The Littoral Strike Group: An Alternative to More Battleships

As I noted the other day on the USNI blog, Frank Hoffman's new CNAS report (PDF) is calling for a 1000 ton PC, while Dakota Wood's CSBA report (PDF) is calling for Marine attachments on the LCS. A new article in National Defense Magazine notes the Marines are now in serious discussions that there is "definitely some momentum building" for either a PC vessel or a 100 foot vessel for irregular warfare operations.

When I had a chance to sit down with Commandant Conway back in September, he emphasized several aspects of getting the Marines back to sea, but two comments he made stood out. First, the Marines are getting too heavy, and need to find a way to get lighter. That point was also made by Colonel David Coffman, Commanding officer, 13th MEU when I spoke with him last month.

Commandant Conway's second point was also interesting, he believes the Marines need to find ways to maintain organizational integrity when broken into smaller units at sea. That last part of the discussion was in response to a question about Marines returning to warships. I think you can link both issues, because the way I think the Navy and Marines can approach the organizational integrity issue while getting lighter is by building Navy platforms and LCS modules intended to support the existing organization of the Marine Corps, keep the vehicles close but separate, and start building with the squad and build up to the Company level.

The Navy has a long history of deploying squadrons of small ships in the littorals to deal with irregular warfare challenges, indeed the comments of this post and this post have plenty of links that recount the historical record. I think as we look at ideas being circulated, review our own Navy and Marine Corps history, and look at the current challenges one option for the way ahead with PC class vessels becomes apparent.

Right now our ESGs are designed to deploy a battalion of Marines. We are looking to build a Sea Base to support a brigade of Marines, and that requirement is actually being driven by a 2 brigade standard. As we look to smaller ships, perhaps we should approach it as part of the solution to deploying a Company of Marines, or perhaps a Platoon of Marines, or as Dakota Woods suggests, perhaps down to the squad level. A 100 foot armed vessel usually runs between 200-450 tons, while a 1000 ton PC usually represents something like a 250 foot vessel. I would suggest maybe we are looking for something between both of those metrics.

Building upon the historical view of deploying small combatant squadrons in the littoral, I think we should look at building squadrons that include 4 PC type vessels, each designed to deploy a squad of 12 Marines, but also designed to include a detachment of Coast Guard for law enforcement while operating the ship with a small Navy crew. I think we should also seek a few requirements for this PC including a $100 million price cap, minimum 10 days endurance, a 2000 nautical mile range at 15 knots, and I would include a small medical space on the PC and insure each PC has 2 corpsman. I don't care what the top speed is and I don't care what the weapon payload is, those can be an argument for someone else, because what I think is important is that we expect this PC to be the physical contact platform with other surface vessels and we let that reality drive requirements. In other words, the PC is sending the boarding party and will be the eyeball that determines friend and foe in confusing maritime environments. The PC becomes a manned engagement node in the deployable Maritime Domain Awareness network.

A 4 ship PC squadron where each PC supports a squad of Marines and a detachment of Coast Guard sailors opens up all kinds of littoral capabilities, but by itself falls just short of completing a Marine Corps Rifle Platoon while also introducing several C4ISR challenges. This is where the LCS becomes the C4ISR enabler, the support ship for the squadron, and where a Marine Corps module fills the gap and completes a Marine Rifle Platoon with everything but vehicles. Essentially, the LCS becomes the Sea Based HQ for the operations of all three services supporting the squadron requirements. With payloads of aviation unmanned vehicles for ISR, replacement RHIBs for the squadron, extra fuel and food for sustaining the squadron, not to mention other options that might include an air traffic controller and several other specialists that can be deployed with the platoon for ground operations. The LCS may even be required to act as a sea based temperary jailing facility during maritime security operations and Coast Guard interdiction operations. A full squadron would be 5 ships.

A Littoral Strike Group would include 4 squadrons, 4 LCS and 16 PCs, plus 1 HSV which carries the vehicles for the full Marine Corps Company that is built into the squadron. Pair this force with 1 LPD-17 with another rifle company of Marines plus detachments, 1 T-AKE mod mothership for the 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 1 T-AKE mod mothership for the 16 PCs, and 1 DDG-51 escort and you have a regional force that could be distributed along a very long coast line with Command nodes on the LPD-17 and all 4 LCS supporting the activities of 16 PCs. With the additional Marine Corps vehicles on the HSV, you could surge a LHA(R), some major surface combatants, and a submarine into this force and come very close to having a light and agile LSG MEU to compliment a traditional ESG MEU carrying the heavier, organic ship to shore deployable Marine Corps vehicles.

When I look at a force like this, I see 2 T-AKE motherships that focus on the Navy's squadron platforms and crews, I see a LPD-17 mothership model for supporting the Marine and Coast Guard detachment crews, I see a HSV for regional partnership with a Marine Corps company of vehicles to support that activity (and plenty of space for all kinds of NECC capabilities), and the LCS's themselves act as motherships for the unmanned systems to support operations on both sea and land. Depending upon the future development of the MIW and ASW modules, particularly if they end up using the same deployable underwater and surface vehicles, it may be possible to build rapid response capability with the tender to meet those challenges with this force.

Sound expensive? Not with the $100 million cost cap requirement. Do the math, a squadron of 16 PCs runs $1.6 billion, $600 million less than the $2.2 billion of a new Burke and if the ship is manned with between 14-18 sailors each, you end up with fewer total sailors in a squadron than a new DDG-51.

There are additional costs though. The LPD-17 and 2 T-AKE mods would cost about $1.8 billion and probably around 2 x $500 million respectively, which added together comes to $2.8 billion + the $1.6 billion, or roughly $4.4 billion total. Wait, that is how much the 2 DDG-51s per year the Navy will ask for starting in FY10!

Operational costs will be higher than 2 Burkes though, fuel consumption will be much higher, and there will be additional Navy (perhaps civilian on the T-AKE) crew costs associated with the LPD-17 and 2 T-AKEs, not to mention potential additional costs for both the Marines and Coast Guard for forward deployment operations. Unfortunately, this is the price of more, faster ships that puts additional manpower at the point of contact in forward deployed theaters, what I have mentioned many times that I believe will be a requirement for the Navy in following through in its effort to "preventing war" as outlined in the Maritime Strategy.

If we think of $100 million PCs in the context of aircraft like the MV-22, which at around the same investment also carries a squad of Marines into harms way, and apply that approach to the sea, the joint maritime services can create persistent sea surface networks better aligned for dealing in the irregular warfare space, the maritime security space, the self generated Maritime Domain Awareness space, and the regional partnership engagement space that better aligns the US Navy to the requirements of the ungoverned and contested spaces in the maritime environment today. This force isn't what we would want for major war, but it fills out peacetime requirements quite well and frees up major surface combatant forces for the responsibilities they are better suited to manage against major competitors.

To borrow another historical look at small combatants, given the cost and size of the force, it would not be inaccurate to call the development of 4 Littoral Strike Groups the 21st century Economy B force discussed only a decade ago, and all 4 LSGs that includes 76 new ships (4 LPD-17s, 8 T-AKEs, and 64 PCs) could be developed with the same SCN funds intended to fund just the 8 more Burkes the Navy intends to build over the next 5 years.

Conversation With Expeditionary Strike Group 5

This is from the bloggers roundtable November 12th, 2008 with Commodore Peter Dallman, Commander, Boxer ESG/Amphibious Squadron Five; Colonel David Coffman, Commanding officer, 13th MEU; and Captain Mark Cedrun, Commanding Officer USS Boxer. As you read, I think you'll note like I did that Col. Coffman steals the show, at least in regards to my question.

You can find the entire transcript of what I thought was a really good coversation here (PDF). Below was my questioning as part of the conversation.

I thought the first bits were interesting, but I really think the conversation opened up when the topic shifted to USS New Orleans (LPD 18). This was the same day as the Time magazine article that called the San Antonio the Floating Fiasco. I have added some commentary and observations.

Q. Galrahn: I have a question on the make-up of the strike group. I noticed that the USS Milius had been mentioned as part of the strike group up until this point, and the captain did not mention the ship. I was wondering if there was a reason. Did it -- is it different tasking or just no longer part of the group?

A. COL. COFFMAN: Well, that's a good question. Milius had been previous -- had been part of our group, but it's been decided that she's going to deploy separately and not as part of our group -- (inaudible) -- missions.

In other words, the strike group consists of:

USS Boxer (LHD 4)
USS New Orleans (LPD 18)
USS Comstock (LSD 45)
USS Lake Champlain (CG 57)
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93)
USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719)

Q. Galrahn: The second question was in regards to the Boutwell. I know that in the Pacific you guys have deployed cutters with your ESGs in the past. I'm just curious. I understand the cooperative function that is gained when you have all three of the maritime services together. I'm just wondering if there is a specific role or purpose for the inclusion of the cutter as part of the strike group? Is there -- are you planning exercises that emphasize more law enforcement? Is that the reasoning? Is there some sort of specific reason that you're bringing the Boutwell along?

