DOT&E; FY2011 Annual Report

The DOT&E FY2011 Annual Report (PDF) is out, and I noted that Wired is focused on the LCS report (PDF). The reason the Wired article on LCS reads like it's reaching for straws to find news in the LCS report is because the DOT&E FY2011 Annual Report on LCS lacks new information. The DOT&E report basically details exactly what ADM Pandolfe told everyone at Surface Navy Association conference - in January of last year (in 2011). Hard to get worked up about issues openly discussed over a year ago.

What I did find interesting about the report is that the report heavily focuses on the MIW module problems, but only one aspect of the module - the airborne pieces expected to be used on the MH-60R helicopter (AN/AQS-20A and ALMDS). Does that mean the rest of the MIW module is doing well? I don't know what the absence of concerns for the SUW and ASW modules means either. Does that mean the program components of those modules aren't mature enough to evaluate, or does it mean they don't have any concerns right now with those components? I don't know.

About the only thing I learned in the LCS DOT&E report is that DOT&E is still actively sounding the bell on the survivability issues of LCS, and the Navy is still not ready to discuss that issue about LCS with anyone. Everything else in the DOT&E report reads like first in class ship stuff. I still think Austal should have seen the corrosion issue coming, and I don't like that there has already been a crack in LCS1, but these are issues where Navy folks involved appear comfortable with the corrections made to address those issues.

While LCS is likely to get lots of attention early (the program is the Navy's attention whore these days), there really isn't much in the DOT&E report on LCS that was new, and certainly nothing worth getting worked up about.

If you want to see what a truly damning report in the DOT&E FY2011 Annual Review looks like, check out LPD-17 (PDF). The report uses several hundred words to detail how the class is "assessed as capable of conducting amphibious operations in a benign environment, but not operationally effective, suitable, or survivable in a hostile environment due to significant reliability deficiencies on major systems affecting communications, propulsion, and self defense."

LCS has nothing even remotely close to damning as that assessment.

USS WillProbablyNeverSail Has Engine Problems, Again

WHAT THE .....!!!

The Navy's problem-plagued amphibious ship San Antonio is undergoing engine repairs again.

The Navy said Tuesday that it called off crew training off the coast of Virginia last week after all four of the San Antonio's diesel engines experienced problems.

Naval Surface Force Atlantic spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Bill Urban told The Virginian-Pilot that all four engines experienced leaks with the intercoolers and the leak-off boxes. One engine had to be shut down.

Repairs, which will be done at Norfolk Naval Station, are expected to be completed in time for a pre-deployment training in August.

"Fortunately, these additional maintenance issues on San Antonio are not as significant as those in the past," Adm. John C. Harvey, the head of Fleet Forces Command, said in a written statement. "I fully expect San Antonio to begin her basic training phase on time in early August and deploy on schedule next year."

Last week huh? Was that before or after the testimony of VADM McCoy and VADM Burke on Navy readiness including Navy surface vessel maintenance problems?

NAVSEA Cancels LPD-17 Maintenance Contract

The last time the Navy terminated a contract, it was related to LCS. Hardly surprising this time it is related to LPD-17. This is the NAVSEA Press Release (PDF).

WASHINGTON D.C.— Today NAVSEA terminated for convenience the LPD 17 Class multi-ship, multi-option (MSMO) maintenance contract with prime contractor Earl Industries, LLC (Earl) of Norfolk, Va. The termination is a complete termination of all work in process as well as options for future work over a five-year period. Work under this contract included options for performance of all scheduled Chief of Naval Operations availabilities as well as all necessary Emergent Maintenance/Continuous Maintenance work on these ships during the contract's five-year period of performance.

The decision to terminate was based on Navy findings of improper work performed and concern regarding Earl Industries’ quality assurance program and the company’s ability to control the quality and documentation of work it performs. These concerns were triggered by the number and severity of corrective action reports issued under the Norfolk Ship Support Activity contract issued last year for USS San Antonio (LPD 17) repairs.

“The company’s performance on this contract was not in keeping with the type of quality work the Navy expects from our industry partners,” said NAVSEA Commander Vice Adm. Kevin McCoy. “These failures are unacceptable, and we have lost confidence in Earl’s ability to continue successfully performing this same type of work on the rest of the LPD-Class ships under the MSMO contract.”

Ship maintenance contractors are accountable to perform first time quality work in accordance with specifications. They are also accountable for maintaining records, including supporting documentation, adequate to demonstrate the extent of work that has been performed and in compliance with applicable procurement regulations and the terms and conditions of maintenance contracts. The Navy relies on accurate documentation to enable the ship's force to resolve any issues that arise during mission execution, as well as to accurately assess a ship's future maintenance needs.

“Based on recent reviews of the work conducted by Earl Industries, NAVSEA believes the company has not met these standards, and, as a result, must be held accountable,” said McCoy.

Contractors must also demonstrate, in addition to a record of integrity, the organizational controls and quality assurance measures necessary to provide quality materials or services, or to manage the work of subcontractors selected for this purpose.

The Navy plans to compete contracts on an individual basis for the scheduled Chief of Naval Operations availabilities as well as all necessary Emergent Maintenance/ Continuous Maintenance work for the LPD 17 class ships homeported in Norfolk among all eligible contractors in the Norfolk area.

This is the fallout from the NAVSEA investigation that has already led to the Norfolk Ship Support Activity oversight authority suspension, and the replacement of Thomas J. Murphy as the command's executive director.

Worth noting, the NAVSEA took care of business in house before moving against the contractor. Also worth noting, the contract revoked is not the same as the contract that deals specifically with the repair of the LPD-17 engines, although the contract is for continuing maintenance of LPD-17 class vessels.

I think there are two things to watch for. First, will the termination of the Earl Industries contract end up in court? If it does, it will be Northrop Grumman (who is now Huntington-Ingalls) that ends up getting thrown in the mud. Second, which shipyard in Norfolk is crazy enough to take on the maintenance of the LPD-17 class given the track record to date? My advice - overestimate the contract by 50%, at least.

I tend to think Vice Adm. McCoy from the NAVSEA side and Admiral Harvey from the fleet side are both doing everything they can the right way in dealing with what we all recognize as continuing fallout from an enormous PMS-317 clusterfuck, and it is very much unclear if that shop has been sorted out. I say that while noting the schedule for PCU San Diego (LPD 22) continues to slip...

There are currently two LPD-17 class ships on deployment, USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) and USS Green Bay (LPD 20). USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) is on her third deployment despite being commissioned into service in December 2007. Also noteworthy, USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) was built at Ingalls, while the other four LPD-17 class ships in service were built at Avondale.

The Answer is Always the Marine Corps, Now What Was the Question?

"With or without the LCS, when asked what capability is required to fight in the Littorals - the right answer will always be the Marine Corps."

I try to save all my email, and that is a quote from an email sent to me in early November 2008, before I was embarked on FREEDOM, from a Marine LtCol who insisted that is the most important lesson I would learn by riding on FREEDOM a few days. I thought of that quote when I read this article over at DoD Buzz discussing Chris Rawley's swarming boat scenario from earlier this morning.

Phil Ewing concludes implying the right answer to swarming threats might be the Marine Corps Cobra gunships. That suggests me that in 2011:

• The LCS is still a Powerpoint capability
• RW Squadrons need more articulate advocates
• Navy ships can never have enough guns, particularly on the bigger warships

The point is valid though. Of the three scenarios presented by Chris, none of them include a Marine Corps perspective. Back when the EFV was in its infancy, I distinctly remember suggestions the EFV and it's 30mm gun could blow up swarming boats as it moved from ship-to-shore. When I was at the EFV shop in San Diego earlier this year, I asked about that. When asked, the Marine SSgt looked at me and said (and I am quoting),

"The EFV is as fast as the LCS, shorter than a Boston Whaler, and surrounded in armor. Tell me how creative the Colonel is and I'll tell you what we can do."

So as I think about the question Chris proposed, I'm thinking that the price of 1 DDG-51 I'll take a LPD-17 with Romeos, Cobras, EFVs, and instead of LCACs or LCUs, I'll take CB-90s and the blue green team that makes this capability a blue/green/brown water nightmare for the enemy.

Remember When the Navy/Marine Corps Did NEO?

