The US Navy and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Tuesday

YOKOSUKA, Japan (July 11, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) moves into Dry Dock 4 at Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka to continue repairs and assess damage sustained from its June 17 collision with a merchant vessel. FLEACT Yokosuka provides, maintains, and operates base facilities and services in support of U.S. 7th Fleet's forward-deployed naval forces, 71 tenant commands and 26,000 military and civilian personnel. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter Burghart/Released)

Tuesday's Senate Armed Service Committee hearing was one of the most important engagements politicians in Washington, DC have conducted publicly with the Navy in a very long time. It has been years since we have watched an important hearing between the Senate and leaders of the US Navy where the primary focus of the hearing wasn't a budget. Tuesday's hearing was about something much more important, it was about the safety of American sailors. After 17 lives have been lost in two collisions at sea in the Pacific this year, this was the moment where elected officials would evaluate and determine if the US Navy is meeting the standards expected by the American people following a series of several tragedies where lives have been lost.

To the credit of the Senators in the Senate Armed Service Committee, as an American citizen I felt well represented by the probing questions that triggered several honest responses. However, as I listened to the answers provided by the Navy, considered those answers overnight Tuesday and all day Wednesday, I am uncomfortable with some of the answers provided by Admiral John Richardson, CNO. The Navy leaders accurately testified that "organizational culture" is part of the problem, and anyone who knows squat about challenges related to "organizational culture" in a big organization like the US Navy understands that among all the challenges the Navy faces with fleet material condition problems - an organizational cultural problem is always the hardest challenge to solve. When any organization has a serious culture problem, particularly one that has results where people die, the only question that demands an answer by the US Senate is whether the Navy leaders tasked to deal with the culture problem are capable of dealing with it successfully.

That hearing did not convince me this group of Navy leaders is prepared to do that today. That can change, but as of Tuesday it's blatantly obvious ADM Richardson does not know how to address the problem, and it's questionable if he even understands the problem yet. Below are two (there were more...) of the issues and comments from the Senate hearing that, quite bluntly, should not be allowed to be said by Navy leaders in front of the Senate and the American people. These statements are not acceptable under any circumstances if the expectation is Navy leaders can successfully address the organizational culture problems in the Navy today.

An Indefensible Statement

I will quote this article over at USNI News. This paragraph is an unbelievable, indefensible statement by ADM Richardson and I was shocked on Wednesday that I couldn't find a single member of the Navy community countering such complete nonsense publicly. But privately... this was widely circulated as a huge pile of complete bullshit.

Asked if requesting a delay in deployment date would negatively affect a commanding officer, Richardson said no and added that “if I could go down and give that commander a handshake and a medal I would do that. This is exactly the type of honesty and transparency we need to run a Navy that’s safe and effective.”

The CNO would give that CO a medal? That answer is absurd at best, and is indefensible if the Senate hearings are supposed to represent serious discourse on a serious subject regarding a specific action that the FITZ or MCCAIN COs could potentially taken that could have saved lives.

ADM Richardson appears to understand he needs Commanders who will be honest and transparent about the true state of his force, but if Admiral Richardson believes there wouldn't be a negative affect to the career of that Commander in his Navy today, then that's a serious problem. I can't find anyone who believes that. In any large business or government culture, much less military culture of the US Navy, nobody in senior management tells executive level leadership "no" because of risk. What happens instead is the executive level leadership demands risk mitigation, and the senior manager does the job as required, and the organization accepts the risk. There isn't an option for Commanders to say "I can't deploy my ship right now" without career consequences, and at minimum it was either naive or ignorant to suggest otherwise.

Here were the follow up questions never asked. Is there a single naval officer who has made Flag in the 21st century who, when a CDR or Captain, requested a delay in deployment to their superior because the request to go to sea carried too high a risk? The answer, of course, will be no.

Is there any example of any COs of any ships in the last ten years that requested a delay in deployment because of a ships material condition? If it happened, was that CO promoted? Has anyone checked to validate the CNO's testimony?

The only legitimate answer ADM Richardson could give in Senate testimony is that "yes, that's a symptom of the culture problem in the Navy." Until ADM Richardson can get that question and answer right, he cannot and will not solve the culture problem in the Navy that led to the death of 17 sailors. If someone was to research the questions listed above, it will reveal there are zero SWO Flag officers today who delayed a deployment because of a ships material condition. They will likely find that among any officers who were brave enough to ask for a deployment delay due to a ships material condition, not a single one of those officers was promoted.

The Navy has metrics that can prove or disprove the statement made by ADM Richardson in testimony to the Senate on this topic, so I hope someone in the Navy turns the CNO's speculation on this topic into a fact finding review. The intent of getting the metrics isn't to prove ADM Richardson wrong, of course his answer in the Senate was wrong, but instead it's important for the Navy to see the context for why no one was ever promoted when the CO did actually ask for a delay - in each case - to better understand both the culture problem and the material condition problem.

CHANGI NAVAL BASE, REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (August 21, 2024) Damage to the portside is visible as the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) steers towards Changi Naval Base, Republic of Singapore, following a collision with the merchant vessel Alnic MC while underway east of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Significant damage to the hull resulted in flooding to nearby compartments, including crew berthing, machinery, and communications rooms. Damage control efforts by the crew halted further flooding. The incident will be investigated. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joshua Fulton/Released)

Misrepresentation of a Basic Organizational Leadership Principle

I am one who is skeptical of President Trump's business acumen, but... if he is the professional business leader he claims to be, this statement by CNO Richardson would represent a huge red flag. Again, from USNI News:

“We have a can-do culture, that’s what we do. Nobody wants to raise their hand and say I can’t do the mission, but it’s absolutely essential that when those are the facts we enable that report,” CNO said.

“We don’t meet more than 50 percent of the combatant commanders’ demands as it is, it’s from a force structure standpoint and a combination of that and readiness. And there have been times where I’ve spoken with my subordinate commanders where there’s just insufficient time to get a force trained and certified to meet the deployment date, and we have to go back to the combatant command and say you’re going to have to wait.”

More than a few editors leveraged the "can do" culture statement in headlines that gave the perception that CNO Richardson was somehow suggesting "can do" culture is a problem. Even the USNI News article I am citing has the headline: CNO Richardson: High Optempo and ‘Can-Do Culture’ Culminated In ‘Pervasive’ Expired Certifications in Forward-Deployed Surface Forces.

I am trying not to interpret the CNO's comment in the way the headlines are suggesting, but it's hard to agree with the CNO's comment in any context that a "can do" culture in the Navy is a problem. When the CNO made his "can do" comment in testimony on Tuesday, it immediately sparked discussion across multiple social media platforms by several of the top military observers who were watching the hearings. The commentary of "can do" being negative didn't sit well with folks, but whether it is the nature of social media or because the hearing kept moving quickly beyond the CNO's comment, no one effectively described why this comment didn't sit well with anyone.

The reason the CNO citing "can do" culture in a problematic context doesn't sit well with people is because the CNO misrepresented what "can do" culture in an organization represents. When an organization can be described as having a "can do" culture what it means is that the employees of the organization are positively motivated towards objectives in support of the organization, and are willing to work harder towards organizational goals. Within the Federal government's own civil service materials for senior management promotional exams, a "can do" culture of a department is an example cited as a reflection of positive work being done by supervised managers. In seminars that discuss organizational leadership principles, "can do" culture is a positive reflection of a good working team environment.

I have no doubt that a "can do" culture exists in the US Navy, but where a "can do" culture exists, it has nothing to do with the Navy's organizational culture problems that the CNO is responsible for fixing related to ship material condition. Leveraging "can do" culture should be part of the CNO's solution, not identified as a problem. In the very same testimony the CNO gave to the Senate, he actually discusses characteristics of a cultural problem that is well known to be toxic in organizations, and btw - ironically, these characteristics of an organization are also cited in the Federal governments own civil service promotional exam materials as representing potentially toxic managers within teams.

Asked by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) if it was “irresponsible” to allow a ship to deploy with an expired certification, Richardson likened the certifications to a driver’s license.

“What had happened in those areas, ma’am, is that the team out there was conscious that these certifications were expiring. And it’s a bit like your driver’s license expiring - it may not necessarily mean that you don’t know how to drive any more, it’s just that expired,” he said.

“However, we do need to recognize that … they need to go back and recertify. What had happened instead is that they would do an evaluation, and say hey, your certification is expired, we’re not going to get a time to get onboard and do the certification for some time, so we’ll do a discussion or administrative review to extend that. It’s called a risk-mitigation plan. That became pretty pervasive, so it was kind of this boiling frog scenario that over time, over the last two years really, became acute.”

When conducting cyber security audits in the IT industry, a good security auditor will look for persistent risk mitigation activities as part of the evaluating the hygiene of security culture within an organization. If during a cyber security audit the auditor determines the ISO is constantly taking steps for risk mitigation for a specific system or service, and there is no evidence of organizational commitment towards solving the root cause for the risk mitigation activities, it basically means the leadership of an organization is the source of the poor security hygiene for the system or service. When there are widespread examples, it's called having a "must do" organizational culture, and the organization "must do" things that carry high risk until eventually, the organization adopts high risk activities into the culture as part of normal status. At that point, even high risk mitigation activities become standard operating procedure, and once something is SOP organizational leadership becomes blind to the risk, and the risk is no longer important enough to resolve at a root cause level.

