Thinking about Offensive Naval Mining

Note from Jon Solomon: The article below was written by a Systems Planning and Analysis colleague of mine, Jonathan Altman. Following my post last month regarding how sea denial might figure into U.S. maritime strategy for deterring—or if necessary, defending against—Chinese aggression in East Asia, Jonathan pointed out to me several issues and scenarios  regarding the potential use of offensive mining in such a strategy that I hadn't considered. Jonathan has graciously agreed to share his observations with you here in order to broaden the ongoing debate.

Recently the concept of naval mining, specifically the potential advantages in using naval mines to achieve targeted sea denial, has received more publicity in naval themed publications and the blogosphere. Mining advocates’ hopes were emboldened just before Christmas when the “Cromnibus” was signed into law, containing a line of $10M for naval mining research and development. However, careful consideration should be given to just what employing mines might entail. Though not apparent from most public analyses, there are significant potential issues with employing naval mines offensively that need to be understood. The first of these is their connotation and associated baggage.

When the average (but informed) American hears the term “mine,” it generally conjures up images of a soldier in Vietnam or WWII missing a limb, or crying in the aftermath of a mine explosion that killed a dear friend. More historically aware Americans might think of WWI era sailors and/or civilians drowning in the frigid North Atlantic, or perhaps our own Sailors during the Korean War (the mine damage incurred by the USS Samuel B. Roberts in 1988 and the USS Princeton and USS Tripoli in 1991 did not result in ship loss). While maritime mining is quite different from land mining, we must not overlook the baggage that mining as a term brings to the table in the broader public sphere. Whole classes of weapons, many of which were quite effective, have been banned by the international community at various points in time (such as cluster munitions; despite continued US use of these weapons). Land mines are similarly the focus of international ire. This is not to argue that the United States should allow other countries to dictate what types of weapons it can employ, only that using weapons such as these should present a higher barrier to use because of the inherent perception loss that a state receives for using them. Fundamentally, a weapon that achieves the same effect without or with reduced baggage should be preferred.

Most recent advocacy with respect to naval mining is written in context of use (either in terms of notional wartime employment or latent peacetime deterrent value) against China, so that’s where the remainder of this piece is focused. Note however that many of the tenets enumerated in a China context could be applied to contingencies involving other illiberal non-Western states.

The foundational issue with employing naval mines offensively against the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is simply that it may not have the intended effect of keeping the PLAN bottled up inside its ports. For offensive naval mining to be effective, the Chinese would need to be deterred from sortieing their fleet out to sea. However, this would require a Chinese cultural aversion to losses that may not exist.  Chinese military culture has historically accepted exceptionally high losses as a price for victory (e.g. Chinese Civil War and WWII), and individual sacrifice for the greater good is respected[1]. Especially when one factors in the ample amount of old ships the PLAN has, there’s reason to suspect that when confronted with a minefield (or a small number of emplaced mines), the PLAN might manually force a Q route using low value, outdated but manned ships (this logic could similarly be applied to Iran or North Korea). This could render the minefield ineffective, and void the operational end that it was deployed to achieve. It should be noted however that this approach runs some risk of failure as narrow channels could be clogged by sunken hulls in an attempt to force a Q route; accordingly this tactic is not likely to be employed where maneuver space and/or water depth is restricted.

Even if offensive naval mining was effective in that it kept PLAN assets contained in port for fear of losses, larger concerns should exist in the mind of offensive mining supporters about what a devious foe could do to exploit this situation given mines’ reputation as indiscriminate killers. Too often in analysis of “the other,” whether in intelligence, military or even economic venues, we as Westerners with our own ingrained biases export these onto those who do not share them; a process called mirror imaging. Assuming that a foe would simply not take losses to force a Q route is one example of this; another is imagining that they would avoid acting in ways that are morally repugnant to Western norms to exploit a favorable opportunity.

