Context Reveals a Reckless CVN CO Got His Revenge

This New York Times article is incredible. A lot of people are talking. Read it all.

Comment:

No one in the Navy can survive a five month investigation, so whenever that happens the officer being investigated is going to get hit hard. Doesn't matter who it is. The SECNAV will have the last word on this, so I'll wait to see what the ultimate conclusion is. And yeah, FOIA will tell all, because everyone and there mother wants to know if the Navy is jumping the shark with all these firings. Is the Navy upholding a high standard for leadership, or an unrealistic standard and simply using the firing of COs for PR purposes now? Time will tell.

Be warned, the "racially insensitive remarks" are not going to be what you think it is, unless you get offended when a strike group commander is encouraging the 5000 person crew of an aircraft carrier to be vigilant and intelligent when protecting the ship from the beeping beep Iranian mother beepers. The context is going to be interesting, and it will be very interesting to see how Ray Mabus sees this.

Here is what is really fascinating to me though. The New York Times just told the American people that the CO of the only CVN in the 7th Fleet today is a vengeful, reckless asshat. As outlined by the New York Times, the CO is so reckless that he will "fly" a 100,000 ton nuclear reactor waving the US flag through the most congested sea lanes in the world, and when the CO was called out for his reckless behavior at the time it was occurring, the CO reacted by getting his superior shipped off the CVN through the IG process, and ultimately ruined the career of the Admiral with a FIVE MONTH IG investigation - an investigation which no one of any rank in the Navy can possibly survive. When process is weighed with result, the IG process is looking less credible, and when the CO is still in command the Navy loses credibility.

The aspect of the New York Times story related to the CO is shocking when everything is examined in context. The behavior demonstrated by the CO is dangerous. It is poison to the institution when commanding officers must be that cautious when witnessing incredibly dangerous behavior, deadly behavior even.

Kirby may think he doesn't need to comment on the IG report, but when the New York Times undermines the CO of a deployed aircraft carrier in a way that tells a very specific and detailed story of a CO on a power trip, that issue cannot simply be ignored. I find it incredible that the Navy has looked the other way on the CO here, because this is clearly not an issue of a whistle-blower, this is an issue of a CO abusing professional processes for purposes of person revenge being told to America through the New York Times.

Unimaginable Statements and Signs of Surrender

Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discuss the effects of sequestration during a news conference at the Pentagon, Jan. 10, 2013.

Erin Kirk-Cuomo/DOD

As Leon Panetta approaches retirement I just want to say that I believe he has been one of the great public servants in modern American history. Until he retires however, he is still the Secretary of Defense and unlike some folks who approach retirement, he has not 'checked out' mentally and is still actively engaged in the responsibilities of his job. This time sequestration.

“We really have no choice but to prepare for the worst,” Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told reporters at a Pentagon news briefing Thursday. “Regardless of what Congress does or fails to do, we still have an obligation to protect this country...”

Earlier this month, Congress came to an agreement to avoid the so-called fiscal cliff, but instead of eliminating the threat of sequestration, the deal simply delayed the automatic, across-the-board cuts until March 1.

“Postponing sequestration doesn’t prevent, it just prolongs the uncertainty for our force and for our military families,” said Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Readiness is what’s now in jeopardy. We’re on the brink of creating a hollow force, the very thing we said we must avoid.”

Absorbing billions of dollars in cuts nearly halfway through the fiscal year would be even more damaging to the military, Panetta and Dempsey said, which is why the military must take steps now to prepare.

I get to this point in the article discussing sequestration and I'm feeling pretty good about how the DoD is handling the immense challenge and burdens the sequestration process has placed on the DoD. My glass is half full until...

If sequestration does take effect, Dempsey said, troops in combat, those about to deploy to combat and wounded warriors will be protected.

“But for the rest of the force, operations, maintenance and training will be gutted. We’ll ground aircraft, return ships to port, and sharply curtail training across the force,” he said. “Within months, we’ll be less prepared. Within a year, we’ll be unprepared.”

If you are the top General in the United States Armed Forces, and you know something is coming that must be planned for, and you have been telling everyone that you have been preparing for that something going back over a year now, if you are not prepared when it arrives is that not a failure of leadership to be prepared?

Brett Friedman said it best. "Can you imagine a USMC 4-Star ever saying "we'll be unprepared'? Never"

It is comments like these that have me concerned that US Army leadership is unprepared for the fiscal situation that is about to hit that great institution harder than the other services. I get it that Dempsey is CJCS and not fully engaged with the US Army anymore, but his comments sound depressing, defeated, hollow...

The US Army really does need to be the most innovative and motivated service of the three major branches of the military if they are going to manage the upcoming budget cuts well. General Odierno is a brilliant tactician, operator, and warfighter but I have not been able to find much media reporting where he is discussing sequestration, or any comment whatsoever where he is able to articulate a compelling strategic vision for a smaller US Army heading into the 21st century.

The US Navy today has this incredible depth on the bench of remarkably brilliant one and two star Rear Admirals, which for the record, makes me think that suggestions the Navy has lost the best and brightest of this early 80s graduation generation of sailors is a bunch of nonsense. When the current group of three and four star Flag Officers in the US Navy retire over the next 2-4 years, which include the remaining group of sailors who come from graduation classes in the late 70s, I strongly believe the Navy is going to be in fantastic hands with a collective cadre of the smartest, strongest leadership the fleet has had in modern naval history - for good reason too, their system of promotion collectively required them to be educated more than any previous generation, and it shows. These Rear Admirals were all doing their DH tour during the post cold war contraction of the US Navy, and if you think about it that gives them a lot of insight regarding what needs to be prioritized. The US Navy has extremely strong leadership right now, and I think there are signs of it everywhere.

As for the Army, not so much. I can't remember the last time I read something from a General in the US Army and thought to myself how smart it was, indeed nearly every really bright idea from an Army officer these days comes from someone in a field grade. I have to believe (or maybe I just want to believe) that after over a decade of war, and because they are of the same generation of military officer, the US Army has depth on their bench of brilliant one and two star Generals that most of us never see or hear from. OSD needs to be more keenly interested in this issue, and make it clear it is time for that generation of US Army officers to step up for their service and their country in what is clearly a significant challenge that will require significant changes forced almost entirely by fiscal stress to the US Army, because from my perspective most of the three and four star Generals in the Army today not only physically look defeated, they are starting to sound defeated.

100 Most Influencial People in US Defense

By now I am sure most of you have checked out the inaugural 100 Most Influential People in U.S. Defense list that was compiled by more than two dozen reporters and editors representing the staffs of Gannett Government Media’s publications Defense News, Army Times, Air Force Times, Navy Times, Marine Corps Times, Armed Forces Journal, and Federal Times. 

You can see the full list here.

I like this idea for several reasons, but the primary reason is because I look forward to seeing how this list changes over time. It is a list, so it isn't exactly something seriously impactful and is obviously a type of popularity contest, but I do believe it can be useful in the future when we look back and see who was at the table when the sausage was made in National Defense.

In my opinion, Gannett got this list 99% right, and I say that because I do not believe Bradley Manning belongs on the list. For everyone on the list but Bradley Manning, Gannett used one definition of Influence, but had to change that definition to include Manning. Other than that one issue, I think Gannett has done a really good job and by ranking folks they have enabled, if so desired, a debate on who should not have been left off the list, who else should not be on the list, and whether the order of the list is accurate.

A few thoughts.

It is noteworthy to Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Buck McKeon is not on the list. I don't know Bob Simmons, but I know of Bob Simmons and I do agree he belongs on the list. I also agree Buck McKeon doesn't belong on the list, as his influence is marginal. I can't explain why, except that I agree with the perception by Gannett that Buck McKeon is more of a figurehead than a leader as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

I would have put Bob Work at 15, Mike Rogers at 25, and Susan Rice at 35. The reason is simple. First, Bob Work has changed the strategy discussion in Washington towards seapower. Second, Mike Rogers may have a prominent position in the House, but he has not exercised his authority to any degree by which we can say there is clear policy influence. Third, Susan Rice has no influence beyond her own community, never has had such influence, and has not demonstrated the charisma she ever will have such influence.

I think the top 10 are spot on accurate.

If we removed Bradley Manning, who would you replace on the list? I note in the "Who didn't make the list" page they list both Doctrine Man and Sailor Bob. I love Doctrine Man, he is great and if you use Facebook and don't follow Doctrine Man, I think you are missing out on something incredibly smart, but in my opinion Sailor Bob was the person who was left off for Bradley Manning.

So to protest the 1% failure rate of Gannett - who did a great job here btw - I have decided to make a Navy Top 50. With help from several Navy officers around the world and the good folks at CIMSEC, I hope to have the list ready for the New Year.

If you have suggestions or wish to comment on the list, the comments are open. Keep it professional, I don't want to spend my day being a conduct cop on the blog.

The Fundamentals of Surface Warfare: Sailors and Ships

The following email was sent out by Admiral John C Harvey Jr. on September 1, 2024 to all surface warfare Flag officers. Admiral Harvey requested no one publish this email until today - his retirement day. Admiral Harvey is one of the great ones - and for me personally the most impressive uniformed leader I have observed since i began writing about the US Navy. I wish him the very best in the future, I can't wait to buy him a beer, and I hope he keeps putting pen to paper.

The Fundamentals of Surface Warfare: Sailors and Ships

Fellow Surface Warfare Flag Officers, I'm communicating with you today in my capacity as the senior Surface Warfare Officer on active duty, otherwise known as "the Old Salt," who is soon to retire and who, upon retirement, will relinquish that status and the honorific that accompanies it to VADM Terry Blake. This e-mail is my first "Old Salt-gram" to you, the leaders of our community, and it will be my only one.