Remember when naval forces could conduct non-combat evacuation operations of American civilians in trouble? I do too, which is why I am very curious why after many weeks of governments falling on the North African coastline the US Navy doesn't have any ships in the region capable of making it happen. Instead we get stuff like this.

"As always, the safety and well-being of Americans has to be our highest priority," she said. Clinton didn't mention Gadhafi by name.

State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said 35 U.S. Embassy personnel and families, who were ordered to leave Libya on Monday, haven't yet been able to depart. "The fact is today we were not able to move any of our personnel out of the country," he said.

The State Department said late Tuesday that it had chartered a ferry for U.S. citizens wanting to leave Libya that would depart from Tripoli on Wednesday to the islands of Malta, across the Mediterranean Sea.

So who is responsible for making sure the Navy is prepared for these type of operations when unrest is now into its seventh week in the region? Admiral Stavridis, Admiral Locklear, Vice Admiral Harris, or Rear Admiral Wary? Did any of these folks request a ship and get denied?

After seven weeks without a single ship surged, I am starting to wonder if the problems related to the San Antonio class has prevented the Navy from surging an amphibious ship to the Mediterranean Sea. I get it that the Kearsarge ARG might be in a holding pattern near 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain due to the tensions in that region right now, but is the Navy so short on Amphibious ships that despite the last month and a half of protests in North African coastal nations we lack the ability to get an amphibious ship from Norfolk to the Med?

The JHSV sure would be handy right about now. For that matter, if LCS-2 was actually operating as designed, she could move the 300 folks in Tripoli to Malta without any trouble.

Canada to Buy Mistrals?

I'm stealing GvG's bit, so don't be surprised if he has a more thorough account of this:

Canada has expressed a "strong interest" for the purchase of two vessels of the Manufacturer's DCNS Mistral class, read The Tribune Friday.

DCNS, controlled at 75% state and 25% by Thales, "is currently exploring the shipyards, particularly in Quebec, for industry associations to contract, after the green light Canadian government," wrote the daily.

He said the two ships would be manufactured locally and the group would seek a signature in 2012.

A spokesman declined to DCNS comment.

Good news for the French. Not so long ago the Canadians were giving thought to purchase of a San Antonio class LPD. Guess that's not going to work out. In ten years, at least three important navies could be operating Mistrals. Obviously there are a couple of interesting stories here, the first being the persistence of interest in middle navies for big amphibs, and the second being the ongoing problems created by difficulties in the LPD-17 construction process.

SAN ANTONIO JAGMAN

In December of 2009, Adm. John Harvey, commander of Fleet Forces Command, ordered Rear Adm. Michelle Howard, commander of Expeditionary Strike Group Two, to begin a Manual of the Judge Advocate General investigation, or JAGMAN, of the problems related to the Main Propulsion Diesel Engines of the USS San Antonio. The effort was led by NAVSEA's Rear Adm. Tom Eccles, the Navy's chief engineer. The investigation focused primarily on the SAN ANTONIO and not other ships of the class that were experiencing similar problems. Attached is a copy of the JAGMAN findings.
San Antonio JAGMAN

Want to see what 'Epic Fail' looks like? Read the whole thing. #265 is one of the saddest records of Command I have ever seen. Check out #268 and ask yourself how that happens following that event.

I've heard from GREEN BAY and NEW YORK - and both are saying things have turned around in a big way for those ships, but it has been a rough ride to this point. Why? According to those who know, the change over the last year has happened because someone has taken responsibility, and all the data collected through investigations suggests no one took responsibility before that time. SAN ANTONIO was a steaming pile of shit, and apparently no one wanted to touch it - and that apparently includes everyone who was responsible at the time.

I find that interesting, because the only person talking to the media at the time was Allison Stiller. All the Flags were reading the same memo - blame the shipbuilder. In hindsight that tactic appears to have been effective if not also appropriate, because the shipbuilder is up for sale today.

What ever happened to those Navy leaders who should have taken responsibility at the time? Well, many of them retired while some got promoted - and I note 3 of that bunch is in line to potentially become the CNO next year. One. Two. Three.

Leadership and Accountability is a tricky thing.

Noteworthy that two of those three are directly responsible for turning this program around.

Also noteworthy, the other guy was in a perfect position between September 2007 to July 2009 to address the issues revealed in this and other reports that took place on his watch. Must of been rainbows and roses where he sat though, because the ship was sent by him on deployment - and we know how that ended.

A Leadership Culture That Selectively Applies Accountability

Tony Capaccio's latest article takes aim at the LPD-17 with a focus on survivability. It is an interesting article to read, made more interesting by the fact this is the latest information based on an interview with Michael Gilmore.

The San Antonio-class vessel’s critical systems, such as electrical distribution, ship-wide fiber optics and voice- communications networks, aren’t reliable, according to Michael Gilmore, the Defense Department’s director of operational test and evaluation. The ship’s armaments can’t effectively defend against the most modern anti-ship weapons, Gilmore said.

The ship is capable of operating “in a benign environment,” Gilmore said in an e-mail to Bloomberg News outlining the unclassified summary of a classified report sent to Congress in June. The vessel is “not effective, suitable and not survivable in a combat situation,” he said.

Craig Hooper notes that the the annual DOT&E report to Congress has historically only been available behind the firewall at Inside The Navy, but highlights that the reports are now available online at the DOT&E website. It looks to me like the annual reports publications page was updated in September, meaning these reports may have actually only been available to the non-ITN subscribers for about a month (I have never seen them before, but have been to that website before so I believe the availability online is new). That would explain why these new details are coming out in the broader press now even though these findings were in the 2009 annual report.

Craig Hooper is right - give credit to Michael Gilmore. The interview with Bloomberg is a smart way to communicate, but giving public access to these reports is also a good way to get Congressional attention in these types of issues that have apparently not been addressed adequately over time. I can say that because by posting the annual reports for the last 11 years - someone like me has a time line and history to draw information on programs from to track progress and activity related to DOT&E findings. For example, listed below are the sections in the annual reports related to survivability over the last 4 years. Keep in mind these are neither all the problems listed, nor do they list the successes in the reports.

2006

• PDT&T to date has shown the ship to have credible capability to defend against small manned surface threats, but has not confirmed the capability to defend against ASCMs. The IOT&E will include a ship self-defense phase focused primarily on the ship and crew’s capability to defend against ASCMs. Currently, there are too few high-diver targets. PDT&T has identified serious integration problems with the AN/SPS-48E radar performance while enclosed in the AEM/S. The Navy is conducting an AN/SPS-48E - AEM/S characterization study. However, it is too early to determine what mitigation will be required.
• The survivability of the LPD 17 class ships should be improved over the 1970’s-era amphibious ships they will replace. The increased survivability is attributed to reduced radar cross-section signature design features, strengthened hull girder design, improved bulkhead connections, improved fragmentation protection, fire insulation at fire zone boundaries, and redundant and separated vital systems.
• Based on proposed changes in the LPD 17 schedule, there is potential that TSST will not be conducted in advance of the lead ship deployment. DOT&E believes the TSST should be done before deployment as it can provide the Navy valuable data to characterize the ship’s survivability and response to damage.

Recommendations

• Status of Previous Recommendations. There were no recommendations made in FY05.
• FY06 Recommendations.

1. Performance of the AN/SPS-48E radar is critical to the ship’s capability to control aircraft and to defend itself. The Navy should investigate and understand the impact of the AEM/S configuration before deploying the ship.
2. The Navy should conduct the TSST in close sequence with IOT&E before deploying the lead ship.
3. The Navy should procure the necessary number of high-diver targets.

2007

• PDT&T identified AN/SPS-48E radar performance degradation while enclosed in the AEM/S. PDT&T and combat system ship qualification trial have not demonstrated the capability to defend against anti-ship cruise missiles; however, the IOT&E includes a self-defense phase focused primarily on this capability.
• The survivability of the San Antonio class ships should be significantly improved over the 1970’s-era amphibious ships they will replace. The increased survivability is attributed to: reduced RCS signature design features, strengthened hull girder design, improved bulkhead connections, improved fragmentation protection, fire insulation at fire zone boundaries, and redundant and separated vital systems.