A. COL. COFFMAN: You want me to answer that? Okay. Because I -- we took one on (inaudible.) I mean, the primary reason is because countries, potential countries --

A. COMMODORE DALLMAN: Go ahead, Mark.

A. CAPT. CEDRUN: Yeah, this is Mark Cedrun, CO of the Boxer. You're pretty much on target. I'll echo what the colonel said and that we don't specifically know what our tasking is going to be once we go, but having done a CARAT deployment, which is a cooperative and readiness afloat training deployment with the Coast Guard cutter Morgenthau, the possibility exists that if we are tasked to go to a country en route to wherever they're sending us that a lot of these folks are very interested in our Coast Guard and how the Coast Guard operates off American shores and they like to mirror that and apply that to their own country. And that's what I saw when I did CARAT in 2002 when we went to various countries in Southeast Asia.

So they were very interested in coastal patrol, law enforcement, coastal defense and bringing a Coast Guard cutter along with us. You've got the pros from Dover and they're very interested in how our Coast Guard operates. So that's the primary purpose.

A. CAPT. CEDRUN: And I would also add in there that, obviously, there's a broad array of maritime missions and tasks that the Navy side -- that we're tasked to do in maritime environment, which is not only the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard pitch into the fight, but also, you know, obviously, we're working with many coalition partners to fulfill those tasks in order to create stable conditions at sea which are going to allow economic prosperity to continue and enhance global security. So the whole idea of the Coast Guard is pitching into the fight and helping us continue to support from the maritime side in order to fulfill those missions of the combatant commanders.

Q. Galrahn: Did you guys request the cutter, or was it assigned to you from your boss? How did that come about to where the cutter gets to be integrated into the strike group?

A. CAPT. CEDRUN: Well, that's probably more of a question for the Coast Guard. They -- obviously, they're aware of our schedules and we work the Navy and Coast Guard together in order to get to an agreement where they would deploy with us.

So it's a little bit above my pay grade to articulate exactly how that was discussed, but, you know, certainly it's a handshake agreement between the Navy and the Coast Guard to reach an agreement on how and when they are going to deploy ships with strike groups. As a matter of fact, the Boxer did have a Coast Guard cutter with us last time we deployed as well, so it certainly is not uncommon.

For the record, I have asked the Coast Guard and hope to get more information regarding the deployment of the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719). These are the deployments we can expect the National Security Cutter to make in the future, so we might as well be talking about them now. I believe these deployments have a lot in common with the recent deployment of the USCGC Dallas (WHEC 716) off Africa, and later to Georgia. Anytime the Coast Guard is deploying forward, this blog is interested.

Q. Galrahn: And the final question I was going to ask about the ships is, this will be the first deployment for the USS New Orleans and -- I mean, even today, Time Magazine runs a story -- I think, the quote was pretty brutal. Something about a floating fiasco when they were talking about the San Antonio. Are you guys concerned about this? Is this -- are you taking any measures to account for the possibility that the New Orleans may run into some problems per se on its first deployment similar to how the San Antonio was?

A. COL. COFFMAN: Yeah. This is Colonel Coffman from the 13th MEU. We are always concerned with the material condition and readiness of the ships, but I can tell you we've done two underways with my Marines on that deck. We have elected and we are the first to do this. They didn't do it with San Antonio. I have put my battalion landing team headquarters on New Orleans.

Yeah, with the capacity of the New Orleans -- and I know you're familiar with that from your question regarding San Antonio -- with this three ship amphibious group out of the West Coast here with LHD Class with Captain Fedrins ship, San Antonio class with the New Orleans and then our LSD, we've got a tremendous leap in capacity in terms of vehicle stowage and, or vehicle cube or square feet and cube stowage. So one thing is we've got a tremendous increase from what has become a very challenging problem for us here, as marine equipment has gotten bigger and heavier with armoring up and whatnot. So we're the -- really the first West Coast MEU here in the last few years that's been able to kind of get all of our stuff well established on board and be able -- (audio break) --

So we were the first MEU to be able to get this much stuff aboard, so that's -- and to put it across the decks to permit the distributed ops of the ships working separate areas. And that's, of course, led us to putting -- I have a flag on each ship. My CLB is on the LSD (sp); my BLT headquarters is on New Orleans; and the MEU command element and squadron, of course, are on the flagship over here.

And what I was going to tell you was we've gained great confidence in New Orleans' ship and crew and have done what the ship was bought to do, particularly over the two (inaudible) periods here of integrated training. We've been able to execute a mechanized raid profile off the New Orleans, basically as an independent platform with our amtrack and tanks and LCACs (sp) working off of that deck. So we're very excited about the increased capacity and capability of that ship. So as far as the employment end of it, which is my part of the business, we're really excited to have New Orleans aboard and have gained increased confidence during the workup period here. And I can probably throw it back to Commodore Dallman if he wants to talk about blue side material condition or any questions regarding that. Do you want to pick that part up, Pete?

Chuck Simmons at America's North Shore Journal also picked up on this, and asked a follow up question later on the topic. One thing forgotten about the LPD-17 class is how the Marines, who have become heavy due to Iraq, are able to get more equiment aboard. Col Coffman describes it as getting all his stuff onboard. This becomes a major theme of the rest of the blogger roundtable discussion.

A. COMMODORE DALLMAN: Sure, sure. Obviously we have specifically addressed the material concerns that we had from before and we're continually working to improve materials -- (inaudible). As the colonel said, we are always concerned about the material status of our ships. That's something that's very top of our list. But I would echo his confidence in this ship's abilities, capabilities to deploy on time and task, and be able to be flexible to respond to tasking from our, from our group, from the Colonel, or me or from higher authorities.

A. COL. COFFMAN: And let me jump back in on that too because I hit the bottom for the well deck and vehicle deck which were laid out beautifully to be able to do mech work and LCAC (sp) work. And the other improvement, as you probably know, is enhanced aviation capabilities. So the ship is designed to hold an aviation deck. We have exercised three different models of that during our workup in terms of the type of aircraft mix we would send over there. So again, it allows us to take that ship and kind of give it an entire mission to itself with a decent aviation compliment upstairs and then the way we put it together in terms of our assignment to shipping with mech capability coming out of the well deck. So for the employment and great capability and flexibility at how to employ that platform.

Q. Galrahn: Now Colonel Coffman, you said three different types of aviation on the LPD, are you talking about not just 46s but also you're talking about the H-1s as well, different groups or -- what does that mean?

COL. COFFMAN: Yeah, that's correct. So for example, if we were going to put the New Orleans against their mechanized raid or more of a kinetic mission then we can go ahead and put their fire support over there as well.

So we have exercised putting a AH-1 and UH-1 get over there which gives them there, basically self-contained capability with rotary-wing casts and then mechanized forces out of the well deck. If we were to send New Orleans, or focus them on less kinetic or humanitarian assistance or other ops, I can put assault helicopters over there, 46's or even 53's and give them assault support that has evacuation or those type of missions. So we're playing with the right kind of combinations to maximize the utility of that deck. As you probably know, I mean we started with the expanded spot LPD's some years ago to increase the aviation capabilities across the decks. But again, with this mix, and I'll throw in Comstock as well, so the increased capacity of the New Orleans has permitted us to reclaim the flight deck of Comstock. Over the last 10, 15 years we have frequently had to put cargo and vehicles up on top of Comstock, on top of LSDs, again because of our space issue. We are able to get what we wanted aboard. Clear two spots on Comstock so we have a good ready divert deck on Comstock. We have a secondary airport on New Orleans. And, of course, here with Captain Fedrin's ship, we have our primary air platform. So I would argue the same way, the addition of the New Orleans has got us back to a really good quality spread in terms of aviation capability to operate across all three of the amphib platforms. So we're delighted with that as well and so we're just kind of writing, or practicing the procedures and kind of the SOPs, the standard operating procedures of what kind of decks would best fit over there and best work over there with that enhanced aviation capability.

Q. Galrahn: Thank you very much.

was an emphasis in strategic Sea Basing evident in the discussion, and I was left with a completely different opinion of New Orleans (LPD 18) than I had going in. If you are familiar with loading plans, you can get a feeling for what the LPD-17 class is doing to the MEU, but also get a good feeling for what the LPD-17 class gives as a stand alone platform. Very interesting...

The Headline Says it All

A very clever headline: The Navy's Floating Fiasco. The article is very fair, because it is true... and it helps that it includes this sentence.

Navy officials say the third and fourth vessels are performing much better.

Too bad the rest of the article is kick in the nuts for the USS San Antonio (LPD 17). The path ahead for the Navy (and NGSS) is clear, get three and four right. It really is too bad the article breaks down near the end.

