The US Navy and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Tuesday

YOKOSUKA, Japan (July 11, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) moves into Dry Dock 4 at Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka to continue repairs and assess damage sustained from its June 17 collision with a merchant vessel. FLEACT Yokosuka provides, maintains, and operates base facilities and services in support of U.S. 7th Fleet's forward-deployed naval forces, 71 tenant commands and 26,000 military and civilian personnel. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter Burghart/Released)

Tuesday's Senate Armed Service Committee hearing was one of the most important engagements politicians in Washington, DC have conducted publicly with the Navy in a very long time. It has been years since we have watched an important hearing between the Senate and leaders of the US Navy where the primary focus of the hearing wasn't a budget. Tuesday's hearing was about something much more important, it was about the safety of American sailors. After 17 lives have been lost in two collisions at sea in the Pacific this year, this was the moment where elected officials would evaluate and determine if the US Navy is meeting the standards expected by the American people following a series of several tragedies where lives have been lost.

To the credit of the Senators in the Senate Armed Service Committee, as an American citizen I felt well represented by the probing questions that triggered several honest responses. However, as I listened to the answers provided by the Navy, considered those answers overnight Tuesday and all day Wednesday, I am uncomfortable with some of the answers provided by Admiral John Richardson, CNO. The Navy leaders accurately testified that "organizational culture" is part of the problem, and anyone who knows squat about challenges related to "organizational culture" in a big organization like the US Navy understands that among all the challenges the Navy faces with fleet material condition problems - an organizational cultural problem is always the hardest challenge to solve. When any organization has a serious culture problem, particularly one that has results where people die, the only question that demands an answer by the US Senate is whether the Navy leaders tasked to deal with the culture problem are capable of dealing with it successfully.

That hearing did not convince me this group of Navy leaders is prepared to do that today. That can change, but as of Tuesday it's blatantly obvious ADM Richardson does not know how to address the problem, and it's questionable if he even understands the problem yet. Below are two (there were more...) of the issues and comments from the Senate hearing that, quite bluntly, should not be allowed to be said by Navy leaders in front of the Senate and the American people. These statements are not acceptable under any circumstances if the expectation is Navy leaders can successfully address the organizational culture problems in the Navy today.

An Indefensible Statement

I will quote this article over at USNI News. This paragraph is an unbelievable, indefensible statement by ADM Richardson and I was shocked on Wednesday that I couldn't find a single member of the Navy community countering such complete nonsense publicly. But privately... this was widely circulated as a huge pile of complete bullshit.

Asked if requesting a delay in deployment date would negatively affect a commanding officer, Richardson said no and added that “if I could go down and give that commander a handshake and a medal I would do that. This is exactly the type of honesty and transparency we need to run a Navy that’s safe and effective.”

The CNO would give that CO a medal? That answer is absurd at best, and is indefensible if the Senate hearings are supposed to represent serious discourse on a serious subject regarding a specific action that the FITZ or MCCAIN COs could potentially taken that could have saved lives.

ADM Richardson appears to understand he needs Commanders who will be honest and transparent about the true state of his force, but if Admiral Richardson believes there wouldn't be a negative affect to the career of that Commander in his Navy today, then that's a serious problem. I can't find anyone who believes that. In any large business or government culture, much less military culture of the US Navy, nobody in senior management tells executive level leadership "no" because of risk. What happens instead is the executive level leadership demands risk mitigation, and the senior manager does the job as required, and the organization accepts the risk. There isn't an option for Commanders to say "I can't deploy my ship right now" without career consequences, and at minimum it was either naive or ignorant to suggest otherwise.

Here were the follow up questions never asked. Is there a single naval officer who has made Flag in the 21st century who, when a CDR or Captain, requested a delay in deployment to their superior because the request to go to sea carried too high a risk? The answer, of course, will be no.

Is there any example of any COs of any ships in the last ten years that requested a delay in deployment because of a ships material condition? If it happened, was that CO promoted? Has anyone checked to validate the CNO's testimony?

The only legitimate answer ADM Richardson could give in Senate testimony is that "yes, that's a symptom of the culture problem in the Navy." Until ADM Richardson can get that question and answer right, he cannot and will not solve the culture problem in the Navy that led to the death of 17 sailors. If someone was to research the questions listed above, it will reveal there are zero SWO Flag officers today who delayed a deployment because of a ships material condition. They will likely find that among any officers who were brave enough to ask for a deployment delay due to a ships material condition, not a single one of those officers was promoted.

The Navy has metrics that can prove or disprove the statement made by ADM Richardson in testimony to the Senate on this topic, so I hope someone in the Navy turns the CNO's speculation on this topic into a fact finding review. The intent of getting the metrics isn't to prove ADM Richardson wrong, of course his answer in the Senate was wrong, but instead it's important for the Navy to see the context for why no one was ever promoted when the CO did actually ask for a delay - in each case - to better understand both the culture problem and the material condition problem.

CHANGI NAVAL BASE, REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (August 21, 2024) Damage to the portside is visible as the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) steers towards Changi Naval Base, Republic of Singapore, following a collision with the merchant vessel Alnic MC while underway east of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Significant damage to the hull resulted in flooding to nearby compartments, including crew berthing, machinery, and communications rooms. Damage control efforts by the crew halted further flooding. The incident will be investigated. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joshua Fulton/Released)

Misrepresentation of a Basic Organizational Leadership Principle

I am one who is skeptical of President Trump's business acumen, but... if he is the professional business leader he claims to be, this statement by CNO Richardson would represent a huge red flag. Again, from USNI News:

“We have a can-do culture, that’s what we do. Nobody wants to raise their hand and say I can’t do the mission, but it’s absolutely essential that when those are the facts we enable that report,” CNO said.

“We don’t meet more than 50 percent of the combatant commanders’ demands as it is, it’s from a force structure standpoint and a combination of that and readiness. And there have been times where I’ve spoken with my subordinate commanders where there’s just insufficient time to get a force trained and certified to meet the deployment date, and we have to go back to the combatant command and say you’re going to have to wait.”

More than a few editors leveraged the "can do" culture statement in headlines that gave the perception that CNO Richardson was somehow suggesting "can do" culture is a problem. Even the USNI News article I am citing has the headline: CNO Richardson: High Optempo and ‘Can-Do Culture’ Culminated In ‘Pervasive’ Expired Certifications in Forward-Deployed Surface Forces.

I am trying not to interpret the CNO's comment in the way the headlines are suggesting, but it's hard to agree with the CNO's comment in any context that a "can do" culture in the Navy is a problem. When the CNO made his "can do" comment in testimony on Tuesday, it immediately sparked discussion across multiple social media platforms by several of the top military observers who were watching the hearings. The commentary of "can do" being negative didn't sit well with folks, but whether it is the nature of social media or because the hearing kept moving quickly beyond the CNO's comment, no one effectively described why this comment didn't sit well with anyone.

The reason the CNO citing "can do" culture in a problematic context doesn't sit well with people is because the CNO misrepresented what "can do" culture in an organization represents. When an organization can be described as having a "can do" culture what it means is that the employees of the organization are positively motivated towards objectives in support of the organization, and are willing to work harder towards organizational goals. Within the Federal government's own civil service materials for senior management promotional exams, a "can do" culture of a department is an example cited as a reflection of positive work being done by supervised managers. In seminars that discuss organizational leadership principles, "can do" culture is a positive reflection of a good working team environment.

I have no doubt that a "can do" culture exists in the US Navy, but where a "can do" culture exists, it has nothing to do with the Navy's organizational culture problems that the CNO is responsible for fixing related to ship material condition. Leveraging "can do" culture should be part of the CNO's solution, not identified as a problem. In the very same testimony the CNO gave to the Senate, he actually discusses characteristics of a cultural problem that is well known to be toxic in organizations, and btw - ironically, these characteristics of an organization are also cited in the Federal governments own civil service promotional exam materials as representing potentially toxic managers within teams.

Asked by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) if it was “irresponsible” to allow a ship to deploy with an expired certification, Richardson likened the certifications to a driver’s license.

“What had happened in those areas, ma’am, is that the team out there was conscious that these certifications were expiring. And it’s a bit like your driver’s license expiring - it may not necessarily mean that you don’t know how to drive any more, it’s just that expired,” he said.

“However, we do need to recognize that … they need to go back and recertify. What had happened instead is that they would do an evaluation, and say hey, your certification is expired, we’re not going to get a time to get onboard and do the certification for some time, so we’ll do a discussion or administrative review to extend that. It’s called a risk-mitigation plan. That became pretty pervasive, so it was kind of this boiling frog scenario that over time, over the last two years really, became acute.”

When conducting cyber security audits in the IT industry, a good security auditor will look for persistent risk mitigation activities as part of the evaluating the hygiene of security culture within an organization. If during a cyber security audit the auditor determines the ISO is constantly taking steps for risk mitigation for a specific system or service, and there is no evidence of organizational commitment towards solving the root cause for the risk mitigation activities, it basically means the leadership of an organization is the source of the poor security hygiene for the system or service. When there are widespread examples, it's called having a "must do" organizational culture, and the organization "must do" things that carry high risk until eventually, the organization adopts high risk activities into the culture as part of normal status. At that point, even high risk mitigation activities become standard operating procedure, and once something is SOP organizational leadership becomes blind to the risk, and the risk is no longer important enough to resolve at a root cause level.