Having had the great privilege of serving as a SWO for many years in a wide array of duties, the last 12 years as a Flag officer, I've watched our community grow and develop in both capability and professionalism across the wide array of mission sets for which we are responsible. And while there is certainly a great  deal that is very positive for us to focus on, from the quality and performance of our ships to the quality and performance of our Sailors, there is a significant  issue I want to discuss with you because of the painful lessons-learned we've accumulated over the years and the potential implications for the surface force  if we don't take those lessons-learned to heart.

The past few years have been a serious wake-up call for our surface force. We discovered that the cumulative impact of individual decisions made over long periods of time, driven by unique and widely varying circumstances, had put the future readiness of our surface force at risk. And, most unfortunately, it took "outsiders" (INSURV followed by the Fleet Review Panel) to fully piece together what happened (Attachment 1) and document the full scope of the problems (Attachment 2), which spanned our entire man, train, equip and maintain domain.

So how did we get into such a situation? As I look back over the experiences in my career, which started in 1973 with naval nuclear propulsion training  followed by my first tour at sea in the Big E's Reactor department, I see three significant changes in how we did business as a community that got us off track:

1) We shifted our primary focus away from Sailors and Ships - the fundamentals of surface warfare - to finding efficiencies/reducing costs in order to fund  other important efforts such as recapitalization. We took our eyes off the ball of the main thing for which we were responsible - maintaining the wholeness and operational effectiveness of the surface force. Because readiness trends develop and evidence themselves over years and not months, shifting our primary focus to individual cost-cutting measures gave us a very myopic view of our surface force and the way ahead; institutionally, we essentially walked into the future looking at our feet.

So why didn't we hear from the deckplates that we were going to walk into a wall? Our conceptual shift to investing the Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) with command and control functions rather than properly limiting the SWE to informing accountable commanders to enable sound decisions removed our most reliable feedback loop by focusing everyone (our leadership, our organizations, and our commands) on efficiency measures, not OPERATIONAL  EFFECTIVENESS. We certainly developed a large number of plans to achieve greater efficiencies, but we did not pay sufficient attention to rigorously evaluating the products of those plans, particularly as their effects on our surface force grew over time.

And, in the process, we "trained" our people on the deckplates that improving efficiency trumped all other considerations - certainly an approach and a philosophy that was completely contrary to the institutional culture of ownership - "this is MY ship; this is MY gear" - and the institutional focus on operational readiness - "we are ready NOW" - that have been at the very foundation of our surface force since its beginnings.

At US Fleet Forces, my #1 priority has been to provide our aviation squadrons, submarines, ships, expeditionary units and cyber units with the means to  accomplish their assigned missions and to ensure they are ready for tasking - in short, to ensure the WHOLENESS of our Fleet.

Specifically, for our surface force, I define delivering wholeness as providing the appropriate resources (for manning, training, equipping and maintaining) and time required to prepare a crew not just to deploy, but to sail forward with confidence in their ability to accomplish their assigned missions, sustain their ship's operational readiness,  and do their part to help their ship achieve its expected service life.

Stated simply, our job is to grow Sailors like FN Thornes and give them ships (Attachment 3) that can confidently accomplish the Navy's mission: conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. All the actions we have pursued over the last three years have been singularly focused to achieve that outcome (Attachment 4).

2) When the assumptions behind the man, train, equip and maintain decisions did not prove valid, we didn't revisit our decisions and adjust course as required.

In short, we didn't routinely, rigorously and thoroughly evaluate the products of the plans we were executing.

For example, we reduced manpower requirements on our ships based on technology initiatives that did not deliver as expected and then manned our ships  to 90% of that lower requirement; the initial struggles of LPD-17's commissioning crew are an example of what occurred as a result of this practice. We shifted maintenance ashore, scaled back our shipboard 3M program and reduced our preventive maintenance requirements to fit a smaller workforce, and then failed to fully fund the shore maintenance capacity we required.

The result was optimally-manned ships that we could not maintain to the performance and reliability standards we previously mandated in order to achieve mission success over service life. This result became apparent with the increase in the failure rate of the INSURV Material Inspection, the "gold standard" inspection which measures the performance of our Sailors and their ships against the established standards required to sustain wholeness and mission  effectiveness over the life of the ship.

Sustaining the force requires constant investment - both in money and time - AND an effective feedback loop. There is no easy way out and there are no  shortcuts, as we are finding out today (Attachment 5).

3) The combination of our shift in focus and failure to routinely evaluate the product of the plans resulted in too many Sailors who no longer understood "what right looks like." Our day-to-day standards and expectations had become dependent variables based upon available resources; our standards dropped  with every cost-cutting measure we implemented. An example of this phenomenon is when we see a very big delta between a ship's actual day-to-day  standards and what is required to perform satisfactorily on INSURV, which should be a "come as you are" inspection that we routinely pass.

Now in discussing these issues with you, I want to acknowledge up front that I realize how much more I could have done to fully evaluate the impact the  actions I've described to you had on our surface force's overall mission effectiveness. Looking back on my time as a Flag officer, I can see that I focused too exclusively on the tasks and responsibilities immediately at hand and did not take sufficient time to "step off the pitcher's mound" and reflect more broadly on the Navy-wide/community-wide impact of what we were doing. And, when we did gather together as community leaders, we did not get to the heart of the matter: our Sailors and our ships and their collective readiness to carry out our assigned Title 10 missions. I could have done better. We could have done better. You MUST do better, because now we know better.

So, having recognized what happened and what we needed to do to get back on track, we've been at it - hard. Over the past several years, in very close  partnership with the Surface Navy's greatest friends - VADM Kevin McCoy and his NAVSEA team - we've cleared out a lot of the underbrush. I strongly  believe that we must now keep the press on with our efforts, but with a far sharper focus on assigning the correct responsibilities to the accountable officer(s) in the appropriate organizations and ensuring we are getting the full value of every readiness and maintenance dollar we spend.

Notice I did not simply say "save money." We must certainly be good stewards of taxpayer dollars, that is an absolute given, but our TYCOMs, ISICs and ships must be focused first and foremost on EFFECTIVENESS - if it's cheap, efficient, but doesn't work, it does us no good. If our budgets drop, we may certainly have to do less; but whatever it is we decide to do, we must do it well.

The absolute accountability of our COs for the performance of their ships and Sailors is the sure foundation for the performance of our Navy under the most challenging conditions imaginable. We know that the concept works.

So why did we so readily walk away from an approach that had accountability at its foundation with regards to how we deliver combat capabilities to the Fleet?

There are many answers to that question, but, now that we know where that path leads, we can no longer countenance such a fundamentally flawed approach - the misapplication of the otherwise very beneficial construct of Enterprise behavior - to sustain the wholeness of the surface force.

Re-establishing the fundamentals of how we train, how we equip, and how we operate and then putting those responsible to deliver on those fundamentals back under accountable officers in the chain-of-command is something I've been working on during my entire tour here at USFF.

It's a task that must continue and it's up to you to keep the effort going.

We may not all agree on what I've laid out for you above or even on the actions we've taken to reverse the negative surface force readiness trends, but I think we can all agree that our surface force's readiness was trending negative. Every day we could see the direct impact our surface force was  having around the globe; it was (and is) an enormously satisfying sight. But for those of us who were responsible for the long-term health of the surface  force, this satisfaction was short-lived when we looked ten years into the future and saw the direction in which we were heading. Fortunately, because of the very hard work of so many of you and our people, we're now turning the corner; but we have a long way to go.

My experience over my career is that if you place one person in charge, give that person the appropriate authority, and hold that person accountable for the results, then that is exactly what you will get - results.

Individuals and organizations succeed because they make the choices that lead to success. Greatness is not primarily a matter of circumstance or happenstance; greatness is first and foremost a matter of conscious choice and discipline. Officers who are accountable for the outcomes must make  those choices and have the courage, energy and discipline to drive their organizations to turn those choices into reality.

I've had my say and my turn at the wheel; now it is your turn - your time to break the Battle Ensign and lead our community into the future.

No matter  what organization you're in, whatever "box" you're in within that organization and however the boxes are arranged linking you with the other boxes or  organizations - straight lines, dotted lines, dashed lines, imaginary lines - for the sake of our surface force and our Sailors, be ruthless in the maintenance of our standards and keep your focus where it MUST be - on our ships and Sailors.

Wherever you may serve, consider yourself accountable for the wholeness of our surface force; find the wherewithal to routinely step back and get the panoramic view of our surface force, not just the part right in front of you. Then, step forward to act on what you believe we need to do to keep our ships and Sailors ready for the conflicts that will inevitably come our way.

Never, never, never give way on the standards of excellence that have made us the greatest Navy in the world, bar none. And never forget that the  fundamentals of surface warfare are our ships and Sailors.

Every day we see that the world remains a volatile place, with new threats to our nation's security emerging rapidly all over the globe. It is crystal clear  that our Navy will be at the forefront of our nation's response to these threats and it will be our Sailors and our ships carrying the might and mission of  the United States forward. You must be singularly focused to ensure those Sailors and those ships are ready for the great challenges that surely await them.

It has been both a great honor and the privilege of a lifetime to serve alongside all of you. I thank you for all you have done, and will do, for our community, our Navy and our nation and I wish you fair winds and following seas.

All the best, The Old Salt

Commanding Officers and Personal Misconduct

This is written by Captain Mark Light in the Summer 2012 Naval War College Review: The Navy's Moral Compass Commanding Officer's and Personal Misconduct (PDF).