Recommendations

• Status of Previous Recommendations. The three recommendations made in FY06 remain valid.
• FY07 Recommendations.

1. Because the AN/SPS-48E radar is critical to the ship’s capability to control aircraft and to defend itself, the Navy should correct the problem and conduct OT&E on the fix before deploying the ship.
2. The Navy should aggressively resolve the shortage of high-diver ASCM targets. Deficiencies with anti-ship cruise missile targets used to test NULKA must also be resolved.

2008

• The ship is capable of supporting C4I requirements in an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) environment; however, reliability problems observed in the SWAN and the Interior Voice Communications System degraded command and control of Marine forces. The Navy still needs to validate Information Exchange Requirements per the approved IOT&E test plan, and pursue a formal Information Support Plan approved by the Joint Staff.
• Information assurance testing revealed vulnerabilities to LPD-17 systems and networks, and the ship was unable to effectively demonstrate network detection, reaction, and restoration until installation of a shipboard Intrusion Detection System designed to help defend against network attacks.
• The ship is vulnerable against specific air and surface threats likely to be encountered by LPD-17 class ships. Testing also identified integration deficiencies with the AN/SPS-48E radar in the Advanced Enclosed Mast Structure as well as other SSDS combat system elements.
• The lack of interface between the real-time SSDS Mk 2 tactical display and the near real-time displays from the Amphibious Assault Direction System and Global Command and Control System-Maritime degrades situational awareness and increases the likelihood of misclassified contacts and potential blue-on-blue engagements.
• Major elements of LPD-17’s SSDS Mk 2 Mod 2 combat system collectively have a large number of high severity software trouble reports, increasing the likelihood of occurrence of one or more during operations.
• During the amphibious warfare phase of the IOT&E, the ship experienced system failures that significantly affected its operations and survivability.

1. The SWAN experienced faults, one of which resulted in a loss of the crew’s capability to control and monitor ship equipment including navigation, propulsion, and steering in the normal mode for approximately 18 hours. Off-ship contractor technical assistance was necessary to restore the system.
2. The engineering control system (ECS) and fire detection alarm system exhibited excessive false alarms and completely failed twice, resulting in the need to man additional engineering watch stations until restoration. The requirement for the crew to man additional watch stations revealed manning and training shortfalls that have implications on the ship’s capability to sustain combat operations.
3. The electrical distribution system exhibited uncommanded opening of breakers and experienced a total loss of electrical power. This highlighted a continuing problem with uninterruptible power supplies, which do not provide power when required.

• The Navy’s CBRD In-Service Engineering Activity documented significant design and installation deficiencies with the Collective Protection System and Casualty Decontamination Stations. Realistic CBRD testing has not yet been accomplished.
• The survivability of the San Antonio class ships appear to be improved over the LPD class ships they will replace. However, problems encountered with critical systems during testing (particularly with the SWAN and ECS) may offset some of the survivability improvements and have highlighted serious reliability shortcomings.

Recommendations

• Status of Previous Recommendations. Two recommendations made in FY07 are being addressed; however, the modified target (GQM-163A Coyote) intended to represent the high-diver ASCM threat has not been flight-tested.
• FY08 Recommendations. The Navy should:

1. Complete remaining IOT&E elements, including: modeling and simulation effort to support an assessment of the ship’s probability of raid annihilation requirement, an end-to-end test of the ship’s CBRD capabilities, and a demonstration of the ship’s capability to satisfy its information exchange requirements.
2. Continue installing the AN/SPS-48E radar antenna corrective shroud on remaining ships of the class and complete operational testing needed to demonstrate the radar’s effectiveness inside the Advanced Enclosed Mast Structure.
3. Conduct comprehensive information assurance testing during FOT&E, including testing to address privilege escalation and an assessment of LPD-17’s susceptibility to internal threats. Additionally, the Navy should re-examine protection, detection, reaction, and restoration capability after installation of an Intrusion Detection System.
4. Develop, test, and field fixes to critical systems including the SWAN, ECS, and fire detection and alarm systems.

2009

• The ship is capable of supporting Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence requirements in an ESG environment; however, reliability problems with the SWAN and the Interior Voice Communications System degrade command and control and are single points of failure during operations.
• The Navy still needs to validate critical Information Exchange Requirements and pursue a formal Information Support Plan to support a Joint Interoperability Certification.
• The LPD-17 exhibited difficulty defending itself against several widely proliferated threats, primarily due to:

Persistent SSDS Mk 2-based system engineering deficiencies

The ship’s RAM system provided the only hard kill capability, preventing layered air defense

Problems associated with SPS-48E and SPQ-9B radar performance against certain Anti-Ship Cruise Missile attack profiles

Degraded situational awareness due to Mk 46 Gun Weapon System console configuration

• LPD-17 failed to satisfy its reliability requirement during the first five hours of an amphibious assault and its total ship availability requirement during IOT&E.
• The survivability of the San Antonio class ships appear to be improved over the LPD class ships they will replace. However, problems encountered with critical systems during testing (particularly with the electrical distribution, chilled water, SWAN, and ECS) and difficulty recovering mission capability may offset some of the survivability improvements and have highlighted serious reliability shortcomings.

Recommendations

• Status of Previous Recommendations. All recommendations made in FY07 and FY08 remain valid.
• FY09 Recommendations. The Navy should:

1. Formally address chronic reliability problems associated with amphibious warfare support equipment, propulsion and electrical systems, critical control systems to include the SWAN and ECS, and demonstrate the efficacy of fixes during FOT&E.
2. Review and investigate reoccurring INSURV deficiencies and lube oil system failures, identify related design, quality control, or training problems, and develop corrective action plans for each.
3. Complete validation of critical Information Exchange Requirements and pursue completion of a Joint Interoperability Certification.
4. Pursue mitigations to the identified weaknesses and longstanding system engineering problems associated with the ships ability to defend itself against threats in multiple warfare areas.
5. Demonstrate the ships ability to satisfy both its reliability and total ship availability requirements during FOT&E.
6. Revise the Test and Evaluation Master Plan to reflect incomplete events and recommended FOT&E from the IOT&E to include a timeline for completion.
7. Correct deficiencies identified in the Naval Sea Systems Command Total Ship Survivability Trial and Full Ship Shock Trial reports.
   

Heads Buried in Sand

I imagine someone in the upper echelon of the Navy chain of command is not happy with Michael Gilmore for talking directly to Tony Capaccio, but the fact is the history of these reports regarding the LPD-17 has led us to this point, and whoever is doing the complaining needs to look in the mirror first.

There are clearly issues here that raise serious questions of specific industry companies as to why they have been unable to meet requirements. There are also serious questions for the Navy though, starting with why the recommendations made by DOT&E have gone ignored for several years in a row through at least December of 2009. I think that is an interesting time frame btw, because the study of the LPD-17 class that was conducted by instruction of Admiral Harvey was completed in January 2010.

The article hits on some of the points that concern me the most.

Gilmore’s office in August told Pentagon officials the vessel demonstrated “poor reliability with critical equipment and control systems,” and an “inability to defend itself against a variety of threats.”

Navy test data indicated the vessels demonstrated an inability to “maintain or rapidly recover mission capability” after being hit by “the variety of weapons likely to be encountered,” the testing office said.

Raytheon Co. is a subcontractor providing electronics, a fiber-optics network and an anti-missile system the testing office concluded had “persistent engineering deficiencies.”

It isn't just Raytheon though, the DOT&E 2009 report specifically mentions problems with the AN/SPQ-9 radar developed by Northrop Grumman and the SPS-48E radar developed by ITT Gilfillan. For me, that seems to be at least as big of a problem because it precludes the possibility of adding ESSM to the LPD-17 class to increase the range of its defensive ring to protect the ship from ASCMs.

In all, a lot of this is unacceptable and some of it goes beyond just the shipyard. LPD-17 class features networks with single points of failure that appear to be perpetually unreliable, new weapon systems that don't meet requirements, and unreliable communication and information exchange equipment - all of which piles on top of the incredible number of HM&E problems identified as a result of poor construction and shipyard practices that have had most the class sidelined.