"Can do" cultures don't require risk mitigation plans, but "must do" cultures do. The distinction is the difference. A "Can do" culture in an organization is a bottom-up culture of productivity, while a "must do" culture within an organization is a top-down culture of productivity. The specific characteristics that distinctly identifies whether an organization has a positive "can do" culture or a negative "must do" culture is the persistent requirement for risk mitigation and the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure at the senior leadership level.

The CNO's own testimony before the Senate on Tuesday suggests that the US Navy has a toxic "must do" top-down culture, because he not only cited risk mitigation but a tremendous amount of evidence was presented in testimony that the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure is prevalent in the Pacific theater.

The CNO testimony also suggests the US Navy has a "can do" bottom up culture, and the CNO seems to believe at minimum that the "can do" culture represents part of the problem. If a positive "can do" culture of the organization is part of the problem, it is a symptom, not a cause. As a symptom it suggests the CNO has another problem, because it can lead to senior level blame gaming. A "can do" culture in the US Navy represents a positive characteristic of the US Navy culture and the CNO needs to take a hard look whether or not that positive culture is being exploited by a toxic command culture of "must do" senior leaders. Who is demanding high risk? Where is high risk institutionalized as standard operating procedure?  How is accountability for risk being determined?

If the CNO actually believes that the "can do" culture is the problem instead of a symptom, ADM Richardson may be incapable of solving the organizational cultural problem in the Navy. Correctly identifying the difference between a symptom and problem is a requirement. How can the CNO be weeks into this process, be testifying in front of the Senate, and still potentially be getting problem identification wrong? Where are the smart people on the CNO's staff?

Remember, what was the first thing Navy senior leadership did when ship material condition problems started several years ago? The Navy classified INSURVs, which virtually insured risk mitigation would become standard operating procedure when public criticism would no longer be a problem.

The CNO's own testimony suggests the problem is a "must do" culture because he testified that the two specific aspects that represent a "must do" toxic top-down organizational culture problem exist - persistent requirement for risk mitigation and the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure at the senior leadership level. There are metrics that can identify the culture challenge the Navy faces, and those metrics are not going to support the CNO's testimony that COs can delay deployments due to a ships material condition without career consequences, because that action would be counter culture. The Senate is asking the right questions. Yet some the answers by the CNO himself aren't believable.

Who suggested to the CNO that the first visible action the Navy needs to take before analysis is completed to identify the basic stuff like 'work hours and duty shifts' should be the Navy should stand up a new staff? What credible analysis has the Navy conducted that identified the first, most important, immediate step to be taken towards solving really tough organizational problems is constituting a new staff organization, rather than a manning review related to number of hours deployed sailors are working per day or week?

In my opinion, given what was said in Tuesdays testimony, the only new staff the US Navy needs is one ready to bring research skills, analysis skills, a significant increase in critical thought to some serious cultural problems in proximity closer to the CNO, because letting the CNO describe symptoms as problems in Senate testimony related to the death of 17 sailors insured Tuesday was a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad day for the US Navy. If creating new staffs and implying blame should be directed towards sailors who are obviously sacrificing themselves towards successful objectives demanded by Navy leadership is being described as the problem... I just don't see how this group of Navy leaders can be trusted to successfully grow and improve the Navy looking into the future when there are so many red flags related to how this group of Navy leaders is struggling to deal with the challenges that already exist today.

SECNAV Search Continues

The United States Naval Institute News service was the first to report that President Trump would appoint financier Philip Bilden to be nominated for Secretary of the Navy. USNI News was among the last to report Philip Bilden would drop out.

Financier Philip Bilden has withdrawn himself from consideration to be the next Secretary of the Navy, he said in a Sunday statement.

In the statement, Bilden said he would be unable to meet the requirements of the Office of Government Ethics requirements for the position without “materially adverse divestment” of his family’s financial interests.

“I fully support the President’s agenda and the [Secretary of Defense James Mattis’] leadership to modernize and rebuild our Navy and Marine Corps, and I will continue to support their efforts outside of the Department of the Navy,” he said in the statement.
“However, after an extensive review process, I have determined that I will not be able to satisfy the Office of Government Ethics requirements without undue disruption and materially adverse divestment of my family’s private financial interests.”

In a Sunday statement, Mattis said the withdrawal “was a personal decision driven by privacy concerns and significant challenges he faced in separating himself from his business interests. While I am disappointed, I understand and his respect his decision, and know that he will continue to support our nation in other ways.”

Mattis also said, “in the coming days I will make a recommendation to President Trump for a leader who can guide our Navy and Marine Corps team as we execute the president’s vision to rebuild our military.”

Thanks to Major Garrett's twitter account, this wasn't exactly unexpected news. Basically, that was the moment the financial conflict of interest was discovered and it was only a matter of time before he withdrew his name from the nomination. Political activists, both on social media and the media, may try to make this into something it isn't, but the bottom line is that it was going to be very difficult for Mr. Bilden to divest himself from the wealth the gentleman had accumulated over his career in International Finance in order to meet the government ethics requirements related to financial conflict of interest.

Having personally run into similar ethical requirements related to financial interests and working for government, it's very hard for me to see this as a big deal. Someone like me who had a few thousand dollars invested in activities that created an ethical financial conflict has nothing in common with someone like Philip Bilden who likely had millions of dollars to deal with. Most people who comment on this stuff have never actually dealt with the issue.

In the end Philip Bilden's nomination and subsequent withdrawal has everything to do with the process working as designed. Philip Bilden's nomination came from the well attuned voices in both the Naval War College Foundation and the United States Naval Institute, both of which have very influential naval insiders who know the man as someone actively engaged and interested in naval affairs, and willing to put his money where those interests are. In that context though, it was unlikely Philip Bilden's supporters saw any potential private financial conflicts of interest as ever being an issue that would prevent his appointmnet, so when credible people recommended him to the President, it isn't hard to see President Trump appreciating the recommendation of an outsider with big name endorsements who General Mattis was also endorsing.

The Navy undoubtedly needs more people like Philip Bilden in their corner, but that can't override how the government undoubtedly needs people who can get through the financial ethics requirements related to offshore investments, and that goes double for this administration. From everything I have seen and heard, Philip Bilden is a great American, but the government financial ethics requirements are not really flexible when it comes to people with global investments. This would be true for most of the wealthy stars super of Hollywood, like George Clooney or Angelina Jolie, who have extensive  foreign investments likely disqualifying them from ever being Secretary of State, for example, just as it is true for Philip Bilden. Bottom line, in American government you are considered far more qualified if you blow trillions of dollars of taxpayer money on government garbage than if you have effectively earned and invested your own wealth resulting in a portfolio showing foreign holdings. Amusing how that requirement for government service is both logical and remarkably pathetic.

I look forward to seeing who General Mattis recommends for the new Secretary of the Navy. While Randy Forbes would have to be the top safe pick on everyone's mind, I'm still hoping the President's team throws the 102 mph fastball right over the strike zone and picks from among the top folks in the next generation who didn't sign that War on the Rocks memo... folks like Mackenzie Eaglen, Jerry Hendrix, or Bryan Clark.

Phillip Bilden Nominated as Secretary of the Navy

From the White House press release.

President Donald J. Trump today announced his intention to nominate Philip Bilden as the 76th Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Bilden, a highly successful business leader, former Military Intelligence officer, and Naval War College cybersecurity leader will bring strategic leadership, investment discipline, and Asia Pacific regional and cyber expertise to the Department of the Navy.

Bilden has longstanding trusted relationships with senior military leaders, particularly in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, through his years of national security engagement, including service on the Board of Directors of the United States Naval Academy Foundation and the Board of Trustees of the Naval War College Foundation. Mr. Bilden understands the strategic, operational, and readiness challenges our Navy and Marine Corps leaders confront in maintaining our naval maritime presence around the globe.

Bilden is deeply committed to military service members and their families, coming from a military family with four consecutive generations of seven Bilden Navy and Army officers, including his two sons who presently serve in the US Navy. He greatly respects the sacrifices that Navy and Marine Corps families make to serve their country.

Mr. Bilden served ten years in the U.S. Army Reserve as a Military Intelligence officer from 1986-1996. He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant and served through the rank of Captain at Strategic Military Intelligence Detachments supporting the Defense Intelligence Agency. He resigned his commission in 1996 upon relocating to Hong Kong.

“As Secretary of the Navy, Philip Bilden will apply his terrific judgement and top-notch management skills to the task of rebuilding our unparalleled Navy,” said President Trump. “Our number of ships is at the lowest point that it has been in decades. Philip Bilden is the right choice to help us expand and modernize our fleet, including surface ships, submarines and aircraft, and ensure America’s naval supremacy for decades to come. I am proud of the men and women of our armed forces. The people who serve in our military are our American heroes, and we honor their service every day.”

“I am deeply humbled and honored to serve as Secretary of the Navy,” said Philip Bilden. “Maintaining the strength, readiness, and capabilities of our maritime force is critical to our national security. If confirmed, I will ensure that our Sailors and Marines have the resources they need to defend our interests around the globe and support our allies with commitment and capability.”