The U.S. Navy has an integrity problem in the ranks of its commanding officers (COs). Consider these headlines: “Cruiser CO Relieved for ‘Cruelty.’” “CO Fired, Charged with Solicitation.” “CO of Attack Sub Fired for ‘Drunkenness.’” These are just a few cases in a recent deluge of early reliefs of “skippers.” In 2010, twenty-three Navy COs were relieved of command and “detached for cause,” an enormous increase over previous years. The trend continues: twentyone commanding officers were fired in 2011 as of the end of October. Even more worrisome is the fact that a large and increasing percentage of those dismissals are due to personal misconduct, such as sexual harassment, drunkenness, and fraternization. Although (as far as we can tell) over 97 percent of the Navy’s commanding officers conduct themselves honorably, the increasing number of those who do not raises concerns that the Navy must address. Alarms should be sounding at the highest levels of Navy leadership, but a review of recent literature reveals only a trickle of discussion on the subject of personal misconduct by military commanders. Instead of calling the service to action, a Navy spokesman said in January 2011 that there was “no indication that the reliefs are the result of any systemic problem.”

This was one of many paragraphs that asks good questions.

Fundamental problems with today’s fitness report system in identifying behavioral shortcomings are its lack of explicit evaluation with respect to ethical standards, the tendency of senior officers to reward mission accomplishment and performance regardless of personal failures, and the fact that all officers from ensign to captain are evaluated on the same criteria. The fitness report grades seven quantitative performance traits: “Professional Expertise,” “Command or Organizational Climate/Equal Opportunity,” “Military Bearing/Character,” “Teamwork,” “Mission Accomplishment and Initiative,” “Leadership,” and “Tactical Performance.” Military bearing is the trait widely considered to be the category for documenting issues concerning physical fitness and body composition (i.e., body-mass index), although by regulation (and as indicated on the form itself) it also includes character, appearance, demeanor, conduct, physical standards, and adherence to Navy core values. The core values include honor, and honor (as the admiral quoted above noted) implies integrity. But should we have to dig three levels to evaluate integrity, and should it be masked in the block regarded as concerning physical fitness? Not if we think it is important. In comparison, the Army’s Officer Evaluation Report requires input on all seven of the service’s core values as part of the character evaluation of the officer, including integrity and selfless service. Such specific evaluation of character is required to emphasize the priorities we desire in commanding officers.

When 97% of the Navy's commanding officers are conducting themselves honorably, does the Navy really need a new conduct cop measurement system that applies an ethical and moral standard towards character evaluation that isn't already present today? Obviously everything can be improved, but the question I have is whether anything is actually broken at all? When a Commanding Officer gets fired for personal misconduct, isn't that representative of the Navy having the right policy in place, a policy that appears to function properly?

In my opinion the evidence of a high standard for Command in the Navy is evident with each new examples by which a Commanding Officer is fired - a process that tends to demonstrate a remarkably high level of transparency btw. I can't remember the last time someone was fired and the cause was questionable. Captain Owen Honors tried to play the role of the martyr, but it was blatantly obvious to everyone except apparently Captain Honors that he did not demonstrate a professional standard that would be acceptable by professionals in private industry, much less a public service profession that demands higher standards like the US Navy.

So 3% of Commanding Officers fail to maintain the very high personal conduct standard of the US Navy. Am I the only one who looks at that number and thinks "wow, that's all?" I know one thing, the percentage of personal misconduct problems commonplace at the higher management levels of American business in society is higher than 3%, particularly in jobs where lots of travel and time away from family is involved.

Sorry, but the statistics in the article suggest to me the Navy's current system of evaluating personal misconduct is pretty good, and is pretty effective. It also suggests to me the Navy's evaluation of people is really good, because in any other industry that number would normally be much higher.

I thought this was a very interesting paper to read. Well done to Captain Mark Light for taking on a tough topic and asking good questions.

Update: Latest incident related to this topic is being discussed at Bubblehead's shop.

Getting the Conversation Started: Innovation for Junior Leaders in the Naval Service

LCDR "BJ" Armstrong speaking at the event.

On Wednesday June 6, 2024 the Naval Warfare Development Command hosted a Junior Leader Innovation Symposium as part of the 2012 Innovation Series held by NWDC. The Symposium objectives were listed as:

• Boost awareness and educate junior leaders on the importance of innovation
• Empower junior leaders to contribute new ideas to Navy missions
• Explore new ways to organize, connect, and proliferate open discussion venues
• Harvest recommendations from junior leaders on key issues confronting the Navy
• Employ the creative energy of junior leaders to tackle emerging challenges

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LT Jon Paris, U.S. Navy attended the event and has contributed the following thoughts on the symposium.

“Some things will never change.”  “If it makes sense, we’ll do it the opposite way.”  “Just press the ‘I Believe Button’.”  These are pretty common phrases - the clean ones - on the deck plates, in berthing, and in the JO Jungle.  Why does nothing (seem to) change?  Our junior ranks are intelligent and full of experience and innovative potential.  They just do not feel that anyone is listening.  To paraphrase one flag officer who “get’s it” - today’s staffs are anti-bodies for good ideas.  Another senior leader commented to me that, when he was a Junior Officer, bottom-up ideas rarely got past the Air Wing.  I quipped back - “In my community, they don’t get past the Department Head.”  Why, is this true?  Culture, for one.  My community is probably the worst - and I say that as a SWOtivated Surface Warfare Officer who cannot wait to lead a Department and hopefully someday, command a ship.  Why else?  Our young leaders - officers and enlisted alike - feel stifled.  Their perception may be misplaced, but it is reality nonetheless.  The Navy does not have a track record of accessing the intellect contained amongst the Young Voice in our service.  Young people have good ideas, too.  Junior Leaders have been, can be, and are, innovators.  And, even if our ideas are not always “top notch,” we are the operators.  We are the ones that think through, carry out, and analyze our Navy’s programs, tactics, doctrine, and operations.  Our brains matter!  What we think, how we think, where our interests lay, how we learn, what keeps our attention, what bores us, and what we retain are all extremely important factors that must be taken into consideration - not only when planning the future of our service, but when plotting our current course.
   
The Naval Services - the Navy and Marine Corps team - is waking up!  DONALD COOK and others have taken innovative approaches to the work-week.  SAN JACINTO took on Surface Warrior fatigue head on with out-of-the-box watch rotations.  A Marine Captain and Cobra pilot took a constant cockpit limitation and turned it into a game-changer.  Some good ideas are making it past the “anti-bodies.”  Our Senior Leadership is taking notice.  They are actively looking to streamline the today’s cumbersome concept generation-concept development process.  The pipeline from innovator to decision maker will soon be more direct.  More importantly, though, Senior Leaders are reaching out to Junior Leaders and empowering them.  They are reminding us that it is okay to think big thoughts - that it is, in fact, our responsibility to do so - and that when we have good ideas, we should speak up.  A perfect example was this week’s Junior Leaders Innovation Symposium, hosted by Navy Warfare Development Command, and strongly endorsed and supported by Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command.
   
I was skeptical.  Would junior leaders show up to this event?  Having spent my sea tours in an environment nearly void of innovation, would I have shown up if I had not already worked here?  Junior Officers and enlisted leaders “know” that nobody listens to them - why would they bother?  Well, they did come.  They came in droves.  Over two-hundred showed up in-person, with at least that many participating on Defense Connect Online.  Junior Leaders made a statement - we do have ideas - ranging from process improvement to new systems - and we don’t want to continue to sit back; we want to be part of the solution.  I was pleasantly surprised at the turnout.  We had representatives from every imaginable community and rate.  Most showed up with a spark in their eye and all left with a sense of purpose.
   
LCDR B.J. Armstrong’s presentation was fantastic.  He used a masterful innovation in Naval Gunnery as a medium for showing Junior Leaders that their ideas can make a difference and that they must remain the squeaky wheel.  I already considered myself an innovator and a leader in my community, and it totally fired me up.  “I could make that kind of difference!”  I saw it around the room, and within the chat session, as well.  LT’s Kohlmann and McFall were living examples of how to get “the conversation” started.  Blogs and boards such as ID, SailorBob, and Small Wars Journal were discussed, as well as the use of sites such as YouTube and Facebook.  The U.S. Naval Institute’s presence was extremely important.  As a one-time “hater” of USNI (they were BORING!), I was fascinated by the changes they have implemented in just the past year, and was motivated by their new approach to tackle “my” demographic - junior leaders!  One of my comments the next day was, “USNI bought me beer and all I had to do was talk about the Navy, which I do anyways.”

That’s it in a nutshell - Getting our powerful brain-trust of Junior Leaders talking.  We don’t need to be the proverbial “Good Idea Fairy” every day, or even every year.  We just need to be a part of the conversation - both written and verbal, wherever that conversation is happening.  The senior folks have done their part - they have started to reach out and listen.  Now the ball is in our court - we need to give them something meaningful to listen to (or read!).  The Junior Leaders Innovation Symposium was a great start.  Young people like pictures, real-life (and current!) examples, and people they can relate to.  “Old people” briefing complex techniques are not as effective.  This observation is not meant as disrespect..  When you talk to an audience - especially if you are trying to motivate them - you have to consider who you are speaking to.  Today’s Junior Leaders play xBox, use iPhones for everything, and generally do not appreciate an argument if it cannot be made in a page or two.  We are not dumb, we are just a different generation with different ideas.  We are today’s Junior Leaders and tomorrow’s decision makers.  The event got people thinking - and talking - which absolutely met its objectives.  Hopefully the continuing conversation will draw more participants.  Future events will help reinforce the process, and we will start breeding a new culture of innovation, where Junior Leaders feel comfortable looking at the tasks they do every day, and working for the collective good to make them better.  Please check out the event’s archive next week, and be a part of the conversation.