In the context of activities that we have seen regarding the LPD-17 program since December of 2009, a lot of things are making sense. For example, one of the things ADM Harvey did when he requested the Balisle Report was have them focus on the LPD-17 class, which went above and beyond the report issued by RDML Michelle Howard back in January 2010 that focused on the LPD-17s problems.

How much difference will the additional additional attention to detail led by ADM Harvey make in improving LPD-17? It is unclear if we will know anytime soon, but the real concern is that we didn't learn about most of the LPD-17 class problems sooner.

Admiral Harvey took over Fleet Forces Command in July of 2009, and if you look over the CRS report by Ronald O'Rourke (PDF) that lists the history of construction problems from pages 17-45 (28 pages!), 10 of those pages disclose problems identified and reported over the 15 month time period since ADM Harvey took over responsibility at Fleet Forces Command. The first ship was procured in FY1996 and accepted by the Navy in June of 2005, and from June 2005 until July of 2009 - 49 months - very few of the major problems that are class-wide and often discussed today were apparently identified, or reported.

Why did everyone have to wait for Admiral Harvey to assume command of Fleet Forces Command to get the LPD-17 class problems identified and addressed realistically?

Why was ADM Jonathan Greenert, who was in charge Fleet Forces Command from September 2007 to July 2009, unable to uncover any of these issues? I think it is interesting that ADM Greenert was apparently completely oblivious to these LPD-17 class problems (nevermind fleet wide maintenance problems) and was apparently not held responsible for any of these problems since exposed by his successor. As a reward for ADM Greenert's apparent ignorance (or intentional concealment) regarding the depth of the LPD-17 class problems - he was promoted to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

I would also think there are plenty of questions for VADM Kevin McCoy who was the Chief Engineer in NAVSEA from 2005-2008 until he became commander of NAVSEA in June of 2008 - because all of the problems with LPD-17 took place while VADM McCoy was part of the leadership in NAVSEA over the last 5 years.

Problems with the LPD-17 class are similar to problems seen in other classes of ships built and maintained over the last several years, and these are problems that leadership at the time did not address and have gone on to cost the Navy billions to resolve. Noteworthy, as a reward for their work (and the problems listed in the Balisle Report is basically the resume of failure at Fleet Forces Command under ADM Greenert btw), the current CNO promoted these folks and the Senate approved those promotions. It is sad that in the country known for free speech, there would be very high costs for just about anyone who observes these things about the US Navy today, with rare exceptions like myself, because to highlight these little details about the job performance of Navy leadership would cost such an observer their job.

Screw up as a leader at sea - You're Fired! Cost the country billions while leading ashore - You're Promoted! That is my definition of a leadership culture that selectively applies accountability.

Picture of the Day

Check out this recent photo from Navy.mil.


I am probably the last supporter for more LDP-17s, despite their high cost, but this image is part of the reason why I believe this is naval power in the 21st century more so than simply focusing all funding on traditional warships.

Count the aircraft. I count 7 in this photo. Now consider what else this ship can carry and consider what comes packaged in this 24,000+ ton sovereign piece of US power.

Need VLS? LPD-17 can have that. Need ground power? This ship supports more than a company of Marines, and based on the equipment on that deck and below that deck, I can move that company of Marines to shore in at least three different ways - including well beyond the shoreline itself. Indeed, I could move a company of Marines, a platoon of tanks, with the HQ and logistics necessary for an days operation all from this one deck - and in this model I have the other two ships of the ARG - including the Nassau - as the reserve.

Before the LPD-17, the big deck amphib was always the primary, and the reserve was never so robust.

Cruisers, Destroyers, and Questions...

Emelie Rutherford has a story out for Defense Daily (subscription only) titled Young: Study If DDG-1000 Hull Is Right For Future Cruiser discussing some comments made by John Young regarding the DDG-1000. This article is just loaded with good information, way too much to quote. Here are the key points listed broken down by category:

Destroyer Programs:

• The Navy had not crafted requirements spelling out the need for more than 64 DDG-51s
• The Navy estimates the new-production DDG-51s would be $2 billion hulls.
• * DefenseNews reports Young said DDG-1000 will "be a $2.5 billion hull"
• DDG-1001 and DDG-1002 will be a fixed-price incentive contract, which suggests some cost certainty for taxpayers (and BIW seems OK with this).
• Plans for future-surface combatant have gone nowhere

CG(X) Program:

• The CG(X) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is completed.
• Requirements work done by the Navy as part of an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the CG(X) cruiser shows that future ship having features of the DDG-1000 hull.
• CG(X) AoA showed the cruiser costing $6 billion.
• Studies have looked at the LPD-17 hull for the CG(X), because of the need for a ship with enough hull size, displacement, and power to accommodate the CG(X) radar.

It looks to me like the recent deal between the Pentagon, Navy, and industry to truncate the buy of DDG-1000s at three ships and build more DDG-51s is nothing more than a 2 year shipbuilding plan to stabilize shipbuilding for a few years, also known as buy time to make a decision. I'm not sure how stable this plan is for Mississippi though, at first glance, of the 3 DDG-1000s and 3 DDG-51s, 4 of those ships are being built at Bath Iron Works.

That raises the question, what don't we know about what will be built in Mississippi? Why would Gene Taylor (D-MS) celebrate this deal if his district does not appear to be getting more work? There has to be more to this, because even though LPD-17 is continuing, that work would be shared with Avondale. I also don't see a National Security Frigate option.

I think this LPD-17 hull version of the CG(X) is in play. There have been rumors of CG(X) being built in two versions, is that what is developing here? One version based on the LPD-17 hull built in Mississippi and one version based on the DDG-1000 hull built at Bath Iron Works?

Gates is punting the CG(X) issue to the QDR, which means the Navy has until the QDR to make the case that it should lead ballistic missile defense. The only way a $6 billion CG(X), or potentially 2 versions of the CG(X) will ever be built is if the Navy makes the case that naval ballistic missile defense is the best investment in the near term (what would amount to 13 years of shipbuildnig for the entire CG(X) program) than any alternative solutions over that period. With ballistic missile defense funding, a short build for $6 billion CG(X) LPD-17 hull versions and a larger build of DDG-1000 hull versions of CG(X) are a lot more affordable. I for one don't think the Navy understands strategic communications well enough to sell this, even though I think that argument is more easily made with the American people than you may assume.

If the Navy is looking at 2 versions of CG(X), the part of the whole mess that makes the least sense to me is restarting the DDG-51. Either the Navy does not need a CG(X) and builds more DDG-51s, or the Navy needs a CG(X) and doesn't build more DDG-51s. The grand plan as outlined by Gates calls for three DDG-51s, which will run at least $2 billion each to restart.

Why not just build a 4th DDG-1000 instead of a 3rd DDG-51? The 4 DDG-1000s can replace the 4 Iowa's and the naval gunfire support requirement is met.

Will there be more than the 3 proposed DDG-51s? If the answer is no, and the current requirement for DDG-51s is 64, build the 4th DDG-1000 instead of the 3rd DDG-51.

If the answer is yes, how many and under what requirement? Furthermore, why? How does the Navy justify the DDG-51 class serving until 2060 and beyond? How in the world will that system remain relevant over the first half of the 21st century when there is very little margin for growth left?

Are there any new ship designs planned? The lack of alternative designs for surface combatants looks to be part of the problem Congress has to deal with.

I look forward to seeing what the Navy intends to build in FY2012, because right now we have no idea what surface combatant shipbuilding looks like after FY2011.

Influence Squadrons - The Next Evolution

Fifth, we will increase the buy of littoral combat ships -- a key capability for presence, stability and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions -- from two to three ships in FY '10. Our goal is eventually to acquire 55 of these ships.

- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 06, 2024

I have a question. Does Secretary of Defense Robert Gates really know anything about maritime presence, maritime stability, maritime counterinsurgency, or maritime irregular warfare for that matter? I think Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is really smart, but I don't think he has ever been challenged in a debate regarding naval issues. Honestly, I don't really think he has ever given it much thought.

Gates talks a lot about the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but I would begin with the question what are the characteristics of successful doctrine, tactics, and strategy in those irregular warfare spaces? My next question would be, what do those characteristics have in common with the Littoral Combat Ship?