Mr. Bilden has three decades of international management, leadership, and investment experience building an investment management business across global markets with diverse international partners. After 25 years, Mr. Bilden recently retired as a co-founding member and Senior Advisor of HarbourVest Partners, LLC, a leading global private equity investment management firm with institutional assets under management currently in excess of $42 billion. He became a founding member of the firm following the management buyout of HarbourVest’s predecessor company in 1997. Mr. Bilden joined the firm in Boston in 1991 and relocated to Hong Kong in 1996 to establish the firm’s Asian presence as a pioneering investor in the region. Throughout his 25 year tenure at HarbourVest Partners, Mr. Bilden served in senior leadership roles in the firm’s global management, including the firm’s four person Executive Committee responsible for governance.

Mr. Bilden serves on numerous philanthropic boards of non-profit organizations supporting military veterans, national and regional security, and cybersecurity missions. He serves on the Board of Visitors of Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; the Asia Pacific Advisory Board and Dean’s Board of Advisors of Harvard Business School; the Board of Directors of the United States Naval Academy Foundation; and the Board of Trustees of the Naval War College Foundation, where he serves as the inaugural Chairman of the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies.

Mr. Bilden graduated as Distinguished Military Graduate, U.S. Army ROTC, from Georgetown University, earning the President’s Cup as the top graduate in the corps. He received a B.S. (magna cum laude) in Foreign Service from Georgetown University in 1986, with a concentration in International Politics and Soviet bloc studies. Mr. Bilden earned an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School in 1991.

President Trump's selection of Phillip Bilden can be described as the expected choice, as he was the only name specifically promoted by the Trump administration transition team for the position. While there was a public campaign for the selection of Randy Forbes for the position, that campaign primarily came from outside the transition team. Once General Mattis had endorsed Phillip Bilden, this was pretty much a done deal.

I think it is a good pick. There are a number of different opinions on how Presidents should pick the cabinet positions for the various military service Secretary's, and there has never been a single proven way to make such a selection. In the eyes of many who campaigned for Randy Forbes, a Randy Forbes selection would have been great for the Navy because it could build upon existing relationships in Congress and he has relevant experience as the House Seapower Subcommittee chairman that would have allowed Mr. Forbes to hit the ground running. In the end I saw that close relationship Randy Forbes has with top uniformed leadership in the Navy as the reason he wasn't selected.

I like and respect Randy Forbes a lot, but I never believed Randy Forbes was going to get the nomination. Had any other Republican President among the list of candidates who ran for President in 2016 been elected, then Randy Forbes would have almost certainly been nominated, and I believe the Undersecretary of the Navy position would have led to a nomination of someone like Bryan McGrath or Jerry Hendrix. With that said, I also don't believe any other Republican President but Trump would have selected General Mattis for Secretary of Defense, which is to note that each administration looks at these top positions in National Defense differently. With the exception of General Flynn, I believe President Trump has done a decent job filling out his National Security cabinet, but people will ultimately be judged by what they do once installed into office, not what their reputation says going in.

The selection of Philip Bilden does bring an outsider into the Navy. Phillip Bilden has been successful in his career, and to me being good at what you do professionally is very important, regardless of the profession. For me, success is also defined by what one does outside of their career, and for Philip Bilden that includes having two children choose and get accepted into the US Naval Academy. Both the choosing and the being accepted aspect of that detail says something about Philip Bilden that I respect. Another part of Mr. Bilden's success is financial, and what exactly is the relevant criticism of a private citizen who donates time and money to support the US Naval Academy, US Naval War College Foundation, and the United States Naval Institute? As a private citizen I have supported all three organizations, and would do so with more monetary resources if I had the means to do so.

For me, I like the signaling of nominating Philip Bilden as Secretary of the Navy on multiple levels. First, I believe it is good for the Navy to have an outside voice advocating for the Navy from the Secretary position. In the end Ray Mabus may have departed the Secretary of the Navy position unpopular for several of his choices, but as Secretary of the Navy his record is that of the Secretary of the Navy who got Congress to fund the second most naval vessels of any Secretary of the Navy since World War II, and unlike John Lehman who remains in first place, Mr. Mabus was able to do that during a time where the relative budget growth for the Navy was either static, or in decline. I tend to believe outsiders tend to prioritize some things better than insiders, and prioritizing shipbuilding was one of those things Ray Mabus did effectively.

Phillip Bilden has the opportunity to do the same thing, particularly with the charge by the Trump administration to grow the size of the US Navy. Until the Budget Control Act is dealt with, that's going to be very difficult to do. Mr. Bilden also has to address the consequences of choices made by his predecessor, specifically how Ray Mabus chose to build ships at the cost of maintenance and upkeep for existing ships and aircraft - particularly but not limited to less popular priorities like the helicopter squadrons. Mr. Bilden must address the broad scope of problems that are a direct result from maintenance shortages for existing ships and equipment over a period of many years, and doing that while also growing the fleet is going to be a significant challenge, and potentially impossible without additional funding from Congress.

Second, another signal I really like here is that it suggests President Trump intends to at least attempt to keep Sean Stackley on as Undersecretary of the Navy. I may be misreading this, but I certainly hope not. A major distinction between the Navy's poor return on investments during the Bush administration compared to the better rate of return on investment during the Obama administration was the presence of a strong Undersecretary of the Navy with a clear understanding of how to work inside the Department. While there was never a strong Undersecretary of the Navy during the Bush administration, there were two very capable Undersecretary's during the Obama administration - Bob Work and Dr. Janine Davidson.

Those are enormous shoes to fill, and if we remove all the names from the National Security letter against President Trump during the campaign as potential Undersecretary of the Navy choices, and we remove Jerry Hendrix because I highly doubt the President will seek another exemption from Congress for a recently retired military officer,*** the only logical choice I see representing someone who can fill the shoes of the last two Undersecretary's of the Navy with a clear understanding of the challenges that lie ahead for the Trump Administration's Navy growth policy is Sean Stackley. In my mind selecting Sean Stackley for the Undersecretary of the Navy is probably the smartest way for the Trump administration to put themselves in a position for success with Phillip Bilden as Secretary and with the stated National Security Policy intent to grow the US Navy.

With that said, I have no idea if Sean Stackley would take the job, I just think it's important that he does take the job given the position and direction of the Navy right now going forward.

Finally, the other signal being sent by the selection of Phillip Bilden is that the Trump administration doesn't appear to have a high degree of confidence in the US Navy to execute the administrations priorities successfully. I think this is related to events as they unfolded immediately following the election of Donald Trump as President. There were two things that became unquestionably obvious, at least from a public perspective, and fueled the gossip coming from the Navy immediately following the election results.

Navy uniformed leadership was shocked Donald Trump won the election. To be honest, so was I and whether you admit it or not - many of you were too. Being shocked by the 2016 Presidential election outcome is hardly something unique.

But, Navy uniformed leadership was also completely unprepared for the possibility of Donald Trump winning the election, and that was the narrative that kept going well into December following the election results, and that is a narrative that isn't easily forgotten. When there are only two possible known outcomes of an election, uniformed leadership of any military service is not allowed to be unprepared for either known outcome, ever. There is one truth about military officers in the United States; the only skill every single military officer over the grade of O-5 can always put on their resume is 'contingency planning expertise.' Contingency planning is what the US military does, all day, every day, whether awake or asleep. US military officers are judged by that standard, and often the standard of quality for a military officer is based on how many contingencies for unknown outcomes they have prepared for. Known contingencies? That's the bare minimum, and yet, somehow, the Navy made the impression publicly, and more importantly - to the Trump administration transition team, virtually every reporter that covers the Navy, and every think tank that follows naval affairs in Washington DC that the Navy was completely unprepared for Donald Trump winning the election with no budget work of value planned for that possibility.

Now, while that was a serious problem, I have no doubt that the CNO and Sean Stackley will leave no evidence that this was ever an issue by the time the budget season arrives, but the seed of doubt was planted. As soon as it became obvious the US Navy had done virtually no FY18 budget planning of consequence in preparation for the possibility of Trump winning the election, I was fairly certain President Trump was going to select someone from outside the known Navy community to be Secretary of the Navy. Randy Forbes was the chairman of the House Seapower Subcommittee, so please don't try to suggest he is an outsider. Under the circumstances as they unfolded after the election, one would expect any smart executive to look for a fresh voice capable of taking an independent, objective view, so that person could get in there and figure out what the administration is dealing with before the administration can effectively move forward.

This isn't a knock against Randy Forbes, but because of his existing relationships with the uniformed Navy leaders at the top, I wouldn't have picked Randy Forbes to get in there and be objective about the situation either. When Flag officers appear completely unprepared for a known contingency - it is so unexpected that it is very hard to ignore. While I see the lack of preparation by the Navy for Trump being elected as a mistake that can be corrected, in my mind one of the top priorities for Phillip Bilden once confirmed is to find out if the mistake is a reflection of a bigger problem, or if the mistake was the wake-up call Navy leaders needed to do some self reflection and get to work.

Answering that question determines where the Navy is today, and what is actually possible for the Trump administration going forward with the people in place.

*** This article originally discussed retired Captain Jerry Hendrix as needing a waiver from Congress if retired for less than five years in order to accept an appointment. This is inaccurate, only retired Flag officers and General officers require Congressional waivers.

Thoughts on the Farsi Island Incident January 12

By now most of you have heard the news of the initial incident and have read several details of the incident that have been reported in the press. The bottom line, there are still a lot of unknowns even as the incident was resolved diplomatically within 24 hours. Below are a few thoughts.

