Innovation, the Marine Corps, and Seventy Years of Vertical Envelopment

If you read this blog, then you probably have more than a passing interest in all things navy. Because of that interest, you have probably received a large dose of innovation articles in your social media feeds over the past year or so.  Frankly, I see the fascination with innovation as another passing management fad, which in a few more years will be overtaken by the next MBA-buzzword onto which we military professionals tend to glom.  That’s not to say military innovation in and of itself is trendy; of course it’s timeless, but the term has become so over-used in DoD circles lately as to be virtually meaningless.

One of the things that makes my eyes glaze over in the military innovation infatuation is desire to emulate Silicon Valley. Certainly modern civilization owes much to young entrepreneurs who have given us smart phones, social media, and instantaneous global communications. These technologies went from ideas to widespread consumer acceptance very rapidly.  However, innovative thinking and action in the U.S. military predates innovation in the Valley by a long shot. The one organization that has proven time and time again that they not only produce innovative ideas, but can translate them into executable combat operations is the United States Marine Corps.

USMC HO3S-1 departs with wounded Marine Korea 1951

B.J. Armstrong recently penned an article on exactly that subject:

"If military organizations don't fit the Silicon Valley mold for innovation, how did the Marine Corps accomplish such a wholesale and revolutionary innovation?"

To illustrate how the Marines broke out of their amphibious frontal assault mindset that made them famous in World War II, B.J. writes (and speaks, if you prefer video) about some forward thinkers in the Post-War Marine Corps who revolutionized maneuver warfare with the help of a new technology, namely helicopters.  These concepts were quickly proven in action during the Korean War and subsequent operations.

"The development of rotary-wing doctrine by the Marine Corps demonstrates that we need much more than the rebel innovator with the good idea. We need senior officers who are quick to recognize a problem and are willing to take action, despite the risks involved. We need senior officers who understand that if you aren’t innovating, you aren’t improving, and if you aren’t improving, you’re falling behind the enemy. Change is good."

Please allow me to interrupt this post with a shameless plug:

Wearing another hat, I am part of an organization called the Center For International Maritime Security. In keeping with the theme of smart ideas at a young age, we want to encourage students early-on to think about the importance of Seapower to global trade and national security.  To further this goal, we're sponsoring a Maritime Security Essay Scholarship contest.  So get those bored high schoolers on winter break off the couch and in front of your laptop to writing and maybe they'll even win some money!  

Fast forward seven decades later: Although helicopter technology is much improved, the the concept of vertical envelopment (or rotary wing air assault, if you prefer), has been largely unchanged since Korea.  Essentially, vertical envelopment involves seizing objectives on the flanks or rear of an enemy using helicopters, or other airborne assault methods, such as parachute troops.   Granted, helicopters provide modern militaries much more than just vertical envelopment, including revolutionized logistics, search and rescue, and scouting, to name just a few missions.  But their importance to maneuver warfare has been proven in practically every war since those early days of Korea.

Recently though, a new capability has begun to disrupt our traditional notions of vertical envelopment and rotary wing operations. The V-22, despite its troubled development history and opinions of continued naysayers, is radically changing the way the Marine Corps deploys and fights. Able to self-deploy over strategically significant distances, the Osprey's primary strengths are its range and speed.

A Liberian soldier and a United States Marine take cover as a V-22 Osprey
buzzes overhead in Tubmanburg, north of Monrovia. CreditJohn Moore/Getty Images

The Marines'  MV-22 operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were largely similar to those of other helicopters in their inventory.  But for post-COIN operations, the Osprey has opened a range of new operational possibilities.

The 2012 attack on the Benghazi consulate was a wake-up call to the U.S. military on a number of levels.  In previous decades, such a non-combatant evacuation operation would have likely been handled by a nearby offshore amphibious readiness group loaded with Marines and their helicopters.  But today, the U.S. Navy simply doesn't have the amphibious force structure to forward deploy ships to the right places in order to quickly respond to such contingencies.  Enter the Special Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response.  Two SPMAGTFs, each scalable up to a battalion of Marines and Sailors, were stood up in 2013 to provide a self-sustaining rapidly mobile "balanced, expeditionary force with built-in command, ground, aviation and logistics elements and organized, trained and equipped to accomplish a specific mission."  One force, based in Spain, was established to respond to crises in Africa, while the other is intended to support contingency operations in the Middle East.  The MV-22 provides the critical enabler to both SPMAGTFs' agility and mobility.