To summarize it in a simple way, irregular warfare requires sustained presence of manpower, but the Littoral Combat Ship doesn't have the endurance for sustaining itself, and as a requirement the platform is short on manpower. Who is advising the Secretary of Defense on naval capabilities?

I believe that Secretary Gates can understand this stuff, I just don't believe he has ever been exposed to enough of the debate in the Navy to understand why his comments make no sense at all. The Navy discussion regarding the littorals needs new ideas forwarded by navy officers for public debate to help push the littoral conversation down the road, something that has not happened in a long, long time. I was very pleased when one such discussion was printed in this months issue of Proceedings.

Commander Harry Hendrix has an article in April's Proceedings titled Buy Ford, Not Ferrari. This is a large article, and after seeing a few initial conversations of the article my first impression is that people are getting hung up on his prescriptions for the large forces, which in my opinion, is perhaps the least important aspect of the article. What jumps off the page for me, and what I believe makes this article one of the most important articles written in Proceedings in a long time, is what is new.

The next step on the Navy's path to a new future should be the creation of "Influence Squadrons" composed of an amphibious mother ship (an LPD-17 or a cheaper commercial ship with similar capabilities), a destroyer to provide air, surface, and subsurface defensive capabilities, a Littoral Combat Ship to extend a squadron's reach into the green-water environment and provide some mine warfare capabilities, a Joint High Speed Vessel to increase lift, a Coastal Patrol ship to operate close in, and an M80 Stiletto to provide speed and versatility.

The Influence Squadron should also heavily employ unmanned technologies to further expand the squadron's reach. Unmanned air, surface, and subsurface platforms could be deployed and monitored by the various vessels, extending American awareness, if not American presence.

These forces, operating every day around the world, would represent the preponderance of visible U.S. naval power. Their understated capabilities would epitomize America's peaceful, non-aggressive intent, and would carry out the new maritime strategy's stated purpose of providing positive influence forward. However, the Influence Squadron, carrying credible firepower across a broad area of operations, could also serve to either dissuade or destroy pirate networks that might seek to prey upon increasingly vulnerable commercial sea lines of communication.

Creating 16 of these squadrons, ten in the Pacific, six in the Atlantic, would allow the Navy to forward deploy six to eight squadrons at any given time, expanding American influence around the world. Pacific-based squadrons would routinely deploy to the east coast of Africa, the Persian Gulf, the waters off Malaysia to include the Strait of Malacca, the archipelagic waters of Indonesia, the waters in and around the Philippines, and the regional waters near Japan and Korea.

Atlantic-based squadrons would visit the Caribbean, South America, the north and western coasts of Africa as well as pushing up into the Black Sea to visit Georgia, the Ukraine and other partners in the region. Sometimes, however, Influence Squadrons, no matter how well they are placed, will not have the necessary concentration of capabilities to meet the emergent challenges. It would be at this point that the next force along the scale of naval response would be dispatched.

The "Influence Squadron" should sound very familiar to readers here, because it is essentially the strategic concept forwarded on this blog of what I have previously called Littoral Strike Groups. Essentially, it is a call for an organizational framework of ships to operate IN the littorals instead of conducting operations in the littoral from over the horizon. I particularly like the idea because it leverages coastal patrol vessels (PCs) and small fast boats (M-80s), supported by a combination of a Marine Company (LPD-17), credible firepower (DDG-51), unmanned systems (LCS), and NECC capabilities (JHSV) with credible littoral centric capabilities. I don't really care about the debate regarding the specific platforms, it doesn't matter and is parochial to the discussion, the specific platform should be derived from requirements planning anyway. What is important is the layered blue-green-brown water approach which I believe is strategically solid as a driving requirement for a littoral organizational squadron, and a tactical necessity for any legitimate littoral influence.

My only point would be this. On the coastal patrol vessels and the small, fast boats the payload is manpower, not missiles. Armed with guns, built for endurance and to be sustainable, capable of having crews rotated at sea while equipment can be repaired at sea; this type of sustained organizational task group can establish regional maritime domain awareness by distributing sensors, leverage helicopters and armed UAVs to engage in combat when the task is required, and be the physical presence to uncover opposition forces operating with stealth in the complex human terrain of the littorals. In this type of organization, the Littoral Combat Ships can be C2 nodes for multiple coastal patrol vessels and small, fast boats operating as ink spots on regional seas.

This type of organizational task group becomes the perfect match for all of our desired cooperative partnerships. We know the LPD and JHSV are the desired platforms for our Global Partnership Stations. We have seen the good results with both of those platforms. We also know our littoral forces need the sensors and capabilities the LCS delivers, and we need the warfighter capabilities of our AEGIS ships to protect our organized task forces, so both of those platforms make sense. What we also need though are the low end, small platforms that can work with partners at the level they are comfortable with, the PC and small, fast boat level.

In my opinion, this where the Bob Work idea, the idea discussed by Thomas Barnett a few weeks back in Congressional hearings, comes into play. The PCs and the small, fast boats are built to be worked in conjunction with partners. We train regional coast guards using these platforms, and as our partners develop proficiency as a coastal security force, we give these small vessels away as part of a strategic concept of building regional coast guards.

Am I biased in favor of the strategic concept being forwarded? Absolutely. I think the details regarding the specific ships needs to be gamed out, tested thoroughly, and survive the acquisition process for the coastal patrol and small, fast boats (and probably the mothership), but from a strategic conceptual perspective this idea is hitting a grand slam in my opinion.

And it shows a hell of a lot more thought regarding how to deal with the key capabilities for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions than our own Secretary of Defense.

One final point.

I do a pretty thorough job of research, I think, and I can only find one other article written by an active duty Surface Warfare Officer since the 313-ship plan was released that talks specifically about the need to change Navy force structure. It turns out, that article was also written by CDR Hendrix, who wrote Dead Reckoning in the March 2008 Armed Forces Journal. In other words, there is exactly ONE active duty Surface Warfare Officer with the gonads to pen an alternative to the Navy's current force structure plan in public with his name on it.

I think that is incredible!

If I am inaccurate, I welcome being corrected on that last point.

(Turns out, Harry Hendrix is an aviator, meaning there are still 0 SWOs who have produced a force structure in public, with their name on it, since 313)

Navy Ships Collide in Strait of Hormuz - Updated -Bumped

Early reporting, so the details may or may not be accurate.

A US Navy submarine and a US amphibious vessel collided in the Strait of Hormuz on Friday leaving 15 sailors slightly injured, the US Navy Fifth Fleet said.

"The collision between USS Hartford (SSN 768) and USS New Orleans (LPD 18) occurred at approximately 1:00 am local time (2030 GMT on Thursday)," the Bahrain-based navy command said.

"Fifteen sailors aboard the Hartford were slightly injured and returned to duty. No personnel aboard New Orleans were injured," it added.

Middle of the night. The condition of the submarine at the time of the accident, on the surface or submerged, will be an interesting detail to watch for. UNCLOS implications there you know.

Updated: As you might expect, the submarine kicked the amphibious ships ass. From the DoD press statement:

Overall damage to both ships is being evaluated. The propulsion plant of the submarine was unaffected by this collision. A fuel tank ruptured on the New Orleans, which resulted in an oil spill of about 25,000 gallons of fuel. Both ships are currently operating under their own power.

Not a good day. We just dumped oil on Iran's front lawn.

Is it time to be superstitious? Is the entire San Antonio class cursed?

Update2: Good discussion over at bubblehead's place. He has some early professional speculation.

Obviously, there are no specifics out yet, but if the submarine had that many people injured, it's safe to assume she was going faster that you might expect a submarine to go at periscope depth; or, if she was at PD, that she got spun over fairly far onto her side before righting herself.

He says he is at PD. Translation: he'll have more as details unfold.

Update3: Navy Times has a damage report.

Campbell said initial assessments showed two ballast tanks on New Orleans were ruptured, resulting in seawater flooding that required the ship to be stabilized. A fuel tank was also ruptured, causing an estimated 25,000 gallons of marine diesel fuel to spill into the gulf.

“She had flooding in three distinct compartments,” Campbell said. “The flooding is secure, and the ship is making way on her own power.”

P-3 Orion aircraft flew over the area looking for a sheen of spilled oil, but “there’s no indication of that,” she said.