The rush to produce the fleet might make military sense if they were needed, but the last time Marines stormed ashore — the key reason the taxpayer is spending $14 billion on the San Antonio, and at least eight more ships just like it — was nearly 60 years ago, at Inchon during the Korean War.

Uhm, because the most flexible ships in the fleet are only good for Inchon landings? Mark Thompson is a good national security reporter, but that comment highlights the limitations of his strategic vision. I guess we can write his name down with the group who believes the Navy needs more battleships.

Hopefully the Obama administration is smarter. I know, my analysis lately is weak because I won't argue points like this. I am waiting for the NOC.

Not a Pretty Sight

Tim Colton on LPD-17.

See some absolutely amazing pictures of some of the weld defects here (PDF). This is just fundamentally disgraceful. Doesn't anyone at Northrop Grumman know how to build ships any more? Why did the Navy ever accept delivery of this piece of %&*#?

Good question. I really want to like the LPD-17... Mesa Verde, don't let me down!

Starting to Taste Like a Sour Citrus Fruit...

There is only one 21st century era warship in the fleet on deployment today. Ugh.

The troubled amphibious transport dock San Antonio has been forced to undergo two weeks of maintenance in Bahrain for “lube oil deficiencies” in the middle of its deployment, a Navy spokesman said.

“They had a scheduled port visit,” said Lt. Nate Christensen, spokesman for 5th Fleet in Bahrain. “They’re in port for two weeks for a maintenance availability on some lube oil deficiencies. It’s related to the diesel generators.”

The NavyTimes has a long memory:

Now in the Persian Gulf, San Antonio needs an extra-long pit stop for a problem that was foreshadowed in the July 2005 inspection report. “Lube oil temperature regulating valves in the main propulsion diesel engine (MPDE) lube oil systems were improperly set. Incorrectly regulated MPDE engine lube oil temperature prevented the ship from making full power for a sustained period.”

The April 2007 inspection report notes several subsequent lube oil problems.

Everyone is pointing to Mesa Verde, you know, the first in this class that did not have to be redesigned after construction started. We'll have to wait and see, but probably not very long now that the ship has completed (and passed) shock trials.

As for San Antonio, she appears to be a bottomless pit of problems. Not good.

The New Shipbuilding Plan For Surface Combatants

Make no mistake, despite all the ink spilled over the DDG-1000 and Littoral Combat Ship, the most important surface combatant program is by far the CG(X). Intended to replace the 22 remaining Ticonderoga class cruisers currently active in service, the current CG(X) program of record calls for 19 replacements. Whether the Navy was going to reuse the DDG-1000 hull or not, this contract award was going to happen. Press Release:

Alion Science and Technology, an employee-owned technology solutions company, announced that it has been awarded a contract to support the Navy in managing the design and acquisition of the Navy’s next generation Guided Missile Cruiser, CG(X). The award, a delivery order under the NAVSEA SeaPort Enhanced (SeaPort-e) contract, has a potential value of $127.8 million over five years. The base year value is approximately $18.6 million.

CG(X) will be a highly capable major surface combatant tailored for joint air and missile defense and joint air control operations providing airspace dominance and protection to Joint forces operating in the Seabase. CG(X) will replace the U.S.S. Ticonderoga, CG 47 class AEGIS cruisers and improve the Fleet’s air and missile defense capabilities against advancing threats, particularly ballistic missiles.

According to an article by Zachary M. Peterson from September, the Navy submitted the first part of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to OSD that included a radar sensitivity analysis, number of missiles the ship will carry, and the various hull forms that will meet the requirements. The article went on to discuss when to expect to see the first CG(X) built.

“We don’t see [CG(X)] commencing within the current [budget plans through FY-15],” McCullough said last week. “It’s got to do with technology development of both the radars and propulsion; and to get the risk to moderate or below we don’t see how we can bring all those things together within” POM-10.

Interesting it mentions through FY-15, because as we look at the bigger picture, that would imply the shipbuilding plan that comes with POM-10 is going to have a different look for surface combatants.

A new InsideTheNavy article by Jason Sherman dated October 20th describes some of the considerations for the DDG-51 surface combatant construction. The title of the article, Navy Eyes Legal Step to Quash Competition For New Destroyers, certainly raises more questions regarding the industry favoritism issue I've been hearing quietly from a number of people, but as I'm seeing something else develop here. The article says:

The Navy’s fiscal year 2010 to 2015 investment plan, prepared this summer, includes funds to buy eight Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51s. The service plans to award six to General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works shipyard and two to Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding’s Ingalls yard as part of a new strategy to modernize the destroyer fleet in light of the decision to truncate the next-generation DDG-1000 program at three ships, according to internal Navy budget documents.

Normal acquisition regulations would require competing the new DDG-51 work, worth more than $16 billion.

However, the Navy’s general counsel, Frank Jimenez, has advised Navy Secretary Donald Winter of a legal device -- a “public interest determination and finding” -- that, if used, would permit the service to side-step normal acquisition rules and hand General Dynamics approximately 75 percent of the DDG-51 workload.

The article goes on to say a DDG-51 will be built at BIW in FY10, FY11, FY12, FY13, FY14, and FY15. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding’s Ingalls yard would build a DDG-51 in FY-11 and FY-13, which according to last years 5 year shipbuilding plan, would be the years the CG(X) would have previously been built. Sounds like favoritism for BIW right? Well, favoritism is the wrong word, this looks to me like the Navy taking control of surface combatant shipbuilding to insure the yards have ebough work as the Navy adjusts the current plan of record.

That is because Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding is going to find new work as well. The recently passed FY09 budget includes funding for two more LPD-17s to be funded in FY10 that will be built by NGSS, although those could be built at Avondale. Under the new plan, Ingalls would also get one LHA(R) in FY-11 and a second LHA(R) in FY-15. So how does this work out?

Well, the current DDG-1000 plan calls for either BIW or Ingalls to build at least %25 of each ship. Under this model, 4 of the ships would almost certainly have been built at BIW and 3 at Ingalls. So for the DDG-1000 plan, if in fact three ships get built (uh, we'll see), if BIWs builds two of the ships BIW will get about 58% while Ingalls will get about 42% of the DDG-1000 work.

That leaves the labor hours issue for the probably never to be built four ships DDG-1003 through DDG-1006. Ronald O'Rourke has done the labor hour math in this report (PDF).

Procuring roughly 9.3 to 10.3 Flight IIA DDG-51s through FY2013 would provide roughly as many shipyard labor hours as procuring ships 3 through 7 in the 7-ship DDG-1000 program of record.

Assigning 5.1 to 5.7 of those 9.3 to 10.3 Flight IIA DDG-51s to a shipyard would provide that shipyard with roughly as many shipyard labor hours as it would receive it were the primary yard for building ships 3, 5, and 7 in the 7-ship DDG-1000 program of record.

Assigning 4.2 to 4.6 of those 9.3 to 10.3 Flight IIA DDG-51s to a shipyard would provide that shipyard with roughly as many shipyard labor hours as it would receive it were the primary yard for building ships 4 and 6 in the 7-ship DDG-1000 program of record.

Applying the DDG-51 model as laid out in Jason Sherman's article, if the Navy builds 6 of the DDG-51s at BIW, then BIW is actually getting more work under the new plan than they would under the DDG-1000 plan. While Ingalls, building only 2 DDG-51s, would fall short between 2.2 and 2.6 DDG-51s, they will have the option of building 2 more LPD-17s and the guarentee of building 2 more LHA(R)s.

So what is the Navy wanting to do? The following best guess is based on some of the surface combatant changes announced.

In FY10 the Navy is looking to buy 1 SSN, 1 DDG-51, 3 LCS, 2 LPD-17s, 2 T-AKEs, and 1 JHSV.
In FY11 the Navy is looking to buy 2 SSN, 2 DDG-51, 3 LCS, 1 LHA(R), 1 MLP, and 1 JHSV
In FY12 the Navy is lookign to buy 2 SSN, 1 DDG-51, 4 LCS, 1 MLP, 1 JHSV, and 1 CVN'
In FY13 the Navy is looking to buy 2 SSN, 2 DDG-51, 6 LCS, 1 LMSR, and 1 JHSV
In FY14 the Navy is looking to buy 2 SSN, 1 DDG-51, 6 LCS, 1 MLP, and 1 JHSV
In FY15 the Navy is looking to buy 2 SSN, 1 DDG-51, 6 LCS, 1 LHA(R), 2 LMSR, and 1 JHSV

The current program of record includes a JCC(X) that would be built in FY12, but there has been no mention of that ship for a long time. With 2 LPD-17s funded for FY10, it is possible the LPD-17 line stays open and the JCC(X) could be build in FY12 based on that hull design, but that is just an observation. The current plan of record would call for 66 ships (1 being the JCC(X)), while the plan above would be 66 ships, and is missing the JCC(X).