"Can do" cultures don't require risk mitigation plans, but "must do" cultures do. The distinction is the difference. A "Can do" culture in an organization is a bottom-up culture of productivity, while a "must do" culture within an organization is a top-down culture of productivity. The specific characteristics that distinctly identifies whether an organization has a positive "can do" culture or a negative "must do" culture is the persistent requirement for risk mitigation and the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure at the senior leadership level.

The CNO's own testimony before the Senate on Tuesday suggests that the US Navy has a toxic "must do" top-down culture, because he not only cited risk mitigation but a tremendous amount of evidence was presented in testimony that the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure is prevalent in the Pacific theater.

The CNO testimony also suggests the US Navy has a "can do" bottom up culture, and the CNO seems to believe at minimum that the "can do" culture represents part of the problem. If a positive "can do" culture of the organization is part of the problem, it is a symptom, not a cause. As a symptom it suggests the CNO has another problem, because it can lead to senior level blame gaming. A "can do" culture in the US Navy represents a positive characteristic of the US Navy culture and the CNO needs to take a hard look whether or not that positive culture is being exploited by a toxic command culture of "must do" senior leaders. Who is demanding high risk? Where is high risk institutionalized as standard operating procedure?  How is accountability for risk being determined?

If the CNO actually believes that the "can do" culture is the problem instead of a symptom, ADM Richardson may be incapable of solving the organizational cultural problem in the Navy. Correctly identifying the difference between a symptom and problem is a requirement. How can the CNO be weeks into this process, be testifying in front of the Senate, and still potentially be getting problem identification wrong? Where are the smart people on the CNO's staff?

Remember, what was the first thing Navy senior leadership did when ship material condition problems started several years ago? The Navy classified INSURVs, which virtually insured risk mitigation would become standard operating procedure when public criticism would no longer be a problem.

The CNO's own testimony suggests the problem is a "must do" culture because he testified that the two specific aspects that represent a "must do" toxic top-down organizational culture problem exist - persistent requirement for risk mitigation and the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure at the senior leadership level. There are metrics that can identify the culture challenge the Navy faces, and those metrics are not going to support the CNO's testimony that COs can delay deployments due to a ships material condition without career consequences, because that action would be counter culture. The Senate is asking the right questions. Yet some the answers by the CNO himself aren't believable.

Who suggested to the CNO that the first visible action the Navy needs to take before analysis is completed to identify the basic stuff like 'work hours and duty shifts' should be the Navy should stand up a new staff? What credible analysis has the Navy conducted that identified the first, most important, immediate step to be taken towards solving really tough organizational problems is constituting a new staff organization, rather than a manning review related to number of hours deployed sailors are working per day or week?

In my opinion, given what was said in Tuesdays testimony, the only new staff the US Navy needs is one ready to bring research skills, analysis skills, a significant increase in critical thought to some serious cultural problems in proximity closer to the CNO, because letting the CNO describe symptoms as problems in Senate testimony related to the death of 17 sailors insured Tuesday was a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad day for the US Navy. If creating new staffs and implying blame should be directed towards sailors who are obviously sacrificing themselves towards successful objectives demanded by Navy leadership is being described as the problem... I just don't see how this group of Navy leaders can be trusted to successfully grow and improve the Navy looking into the future when there are so many red flags related to how this group of Navy leaders is struggling to deal with the challenges that already exist today.

The Fleet in Being Strategy

PACIFIC OCEAN (Jan. 20, 2017) Aircraft from Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 conduct flight operations aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). The carrier is currently off the coast of Southern California conducting carrier qualifications. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Bill M. Sanders/Released)

The US Navy has dealt with the fiscal controls of sequestration put in place by Congress and the Obama Administration over the last few years by making a strategic choice that favored new shipbuilding activities over the maintenance of ships and aircraft - among other things. Budgets are zero sum, and Defense News is reporting the consequences of that strategic choice.

The U.S. Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet strike fighters are the tip of the spear, embodying most of the fierce striking power of the aircraft carrier strike group. But nearly two-thirds of the fleet’s strike fighters can’t fly — grounded because they’re either undergoing maintenance or simply waiting for parts or their turn in line on the aviation depot backlog.

Overall, more than half the Navy’s aircraft are grounded, most because there isn’t enough money to fix them.

Additionally, there isn’t enough money to fix the fleet’s ships, and the backlog of ships needing work continues to grow. Overhauls — “availabilities” in Navy parlance — are being canceled or deferred, and when ships do come in they need longer to refit. Every carrier overall for at least three years has run long, and some submarines are out of service for prolonged periods, as much as four years or more. One submarine, the Boise, has lost its diving certification and can’t operate pending shipyard work.

Leaders claim that if more money doesn’t become available, five more submarines will be in the same state by the end of this year. 

The article has plenty of details, but the eye popping quote comes after the article cites "$6-8 billion" in immediate needs. There is only one way to describe what this means.

The dire situation of naval aviation is sobering. According to the Navy, 53 percent of all Navy aircraft can’t fly — about 1,700 combat aircraft, patrol, and transport planes and helicopters. Not all are due to budget problems — at any given time, about one-fourth to one-third of aircraft are out of service for regular maintenance. But the 53 percent figure represents about twice the historic norm.

It doesn't matter how many ships are in the US Navy's shipbuilding plan, the unequivocal truth of the situation is - the US Navy today is a hollow force. When the fleet cannot leave port and has been degraded to the point it cannot maintain it's own resources, it is a fleet in being. It was an intentional choice, by both Navy leaders and Congress - they all own the situation as it is today. This has been the strategy of the last several years to insure new construction and new ships. No one, whether a civilian in either political party or an Admiral in the Navy today, can claim they are not accountable. Priorities get funded, and a lot of priorities that have nothing to do with the maintenance of naval power have been funded over the last many years.

Consider for a moment that it is very likely the training squadrons are probably among the squadrons actually getting maintenance funding, which means it is very likely the US Navy couldn't field more than 4, and probably not even 5 aircraft carriers with functioning combat aircraft today in response to a national emergency. I don't know what percent of the F-18s force is grounded, but I bet the percentage of helicopters grounded is much higher, because if there is one thing we can make a safe bet on - it is that naval aviation leaders will have prioritized the F-18s and done only the minimum everywhere else.

Last week the Question of the Week asked whether the US Navy was prepared for combat at sea. My answer to this question would be, "Yes the US Navy is prepared to fight, at least initially, and while the tip of the spear is very sharp - it's the shortest spear the US Navy has represented since the 19th century."

In 2010 I remember listening to fleet leaders who were very concerned that the US Navy was on the verge of being a hollow force, and today in 2017 the US Navy is absolutely hollow. There are entire squadrons of aircraft that cannot fly today, and ships that not only can't get underway - but it is unclear when they next could get underway. When I read articles discussing the size of the US Navy in 2017 I roll my eyes wondering if they have any idea how meaningless the numbers they use actually are. Numbers on paper have nothing in common with reality. The CNO telling any and all who will listen that the state of maintenance in the force has already passed critical levels - that's the reality.

Thoughts on the Farsi Island Incident January 12

By now most of you have heard the news of the initial incident and have read several details of the incident that have been reported in the press. The bottom line, there are still a lot of unknowns even as the incident was resolved diplomatically within 24 hours. Below are a few thoughts.

1) Even 48 hours after the initial incident it doesn't even appear CENTCOM or the Pentagon has a full accounting of the details of exactly what happened. People who have been telling the narrative since the incident first occurred are sure to be proven wrong, since they have almost certainly been guessing as to causes and motives. In the end, it is starting to look to be exactly what it looks like... a bunch of young sailors lost because of reliance on technology and/or machinery that failed. There is also, potentially, a training issue here related to navigation and leadership.

2) Those who are claiming the US Navy should have shot their way out of the standoff - when it appears the US Navy sailors actually involved appeared to have convinced themselves their ships were inside Iranian waters - make very interesting and yet terrible arguments for shooting at Iranians. Farsi Island may be a disputed Island in the Persian Gulf, but there is an IRGC naval base on that island and presence in the first rule of ownership. If the Iranian Navy, or Russian Navy, or any Navy drifted armed boats into US waters off Kings Bay, I suspect the US Coast Guard and/or US Navy would be very quick to point guns and be active in detaining the drifters.