Hartford suffered “visible” damage to the sail and to a bow plane. Campbell could not say if components of the sail such as masts and periscopes are damaged.

More at Navy Times. Sounds like it has been a busy day at the damage control locker on New Orleans. Wasn't the USS Mesa Verfe (LPD 19) the first San Antonio class to have a shock test? Early lessons for a class of ship that can't seem to catch a break.

The Amphibious Ship Plan Evolves Towards FY 2010

Zachary M. Peterson had an article in InsideDefense (subscription only) over the weekend discussing some of the ongoing discussions on Navy-Marine capabilities for the new shipbuilding plan expected to be released with the FY 2010 budget. The first section of the article covers the tentative agreements regarding amphibious ships.

The draft Naval Operation Concept reveals the need for a 38-vessel amphibious ship fleet consisting of 11 amphibious assault ships (LHA/D), 11 transport dock ships (LPD), 12 dock landing ships (LSD) and four additional LPD and LSD vessels. Only 33 amphibious ships are currently resourced in publicly available service budget plans.

The two services agree that the San Antonio-class LPD-17 hull should be used for the LSD ship replacement instead of pursuing a new design.

There is a lot here. First, it looks like the agreement is for 11 ESGs, with the forward deployed ESG getting 2 LSDs as per normal operations. That LSD also acts in the role of a Global Fleet Station platform with CARAT and several other annual exercises, so there is nothing abnormal about the 11/11/12 combination. What is new is the agreed upon arrangement for 4 additional LPD/LSD type vessels, which look to me to be 4 large ships for the other 4 desired Global Fleet Stations the Navy wishes to incorporate into a joint services operation in Latin/South America, East Africa, West Africa, and the Persian Gulf/Mediterranean Sea regions.

As we have noted many times on the blog, the amphibious ship is the hardest working type of ship in the US Navy in the 21st century. The data says all that needs to be said regarding the requirement.

They are flexible platforms that bring together a wide variety of capabilities that can effectively perform the range of mission profiles from soft power to forward afloat staging bases to even assault roles when necessary. They are the rapid responders when crisis breaks out on land, and best fit the most often called upon requirements of the US Navy when problems occur, whether it is Hezbollah/Israel or a natural disaster, the amphibious ship, not the aircraft carrier, is the type of platform sent into to help out people.

I am also very pleased the Navy will capitalize on the LPD-17 hull for the LSDs. The LPD-17 hull can be reconfigured to support the new LCAC(X) which is expected to be bigger, and due to size and with built in hanger facilities the LSD will become a much more capable ship by reusing the LPD-17 hull. It will be interesting to see when in the new shipbuilding plan the Navy replaces current LSDs, because the current LSDs have some life in them. It will also be interesting to see if the Navy arms up the LSD(X) based on the LPD-17 hull with VLS, which would not be a bad way of adding a bit of forward firepower with both ESSM and Tomahawks.

This plan changes the Sea Basing concept (thankfully), but many questions remain.

MPF(F) is conceived to be composed of 14 ships, including two LHA(R); one amphibious assault ship (LHD); five cargo ships (T-AKEs and T-AKs); three Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships; and three Mobile Landing Platforms (MLPs). Initial operational capability is planned for around the FY-16 to FY-17 time frame.

In a Feb. 18 presentation at the annual meeting of the National Defense Industrial Association’s expeditionary warfare division, Rear Adm. Robert Wray, the deputy commander of Military Sealift Command, noted that several courses of action (COAs) are still under discussion to meet the aviation capability for MPF(F).

The article goes on to highlight four courses of action under consideration:

• The program of record without big decks with three modified LMSR platforms;
• The program of record without big decks with four modified LMSRs;
• The program of record with two converted Tarawa-class LHAs by 2021 with the potential for a third conversion in the 2030s and interim plan to rotate an active big deck as the third MPF(F) big-deck ship;
• A commercial ship conversion to an aviation-capable platform.

In the article, this is also included for context.

The Navy’s position, according to a Feb. 25 briefing slide, is that MPF(F) big-deck capabilities are “dependent on affordability,” while the Marine Corps’ position is to pursue the best COA to fulfill the requirement.

In other words, the Navy is committed in a bean counter kind of way, while the Marines appear committed.

In my opinion, the success of the MPF(F) depends almost entirely on the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) and the Test Article Vehicle Transfer System (TAVTS) .

MLP will provide the vehicle transfer system that permits transferring personnel and equipment from a between the Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off Ships (LMSR) to the MLP and smaller craft to facilitate delivery of combat ready forces from the sea base in support of reinforcement missions. An MLP will have two surface interface points for loading, launching and recovering two Landing Craft-Air Cushioned (LCACs) vehicles near-simultaneously. It will carry up to six LCACs. Each MLP will have berthing to accommodate brigade forces during the employment and reconstitution phases of the operation.

The MLP will be able to travel at the rate of approximately 20 knots and have a range of approximately 9,000 nautical miles. The Navy intends to procure and build a total of three MLPs. The first MLP is expected to be delivered in 2015.

TAVTS is described as:

The Test Article Vehicle Transfer System (TAVTS) will demonstrate the transfer of vehicles between a surrogate Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship and a side port platform on a large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ship.

The two primary components of TAVTS are a self-deploying ramp system that will be mounted to a surrogate MLP and a self-deploying sideport platform system that will be mounted to an existing LMSR ship. The TAVTS system is intended to operate through sea-state 3 conditions.

In other words, the Navy is looking to build bridges between ships for vehicles to drive on up to sea state 3 instead of using cranes. This will be interesting. I for one prefer cranes, because with cranes the Navy can maximize the use of existing sea lift much better than relying on specifically configured ships with side hatches. I guess I'm a big skeptic that the idea is to build a capability at sea that would essentially replace the need for a port on shore, but we are doing it without cranes? Maybe a big crane ship instead of the 4th LMSR?

Either way, the plan calls for a bunch of sealift ships that form a system of systems approach, and whenever we are talking about system of systems approaches that use highly specialized types of ships, redundancy appears to be an after thought. No other program quite tells the story of fighting the last war like the Sea Basing program, because it literally is being justified due to how Turkey denied access for the Iraq war.

A few thoughts:

1) The Navy appears sold on the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) concept. How much compatibility exists between the existing sea lift of the US and foreign nations and the MLP will decide if this is an effective platform. If it can't support US, allied, and most importantly, chartered sealift ships, the MLP is a waste of money, period.

2) Any aviation strategy for Sea Basing that can't support the 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division is a Marine Corps centric sea base concept that fails to meet the requirements for a joint capability. Congress should reject funding for any Sea Basing aviation concept that can't meet this requirement.

3) Where are the oilers? The biggest problem with the sea basing concept isn't the idea regarding how to get troops to land, but how to sustain troops from sea once we get them on land. The single largest factor that limits support is fuel. The sea basing capability is expected to be a major asset in major disasters. Well, if Katrina is the lesson, the necessity for fuel is a major aspect of dealing with the problem. Not every country is going to have fuel stations everywhere like we did in Mississippi and Louisiana.

I like the idea of 38 amphibious ships, that seems to match up very well with the emerging challenges likely to be faced, mostly from places without well developed ports around South America, Africa, and southeast Asia. As for the Sea Basing idea, I'm still waiting to see how this idea is either Joint or backwards compatible with everything the MSC/TRANSCOM already uses today.

Report: More Amphibious Ships in New Shipbuilding Plan

The amphibious ship is the dreadnought of the modern era at sea, at least when looked at from the perspective of prestige globally and how virtually every major naval power is adding amphibious ships to its list of capabilities. Some have called the emerging 21st century era the Expeditionary era. While I don't think expeditionary warfare must mean amphibious warfare, the flexibility of amphibious ships in tackling modern maritime requirements is unmatched by other platforms, which is why I share the General's pause for optimism.

From Key To Future Seabasing Efforts Conway: Marines Need Amphibious Ships, Prepositioning Vessels by Zachary M. Peterson, Inside the Navy (subscription).

“There’s a new Navy shipbuilding program out there that I don’t think has been made public yet, so I won’t talk about it,” Conway told reporters Jan. 23 at a breakfast in Washington. “It gives me pause for optimism on the subject of amphibs.”