LT Jon Paris is a Surface Warfare Officer who did tours aboard CHUNG-HOON and CHOSIN in Pearl Harbor, taught Seamanship and Navigation at the Naval Academy, and is currently serving as a Flag Aide in Norfolk.

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See also:

LCDR BJ Armstrong is publishing his presentation on the US Naval Institute blog, the first installment can be read here.

LT Rob McFall recently discussed tactics on the US Naval Institute blog.

LT Kurt Albaugh discusses his thoughts from the symposium here.

USS Freedom - "Fit and Ready for Service"

SAN DIEGO (May 2, 2024) The littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1) operates in the waters off Southern California. The littoral combat ship is a fast, agile, networked surface combatant designed to operate in the near-shore environment, while capable of open-ocean tasking, and win against 21st-century coastal threats such as submarines, mines, and swarming small craft. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Jan Shultis/Released)

The Board of Inspection and Survey has taken a little Pacific cruise on USS Freedom (LCS 1), and issued a grade.

“My assessment is the ship is sound, the engineering plant is good, combat systems are good,” said Vice Adm. Richard Hunt. “The ship rides very well.”

That verdict came after a three-day “special trial” conducted May 22-24 at San Diego by the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey, or INSURV. Nearly 200 people rode the ship — normally crewed by 40 sailors — to test the Freedom’s combat, communications and engineering systems; minutely examine the ship’s physical condition; and put the vessel through a series of ship-handling evolutions.

“There were some hiccups in the demonstration in some of the areas,” Hunt admitted, “and there are things that ought to be fixed on three, five and seven” — follow-on ships built to the Freedom (LCS 1) design. “But the things we identified [as problems] are fixable.”

The first thing that needs to be highlighted, I think, is that the TMI worked exactly as designed. I knew as soon as I posted the TMI results there was about a snowballs chance in hell that Freedom would fail INSURV, in fact, I don't think any ship that had their TMI results posted publicly would fail INSURV - which is one more reason I strongly believe the US Navy should be more transparent with TYCOM Material Inspection results since they are moving ahead with the policy of keeping INSURV reports classified.

You have to read all of Chris Cavas's article to get the full picture, which is basically the new baseline for keeping track of issues on USS Freedom going forward.

For me the hawse pipe design problem and the stern door problem stood out as the biggest issues. The design problem related to the hawse pipe forward appears to still be the problem without a solution on Freedom, because it also appears to be a problem on Fort Worth. That problem was on the ship in 2008 - when I rode the ship. That problem is not the Navy, that's the shipbuilder.

So water is still coming in on the stern doors? Again, that was an issue in 2008, and is obviously a design issue because the doors aren't the same on Fort Worth (but no word if the new doors on that ship are working). I note that Independence, Bertholf, and San Antonio (basically the three latest new classes of medium and large ships other than Freedom) have had major stern door problems. I don't think the issue is a show stopper for the deployment, because as I understand it the water seeps in only when the ship is at high speed, but that corrosion in the stern door area is only going to get worse until the stern door has an actual solution vs a mitigation process. 3+ years later though? Come on.

The propulsion plant issue that had one of the diesel engines down isn't that big of a deal to me, and was something that I had heard about previously. From what I understand of that issue, that's basically a 'crew needs more time at sea on the engines' problem because the hot bearing is related to an issue related to a yet to be determined setting for oil pressure. That is a new ship problem that gets fixed when time allows you to tinker with it at sea, something Freedom hasn't been able to do.

The misfire is an analogy just waiting to be defined in the comments, but that doesn't strike me as an issue if the ship has fired 840 rounds and only suffered 2 misfires to date. That's actually pretty good. With that said, in the article Hunt attributed the combat system problem to the crew being unable to load the combat system's software properly. OK... that sounds like a procedural issue, which happens, but I do wonder to what degree that process is done on simulators. I get it that the ship has been down for a long time and that process hasn't been performed much in over a year, but isn't that something that can be done in a simulator? Human error, got it; but a training simulator double check might be worth a look as well, just to be sure.

There were some positives covered in the article, and for the record Chris Cavas and I have both been on USS Freedom when it performs a crash back - and I remember Chris looked at me and whispered wow when it happened - which is probably why he notes Hunts reaction in the article. If you have ever been on a ship moving really fast that comes to full stop quickly, you'll know it can be bumpy. You know, that speed thing bugs me too, but I think for USS Freedom (LCS 1) we can at least say it appears speed has been designed into the ship well. The article ended with one last thing I want to cover.

Hunt said he had seen a great improvement in the Freedom over the past 18 months or so.

“I’m not sure I was a believer a year and a half ago, but I’m there now,” he declared.

Obviously it is noteworthy that the President of INSURV Rear Adm. Robert Wray and Commander, Naval Surface Forces Vice Admiral Richard W. Hunt were both apparently on the bridge during some portion of the 3 day INSURV. The reason I think it is interesting is because I have spoken to Vice Admiral Hunt before, and I know a little about him. For example, he was on USS Underwood (FFG 36) during that ships first deployment, which I think is interesting because USS Underwood (FFG 36) was the first of the FFG-7 class to field the 3 promised capabilities of the OHP - RAST, Link 11, and LAMPS III. In many ways, that gives him a lot of insight into what it means when USS Freedom (LCS 1) is being deployed without some promised capability - like the original modules, because he lived that story with the FFG-7 class as many did. Ten years after his tour on Underwood, Hunt was CO of USS Crommelin (FFG 37), which if you ever talk to a SWO who did a LT tour on a ship class then returned to do a XO or CO tour on the same ship class, you'll know those guys really know that ship class very well. Hunt is basically a 35 year active duty SWO who really knows frigates while also really knowing CRUDES, and he's also the Type Commander - so lets not ignore the irony that the TYCOM Material Inspection (TMI) of LCS 1 a few weeks ago was performed by his people.

I note these little informative details because from my point of view, the story of USS Freedom (LCS 1) is at minimum - always remarkable and interesting. I don't know about you guys, but I can't wait for USS Freedom (LCS 1) to deploy to Singapore, because it's an absolute certainty that the deployment will be remarkable and interesting - the same as it always is with this ship.

Congrats to both crews of USS Freedom (LCS 1). With the constant circus surrounding the ship, you folks are fantastic and have stayed professional through it all. I hope someone is keeping a good journal, because the book on this ships development would likely sell pretty well, and we are only on something like chapter 5 with many more chapters yet to be written.

Meanwhile, Good Things

From here.

Navy Vice Adm. David H. Buss for reappointment to the rank of vice admiral, and for assignment as commander, Naval Air Forces/commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, Calif. Buss is currently serving as deputy commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.

Navy Rear Adm. Michelle J. Howard for appointment to the rank of vice admiral, and for assignment as deputy commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va. Howard is currently serving as chief of staff, J5, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Navy Vice Adm. Mark I. Fox for reappointment to the rank of vice admiral, and for assignment as deputy chief of naval operations for Operations, plans, and strategy, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Fox is currently serving as commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command and commander, Fifth Fleet, Manama, Bahrain.

Navy Vice Adm. Allen G. Myers for reappointment to the rank of vice admiral, and for assignment as deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Myers is currently serving as commander, Naval Air Forces/commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, Calif.

From a career perspective, worth noting the ties these folks have to USS Sacramento (AOE 1), pirate fighting, and J5.

Three things here. First, Michelle J. Howard is remarkably well respected, and has been one of those folks quietly doing great things in the Navy the last few years. Well earned.

Second, Vice Adm. Mark I. Fox has been the point man at 5th Fleet pushing for the Navy to take a stronger, more active role in the region and good things have been happening under his leadership. The folks at the State Department privately think he's crazy, which is just one more reason why I think he's fantastic, because I think they're delusional over there.

Finally, note how much touch these folks have to the positive changes that have been taking place from the direction of Fleet Forces Command. These folks, behind the scenes, have quietly been doing the hard work necessary to turn the ship around on several of the very hard challenges the Navy has been facing the last few years - and it is credit to the CNO they are getting rewarded for it.

I love this list. Everyone on this list comes with high praise from the people who have worked with and for them. I absolutely love that Mark Fox going to N3/N5, very smart I think, indeed naval aviators are typically tactically brilliant, but this list has three aviators who are also genuine strategic thinkers on it. This list strikes me as a break from the promotion as usual pattern of the Roughead era - because while the good guys usually do finish first, the excellent folks have often got left behind.

Not this time.

Wait, He's a Congressman?

Did Representative Randy Forbes really write this? This is not the stuff one typically finds from a Congressman, because it's too smart. Forbes is no longer simply a Congressman on Navy issues - he's now the Congressman on Navy issues.

Throughout the last six decades, America’s military strength has helped preserve a relatively stable geo-strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific. However, in the past decade China has rapidly modernized its military, including another double digit military increase next year, with aspirations of supplanting the U.S. position. If present trends continue, the regional balance of power could tilt in Beijing’s favor as it is increasingly able to deter U.S. forces from entering the region, coerce neighboring states, or - should conflict ensue - win a rapid victory. In response, the United States must work to simultaneously sustain a level of credible deterrence in the region while reassuring allies, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and strategic partners like Singapore. Air-Sea Battle is now at the center of this effort.