3) I am unable to see any strategic advantage the US would have gained by fighting Iran inside the 3 mile zone of Iranian territory, and I am unable to see any strategic consequence to the US by not fighting Iran inside the 3 mile zone of Iranian territory. However, had the US Navy tried to shoot their way out of that situation, the strategic consequences would have been significant, and not just how it relates to Iran. Such a violent action would have given China a valid example to act the same way in disputed places in the South China Sea. If the US Navy is going to lead the global commons based on our interpretation of the rules at sea, the LT who apologized (and everyone on the political right is flogging) just forwarded America strategically. I note it is primarily the parochial arguments from people whose expertise lies in other military services like the Army who have completely ignored the details like global rule sets at sea who have been the loudest to shout at the Navy in this incident. With all due respect, this is an incredibly parochial and shortsided overreaction of the incident, because the National Review can and should do better than finding an Army guy - Bing West (whom I know and respect but wtf...) when it comes to a complex naval incident. This isn't the Pueblo, nor is it the Korean War. There will be no museum in Iran, and both the boats and the crews were returned.

4) This is one of those difficult issues that, in my mind, separates serious people who care about serious strategic issues the US faces in the 21st century and demagogues who see conspiracy and opportunity in every political crisis. If you are a partisan who sees a conspiracy, go away. For the rest of us, there are serious naval issues here that need serious answers. These are a few of the initial questions that should be considered.

- Is the maintenance of the riverine command boats contracted to the point the onboard crew was unable to repair the problem? The crew of only 5 sailors per boat suggests to me that something might be off with the manpower and maintenance procedures surrounding these very capable chess pieces of naval equipment. The RCB is made to fight in the Persian Gulf, but a broken RCB isn't going to win.

 - This is a teaching moment if there ever was one, and as an incident this appears to represent a textbook case study on the reasons why the Navy needs more, not fewer, Commands for junior officers. It may be the opinion of some hard core political demagogues who have over a decade of tactical success combined with over a decade of strategic failure that this incident is somehow a defeat for America, but each new fact that emerges from this incident suggests to me this may be a case of procedural failure far beyond the scope of a LT... but when shit happened, strategic acumen by the officer in charge (LT) is potentially emerging as a feature in handling a bad situation and not making it worse. The facts are still unknown, and we may not know for sure for awhile, but regardless of what the facts are in the end I see this as a very teachable moment that favors the argument for early Command as often as possible for junior officers.

- I have no problem with high profile diplomatic incidents like this between the US Navy and Iran, as long as for each incident the actions of the US Navy is aligned with the strategic aims of the United States. If the US Navy had attacked the IRGC inside the territorial waters of Farsi Island to defend their boats, this would be a major strategic setback for the US. Had the incident occurred outside the territorial waters of Iran and the US Navy not fought back; that would also be a strategic setback for the US. Right now it appears the US Navy sailors on the scene did everything right.

- The only way to produce a genuine strategic failure from this incident is to unfairly punish those involved, in other words... if the Navy wants better commanders, handle early career mistakes the right way. Tell me how any of those 10 sailors are somehow worse off for this incident. If legitimate mistakes were made, deal with it appropriately, but pinning blame for things out of their control would be a failure of leadership, and in my mind an unforgivable sin.

- At the end of the day, this was a real diplomatic test of the US and Iran who under the recent agreement are partners in Iran's nuclear energy ambitions. The outcome is very positive for the United States. I don't trust the government of Iran, but I am yet to see anything from this incident that suggests to me Iran has has been inappropriate. If you're the American Idiot who doesn't think it was appropriate for the US Navy sailors to have their hands on their heads at any point in the engagement near the IRGC base on Farsi Island, try drifting your private armed boat into the US Navy area of Kings Bay or Norfolk or New London and pretend like there is a snowballs chance in hell you will get out of there without your hands on your head. You will have your hands on your head, or if you point a gun back at the US Navy or US Coast Guard, you will be shot dead by very serious people who protect that location and will be pointing guns at you. You don't even have to be an Iranian for that outcome to occur, nor will you need an Iranian flag on your boat, a US flag will result in the same action. Wake up people, don't let the silly season control your ability to think with objectivity.

I look forward to learning what really happened, because at the end of the day we have a well armed naval craft in the middle of the Persian Gulf with a serious mechanical problem that couldn't be quickly resolved apparently combined with some incredibly bad navigation from two crews who somehow found their way to the only piece of land between their departure location and destination that could create a diplomatic problem. When you swim past all the political bullshit, the serious naval specific issues on the table leave a lot of serious questions that deserve serious answers.

Future Uncertain

NORFOLK (Nov. 7, 2013) The amphibious transport dock ship USS San Antonio (LPD 17) returns to Naval Station Norfolk after completing an eight-month deployment. San Antonio was part of the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th and 6th Fleet areas of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Julie Matyascik Released)

No ship returns from deployment looking good, but every once and awhile we get to see the 'other' side of a ship returning home from deployment - and by other side, I'm talking about the side that doesn't face the pier.

USS San Antonio (LPD 17) was designed for regular six month deployments. The ship is less than eight years old, and the ship is returning from only her second deployment. The deployment was eight months, not six. Longer deployments are becoming increasingly common for all amphibious ship deployments.

The San Antonio class amphibious transport docks are designed to be optimally manned compared to the Austin class LPDs. Basically that means USS San Antonio (LPD 17) has 60 fewer sailors than the Austin class LPDs, even though USS San Antonio (LPD 17) is over 7000 tons bigger than the Austin class LPDs.

The San Antonio class LPDs are designed for a 40 year service life. The most recent US Navy shipbuilding plan is based upon these ships serving 43 years, not 40 years.

So in summary, at less than eight years old USS San Antonio (LPD 17) is looking pretty rough after returning from only her second deployment. At 25,000 tons the ship is optimally minimally manned, is expected to last three years longer than designed, and is being deployed for longer periods than originally designed. To pay for pushing the ship harder and longer with fewer sailors, the best idea of the DoD is to cut benefits and pay for those sailors.

I lack confidence in this the plan to keep USS San Antonio (LPD 17) and her sister ships in service until 2049. It's hard to believe that any Navy and Marine Corps leaders actually believe this is a legitimate and workable plan.

One Thing I'll Be Watching in 2013

TOKYO BAY (August 6, 2024) Senior Chief Damage Controlman Gary Wise, from Clearwater, Fla., speaks with inspectors from the board of inspection and survey (INSURV) during a test of the hangar bay aqueous film forming foam counter measure wash down system aboard the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73). INSURV conducts inspections every five years of a ship's life to ensure mission readiness and material conditions are up to standards. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class William Pittman/Released)

Both CDR Salamander and Bryan McGrath appear pleased with these changes. I don't think there is any reason for optimism until we see reason for optimism, and a policy change this big by itself is no reason to be optimistic.

The president of the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) rolled out major changes to the frequency and grading method of the INSURV program effective Jan. 1.

Rear Adm. Robert Wray, INSURV president, said changes to the frequency of the inspections and the grading system were implemented to improve the readiness of Navy ships and crews and to provide Navy and congressional leaders with an accurate reflection of that readiness.

Under the old program, INSURV teams conducted exhaustive inspections and surveys of ships every five years and reported their material readiness to Congress. Now ships will be inspected about every 30 months.

INSURV has become a huge shell game within the surface force, so we must start with the fact that change is necessary, because what exists is not working and it was well documented by the Fleet Review Panel of Surface Force Readiness (also known as the Balisle Report) to be a shell game. The report went into some detail to note the shell game by how people and resources were being shuffled solely for the purpose of passing the INSURV. It is noteworthy the new changes are not part of the recommendations in the Balisle Report:

Under the new inspection timeline, INSURV inspectors will conduct a traditional "Material Inspection" during a unit's Fleet Response Plan (FRP) cycle. In the alternating cycle, a similar inspection will be conducted by the unit's type commander with INSURV support.

The Balisle Report has an entire section (section 5.2) on INSURV Material Inspections, and while it is possible to argue that the changes being implemented by Rear Adm. Robert Wray are in the spirit of the Balisle Report, what must be stated loud and clear is that the most important recommendations of the Balisle Report still have not been implemented, and it is absolutely fair to say that the most critical issue with both INSURVs and surface maintenance has not been addressed at all.

For example, Section 5.2.2 states "The panel believes that the long term solution for reversing the downward trend in INSURV performance is to implement the balanced set of material readiness initiatives addressed in Section 3.3 of this report. Full implementation of these initiatives may well take 12-18 months longer, and a near term plan of action is needed to ensure acceptable readiness levels are achieved for pending INSURV inspections."

Even if we suggest the changes to the INSURV policy are only one part of the short term or long term action plans, despite them coming 35 months after the Balisle Report was published, these changes do not address the very serious issues outlined in the Balisle Report as the fundamental problems that have led to poor management of surface force readiness nor WHY the fleet is experiencing an increased frequency of failing INSURV grades.

I am trying hard not to call bullshit here, but it is very hard for me to understand why this is anything other than typical Navy bullshit. How exactly does increasing the frequency of INSURVs help solve the problems of an increased number of failed INSURVs, or somehow address surface readiness? Instead of No Child Left Behind, we get the Navy's version of No Ship Left Behind...

Whether you are reading Section 5.2 or Section 3.3 of the Balisle Report, there is only one topic that is consistently being emphasized as the solution to the failing material readiness in the Navy, and that is the significant shortfall of manpower in support of maintaining surface ships.