The commandant may have been referring to yet-to-be-released ship force structure numbers anticipated to include a higher number of amphibious ships. The numbers are expected in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard’s Naval Operations Concept, which was supposed to be released last year but has been held up due to the inclusion of the force structure numbers.

Marine and industry sources tell Inside the Navy an amphibious fleet larger than 33 vessels is expected in the document.

This move would put the future force structure of the US Navy into alignment with maritime strategy in my opinion, but it also means something has to give. If we give to amphibious ships, we take from somewhere else.

The most likely scenario is we reduce the number of nuclear aircraft carriers to at least 10, potentially fewer. The next most likely scenario is fewer submarines, which accepts risk at the high end of war. While submarines are smarter platforms for the future Navy than DDG-51s, more DDG-51s will win that debate.

We will have 62 DDG-51s for almost 2 more decades, the difference between 62 and 70 DDG-51s is purely an industrial consideration to the shipyards, not strategic to the Navy, so in keeping shipyards working it is not necessarily a bad thing. CG(X) is the most important ship in development, and someone in the Navy needs to be saying this as often as possible. We know it won't be built on the DDG-1000 hull, and we know it will probably use many technologies developed with DDG-1000. We also know CG(X) will be the centerpiece of the Navy's ballistic missile defense priority as we move into the 21st century. The more CG(X) is discussed, the better in my view.

The least likely scenario is the LCS buy is reduced from 55, although that would be where I would start cutting current plans. While the LCS is not a wasted effort, the platform has capabilities worth replacing the mine ships with even at a cost of $550 million. However, it doesn't solve many existing littoral warfare challenges even if others claim it does. We are still missing that small combatant, what I think should be ~600 tons and cost $100 million, a ship built to do the dirty work in the littoral.

Regardless, more amphibious ships is a great start. Using the Seapower 21 analogy from last night, the Navy has decided big surface combatants were a bad idea, and has gone with more amphibious ships (which can be big motherships) instead. This move is perfectly aligned with maritime strategy, and news worth being optimistic about in my opinion.

Barack Obama's First Act: Send the Navy to War

I was disappointed when I read Thomas Ricks strategic assessment regarding the Navy's approach to piracy.

Tom Ricks is an astute observer of military strategy, and if he sees the pirate situation off Somalia as simply a way to take a cheap shot at the disaster called naval shipbuilding strategy, then I'm afraid nobody in the media may understand what is and has happened. I'd like to welcome Thomas Ricks to the blogosphere by suggesting that when it comes to maritime strategy as it relates to the issue of Somali piracy, he doesn't appear to know what he is talking about. Thomas Ricks writes:

Better late that never to be going after the Somalia pirates. To me, this is a strategic issue. Keeping the sea lanes open, especially for oil, should be a top priority for the U.S. military. Instead we seemed to defer to the Indians, Chinese and others, letting them take the lead. The Navy may feel that all its special operators -- the guys trained to board and take over ships -- are busy in Iraq and Afghanistan. So, admiral, does that tell you that you probably need more ship boarders, and maybe fewer aircraft carriers or anti-missile systems? You think maybe?

I noted that Yankee Sailor left a comment on the thread. I'm betting Thomas Ricks has no idea who Yankee Sailor is, nor why Yankee Sailor's opinion is more informed. We know better. I have a lot of problems with the assessment Tom is making here, starting with what the top priority for the US military should be. If the top priority of the US military, including the Navy, isn't winning the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, then something is wrong. There is a reason why there are more sailors deployed on land in the CENTCOM area of operations than at sea, and that reason is absolutely valid.

This is a strategic issue as Tom contends, but with the assertion of "better late than never" and the suggestion that "Indians, Chinese and others" taking leadership roles is somehow representative of a failure of maritime strategy, Tom Ricks is essentially admitting to me that he has never actually read the US Navy's maritime strategy.

I couldn't agree more with Thomas Ricks regarding his implied assessment of naval shipbuilding, as I have stated in the past, in no case can we exercise control of the sea with battleships alone. Our collective opinions regarding force structure however do not translate into analysis whether the Navy has the right equipment to address piracy, nor does it hold any bearing on whether the strategic approach the Navy, indeed the nation, has taken to address piracy off the coast of Somalia has been effective. By turning his assessment of the US strategy towards the Somali piracy issue into a force structure debate, Tom Ricks is making an apples and oranges comparison.

But when it comes to naval forces and the US Navy's approach to Somalia, I'd suggest that even on this specific point Tom is inaccurate. I see the use of the LPD-17 platform as an afloat forward staging base (AFSB) as a brilliant approach to addressing irregular littoral challenges like piracy. While no one is suggesting the LPD-17 is the only solution towards a challenge that requires a network of naval vessels, the LPD-17 platform represents a central node in that network in a lot of the analysis I've read on the subject. It isn't an accident the Navy is using the USS San Antonio (LPD-17) as a command ship for CTF-151, and don't be surprised when the USS New Orleans (LPD-18) becomes the next command ship for CTF-151. In this regard, I see the analysis of Thomas Ricks regarding what means to use to execute maritime strategy off Somalia as flawed as well.

Tom's point raises the question whether the US Navy needs to retool long term for fighting challenges like piracy. I would contend that Somali piracy is indeed a test case that answers those kinds of questions.

All strategies have an expiration date, because with any new policy comes a new strategy. As signaled by Admiral Gortney last week in the Pentagon press conference, all indications are that a new policy is soon to emerge, meaning the current strategy for addressing Somali piracy is about to expire. With that the case, we can now evaluate whether the current strategy to date has been successful or not.

What has been the Navy's strategy? The ends of strategy has been two fold. First, to build an international approach towards the shared international security problem of Somali piracy. Second, to develop the political and legal framework to enable action against Somali piracy. If we judge the success or failure of strategy by whether the ends of strategy are achieved, then I would suggest the Navy has done a brilliant job.

Even a casual reading of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower notes that by placing emphasis on taking cooperative approaches to shared problems, the Navy will always be taking a "diplomacy first" approach in executing maritime strategy. Building coalitions is by definition political, and using the time frame discussed by Admiral Gortney in the press conference, comparing the situation in the region in August to the situation today, clearly the conditions have been shaped towards the ends of strategy in terms of building international participation. Could the US Navy have taken ownership or leadership in the fight against piracy? Absolutely, but they wisely, intentionally avoided doing so, because the absence of the US Navy was the enabling condition that built the international military response to date, and allowed the political process led by the European and Asian economic powers in the United Nations to develop towards our strategic goals.

The conditions for using military power today are not the same as they have been in the past. Those conditions are influenced heavily by how previous military actions taken by the Bush administration have been seen globally. Dealing with this condition change has, in the specific case of Somali piracy, required the US Navy to do nothing about piracy off Somalia in order to build an international diplomatic and military response. For those who seek more clarification regarding the strategic environment we will build strategies in after Bush, I encourage you to read Great Powers: America and the World After Bush by Thomas Barnett set to be released on February 5, 2009.

Admiral Gortney told the media in the press conference that sometime in the next week the State Dept would finalize an agreement with one of the nations in the region to prosecute pirates, and once that happens there will be a change in the Navy's rules of engagement. The implication is, because all strategies expire with policy change, a new strategy in regards to Somali piracy is soon to emerge with a new proactive policy, and the implications of a new policy are historic in regards to the timing.

The nations maritime strategy towards Somali piracy, by emphasizing a diplomacy first approach, has resulted in 1) a United Nations driven mandate for military action (still evolving as recently as today towards a multinational land action btw) 2) built on international consensus 3) to address a complex international security problem resulting 4) in the largest collection of international warships off the coast of Africa since WWII with 5) a legal framework to take action. By taking a patient approach, largely consisting of military inaction while implementing a diplomacy first solution with allies towards building this large international presence, the diplomats have developed the desired international legal framework necessary for the Navy to take action, and do so in the exact conditions desired and expressed in the Navy's own maritime strategy.

The execution of maritime strategy to date has been brilliant in my opinion. The timing isn't "too late" as Tom Ricks contends, the timing is perfect.

When was the last time a President of the United States, acting as Commander in Chief, has entered office and on the first week has instructed the US Navy to take military action? In the history of our country, this has never happened, ever! And yet the strategy towards Somali piracy has been executed so well that Barack Obama will enter office this week, and one of his very first acts as Commander in Chief will be to send the US Navy to war against pirates off the coast of Somalia.