In short, the Air-Sea Battle Office aims to define initiatives to develop the capabilities and integration necessary to help Combatant Commanders conduct integrated, cross-domain operations in A2/AD environments. According to Schwartz and Greenert, Air-Sea Battle seeks to use “Networked, Integrated Attack-in-Depth” to “disrupt, destroy, and defeat” (NIA-D3) adversary capabilities. More specifically, the joint force (integrated air, ground, and naval forces) armed with resilient communications (networked) aims to strike at multiple nodes of an enemy’s system (attack-in-depth) along three lines of effort. If we can consider these lines in terms of an enemy archer, one could choose to blind the archer (disrupt), kill the archer (destroy), or stop his arrow (defeat). Balanced capabilities geared towards executing all three will be required.

If Ray Mabus would have written this article, he'd be the most popular Secretary of the Navy since Lehman! Instead you folks get breathalyzers without any measurable or cited statistics related to alcohol on why... /facepalm!

Read it all.

One more thought on Randy Forbes. Yesterday I posted the YouTube link of his public, white glove, mild pat on the cheek of the SECNAV in a recent Congressional hearing. The thing about Randy Forbes argument that struck me at the time is that the questions he raised in that hearing about SECNAV priorities are the same questions I have heard in quiet, completely off record discussions with folks in the Navy.

That tells me two things. First, Randy Forbes has his finger on the pulse of the Navy like no Congressman in a long, long time. That leads to the second point. There is a snowballs chance in hell Randy Forbes is talking to the same people I do, and it has me thinking Randy Forbes questions about the SECNAVs priorities was a reflection of the uniformed Admiralty's concerns for the SECNAVs priorities. Maybe not the CNO, or maybe the CNO - who knows, but if Randy Forbes wrote that article it's a safe bet he had more than a few conversations on the topic from some pretty damn smart (and likely high ranking) folks inside the Navy bubble.

I'm not saying the SECNAV is facing a mutiny in the Navy (although what does exactly make a SECNAV jump THAT HIGH following a blunder THAT political), but I am saying there appears to be a Congressman who has more respect than the SECNAV from the uniformed Navy leadership at this point in time.

Flattening the Chain of Command

Following the recent public news articles of the toilet troubles on CVN77, I think it is time to ask some questions that - at least today - may not have answers. Has Navy senior leadership created a cultural environment within the ranks that allows - even encourages - a sailor to go outside the chain of command and publicly air grievances on the internet? Do sailors now have the expectation that every electronic complaint should merit four-star attention? In doing so, is the system trending towards undermining the authority and responsibility of the Commanding Officer?

When a four-star admiral reads and personally participates in discussions about the Navy on blogs and message boards, it is and should be hailed as great dialogue and engagement. But what about when an admiral personally replies to electronic whines and rants posted by officers and sailors on blogs and message boards and publicly orders one star admirals to dig into these complaints? I understand not all of these situations are equal, but it is worth asking whether these type of actions by admirals is changing the culture of communication and undermining the authority of commanding officers. When senior leadership enters crisis mode every time negative press hits the wires, it can serve to encourage others to use this known, predictable response for their own benefit.

Instead of dropping a note in the CO’s suggestion box, making a suggestion on a survey, or even speaking with the chain of command, sailors are now finding it more effective and expeditious to rant and air grievances publicly on the internet. It is the responsibility of the leadership of the command to ensure that there is encouragement and positive reinforcement for making challenges known to the command. Yet, today, even if a command enjoys a command climate that encourages healthy internal dialogue, some now see the internet as the place to conduct that dialogue anyway.

When the admiral shows interest with an online post, that interest might be as simple and innocuous as a single question in an email to a chief of staff. But then that email takes on a life of its own as it travels downstream. Time pressure to respond to the admiral’s question falls squarely upon the shoulders of the commanding officer. As it should. The flag-level attention takes over the plan of the day and draws the command’s attention. What might be one of many competing command priorities suddenly might garner as much priority as a shipboard mishap. By allowing and encouraging the dialogue to go beyond the chain of command directly to senior flag officers, are we observing a mechanism forming for the statistical outlier to represent the population?

Is this just a part of life in the electronic age? Is the Navy simply “flattening the chain of command?” Are we simply observing the dynamics that comes with competing the hierarchical structure of the chain of command against the flattening of communications that has resulted from tools that allow greater accessibility? Is the Navy effectively balancing the flattening of and hierarchy of the chain of command?

If the Navy is willing to flatten the input side of public communications, the Navy should also be willing to flatten the feedback response. The proper response to a public complaint about a specific command should come from the commanding officer of that command, and no one else. In my opinion, the actions taken by Captain Luther regarding the toilet troubles on CVN77 is the model for dealing with these types of public complaints.

When sailors take grievances about a specific command publicly with intent of bypassing the chain of command, while it does represent a challenge to be addressed by the specific command, it also represents a challenge for those up the chain of command - all the way to the 4-stars. In my opinion, it is a legitimate challenge for admirals to know when and when not to engage public grievances about a specific command. I also tend to believe there is a broader issue for the Navy at large, for example, does it become paradoxical for someone in the Navy to publicly bash AM1 and and his mommy for blogging about toilet problems on CVN77 when USFF encourages and enables the same behavior publicly? I believe these are thin lines, and the questions are worth the discussion towards answers.

And to blunt the criticism ahead of time, as a civilian unassociated with the Navy - the paradox doesn't apply to me.

Finally, life in the Navy is not easy. The first response to challenges should always be to work together as a crew to find solutions, not find ways to blame the command.

Observing the Sh!t Talking About George H. W. Bush

On Monday the Navy Times ran a story about the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) having some problems with their toilets. It is one of those news stories where the jokes write themselves, if you are the general public and only see the issue from an outsider (non-Navy) perspective. What is less known is that there is a back story that has led to the media attention. Apparently the mom of an AM1 (supposedly w/ 16 years experience in the Navy) set up a blog dedicated to this specific problem.

Obviously a discussion about shit, literally, is not the kind of news the Navy wants to see discussed publicly in the press following the amazing public relations achieved with the Carrier Classic on the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), but the blogger has reached out and driven as much media attention as possible to this issue. Headlines in response to the issue include:

Toilet Trouble on Navy Carrier Leaves 5000 Sailors Doing the Pee Pee Dance from Gizmodo, Broken toilets keep sailors squirming from the Atlanta Journal Constitution, $6B Navy Carrier Has Lousy Toilets by Newser, and 10000 man hours to keep 423 aircraft carrier toilets working by The Inquisitr.

Today the CO of the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) published a statement on the aircraft carriers Facebook page regarding the toilet issue. I quote in full:

Dear Families and Friends,

It has come to my attention that a blogger has posted about our Vacuum Collection Marine Sanitation (VCHT) system…our heads (i.e., restroom facilities). The blogger provided her blog as a “media release” to various news outlets. Unfortunately, the blogger has never once contacted us for information and the blog has since been quoted in multiple outlets as undisputed fact. The blog casts the ship in a very poor light. It paints a picture of heads frequently out of order, out of order for 24 hours or for 8 days at a time. Further, the blog states that only ship’s company heads worked, operating heads are locked so Sailors cannot use them, or that medical issues have developed as a result of the heads. Lastly, the blog claims that heads are even affecting morale and military readiness. Had this blogger contacted the ship I could have provided some facts about each and every one of her claims.

All individuals embarked - whether permanently assigned to CVN 77 or one of its embarked units - are responsible for the cleanliness, stocking of supplies, and upkeep of their assigned spaces to include heads. If a system or piece of equipment is malfunctioning, the individual unit is required to place a trouble call (request for maintenance) with the CVN 77 engineering department. The engineering department dispatches repairmen on a job priority basis. Additionally, there are no individuals assigned to USS George H. W. Bush - or any other naval vessel - whose sole job is monitoring of commodes.

It is true that the USS George H. W. Bush has a VCHT system that is unique amongst aircraft carriers but it is not unique to naval vessels. It uses a vacuum to draw waste from the commodes into the temporary holding tanks. The system divides the ship’s heads into two independent loops. The system is maintained by Hull Technicians (HTs) who respond to trouble calls associated with the ship’s VCHT system. These Sailors are also responsible for welding, brazing, and sundry other duties commonly associated with plumbing and pipe fitting. I’d like to share a little information my engineering department has reconstructed using the ship’s trouble call log over the last year.

• In the 12 month period from 15 November 2024 through 15 November 2011, 4054 trouble calls have been placed throughout the entire ship (electrical outlets, doors, leaks, etc.)
• During the same 12 month period, 2,036 of those trouble calls have been associated with heads (i.e., restroom facilities).
• Of the 2,036 trouble calls, 976 have been for commodes and 280 for urinals. The rest are for lighting, ventilation, etc.
• Trouble calls for the heads have been split 51% on the forward loop and 49% on the aft loop.
• Trouble calls for the head mentioned by the blogger include: one (1) each in July, August, and October - all three calls were resolved in less than 24 hours. There were zero (0) trouble calls in September and November. The blogger started commenting on November 7th when every commode in that head was working.
• In each instance, the individual trouble calls were for a single commode within the head. The head has 6 total commodes and 2 urinals. At no time has there been a trouble call for more than a single commode out of service in that particular head.

The HTs maintain the overall system and problems vary from loss of vacuum within a loop to clogs in system piping. Loss of vacuum is most often caused by damage to individual flushing mechanisms but can also be caused by a clog in the loop. I mentioned earlier that there were two loops in the system. A loss of vacuum momentarily affects all heads on the same loop.