Recent action in the South China Sea has shown the Chinese to be not only excellent strategists  (incrementally extending their legitimacy in a whole region without firing a shot), but also masters of information warfare (the Russians are not too shabby at it themselves). Applying this acumen to offensive naval mining, as soon as a minefield was discovered (or more likely announced to meet the rules of war); there would be tremendous advantage for the Chinese government to create the conditions where a US mine (real or perceived) kills a large number of Chinese (or third-party country) civilians. Here is where the tactical views of mining could become irrelevant in the face of a well-designed strategy. For example, even if a US mine is so “smart” that there is no way it could ever kill a civilian ship (no small feat), there would be nothing to stop the Chinese from packing a vessel with explosives and blowing it up themselves in the rough geographic region of the offensive minefield; preferably in full view of cameras and with plenty of innocents on board. This situation could be made even more challenging for the US if a legitimate mine had already sunk a military ship in a similar location, as deniability would become nearly impossible at that point.

The Chinese could conceivably also create the appearance that the U.S. had mined offensively when or where it had not. They could use the confusion that surrounded the “mine strike” for propaganda purposes as well as to justify ‘retaliation’ that was actually premeditated escalation. By selling the perception that they had responded rather than preempted, they would reduce the risk of being seen as an aggressor and would create a more favorable image to the world at large (a key component of information warfare).

There would probably be no way, and certainly no quick way, for the United States to prove to the watching global public that a Chinese non-military vessel’s loss in the above scenarios stemmed from a Chinese false flag operation as opposed to a genuine US mine.  The perception that the Chinese were the victim of an irresponsible US weapon could also be used as diplomatic leverage to strain US regional alliances and push neutral powers towards China. European countries could be especially sensitive to pressure from their publics to back out of openly supporting the US in this case.

Depending on when in a conflict the aforementioned incident is staged, a savvy adversary may be able to extract additional advantages. For instance, if conducted at a period of heightened tension, China could use the incident as a casus belli and follow it with an overt (preemptive) attack. This would be increasingly likely if the Chinese were already preparing for a major offensive; similar to the German false-flagged Gleiwitz incident in 1939. Any strain on the Chinese economy (the basis of Chinese Communist Party legitimacy) would make this option even more attractive.

Ultimately, it must be asked “what is the intended goal of offensively employing naval mines”? According to recent writing, it seems to be large scale but targeted sea denial enabled through a capability to strike targets in a discriminate fashion at a time and place of US choosing. Certainly this is a valid and desirable military end. The only question then is whether offensive mines are the best tool to accomplish this objective given their stigma and assumed ability to engage targets without human intervention. Some existing technologies that might be evaluated as alternatives to mines in this respect could include torpedoes, long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, or surface ship delivered anti-ship ballistic missiles. Future unmanned systems may also provide an option for selective targeting with a man-in-the-loop that would greatly reduce the baggage that comes with both the word “mine” and with the idea of a self-targeting weapon. In the end, a weapon that delivers targeted but wide area sea denial without the downsides associated with a naval mine is likely to be a valuable and increasingly necessary military tool to maintain United States maritime influence in many parts of the world.

Jonathan Altman is an analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis Inc, a defense contractor located in Alexandria, Virginia. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. The views expressed herein are those only of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Systems Planning and Analysis, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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[1] Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analyses. In this analysis of 250 cultures, the Chinese were found to be the most collectivist of all groups studied. Collectivist groups typically subordinate individual actions for the good of the group.

Sea Denial, U.S. Maritime Strategy, and Conventional Deterrence of China

In the February 2014 issue of Naval Institute Proceedings, retired U.S. Navy Commander Victor Vescovo suggested that a maritime strategy relying primarily on sea denial capabilities could be sufficient to deter Chinese aggression against America’s East Asian allies. Vescovo outlined how wartime offensive minelaying in the vicinity of major Chinese ports by U.S. submarines and long-range aircraft could severely damage the export-driven Chinese economy. Vescovo appears to endorse strategies emphasizing conventional deterrence by punishment and compellence by economic coercion, both of which can be highly problematic for reasons I’ve previously addressed.

