the Navy needing today, based on current Navy operations, which might not be the same in all respects as what the Navy will need in the future...”[xxii]  
The SSC Study considered completely new designs, existing ship designs, as well as modified LCS designs.     The recommendation briefed to and approved by Secretary Hagel in late 2014 was to acquire 20 modified LCS with an improved air defense radar; air defense decoys; a new, more effective electronic warfare system; an over-the-horizon anti-ship missile; multi-function towed array sonar; torpedo defenses; and additional armor protection.[xxiv]

While the decision to adapt a modified LCS over other potential concepts has been subject to significant discussion, it is difficult to argue the decision since the SSC study itself is not available to the public.  However, what can be openly debated is the deeply flawed analytical path by which the decision was arrived, and the manner in which it is being implemented.

The SSC Study yielded a detailed modified LCS designed to satisfy current shortfalls - yet lacked the analysis to determine whether it will meet future requirements.  The modifications recommended will undoubtedly make the LCS “better”, but no study was done as to whether they will make the LCS “good enough” to meet the Navy’s future threats.

Further confusing the issue is Congressional testimony by Mr. Sean Stackley (Ass’t Secretary for Research Development and Acquisition) which indicates that the Navy had not even begun the LCS-FF requirements development and staffing process until after it had selected the LCS-FF design.  It thus appears that the Navy is attempting to make the question fit the answer.[xxv]

The Need for a Capability Based Assessment

It should be clear from the above paragraphs that: the assumptions which existed at LCS conception are largely outdated; the baseline LCS conducted in the early 2000s had an incomplete foundational analysis; and the recently completed SSC Study essentially selected a ship design to meet current gaps with no analysis of future mission requirements.

An analysis method which could address these myriad of flaws exists and is referred to as a Capability Based Assessment (CBA).  A CBA is required by the Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) prior to selecting a material solution.  It provides recommendations on whether to pursue a materiel solution to an identified capability gap that meets an established need.

A CBA assists Navy decision makers in determining the problem, whether or not it needs to acquire ‘something’ to address the problem, and what requirements for that ‘something’ should look like.  A CBA is often confused with an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) - in fact they are separate but interrelated efforts with the CBA occurring first.  The general steps of a CBA are:
  • Define the mission;
  • Identify capabilities required;
  • Determine the attributes/standards of the capabilities;
  • Identify gaps;
  • Assess operational risk associated with the gaps;
  • Prioritize the gaps;
  • Identify and assess potential non-materiel solutions and;
  • Provide recommendations for addressing the gaps[xxvi]
Proceeding from the first step, and based on the information in the paragraphs above, the LCS analysis of the early 2000s was focused on both a mission (“littoral combat”) of decreasing relevance, and assumptions regarding the future environments which have proven largely invalid.  If these factors have in fact changed then a ‘daisy-chain’ ensues: the recognition of a changed problem/mission should drive the Navy to reinvestigate its required capabilites (i.e. what it will need to do), resultant gaps (i.e. what it cannot do with its programmed portfolio), and the required attributes of the ship(s) it needs to acquire. 

What Should Be Done and What It Will Take

It is imperative for the Navy to determine the capabilities it needs in a future Small Surface Combatant which will serve the fleet well into the middle half of this century. The recommended course of action is to immediately ‘pause’ the ongoing LCS/FF capability improvement effort, reconsider the decision to acquire LCS/FF hulls 33-52, and conduct a Small Surface Combatant CBA in accordance with JCIDS.

There are numerous qualified, highly-skilled, analysis organizations available to lead such a CBA including but not limited to the Center for Naval Analysis, RAND and the Institute for Defense Analysis.  However, under no circumstances should PEO-LCS be allowed to lead the study since by definition this would represent a conflict of interest.  PEO-LCS should instead focus on addressing the many issues associated with ‘baseline’ LCS - particularly in developing an alternative course of action for the failing (but critically needed) MIW mission module.

Multiple other organizations would need to play roles to the CBA.  An Executive Steering Group (ESG) consisting of OPNAV, NAVSEA and Commander Naval Surfaces would provide high-level guidance.  Naval Warfare Development Center would assist in identifying scenarios, tasks and metrics.  The Office of Naval Intelligence would identify threats and enemy CONOPS.  Fleet subject matter experts would provide inputs CONOPS - although their near-term, qualitative inputs would not be viewed as a substitute for the actual analysis.