And lets be very clear... the manpower shortages today are throughout the fleet, indeed they are everywhere.

Ships are undermanned. Any aircraft squadron not specifically assigned to an aircraft carrier today is undermanned. Submarines that are not on deployment today are undermanned. Everyone in the Navy outside of Washington DC knows this, but no one except those directly involved is willing to admit it's a problem. I don't want to suggest that hollowing the Navy hasn't been the right choice, because it has probably been the correct, hard choice. But what we have to also admit is that those choices have consequences, and the Balisle Report already told us that you can't ignore those consequences or you simply compound the problems.

I am not outside the lines to note the seriousness of the problem, nor am I saying anything that is new to anyone. ADM Harvey was perfectly willing to tell the Emperor loud and proud and that he was wearing no clothes... except he waited until the day he retired to say it. But at least he said it...

So going forward in 2013 I am very curious to see how Rear Adm. Robert Wray handles this issue. For example:

The other notable change comes to the overall grading system. Previously, the program utilized a grading status of Satisfactory, Degraded or Unsatisfactory, which oversimplified inspection results with a coarse one-word descriptor attempting to describe a ship with nearly 200 sub-systems. The new system will use a more quantifiable INSURV "Figure of Merit," which is a weighted average of 30 scores used to provide a final grade and report on the overall readiness of a ship.

It is very easy to call a simple system that grades Satisfactory, Degraded or Unsatisfactory as oversimplification but it is just as easy to take a 30 pointed weighted average and skew statistics to meet a stated requirement. This sounds great... or does it?

"The major change for the average Sailor will be two-fold," Wray said. "First, each ship, prior to each deployment, will have a full-blown material inspection in which the ship will be expected to get underway, do full power, anchor, shoot guns, operate combat systems, etc., for a team of external inspectors. Second, ships will be expected to do this on their own, without months of external preparation and assistance."

While twice as many inspections may sound like a bad thing, Wray stressed that the new process will benefit the Sailors who have to prepare the ship for INSURV.

"We want the pre-deployment material inspection to be a normal part of doing business, like the Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX), something ships know how to do on their own," he said. "In a larger sense, we want to create a 'culture of material readiness' in which ships and their crews are always thinking about being ready for INSURV. The concept is to create a culture for material readiness, in which any ship, at any time in the appropriate part of the FRP, could successfully shoot their guns, do full-power runs, anchor, and demonstrate her combat systems."

Wray said the goal of these changes is very simple.

"In a perfect world, every ship will complete a rigorous material inspection prior to every deployment, conducted either by INSURV or by their TYCOM, using INSURV methods. Ship's crews will be able to prepare for, and successfully complete, the inspection on their own. Navy leadership will also get true, accurate, unvarnished readiness information upon which to make resourcing decisions."

Dear CO, "Come as you are" right before deployment and we shall have an INSURV, because we really want an "honest" assessment of the material readiness of your ship. If the ship fails the INSURV and has to skip deployment because of it, your honesty will be rewarded...

I simply don't see how this new policy is performing a service or function related to the intent of the change, because the Navy still hasn't addressed the most significant factor that led to failures of INSURVs according to the Balisle Report - manpower shortages.

Rear Adm. Robert Wray has a book described as a Primer on Leadership for the Young Sea-Service Officer coming out in March of this year. I look forward to reading the book, because under this system of INSURVs where people are no longer going to play the old shell game, every Surface Warfare Officer in the Navy will know with certainty whether Rear Adm. Robert Wray practices what he preaches regarding leadership, or if he is full of shit.

Or put another way, either Rear Adm. Robert Wray is about to get several opportunities to offer significant input into the problems towards the real solution of surface readiness, putting him in a position towards fixing the shell games caused primarily due to serious manpower shortages at all levels of the water front - or he is going to be one of the quiet majority that isn't willing to use their position of leadership to speak honestly to the problem, and we will simply see a new shell game emerge to replace the old one that currently thrives under the old system.

Still Working Out the Kinks

I am not sure what I find more frustrating, that the crew is struggling with their role in the maintenance of the ship, or that the contractors are struggling with their role in the maintenance of the ship.

It's a given that by posting this, the content of what is said will get blown out of context, so for those who aren't sure what is going on here - keep in mind the TYCOM Material Inspection (TMI) is a process intended to help ships prepare for INSURV. This is by definition what you would call good work on their part, identifying problems prior to INSURV. There is both good and bad here, as there always is with any TMI.

R 071920Z MAY 12
FM COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
TO USS FREEDOM
INFO COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
PRESINSURV VIRGINIA BEACH VA
COMLCSRON SAN DIEGO CA
COMLCSRON ONE
BT
UNCLAS
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA/0805/MAY//
SUBJ/TYCOM MATERIAL INSPECTION REPORT FOR USS FREEDOM (LCS 1)//
REF/A/MSGID:DOC/INSURV/28FEB2008/4370.1//
REF/B/MSGID:DOC/INSURV/06JUN2008/4730.3//
REF/C/MSGID:DOC/COMUSFLTFORCOM/11MAR2008/4790.3//
REF/D/MSGID:DOC/INSURV/26OCT1999/4730.11//
REF/E/MSGID:DOC/OPNAV/26DEC2007/5090.1//
REF/F/MSGID:DOC/OPNAV/30MAY2007/5100.19//
REF/G/MSGID:DOC/NAVSEA/15APR2004/9593.2//
REF/H/MSGID:DOC/CNSP/22SEP2011//

REF A IS INSURVINST 4730.1 SERIES, MATERIAL INSPECTIONS OF SURFACE SHIPS.
REF B IS INSURVINST 4730.3 SERIES, TRIALS OF SURFACE SHIPS.
REF C IS COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3 SERIES, JOINT FLEET MAINTENANCE MANUAL (VOL IV).
REF D IS INSURVINST 4730.11 SERIES, DOCUMENTATION OF DISCREPANCIES.
REF E IS OPNAVINST 5090.1 SERIES, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAM MANUAL.
REF F IS OPNAVINST 5100.19 SERIES, NAVY SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (SOH) INSPECTION AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS FOR OIL POLLUTION ABATEMENT (OPA) SYSTEMS IN U.S. NAVY SURFACE SHIPS AND CRAFT.
REF H IS CNSPINST 4730.2, TYCOM MATERIAL INSPECTION (TMI) PROCESS.//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/
1. A TMI WAS CONDUCTED ON USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) IN SAN DIEGO, CA FROM 3-5 MAY, 2012. THE TMI TEAM (TMIT) ASSESSES FREEDOM AS A HIGH RISK TO PASS THEIR SPECIAL TRIAL AND DOES NOT RECOMMEND THE SHIP PROCEED TO THEIR SCHEDULED SPECIAL TRIAL UNTIL THE SHIP COMPLETES A SATISFACTORY RE-DEMONSTRATION.

2. SENIOR INSPECTOR COMMENTS: USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) IS EVALUATED AS A "NO-GO" AND IS NOT RECOMMENDED TO PROCEED WITH THE SCHEDULED SPECIAL TRIAL (ST). FREEDOM'S CREW AND CONTRACTORS WERE NOT PREPARED FOR THE INSPECTION. BOTH ENTITIES WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CONDUCT OF INSURV MATERIAL CHECKS. EXECUTION OF THE SOE WAS VERY POOR. THERE WAS CONFUSION BETWEEN CONTRACTOR AND CREW RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT CHECKS. THE INSPECTION EXPERIENCE LEVEL FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE CREW IS LOW ALTHOUGH THEY DID DEMONSTRATE A GOOD POSITIVE ATTITUDE. THE CREW AND CONTRACTORS NEED TO CONTINUE TO FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE SHIP'S EQUIPMENT, OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, IMPROVE IN PRESENTATION/DEMONSTRATIONS AND AGGRESSIVELY MANAGE/COORDINATE SOE. THE SHIP WAS CLEAN. SEVERAL AREAS REQUIRE PRESERVATION. SAFETY PROGRAMS ABOARD THE SHIP ARE NON-EXISTENT. THE SHIP DID DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO SELF-ASSESS. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT AGGRESSIVELY REPORTING AND PURSUING RESOLUTION OF THE DEFICIENCIES THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED.

3. DEMONSTRATION RESULTS:

A. FULL POWER-RED
B. QUICK REVERSAL ASTERN-RED
C. QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD-RED
D. STEERING-GREEN
E. ANCHOR DROP-YELLOW
F. AFFF TEST-RED
G. SD DTE-YELLOW
H. LONG RANGE AIR SEARCH- GREEN
I. 57MM LIVE FIRE-GREEN

4. FUNCTIONAL AREA RESULTS:

A. AVIATION-RED
B. COMMUNICATIONS-RED
C. INFO SYSTEMS-GREEN
D. NAVIGATION-YELLOW
E. OPERATIONS-RED
F. WEAPONS-YELLOW
G. AUXILIARIES-RED
H. ELECTRICAL-RED
I. MAIN PROPULSION-RED
J. DAMAGE CONTROL-RED
K. DECK-RED
L. ENVIR PROTECTION-YELLOW
M. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH-RED
N. MEDICAL-YELLOW
O. VENTILATION-YELLOW
P. HABITABILITY-GREEN
Q. SUPPLY-YELLOW
R. ABILITY TO SELF-ASSESS-GREEN
S. 3M SPOTCHECKS-RED
T. ATIS DATABASE-NOT DEMONSTRATED//

ALT POM Early Decommission Plans

Here come the cuts. Details from AOL Defense reporter Carlo Munoz.