However, the latent ability to use offensive mining to bottle People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) forces up in their home ports—and also cut crisis-surged units off from returning for rearmament and repair—could greatly buttress conventional deterrence by denial. This notion dovetails with a November 2013 RAND Corporation study that highlights how modern, highly mobile coastal anti-ship cruise missile batteries deployed in the Ryukyus, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia could pose a severe challenge to Chinese wartime passage through the key straits that would provide them access to the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans. Both the mining and coastal missile concepts are captured within the December 2013 testimony of prominent Naval War College Chinese maritime strategy expert Andrew Erickson  to the House Armed Service Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee as well as his related article in The National Interest. Erickson additionally (and rightly) argues that conventional deterrence by denial can be further reinforced via latent U.S. threats of using submarines and long-range aircraft for traditional Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) operations within contested zones in the event of a war, or if need be to pummel Chinese expeditionary lodgings upon allied territories with land-attack missiles.

These commentators are absolutely correct that sea denial is an essential element of any U.S. strategy for deterring China—and failing that, for defending America’s East Asian allies under fire. Blunting PLAN operations in the East and South China Seas, not to mention preventing effective PLAN breakouts from the First Island Chain, would go a long way towards preventing China from attaining certain types of political objectives in an East Asian war. U.S. and allied sea denial operations would indeed make it enormously difficult for China to undertake a large-scale invasion of a sizable allied territory, persist in holding any small and isolated allied territories it seized in a hostilities-igniting gambit, use surface forces (including future aircraft carriers) to blockade or conduct land-attack strikes against allied territories, sortie submarines into the Western Pacific for ASuW or land-attack tasks, suppress opponents’ submarine operations inside the First Island Chain, or protect its flow of logistical support to its expeditionary forces.

Chinese wartime political objectives might not necessarily require that the PLAN obtain or maintain sea control in these bodies of water, though. If Chinese leaders sought to coerce a U.S. ally through a maritime blockade, and their valuation of their political objectives drove them to use lethal and not necessarily discriminate force to enforce this embargo, minelaying and traditional ASuW operations by Chinese submarines and land-based aircraft might be entirely adequate. While Chinese sea denial operations might not present a major concern for the U.S. with respect to unpopulated allied territories, they would pose a critical problem with respect to populated ones. Could the southern and central Ryukyus (especially urban Okinawa) hold out indefinitely if their flow of basic foodstuffs, petroleum products, or other staple goods were heavily disrupted? How drastically might the developing Philippine economy be affected if its major ports in western Luzon were pressured? The question’s applicability to Taiwan should be obvious.

Furthermore, any U.S. or allied forces stationed in or operating from blockaded, geographically-isolated friendly territories (the Ryukyus again come to mind) would find their logistical lifelines endangered. If the sea blockade could not be breached via airlift due to insufficient cargo aircraft capacity or perhaps Chinese offensive counterair operations, then these critical lines of communications might be severed altogether. U.S. and allied forces in ‘frontline’ territories could certainly make use of ordnance, food, and other supplies stockpiled (and concealed) near their positions during peacetime—if such foresighted steps had been taken. If not, or if the conflict became protracted, how long would they be able to sustain operational effectiveness with their maritime lines of communication under such pressure? What if the U.S. and allied plan was to surge assets such as anti-ship or anti-air missile batteries to these forward territories only upon detecting Indications and Warning of possible Chinese aggression? If warning signs were missed, or if crisis-psychological factors delayed the U.S. and allied reactions to those signs until too late, could campaign-critical defensive assets warehoused in rear areas be transported to the ‘frontline’ and then emplaced while under fire? If the answers to these questions are highly doubtful or clearly in the negative, then conventional deterrence theory makes clear that it would be unlikely such a force or its associated strategic concept would be an effective deterrent. ‘Mutually-assured’ sea denial cuts both ways.