At its core, the Small Surface Combatant CBA will be a scenario-based assessment focused on likely missions and threats in the post-2030 timeframe.  The missions and scenarios would be identified by the ESG and refined during the CBA but would likely include:
  • ASW. Escort in the open ocean;
  • SUW. High-end, surface action group;
  • Counter-piracy;
  • Maritime Interdiction Operations;
  • Visit Board Search and Seizure;
  • Support to Navy Special Warfare;
  • Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response and;
  • Global Presence.
It is important to note that, consistent with Secretary Hagel’s original guidance, the MIW mission would remain ‘off the table’.  It is presumed this mission would be performed by the baseline LCS - if and when the MIW mission module is fielded.

The CBA would be resource informed, meaning that any materiel solutions would need to be considered against an assessment of available shipbuilding dollars in the 2030-40 timeframe.  Given the many competing priorities in that timeframe (including SSBN(X), continued CVN-78 cost overruns, and the DDG Flight III) cost-effectiveness and affordability should feature heavily in the assessment.  However, care should be taken to not simply identify and recommend the lowest-cost solution; capability should be the dominant measure.

Critics may argue that such a Small Surface Combatant CBA would jeopardize the ongoing LCS/FF program; would be too expensive, and would take too long. The first point is germane only if the LCS/FF is in fact the optimal solution to meet future missions; since a proper CBA was never conducted this is impossible to determine.  As to the second and third points, if one thinks analysis is expensive and time-consuming, they should try ignorance.



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[i] http://nation.time.com/2012/10/05/the-navys-new-class-of-warships-big-bucks-little-bang/

[ii] “DOT&E Report for Fiscal Year 2014”, published January 20, 2015.

[iii] “ibid

[iv] “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS, September 2015.

[v] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_022_missile_boat

[vi] https://news.vice.com/article/the-us-navys-new-ships-are-supposed-to-hunt-mines-but-cant-actually-find-them

[vii] http://news.usni.org/2015/07/30/lcs-anti-sub-warfare-package-too-heavy-3-contracts-issued-for-weight-reduction-study

[viii] http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20120714/DEFREG02/307140001/LCS-Quick-Swap-Concept-Dead

[ix] “Network Centric Warfare”, DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 2002.

[x] “Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship,” Robert O. Work, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004.

[xi] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2158343/U-S-Navy-shift-60-PER-CENT-fleet-Pacific-China-builds-military.html

[xii] “Why Air Sea Battle?”  Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010.

[xiii] Navy information paper dated April 22, 2015, referenced in CRS report, dated April 22, 2015.  

[xiv] Seaframe and mission module costs per CRS report on LCS.

[xv] See “Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship,” Robert O. Work, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004.

[xvi] “Network Centric Warfare”, DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 2002.

[xvii] “Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship,” Robert O. Work, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004.

[xviii] ibid

[xix] “Navy Littoral Combat Ship(LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress,”  September 2015

[xx] “Admiral: Most LCS Requirement Analysis Done After Decision To Build,” Inside the Navy, April 14, 2003.

[xxi] “Navy Littoral Combat Ship(LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress,”  CRS, September 2015

[xxii] ibid

[xxiii] ibid

[xxiv] Statement by Secretary Hagel on the Littoral Combat Ship, December 11, 2014.

[xxv] Testimony by Mr. Sean J. Stackley to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 2015.
[xxvi] CJCS Instruction 3710, Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS).

Thursday, June 4, 2024

Sea Lanes Protection Between the First and Second Island Chains in a Notional Sino-American War