Put another way, all this noise results in the addition of a single ship, IF the JCC(X) is still built in FY-12. All the while the DDG-51s will be more expensive, the LPD-17s will be more expensive, the LHA(R)s will be more expensive, and the LCS has become more expensive. Welcome to the shape of shipbuilding for the US Navy.

Photo of the Day

Wow. Yes, despite the problems, we love this ship, and we love this photo.


Click for link to hi-res. This ship and a minor RoE change combined with some political support can solve the piracy issues off Somalia in a hurry, and I don't care what kind of radar the Somalian pirates have, they would never see it coming. Ever looked at a LPD-17 through a commercial radar system you might find on a privately owned ship? If you ever get the chance, check it out. You'll ask yourself how in the world that tiny dot is a 25,000 ton beast.

Observing the Training Cycle

We have been keeping an eye on the Iwo Jima ESG as it prepares for its deployment this fall. We expect the strike group will be ready to deploy by mid September, but may in fact not deploy until later than that. Either way, the strike group has begun COMPTUEX, an intermediate-level strike group exercise designed to forge the battle group into a cohesive, fighting team. It’s an important step in the pre-deployment training cycle and a prerequisite for a strike group’s Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX). Why are we interested? Because the USS San Antonio (LPD-17) is part of the Iwo Jima ESG.

The Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) is participating in a composite unit training exercise (COMPTUEX) July 8-Aug. 1 to prepare for deployment...

The Iwo Jima ESG consists of the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) with the embarked 26 Marine Expeditionary Unit; the amphibious dock landing ship USS Carter Hall (LSD 50); the amphibious transport dock ship USS San Antonio (LPD 17); the guided-missile cruiser USS Vella Gulf (CG 72); the guided-missile destroyers USS Ramage (DDG 61) and USS Roosevelt (DDG 80) and the fast attack submarine USS Hartford (SSN 768).

This is a pretty powerful strike group, indeed we observe this is one of the most impressive Atlantic based ESGs we have seen assembled in awhile. The USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) was on station fighting pirates off the coast of Somalia last summer and has been widely discussed in professional papers as being quite effective in that role. The USS Ramage (DDG 61) was scheduled to be the 17th AEGIS warship to be upgraded with ballistic missile defense, the first Atlantic fleet warship to be upgraded with the AEGIS BMD capability. We believe that upgrade has already occurred.

The USS Roosevelt (DDG 80) was an extremely impressive ship in 2006. Chief and I met Captain Clemmons, who was CO for that 2006 deployment, and he left one of the best first impressions of anyone in the Navy I've ever met. That ship was known at the time for being all business, and we remember a few European newspapers writing compliments about the ship and crew after liberty visits, something unusual enough we noted it. Two years later we'd bet good money USS Roosevelt (DDG 80) is preparing to exceed the achievements of that deployment, but that won't be easy.

When you also add in the USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), and USS Hartford (SSN 768), it is pretty clear the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) has been put in good company to insure a successful first deployment. She will certainly get her chance, the strike group will almost certainly be going to the Persian Gulf.

USS Green Bay Builders Trials

Good news coming from Avondale regarding USS Green Bay (LPD 20).

The USS Green Bay has completed its maiden voyage during Builder's Trials.

"Builder's Trials was a successful event, and we continue counting down the days until the crew of USS Green Bay accepts delivery of the ship on Aug. 29," said Lt. Frank Lencz, USS Green Bay operations officer.

The ship departed June 23 from the Northrop Grumman pier in Avondale, La., and traveled down the Mississippi River to the Gulf of Mexico.

About 950 shipbuilders, government contractors and military personnel were aboard for the test run.

Below are some of the photo's we have been sent from the USS Green Bay (LPD 20) builders trials. Click for hi res, and yes we see the rust too.



The really nice thing about these photo's is that they are the first we have seen that really give people a sense for the size of these platforms. The Navy is thinking about all kinds of ways to reuse this hull, and we think that is a very smart thing to do.

Thinking LSD(X) and Motherships

We've been reading CRS Report RL34476 by Ronald O'Rourke on the LPD-17 program, and within pops out some interesting details regarding the current 2 MEB AE threshold for the Marines that has been agreed to by the Navy. Here we are in an Expeditionary Maritime Era, where projecting forces to shore becomes a critical strategic aspect of the era, and the Marines have to negotiate with the Navy and downsize just to meet a reduced requirement a full MEB smaller than what was recommended by the 1997 QDR. Keep in mind, the 11/11/11 figure listed is a designed goal, not actually in the Navy's current shipbuilding plan.

The Marine Corps states the 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift goal translates into a requirement for a force of 33 amphibious ships, including

• 11 LHAs/LHDs,
• 11 LSD-41/49 class ships, and
• 11 LPD-17s.

In explaining how the requirement for 2.0 MEB AEs translates into this 33-ship requirement, the Marine Corps states the following:

Given the lift capabilities of the Navy’s current amphibious ships, each MEB AE would require 19 operational amphibious ships to lift: 6 LHAs/LHDs, 7 LSD-41/49s, and 6 LPD-17s.

To arrive at a more fiscally constrained goal, the Marine Corps reduced the above 19-ship total to 17 operational ships: 5 LHAs/LHDs, 7 LSD-41/49s, and 5 LPD-17s. This 17-ship force requires about 11% of the MEB AE’s vehicles to be shifted to the AFOE, which creates a degree of operational risk. This 17-ship force was presented to Navy officials in mid-2007.

To arrive at a still-more fiscally constrained goal, Navy and Marine Corps officials in mid-2007 agreed to reduce the 17-ship total to 15 operational ships — 5 of each kind. This 15-ship force requires about 20% of the MEB AE’s vehicles and about 12% of its cargo to be shifted to the AFOE, which creates an additional degree of operational risk.

It would be nice to start thinking LSD(X) sooner rather than later, the purpose being to improve the MEB capability of the Marine Corps sooner rather than later. We think this approach would be good for a few reasons. First, Marine Corps equipment has become larger during the current wars as they armor up. It really makes one wonder how the MRAP fits into the MEU float loading plan without major sacrifices. The LSD(X) can help relieve the pressures this problem creates.

Second, building the LSD(X) sooner allows for the Navy to take the existing LSD force and use their mid-life upgrade to turn them into large motherships. A LSD(X) / Corvette approach between now and 2025 allows the Navy to completely replace the small surface combatant fleet, the submarine fleet, and the bulk of the expeditionary fleet just in time to free up funds for building the major surface combatant replacements.

In other words, fleet strategy would then reflect building for the current warfare requirements while planning for the future warfare requirements.

USS San Antonio Good To Go

It only took 12 years, too many problems to review, and a bunch of hard work by a number of folks in both the industry and the Navy, but the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) is finally ready to go.

The Navy declared the San Antonio, or LPD 17 class, had reached "initial operating capability" 12 years after its funding began.

"We've had some challenges to overcome with LPD 17," Rear Adm. Charles Goddard, program executive officer for ships, said in a statement. "But reaching this milestone is a testament to the collaborative efforts between the Navy and shipbuilding industry."

Every ship is unique, and most come with quarks. Given the amount of change work required just to get the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) to this point, that ship is going to have some unique issues for its entire lifetime.

LPD 17 is the story of modern shipbuilding, first in class disaster, but by the third ship things start to get under control. As I have mentioned before, I have been on the USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), was with SGT at the time and got the detailed view, and it shaped my opinion.

The LPD 17 class is fantastic, and it can be a lot more than just a LPD. It is a big ship that feels like a big ship from the inside. It costs the same as a DDG-51, but it is two and half times larger, and the configuration is optimal for taking everything you would want with you to the front lines of any battlefield and operating.

In the time we are in, given the choice to build more DDG-51s or more LPD-17s, the Navy should pick more LPD-17s every time. Until the Navy provides better designs that meet the needs of the war we are in, we believe the LPD-17 should be built every year, starting in FY09.

The USS San Antonio (LPD 17) is expected to deploy with the Iwo Jima ESG later this year. Interesting the ship had IOC this week, because while the ship was undergoing this process, other ships in the Iwo Jima Strike Group were enjoying fleet week down in Florida.

Eye on the Fleet: USS San Antonio (LPD 17)

A number of people have called attention to the very good pictures recently added to the Navy Newsstand website of the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) well deck. These are excellent photos, I don't remember ever seeing pictures this good of well deck operations on amphibious ships in the past.

The dedicated space for the AAV platoon is going to give all kinds of options to future loading plans. The big change these pictures remind us of is that the AAV platoon has its own stowage on the LPD-17, where on the Austins they would usually sit on the well deck.

These pictures also appear to reveal the Iwo Jima ESG will include the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50). That got us to think about something.