• The most common loss of vacuum is a failure/disconnect of the vacuum valve connected to the individual commode. The average time to return the loop to full service is typically less than 15 minutes. The follow-on repair to the individual commode/head in question depends on the malfunction but is typically complete in less than 30 minutes.
• Severe clogs can also cause a loss of vacuum in a single loop. The average time to isolate, locate, and repair significant clogs is less than three hours.
• The single longest loss of service to an entire head occurred in June due to a massive clog while the ship was in port. It took three days to repair because a section of pipe had to be removed and re-welded into place. The three day repair affected a single head on the starboard side of the aft loop. That berthing had a second head in the same area on the port side of its berthing that was functional the entire time of the repair.
• Inappropriate items that have been flushed down the commode and caused clogs during deployment include feminine hygiene products and their applicators, mop heads, t-shirts, underwear, towels, socks, hard boiled eggs, and eating utensils.
• There have been ZERO (0) clogs caused by toilet paper and human waste.
• There have been six (6) instances of both loops of the VCHT system being simultaneously unavailable during deployment. The longest dual (i.e., whole ship) outage was 15 minutes.

I have addressed the crew multiple times during the deployment about the system and damage caused by inappropriate items being flushed down the commodes. The indifferent, inconsiderate and irresponsible actions of a few Sailors were adversely affecting everyone onboard. To address the abuse of heads and commodes, I made the decision to allow departments and squadrons to install cipher locks on all heads. This would limit access to heads to members of the berthing assigned and foster a sense of ownership amongst berthing inhabitants. It would also allow better forensics into the source of the vandalism because the number of people allowed in a particular head would be known. It worked… during the roughly 50 hours that some heads were locked, trouble calls dropped by 67% and Sailors reported their heads were noticeably cleaner.

• Eight (8) heads were identified as public heads which would not be locked. They included two (2) head each for both sexes on the port and starboard sides for each loop.
• Lock installation began on 3 November 2024 with 4 of the 18 departments assigned to CVN 77 because they had submitted trouble calls requesting locks and had ordered locks from Supply.
• The total number of heads locked was 23 of the 93 heads associated with junior enlisted berthing.

The blogger asserts Sailors are afraid to speak out for fear of retribution. Not true. I have an electronic CO’s Suggestion Box which allows anyone onboard USS George H. W. Bush to email me with questions, suggestions and comments. Because comments are emailed, each and every comment has the Sailor’s name on it. I received one email on the first day of installation, 18 on the second day and 15 on the third day. The comments ranged from understanding why the locks were being installed to complaints about the inconvenience associated with leaving their work center and walking to their berthing to use a head. On the third day, I was made aware there were insufficient locks available through purchase or reallocation to provide every head with a lock in a timely fashion. Accordingly, I directed that every cipher lock be reprogrammed to a common code. However, I briefed the crew that this would remain only as long as clogs did not return. Since all locks have been recoded, there has not been a single clog.

Based on blogger comments the media has reported increased health issues, such as dehydration, and increased urinary tract infections. Again, not true. In fact, for deployment, 91.5% of all personnel onboard this ship have not been to medical. There have been 60 total cases of urinary tract infection during deployment with two major spikes occurring immediately following port visits. This represents approximately 1.3% of the crew. During the period of the blogger’s comments, potential urinary tract infections have declined each month from September through November.

I understand the concern for your friends and loved ones and their living conditions onboard the world’s newest aircraft carrier. While I disagree with the blogger’s comments, I will defend with my life her right to make them. However, she presents the unsubstantiated comments of a single Sailor as fact and, in doing so, denigrates the efforts and sacrifices of the other 4,800 members of the entire strike group team who during the last six months supported ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. During this time we also have hosted ambassadors, members of foreign governments, foreign nationals, members of the foreign media, coalition partners, entertainers, folks from home and, without fail, they have left singing the praises of the Sailors and their ship.

I can assure you the ship has, and continues, to perform admirably. While we have a ways to go yet, your Sailors are healthy, happy and excited to be heading home. I am proud of each and every one of them and look forward to bringing them safely home to you soon.

Warm Regards,

Brian Luther

I appreciate the detailed response by Captain Luther. The Navy Times conducted a phone interview with the CO of CVN 77 about this issue today, and this second Navy Times article on the issue that resulted from that phone conversation paints a different picture than the one by Captain Luther.

The system was designed with unusually narrow pipes to help keep a high vacuum pressure. However, these narrow pipes make it more likely that the system will clog. They should be wider to let potential clogs move through, Luther said.

Additionally, the individual commodes need to be upgraded. Sometimes vacuum pressure is lost when someone presses the flush button with his boot instead of his hand, breaking a mechanism. Or a tube is knocked out of place during a regular cleaning, causing pressure to drop, Luther said.

The toilet problem has become unbearable, said sailors onboard the carrier, who spoke with Navy Times on the condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak with media. There have been occasions during the deployment when every toilet went offline. More frequently, every commode aft of midship will be out of order, they said. Or several heads in a single area will go down, and when they are repaired, a new problem will occur elsewhere, sailors said.

The problem has left sailors searching for a proper place to relieve themselves, a quest that can last an hour. Often, when they do find a working commode, they need to wait in line and the head is filthy from overuse. As a result, sailors are taking extra showers or using industrial sinks in their workspaces. Men are urinating into bottles and emptying the contents over the ship’s side. Some have cut down on their food and fluid intake, and some women are holding it for so long that they’re developing urinary tract infections.

Luther said that 8.8 percent of the sailors onboard have received medical attention for either dehydration or urinary tract infections, and sick bay data show that cases of urinary tract infections have declined through the deployment. Comparable figures for other deployments were not available Tuesday night.

The ship’s sanitation system is divided into forward and aft sections, which operate independently of each other. However, six times since the deployment began, both sections broke simultaneously, leaving each of the carrier’s 423 toilets inoperable. However, at the worst, both sections were concurrently down only for 15 minutes. No commode is immune, Luther said, and his own toilet has gone out of service.

“If you use vacuum, you lose vacuum. Whether you’re me, the admiral, or the most junior sailors. And even I’ve gotten a call from the admiral who said ‘Hey! What’s up with that?’ ” Luther said. “It’s egalitarian."

It is a safe bet neither the CO nor the Navy saw this narrative associated with the maiden deployment of the nations newest aircraft carrier. I see three issues here.

First, this is an aircraft carrier that is supporting operations over Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia and this discussion about the ships terrible toilet system represents the only headline the ship has been able to generate to date. Maybe if the Navy did a better job telling the public what they did with their multi-billion dollar warships when the fleet deploys for 6 months to CENTCOM, when a news article discusses toilet troubles on a ship, the news would also mention other more naval centric newsworthy events the ship has been previously involved in.

Second, this looks like a design problem on the ship. Why is the VCHT system divided into only two zones? Why does the Navy have this problem on their aircraft carriers but cruise ships, which rotate thousands of passengers every week, don't seem to have this VCHT problem? When 2,036 of the ships 4,054 trouble calls (50%) are specific to the ships heads, and 30% of the 4,054 trouble calls are specific to the toilets, that suggests to me there is a legitimate technical issue here and the problem isn't limited to human behavior.

Third, how can I ignore this nonsense in response to the CMC from an AM1 that supposedly has 16 years of service? When the CO says "individuals embarked... are responsible for the cleanliness, stocking of supplies, and upkeep of their assigned spaces" he is clearly responding directly to that specific blog post, and to what could be described as one whiny bitch of a First Class Petty Officer.

I don't know about the Navy, but in every private sector job I've ever worked, when an employee with 16 years experience and in a position of leadership complains about basic tasks like keeping their space clean, keeping supplies properly stocked, or maintaining upkeep to ones limited area of responsibility - we describe those type of folks in the context of a useless middle manager who works in the organization as a public reminder to everyone else what is broken within the bureaucracy. Sorry, but some 30 something year old First Class Petty Officer complaining to his blogging mommy about the CMCs legitimate, remedial instruction didn't sit well with me at all. The CMC had this exactly right, First Class Petty Officers should be expected to be part of the solution to a ships problems, but that guy decided to add an additional layer to the ships problem. Classy.

So what are we learning here? In my opinion, we are learning that Captain "Lex" Luther is the real deal. I like that he is using social media to tackle a social media centric public relations issue. I like that he is addressing the issue directly, publicly - owning the problem instead of ignoring the problem. I like that he has implemented solutions that have, at least according to some statistics, helped address the problem, although not completely. I like that the ship is carrying on it's responsibilities despite distractions and ongoing problems that have no permanent fix while on deployment. Public relations challenges are always difficult, particularly in the Navy that as an organization really doesn't always deal with public relations challenges well, but the CO of CVN 77 is doing everything right here. Information is the best weapon against ignorance, and I think the information by the CO was on target.

We are also learning about a very shortsighted engineering problem on CVN 77, because I can't think of any good reason for a VCHT system to be divided into only two zones. It's not like this issue is something new to the Navy. When 30% of all trouble calls over a 12 month period are specific to the toilets and urinals of the Navy's largest ship, this is bigger than a human behavior issue. If the Navy is serious about reducing crew sizes on ships in the future, smarter design and engineering for spaces and systems that consumes maintenance time of the crew while underway would be the logical place to start.