Washington: Just as the Navy is planning to take on a larger strategic role in regional hot spots around the world, the service is considering massive fleet reductions -- including a two-year delay on its new aircraft carrier -- as part of its upcoming budget plan.

The Navy may cut nine cruisers and three amphibious ships as part of its soon-to-be released budget blueprint covering the next five fiscal years, sources say.

The Navy plans to deactivate four cruisers from the fleet in fiscal year 2013, with another five cruisers coming out of the fleet the next year, according to a preliminary version of the spending plan. The three amphibious landing ships will be deactivated along with the five cruisers.

He goes on to note the potential early retirement of USS George Washington (CVN 73) and shifting of aircraft construction to 7 years instead of 5 years. Very smart folks I have spoken to have noted that a shift to 7 year construction cycles for big deck aircraft carriers will result in either paying up to 25% more for aircraft carriers than we would under 5 year cycles, or loss of that capacity in industry. When you extend the time out on any construction project, you raise costs. Clearly this an accountants idea spawned from an accountant, not one from an engineer.

Getting back to the cruisers and amphibious ships, I thought I'd offer some additional details.

The FY13 ships are:

USS Normandy (CG-60)
USS Anzio (CG-68)
USS Vicksburg (CG-69)
USS Cape St. George (CG-71)

The FY14 ships are:

USS Princeton (CG-59)
USS Cowpens (CG-63)
USS Gettysburg (CG-64)
USS Chosin (CG-65)
USS Hué City (CG-66)

USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41)
USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43)
USS Tortuga (LSD-46)

You might look at this news and think - well, these are just plans, so it's nothing to concern us right now. Wrong. These are part of alternative plans now, and that has maintenance ramifications.

Title 10: 2244a. Equipment scheduled for retirement or disposal: limitation on expenditures for modifications

(a) Prohibition.— Except as otherwise provided in this section, the Secretary of a military department may not carry out a modification of an aircraft, weapon, vessel, or other item of equipment that the Secretary plans to retire or otherwise dispose of within five years after the date on which the modification, if carried out, would be completed.

(b) Exceptions.—

(1) Exception for below-threshold modifications.— The prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a modification for which the cost is less than $100,000.

(2) Exception for transfer of reusable items of value.— The prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a modification in a case in which—

(A) the reusable items of value, as determined by the Secretary, installed on the item of equipment as part of such modification will, upon the retirement or disposal of the item to be modified, be removed from such item of equipment, refurbished, and installed on another item of equipment; and

(B) the cost of such modification (including the cost of the removal and refurbishment of reusable items of value under subparagraph (A)) is less than $1,000,000.

(3) Exception for safety modifications.— The prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a safety modification.

(c) Waiver Authority.— The Secretary concerned may waive the prohibition in subsection (a) in the case of any modification otherwise subject to that subsection if the Secretary determines that carrying out the modification is in the national security interest of the United States. Whenever the Secretary issues such a waiver, the Secretary shall notify the congressional defense committees in writing.

USS George Washington (CVN 73) will likely get a waiver. Somehow I doubt these other ships will, which means several COs will not be getting that maintenance for a few months, or may be retiring their ships early. The Navy will retire oldest first to keep new construction, which is how the US Navy has handled every force reduction in their history.

One more thought. I look at this list and notice a few things. First, BMD capable and ships capable of BMD upgrades are on this cruiser list. The list basically cuts the one non-BMD cruiser at Pearl; cuts half the number of cruisers everywhere but San Diego; and only cuts two at San Diego. Randomly. The first cruisers to get modernization are not on the list, but they are also not BMD capable (the Block 2 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, CG-52 through CG-58).

Just think it is interesting that of the 22 Cruisers, the Navy will keep the eight that cannot get BMD upgrades and only 5 Cruisers that can or already are BMD compatible. I don't see how this approach squares with the BMD requirement that is currently driving surface vessel construction plans.

Signs of Decline

This is what stretched thin looks like in practice.

When the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group headed to sea in August for the first of three planned exercises with Marines, it got underway with only two of its three ships.

The dock landing ship Pearl Harbor remained in San Diego while the amphibious transport dock New Orleans and amphibious assault ship Makin Island conducted “blue-green” training ahead of their deployment later this year.

Pearl Harbor is completing a scheduled-but-extended maintenance period at a San Diego shipyard, so its crew sat out the first set of training. When the ARG gets underway again later this month for its composite training unit exercise, Pearl Harbor won’t be joining them for that one, either, officials say.

That will be one fewer ship Marines and Navy commanders have for training to handle helicopters and vehicles, launch landing craft and support operations ashore.

But Navy officials are “cautiously optimistic” that Pearl Harbor will be ready to join the final training that ultimately deems the ARG and Marine expeditionary unit “ready” to deploy.

“We are not going to relax a single certification standard for the Pearl Harbor as they integrate into this ARG/MEU,” said Rear Adm. Gerard Hueber, commander of Expeditionary Strike Group 3.

I am curious if the continuing resolution process for FY11 earlier this year contributed to this delay. The fleet does not appear to have any margin for errors or delays anymore - whether from political process or an accident. When something happens that delays any single ship, due to the smaller fleet the cascading impacts always seem to always have broader impacts to schedules and training of other ships and crews.

The rest of the article does a good job discussing options and alternatives. It's worth reading to understand the depth of the issue.

More Clarity, or Added Confusion?

Am I missing something? Check out the second half of this Navy Times story and tell me what you think.

Aviation readiness isn’t tied exclusively to the budget, Navy officials said.

“A combination of factors, not just funding, impact readiness and capability, which we closely monitor. Gaps in maintenance funding have the potential to place more workload on the fleet to move equipment in order to manage readiness and cannibalization rates,” said Lt. Paul Macapagal, a Navy spokesman.

The capability rates the subcommittee evaluated are below goals, due in part to operations in several theaters at high op tempo, a changing emphasis from Iraq to Afghanistan that lengthened supply lines, as well as other factors, said Capt. Mike Kelly, the force materiel officer at Naval Air Forces.

Additionally, the data the subcommittee is using isn’t the best tool to assess full mission capability, Kelly said. For example, an electronic attack aircraft might be in a carrier hangar, in great shape, but isn’t equipped with a jamming pod. For every half-hour it sits without that pod it technically doesn’t count as “fully mission-capable,” he said.

It’s better to consider whether the aircraft is ready for a certain task, Kelly said.

“Do I have the aircraft? Do I have the mission sets? Do I have the required equipment? Do I have the required crew?” he asked. “We send each and every strike group with a complete set of assets. We’ve been solid doing that, and I can’t think of any shortages when we’re sending them to sea.”

Where did Rep Forbes get his information? From the Navy. That means the Navy is who says that an electronic attack aircraft in a carrier hangar without a jamming pod for over a half-hour doesn’t count as “fully mission-capable" even if the aircraft is otherwise just fine?

But if the jam pod is broken and that is why the electronic attack aircraft doesn't have a jammer, doesn't that mean the aircraft isn't fully mission capable, and suggests the aircraft would have to cannibalize a jammer off another aircraft in order to perform a mission?

Seems to me that if the Navy is measuring by that criteria, the Navy is measuring correctly. That would then beg the question why the data the subcommittee is using isn’t the best tool to assess full mission capability if indeed the data used by the subcommittee (and even in the example provided by Lt. Paul Macapagal) effectively assesses full mission capability?

The Navy is saying "but the aircraft isn't broken" while Forbes is saying "fix the jammer" before you pat yourself on the back. I get it things won't always work right, but when the target is 60% full mission capability and the Navy is only able to get 45% from the entire fleet, I'm thinking Forbes is making the right point.

I'm not sure if the new information adds more clarity or more confusion. Am I missing something?

Congressman Kissell Throws Three Strikes

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness hearing that focused on Navy Readiness on Tuesday is a gold mine of good information. Unfortunately, most of the real eyeopening information to those outside the bubble (like me) came from the Committee members, not the Navy. My impression was VADM Burke and VADM McCoy walked into a lions den of tough questions and came off looking unprepared, for example, the uncomfortable long pauses followed by very short answers to tough questions didn't project much confidence in the answers being given by the Navy. That is a body language analysis, but a fair one - I think. With that said, both Vice Admirals did remarkably well considering there is no question the questions being asked by Congress were really tough questions almost throughout.