On Tuesday, I summarized China’s potential wartime anti-ship capabilities between the First and Second Island Chains. It stands to reason that the U.S. and allied ability to avoid or parry any PLA attacks in these waters would depend upon the margin of temporary localized maritime superiority—or sea control, if you will—that could be extended around a transiting convoy, replenishment group, or naval battleforce.[i] This margin would likely be highest in the waters that could be persistently covered by fighters, Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, and wide-area anti-submarine aircraft operating from the Marianas, Japanese home islands, or the central/southern Philippines.
As this sea control coverage thinned out with range, PLA forces would in theory gain more operational flexibility. This might be offset, however, through the intelligent use of the one or two U.S. Navy aircraft carriers available in theater during a war’s opening weeks. I’ve previously noted how these carriers ought to be used to provide situation-dependent sea control support to Surface Action Groups (SAG) operating further forward, and alluded to their utility in providing situation-dependent tactical support to defenders in embattled First Island Chain territories like the Ryukyus. The positioning required for those tasks could also allow their fighters and AEW aircraft to screen CLF groups, military sealift convoys, and prioritized commercial vessels transiting outside effective land-based air coverage. With two carriers working together, it might even be possible to occasionally use actual or simulated shipping as ‘bait’ for luring Chinese strike aircraft raids into aerial ambushes.
It additionally should be noted that the U.S. and allied ability to delay or prevent the Chinese Ocean Surveillance System (COSS) from locating and correctly classifying transiting ships would severely complicate the PLA’s ability to cue effective anti-ship attacks. Emissions control, operational and tactical deception, and physical as well as electronic attacks against COSS assets would be essential aspects of any U.S. and allied sea lanes protection campaign. Emissions control and tactical deception would also greatly complicate PLA strike aircraft and submarines’ job of locating, correctly classifying, and targeting protected shipping. The use of “decoy groups,” perhaps using a mix of unmanned systems and actual manned low campaign-value platforms that together simulated a convoy or naval battleforce, might induce PLA attackers to waste precious time and weapons inventories engaging false targets. Better yet, it might cause them to move out of positions from which they could detect and intercept actual shipping. Attacking decoys would be particularly harmful to PLAN submarines, as every weapon wasted (and in the case of AIP boats, fuel burned moving into attack position and then "breaking datum") would eat into the amount of time the boat could remain on patrol before needing to head home for replenishment, and the time spent "breaking datum" would be time the boat would not be able to hunt effectively. Effective deception and concealment would likely have detrimental psychological effects on PLAAF and PLAN crews; over time these effects might become debilitating—and highly exploitable by U.S. and allied forces in their own right.
Lastly, U.S. political leadership might opt to selectively strike PLAAF airbases, PLAN submarine bases, and related PLA infrastructure on the Chinese mainland with long-range guided munitions in order to suppress PLA operational tempo. This would be especially likely if the PLA had set the escalation precedent of striking allied territories first at the opening of the war. Such strikes would have to be highly bounded and selective in terms of their targets in order to mitigate escalation risks. U.S. Navy submarines and U.S. Air Force intercontinental-range strike aircraft would probably perform these strikes, with additional strikes launched from Aegis combatants operating as offensive SAGs. Reducing the PLA’s ability to cycle anti-ship attackers into the Western Pacific would be of immeasurable help to the sea lanes protection effort.
With all these combined arms contributions in mind, the principal screening challenge from a surface combatant standpoint would be defending convoys and CLF ships against “leaker” anti-ship missiles fired by PLA strike aircraft and "pop-up” missile or torpedo attacks by PLAN submarines. The density of the PLA threat in a given area arguably would determine an escort’s necessary capabilities. Aegis combatants’ area air defense capabilities would probably be highly desirable for escort missions in the vicinity of the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and Luzon given the proximity to the Chinese mainland. It’s important to remember, though, that the U.S. only has nine Aegis combatants permanently homeported in Japan (with two more coming by 2017), and these warships would probably be charged with escorting the Navy’s Japan-homeported carrier, protecting the Navy’s Japan-homeported amphibious warships, executing offensive SAG missions, and performing ballistic missile defense tasks. The Navy has thirty-eight other Aegis combatants homeported in the Pacific, eleven of which are homeported in Pearl Harbor. However, not all would be surgeable due to the inter-deployment maintenance and training cycle (and this says nothing of the surge-readiness impacts stemming from the 2011 Budget Control Act). We might theorize that of the five West Coast-based carrier battleforces, the first might already be forward deployed in or near the Western Pacific as a crisis peaked, the second and third might be surgeable for arrival forward within 30 days, the fourth might be surgeable within 90 days, and the fifth would have to complete its ships’ (abbreviated) overhauls and pre-deployment workups before surging. Some of these Aegis combatants would not be detachable from their carrier battleforces, and those that were detachable might be needed more for offensive SAG operations.