Finally, anyone who suggests the public attention by this AM1 or his mom has somehow contributed positively to the ship or crew would be wrong. Does public knowledge of a poorly designed VCHT or public knowledge of a misbehaving crew flushing inappropriate items in the toilets somehow help the ship? No. Are the folks who are working to address these problems aided by public awareness of the challenges they face when they work? No. Was the ships leadership somehow unaware of the issue? As I understand it, the CO has directly addressed this issue every few weeks throughout deployment over the 1MC, which suggests to me that this is not a problem being ignored, and the various actions taken like cipher locks also suggests the ships leadership was actively engaged in trying to address the issue as best they can. Can anyone name any specific good that might come from public awareness of this issue? I'm struggling to find any positive that comes from publicity of this issue.

The way I see it, generating public interest regarding the inconvenience of low quality shitters on CVN 77 isn't a whistle-blower scenario as this AM1's mommy suggests, and it is hard to find a legitimate intention for making the issue public other than to embarrass ships leadership who, according to every account I can find, has throughout deployment been legitimately trying to address a legitimate problem.

When I look at this story, in my opinion, this AM1s public whiny attitude towards a pristine pissing environment properly managed on his behalf by other sailors reveals itself as a questionable character issue at least as interesting as the issue of a poorly designed VCHT, and for that reason I find this whole story to be one of terrible judgment by a First Class Petty Officer and his blogging mommy in using social media as an instrument of publicity that ultimately does absolutely nothing to help a ship and crew dealing with a legitimate issue.

RIP

By now, you have likely heard.

The commanding officer of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) died suddenly Nov. 8 at Norfolk Naval Shipyard.

Capt. Tushar Tembe was departing the ship at approximately 10 a.m. when he collapsed.

The ship's medical response team provided immediate medical assistance until Tembe could be transported to Bons Secours Maryview Medical Center where he was later pronounced dead. The cause of death has not been determined.

"We offer our sincere condolences to Capt. Tembe's wife and children, his family and the Truman crew. They are in our thoughts and our prayers as we deal with this tragic loss. Capt. Tembe served the Navy and our nation honorably and with great distinction. We honor his outstanding contributions to our nation," said Rear Adm. Ted Branch, commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic.

Tembe, 49, a naval aviator, assumed command of Truman last August. He was born in Bombay, India and came to the United States as a child and later graduated from Texas Tech University. After receiving his Wings of Gold, Tembe flew a variety of aircraft including the F/A-18 Hornet. His many assignments included a tour as commanding officer of Strike Fighter Squadron 87, the "Golden Warriors" at NAS Oceana, Va.

Tembe is survived by his wife and two sons.

Planning for a memorial service and funeral arrangements is ongoing.

The ship's executive officer, Capt. Craig Clapperton, has temporarily assumed command.

Harry S. Truman is undergoing repairs at Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth.

Nothing Wrong With That

This USA Today article annoyed me, but I found it interesting nonetheless.

The Pentagon's use of retired generals and admirals as paid advisers has virtually ceased, plummeting from 355 "senior mentors" in 2010 to four today, according to a report released by the Defense Department's inspector general.

Requirements to disclose their business ties, a cap on pay of $179,700 per year and limits on working for private firms were the reasons the generals and admirals gave for quitting the program, the report said.

Retired officers from several services told investigators they quit because they did not want to disclose their finances publicly. Others pointed to the pay of $86.10 per hour, with a maximum of $179,900 as too low.

The story goes on to quote some POGO guy discussing motivations by implying the motivation was money. Well, DUH! Whether military or non-military, here is a gold plated fact of government service that everyone not in government service needs to realize...

Once someone gets out of government service, they can go make as many bucks as they can without government limitations. My advice - I hope they go make a gazillion bucks and never apologize to anyone for it. The capitalist in me stands up and applauds the idea that a retired 4-star would scoff at $86.10 per hour. Why? Because while I am now a public sector employee, for the better part of my working career I would scoff at $86.10. Telling someone who pays lowest bidders that they can't afford you isn't arrogance, it's reminding someone that your market rate isn't among the low bids.

The inspector general's review of two services — the Navy and Marines — and three combatant commands — Joint Forces, Special Operations and Strategic — found that 194 mentors were advising the military in 2010. By February 2011, out of 183 mentors, 11 had become government employees, and seven have since resigned, according to the report. The Navy, for example, had used 109 senior mentors in 2010; today it has none.

Is this a good thing or bad? I could see legitimate arguments both ways. That is a lot of lost institutional knowledge when the DoD no longer have 109 "mentors" on payroll, but more likely, it was never really about mentoring in the first place.

Observing CO Contempt for Colleagues and Crew

The Navy has now fired 20 Commanding Officers this year, and with this list the number of high profile firings for 2011 is remarkable - and it's not even Halloween yet.

Part of me believes that 20 CO firings suggests the Navy is healthy as an organization because the organization is enforcing it's rules. However, another part of me has me very concerned about quality control processes in place regarding Commanding Officers.

Can the Navy explain how an organization that claims to have a competitive promotion system appears to have so many quality control issues with the people being selected for leadership? I am finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile the number of character related firings this year as opposed to the profession related firings, particularly when in the Navy - quality for both are required for success. Are both professional merit and a persons character measured at a level of sufficient quality? Navy leaders say people come first, but that is only true when people aren't put into the situations by a leader in the Navy as described in this Gidget Fuentes article on Navy Times.

Cmdr. Jay Wylie, 40, who commanded the Everett, Wash.-based ship until he was fired April 27, is scheduled to appear in a courtroom at Naval Base San Diego and has been charged with one count of rape, two counts of aggravated sexual assault, two counts of abusive sexual contact, one count of sodomy, two counts of maltreatment, three counts of conduct unbecoming an officer and four counts of violating general orders, according to the charge sheet.

According to the charges, the first incident occurred Dec. 31 in a bar during the ship’s liberty visit to the Seychelles town of Victoria. Wylie “became publically intoxicated, ... made unwanted sexual advances and engaged in an unwanted sexual contact with ... a junior officer,” the charges state.

Wylie had “unduly familiar conduct” and made “unwelcomed sexual advances ... and contact” with the female officer, according to the charges, by “rubbing her shoulders, leaning against her and pinning her to a bar, requesting that she kiss him, attempting to kiss her, putting his hand up her dress and inside her underwear.”

Wylie encouraged the junior officer “not to report” the incident, the charges state.

Four months later, on April 25 and while Momsen was at Naval Magazine Indian Island, Wash., a “publicly intoxicated” Wylie coaxed an enlisted woman into his cabin aboard the ship, according to the charges.

Wylie allegedly engaged in “unduly familiar conduct” and made “unwelcomed sexual advances ... and contact” with the sailor by “brushing his hand on her shoulder, requesting that she come home with him, placing his hand on the small of her back, escorting her to his cabin, grabbing her shirt, kissing her” and placing his hand and mouth on her genitals.

Two days after that alleged incident, Wylie was fired by Rear Adm. Mark Guadagnini, commander of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, due to “loss of confidence in his ability to command stemming from allegations of misconduct.”

It is hard to assume much without more detailed information, so I'm going to plow ahead - cautiously. First, it is hard to believe a 40 year old destroyer CO suddenly, after 18-19+ years in the Navy, discovered the combination of alcohol and sexual harassment at that stage of his life and career. I do not know if there are other cases of this type of behavior in this guys history, but assuming there are not is less believable than assuming there is. If we assume there is not, is it a legitimate concern that judgment can be tossed so casually overboard by a Destroyer CO?

Something in the system doesn't work, but it is also worth suggesting the system may also never work. Had the junior officer reported the first incident, the enlisted female would not have found herself in that situation. At the same time, had the JO reported the incident when it first happened, it probably would have been a he said/she said incident and destroyed her career. The second incident makes it easier for the JO to come forward regarding the first incident, and the promotion system that - for legitimate reasons - weighs heavily on the evaluation by the CO of the JO, seriously undermines the ability of the JO to act.

It is very easily to pass judgment on the JO for not acting immediately, but you aren't the fresh out of college young 20s O-1 who was placed in that situation by your 40 year old O-5 boss - the most important person in your career - who finds oneself potentially intoxicated and harassed while enjoying a New Years Eve liberty (after months at sea) in the context of being one of the most junior leaders of a warship patrolling the armpit of planet Earth. I'll stop there - the dynamics and complexity of this JOs situation doesn't lend itself to black and white - right and wrong answers without throwing rocks in a glass houses.

In the big picture, the Navy is lucky the big firing controversy that blew up in public this year is Captain Owen Honors and his poor judgment and antics with questionable motivational videos, because situations like this are much worse - and sounds even worse on the TV national news. The poor judgment of Honors was a self-inflicted wound, while this situation is predatory and has serious impacts on the lives of others.

It Was a Time Not Unlike Today

"I'd rather make ten major decisions a day and later have to reverse three, than to study issues to exhaustion and make one decision a week—often too late."

- ADM Elmo Zumwalt

Last month, by popular demand (and a bit of lobbying), CNA posted CNA Research Memorandum 93-22, On His Watch: Admiral Zumwalt's Efforts To Institutionalize Strategic Change (PDF), by Jeffery I. Sands, Jul 1993 on the CNA website. If you haven't read it, it is worth the time to read in full.

The study is too comprehensive to list all the various pieces of goodness, but the analysis does discuss the various concrete steps that can be taken in policy-making to institutionalize strategic decisions - and looks at it from a CNO perspective (Zumwalt's). It examines four basic stages in the decision-making process:

• Initiation, the first formulation of a proposal (or an agenda) to respond to and deal with a new need or problem
• Persuasion, the effort to build support for the proposal and formulate options to carry it out
• Decision, the phase where options are examined, approved, or vetoed by those with the authority to do so
• Execution, the phase in which policies blessed with legitimacy are carried out and sometimes adapted or distorted.