1) Even 48 hours after the initial incident it doesn't even appear CENTCOM or the Pentagon has a full accounting of the details of exactly what happened. People who have been telling the narrative since the incident first occurred are sure to be proven wrong, since they have almost certainly been guessing as to causes and motives. In the end, it is starting to look to be exactly what it looks like... a bunch of young sailors lost because of reliance on technology and/or machinery that failed. There is also, potentially, a training issue here related to navigation and leadership.

2) Those who are claiming the US Navy should have shot their way out of the standoff - when it appears the US Navy sailors actually involved appeared to have convinced themselves their ships were inside Iranian waters - make very interesting and yet terrible arguments for shooting at Iranians. Farsi Island may be a disputed Island in the Persian Gulf, but there is an IRGC naval base on that island and presence in the first rule of ownership. If the Iranian Navy, or Russian Navy, or any Navy drifted armed boats into US waters off Kings Bay, I suspect the US Coast Guard and/or US Navy would be very quick to point guns and be active in detaining the drifters.

3) I am unable to see any strategic advantage the US would have gained by fighting Iran inside the 3 mile zone of Iranian territory, and I am unable to see any strategic consequence to the US by not fighting Iran inside the 3 mile zone of Iranian territory. However, had the US Navy tried to shoot their way out of that situation, the strategic consequences would have been significant, and not just how it relates to Iran. Such a violent action would have given China a valid example to act the same way in disputed places in the South China Sea. If the US Navy is going to lead the global commons based on our interpretation of the rules at sea, the LT who apologized (and everyone on the political right is flogging) just forwarded America strategically. I note it is primarily the parochial arguments from people whose expertise lies in other military services like the Army who have completely ignored the details like global rule sets at sea who have been the loudest to shout at the Navy in this incident. With all due respect, this is an incredibly parochial and shortsided overreaction of the incident, because the National Review can and should do better than finding an Army guy - Bing West (whom I know and respect but wtf...) when it comes to a complex naval incident. This isn't the Pueblo, nor is it the Korean War. There will be no museum in Iran, and both the boats and the crews were returned.

4) This is one of those difficult issues that, in my mind, separates serious people who care about serious strategic issues the US faces in the 21st century and demagogues who see conspiracy and opportunity in every political crisis. If you are a partisan who sees a conspiracy, go away. For the rest of us, there are serious naval issues here that need serious answers. These are a few of the initial questions that should be considered.

- Is the maintenance of the riverine command boats contracted to the point the onboard crew was unable to repair the problem? The crew of only 5 sailors per boat suggests to me that something might be off with the manpower and maintenance procedures surrounding these very capable chess pieces of naval equipment. The RCB is made to fight in the Persian Gulf, but a broken RCB isn't going to win.

 - This is a teaching moment if there ever was one, and as an incident this appears to represent a textbook case study on the reasons why the Navy needs more, not fewer, Commands for junior officers. It may be the opinion of some hard core political demagogues who have over a decade of tactical success combined with over a decade of strategic failure that this incident is somehow a defeat for America, but each new fact that emerges from this incident suggests to me this may be a case of procedural failure far beyond the scope of a LT... but when shit happened, strategic acumen by the officer in charge (LT) is potentially emerging as a feature in handling a bad situation and not making it worse. The facts are still unknown, and we may not know for sure for awhile, but regardless of what the facts are in the end I see this as a very teachable moment that favors the argument for early Command as often as possible for junior officers.

- I have no problem with high profile diplomatic incidents like this between the US Navy and Iran, as long as for each incident the actions of the US Navy is aligned with the strategic aims of the United States. If the US Navy had attacked the IRGC inside the territorial waters of Farsi Island to defend their boats, this would be a major strategic setback for the US. Had the incident occurred outside the territorial waters of Iran and the US Navy not fought back; that would also be a strategic setback for the US. Right now it appears the US Navy sailors on the scene did everything right.

- The only way to produce a genuine strategic failure from this incident is to unfairly punish those involved, in other words... if the Navy wants better commanders, handle early career mistakes the right way. Tell me how any of those 10 sailors are somehow worse off for this incident. If legitimate mistakes were made, deal with it appropriately, but pinning blame for things out of their control would be a failure of leadership, and in my mind an unforgivable sin.

- At the end of the day, this was a real diplomatic test of the US and Iran who under the recent agreement are partners in Iran's nuclear energy ambitions. The outcome is very positive for the United States. I don't trust the government of Iran, but I am yet to see anything from this incident that suggests to me Iran has has been inappropriate. If you're the American Idiot who doesn't think it was appropriate for the US Navy sailors to have their hands on their heads at any point in the engagement near the IRGC base on Farsi Island, try drifting your private armed boat into the US Navy area of Kings Bay or Norfolk or New London and pretend like there is a snowballs chance in hell you will get out of there without your hands on your head. You will have your hands on your head, or if you point a gun back at the US Navy or US Coast Guard, you will be shot dead by very serious people who protect that location and will be pointing guns at you. You don't even have to be an Iranian for that outcome to occur, nor will you need an Iranian flag on your boat, a US flag will result in the same action. Wake up people, don't let the silly season control your ability to think with objectivity.

I look forward to learning what really happened, because at the end of the day we have a well armed naval craft in the middle of the Persian Gulf with a serious mechanical problem that couldn't be quickly resolved apparently combined with some incredibly bad navigation from two crews who somehow found their way to the only piece of land between their departure location and destination that could create a diplomatic problem. When you swim past all the political bullshit, the serious naval specific issues on the table leave a lot of serious questions that deserve serious answers.

Fact Check: John McCain vs Bob Work

Photo by: Jacquelyn Martin

As Bryan also discussed tonight, John McCain and Bob Work had a nice little exchange today in the Senate during today's nomination hearing. There are several things going on here, but like Bryan I don't see any scenario where Bob Work has his nomination blocked by John McCain very long, particularly if someone in the mainstream press decides to do even basic fact checking.

As everyone knows, I have been and remain a very strong supporter of the Littoral Combat Ship program. My argument since late 2008, when I spent 3 nights aboard USS Freedom walking through the ship with very smart folks thinking about what the Navy is doing with the Littoral Combat Ship program, has been that the naval warfare theories found in the concept of LCS will heavily influence surface warfare in the 21st century. I still believe that to be true.

To date, USS Freedom has yet to do anything that can be described as anything other than an activity designed for domestic political purposes. Whether it was the tour of ports across the US prior to being commissioned, the short patrol off the US southern coast, the deployment to Singapore, and even the response to the recent tsunami in the Philippines - USS Freedom has basically proven to be an operational lemon and a political flop.

But that doesn't surprise anyone paying attention to the LCS program, because all LCS observers have seen how the Navy has had to slap on one change after another to put the ship to sea, only to frequently see the ship limp back to port. It is a first in class lemon paid for by R&D funding, forced into operation too quickly for purposes of being tested by fire only to see the Navy burned every time. So the first ship, redesigned after construction begun, is a lemon. No shipbuilder - even those at Lockheed Martin - are surprised by that reality. The only real surprise with LCS to date is that USS Independence - the Austal version first in class - apparently isn't a lemon also.

But the Navy put their lemon out there, tried to make lemonade, and so far it looks more like dog urine. Worth a try? Maybe? I honestly don't know, time will tell. The question is, does anyone honestly believe the rest of the Lockheed Martin LCS class is going to be a lemon too? I don't. It is also important to contrast all the publicity of USS Freedom with the complete absence of publicity for USS Independence. I do not mean to imply the LCS will be some great class of ship by itself, rather I do strongly believe the impact that LCS will have on surface warfare is going to be very positive for that community long term.

Despite all the news you may be reading right now, to me I am thinking 2014 is the turning point for the entire Littoral Combat Ship program, and thanks to John McCain's circus in the Senate, people might finally realize it as new events start unfolding. The conversation has, almost entirely, been what the ship presumably can't do. The conversation, very soon, will transition into what the Littoral Combat Ship is doing. For the past 15 ship classes (mentioned below), that simple transition has made a lot of difference in how people looked at ships that couldn't meet early cost estimates.

When Talking Points Fail

John McCain is one of the best in Washington, DC when it comes to complaining as loud as possible about unpopular defense programs. Unfortunately he complains so much about what he is against, no one knows what he is actually for anymore when it comes to defense. Today the Senator made a big scene, and as long as no one actually fact checks what he said, he might not take a hit for the magnitude by which he was completely wrong today... again, and again, and again. This is what I like to call terrible preparation and staff work by a Senator and his office.

John McCain: Mr. Work, as a former Navy Undersecretary you wrote a very candid paper about the Littoral Combat Ship program. I have a memorandum from Secretary Hagel to the Chief of Naval Operations, I don't know if you are aware of it or not, he says "Therefore no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward" talking about the Littoral Combat Ship. Do you agree with that assessment?

Bob Work: As I understand it, what the assessment is saying is we will stop building the Flight 0+ LCS at 32 ships and we will consider follow-on ships - small combatants - a modified LCS could be one of the options, a domestic or foreign design could be one of the options, so I think this is very normal with Navy shipbuilding. We build Flights...

John McCain: You think it's normal? You think it's normal that the cost overruns associated with this ship? The fact that we don't even know what the mission is, that there has not been a, this whole idea of moving different modules off and on? You disagree with the Government Accountability Office statement about the cost overruns? This is normal Mr. Work?