What made this hearing better than most Congressional hearings is that Steve Palazzo of Mississippi was the only subcommittee member to ask parochial questions that really seemed out of place in the context of the hearing. Did you get your Northrop Grumman check for that series of questions Steve? If you didn't get paid, then keep in mind you sounded unprepared and out of place for free. Sorry dude... you have a long way to go if you want to fill Gene Taylor's shoes. Every one else in the hearing asked tough, probing questions to the topic on hand. People familiar with Congressional hearings will recognize just how rare it is for any House subcommittee hearing to be absent the parochial non-sense one usually finds in a Navy budget hearing.

The Navy is in a maintenance mess and everyone knows it. This was a tough hearing for the Navy, because nobody wants to go testify under oath about public, obvious problems that have difficult, long term solutions. For me, what is great about this hearing is that it provides plenty to write about - indeed I hope this will be the first of several posts because my time is limited and this hearing produced a cart load of low hanging fruit.

Lets kick it off with three important issues raised by Larry Kissell from North Carolina, who in my opinion really did some top quality work probing the Navy with these questions and getting the responding, revealing answers.

FORBES: Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Kissell.

KISSELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today. Admiral Burke, you said a couple times, "a limited supply of forces." What were you referring and -- in the big picture there and what does that affect?

BURKE: What I'm referring to when I say we have a limited supply is we only have 285 ships. And I'm - as a submariner, I'm most familiar with the submarine model, where COCOM demand is for about 16 or 18 sub SSNs at any one time. We deliver about 10 SSNs at any one time. So why do we only deliver 10? Because that's all we can afford to deliver. So...

KISSELL: When you were talking about limited supply of forces, you were talking about specifically ships, not personnel, not aircraft, not missiles or equipment for the ships? You were talking specifically for ships?

BURKE: I'm talking about ships as a representative of the entire Navy. So the same sort of thing happens with aircraft. But the aircraft in the Navy are typically on ships. So they're part of that process. So, in other words, we frequently get asked to deliver more carrier presence with the carrier and the aircraft than we can deliver.

KISSELL: So for every ship that we're short, then you're saying there's just a multiplied shortness there of everything that you could want or imagine or need with that ship, and that's what kind of - I was just curious more about, when you say, limited supply of forces, just, you know - so that's kind of a - for every ship, then, what comes with that ship, we're missing?

BURKE: Yes.

VADM Burke is hitting home the impact of a small fleet in high demand, the impacts at both the operational end and how that cascades in the cycles towards training and maintenance. The Navy struggles with these challenges, and Navy leaders do a good job juggling priorities in meeting COCOM demands while also meeting engineering and training requirements. It's a tough situation that leaves only tough decisions where something gets missed due to circumstances.

Fewer ships under higher demands equals higher tempo, and the administration appears to be ignoring the impacts of that equation to the Navy while Congress is struggling to deal with those impacts.

The key detail provided by VADM Burke is, I think, an important topic, and I'll likely repeat this revealing detail in future posts - "COCOM demand is for about 16 or 18 sub SSNs at any one time. We deliver about 10 SSNs at any one time."

WOW! Will the Navy please communicate challenges like this more often! Unfortunately, that probably won't happen. When this tidbit was discussed among folks in social media yesterday after the hearing, several very bright military savvy folks started asking the questions the Navy doesn't have a public answer for, like:

• "Why do COCOMs have such a high demand for submarines?"
• "What do submarines actually do that makes them this important?"
• "Could this be true? What do submarines do?"

As much as folks email me to answer these questions publicly, I won't - it's not my job to answer these questions; it is the Navy's job. All I will say is this... and encourage folks to think about it.

What would you do in the modern technological age with an invisible nuclear power source off a country where bad things are taking place? Here is another question... if you don't have a submarine to conduct operations, does that mean you have to fill that requirement gap with secret bases filled with spooks? Give it some thought.

The American people don't seem to understand that a smaller Navy offshore means more US presence on land inside other countries will be a required result to compensate for the lack of ships. The American people aren't alone in failing to see how this cause and effect activity takes place, because even think tank policy shops like the Center for American Progress are apparently unsophisticated enough in national security affairs analysis to figure out how lack of ships translates into other activities. Policy will be executed... one way or the other. That will never change without a massive overhaul of US foreign policy, and President Obama rejected the option to overhaul US foreign policy when his turn to make the choice came. It is a safe bet that future Presidents will maintain current policy as well. Frustrating..., but true.

KISSELL: OK. And Admiral McCoy, you mentioned a percentage of ships being deployed. And I know we had some charts here, and I probably - it's on there somewhere and I just missed it. But is there an optimum level that we operate against in saying this is the percentage that we would like to have deployed at any one time, in order to have the rest and retrofitting and everything else that we need going on at one time? Is there a percentage that we shoot for, or does it just kind of vary to tempo levels, or...

BURKE: Let me take that one.

KISSELL: OK.

BURKE: There are - first of all, there are about 12 percent of our forces forward deployed. In other words, it is home ported in Sasebo, Yokosuka, Japan or in Bahrain. So those forces are always forward, if you will. That number has essentially doubled over the last 10 years, effectively doubled, given the increase in forces forward and the decrease in overall forces. But 40 percent - so the 40 percent includes that. What we've done over the last several years is, by increasing those that are forward deployed, we have taken those that are rotationally deployed - those that deploy from Norfolk and Groton and San Diego and Hawaii go other places. We've taken that number and kept it the same, even though the force size is dropping. So where we are today is we're not at a sustainable level. Forty percent is not sustainable in the long term.

KISSELL: Is there a percentage that would be, you know, all things being equal, more sustainable?

BURKE: Well, in the submarine force, that number is about 22 percent.

KISSELL: OK.

BURKE: So 22 percent are forward at any one time.

This is a very interesting answer, and represents the kind of 'process model' answer the Navy isn't very accustomed to giving as an answer under oath. I'm curious if VADM Burke knowingly let slip this answer, because he may regret being bluntly honest (the Navy doesn't reward revealing their thought processes to Congress). Basically VADM Burke is admitting that as the Navy shrinks, more ships will have to be forward based in order to meet the deployment requirements. This is an even more curious issue because the Navy has already announced they intend to forward base several Littoral Combat Ships. The answer by VADM Burke raises a serious question just how far away the 284 ship Navy of today actually is from being able to meet the COCOM demand for naval forces?

The LCS program with it's dual crew model, modular engineering, and massive offshore maintenance infrastructure requirement is supposed to offer the Navy more deployment time than the ships the LCS replaces. So more deployment time + more forward based Littoral Combat Ships means the Navy is hoping to leverage the LCS as a way of meeting the COCOM demand that is currently being unmet with a 284 ship fleet. The real problem here though is that the argument VADM Burke is making makes it sound like even 313 or 324 ships wouldn't come close to being enough to meet the COCOM demands either, and that demand is being driven by US foreign policy.

I honestly don't know how Congress can read VADM Burke's answer and come to the conclusion that 313 or 324 ships is a legitimate number of ships to meet COCOM requirements when so many of the ships in that plan yet to be built (LCS) don't exist yet and are attempting to meet forward deployment requirements well above existing capacity for forward presence. From my perspective, COCOM demand seems to be suggesting the Navy has a quantity problem, while the Navy is busy focusing force structure on developing quality solutions which ultimately reduces the quantity of available ships to the COCOMs.

The way I read this answer, the Navy has a square peg (COCOM requirement), round hole (Navy Force Structure plans) problem that VADM Burke's comments contribute more skepticism towards.

KISSELL: And one other question, Admiral Burke, you talked about that, with aircraft, that there's a certain number of hours you get to fly them. And with the delayed delivering of the F-35 and the more hours that we're flying on the wings we have now, where are we heading to? Are we heading towards to the point we don't have the aircraft that we need? And how soon might we be there or the consequences - what do you foresee there?

BURKE: The delay and the arrival of the F-35 is a challenge for us. It will add hours on those other aircraft that we call legacy aircraft. It will add hours to them. And those hours are costly, particularly at the end of the aircraft's life.

KISSELL: And how many more hours do you think we have there? When are we going to reach the point where those lines start coming too close to each other?

BURKE: Well, we're addressing that now. We have a surface life assessment program and a service life extension program for our F-18s. And we're in the middle of actually assessing and extending some of those aircraft. So they're built as a 6,000-hour aircraft. And we're doing the engineering analysis. And we think we can get them to 8,000. And then there's additional analysis that's going on, to try to get longer life out of them. But there's only so far you can go.

The other thing we're trying to do in that regard is to add simulation time. So if we can simulate our hour as one cheap - if we can make if effective, we can reduce the hours on the actual airplane.

KISSELL: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask the admiral to give some more information on that and to kind of project where these lines may be going, because if we don't get the F-35 in and we can't get there, you know, how soon is that crisis point coming?

BURKE: I'd be happy to do that.

KISSELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FORBES: Thank you, Larry.