Earlier this year, eight MV-22s and 200 Marines from the SPMAGTF-CR quietly supported the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy staff in Tripoli, Libya. Then in the fall, a company of Marines self-deployed 1,500 nautical miles with MV-22s (refueled by KC-130Js) to Dakar, Senegal to assist in the Ebola outbreak response.  Some may argue that these ground-based deployments are pulling Marines away from their amphibious roots. Perhaps, but the MV-22 is really facilitating the Marine Corps' continued supremacy as the world's most expeditionary fighting force. 

The Marines aren't the only organization changing the way they fight because of the Osprey.  Nearly a year ago, while most Americans were finishing up their Christmas shopping, another group of military innovators from the Air Force Special Operations Command put the Osprey to its ultimate test.  On the morning of December 21, 2013, three CV-22s took off from Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti loaded with a platoon of Navy SEALs to evacuate a group of stranded U.S. citizens from civil war-torn South Sudan.  Over 750 nautical miles later, while on final approach to the United Nations airfield at Bor, the aircraft were engaged with heavy ground fire from nearby rebel forces. The three aircraft, although badly shot up and leaking fuel, took turns sucking gas from the waiting MC-130 tankers while they quickly flew another 375 nautical miles to get four seriously wounded special operators to Entebbe, Uganda for transfer to a waiting C-17 and further medical evacuation to Kenya.  Through their skill and valor, the AFSOC pilots narrowly averted a major disaster and were awarded the prestigious MacKay Trophy. The point of this story is that a special operations vertical infiltration this long could not have even been conceived without the capability provided by the CV-22.   (By comparison, another ill-fated operation in 1979 to rescue the Iranian hostages involved a 600 mile RH-53 flight from USS Nimitz to the Desert One forward refueling point. Ironically, Operation Eagle Claw became the impetus for the U.S. military's acquisition of the V-22, among other initiatives).

The Osprey is certainly not without its weaknesses, including a limited cargo capacity compared to its predecessors and a lack of ballistic protection in the passenger compartment as demonstrated above.  But some of these weaknesses are being addressed, and the aircraft continues to evolve with the addition of new avionics, armor, and forward firing missiles.

Simply put, the Osprey has allowed Marine Corps to continue its tradition of warfighting innovation and maintain their lead as the expeditionary service of choice for America's Geographic Combatant Commanders.  But as always, people are more important to innovation than hardware. Be it Colonel Edward Dyer in the 1940s or today's Marine Corps and AFSOC Osprey pilots, military innovators turn ideas and new technology into operationally-relevant capabilities.  And today as it was then, without top-cover from senior leadership, good ideas tend to fizzle out.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.  

The Cost of an Army Path in the Pacific

PACIFIC OCEAN ( Dec 9, 2024) Sailors aboard the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70) direct an Army OH-58 Kiowa Warrior helicopter from the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (25th CAB) off the coast of Hawaii during joint training operations. The 25th CAB is expected to participate similarly in other training exercises in 2014. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist John M. Hageman/Released)

The following contribution is submitted by Major David Andersen, US Marine Corps.

Recently, Rajiv Chandrasekaran discussed the Army’s efforts to become more expeditionary and maritime capable.  Yet, as Mr. Chandrasekaran points out; the United States already has a maritime expeditionary force: the Marine Corps. 
   
In business, new initiatives are challenged by various barriers such as cost, equipment design, licensing, and market saturation. If a hardware store wants to expand its business, it’s unlikely to diversify into car tune-ups. Just because a handyman can turn a wrench doesn’t mean he can drop an engine.  However similar the Army and Marine Corps may appear to the untrained eye, the same may be said regarding amphibious operations. While the Army did amphibious landings quite well in World War II, they involved a short time at sea as a preamble to the sustained operations ashore that armies are designed for. Today’s amphibious operations are more diverse and require a force designed, trained and equipped to operate at and from the sea over extended periods—as Marines are.
 