Not all of the Aegis combatants would necessarily deploy with carriers, though. If we assume that two-thirds of the Pearl Harbor contingent surged as a crisis peaked, we might have seven Aegis combatants available for tasking along the First Island Chain. These warships would be well-placed for protecting shipping to the Ryukyus, Luzon, or eastern Taiwan. Even so, their use for these missions would trade against their use in offensive SAG operations.
The story would be similar with respect to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF) Aegis contingent. Japan fields six Aegis DDGs and plans to build two more by 2020. Nevertheless, their principal mission of homeland ballistic missile defense would prevent some number of them from performing sea lanes defense operations. The South Korean Navy’s three Aegis DDGs are not counted in this analysis as it is unlikely they would be offered up for operations that did not involve direct defense of their country’s sea lanes.
It should be clear that Aegis combatants’ use for direct protection of shipping would trade against a large number of other high-priority missions. Moreover, Aegis combatants would generally be tethered to the western half of the waters between the two island chain lines. This would hardly preclude their use for sea lanes and CLF protection, for example as a forward screening layer by virtue of their positions, but they probably wouldn’t be able to closely escort shipping all the way from port to port.
Therein lies the logic of a small surface combatant possessing medium-range anti-air and anti-submarine capabilities. Such a combatant would be entirely sufficient for close escort within waters in which air defense is provided by friendly AEW and fighter aircraft supported by aerial refueling aircraft. Closer to the Ryukyus-Taiwan-Luzon line, this kind of combatant would backstop Aegis combatants’ defensive coverage of a convoy.
The proposed LCS-derived frigate will possess the towed active and passive sonar arrays as well as helicopter capabilities needed for effective anti-submarine warfare. CSBA’s Bryan Clark has also outlined how it could receive the requisite anti-air capabilities for shipping escort.[ii] These improvements would not allow the LCS-derived frigate to detect a submarine-launched sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missile raid beyond effective shipboard radar coverage, though. Land or sea-based AEW support via the Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air capability would be crucial to that end.
Bryan has additionally proposed a longer-range shipboard anti-submarine missile than the legacy Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rocket; such a weapon could be very effective in disrupting a PLAN submarine’s attack preparations.[iii] It’s worth pointing out that if COSS could not provide a PLAN submarine with a targeting-quality tactical picture to support firing anti-ship cruise missiles from over-the-horizon, the PLAN submarine would have to close within the range of its onboard sensors. If we assume the primary use of sonar for this purpose, that range might be one to two convergence zones from a target (perhaps 30 nautical miles in the first case and 60 nautical miles in the second case). A shipboard “rocket-thrown torpedo” able to quickly reach out to the first convergence zone and ideally also the second would thus be highly useful.
It’s important to note that the JMSDF already fields two light destroyer/heavy frigate classes that would anchor shipping protection in the approaches to the Japanese home islands and Ryukyus.[iv] As I noted earlier, though, there might not be enough of them to fully carry the shipping escort load within the waters Japan was primarily responsible for protecting. This suggests the utility of the LCS-derived frigate gaining medium-range anti-air capabilities.
One final point is that there would be a demand for LCS-derived frigates to participate in offensive SAGs. It would accordingly be desirable to backfit as much of the LCS-derived frigates’ anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities as possible into legacy LCS hulls in order to free up as many of the frigates as possible for shipping protection tasks. The logic for using backfit LCSs instead of the frigates in forward-operating SAGs is simple: since the frigates are not presently slotted to receive medium-range air defense capabilities, and since Aegis combatants would be principally responsible for SAG air defense anyway, then the inclusion of backfit-improved LCSs instead of air defense-capable frigates in the SAGs would not alter the existing concept of operations.
The bottom line is that protection of shipping, including the CLF, would likely be far more resource-intensive than is often assumed in the strategy debates. Sea lanes protection would be absolutely critical to the U.S. prevailing in the war, and as such merits extensive study and analysis. I will note that I have never participated in campaign analysis of these questions, nor have I ever been “read into” any such analyses that might have been conducted. Detailed quantitative analysis may very well prove that some of my key assumptions and conclusions are incorrect. Even so, my errors almost certainly center on the specifics of the threat and not on its general nature or the needed seriousness of the offsetting response.