All this also says nothing about scenarios in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might employ conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles to bombard allied military, economic, and civil targets as a means of coercion. U.S. and allied sea denial operations could do nothing to directly counter such a thrust. PLA suppression of U.S. forward airbases via periodic cruise missile (and perhaps short-range ballistic missile) bombardments would additionally reduce the screening air cover available to protect sea (and air) lines of communication to the embattled ally as well as support friendly forces’ own sea denial operations.

Should the Chinese combine missile bombardment with a submarine and aircraft-enforced blockade, there would be a real risk of rendering U.S. and allied forces in ‘frontline’ territories hors de combat. The PLA might not be able to physically seize or hold those territories, but if the U.S. and its allies could not break the Chinese blockade and roll back China’s ability to continue at-will bombardment, then it is entirely conceivable Chinese leaders might be satisfied by forcibly compelling the U.S. and its allies to militarily withdraw from the territories as the price of a settlement. For instance, the prime Chinese objective in a limited war with Japan and the U.S. might very well be demilitarization and eventual political Finlandization of the Ryukyus. A U.S. conventional deterrent resting purely on sea denial would not be sufficient to prevent this kind of war, and it follows that allowing the maritime approaches to U.S. allies’ populated territories to become a de facto ‘no-man’s land’ would be self-defeating.

U.S. conventional deterrence credibility therefore not only depends upon U.S. forces’ abilities to assert maritime denial against PLA operations in the combat theater, but also their abilities to obtain and exercise localized maritime control within the approaches to allied territories. Protection of these sea and air lines of communication, not to mention the associated sea and air ports of debarkation, may be possible using Joint combined arms including sea-based and theater-range land-based aircraft, naval surface and subsurface forces, land-based air and missile defenses, and defensive naval minefields.

In a major war, though, these measures alone might not be adequate for obtaining maritime control when and where needed. The PLA’s quantitative advantages in theater combined with China’s physical proximity to the probable contested zones suggest PLA forces would be able to attain higher operational tempos than their U.S. and allied counterparts. This differential would be further aggravated if China engaged in a conventional counterforce first strike. Maritime lines of communication protection might consequently depend upon taking actions that suppress PLA operational tempo and offensively attrite the PLA forces engaged in sea denial operations.

Such actions might include cyber or electronic attacks that disrupt, deceive, or exploit PLA maritime surveillance/reconnaissance systems and networks, command and control networks at the operational and tactical levels, or logistical support networks. They might also include offensive maritime operations designed to lure PLA maritime forces into battle on terms that strongly favored the U.S.; an example might be an attempt to draw PLA maritime strike aircraft into an aerial ambush with a convoy or a U.S. Navy task group approaching the First Island Chain serving as bait. In the event China did set the escalatory precedents of unleashing a conventional first strike against U.S. and allied forces and bases, the U.S. could conceivably (and with legal, moral, and operational justification) respond with conventional strikes against equivalent PLA targets on Chinese soil.

It is clear, then, that just as U.S. and allied sea denial capabilities would curtail the PLA’s ability to invade and occupy allied territories, U.S. and allied maritime control capabilities—plus the latent threats posed by U.S. long-range strike capabilities—would be necessary to prevent ‘frontline’ East Asian territories and the friendly forces defending them from withering on the vine. The region’s geography, the PLA’s ever-expanding maritime and land-attack capabilities, and the plausible spectrum of Chinese political objectives and conflict scenarios make it so. Indeed, a conventional deterrent must be designed such that it can cover this full spectrum if it is to enduringly prevent war; one that covers only a narrow range of contingencies risks catastrophic failure if it cannot match up to the unique circumstances of a crisis or the political objectives of an intelligent and determined opponent. U.S. conventional deterrence of China (and U.S. maritime strategy) accordingly must embrace sea denial, but cannot solely rely upon it.