Everything about the Joint Strike Fighter stinks. Everything. It is time for Congress to start asking if a larger quantity of enhanced F-18E/Fs is a better value than the cost nightmare quality of the F-35C. I still support the F-35B - it is past time to replace the AV-8s, but someone explain to me how an aircraft carrier with 2 squadrons of F-35Cs and 2 squadrons of F-18E/Fs is better than an aircraft carrier with five 12-plane squadrons of F-18E/Fs supported by 2 squadrons of EA-18Gs. With 70 F-18 E/F/Gs, would the Navy save more money in procurement, maintenance, training, support, etc (every category) than they will by adding the F-35C into the mix? I think the numbers would be very close.

When quantity is less expensive than quality, something doesn't add up. If the X-47 can support the carrier based refueling role, then I no longer see the value of the F-35C on an aircraft carrier. JSF is the modern A-12, only no one will admit it. I still say the Navy would be better off modifying a version of the F-22 for naval operations to fill the intercept role than chasing the F-35C any longer - and even that radical idea could potentially be less expensive if the Navy is willing to accept 10-15% less capability in the navalized version of the F-22.

Regardless, the F-35C is a serious challenge and I just don't know how the platform fits the Navy anymore, particularly if it continues to get more and more expensive making the actual aircraft carrier expected to carry the JSF no longer affordable for the Navy.

Austal's LCS Corrosion Problem

It started when Bloomberg reported the Navy had discovered “aggressive” corrosion on the USS Independence (LCS 2). There weren't many details in the original report, so I initially chalked this up to part of the learning curve both the Navy and Austal will suffer through with a new ship type built completely of aluminum. The story became more interesting to me as an observer when I saw the way Austal Chief executive Andrew Bellamy responded to the news.

Chief executive Andrew Bellamy said any corrosion on the vessel, known as a ''littoral combat ship'' for its ability to hug the shore, would be the fault of the operator or maintainer.

''We have built 230 vessels of this type that have not suffered from this type of problem … where the operator and the maintainer of the ship have followed the procedures in a thorough way,'' Mr Bellamy said. ''I suspect there is a problem in the area of operational maintenance if there is a galvanic corrosion issue.''

The rust claim comes weeks after the Perth-based Austal said it would sharpen its focus on the defence sector amid weakening demand for commercial boats.

Blame the Navy for poor maintenance because Austals first big warship runs into a problem none of their simple commercial ferry designs ever had? That seems like a really poor way to respond to problems encountered. My impression at the time this article was released is that the Navy was dealing with a rust problem, so to me this article was nothing more than a good laugh at the hubris of Austal.

But it turns out this isn't a simple rust problem, which was my mistake in following this story. Check out this remarkable press statement sales pitch by Austal.

Galvanic corrosion is an issue that has challenged U.S. warships since 1844, when the USS Michigan, the first iron-hulled Navy ship, entered service. Today, two common and robust solutions, impressed current cathodic protection systems and the use of strategically-placed sacrificial anodes, are in wide use throughout the world, particularly in ships where two different metals such as steel and aluminum are utilised in the one vessel.

As a specialist in aluminum shipbuilding, having built over 220 aluminum vessels for defence forces and commercial clients around the world since its formation in 1988, Austal is intimately familiar with the management of galvanic corrosion. An electrochemical process, galvanic corrosion occurs when two dissimilar metals, after being in electrical contact with one another, corrode at different rates.

According to company records, galvanic corrosion has not been a factor on any Austal built and fully maintained vessel, and our technical experts are eager to support any request to identify root causes of any corrosion issue in any aluminum naval vessel in service today. The Westpac Express, an Austal-built and fully maintained high-speed catamaran, has shuttled U.S. Marines throughout the Pacific Basin continuously for ten years, with a 99.7% availability over that period.

As Prime Contractor for Jackson, the third Independence-variant Littoral Combat Ship (LCS-6), Austal has a well-developed methodology for the management of galvanic corrosion, which it has deployed globally on behalf of its defense and commercial clients. If selected to provide post-delivery support for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Class Services program, it is a straight forward process for Austal engineers to regularly conduct systematic reviews of the electrical grounding throughout each Austal-built vessel to detect and eliminate stray currents that might cause electrolysis between the stainless steel impeller housing and of the adjacent aluminum structure.

An integral part of any post-delivery support program for a high-performance, high-speed vessel such as the Independence-variant LCS is to provide a cadre of qualified maintainers who can help our Navy partners to deploy temporary sacrificial anodes every time the vessel is moored, and ensure that high-voltage maintenance equipment is properly grounded before use aboard ship. These are services that Austal’s skilled aluminum specialists, operating from six maintenance hubs in the Asia-Pacific, North America, South America, Europe and the Middle East, offer Austal customers every day.

With almost 2,200 current employees at Austal’s USA shipyard, with a future workforce planned of over 4,000, each and every Austal employee is committed to making the Littoral Combat Ship a success. Awarded a ten-ship contract in December 2010, Austal has eagerly assumed the role of Prime Contractor for the Independence-variant Littoral Combat Ships awarded under the 10 ship block buy contract, and, as a Prime Contractor for those 10 ships, Austal will always stand by its products and our Navy partners.

It turns out this is not rust, rather an electrolysis issue between the stainless steel waterjet parts and the aluminum hulls, and when the Navy calls an electrolysis problem “aggressive corrosion" that suggests to me the metal is completely gone - not rusted. In the case of LCS-2, the problem was apparently accelerated by stray currents in the hull from the electrical distribution system problems the ship has been having since it was turned over to the Navy. Normally an electrolysis problem would be prevented by the use of a Cathodic Protection System (CPS), but wouldn't you know it - USS Independence (LCS 2) doesn't have a CPS.

LCS-4 doesn't have one either, but apparently CPS is part of the lessons learned process and was included in the fixed-price contracts for Austal versions of the LCS beginning with LCS-6. LCS-2 will have the CPS installed at the next drydock period, while Austal has said a CPS will be added to LCS-4 before the ship is turned over to the Navy.

The question everyone seems to be asking is whether the JHSV could suffer the same issue. With all due respect to the Austal press statement, vessels built for Navy purposes have a great deal more technology potentially running electrical currents through the ships than commercial ferry's do, and Austal isn't exactly a world wide expert on building frigate sized navy ships. The stray currents in USS Independence (LCS 2) could easily reoccur in the JHSV creating similar problems if prevention isn't built into the design. The Westpac Express is a commercial design and the charter did not significantly add technology nor were changes made to Westpac Express that runs electrical power throughout the ferry, so Austal is making an apples to oranges comparison suggesting their immune from criticism because their simple commercial vessels don't have this problem.

I've heard from a few unofficial but relatively informed folks the JHSV does not have a cathodic protection system, and if that turns out to be true we could see the Navy move to address that issue before JHSV-1 conducts sea trials later this year. I'd be curious to know if Westpac Express has a CPS installed, or some other form of prevention is used at all.

I tend to think of this problem as the first public problem that is part of a steep learning curve process both the Navy and Austal were bound to run into with the Austal version of the Littoral Combat Ships, indeed I suspect there will be other public problems revealed over time that will require relatively simple, albeit costly, solutions. Is this a big deal? Hard to tell, but given both the problem and solution is well understood, in the context of unknowns yet to be discovered with LCS - to me this isn't really that big of a deal as long as the long term solutions effectively work as intended.

Something Clearly Went Wrong With USS Philippine Sea

U.S Code Title X, 7304 requires a Board of Naval Officers to conduct a Material Inspection of all naval ships at least once every three years, if practicable.

SECNAVINST 5040.3, Department of The Navy Inspection Program (DONIP) and OPNAVINST 4730.5(series) Trials and Material Inspections of Ships provides additional directions and responsibilities to the President, Board of Inspection and Survey (PRESINSURV).

Instructions and procedures established by PRESINSURV for conducting inspections, surveys and trials are found in the following instructions; a)INSURVINST 4730.1, Material Inspections of Surface Ships, b) INSURVINST 4730.2, Material Inspections of Submarines, c) INSURVINST 4730.3, Trials of Surface Ships.

Lets talk about this news report.

Two East Coast-based ships — a cruiser and a frigate — registered unsatisfactory grades following early-December material readiness assessments by the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey, Fleet Forces Command has confirmed.

The grades were the worst of 41 ships assessed by the INSURV so far in 2010.

The Mayport, Fla.-based cruiser Philippine Sea “demonstrated challenges” in the areas of main propulsion, environmental protection, electrical, weapons, ventilation and aviation, according to Lt. Cmdr. Mike Kafka, a Fleet Forces Command spokesman. The Norfolk-based frigate Nicholas, he said, was similarly “challenged” in the areas of main propulsion, environmental protection, combat systems and aviation.

The first instinct lately with INSURVs has been to focus in on the ships leadership and crew, but I'll let the Navy handle that aspect. What I want to look at is some history.

USS Nicholas (FFG 47)

I do not know when the last INSURV was for USS Nicholas (FFG 47), but I am going to assume that it was sometime between August 18th, 2008 when the ship returned from a six month patrol in the 6th Fleet and December 2009 when the ship deployed to participate in Africa Partnership Station (APS) in support of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). The ship was commissioned on March 10, 2024 and is now 26.8 years old. The public record suggests the ship hasn't been doing much since returning from that deployment on June 3, 2010.