With all due respect to Thomas Ricks, he may need to write a new book to adequately explore the dynamics of just how successful the US diplomatic and maritime strategy for dealing with Somali piracy has been. When a strategy is implemented so masterfully that both the media and all the partisans in the US completely miss that Barack Obama's first act as Commander in Chief will be to go to war on a third front, and by taking this action, the international community is excited that one of the first actions by the President replacing George Bush is to commit military power in the Middle East region...

...clearly someone, somewhere, is doing something right.

It will be interesting to see what strategy emerges to carry out the upcoming policy change in regards to Somali piracy. Everyone knows the solution to piracy is on land. It is also noteworthy that the symptoms of Somali piracy are the same as the symptoms creating the terrorism issues that have long driven US policy towards Somalia under the Bush administration. The challenge is now that the US has found a way to align the strategic interests of the international community with US strategic interests in Somalia, can the political process develop an international solution to both problems? I don't know, but I bet the success of that process will be diplomatic, not military, and may even require naval forces to fail to stop piracy at sea to be achieved.

cross-posted at the United States Naval Institute Blog

Observing The Establishment of Combined Task Force 151

As The Custodian noted on Thursday, the US Navy has established a multinational task force focused solely on counter-piracy operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The name of this new task force is Combined Task Force 151 (CF-151). Despite the previous rhetoric otherwise from 5th Fleet and the political forces in Washington, including Condoleeza Rice at the United Nations, this is the first tangible action taken by the United States Navy to address the piracy problems emanating from Somalia. Previous efforts have consisted solely in information sharing and assistance response to mariners under threat. These are my observations of the political, tactical, and strategic thinking behind this action by the US Navy.

Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) will operate from the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) which will act as a command ship, and initially will be supported by two unnamed warships. It will be interesting to see what kind of helicopters we see flying off the USS San Antonio (LPD 17), we have recently seen AH-1s and UH-1s on the flight deck (click image above and look at it in hi-res), and it will be interesting to see if it becomes Marine airmen who become the sharp end of the spear. I also noted the announcement that the Boxer ESG will deploy Friday, which includes both the USS New Orleans (LPD 18) and the new UH-1Y Huey's. Go back and read my conversation with Expeditionary Strike Group 5 leadership, including the transcript of the whole conversation. The announcement today puts a lot of that conversation in context, making me think they kind of knew this was coming. As a consistent vocal fan of the San Antonio class, this is exactly the scenario that I have so often discussed this ship... as the flexible sea-air-land nGW maritime domain command ship (mothership). It will be interesting to observe whether reality confirms or discredits my theories through this implementation.

One final note on this, the Boxer ESG only has 2 warships and 1 Coast Guard Cutter. If this ESG replaces the Iwo Jima ESG in the 5th Fleet operating theater, the net effect is a reduction of one warship. It is interesting we are setting up a new command to be resourced by ships at a time the Navy appears to be gradually reducing the number of ships in the region. This could be telling us something about the Navy's obligations being reduced as it relates to the Iraq war theater.

Depending upon your point of view, or world view, the reasons regarding why the US Navy is developing CTF-151 may very. The Europeans, in particular the Germans, believe this is a reaction to the German Navy taking over command of Task Force 150 next week. The German Navy has a very specific mandate in the region regarding action against piracy, and German command over Task Force 150 coalition forces that take proactive steps to curb piracy could create political problems, and disrupt what has been a very successful coalition effort dealing with other security issues maritime forces are operating to address in the region.

While it is an interesting theory, that would not explain why the US Navy's commitment to date fighting piracy has been lackluster at best, so it wouldn't explain why the US Navy decided to all of a sudden take a more proactive approach against piracy simply because Germany is taking command of Task Force 150. The fundamental change here has nothing to do with the Germans, the fundamental change is a shift in strategy towards piracy. Without the decision to adjust the Navy's fundamental strategic approach to fighting piracy, the US Navy would be quite content operating in Task Force 150 under German command.

I also think CDR Salamander couldn't be more off the mark with his analysis that this represents the US Navy going it alone in theater. The US Navy has talked tough about piracy and has intentionally NOT done the job of the Europeans in protecting their trade for a long time now. In my opinion, the result of the pirate problem is that pirates have become the solution to developing a multinational approach to solving the difficult challenges in Somalia, and has built the largest collection of warships in the 21st century dedicated to the single purpose of curbing piracy against global trade in a concentrated region. There are 3 Saudi frigates and 3 Chinese ships missing from my last Order of Battle for the 5th Fleet. I'm stunned that the CDR believes as we observe another prerequisite for the framework required in developing a Global Maritime Partnership, he sees it as a sign the US Navy is abandoning the maritime strategy that has so brilliantly shaped these conditions? The patience that has been demonstrated, particularly given the incredibly harsh criticism of the US Navy by so many people on both the CDRs blog and mine, has been extraordinary, and the results in the form of a shared international responsibility against the difficult challenge of piracy has been well worth the wait.

CTF-151 will have a one-star Admiral in command, Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, which I think is exactly the right approach towards building this force for the long haul. After all, I suggested it would be the right approach towards coalition building for a multinational approach to piracy back in December after the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1846.

My only concern by the pick of Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is that I am surprised the Navy picked an Admiral from the Atlantic Fleet. Expeditionary Strike Group 2, last I heard, was associated with the USS Bataan (LHD 5). I am sure Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is capable, but I was just expecting leadership to come from the Pacific Fleet. Put another way, I expected the Navy to pick someone with experience and familiarity dealing with the PLA Navy.

There is another reason the Navy may be forming CTF-151 besides taking a unilateral approach or because the Germans are taking Command of Task Force 150. This week the PLA Navy entered the action curbing piracy against regional commerce off the coast of Somalia. While the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 might represent the tactical development of an infrastructure to fight the pirate problem originating from Somalia, a problem everyone agrees is on land more than sea; the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 also represents a long term strategy towards the ends of linking the national security strategies of CENTCOM and PACOM looking into the future. Consider for a moment what CTF-151 looks like in the context of an image posted by EagleOne the other day, what I'm calling in the spirit of Thomas Barnett, the Navy's New Map in the first term of the Obama administration.

The tactical purpose of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) might be to establish "a multinational task force focused solely on counter-piracy operations," but the strategic purpose has larger ends. Combined Task Force 150 represents a mostly Western approach to nGW in the maritime domain in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The nations that contribute to Task Force 150 are European and North American, but also made up of regional partners including Pakistan. If there is any vision behind Combined Task Force 151, the number one priority of Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is to build an Eastern approach to nGW in the maritime domain in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Essentially, Rear Adm. Terry McKnight priority from day 1 should be to recruit China, Russia, India, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia into CTF-151, all of whom have already committed ships with the intent to fight piracy. If or when Japan and South Korea send ships, recruit them as well.

The US Navy has absolutely nothing to gain in creating maritime competitions in fighting piracy, indeed the Maritime Strategy is about creating maritime coalitions in dealing with maritime challenges. With the creation of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) the US Navy continues to evolve at the pace of the international community towards the development of a cooperative approach to dealing with the problems in Somalia. The strategy here has been absolutely brilliant in my opinion. By not solving the piracy problem for others, a problem that has no economic impact whatsoever to the United States; by encouraging and assisting coalition partners with existing resources; and by remaining patient but engaged in the slowly evolving political process (UNSCR 1846) the United States Navy now finds itself with the internal infrastructure, regional participants, enabled by evolving international political and legal frameworks, and the right tactical resources to address a maritime nGW problem with an international, coalition approach.

For better or worse, the US Navy's Maritime Strategy has put the US Navy exactly in the position the maritime strategy states it is designed to do. It is now up to our national leadership, both political and inside the Navy, to close the deal with the opportunities at hand. In this bloggers opinion, there is some irony the success in developing a coalition approach to deal with Somalia will fall to the new Secretary of State, one Hillary Clinton. She, more than anyone, understands the challenges of military activities in Somalia. The question is whether that is an advantage, or a burden in the process. Time will tell.

cross-posted at the United States Naval Institute Blog