Two things here. First, LCS is not being cancelled like Senator McCain is suggesting, rather the Senator's staff isn't smart enough to realize this is what down-select for the LCS looks like. Hagel is basically reintroducing competition back into the LCS program while building upon lessons learned from the first Block 0+ ships. Yeah, someone is going to offer up some incredibly expensive FFG in the analysis of alternatives, but don't bite the hook, rather expect the winner to be a Block I LCS based on one of the two designs, but the Block I will add firepower while keeping to some of the core concepts of the original LCS... that's where this is really heading.

Second, did Senator McCain really ask if cost overruns are "normal" three times?

Of the nine first in class ships previous to LCS, four had overruns of greater than 100% (Avenger class, Osprey class, Arleigh Burke class, San Antonio class), three had overruns between 40-60% (Oliver Hazard Perry class, Ticonderoga class, Whidbey Island class). Only two had overruns less than 20% (Wasp class and Virginia class). NONE came in lower than expected. Now, if we also count the Seawolf class, the America class, the Zumwalt class, the Ford class, and throw in Independence and Freedom as unique classes of ships...

The last 15 classes of US Navy ships have started out with cost overrun problems. For the entire career of John McCain as a Senator, this has been normal by any definition of the word. John McCain is either the most remarkably ignorant Senator on Navy shipbuilding issues in US history, or he's intentionally acting like a clown. I'll let you decide.

Bob Work: Well sir, up until 2007, 2008, 2009 when the program almost imploded there were significant cost overruns. When Secretary Mabus, Secretary Stackley, and I arrived in the Department of the Navy in 2009 - I believe since then the program has met it's cost targets. In 2001 the guidance to the Department of the Navy was to be able to build 3 LCS's for the price of one Arleigh Burke. The Department of the Navy is doing that, today. So I think you have to look at the performance of...

John McCain: So it makes it hard to understand why Secretary Hagel would, when the original plans as presented to Congress for their approval was 52 ships. And by the way, was anyone ever held responsible for these failures 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010?

Bob Work: Those happened in the administration prior to ours so I don't know what... 

How many folks involved in the Littoral Combat Ship program from 2005 - 2008 have been nominated and approved by Senator McCain to become a Flag Officer? The only person in this conversation who was legitimately in a position to hold people accountable for failures in the LCS program was Senator John McCain. The only person in this conversation whose record reflects a positive contribution to the Littoral Combat Ship program problems is Bob Work.

Senator McCain, your music is playing.

John McCain: So everything has been fine under this administration as far as the LCS is concerned?

Bob Work: I believe that the program is on solid ground and is meeting its cost targets, yes sir.

John McCain: You do believe that?

Bob Work: Yes sir.

John McCain: So you are in direct contradiction of the Government Accountability Office study of 2013.

Bob Work: I haven't read that particular uh....

John McCain: You haven't read it?

Bob Work: No sir. 

Like Bob Work, I was guilty of not reading the full US Government Accountability Office study of the Littoral Combat Ship from July of 2013. I read the highlight page back when it was released, then shrugged and went on to do more important things. No matter how John McCain tries to spin it, the GAO report isn't in direct contradiction of anything Bob Work said, indeed the report highlight page starts by saying:

GAO found that the Navy has made progress in addressing some of the early design and construction problems on the LCS 1 and LCS 2 seaframes, and quality defects and unit costs are declining, now that the seaframes are in steady production. Based on projected learning curves, shipyard performance can be expected to continue to improve over time.

I went ahead and read the entire GAO report because Senator McCain made it sound like the report says something incredibly important, but I could never could find where the report contradicts what Bob Work said, indeed it basically answers Senator McCain's question by suggesting that the Littoral Combat Ship is doing much better under the current administration.

Hmm...

John McCain: Wow... uhm... I'm stunned that you haven't. But the fact is that the ship has still not, uh, had a clear, uh, mission. The modules that were supposed to be moving back and forth have not, uh, we have not persued the fly before you buy, uh, uh, policy. And, uhm.. Do you remember the original cost estimate for the LCS?

Bob Work: It was $220 million for the sea frame Senator, and depending on the number of modules that you would buy the total cost for a missionized LCS, average cost was supposed to be no more than $400 million in FY2005 dollars.

John McCain: And what is it now?

Bob Work: I think, I haven't been briefed on the most recent cost - I'll do that if confirmed and look at it but I know that we are on track...

John McCain: Thank you for doing that, what's the cost now? You don't even know the cost now Mr. Work?

Bob Work: I believe the average cost with modules is about $450 million but not in FY2005 dollars, two thousand five dollars. So if you take a look at the original costing factors, I believe the cost of today's LCS's are very close to the costs that were set back in 2002-2003.

Senator McCain, no one outside the DoD has the real cost of LCS sir, because the cost of the modules has not been released publicly.  Why would Bob Work know the cost of LCS considering he hasn't been in government service for almost a year?

We all have different 'unofficial' estimated numbers for the Littoral Combat Ship seaframe and modules. I have mine, and Bob Work probably has better numbers than mine. To protect my sources I will not detail mine exactly, but generally as of FY2014 I have the Littoral Combat Ship plus the average cost of one mission module costing around $548 million, which is $421 million in FY2005 dollars. Now, without going into too much detail, allow me to provide some insight into those numbers. The primary reason why the average cost of the Littoral Combat Ship is more than $400 million in FY2005 dollars is because the MIW module is incredibly expensive, indeed I believe the very high cost of the MIW module is why the LCS modules are yet to be released in the SAR. Once we see the module numbers in the SAR, we will all have a much better idea of how much LCS really costs.

But here is the rub... even if the LCS went away, the one part of the entire LCS program the Navy will keep under any circumstances is the Mine Warfare Module. It is the most desired piece of the entire program, so that cost is going to exist with or without the LCS.

And yes, if I replace the 24 MIW modules with 12 ASuW and 12 ASW modules based on the numbers I have, and applied the average, the LCS cost in FY2014 dollars is less than $400 million FY2005 dollars. Expect the MIW module to cost in the neighborhood of $70 - $80 million per module when the SAR finally reveals the cost. As we already know, mine warfare is very expensive.

John McCain: Well given that then it is hard to understand why the Secretary of Defense would curtail the production of it by some 24 ships, so Mr. Work every objective study whether it be the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Government Accountability Office, every other objective observer the LCS is not anywhere near what it was presented to the Congress by funding and this again makes me wonder about your qualifications because the one thing that we are plagued with is significant cost overruns and lack of capability.

John McCain's staff failed him today, because they forgot to update all the old talking points and forced John McCain to say a lot of inaccurate things about LCS in an attempt to stick it to Bob Work, stuff that was very much once true but today is clearly not. The Senator's implication regarding the cost of LCS is wrong, and I'm struggling to find all these objective observers saying otherwise today, because even the GAO in the July 2013 report the Senator claims to be citing concedes the cost of LCS is no longer the programs problem. Now maybe the Senator disagrees, but $421 million in FY2005 dollars appears to me to be pretty close to $400 million in FY2005 dollars, in fact the cost of LCS today is a lot closer to the original estimate than I think every reasonable observer would have ever believed possible back in 2007-2008 when the Navy was ceasing construction of ships in both shipyards.

Senator John McCain today is attempting to publicly slap Bob Work with the LCS program, which makes no sense because every data point suggests Bob Work was part of a team that took a really bad LCS program suffering from enormous cost problems, and clearly turned it around and got it back on track. If the Senator will publicly attack people who do a good job, and the same Senator voted affirmative for promotions to Navy officers who were directly involved in the problems of LCS, the Senator is hardly qualified to pass on judgment regarding qualifications, because the Senator is the one demonstrating clear lack of good judgment.

In hindsight, I find the whole thing sad. Bob Work might legitimately be the nations top civilian strategic thinker on defense issues since the cold war, and John McCain - who some consider to be the nations top defense Senator - has clearly gone off the deep end into the land of crazy nonsense. As soon as Senator John McCain realizes his staff let him down big time today, that the Senator is on the wrong side of the facts he argued, and assuming his ego allows the Senator to concede he made a mistake....

Bob Work will be the next Deputy Secretary of Defense.

As for that whole New Hampshire BRAC thing that happened today... either the Portsmouth Shipyard folks honestly believe they are in trouble keeping the yard open, or that was the Joint Strike Fighter lobby nervous as hell about Bob Work's appointment.

Something to keep an eye on.

USS Chancellorsville: New Details Tell a Different Story

This is the official press release by the US Navy.

PACIFIC OCEAN (NNS) -- An aerial target drone malfunctioned and struck guided missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) off the coast of Southern California at approximately 1:25 pm local time today, Nov. 16, while the ship was conducting a radar tracking exercise during routine training at sea.

No Sailors were seriously injured, but two Sailors were treated for minor burns. The ship remains capable of operations, however it did sustain some damage and will return to its homeport of San Diego to have the damage assessed. The Navy is investigating the cause of the malfunction.

That is very vague, so what if we add a bit of factual detail?

PACIFIC OCEAN (NNS) -- A BQM-74 aerial target missile drone malfunctioned and struck a direct hit in the port side of the guided missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) off the coast of Southern California at approximately 1:25 pm local time today, Nov. 16, while the ship was conducting a radar tracking exercise of the BQM-74 during routine training at sea. USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) is currently conducting Combat System Ships Qualification Trials for Baseline 9 of the AEGIS combat system - the most advanced version of the AEGIS combat system. USS Chancellorsville is currently the only US Navy ship certified with the latest version of the AEGIS combat system.