The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.


[i] The discussion that follows is heavily influenced by CAPT William J. Toti, USN (Retired). “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW.” Naval Institute Proceedings 140, No. 6, June 2014. Toti’s article is seminal on modern anti-submarine warfare and should be read in its entirety in parallel to this post.
[ii] See Bryan Clark. “Commanding the Seas: A Plan to Reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface Warfare.” (Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), 27, 50-51.
[iii] Ibid; 27.
[iv] A third similarly-capable JMSDF destroyer class exists but would generally be tied to providing air defense support to Kongo-class DDGs on ballistic missile defense patrols.

Wednesday, January 14, 2024

The CSBA Monograph on U.S. Navy Surface Forces

Over the holiday I read Bryan Clark’s study on reinvigorating U.S. Navy’s surface forces’ abilities to perform sea control tasks. His commendable work casts a light on surface Navy issues that generally don’t receive much attention from the think tank community—and certainly not at such high levels of detail and fluency.

Bryan’s core argument is that the surface Navy is disproportionately organized and armed for reactive defense, and that this implicitly contradicts the maxim that the side that effectively employs its offensive weaponry first in naval battle is generally victorious. He also observes that the primary weapons the surface Navy uses for defense are often at a sizable cost-per-engagement disadvantage to the offensive weapons they counter. These considerations lead him to suggest the surface Navy should cede defensive depth against an adversary’s inbound weapons in exchange for a combination of increased offensive armaments capacity and increased inner-layer defensive density. By doing so, he argues, the surface Navy would be better able to disrupt or destroy adversary platforms before the latter could attack effectively, and any weapons the adversary did succeed in launching would have to contend with a deep (and cost-per-engagement advantageous) arsenal of multiple overlapping short/medium-range defensive systems. 

Bryan addresses quite a number of topics including fleet doctrine, top-level requirements for weapons, ideal characteristics for the LCS-derived Small Surface Combatant, and potential uses of U.S. Coast Guard and Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships to shoulder more of the overseas maritime security cooperation task load. Since several of his ideas relate closely to subjects I wrote about last fall, I will focus my commentary accordingly.

Sea Control, Campaign Design, and the Carrier-Surface Combatant Relationship

Bryan asserts that the Navy’s surface combatants must possess some capacity for attaining and then holding sea control (e.g., a temporary local margin of naval superiority) on their own in a notional major conflict because large-deck carriers’ air wings might not be available to contribute. I strongly agree, but my reasoning is different.

Bryan suggests the carriers’ unavailability might result from their being engaged in power projection operations elsewhere in theater. It seems unlikely, though, that conditions could be shaped to allow carrier battleforces to operate deep within a contested zone at a tolerable degree of risk relatively early in a conflict against a strong adversary. This would be especially true if the contested zone’s inner sections were adjacent to the adversary’s own borders. Furthermore, it normally takes a minimum of two carriers on scene to conduct sustained land-attack operations in even a lesser contingency, let alone to conduct operations of any kind inside a contested zone. Given that the presently-programmed 30-year carrier force structure means deployments of a single carrier within a given region will be the norm unless a crisis erupts, and given that the time lag for a second carrier to arrive on the periphery of a contested zone from elsewhere could be measured in weeks, there is a considerable chance that insufficient carriers would be on hand to perform early-phase land-attack strike tasks. For these reasons, the largest share of these early-phase tasks deep inside the contested zone would likely be allocated to missile-armed submarines and land-based long-range aircraft. Not only would these platforms be less vulnerable in such areas to the adversary’s attacks than carriers, but they would also be comparatively more available for this tasking.

Unlike the case with early-phase deep power projection, however, a battleforce containing a single carrier could contribute immensely to protecting situationally prioritized segments of the sea and air lines of communication that are necessary for U.S. military access to the combat theater as well as for embattled allies’ economic sustenance. A single-carrier battleforce operating from the contested zone’s periphery could similarly provide support to operations by Surface Action Groups (SAG) or other friendly forces further forward on a periodic basis. These would arguably be the most important—and in some cases, irreplaceable—roles for carriers during the early phases of a major maritime war.

This is where the doctrinal changes and capability enhancements Bryan recommends come into play. The in-theater carrier shortage means that mission-tailored U.S. Navy SAGs must be able to operate at some distance inside a contested zone for multi-day periods with limited to no external air support at a tolerable degree of risk. These operations might be offensive sweeps to draw out and then destroy adversary maritime forces. They might be reconnaissance missions or raids against adversary forward operating bases or expeditionary lodgments. They might be missions to provide friendly forces on the ‘frontline’ with supporting fires or defensive coverage. They might be convoy escort missions supporting the flow of supplies and reinforcements to these forces, or perhaps the flow of economic and basic humanitarian goods to embattled allied populations. They might even be operations to induce the adversary to react in ways that other friendly forces could then exploit.

The extent to which surface forces could perform any of these tasks at a particular distance inside a contested zone for a particular length of time would be determined by the margin of temporary local superiority they could sustain under such circumstances. It should be clear that the deeper an operating area might lie within the contested zone (and the closer that area was to the adversary’s homeland), the harder it would be for any SAG to persist in operating there. Bryan is thus absolutely correct in that the more offensive and defensive capacity that can be packed into existing surface combatants, the longer on the margins they would be able to operate more or less on their own at some distance inside a contested zone before their ordnance depletion reached the point that their margin of local superiority—and thus staying power—was all but gone. These considerations combined with the availability of carriers and other maritime forces to support SAG operations as deemed necessary would shape the sequence in which individual maritime operations were conducted a U.S. campaign. Precursor or parallel operations by other forces accordingly might be required to pave the way for a SAG’s operation.