I see a very old ship that never underwent modernization among a class of ships that was stripped of weapons long ago that has undergone a lifetime of command and crew changes that just spent 6 months in one of the few places on the planet parts are virtually impossible to come by and the result doesn't surprise me any. In all likelihood the CO saw this coming months ago, alerted the Navy, and the crew has done what it could with what little it had - while probably also being looted for IA and any number of other training or assignment tasks - and ultimately the ship didn't pass INSURV. Even without knowing the details, there is very little about this case that I find out of the ordinary or unexpected - indeed it would have been heroic had the ship passed INSURV based on what public information is available.

USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)

The USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) has a much different history than USS Nicholas (FFG 47), and if we examine the results of a bad INSURV in the context of public information - someone needs to be asking questions. On September 29, 2024 USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) participated in an Expeditionary Strike Group Integration exercise (ESGINT), with the USS Nassau (LHA 4) ESG, in preparation for a deployment in 2008. On December 15, 2024 USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) successfully completed a 17-day Composite Unit Training Exercise (COMPTUEX).

USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) returned from a five month deployment on July 10, 2008, and wasn't heard from in the news again until USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) became the school ship for Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) in January 31, 2009.

On March 10, 2024 USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), along with USS Anzio (CG 68) and USS Porter (DDG 78), was conducting Fleet Irregular Warfare Training in the vicinity of the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) and in the Jacksonville Operating Areas according to news reports. On April 23, 2024 the Philippine Sea performed an airborne medical evacuation of a 70-year old passenger aboard the cruise ship Motor Vessel Braemar, while underway in the Atlantic Ocean. The guided-missile cruiser was en route to Plymouth, United Kingdom, to participate in a multinational NATO exercise Joint Warrior at the time. USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) spent all of May at sea in Europe returning to Virginia by June 1. Then this happened.

PSE arrived at Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, VA on June 1st and commenced a weapons offload. On the 2nd, ATG inspectors arrived, inbriefed the 3M Certification, and began the inspection the very next day. After completing the certification with Mayport Basin record-breaking scores, Phil Sea returned to homeport and entered her 10-month availability on the 8th. This availability encompassed what is known as Cruiser Modernization fleet-wide. USS Philippine Sea would soon become the 2nd cruiser in the fleet to complete Cruiser Modernization, the 1st on the east coast. The month was filled with crew move ashore, defueling, planning and coordination meetings, and finally entering Atlantic Marine Drydock on the 24th.

Captain Herbert M. Hadley took over command of the ship on November 19, 2024 according to the ships own history. Cruiser Modernization completed in February 17, 2024 when the ship returned to sea. In May 2010 the ship participated in New York City Fleet Week and as recently as October 22, 2024 the ship was reportedly conducting training operations with the George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) Carrier Strike Group in preparation of a deployment next year.

Something Clearly Went Wrong

Someone explain to me what just happened. USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) is 21.9 years old and just underwent cruiser modernization, which includes "smartship" and all electric modifications to the ship. The ship was in the yard from June 1st, 2009 until getting back to sea on February 17, 2024 and by December - 10 months after cruiser modernization - the ship fails INSURV? How can a ship be 10 months out of cruiser modernization and INSURV reports the ship “demonstrated challenges” in the areas of main propulsion, environmental protection, electrical, weapons, ventilation and aviation? Doesn't "smartship" reduce the crew size, extra hands that would have been nice during maintenance prior to INSURV?

From 1868-2009 INSURV reports were unclassified information. It is unclear why INSURV reports are classified, because the only thing one can learn from an INSURV report is that a ship isn't in good condition at some point in time. Clearly the enemy is unaware that ships can potentially wear down.

Because INSURVs are classified, we have no idea what went wrong with USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), but something clearly did. When a ship is only 10 months out of the yard following the ships single most important, and expensive modernization availability period and fails an INSURV, something is clearly not right. Inspections of Navy ships are required by law, and here is a great example where an INSURV report being classified conceals the material condition of USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), among the three CGs to be modernized, from Congress.

Did the Navy just flush millions in taxpayer money down the toilet with the modernization of USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)? How can we spend multiple millions on upgrades but fail to spend the multiple thousands necessary for upkeep? Sorry Congressman, unless you ask the question yourself while the Navy is under oath, you may never get the answer.

Here is another question the new Congress should think about - did the delay in the FY2011 defense budget impact maintenance funding for these ships? As a taxpayer and a voter, I think Americans should know that answer because warships are incredibly expensive, and shouldn't be allowed to fall into poor condition because money isn't available (when it could be made available in a CR) during a maintenance period due to political obstacles in passing a budget on time.

The July 28 House Hearing

The House Armed Services Committee hearing back on July 28th was quite interesting - at least to nerds like me. If you haven't seen it, the webcast is available on the HASC website. The hearing on surface fleet readiness was prompted by the Balisle Report.

I've had about 5 weeks to think about the Balisle Report, and the only thing I know for sure 5 weeks later is that I have more questions now than I did after I read the report. I find it interesting that ADM Harvey was who pushed for the independent review with ADM Willard, and then had retired VADM Balisle lead the Fleet Review Panel.

What is interesting to me is that the report is ultimately critical regarding many failures of leadership over a span of nearly 2 decades until today - which if you think about it, means that ADM Harvey had VADM Balisle (ret) lead a team to issue a report that was critical of the job performance of VADM Balisle (ret) and ADM Harvey - because among many others, those two are among the leaders responsible during the period where problems occurred.

Was the ultimate purpose of the report to clarify and justify changes to fleet readiness that ADM Harvey knew needed to be made? Was the intended function of the report to ultimately help produce the evidence necessary to make those changes? The answer is probably - YES, which is noteworthy because it highlights the level of effort necessary (efforts which includes producing a report that intentionally casts doubt on ones own ability to properly do a job) just to properly fund an obviously broken maintenance system in the Navy today.

When was the last time a 4 star in our military pushed for an independent report that was directly critical of the job performance of the 4 star who pushed for the report? Just a small detail, but since the report basically calls into question the job performance of those who have served as head of Fleet Forces Command - what was the CNOs last job before he became CNO? I understand he wasn't there but for a few months, but at what point do the excuses end and does taking ownership of problems begin? The Balisle Report doesn't really build confidence in the Navy when you think about who those leaders were who dropping the ball. Just saying...

Ownership though is what distinguished ADM Harvey in the hearing - because he took ownership of the problem. When you account for the style of ADM Harvey - which I have noted over the last few years is one of a leader who leads from the front - the final result of the hearing is that ADM Harvey spent July 28th throwing his name in the hat for the next CNO. It is never too early - because the big change is only 13 months away. ADM Harvey made a really good impression with the HASC - something I think is clearly obvious in the webcast.

Something else I found really interesting about the hearing is how no actual specific information was revealed in discussion regarding what the Navy is specifically doing to solve the fleet readiness problems. Don't get me wrong - there is clearly work being done - but no details of that work was mentioned. Part of me sees this as a problem - because whatever the Navy is going to do about the conclusions of the Balisle Report, they certainly didn't tell anyone what that would be. However, another part of me noted a sharp change in the way VADM Burke, VADM McCoy, and ADM Harvey talked about the manpower, training, and maintenance topics surrounding surface fleet readiness...

They spoke with an authority of being results oriented. It is the distinguishing difference between the usual generic speak of Navy leaders giving Congressional testimony and the tone established during this hearing. The blunt speak - despite being absent detailed substance - was different and exceeded my own expectations of the hearing. I'm used to Navy leadership saying nothing in long hearings, but I'm not used to hearing Navy leaders talk about accomplishing goals (at least in a believable way). Seriously - go watch more hearings if you dispute that very fair and accurate characterization of Navy leaders testifying in front of Congress.

In all - including about an hour and a half of testimony - we only learn one specific change taking place regarding the fleet readiness issue. Buried, and I mean six feet deep within the submitted written statement (PDF) and never once mentioned during the hearing itself is this not so trivial organizational change:

Clear lines of authority and accountability for ship man, train, equip and maintain issues. Specific corrective actions include establishing clear and unambiguous Type Commander accountability for ship man, train, equip and maintain issues and standing down CLASSRONs and transfering manpower/functions to a "Readiness ISIC", Afloat Training Group and Type Commander as appropriate.

Wait... what!?! So let me get this straight... For no obvious or stated reason, the Navy is going to stand down CLASSRONS - even though we have spent over half the 21st century to date standing them up? Yep... and that was basically the only specific detail of change learned from the entire hearing.

I guess I'm the only person who read this fairly major organizational change in the report and thought to myself such a change certainly deserves a bit of explanation, but it would appear nobody in the House Armed Services Committee caught this rather enormous rearrangement of the deck chairs. The hearing spends a great deal of time discussing the Littoral Combat Ship - but in paragraph 1 on page 4/4 of the written statement - LCSRON just got tossed overboard with the trash.

WTF?