No Sailors were seriously injured by the direct hit of the missile tracked all the way into the hull of the cruiser, but two Sailors were treated for minor burns. The ships officers and crew may or may not have bravely and intelligently attempted to defend itself from the rogue drone, but what's really important enough to mention is that the ship and technology on the ship remains capable of operations. However it did sustain some damage from the direct hit that put a two foot hole in the port side of the ship, and as a result USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) will return to its homeport of San Diego to have the damage assessed. The Navy is investigating the cause of the malfunction.

So how is it exactly that the one ship on the planet with the most advanced version of the worlds best anti-missile combat system took a direct hit from a rogue missile drone?

The Navy tells us the drone malfunctioned, and apparently the combat system on the ship had no problems if the ship remains capable of operations, so based on those details of the press release the officers and crew of the USS Chancellorsville tracked the target missile drone - during the radar tracking exercise - apparently as it scored a direct hit into side of the ship.

But the ship was unable to defend itself? I get it that the safety systems were probably engaged that would prevent the full capabilities of the AEGIS combat system from being employed against the rogue drone, but what about the independent close-in point defenses of the cruiser?

The official story, based on the details as released officially, is that the most advanced AEGIS warship in the world tracked a direct hit by a missile drone and was apparently unable to defend itself successfully. Did the ship even try to defend itself from a rogue drone? We don't know, because the press release focuses on telling the public the technology of the ship is sufficient enough for the ship to conduct normal operations, but tells us no details at all regarding what the crew did or did not do to defend the ship from a direct hit.

There is a detail that is omitted in the official press release, and because it is a detail of the incident known at the time of the press release, we can only assume the omission is intentional for purposes of protecting a reputation. The ships officers and crew apparently did try to defend the ship. The CIWS apparently fired at the BQM-74 but was unsuccessful in defending the ship. That detail matters, because the omission of that detail is the difference between protecting the reputation of the ships officers and crew who tried to defend the ship, or protecting the reputation of a piece of technology that was unsuccessful - for unknown reasons - in performing the technologies primary role as the last line of defense for the ship.

Let's hope that while the Navy investigates the drone malfunction they also look into why the CIWS was unsuccessful in engaging the rogue drone in defense of the ship. It seems to me the CIWS investigation is much more important than an investigation into the malfunction of a target drone.

Based on where the rogue drone hit the ship, had it been a real ASCM - it could have easily been a mission kill for the ship. This is a very serious incident involving the most advanced AEGIS warship in the US Navy, and the Navy has started the incident with a press release that intentionally omits a critical detail - that the ship tried to defend itself and the specific technology designed to defend the ship for this specific situation failed.

This incident is a big deal, and on the first day there is already a deception effort underway to conceal key details of the incident - an omission that only serves to cast doubt upon the reputation of sailors for purposes of protecting the reputation of a piece of technology. Why did the Navy conceal from the public that the point defense system of the most advanced AEGIS ship in the US Navy failed to protect the ship from a direct hit from a rogue drone?

FY2013: The Year the Navy Sprinted in Circles

A better analogy in photography for 2013 in the US Navy would be hard to find!

It was only a matter of time before we saw some daylight creep in between the SECNAV and the CNO with the issue of sequestration. Sam Fellman saw it too, and this is outstanding reporting. We start with the speech from Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus from September 11th, as reported in Defense News.

“In another 12 to 18 months, we will have sailors and Marines deploy without all the training they need,” Navy Secretary Ray Mabus said in a Wednesday speech before students and faculty at the National Defense University in Washington. “Through no fault of their own, they will be less ready to face whatever comes over the horizon.”

“We are rapidly reaching the point where no amount of hard work or innovation or anything else will allow us to get this training back,” Mabus said, casting the service’s possible $14 billion shortfall for the upcoming fiscal year in the starkest possible terms.

Mabus also said that the scale and indiscriminate nature of the sequester cuts could slow the Navy’s response in a crisis, such as that unfolding after Syria’s reported use of chemical weapons. A force of destroyers, amphibious ships and two carrier strike groups were in the region, ready to respond immediately.

Because of the sequester cuts, a similar response “may be limited or unavailable in the future,” Mabus said, noting that it will also reduce steaming days, flying hours and other vital training that the fleet depends on to prepare for deployment.

Mabus is talking about operations and maintenance. The key point is that all year long the uniformed Navy has been telling Congress everything is fine with operations and maintenance, indeed the uniformed Navy is sticking to their story.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert also spoke about the impacts last week with many new specifics on their possible impacts. But Greenert stopped short of casting them in as harsh a light, instead saying that his priority is “that those ships we put forward are ready to go, no matter what the number in the Navy are.”

The SECNAV is pushing a new issue, and as of September 11, 2024 the CNO apparently wasn't ready to push that issue. The problem is, the CNO has been wrong on the sequestration issue all year and basically lost a year where he could have been pressing this issue. It is unclear if the CNO is following orders from somewhere else or simply had a budget strategy that ignored the long term effects of sequestration, but all year long the uniformed Navy has been acting like sequestration is going away. It isn't.

As I have been watching the FY14 budget debate unfold, it is not clear at all to me what the objective of the CNO's script has been, but it is clear to me the approach has been ineffective and the objective has not been achieved. Lets review what we can safely call 'the wasted year' for a second.

First, the CNO made clear early on that the priority would be the next ships out for deployment, and budget resources are being expended to maintain a very high operational tempo at the expense of ships staying home. Nearly all deployment reductions have come at the low end, basically frigates for SOUTHCOM, and there has been nearly zero reduction of major force deployments to CENTCOM or PACOM. Even though the US has completely withdrawn from Iraq, and is in the process of winding down in Afghanistan, the US Navy today is operating two carrier strike groups and an amphibious ready group in the 5th fleet AOR.

For what purpose could the US Navy possibly need that much presence in the 5th fleet given the budget situation? It's something like 2 CVNs, 1 LHD, 1 LSD, 3 CGs, and 6-8 DDGs in the Middle East right now. For what? Yemen? Somalia? Iran? Surely that much firepower isn't needed for Afghanistan today, is it?

The answer is not Syria, because Syria is 6th fleet where the US Navy has another 4 DDGs and an unknown number of submarines loitering near Cyprus.

The US Navy is throwing everything in the budget to keep massive force levels in the Middle East when the threat to US interests at this point in time is marginal, at best. The worst part is that while the US is sending ships on schedule, none of the ships being deployed know when they are coming home - and the schedule for returning home from deployment is fubar. Leadership is pushing material, and more important manpower, to the brink for purposes of sustaining an operational strategy with no obvious alignment in support of threatened national interests.

What exactly is the strategic objective of the CNO's current operational tempo and operational posture in this budget environment? How can anyone objectively call the current Navy OPTEMPO wise given the lack of an apparent threat and the impacts of that OPTEMPO on man and material? All I see is the wear and tear on ships being deployed longer than intended, ships that will not have maintenance funded fully upon their return home. Even worse, I am seeing ships deploy and crews unable to make any plans at all because their return date is a moving target - always towards longer deployments. Always.

With all due respect to the CNO, his stated commitment to sailors in his own sailing directions lacks credibility in action. It is one thing to push the fleet during war, but the Navy today is being pushed for a political objective - to prove to 'no one who is listening' the value of the fleet by simply being forward deployed. Want someone in Washington to know what the value of a forward deployed Navy is? Bring the majority of the fleet home and let the President get told "no" a few times. President's don't like that answer.

Entire Air Wings are not flying today, already, and ships that return from extended, lengthy, and seemingly never ending deployments are not fully funded for maintenance. There is already a problem with operations and maintenance budgets before we even get to discussing the future of sequestration, because operations are being extended for each individual deployment and the maintenance money is not there already. The CNO is a submariner who has spent decades in a community that has always been fully funded to meticulous detail, so perhaps he assumes that is how it is for everyone in the Navy? I dunno, but I do know that the strategy all year to tell Congress that everything is just fine has been ineffective at best, and a failure as a budget strategy by any definition.

Which raises the question, was this post by CHINFO on sequestration a sign that the CNO is ready to pivot his position and start being honest about the impacts of sequestration?

Well, what about reprogramming authority? Wouldn’t that help? Sure it would. We’d love to be able to move some money around. But even with reprogramming authority under an FY14 Appropriations Bill - which, by the way, we don’t have yet - sequestration would cut our operations and maintenance account by $4.6 billion instead of $5.6 billion. That’s the account we use to keep those ships out there and those Sailors fully trained.

A cut of this size to that account - without reprogramming authority - will delay more than half our ship maintenance availabilities next year and reduce our training to “just in time,” meaning our Sailors won’t be ready until just before they leave.

In fact, we’ll have to shut down two airwings for three months each and limit four others to only the minimum level of flying, the “tactical hard deck.”

Not only will we have fewer ships, subs and aircraft ready to go if needed, we’ll also lose $4.5 billion next fiscal year from the accounts we use to buy new ones.

The million dollar question this week is whether CHINFO is off script because his argument supports SECNAV, or is he on script and the CNO is ready to get in line with SECNAV on this new approach to the sequestration issue? Time will tell.