This would not change dramatically as reinforcement carriers arrived in theater. Some would likely be tasked with extending greater protection over intra-theater maritime lines of communication. Others might be used to take on some share of Joint power projection tasks as submarines’ and long-range air forces’ standoff-range strike missile inventories became depleted. It should be noted, though, that these power projection operations could not be performed unless the carriers and their surface combatant escorts had already obtained the requisite sea control. As a matter of fact, a carrier battleforce’s tactical actions to seize and retain sea control could be just as consequential in a campaign context as the power projection tasks they might support. For instance, if a carrier battleforce could sustain a certain margin of temporary local superiority when clashing with the adversary’s maritime forces, its ability to inflict outsized damage or losses on the latter while absorbing tolerable damage or losses of its own would help erode the adversary’s probable advantages in the overall theater conventional military balance as well as arrest the adversary’s campaign progress. Likewise, the adversary’s allocation of maritime forces to fight a carrier battleforce (and any friendly forces supporting it) might result in fewer adversary forces available for operations elsewhere in theater during some period; this could be exploited by other friendly forces including independently-operating SAGs. The use of carriers in any of these ways should of course be governed by calculated risk, and precursor/parallel operations by other elements of the Joint force would very likely be necessary or desirable to create particularly advantageous margins of temporary local superiority.


The Airborne Early Warning Caveat

The greatest challenge facing SAGs operating without external air support would be their ability to detect and engage adversary platforms (or inbound threat weapons) at the most tactically advantageous distances. As I’ve previously noted, AEW is crucial to gaining and then holding sea control under intense opposition. Shipboard sensor ranges are limited by their height of eye relative to the earth’s curvature; an inbound air threat flying beneath or beyond this coverage will not be detected in the absence of offboard sensor support. It should also be pointed out that carrier-organic AEW is presently central to maximizing the effective range of the shipboard SM-6 interceptor missile via the Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) concept. While it would be possible for Air Force or allied AEW aircraft to support U.S. Navy SAGs, I am aware of no plans to develop capabilities for integrating either in NIFC-CA. Nor are there any plans I’m aware of to install the large aperture AEW radars necessary for long-range/wide-area surveillance on unmanned aircraft.[i] All of this drastically affects a surface combatant’s ability to engage an adversary aircraft before the latter can launch its own missiles.

SAGs can mitigate this somewhat by positioning their combatants so that the group’s fused sensor picture provides expanded coverage as well as engagement depth. Not all of these combatants need to employ their active sensors; it is perfectly valid for some to only search using passive sensors depending upon the tactical situation. Nevertheless, actively radiating SAG units expose themselves to counterdetection and targeting by adversary platforms operating outside the SAG’s sensor coverage. The same would also be true for the use of a SAG’s helicopters to perform AEW against inbound sea-skimming ASCMs, as the helicopters’ necessary proximity to SAG units to perform this task would cue the adversary’s reconnaissance and possibly targeting efforts. The risk that a SAG’s active sensor usage poses may remain entirely tolerable if the SAG possesses a sizable margin of temporary local superiority against the adversary’s forces. As this margin decreases, though, tactical (and operational) risk increases. Below some threshold margin, it very simply may not be possible for a SAG to operate at acceptable risk in some area for some span of time without carrier/land-based large AEW aircraft support. This further highlights the importance of a campaign’s operational sequence, particularly with respect to the role of precursor/parallel operations in helping a SAG gain and hold sea control.

Engagement Depth, Ordnance Inventories, and Targeting Confidence

Bryan correctly notes that shorter-range defensive weapons tend to be more affordable-per-engagement than longer-range defensive weapons, and that the latter tend to take up more shipboard space than the former. He consequently argues that by concentrating defensive firepower in a single inner layer with a roughly 30 miles radius, each surface combatant not only gains more favorable cost-per-salvo ratios relative to the adversary’s inbound weapons but also gains more opportunities to engage the adversary’s ‘archer’ aircraft with SM-6 before they can fire their ‘arrows.’