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)

Adding up those three ships amounts to around 62,800 vehicle square and 211,700 cargo square. That appears to be only about 3200 vehicle square short of what was reportedly taken by the 24th MEU recently forward deployed by the USNS Algol to Afghanistan. That must make Marines very happy. For comparison purposes, the three ships of the Tarawa ESG currently in the Persian Gulf has around 50,700 vehicle square and 149,300 cargo square.

In other words, the LPD-17 class not only adds tremendous vehicle and cargo square for the MEUs being deployed, but because they have stowage for the AAV platoon, they allow for more ship to shore connectors for the MEU. The effect is a more capable first wave, or what we think could potentially become a method ground forces are utilized in the long war for dealing with ungoverned regions, a quick assault. Basically the fast assault by air or sea of mobile specialized units against an enemy stronghold, but includes a rapid, complete extraction. That may sound strange, but there are dozens of places today that would be legitimate targets if the military wasn't engaged in Iraq, with at least 3 locations in Somalia.

When looking at the first wave of an MEU landing, consider the following. With 4 LCACs, and 2 LCUs a first wave can include:

1 AAV platoon with 1 Marine Rifle Company (self deploy)
1 M1A1 Platoon with 4 tanks, 2 per LCU
2 LAV Detachments, 16 total, 4 per LCAC

It is also noteworthy that a Whidbey Island class LSD would provide for 6 LCACs and 2 LCUs per ESG, and the option offered there is the ability to land a full LAR company (24 LAVs) in one wave with 6 LCACs.

That is before you factor in 12 MV-22s and 4 CH-53Es for the first wave.

Obseving the Marine Maritime Debate on Capital Hill

Navy Times has an interesting article that overviews some of the Marine Corps discussions taking place on Capital Hill. We have mixed feelings on some of the press coverage, because in many ways it creates a perception that there is a conflict of interests in statements and desires.

Marine Corps leaders say they’re concerned about the Navy’s capability to support amphibious assault forces and is asking Congress to provide money for at least one new ship.

“Our nation needs this ship, and we need your help in procuring it,” Lt. Gen. James Amos, head of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, told a House Armed Services subcommittee Feb. 26.

Amos was referring to an additional LPD 17 San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock; the class is replacing a series of aging amphibious ships.

The Navy is on track to buy nine LPD 17s, and getting a 10th hull is the Corps’ top unfunded priority for the fiscal 2009 budget cycle.

The article goes on to highlight several points. First the Marine Corps want 33 amphibious assault ships; 11 “big deck ship” amphibious assault ships, 11 dock landing ships, and 11 LPD 17s.

Second, the Marine Corps desire 2 MEBs for amphibious assault, and the article highlights an important point, a single MEB requires 17 amphibious ships for assault, meaning the Navy needs to maintain a total amphibious force of 34 ships, if the amphibious support mix retains the current three types of ships.

Finally, despite recent Navy comments, Congress Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md observes something we have been unsure about. Apparently we are not reading the FY09 budget incorrectly.

Navy budget documents for the fiscal 2009 proposal show the production line for San Antonios will shut down after nine ships. Restarting production would raise the cost of future amphibs.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., said the Navy’s decision to shut down that line seems like a bad one.

“With all the talk about controlling costs of shipbuilding, I was dismayed that the Navy would request and take specific steps that should only have the effect of increasing the eventual cost of the 10th LPD,” Bartlett said.

Thats the way we read it too, although we note the Navy has made several comments otherwise. While the press is giving some of the story, the testimony of General Conway in front of the Senate on Feb 28th makes clear in our opinion what the Marines are looking for at sea.

Based on strategic guidance, in the last several years we have accepted risk in our Nation’s forcible entry capacity and reduced amphibious lift from 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault echelons to 2.0 MEB assault echelons. In the budgetary arena, the value of amphibious ships is too often assessed exclusively in terms of forcible entry—discounting their demonstrated usefulness across the range of operations and the clear imperative for Marines embarked aboard amphibious ships to meet Phase 0 demands. The ability to transition between those two strategic goalposts, and to respond to every mission-tasking in between, will rely on a strong Navy-Marine Corps Team and the amphibious ships that cement our bond. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked diligently to determine the minimum number of amphibious ships necessary to satisfy the Nation’s needs—and look forward to working with the Committee to support the Chief of Naval Operation’s shipbuilding plans.

The Marine Corps’ contribution to the Nation’s forcible entry requirement is a single, simultaneously-employed two Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault capability—as part of a seabased Marine Expeditionary Force. Although not a part of the Marine Expeditionary Force Assault Echelon, a third reinforcing MEB is required and will be provided via Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) capabilities. Each MEB assault echelon requires seventeen amphibious warfare ships—resulting in an overall ship requirement for thirty-four amphibious warfare ships. However, given current fiscal constraints, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to assume greater operational risk by limiting the assault echelon of each MEB by using only fifteen ships per MEB—in other words, a Battle Force that provides thirty operationally available amphibious warfare ships. In that thirty-ship Battle Force, ten aviation-capable big deck ships (LHA / LHD / LHA(R)) and ten LPD 17 class ships are required to accommodate the MEB’s aviation combat element.

In order to meet a thirty-ship availability rate —based on a Chief of Naval Operation sapproved maintenance factor of 10%—a minimum of eleven ships of each of the current types of amphibious ships are required—for a total of thirty-three ships. The Navy has concurred with this requirement for thirty-three amphibious warfare ships, which provide the “backbone” of our maritime capability—giving us the ability to meet the demands of harsh environments across the spectrum of conflict.

Emphasis ours. There is a lot of good information here. Notice how this is breaking down.

For the 2015 MEB Assault Echelon (AE) the Marines require 17 ships (five LHD, five LPD-17, five LSD-41, two LSD-49), which as is confirmed in testimony means for the MEB ACE the Marines require 4 LHA/LHDs, 1 LHA(R), and 5 LPD-17s. Current plans leaves the Marines short 1 LHD, which is intended for the Sea Base. The primary equipment aspects include 18 LCACs, 30 JSFs. 48 MV-22s, 20 CH-53Ks, 18 AH-1s, 9 UH-1s, 2 MH-60s, and 8 UAVs. A full MEB ACE is basically 246 CH-46 equivalents. For the Sea Base, the 30 JSFs get put on CVNs, which could directly effect Navy specific aviation requirements.

The Marine Corps should never have accepted the reduced 2.0 capability, which was reduced to 2.5 during the cold war due to budget, because during the cold war it was actually 3.0. We continue to remind that the reduced 2.0 capability is counter to the studies leading into the 21st century, which noted the 3.0 MEB capability would become MORE important to meet irregular challenges in a world changing through globalization. The Marines are advocating for 33 ships to support a reduced 2.0 MEB assault capability, which actually requires 34 operational ships to fully assault with 2.0 MEBs, and all 34 would need to be 100% operational. This tends to imply what the Marines actually need is 36 ships. The Navy has no intention, and is under no obligation to support that.

To compound the problem, the Marine Corps are trying to squeeze this capability into the new Sea Base MPF(F). No wonder they have slowed down, no wonder they are looking for a new amphibious ship mix, and no wonder the Marines inch up the number of LPD-17s they need every year, from last years number of 10 to this years number of 11. All of this is absent the discussion of the JHSV, which has an entirely different but important role for expeditionary warfare.

Absent from the discussion is the Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP), which has never been tested but has five LKAs and four LSTs, providing a total of 201,000 square feet of vehicle lift capacity. Also absent from the discussion are the two Aviation Maintenance Logistics Ships (T-AVB), both of which will be retired by 2020. Each T-AVB carries a Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) to a crisis area, without which would put a huge strain on strategic airlift to support.

Does anyone believe at this point the LPD 17 class replaces four classes of older ships—LKA 113, LST 1179, LSD 36, LPD 4? Does anyone believe the Navy and Marines should really give up the LHA(R) for the Sea Base? Anyone remember the warnings in the Defense Science Board Study on Seabasing? This is why ONR had it absolutely right, what is needed to solve the sea basing aviation issue is something very large, something like the Maersk S-Class Conversion Concept. 2 on each coast would be the biggest boost to capabilities for virtually every Sea Basing mission ever convinced, and would allow both the Navy and Marine Corps to rightsize the amphibious fleet to support not only the amphibious assault requirements for major war, but the mothership requirements for peacetime.

Amphibious ships continue to be the most flexible platform in the Navy today, Congress should ask Sec. Winter to develop alternatives for amphibious ship strategies either with or without the Sea Base for supporting a 3.0 MEB capability afloat, with a 2 MEB Prepositioning requirement, and at least a 2.0 MEB forcible entry capability.

While the Navy might claim that is exactly what is currently in motion with the Sea Base, clearly the data continues to tell a different story.