IMCMEX12

U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Aug. 29, 2012)The mine countermeasures ships USS Pioneer (MCM 9), left, USS Devastator (MCM 6), USS Sentry (MCM 3) and USS Dexrous (MCM 13) approach for an astern replenishment at sea with Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce (AFSB(I) 15). Ponce, formerly designated as an amphibious transport dock ship, was converted and reclassified in April to fulfill a long-standing U.S. Central Command request for an AFSB to be located in its area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Toni Burton/Released)

I think this is a big deal.

Navies from six continents and more than 30 nations kick off the most widely attended international exercise ever held in the region, Sept. 16.

International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX) 12 is the first of what is intended to be a recurring partnership event.

"This exercise is about mines and the international effort to clear them," said Vice Admiral John W. Miller, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. "Represented here are the best of our individual countries' efforts dedicated to securing the global maritime commons and I look forward to  seeing how this exceptional team of professionals moves forward."

The wholly defensive exercise consists of two distinct phases, the first is a symposium where senior leaders from participating countries will exchange ideas and view the latest mine hunting, sweeping and neutralization technologies provided by a panel of industry representatives and presenters.

In the second phase, ships, crews and observers get underway to train together to prepare for tactical execution. Ships will conduct at-sea maneuvers in three separate geographic areas, which will include mine  hunting operations; helicopter mine countermeasure operations; international explosive ordnance disposal mine hunting and diving operations and small  boat operations focused toward underwater improvised explosive devices.

"Everyone here at IMCMEX 12 understands that countering the threat posed by mines is a critical mission to ensure security in the maritime domain," said  Rear Adm. Kenneth Perry, commander, Task Force 522 and exercise director. "The work we will do here will strengthen relationships and enhance mine countermeasures interoperability among participating navies."

The exercise will finish with leaders, liaison officers and observers gathering to discuss lessons learned during the three phases to further foster interoperability among participants.

I think we all recognize this is one of the constructive way the region is responding to Iranian threats, so there is no need to discuss the geopolitical angles here. Several other thoughts come to mind.

First, 2012 has been a busy year for the US Navy, but in my opinion the most impressive thing the US Navy has done is rapidly forward deploy 5 ships for mine warfare to the CENTCOM area of responsibility on a simi-permenant basis. Starting with the four MCMs from San Diego, for the Navy to basically pick up and completely relocate the infrastructure for 4 Mine Countermeasures ships, including the ships and crews, and move them from San Diego to Bahrain - and insure the vessels are mission functional all within about a 6-8 month time period is truly remarkable. When one starts to think through all the various people with responsibility and touch to this activity it truly is incredible what the Navy has done. It was almost certainly a huge mess, but nothing hard work couldn't accomplish - and did accomplish. Throw in the refit and forward deployment of the USS Ponce (AFSB(I) 15) and in my opinion this activity has been to date in 2012 the single most impressive activity by the US Navy.

Second, the participation of over 30 nations for a mine warfare exercise in that part of the world is a big deal. I spoke with Rear Admiral Kenneth Perry on Friday afternoon and he mentioned this is the largest mine warfare exercise in that regions history in terms of scope and size. Getting the international community together for this kind of exercise - specifically in that part of the world - is incredibly important because it sets up exactly the kind of real work cooperation and experience necessary in practice should the activity ever be necessary in a real world emergency. Exercises like this help sailors from various parts of the world come together and understand not only what each others capabilities are, but how they can work together more productively. It is important, because mine warfare is time consuming art towards detection and neutralization as much as it is a science of the same activity, and through cooperation naval forces can reduce the time necessary in conducting the hard, ugly business of removing mines.