The Army’s current barriers include:

Cost: Army equipment is not “marinized;” a process where everything from engine intake systems to the metals and paints used are designed to withstand high levels of salt water so that corrosion can be minimized and service life extended. This is why several Army aircraft were scrapped after Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, as Mr. Chandrasekaran pointed out. The Army subsequently explored the price of marinization and concluded it was cost-prohibitive.

Equipment design: The majority of Army helicopters have neither rotor brakes nor folding blades and tail booms. These features are unnecessary for land-based operations but essential for safety, shipboard stowage, and operational tempo reasons in sea-based operations. Without brakes rotor blades continue spinning for extended periods of time, gradually drooping as they slow and endangering crews and equipment on a pitching flight deck.  Without folding components most Army helicopters take up an inordinate amount of precious deck space on an amphibious ship. A few do have manually folding blades to permit occasional embarkation in C-17 transport planes, rather than the faster and less manpower intensive automated type found in Marine aircraft.  As a result, in the time it takes to tow, spread, spot and start a single Army H-60, a typical Marine squadron can launch two full waves of six aircraft.
  
Licensing: Most of the Army’s aviation weapons systems are not certified for shipboard use or storage. Why does that matter?  Because the many emitters aboard the ship could make them launch, fire, or detonate prematurely.  Sure, the ship could turn off those emitters, but then it can’t see or communicate with other ships, or identify threats, making operations in hostile or congested waters unsafe.

Market saturation:  Plenty of global business exists for expeditionary crisis response forces, so the market is not saturated.  What is in short supply, however, is the number of Navy ships capable of projecting forces in “ready to fight” condition. Amphibious ships, specifically designed for that purpose, are obviously the preferred platforms. Unfortunately, the Navy does not have enough amphibious ships to lift the force specifically designed to operate from them: the Marine Corps. While aircraft carriers may appear a viable alternative, the Navy’s inventory is smaller today than it was during Operation Uphold Democracy, meaning that the ability to replicate that model without disrupting existing deployment and maintenance cycles is problematic and likely to occur only in the event of a dire national emergency. What about the USS Lake Erie as cited in the article? She had space because she was at home. When a cruiser, destroyer or frigate, deploys, she does so with a detachment of Navy helicopters designed for sea going missions, like anti-submarine warfare. So, while the market is not saturated, the current budget environment and underfunding of the fleet means the shortage is not sea-based expeditionary forces, but the ships from which they operate.

So, why go to the hardware store to change your muffler?

Rather than trying to diversify its business, what if the hardware store found another means to deliver its existing products? The Army and Marine Corps have experimented with high speed logistics vessels since 1999. The Westpac Express, leased from Austal Marine, has internally transported Marines, aircraft and vehicles throughout the Pacific theater.  The Army conducted similar operations aboard TSV-1X Spearhead.  With these logistics ships, aircraft and other equipment can be carried internally, requiring no special equipment or training. While they are not capable of conducting sea-based operations, they provide a means to project forces via austere port facilities. Upon arrival, vehicles are driven off and stowed aircraft are craned off and reassembled for operations. These ships and others like them are available for contract for a fraction the cost of marinizing Army capabilities, allowing the Army to improve their expeditionary responsiveness without attempting to become a second Marine Corps.



Maj Andersen is a Marine Corps AH-1W Super Cobra pilot who has conducted three Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployments, twice as a pilot where he served in the squadron Maintenance Department (OIC of the Airframes and Quality Assurance Divisions) and once as the MEU Air Officer where he was responsible for all MEU aviation operations. During these deployments he conducted extended amphibious operations into Iraq, Kuwait, the Horn of Africa, Bangladesh and the United Arab Emirates. In Bangladesh he was responsible for all MEU aviation operations in support of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations for Operation Sea Angel II following Typhoon Sidr. Maj Andersen also participated in one of the first deployments which utilized the Westpac Express during which his squadron deployed a detachment of 4 AH-1W and 3 UH-1N helicopters as well as required support equipment aboard the vessel, along with additional ground combat equipment, to support exercises in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the Republic of the Philippines and Thailand. Maj Andersen has also completed combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Makin Island Deployment - Another Reminder the US Needs More Amphibs

The Makin Island ARG consisting the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8), the amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18), and amphibious dock landing ship USS Pear Harbor (LSD 52) departed San Diego with Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) 5 and the 11th MEU on Tuesday. The deployment has generate a bit of news in the media with articles at DoDBuzz, Marine Times, the San Diego Union Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times. Of the various articles, the Los Angeles Times has this right - pirates should be concerned.