The Most Important Naval Discussion in a Decade

I'm not sure but it is entirely possible that CDR Salamander and I are not as far apart as the titles of our observations may indicate. I don't disagree with his comments warning of legislative solutions, but we note change will only come from the legislature as long as Mullen, the architect of the 313-ship plan, is CJCS. I also observe, one cannot bring a strong bias against Murtha if one is to measure these comments in good faith.

In observing an article by Geoff Fein, I observed the beginning of what might be the most important naval discussion in the last decade. On Wednesday, John Murtha discussed the 313-ship plan, and in the process asked several good questions. We quote the 5 noteworthy comments from the article:

"A couple of suggestions staff has made is to take one of the DDG-1000s out and put in two more T-AKEs because they are stabilized platforms. I don't know if that is the right answer," he [Murtha] said. "Our industrial base is so small now, there is so little competition, and we obviously need competition. But on the other hand, we need to build as many ships as we can, so we need to look at all the options."

In its FY '09 budget, the Navy has requested $14.2 billion to build seven ships. Of that amount, $2.55 billion is for full funding of a third DDG-1000 and advanced procurement for the fourth ship of the class.

"If we took the ships the administration sent over, we would never get to what the Navy says it needs," he added. "So we are going to try...Bill and I are going to try...and convince the committee that we need three or four more ships. [We need to] find a way to get to take us to 313 ships in much less years."

"There are three (DDG-1000s) now in '09. If you take one out what does that do to the shipbuilding distribution," Murtha said. "If you take one out and go to two T-AKEs, what does that do to...capability of the force?"

If you take one of the other DDG-1000s out, it would fund a 10th LPD-17 and two T-AKEs, Murtha said. "We are looking how we can shift this and not affect you," he said. "What happens to the shipbuilding industry, how will it affect them?"

Lets break this down. Murtha is looking to do what must be done for the future fleet to have more than 313-ships, he is looking to cancel the DDG-1000. His idea is to replace the DDG-1000 in FY09 with 3 ships, the 10th LPD-17 and 2 additional T-AKEs, all of which the Navy has listed in its unfunded priorities listings.

This article is so damn good, if Geoff Fein could get an award for writing about the Navy, this would be the winner. The article gives us 5 very insightful comments from the Navy's point of view on the subjects Murtha discusses.

"NASSCO likely could not execute four in one year," Allison Stiller, deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition), told lawmakers. "They would have to spread them out. We felt they could go to two year; that's why we put two in '09," she added.

Stiller said any reduction in DDG-1000s would be an issue for the surface combatant force as well as Bath, which is one of the Navy's surface combatant providers, she said.

After the hearing, McCullough told reporters the cost to do a Service Life Extension Program on the four amphibious ships was less than buying a new LPD-17. "It's around $1 billion to get 27 years of ship life out of those [ships], and that includes operations and maintenance...it might be $1.2 billion, but it's a billion dollars," McCullough said "Currently one LPD-17, on our unfunded list, is $1.7 billion. So for me to get 27 years of ship life is about a billion...by extending the estimated service life of those four ships. To buy a new one is $700 million more, and that's not counting the operations and maintenance."

While the CNO supports Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway's requirement for 11 aviation capable amphibious ships, 11 LSD-class and 11 LPD-class ships, the Navy has to balance that in its budget, McCullough added.

LPD-25 doesn't deliver until 2012, so there is a backlog of ships, she added.
The Navy wouldn't be shutting down the LPD-17 production line once the final ship is built, Stiller noted.

Lets break this down. According to Allison Stiller, NASSCO cannot build more than 2 T-AKEs in one year, and there are already 2 T-AKEs in the FY09 budget. While the Navy claims to support the 10th LPD-17 (and supposedly the 11th too) requirement of the Marine Corps, they would prefer to extend the lives of 4 older ships an average of only 6.75 years per hull, even though they will still be retired within the next decade (basically a plan to stall the problem), than to get a new ship that would last for the next 40 years. The Navy does not intend to shut down the LPD-17 production line in the future, meaning the Navy intends to use the LPD-17 for other purposes in the future (BMDCGN? Hospital ship? Command Ship?).

Additionally, the Navy can't stop production of the DDG-1000 because it will hurt Bath Iron Works, which we agree is an important consideration. Is it just me, or is the solution plainly apparent to everyone, just waiting for someone to shout it out loud?

We believe any major changes to the 313-ship plan will require solutions that benefit the Navy, the Industry, and Congress. If it cannot do all three, it will never happen. In this case, assuming it is even possible, we see a solution that might do exactly that.

Congress needs options. Lets face it, for the last decade Congress failed to give itself low mix alternatives by not forcing the Navy to produce designs for frigate sized warships. This is a lesson that needs to be learned, retained, and never repeated, and if necessary forced upon the Navy starting this fiscal year. Congress must always have options in regards to building ships, because it can never be assumed that all programs will work out.

The Industry needs work. The idea that $2.5+ billion dollars annually for the next five years tied up in only 5 warships will help the industry, helping competition, and sustaining the workforce is dead wrong. The only way to boost shipbuilding is to build more ships, it is the only factor that is universal, while all other factors can only contribute to industry stability as long as that factor exists. The DDG-1000 must be canceled, and the Navy must build any ships above and beyond 313 before 2020 as afterwards all money must go directly to replacements.

The Navy 313-ship plan doesn't even meet the requirements of the Navy's own maritime strategy, so the Navy really can't even defend it intellectually. I'll debate any Admiral all day long on the merits of building more battleships for an already battleship centric fleet within the context of the new maritime strategy, and I'd win that debate even though Admirals are a hell of a lot smarter than me. The sole reason I'd win is because the position really can't be defended due to strategy. The Navy may defend specific metrics of specific programs, but all they do in those discussions is raise even more compelling questions whether the current approach matches strategy.

Seems to me the answer is obvious. Cancel the DDG-1000 after two ships. Take the $2.55 billion this year, spend $1.7 billion on LPD-26 to recover the $1 billion that would be used on the 4 old amphibious ships. Take the recovered $1 billion and leftover $855 million and build 1 General Dynamics LCS MMC and 1 Lockheed Martin LCS MMC. Build the General Dynamics ship at Bath to insure they have some work, and equally important, let Lockheed Martin decide where to build its ship based on where export orders for Israel and India may come from.

Seems to me building two more first in class now would be a good idea, to at minimum offer an alternative to the low mix to the LCS concept, but also very important, set the industry up for potential exports of MMC versions. It would be hard for the industry to complain, as it begins the process of spreading the work around, and most importantly, gives the Navy a fifth-rate to evaluate as part of its future fleet constitution, something we believe is very important in the context of strategy. We see this as a winning approach from all sides, if it can be done. We also note that if it is to be done this year, it would only happen if John Murtha pushed for it.

Two Stories, Same Topic

National Defense Magazine has two stories by Grace V. Jean in its February 08 edition discussing Marine amphibious forces. My first question was, why is this two different stories?

The first story, Marine Corps Makes Strong Pitch for ‘Sea Bases’, highlights the point made by Bob Work that Seabasing lacks definition.

So far, however, there is little consensus on what exactly constitutes a sea base. Some officials have argued that the Navy already deploys sea bases — in the form of aircraft carriers, large-deck amphibious ships and cargo vessels. Others, particularly in the Marine Corps, contend that future sea bases require more sophisticated equipment that the Navy currently does not have.

General Conway gives us an idea of what he believes Sea Basing is.

The commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James T. Conway, recently endorsed the sea basing doctrine.

“One of the important cornerstones in my mind is this concept of sea basing,” he said. “To be able to put something at sea that serves as a port and an airfield, to flow things through to shore” in an anti-access environment is crucial, he said.

In other words, Conway appears to want a transshipment dock at sea. The advantage to the Marines under that approach is it turns the entire concept of Sea Basing into a MSC issue, forcing the MSC to work out the transfer system problems for the Sea Base itself. It also removes the amphibious force as part of the problem (from the perspective of the Marines), because today's amphibious ships doesn't have the same number of cranes the ARG of the cold war did. By giving up 3 aviation deck amphibious ships, the Marines basically get to upgrade 1 MPF to a forcible entry brigade. We believe this concept of Sea Basing ultimately kills the "Joint Services" approach to Seabasing though, because the capability is only enabled for the prepositioned forces of the Marine Corp.

We tend to think General Conway has the right idea, but the specific approach being sold isn't going to work as advertised. Did anyone tell General Conway what "anti-roll tanks" will do to the cargo load of a LMSR? Beyond that small nugget, if the article is correct, it looks like they are trying to solve the skin to skin transfer problems with the LMSR, but that doesn't make sense, the MLP is the dock. By specializing the transfer system to the LMSR, this approach hampers the capability of existing ships to participate in the Sea Base. That will mean the transfer system for all other ships supporting the Sea Base (like say those supporting the Army),those outside the MPF(F), will have to transfer equipment via cranes. UNREP isn't going to be a fast process.