Near the end of the document, the analysis makes inferences from the Zumwalt experience leveraging the outline of the four stages in the decision making process - and in my opinion these conclusions are timeless. I've quoted in full (but you are really missing out if you aren't reading the entire analysis).

History of course cannot be used as a sole guide to the future. But if Adm. Zumwalt's style led to the results discussed, the lessons for today are clear, even given the different context of strategic and conventional force threats, economic and political conditions, and bureaucratic interplay.

Initiation

Be bold
Change can be evolutionary or revolutionary. To be institutionalized during a single four-year term in office, however, vectors of change have to be more revolutionary than evolutionary in nature. Otherwise, one's efforts could be overcome relatively easily by those opposed to the idea of change itself. Being bold is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for successful institutionalization. That is, evolutionary changes can become institutionalized, and revolutionary changes can fail, not only on military-technical grounds. But boldness can help ensure high-level consideration and thereby influence outcomes.

Be quick
Because four years is a short time, it is better to enter office with a clear idea of where one wants to go. Hence, the more one formulates ideas before becoming CNO, the more time there is to implement them. This is especially critical for new CNOs in their first few months in office as the Navy bureaucracy and leadership expects and probably is more supportive of a new agenda.

Be specific
If vectors of change are too vague or ambiguous to permit them to become a ready basis of task definition, the precise tasks are likely to be shaped by the incentives of those tasked rather than by the preferences of those doing the tasking. Hence, the greater the task specificity embodied in the change vector articulated, the greater the possible influence of the decision-maker over outcomes. Again, task specificity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for institutionalization, but it can influence outcomes.

ADM Greenert is off to a fast start. I have nothing but praise for the CNO Tenets already discussed, and I noticed the CNO's second move was his speech at the 20th International Seapower Symposium (PDF) to the international community. It is my sense that the next speech is going to be very important.

Persuasion

Get a mandate from above
A mandate from above is essential if broad change is to succeed. This includes more than support from Congress and the civilian chain of command from SecNav through SecDef to the White House. Because of Goldwater-Nichols, support from the Joint Staff, and especially the GJCS, may also be critical. The same may also be true of the Unified CINCs given their evolving role in setting requirements. The exact means of doing this will vary with the personality of the CNO and the senior naval leadership, but it needs to be done nonetheless. Direct, targeted personal attention by the CNO is an important part of any marketing strategy.

Find a hammer, and use it effectively
With the introduction of the CPPG/CPAM process, supported by the green-striper follow-up process, OP-96 became a critical element of Adm. Zumwalt's cross-mission, cross-platform prioritization process. Putting the responsibility for the process of internal analytic give and take under the direction of close allies in key decision nodes was critical to Adm. Zumwalt's efforts to institutionalize his agenda internally given the intra-service bureaucratic process. The responsibility for carrying out internal creative friction must be given to a trusted, independent body divorced to the fullest extent possible from parochial considerations.

Use a common language, especially one in vogue with OSD
It helped that Adm. Zumwalt's hammer was adapted from the process Secretary of Defense Laird was pushing from a DOD perspective. This helped ensure connectivity between the Navy and the larger DOD decision-making process. Given the emergence of a former systems analyst as SecDef, an "OP-96-like" capability may be important as much for external as well as internal strategy. More broadly, because the new SecDef is reshaping OSD, the Navy must be prepared to emulate whatever OSD process emerges and use whatever language emerges. Given Goldwater-Nichols, the same may also be true with respect to that of the Joint Staff.

Keep the focus clear and consistent
In sales, product recognition can be critical. Similarly, a clear moniker and consistent message can be critical to successful strategy institutionalization. Like in sales, trying to send too many messages at any one time can diffuse each discrete message and confuse the audience. Hence, narrowing one's focus can help strengthen the signal one is trying to send, thereby enhancing the prospects that it will be received, understood, and—by minimizing the possibility of misunderstanding or undermining—accepted.

Work the problem outside the Navy
Adm. Zumwalt spent a large amount of his own time - while he was CNO and since - trying to persuade people outside the Navy of the wisdom of his changes. Institutionalizing change will be far easier given — and far more difficult if internal opponents can gain - external allies.

This was where ADM Roughead was weak relative to his counterparts in other services. Part of ADM Roughead's challenge was that his external message was crafted for him in the form of The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Another problem ADM Roughead had was that he never developed a base of support outside the Navy that was willing and committed to working with him, while other services were busy building that support and finding allies among institutions like the think tank community, academia (See how the Army advanced COIN doctrine discussions into the public by leveraging academia), and established internet communities (consistent submissions to the Small Wars Journal, GO feedback to Foreign Policy blogs like Tom Ricks, etc).

ADM Greenert has an opportunity to change that. For example, does CNO Greenert know who Mike Few is? He and the Commandant should be briefed, and then they should call up various folks from shops like N3/N5, the NWC, NPS, and USNA and ask "Who do you have consistently writing for USNI?"

Decision

Balance top-down and participatory management
Getting a ball to roll can take a strong push—depending on the strength of the opposing force (s). Overcoming inertia alone, however, does not guarantee that the ball will travel as far as or in the direction that is desired. In a dynamic environment, ensuring that the ball comes to rest near a desired destination requires an understanding of the environment and how it may respond to intervention. It also requires an understanding of how the intervention itself may change the environment through which the ball travels. In other words, changing the strategic focus of the Navy may require not only top-down intervention coupled with an understanding of the Navy bureaucracy, but also anticipation of how the bureaucracy might respond to that intervention. This requires consensus building and continued attention to the evolution of your initiative.

Reorganize: half empty or half full?
Organization theorists have long argued that institutional changes are almost always required to make strategy shifts by large organizations more concrete. Adm. Zumwalt quite deliberately sought to vest the sea-control agenda into the OPNAV organizational structure. Further, he intentionally "de-linked" both the barons and the czars from leadership roles in the assessment process. But it was not until the July 1992 OPNAV reorganization that Adm. Zumwalt's preferred philosophical approach—deemphasizing the warfare communities and giving prominence to mission areas—began to be realized. Yet this reorganization preceded final publication of ...From the Sea. To ensure future success, the assessment process subsequently established in the fall of 1992 may have to be more fully "institutionalized"— that is, more fully integrated into the OPNAV organizational structure by de-linking those with remaining community responsibilities from leadership positions of the individual joint mission assessments.

Establish an independent review body
Further, it is not clear that an independent review by those not involved in the process is used today. Adm. Zumwalt had used the CEP and CNA to provide ongoing independent review before making major decisions, thus obviating the need for a post-decision review. The current process should include some external review of major decisions, be it pre- or post-decision.

It appears, based on limited reporting, the CNO is already doing some reorganization in OPNAV (and actually may have started this process while VCNO). A lot of ink could be spilled in comment on this topic, but I'll save my ink in quiet observation, for now.

Execution

Get a watchdog and follow up
Without sufficient intervention by an agent of change from outside—outside and above—the prior experiences and professional norms of rank-and-file bureaucrats resistant to change can lead them to hinder or otherwise misdirect vectors of change. This could occur even in the absence of dedicated opponents moved by honest belief or interested solely in the maintenance of things as they are with which they have become identified. Without such assistance from outside, decision-makers need to establish independent watchdog agencies with the power—directly or indirectly through referral—to enforce compliance.

Encourage innovation
Change requires agents of change; radical change requires risktaking. Perhaps the greatest challenge of all, therefore, is to encourage innovative thinking without unduly prejudicing career incentives. To the degree possible, innovation should be encouraged by rewarding those who dare try something different, even if the effort ultimately proves unsuccessful. This could be done, for example, through the SecNav instructions to promotion boards, or by encouraging experimental innovation such as the Mod Squad and Project Lawrence.

The budget process underway in Washington DC is an agent of change that is coming whether folks like it or not, so part of the challenge the CNO faces is how to deal with change forced externally on the Navy vice forcing change internally himself.

With that said, one of the reasons I have studied ADM Zumwalt so much recently is that he dealt with many of the same issues CNO Greenert and the Navy faces today. ADM Zumwalt became CNO during the last years of a long land war in Asia (Vietnam) and civilian leaders in Washington were making very large defense cuts. The Navy was also facing a unique challenge at the time, a rising maritime power (in early 70s was a rebirth period for the Soviet Navy). Sound familiar?

Zumwalt developed a maritime strategy based primarily around the Nixon Doctrine in effect at the time, and the result was increased budget priority for the Navy. It wasn't enough money to prevent a post-Vietnam decline by the US Navy, but Zumwalt did drive a process by which a maritime strategy was developed conceptually, and later that strategy was adopted but significantly adjusted by John Lehman leading to the 600 ship Navy goal in the 1980s.

"He would rather shoot 1,000 arrows at the target and have ten hit than only shoot two and the two hit"

Funny thing about innovation... it looks great on PowerPoint, but is hard because it involves the risk of not succeeding. Innovation rarely works on first effort, and lack of success today in the Navy too frequently translates into failure. Perception of failure impacts promotions in an officer community that is likely downsizing and is already competitive. I'd love to see more innovation in the US Navy, but I don't think the US Navy is organized in a way today that encourages innovation - rather it is my impression the promotion system is biased, even if only slightly in some cases, towards rigid consistency to pattern - not innovating new processes.

I don't want to imply that innovation doesn't exist in the US Navy, because it absolutely does - but I do believe it is fair to say the US Navy is not an organization that fosters and promotes innovation within their leadership community. I note that most stories involving innovation in the Navy begin in the enlisted community, and more than one person has noted that this is probably the case because folks in the enlisted community have less to lose from making mistakes.