While ARG deployments in the Pacific are old hat for the Navy and Marine Corps, it is becoming increasingly rare to see an ARG deployed from either coast to spend any significant amount of time anywhere other than operating under CENTCOM command in the 5th fleet. I have heard many suggestions that the Makin Island ARG has been working overtime during deployment preparations training for activities specific to activities one might find around Somalia and Yemen - like piracy. If I was a pirate warlord, my advice is to take the best deal you can for ransom as soon as possible, and start looking for a new job with less associated risk.

All I'm saying is that I have noticed the US is giving the Horn of Africa a lot of attention lately, and if we are ever going to see a shift in US policy towards piracy, that policy change will arrive in the form of an ARG that added extra training specific to the piracy issue - and a new ARG just deployed to that region following rumors of intense anti-piracy training.

But while we are talking about Amphibious Ready Groups and CENTCOM, I want to point out that Makin Island hasn't done anything yet, and the real amphibious ready group story is the unfolding record breaking deployment of the Bataan ARG. If you recall, as a response to unfolding events in Libya, the Bataan ARG deployed a few weeks early on March 23, 2024 - 207 days ago (nearly 8 months ago). Lets just say she isn't coming home for Christmas, and if she isn't home by Valentines Day (a legitimate possibility) - the ships will break all records for deployment length since World War II.

Tipping Point much?

Seriously, keeping up with folks on LHD5 has been one of my most enjoyable blog related activities in 2011, and while that deployment has been very challenging for the families, I will pass on that the morale on The 5 is still very high. There are some special folks on those ships, and it's a good thing too because a deployment that will exceed 10 months like that Bataan ARG requires nothing less to be successful.

For the record, Bataan ARG represents a visible data point regarding the need for more amphibious ships. When amphibious ship deployments start breaking modern deployment length records - which WILL happen with Bataan - that means the Navy has not built enough amphibious ships. Politicians in Washington have held many hearings on the topic of dwell time for the Army, but right about now I'm thinking the Navy and Marine Corps folks who have been on ship for over a year in training and deployment are probably wondering who the hell their dwell time advocate is in Washington DC. At what point will Congress get the message that without more amphibious ships - which consistently has by percentage the highest number of days at sea annually of any surface vessel type - the nations leaders are asking way too much of the smaller, always desired but usually-overlooked-by-big-Navy amphibious force. 10 months is a long time for a battalion of Marines at sea, but because they are Marines - no one will ever hear a single complaint about it.

That doesn't mean it isn't a real problem.

The maintenance bill at the end of these very long ARG deployments isn't going to be small. Remember, Kearsarge ARG was at sea for 8+ months and now Bataan ARG will be at sea for 10+ months. I think these are important issues to keep in mind as Makin Island ARG heads to sea.

Rethinking Amphibious Assault

For USNI subscription members only (behind the paywall), this article by Noel Williams titled The Next Wave: Assault Operations for a New Era is a really interesting read. Here is a sample:

Perhaps the most promising technology area is unmanned systems. In the 2020s and beyond there will simply be no reason to place 20 Marines in a steel box and drive them through mined waters to land on an area-denied beach. An unmanned breacher vehicle (UBV), or family of unmanned systems, could clear and mark the assault lanes ahead of any manned surface movement. These UBVs could be launched from surface, subsurface, or airborne delivery means—overtly or covertly. UBVs could be given large magnetic and acoustic signatures to trigger influence mines and could be equipped with cameras, remote gun systems, plows, cutters, and/or line charges to clear beach obstacles. Additionally, it would be possible to transition the UBV to convoy reconnaissance and clearing missions once manned vehicles are ashore.