Third, everyone knows that mines have done more damage to US Naval forces than any other weapon system since WWII, but that still didn't stop the Navy from spending less money and providing sufficient resources for mine warfare for the last several decades. If you have ever heard an insult of US Navy mine warfare (MIW) capabilities relative to other nations - particularly NATO nations, it was almost certainly a well earned insult. Things are changing though. Over the last few years investment in US Navy MIW is up, considerably, and as a warfare area it is no longer seen as something the US Navy could ignore as critical to the way we fight. The reuse of USS Ponce for purposes of an Afloat Staging Base and modernization of the MCMs to use the Expendable Mine Neutralization System (EMNS) and SeaFox UUV are only a few examples of technology capabilities being upgraded, but just as important (I think) over the long haul are the software and data systems on the back end that will help sailors get better at their warfare specialty by being able to accumulate and use mine warfare data - both ours and the data of our partners - in ways not previously available. Whether it is art or science, having better, more accessible data improves the quality of work being done and can have huge payoffs over time - and I believe that is the impact we will see. ICMCEX 2012 is testing new software and data management systems, and while it is a very small part of the exercise, it is a part I believe matters a lot.

Fourth, I asked Rear Admiral Perry about CONOPs for the USS Ponce and he felt they were all in place, that the Navy is ready to go with a Mine Warfare Command Ship. USS Ponce is not a tender, but the ship does have a logistical support capability for the MCMs in addition to the aviation, manned and unmanned deployable, and C2 capabilities one would expect from a mine warfare command ship converted from an LPD. Mine Warfare is more than just sensor and neutralization technologies - indeed it can quickly become manpower intensive work requiring small boats, divers, and all kinds of other specialists depending upon environment and conditions. The addition of a capability like USS Ponce is a huge upgrade for US Navy mine warfare capabilities, because it doesn't steal from the already over tasked Marine Corps an amphibious ship to conduct US Navy specific operations.

CDR Chris Rawley has more on IMCMEX12 and MIW on his blog Naval Drones - worth checking out.

Preparing for War

In chess, to achieve checkmate you must first position your pieces properly.

For years I've dismissed the topic of war with Iran. I just never thought it would happen, or at least knew we would see it coming so have repeatedly dismissed claims that war is near. We'll, this is the kind of movement I've been waiting to see happen before taking this too seriously as a legitimate possibility, rather than an implied one.

Today, mentioned in passing in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee - without a word or question on the topic from any supposedly well informed Senators - Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert told the Senate committee that the US Navy is going to deploy 4 minesweepers to the Persian Gulf (which will double the number of US Navy Minesweepers in the Persian Gulf) and also send additional mine hunting helicopters to the region. This comes following news earlier this year that the US Navy is working on the USS Ponce to deploy to the Persian Gulf to be a full time Mine Warfare Command Ship.

In other words, the Chief of Naval Operations announced to the Senate Armed Services Committee this morning specific details about preparations for war with Iran, and in response the Senators drooled on themselves in silent capitulation. The only thing missing from that scene from this mornings Twilight Zone moment in the Senate was the CNO knocking on the microphone asking "is this thing on" for dramatic effect.

When the CNO tells Senators in a public hearing that the Navy is deploying four little 1300 ton minesweepers to the other side of the world, in any context that can be described as the US Navy preparing for war with Iran. Deploying minesweepers to the Persian Gulf isn't like a typical 6 month deployment of a Navy warship, because some big commercial vessel will almost certainly be chartered to carry the ships across the ocean. This is a big deal.

This is also what a naval buildup for war against Iran looks like.

Update: And here is the charter. Note the timeline. Basically we seem to be in a hurry to get everything in place by summertime.

Speaking of MIW

Speaking of mine warfare, from last Friday's contract list.