The point is, the CNO's leadership on messaging has been a mess all year long, and credit the SECNAV, not the CNO, for carrying the conversation forward. In March VADM Copeman's memo got leaked and suddenly a real opportunity to discuss force structure changes that might be necessary under sequestration. Nope, CNO doesn't lead that conversation, indeed he works hard to insure that conversation goes no where. Then when Captain Hendrix releases that CNAS paper on aircraft carriers, again a perfect opportunity to discuss what sequestration means pops up. Nope. All I see is NAVAIR circle the wagons around both the CVN and the JSF, which is ironic because nothing makes the CVN look like a waste of money better than the JSF.

Then last week the Navy sends a two star to float an idea for the first time ever in public before Congress - a $4 billion annual supplemental package to fund the Ohio-class replacement. CNO has had all year to bring up this important issue publicly, but has instead waited until September 12, 2024 to have a two-star raise the issue in a Congressional hearing? This is a huge topic and is just as much part of the sequestration issue as anything else. Did a two star just go off script, or is this just another poor messaging decision in a year that is full of poor messaging decisions? It is ironic the best messaging the Navy had all year was when an active duty Captain was attacking the value of aircraft carriers, because despite Captain Hendrix's argument, the aircraft carrier not only won the argument, but the value of the aircraft carrier became a conversation topic to a much broader audience. Was that the CNO starting a conversation? Hard to believe considering CNO has spent all year trying to control all the conversations, and doing so without making a notable positive influence anyway.

It is shocking how much of a wasted year this has been for the Navy to make a case for seapower, and the only notable change in the Navy this year was the retirement of Bob Work. It is surprising, to say the least, that his replacement is Jo Ann Rooney, because the Navy is going from an Undersecretary of the Navy who is one of the most respected voices on seapower in the 21st century to someone who once worked a few months in the DoD and may or may not have ever actually been onboard an active Navy ship in her life, and almost certainly never before 2013.

The Department of the Navy has the biggest single budget in Department of Defense, and if you break up the DoD budget into individual departments, the Department of the Navy has the biggest budget in the federal government. Why would anyone in the Senate accept someone as unqualified as Jo Ann Rooney as the #2 in the Navy and claim with credibility to actually care? I'm sure Jo Ann Rooney is a very nice person, and everyone says she did a great job as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, but she simply isn't qualified to be UnderSecNav.

This means SECNAV has no choice, Mabus has to step up and be the vocal advocate of seapower because no support at the UnderSecNav position is apparently coming his way, and CNO has been ineffective in this role all year long. CNO needs to step up too, because 2013 is memorable only for the opportunities lost with the budget, the plans that have not worked, and political moves at the fleet operational level that make very little sense strategically in context of sequestration of which nowhere exists political will to change. It is really weird that at the end of FY13 I have a better idea what the CNO doesn't want than I do regarding what the CNO wants. How many serious, consequential decisions were made this year that have significant long term impact for the Navy?

Zero.

Since day 1 the CNO stump speech has been about hard choices. Yet, the operational tempo has not fundamentally changed, and the force structure being procured has not fundamentally changed. Meanwhile the Navy has taken consistent budget cuts, and now is taking additional budget cuts in the form of sequestration. Is the CNO surrounded by yes men, because after years of discussing hard choices, no one has apparently pointed out to the CNO that he has yet to make any hard choices. The CNO's decisions have primarily involved low hanging fruit - also known as the easy, obvious decisions because there were no options. I think everyone accepts that there are nothing but bad choices, but it is better to transparently make bad choices when all choices are bad than to make no choices at all.

Sequestration will make everything much harder for the Navy, and the Navy did as little as possible this year to prepare itself for the pain in future years. All of the pain the Navy felt in the second half of FY2013 was basically pain incurred by failing to make any hard choices the first half of FY2013. Be sure to read this very important contribution on the issue of sequestration by Christine Fox that came out Tuesday. Bottom line, unless the process gets fixed by Congress, which is unlikely, and the DoD gets to decide how to spend money on defense, the arbitrary approach by Congress is going to hit the DoD like a sledgehammer.

What makes Christine Fox's argument so good? For starters, she never actually complains about the size of the cut to the defense budget, she is only truly ranting against the arbitrary way the cut must be implemented due to Congressional action and inaction. More to the point, Christine Fox articulates the issues of sequestration very well, and without directly saying it - makes it crystal clear that right now Congress is destroying the DoD in ways adversaries have been incapable of doing in the last 6 decades.

One final thought... the worst kept secret in Washington DC is that Bob Work's replacement would be a woman. Some have a problem with that, but I don't. How is it possible the President looked far and wide to find a woman to be UnderSecNav, and picks someone as unqualified as Jo Ann Rooney? Why would he pass up on the numerous qualified women options out there, particularly someone as eminently qualified as Christine Fox?

What I have a problem with is that no President should ever get political points for hiring a woman when that is the explicit and well known objective of an appointment (in this case, in response to legitimate criticism regarding the lack of women appointments) when in fact the woman hired isn't qualified for the job, and legitimately qualified women are being passed up for the job.

Sorry, but the President doesn't advance women's issues in the workplace when he appoints someone absent the resume that merits a position when also passing up on highly qualified women for the same job - in fact the exact opposite message is sent than the one he is seeking political credit for when the President does that. This isn't the first time the President has passed up on an eminently qualified female candidate for a defense appointment this year and selected someone with far less qualifications, and yes I'm speaking of Michelle Fourney who was qualified by any definition and Chuck Hagel, whose resume by comparison was thin - indeed paper thin.

"Amateurism"

This article by Major General Robert Scales (ret) is remarkable.

The tapes tell the tale. Go back and look at images of our nation’s most senior soldier, Gen. Martin Dempsey, and his body language during Tuesday’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Syria. It’s pretty obvious that Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, doesn’t want this war. As Secretary of State John Kerry’s thundering voice and arm-waving redounded in rage against Bashar al-Assad’s atrocities, Dempsey was largely (and respectfully) silent.

Dempsey’s unspoken words reflect the opinions of most serving military leaders. By no means do I profess to speak on behalf of all of our men and women in uniform. But I can justifiably share the sentiments of those inside the Pentagon and elsewhere who write the plans and develop strategies for fighting our wars. After personal exchanges with dozens of active and retired soldiers in recent days, I feel confident that what follows represents the overwhelming opinion of serving professionals who have been intimate witnesses to the unfolding events that will lead the United States into its next war.

They are embarrassed to be associated with the amateurism of the Obama administration’s attempts to craft a plan that makes strategic sense. None of the White House staff has any experience in war or understands it. So far, at least, this path to war violates every principle of war, including the element of surprise, achieving mass and having a clearly defined and obtainable objective.

While there are points in the article I do not agree with, this article goes on to make several interesting arguments. The Pentagon under Panetta struggled dealing with sequestration, but folks in the Pentagon always believed he fought for their best interest. The same cannot be said of Secretary Hagel.

President Obama traded in people with serious leadership skills - folks like Hillary Clinton,  Leon Panetta, and Tom Donilon - for ex-Senator buddies like John Kerry and Chuck Hagel, or close friends like Susan Rice.

Syria: Sitrep

The answer from the beginning has been made clear: Bomb Syria. Now what are your important, intelligent questions?

Why would the US bomb Syria?

It began when it was revealed that Syrian government military forces used chemical weapons in Damascus during a military operation on August 21, 2013. According to NGO sources, at least 100 people died in the initial attack, and many more have died since. The attack appears to have exposed between 300 - 1000 people to chemical agents (depending upon source), overwhelming NGO health organizations working in Syria. The UN has not officially confirmed the use of chemical weapons, and Syria has not exactly been cooperative in helping the UN teams assess the situation.

Both President Obama and Secretary Kerry describe the evidence in the hands of the US intelligence services proving the use of chemical weapons as conclusive, but the intelligence with the most credibility that is accessible to the average American came from the Violations Documentation Center in Syria. This outstanding Foreign Policy story tells their story.

Activist Razan Zaitouneh, who runs the Violations Documentation Center in Syria, tells FP that her team sped to the Damascus suburb of Zamalka immediately after a chemical weapons attack was reported there on Aug. 21. The media staff of Zamalka's local coordination committee, which is responsible for filming videos in the area and uploading them to the world, also sped to the scene. According to Zaitouneh, all but one of them paid with their lives.

"The chemical attacks, on the first day of the massacre, claimed the lives of many media activists in Zamalka coordination because they inhaled the chemical toxic gases," Murad Abu Bilal, the sole survivor, told Zaitouneh in an interview uploaded to -- what else -- YouTube. "[T]hey went out to shoot and collect information about the chemical attack, but none of them came back."

The videos quickly removed any doubt for U.S. intelligence analysts that chemical weapons were used in the Aug. 21 attack. They showed children with constricted pupils who were twitching and having trouble breathing -- classic signs of exposure to sarin gas. They also showed the remnants of the rockets reportedly used to deliver the gas, which were largely intact. If they had delivered conventional explosive munitions, more of the rocket would have been destroyed on impact.

What does the US hope to achieve by bombing Syria?

The objective, goal, or "ends" of strategy for Syria is where the Obama administration has detoured into a ditch, because apparently the use of military power isn't the way the Obama administration will execute strategy, using military power - as in the action of using of military force - is the "ends" of the strategy itself... at least according to the New York Times.

The goal of the cruise missile strikes the United States is planning to carry out in Syria is to restore the smudged “red line” that President Obama drew a year ago against the use of poison gas.

If carried out effectively, the strikes may also send a signal to Iran that the White House is prepared to back up its words, no small consideration for an administration that has proclaimed that the use of military force remains an option if the leadership in Iran insists on fielding a nuclear weapon.