The second story, More Amphibious Ships Are Needed, Marines Contend, is an interesting article on the problems the Marines are facing with their Amphibious fleet. General Conway offers thoughts on the size of the amphibious fleet.

To support the deployment of two Marine expeditionary brigades in 2015 will require 17 ships for each brigade, Gen. James Conway, commandant of the Marine Corps, told a National Defense Industrial Association expeditionary warfare conference.

“You need 33 or 34, because you have to apply an 85 percent availability factor against that,” said Conway.

“When you go from 17 to 15, you’re leaving about 38,000 square feet of equipment on the pier side,” said James Strock, director of the sea basing integration division at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Having more ships would enable the Corps to respond to multiple contingencies, such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions. Strock said studies concluded that the minimum requirement is 11 big deck amphibious ships, 11 amphibious transport dock ships and 11 dock-landing ships.

However, here is the real crux of the problems facing the amphibious fleet.

In recent years, equipment has become heavier because so much armor is being added to trucks and combat vehicles.

“The medium tactical vehicle, a 7-ton truck fully dressed out, is showing up at the pier for embarkation in excess of 50,000 pounds,” said Strock.

As a result, 55 percent of the amphibious ships are exceeding weight and stability limits. Another 16 percent exceed only stability limits.

Next generation weapon systems, such as the joint light tactical vehicle, are expected to weigh even more than current equipment.

“Maybe we ought to think about taking the L’s out of that name, because the lightest version is 14,000 to 15,000 pounds,” said Strock.

Amphibious ships are built to accommodate certain numbers and types of equipment and supplies. The problem with vehicles becoming heavier is that the ships can carry only so much extra weight.

“The number of aircraft, tanks and rolling equipment you can put on an amphibious ship is already fixed. You can’t jam a lot more equipment on that ship than what it was designed for,” said Carnevale.

Future weapons systems in all categories are expected to be heavier than current technologies. Increasing the number of ships to accommodate more of those technologies may be one of the only solutions.

I don't care what Northrop Grumman or the Navy says, DIDs LPD-17 page has a paragraph that highlights the broken promise that was in part the justification for the massive size increase in the ship as a replacement.

Navy sources note that the 9 scheduled ships of this class (reduced from 12) are slated to assume the functional duties of up to 41 previous ships. These include the USA's older LSD-36 USS Anchorage Class dock landing ships (all decommissioned as of 2004, LSD-36 and LSD-38 transferred to Taiwan) and its LPD-4 USS Austin Class ships (12 built and serving, LPD 14 Trenton now India's INS Jalashva). The San Antonio Class ships may also replace 2 classes of ships currently mothballed and held in reserve status under the Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP): the LST-1179 Newport Class tank landing ships, and LKA-113 Charleston Class amphibious cargo ships.

Clearly that is no longer true. The comments above highlights a problem facing the Marines today, the LPD-17 isn't a replacement for the LST or LKA. While the JHSV can supplement the lost LSTs, so many aspects of the LKA is where the Marines find themselves lacking today, for example the lack of cranes for amphibious ships, the lack of cargo square, and the lack of vehicle square are all problems specific to the lack of a replacement for the LKA.

These are tough lessons learned in war. The answer isn't to take the armor off, it is to to find a way to meet the lift requirements, starting with putting lift back in the ESG as a metric! There are a number of ways to meet the challenges, and it doesn't have to be either Sea Basing or amphibious. I am not impressed how NDM took two stories on virtually the same topic, where you can mix and match the challenges, and broke it into two stories. Both stories is the story, and if it is the Marines and not NDM treating the issues as separate and unrelated, that is another story worth writing.

For the most part though, both stories simply combine to tell half the story. No one mentioned the part about the Sea Basing concept falling short on the aviation requirements. No one mentioned that CH-53K, the primary heavy lift aviation connector for the Sea Base, is underfunded in FY09, and very few on Capital Hill appear interested that as the number of amphibious ships and MSC ships continues to shrink, the demand for both has increased in recent years.

Consider the irony, the Marines want to move entire brigades through a transshipment point in the middle of the Ocean, and the Navy lacks the tenders to reload a single VLS cell at sea. The current Sea Base design doesn't appear to address this maritime anomaly either.

It is also worth noting that amphibious ships are being utilized by the Navy rather than the Marines, which applies another cut into the total capabilities of the amphibious fleet.

Here is something I keep noticing, and maybe the question should be asked to General Conway. Why is it anytime someone discusses Sea Basing, or the amphibious fleet, both are sold with the condition of being able to provide the same capabilities. The (insert either one) will be able to provide greater response to contingencies like disaster relief or humanitarian assistance, and will have forcible entry capability against the enemy. Either topic, just insert either Sea Basing or amphibious ships and you can create the same sentence in either story.

It is time for clear definitions. It is time to apply a clear strategy for expeditionary warfare at sea. Only then will the requirements be right.

Common Hull Strategy: Amphibious Ships

As shipbuilding costs have continued to rise, several suggestions have been made to help bring down the costs in shipbuilding. Among the many suggestions, one that continues to rise to the top is for the Navy to use common hull strategies for ships, similar to how the Spruance class destroyer hull and Ticonderoga class cruiser used the same hull. Another aspect of the common hull strategy is the type vs model debate, for example the DDG-51 represents a single type of ship with three models. These types of model changes for a ship type are built from lessons learned in production and adapted to meet requirements in an evolutionary model as technology changes, so they aren't necessarily a bad thing.

Defense Daily has an article out today describing some of the efforts of NAVSEA to evaluate reducing the number of hull types the Navy operates. Today, the Navy operates 21 types of ships and there are 29 models based on those 21 types. The process as described in the Defense Daily article focuses on amphibious ships and surface combatants (available here, #16). This post is specific to Amphibious Ships.

Amphibious Ships

"If you kind of look at it, it is how we decided to spread the MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) across those big ship. We tended to focus aviation assets on the large deck, and then depending upon the variety of the LPDs and LSDs, one is heavy in vehicles and one is heavy in well-deck kind of craft," he said. "The question is, is that the best way and most efficient way to spread the MEU across the ESG? And who says it has to be three ships?

"So we created what would be a new ESG," Goddard added.

One variety had two large deck ships, one focused more on aviation and the other focused more on well-deck. And then there was a variant that had them both the same--the same aviation and the same sort of well-deck capacity. "That drew you to two pretty large ships, not all that different in size from a LHA-6 [or] LHD- 8," Goddard said.

The Navy has followed a pattern since WWII of replacing ship type with like type, so as the current LHAs are being retired, the Navy is building a new LHA(R) for example. The same theory is being applied to the LSD with the future LSD(X). The Navy is just completing a build of 9 LPD-17s, and is just beginning a program to build 4 LHA(R)s, an evolutionary design based on LHD-8. It should be noted that the design requirements, including the size increase of both the LHA(R) and LPD-17 over the platforms they replace, are driven specifically by the size increases of both the EFV and MV-22. High Speed Transport Vessels, like the JHSV that will be funded over the next 5 years, is a break from the traditional model, and signals perhaps even in the Navy, traditions can be retired.

Consider the irony, at a point in time the Navy is looking at consolidating the number of amphibious platforms to deliver Marines, the Navy is also designing and getting ready to build a new MPF(F) force driven directly by requirements established for an amphibious assault capability. The MFP(F) is 15 ships of 5 types and 6 different models. There is the MLP, LMSR, T-AKE, Fast Supply Ship, and the LHA(R)/LHD which we count as the type with 2 models. When you consider the different requirements driving this Sea Basing ship structure, including the 1 MEB and the '2 battalions in one 10 hour period of darkness' type stuff, and acknowledging the requirement for an additional MEB on amphibious ships is required anyway the whole idea of common hull strategy is ironic. Sea Basing is a very clever idea as proposed, particularly the logistics aspect (aviation isn't impressive to us), but being clever doesn't make it the best way ahead.

The question the Marines should ask is whether it is time to give up this very smart but perhaps wrong approach to delivering Marines from the sea? Since the Korean War, Marines have not had to assault a beach. That doesn't mean it won't be a requirement in the future, but the Sea Base doesn't meet the beach assault requirement anyway. The lack of a beach assault has not however reduced the necessity of the Marine Corp and its afloat capability, in fact in recent times the ESG, not the CSG, has been one of the most desired capabilities to fight the emerging irregular and small war challenges at sea. This shift by forward commanders from desiring the CSG to ESG at sea in gap spaces of South Asia and Africa comes at the same time the number of ESGs has been reduced from 12 to 9, directly counter to the recommendations of most studies looking to the post cold war requirements of the Navy, including the studies leading into the 1997 QDR, not to mention the expeditionary nature of the new Maritime Strategy.