General Dynamics Advanced Informational Systems Inc., McLeansville, N.C., is being awarded a $48,606,916 contract with cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-fixed-fee, and firm-fixed-price line items for the engineering, manufacturing and development of the Surface Mine Countermeasure Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (SMCM UUV). The SMCM UUV system will provide the fleet mine warfare commander with enhanced mine-hunting capability. The SMCM UUV system will address the Navy's need to reliably detect and identify undersea volume and bottom mines in high-clutter environments and areas with potential for mine case burial. The SMCM UUV will also gather environmental data to provide intelligence support for other mine warfare systems. SMCM UUV system will be a part of the Littoral Combat Ship MCM mission package. This contract will also contain an option for the production of up to five low rate initial production systems. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of the contract to $86,719,986. The contract will be initially funded with $10,119,000. Work will be performed in McLeansville, N.C. (38 percent), Quincy, Mass. (27 percent), Braintree, Mass. (16 percent), Houston, Texas (10 percent), Reston, Va. (5 percent), State College, Pa. (3 percent), and Fairfax, Va. (1 percent), and is expected to be completed by March 2016. Contract funds in the amount of $237,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitive procured via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with four offers received. The Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division, Panama City Beach, Fla., is the contracting activity (N61331-11-C-0017).

I'd be more impressed if the vehicles could deploy and lay mines as well. Has anyone seen the latest PPT of LCS mission modules? I for one would like to see what the current makeup of baseline 0 modules looks like these days. Noteworthy how LCS went from being exclusively PPT a few years ago to being a lot harder to find accurate, current information regarding.

The US Navy's Combat Ineffective Mine Warfare Force

The article by Sam Lagrone in Janes Navy International this week on the MCM fleet is insanely informative. Titled New Avengers: USN's MCM fleet in need of vital upgrades, it is unfortunately behind the Janes firewall, but I have included a few very important quotes.

Despite the threat, the navy's 14 Avenger-class mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels have one of the worst readiness and obsolescence records in the fleet. At the start of a recent year-long review of the Avenger class, NAVSEA found that only a tiny proportion of the vessels were able to execute their mission, Captain Robin Rusell, representing NAVSEA's Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare (SEA 21), told Jane's.

The SEA 21 study was prompted by a report in February 2010 from the Fleet Review Panel of Surface Forces Readiness, led by retired Vice Admiral Philip M Balisle. The Balisle report concluded that nearly two decades of neglect had resulted in acute readiness problems across the surface fleet. "What we had was a naval sea systems organization that was ... not as responsive as it could have been," Capt Rusell said.

Historically, MCM has been given less of a priority by the USN than other warfare areas and has often been relegated to the sidelines of procurement struggles. "There's roughly a USD500 million bill to fix the ships we have and keep them operational," Scott Truver, a director of national security at Gryphon Technologies, who helped the USN formulate its mine warfare doctrine from 1992 to 2004, told Jane's . That bill has yet to be paid in full.

It's actually worse than you think.

In April 2010, the SEA 21 MCM Task Force began an evaluation of the Avenger class to assess its health and readiness. The initial findings were bleak. "What we found out on going onboard all 14 mine countermeasure ships was that only one of them was able to go under way and [fully] execute her mission," Capt Rusell said. "One out of 14 is not too good." Of the remaining 13 ships, some could get underway and perform some of the MCM missions.

Only one in fourteen? That's less than 8% of the total force! Ouch! This quote by Scott Truver is clever, but brutal.

Truver characterizes the six ships in San Diego as "one training ship and five spares".

The article notes that funding for mine warfare is expected to increase in FY13. We'll see, this stuff tends to get high profile right up until it's time to pay the bill, then somehow gets shoved in a desk until there is a real problem.

A news report like this highlights that when it comes to the least expensive, most effective asymmetrical threat virtually any nation can employ, the US Navy is woefully unprepared with funding priorities largely focused on the most expensive, extreme, and unlikely threats.

One good thing about the Littoral Combat Ship program that isn't noted enough - for once, at least MIW is getting high visibility and priority with a budget thanks to LCS. With that said, IOC for the LCS MIW module is scheduled for 2017, so the next 6 years we will be dependent upon the MCMs to meet the needs for MIW.