The Obama administration apparently plans on using military power in Syria so they can set a precedent for using military power next time someone uses chemical weapons, with a focus on Iran. I have no problem with any President of the United States using military power to follow through on a threat to use military power when a red line is crossed. The credibility of the President of the United States in foreign policy is the same thing as the credibility of the United States.

With that said, there is no question the reaction so far by the White House to the events in Syria have been mismanaged by national security leadership. It is impossible for me to imagine Tom Donilan, Hillary Clinton, and Leon Panetta allowing this situation to unfold like what we have seen this week with Susan Rice, John Kerry, and Chuck Hagel. It is also impossible for me to believe that Donilan would ever go along with a plan like this.

But the military strategy that the Obama administration is considering is not linked to its larger diplomatic strategy of persuading President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to yield power and join in negotiations that would end the bloody civil war.

Only someone as strategically inept as Susan Rice would think this is a good idea. Democrats have defended Susan Rice when the evidence has been overwhelming she really isn't qualified to be top National Security advisor, and her inexperience outside her foggy bubble is on parade right now. Partisans in the US keep making the same mistakes. They get caught up listening to what their political opponents say and don't pay enough attention to what the career oriented professionals say. The line of non-partisan career national security professionals who have deep respect for Susan Rice for her intellectual capacity of national security affairs is very short, and today may be invisible.

When the UK Parliament voted down Prime Minister Cameron's military participation in Syria on Thursday, that was a blatant sign of war fatigue by civilians in the UK (which also exists in the US). The last time the UK Parliament voted down a Prime Minister on matters of war and peace in the UK was regarding the Crimean War in 1855, meaning the events of Thursday was a once in a lifetime event as a political failure. Lord Aberdeen resigned the next day! Before 1855 the previous time was in 1782, when Parliament voted against further war against America. Lord North, Prime Minister at the time, resigned 3 weeks later!

I believe Susan Rice is partly accountable. She put Prime Minister Cameron in an impossible position and never saw his opposition coming. She is responsible for managing the national security political processes in defense of US National Interests, but her first move was to put the act of taking military action in Syria ahead of the facts that make a case for military action in Syria. Process is one of her primary responsibilities for the administration, and she is doing a terrible job. The first casualty of our National Security Policy to address Syria using chemical weapons on civilians was America's closest ally.

How will the US strike Syria?

The United States intends to use a limited set of military resources to conduct a limited military operation against a limited set of targets, so expectations for successful action should be for a limited achievement of objectives. That's the real problem here, the plan has a very low ceiling for success, but if you think about it, the floor for failure makes limited military action as suggested to date incredibly risky.

Four or five destroyers of the United States Navy are projecting power offshore of Syria, a role historically associated with battleships. Should a military operation be executed, it is unlikely the majority of the cruise missiles will come from those surface ships. The real "battleship" per se off the coast of Syria is the Ohio class SSGN that has probably been operating for months off the Syrian coast. While the destroyers probably will shoot off Tomahawk cruise missiles if a strike is ordered, the majority of cruise missiles will come from submarines.

These destroyers and submarines constitute the 6th Fleet, which is a shadow of what was once the most important fleet for the United States Navy in the cold war. From the 1950s through the 1980s, the US Navy operated at least two, and often three aircraft carrier strike groups in the Mediterranean Sea at all times. Credit should be given to Admiral Stavridis, Secretary Panetta, and Admiral Greenert for moving to base destroyers in Rota, Spain by 2015, because those folks worked very hard and had the strategic foresight to recognize the need for a sustained US naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea.

The United States will likely still be able to use the UK air base in Cyprus, and presumably air bases in Turkey. This should be enough for basing Air Force capabilities in support of a limited military strike.

The coalition to date consists primarily of the United States, France, Canada, Australia, Greece, and Turkey. The smaller the coalition, the more resources the US will have to bring to the table, and that truly is a problem. Count me among those who does not see sequestration as a deep budget cut. As a budget number, I do not see the size of the cut to defense as the problem, but what I do see is the sequestration process Congress has put in place as a very broad cut across defense, making the process enforcing what is otherwise a historically modest budget cut one of the least well thought out plans executed in Congressional history (which is really saying something). Because the budget cut, by law as designed through sequestration, must in fact be spread out broadly across the defense budget, it impacts virtually everything.

The effects of the broad sequestration cut across the whole of defense in the context of Syria means the United States has virtually no ready reserve should things not go according to plan. The CNO has a plan that I do not agree with, it basically commits all resources in the Navy to the next deployment while the US Navy continues to sustain a robust operating tempo. What that means is the Navy is sending as many ships as they can on deployment, and those ships have the resources to be ready. The ships working up for the next deployment are also resourced well. However, everything at home not scheduled for the next deployment, which is about half the fleet, is hollowed out. Those ships are far from being a ready reserve, and would take a great deal of money to get ready quickly. If those ships are needed, savings from sequestration aren't going to be savings at all, because it's going to be expensive to fix the slow rot taking place across the fleet under the current high tempo and reduced maintenance model.

So what is the plan for Syria?

We know the objective of military force is not regime change nor is it to establish a no-fly zone. The military action is intentionally limited, so whether it includes manned or unmanned aircraft in addition to cruise missiles is irreverent because air power alone cannot achieve most strategic objectives that would otherwise be worth achieving in Syria - like destroying all the chemical weapons in Syria.

While it is safe to assume target lists would include some of the air defense command and control in Syria, and probably SCUD missile launchers, the real question is whether the target list will also include Al Qaeda forces working with the rebels. Do not be surprised if the US bombs both Syrian military targets and Al Qaeda targets aligned with the rebel insurgency.

The US plan is to successfully strike several targets in Syria. That's it. The plan is successful if the US military strikes targets in Syria without obscene collateral damage. The plan is not successful if there is obscene collateral damage, if there is attrition by US military forces, or if the military strike results in regional escalation resulting in a major attack against Israel. Short of one of those three things happening, the US achieves success in pursuit of the demonstration that the policy is seeking.

Sounds easy, what could go wrong?

What part of the US response to the initial reports of confirmed chemical weapons use feels right so far? Because the US announced intent to conduct military strikes in Syria, it is a safe bet that when US cruise missiles pound the hell out of something important, there will be plenty of human shields ready to die to American weapons. The US has made no secret it desires to keep military activity to a minimum, in fact the US strategic objective of limited military action is more proclaimed to date by Obama administration officials than any actual US strategic objective of military action inside Syria. The arrogance and casual expectation by the Obama administration that assumes Syria will simply roll over in the face of limited US military power disturbs me. No matter which way events unfold, administration people have said way too much and it is very dangerous to military personnel.

So far things don't have the feel of events going well, but the US has yet to reveal any actual evidence the intelligence services supposedly have to convince the American people war is necessary, and we have a lot more intelligence than what has been reported in the news so far. For example, there are widespread reports that the US has taped recordings of high ranking Syrian Army officers discussing the use of chemical weapons. But... there are also reports that US intelligence strongly suspects the movement of Syrian military forces around Damascus implies another large chemical weapon attack on rebel strong positions may be imminent. Nobody expects that to happen, and yet, that may actually happen... so let's be careful with our starting assumptions that predict how this might unfold.

We presume Syria will play the part of a completely rational actor, and by rational actor we presume Syria will do exactly what we want Syria to do to insure our limited military campaign is completely successful for us. The thing is, I've studied Putin since the late 90s, and the way he looks at Russia in the Mediterranean Sea isn't always compatible with what the US interprets as a rational viewpoint.

When Russia deploys a Cruiser and destroyer off Syria, it isn't to make headlines. The Syrians are going to know where our ships in the 6th fleet are. Russia will provide Syria with technical support, and that technical support will include filling gaps in Syrian ISR at sea.

The US forces cannot take attrition in a military attack against Syria without suffering significant strategic consequences, and the reserve options at sea for the US Navy are extremely limited. If US warships in the Med are successfully attacked, there is a zero percent chance the first thing the US Navy is going to do is send an aircraft carrier through the Suez canal, because I assure you the overwhelming explosion in the Middle East of "f u usa" chants following US Navy attrition, particularly in Egypt, is going to make a Suez canal crossing under those conditions impossible.

So any scenario where warships suffer attrition, even with 100% solid evidence the Russians helped empower a Syrian attack achieve that objective, is going to put US policy in free fall with the Obama administration scrambling under a domestic pressure cooker and the US Navy week(s) away from being able to field a reserve capable of fighting due to sequestration cuts. Short of a direct attack by Russia against US military forces (extremely unlikely), Russia is in no danger of being attacked by the US for helping Syria.

So yeah, the number of things that can go wrong, in my opinion, greatly exceed the number of things that can go right. Susan Rice does not give me any confidence at all this will end well for core US national interests. With everything going on surrounding Syria this week, my faith in process and execution is solely with the professionals in the military who are on the front lines. Unless there is a brilliant plan that nobody has leaked, which is unlikely given the number of leaks we are seeing right now, my sense is this will come down to the individuals on the front line to make something useful out of the rotten pile of nonsense they are being handed by the administration.


And I hope no one forgets the policy with strategic "ends" defined as "bombing Syria" is taking place on General Dempsey's watch. Wake me up if that guy ever steps up, because the only thing every new challenge facing the military does is make me miss Admiral Mullen's leadership as the CJCS that much more.