The implication here is that surface combatants are most likely to detect inbound Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) at the shipboard radar horizon. This is certainly true for sea-skimming ASCMs to a considerable degree, but not all ASCMs are pure sea-skimmers. For example, some spend a good portion of their flyout at high altitudes, and a few older types perform terminal dives on their targets. Shorter-ranged defensive interceptors can certainly be used against these threats, but it might be desirable to retain the option of situationally employing longer-ranged interceptor missiles (though not necessarily SM-6) against them as well. It should also be noted that an interceptor missile’s ability to intercept any particular inbound threat is often a factor of the ‘engagement geometry.’ Assuming sufficiently timely sensor detection and tracking of a given air threat, an interceptor missile’s effective range against that threat will be closer to its ‘advertised’ maximum range when the threat is headed more-or-less directly towards the interceptor’s firing unit than when the threat is crossing at a tangential distance to the firing unit. If SAG units are intended to mutually support each other within an inner zone defense, this means that the practical separation distance between those units will be less than the ‘advertised’ maximum reach of their shorter-range interceptor missiles; Bryan notes as much in his Footnote #51 (Pg 20). Many perfectly valid SAG tactics allow for minimal to no mutual kinetic defensive support. Greater separation between a SAG’s combatants might be desirable at other times, though, in order to expand the volume covered by the SAG’s sensors or to support concealment tactics. If either of these are the case, and if some degree of mutual kinetic defensive support is desired, then use of a somewhat longer-ranged interceptor becomes necessary. Lastly, it should be noted that if ‘archer’ aircraft could fire their ‘arrows’ from outside SM-6 range (which is well within the realm of the possible), SAG defenses would have to cope with a much larger inbound salvo. The preceding considerations lead me to conclude that Bryan’s call to rely predominantly on a dense inner zone defense is correct, but that some number of relatively affordable medium-range interceptors that can reach beyond 30 miles will still need to be carried in combatants’ vertical launchers for the reasons I’ve outlined.

Not all inner zone defenses need to be kinetic, however. Bryan correctly observes that Electronic Warfare (EW) systems can contribute greatly to defensive effectiveness. He also correctly observes that the short distances and timeframes involved during inner zone defense mean that even the most effective of shipboard EW systems will not allow a surface combatant to refrain from firing interceptor missiles against a given inbound threat. There are also physics-based limitations on the jamming techniques a shipboard EW system can employ. The same physics suggests the value of offboard EW systems, especially in circumstances where their placement can result in inbound threats never detecting or otherwise locking on to defended combatants.[ii]  With adequate separation between offboard EW systems and defended combatants, it becomes theoretically possible to cause a threat ASCM to commit itself early enough towards a harmless direction such that shipboard interceptor missiles can actually be withheld. Perhaps more significantly, the intelligent use of offboard EW systems can contribute enormously to an overall deception and concealment plan that prevents a SAG from being detected or correctly classified by the adversary in the first place. Consequently, I would add ship-launched offboard EW systems to Bryan’s list of future ‘ordnance’ that would be useful for expanding the surface Navy’s sea control capabilities.

All the same, nothing prevents the adversary from employing similar EW methods to defeat the surface Navy’s own offensive weapons. An adversary’s effective use of EW in tandem with other forms of deception could entice surface combatants into wasting their limited longer-range missile inventories against decoys. As I wrote last fall, the Navy faced this exact problem during the Cold War. Thus, from a purely technological perspective (i.e., excluding the non-material solutions I mentioned in a follow-on piece), the use of multi-phenomenology sensors (and often visual-range examination of contacts) is necessary to have high confidence in a long-range targeting picture. While SAG-organic scouts such as manned helicopters or unmanned aircraft can perform this role against distant surface contacts, it is less clear what organic tools a SAG could to perform it against distant air contacts. Shipboard radars could use non-cooperative target recognition techniques to perform some air contact classification, but their doing so could be subject to EW countermeasures by the adversary. Bryan’s call for improved inner layer defensive density resultantly gains additional importance, as it would provide a SAG’s only other recourse in the event an adversary’s deceptions defeat a SAG’s offensive use of ASCMs or SM-6.

In turn, this reemphasizes my earlier point that the location and length of a SAG operation within a contested zone must be predicated on its ability to sustain its margin of local temporary superiority above some threshold. If it cannot do so on its own, and if the operation in question cannot be delayed until circumstances are more favorable, then it will either need external air support at some stage (such as for detection and outer-layer visual-range identification of air contacts) or the theater commander will have to accept the elevated risks.