The Avenger class and it's associated capability is treated like a red headed step child when it comes to budget priority. Hopefully FY13 budget will fund requirements for MIW, because MIW is both art and skill - and that art and skill requires dedication to proper resourcing to do well.

The Workhorse of the Misrata Port

NATO still has a rather large armada of ships in the Mediterranean Sea supporting operations for Libya. This includes aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, submarines, and all varieties of support craft.

Interesting who is making the big difference at the pointy end of the spear.

Aid ships have begun to enter Misrata after NATO ships cleared mines laid by forces loyal to Colonel Gaddafi.

Humanitarian relief ship Red Start One has made it in to Misrata port according to The International Organisation for Migration and they are going to start evacuating 1000 civilians.

Aid ships had been prevented from entering the port after Gaddafi’s forces laid mines.

Royal Navy Minehunter HMS Brocklesby played a "key role" in clearing them.

Ah yes, Mine Warfare, the red headed step child of every Navy that no one actually cares about come budget time until the guy in the field can't do his job without the little minesweepers. The first vessel to standout as a critical enabler of operations off Libya was USS Florida (SSGN 728). The second vessel to standout as a critical enabler of operations off Libya in my book is HMS Brocklesby (M33).

Check out the photo gallery for the ship to get a sense of the technology being used. In addition to traditional MCM capabilities, it looks like HMS Brocklesby (M33) also deploys the Recce UUV, which is very similar to the REMUS 600 autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV).

Nobody in the United States wants to hear this, but observing several of the littoral activities we have seen from NATO off Libya, from Royal Navy MCM to Italian Navy humanitarian escort, I keep thinking to myself that the Littoral Combat Ship can do all of these missions, and more, very well.

With that said, it is important to note that Libyan anti-access operations focused on sea lines of communication have been very limited to date. How much more aggressive would Gadhafi need to be to scare NATO out to 25nm? I find it interesting that Hezbollah has proven to have more anti-Navy access denial capability from shore than Libya apparently does.

Royal Navy Preparing for Naval Ship Fire Support in Libya

I am in full agreement naval gunfire support is needed off Libya, but the British press would be wiser to report such activities for their Navy after it happened, not before.

BRITISH destroyer HMS Liverpool was last night preparing to shell targets in Libya and quicken the downfall of tyrant Colonel Gaddafi.

Defence chiefs have ordered the Type-42 Destroyer to start pounding command and control centres and boost the ill-equipped rebels.

Until now Britain has only used RAF Tornado and Typhoon warplanes and a nuclear submarine.

But sources close to the mission told The Sun a major Navy assault will begin this week. The source said: "Final details are being hammered out now but they are looking to strike over the next few days. When they do, Gaddafi won't know what's hit him."

The Liverpool is a batch 2 Type 42 destroyer with the standard British 4.5 inch Mark 8 gun. There are some new rounds called the High Explosive Extended Range round which give the gun a range of about 27km, while a traditional round offers about 22km.

Either way, the NATO Navies find themselves in a major fight for Misrata, and the absence of fire from the sea has been problematic. Many of the aid ships have been chased out of Misrata's port, and the mines that have been laid in the harbor continue to be a problem.

While it is always dangerous to send ships closer to shore for combat operations, it is good to see the Royal Navy stepping up. Leveraging the type of sustained, persistent fires that offshore fire support brings to the fight, NATO can augment aircraft and remain continuously engaged with fires as needed in Misrata making it very problematic for the Libyan government to move their heavy equipment into offensive position.

I still don't understand why NATO hasn't captured the airport at Misrata. In any other humanitarian operation in the world the very first thing NATO countries would do is send force to the airport in the middle of the disaster zone. I see this as one more reason the political micromanagement of Libyan military operations through the UN directed tactical advisory of no troops on land is far closer to stupid than wisdom, and is why I won't be surprised if the best NATO can do is sustain a stalemate while Libyans continue to die.