NAVSEA, and the Marines, have their hands full on this issue. The Marines face increased demand for capabilities by forward commanders, larger deployable platforms in the future requiring larger amphibious ships, and the primary requirements driving future designs are based on the least likely but most difficult scenario; an assault from the Sea. Throw in a common hull concept to maximize economies of scale for shipbuilding expenditures at this point and the challenge appears daunting. When, or if for skeptics, the 10th LPD-17 is built, current plans will produce 9 ESGs spreading 9 MEUs around as follows.

1 LHD, 2 LPD-17, 1 LSD - Forward deployed
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD
1 LHA(R), 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD
1 LHA(R), 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD

If you add that up, it comes in at 7 LHDs, 2 LHAs, 10 LPD-17s, and 9 LSDs for a total of 28 Amphibious ships. The Navy intends to use the remaining 3 LSDs for GWOT operations, presumably as motherships for MSO operations like we have been observing off the Horn of Africa.

It requires 5 ESGs to assemble a single MEB with the force structure described above. The total force above is actually 1.9 MEBs, below the stated requirement of 2.0, meaning even with the Sea Base the Marines are not capable of even a 2 brigade assault from the sea under current plans (plus the 10th LPD-17). The Sea Base adds 1 more MEB, and 2 traditional MPF squadrons bring the total number of MEBs afloat to 5. We see irony that the reduction from 6 MEBs to 5 MEBS comes at a time when the Marine Corp is being expanded, as well as the other demands on the Marines mentioned above.

Given the ESG is in higher demand, and it looks like that trend will continue to go up, not down, as the US moves to Phase 0 approaches in unsecured gap regions, are the requirements really leading to the conclusion we need to 1) reduce the number of ESGs, and 2) consolidate some of the MEUs into MEB sized chunks? The nature of globalization points to a distributed force requirements for ESGs in the future, not a consolidated ESG force requirement that removes 3 MEUs that could potentially be distributed to form a MEB as the Sea Base concept does, and drops an entire deployable brigade at sea from the inventory.

Perhaps it is time to take a new look at the requirements. Hopefully NAVSEA is developing alternatives that discard the current proposed Sea Base, and specifically look at a very well thought out concept (PDF) by Bob Work, first produced in Chapter 5 of the Newport Papers #26.

The Navy Discusses Force Structure Changes

When I read this article over breakfast, I nearly spit my coffee on my monitor. Fresh off the development of the new Maritime Strategy, Vice Adm. John Morgan is reportedly floating ideas on future fleet structure. While his first few ideas didn't appear to get any traction, this is a great development in my opinion.

The Navy’s top strategist has floated to the chief of naval operations three alternatives to the service’s current 30-year shipbuilding plan that if adopted would radically reshape American naval power.

The three options are contained in a 26-page briefing titled “Three Futures, One Navy, A Portfolio Analysis” by Vice Adm. John Morgan, the service’s strategy chief, which was e-mailed to Adm. Gary Roughead, the chief of naval operations, just before the Thanksgiving holiday.

OK so it is basically an informal process at this point, but at least there is some process in development.

Each of the notional fleets increases amphibious ships but cuts submarines, while one increases the number of aircraft carriers. Two of the options would dramatically increase the number of small corvettes, patrol craft and riverine forces.

The briefing assumes the Navy’s ship construction budgets will remain constant at about $12.5 billion annually over the coming three decades for a total of $377 billion. But that $12.5 billion figure, sources said, is below the roughly $15 billion annual shipbuilding budget that the service has previously said it would achieve over the coming years, which is critical to the execution of the current 30-year plan.

Each of the options assume the following unit costs: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at $5 billion, big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers of either LHA or LHD classes at $2.5 billion, amphibious ships of LSD or LPD classes at $1 billion, cruisers and destroyers at $1 billion, corvettes of the LCS class at $500 million, patrol craft at $100 million, riverine squadrons at $100 million, submarines at $2.5 billion, and auxiliaries at $500 million.

The devil is in the details here, note some important characteristics of these early discussions. First, it needs to be noted that the Navy is run by surface warfare and aviation officers, so it should not too surprising they would look to cut submarines first, or even look to increase the number of aircraft carriers. Submarines are expensive, and it is an easy place to grab money quickly over an extended period of time.

I'm not too impressed with the costing here, lets face it, the figures are not realistic, but the Navy doesn't have a reputation of realism with their budgets anyway, so we'll let that slide a bit as well. Otherwise, there is great stuff here.

Increase Amphibious Ships

First note that the emphasis is to increase amphibious ships. While the LPD-17 certainly got off to the wrong start, the hull is widely recognized as a terrific platform, and can be reused in a number of ways. The Mesa Verde (LPD 19), commissioned this past weekend, reminds us that after you get through early problems a class of ships can be built to meet price targets and with excellent quality.

I have argued for more Amphibious ships even before the new Maritime Strategy, but with the new Strategy it is almost a foregone conclusion the need exists. The problem of coarse is how do you pay for them, and should the Navy stick with standard configurations beyond the first 10 LPD-17s built. I would argue, emphatically even, the answer is no.

One of the great things about the LPD-17 design is that it is so big, it can be adjusted to give more or less of certain capabilities. I would propose the way forward is to dust off the "50 ft plug" version of the LPD-17, increasing the size of the well deck to support 3 LCACs or 2 LCAC(X), and increase the aviation facilities to support 2 MV-22s, thus building 4 larger LPD-17s specific to the task of "Forward Operating Bases," otherwise known as motherships. Additionally, instead of filling the ship solely with Marines, the Navy should build and deploy surface craft the size of the original LCAC built specifically as small independent FACs, deployable from the improved LPD design.

They should be armed, fast, and able to be logistically supplied by helicopter for extended operations if necessary. These small deployable fast attack patrol craft would replace the $100 million patrol craft described above. By making these patrol craft deployable by well decks, the Navy solves several of the problems associated with deployments and logistics in operating theaters. They should be treated as commissioned warships.

The mothership would be nuclear powered, to give it greater range and faster speed for quick response to regional developments. With a focus on Command and Control and Logistics, they should also be armed for limited strike operations as well, but treated as High Value Units specific to addressing irregular warfare challenges. Roles not only include the capability to be utilized as an Amphibious Ship, but additionally as a rapid response vessel to humanitarian crisis in forward deployed theaters. Consideration should be given to providing the facilities necessary to perform the roles of Partnership Stations, which means first class medical facilities and a machine shop capable of small repairs coast guard vessels of partner nations. Instead of cargo loads of Marine vehicles, detachment vehicles able to be airlifted is all that would be required, instead allowing the Navy to forward stage unmanned systems of all kinds for distribution to other naval assets operating in theater.

Corvettes of the LCS Class

Following the construction of the original pair of Littoral Combat Ships, I hope the Navy considers a mix of "naval trucks" and "LCS Corvettes." There is certainly some value for the "naval truck" concept, but without a tender to exchange mission modules at sea, these ships will ultimately fall short of expectation. The OHPs need a replacement just as badly as the now retired Osprey class, mixing the build to include various types of LCS class ships gives the Navy flexibility in developing its concepts for small, fast, low cost warships.

This approach also allows the Navy to test the above LPD-17 "50 ft plug" proposed above as a forward deployed mission module tender for the LCS class. With all that cargo space on the LPD-17 hull, the ship should be able to deploy numerous mission modules, and support the maintenance facilities that are also lacking forward deployed in supporting unmanned systems. We already know the LCS isn't large enough to carry all the toys the Navy wants to move forward, so why not carry the tools forward on a forward operating "Sea Base" and allow them to be swapped in and out as required. This reduces the need to continue requirement creep into future LCS designs, as repairs of UUVs can be conducted by a forward unit, but additionally if a certain unmanned system is needed in greater numbers than the programmed modules intend, that will be available as well. The Navy would end up with a high end naval truck for unmanned systems fully supported by a forward operating "Sea Base," but additionally the same "Sea Base" can support unmanned systems from the smaller "LCS Corvette," other surface vessels in theater, and additionally in smaller numbers from the deployable patrol craft.

How do you pay for these ideas? Well, if the Navy canceled the DDG-1000, they would find $15 billion to buy all of what is being discussed above, and I find it hard to believe, even with nuclear power, what is being discussed would cost that amount of money. This is the first of several ideas on how to free money to expand the fleet.

The above proposal would eliminate 5 DDG-1000s but would add 12-16 additional ships, 4 motherships and between 8 and 12 fast patrol craft, a net gain of 7-11, and additionally move money to allow for a larger variety of options based on the LCS hull designs. Because this proposal removes the need to increase the size of the LCS to overcome shortcomings in the current design, there is a good argument you can also find additional LCS hulls in this proposal.

Is it a cost saver in the operational budget? Over time, nuclear power would probably be cheaper and built in logistics models can certainly save money for small craft and for LCS logistics, but in absolute terms it is difficult to give a definitive answer. It will certainly save money in the shipbuilding budget though.