Other Thoughts

  • One of Bryan’s most important observations was in his Footnote #39 (pg 14). In describing an adversary’s reliance on wide-area surveillance and data relay systems to cue attacks by Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM), he suggests that “surface combatants would be more effective in targeting these enablers, rather than planning to attack mobile ASBM launchers themselves from 800 - 1,000 nm away.” This is absolutely correct. What’s more, these surveillance/reconnaissance 'systems of systems' are likely to be used to cue anti-ship attacks by other platforms such as submarines and land-based aircraft. Degrading or neutralizing these constituent sensor and communication systems—however locally or temporarily—using deception, concealment, or (as feasible) physical attack will be a critical prerequisite for sea control within a contested zone. Doing so essentially represents a 'mission-kill' against the adversary's ability to perform over-the-horizon targeting. At the campaign-level, these anti-scouting efforts will be central to rolling back the adversary’s offensive progress and eroding his military potential in theater. Surface forces will have major roles to play in this fight, but it will often require contributions from other Joint combined arms to be successful. 
  • I agree with Bryan’s three desired design attributes for future shipboard missile development: offensive capability, multi-mission usability, and smaller physical size. I would also add wartime producibility to Bryan’s list. 
  • I strongly support the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) concept for all the reasons Bryan articulates. Nevertheless, I believe more analytical attention needs to be paid to how it will be provided with high-confidence targeting cues at distances beyond the range of SAG-embarked aircraft or in hotly opposed areas where the MQ-4C Triton or P-8 Orion might not be risked. The Navy’s Outlaw Shark over-the-horizon targeting experiments of the late 1970s highlighted the extreme difficulties this situation presents, especially if missile cueing depends upon the adversary’s Emissions Control indiscipline.[iii] Visual-range confirmation of a target’s classification may be necessary for employing LRASM with high confidence. This may be a potential major role for the proposed Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system. 
  • Aircraft embarked in combatants will remain the most lethal means for time-sensitive attacks against a nearby adversary submarine in the absence of land-based anti-submarine aircraft support, but as Bryan observes there is a need to buy some time for the embarked aircraft to fly out to the threat. The existing Vertically-Launched Anti-Submarine Rocket (VLA) does not have sufficient range to disrupt attacks by adversary submarines that are solely using their organic sensors to target the protagonist’s battleforce. I therefore strongly agree with Bryan’s recommendation for a new, longer-ranged quick-reaction anti-submarine weapon.
  • Bryan is entirely correct that the Navy’s programmed shortfall of Small Surface Combatants (SSC) capable of performing wartime convoy and combat logistics ship escort duties means these tasks would fall on the AEGIS cruiser and destroyer force, which itself would be heavily in demand during a conflict. He is also correct that the SSC shortfall in general is pulling cruisers and destroyers into performing peacetime security cooperation tasks that detract from their combat readiness. I agree with his recommendation that the sea services should find ways to use U.S. Coast Guard and MSC ships to take on some share of peacetime as well as wartime SSC missions. In particular, I think it would be worth examining whether the Coast Guard’s High Endurance Cutters could be outfitted and their crews regularly trained to take on some share of wartime escort duties in low to moderate threat environments (e.g. outside or on the periphery of a contested zone). With respect to MSC ships, though, I would note that their hypothetical combat activities may be constrained by international legal considerations. These need to be fully investigated when developing concepts for how they might be used to take on SSC-type tasks.
  • The Navy’s proposed SSC solution is to modify the two existing LCS variants’ designs so that the FY19 and follow ships receive permanently-installed anti-submarine and long-range anti-ship capabilities as well as improved EW capabilities. Bryan reasonably recommended that they should also receive a medium-range air defense interceptor such as the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) that would allow them to protect escorted units, but this is not part of the proposed program of record. As a result, wartime convoys approaching a combat zone in which there is a considerable air (or submarine-launched ASCM) threat will likely need to be augmented by AEGIS combatants or external tactical air support. This will absolutely be the case if a convoy must traverse part of a contested zone. Convoy demands are likely to be high in a war against a great power adversary, and as such the availability of AEGIS combatants for offensive SAG operations may be limited by the demands on them for convoy protection.


--Updated 8:43PM 1/14/15 to clarify why longer-ranged interceptors might be needed by a SAG if the separation between its units is increased, and to delete a typo in the beginning of the 'Other Thoughts' subsection--

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.



[i] The X-band AN/ZPY-3 radar on the MQ-4C Triton is a surface surveillance and ship classification sensor. It is not suited for long-range AEW.
[ii] See 1. Dave Adamy. “EW Against Modern Radars-Part 2: Radar Jamming Techniques.” Journal of
Electronic Defense 33, No. 1 (January 2010): 44-46; 2. Thomas W. Kimbrell. “Electronic Warfare in Ship Defense.” Technical Digest, Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, (September 2004): 85-86; 3. Craig Payne. Principles of Naval Weapon Systems. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006), 91-92.
[iii] See Norman Friedman. Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter Through Three World Wars. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 206-210.