Introducing an unmanned system breaks the tyranny of the hybrid vehicle that we have found to be so costly and that inevitably results in compromises in both operating domains—afloat and ashore. Since current plans call for landing existing manned breacher vehicles roughly 30 minutes after the first amphibious tractor landing, the time frame requiring a vehicle that transitions seamlessly from sea to shore is roughly 30 minutes. If the joint force is able to achieve beach superiority for this brief period, there is no need for a hybrid vehicle at all. Introducing an unmanned initial assault wave completely eliminates the requirement.

Unmanned systems can provide improved operational capability and enhanced force-protection at significantly reduced cost. Unmanned breachers allow the introduction of ground-fighting vehicles to shore via surface-effect and displacement connectors. By thus avoiding the requirement for a hybrid vehicle, the Marine Corps can focus its limited resources on producing a new fighting vehicle optimized for operations ashore.

This combination of unmanned systems for the initial surface wave and non-hybrid wheeled fighting vehicles for ashore provides a real opportunity to lighten the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), while drawing a clear distinction between Marine Corps and heavy Army units. Additional savings might be realized by participating in a joint venture with the Army to produce a next-generation fighting vehicle (a Stryker successor) with riverine capability. The latest generation of light armored vehicle, or its commercially available equivalent, would provide operational flexibility, training, maintenance, sustainment, and affordability benefits. Determining the actual material solution should be facilitated by additional wargaming and analysis based on threat and operational-concept considerations.

If the USMC did something like this - going unmanned with their breach vehicle from the sea - that would have a trickle down impact on several things including the MPC (Marine Personnel Carrier) requirements, because the MPC would become more important as the primary mover of Marines. There are a lot of things you can do when you remove the EFV/AAAV role and replace that with an unmanned system, but it is also obvious it adds additional impacts to other areas of the USMC ground vehicle force that would require additional study.

I like this idea a lot, but need more time to consider the degree to which it impacts other things.

F-35B Costs

This is not perfect analysis by Bill Sweetman, but when your talking about a money target the size of the Joint Strike Fighter program, it doesn't need to be a bulls-eye to hit the target.

What Bill has done is break down an estimate for how much STOVL capability has cost the Joint Strike Fighter program. After long hand analysis, he is able to produce an estimate:

Total Pentagon investment for 340 F-35Bs, according to the program of record: about $92 billion, or $270 million per unit.

It's probably closer to $300 million per, because there are some commonality savings between F-35A and F-35C that cannot be calculated. The question I would ask is whether commonality with other variants of the JSF has cost the Marine Corps more than it could ever potentially save in the future? I think the safe answer is yes.

We really cannot afford to make these types of mistakes in weapons development in the future - the Joint Strike Fighter is the mother of all bad ideas by being Joint and International Acquisition. It is hard to believe any politician would allow that many hands into a cash filled cookie jar the size of JSF and think it is a good idea. Lack of wisdom and foresight is an understatement.

I will note one thing though. If the F-35B was a separate program today and not integrated with the rest of the Joint Strike Fighter program, during these times of budget cuts does anyone honestly believe a unique Marine Corps VSTOL stealth fighter aircraft would survive the accountants? As part of the JSF program, the F-35B will almost certainly will survive. As a unique program - even if it was less expensive, on cost, and on schedule - Congress would have probably canceled it today.

So while I think it is safe to say the Marine Corps paid more for STOVL by participating in the JSF program, I think it is also true to suggest the Marine Corps also paid the extra cost as a form of insurance from the politics of Washington.

No one has ever suggested watching the sausage get made in Washington DC was worth the price of admission.

Because Marines Don't Know How to Fail in Any Context

This article was on the front page of the New York Times print edition today.

The Marines were at the gay rights center at the invitation of Toby Jenkins, the center’s executive director, who said he saw no better way to celebrate the end of “don’t ask, don’t tell” in a conservative state that strongly supports the military.

“If we’ve been fighting for 15 years for the right to be in the military, we said, ‘Let’s just ask military recruiters if they’d be available,’ ” he said. “But no one was prepared for that question. It was like I was talking to people like they were deer in the headlights.”

The Marines did in fact think that Mr. Jenkins’s invitation might be a hoax, so they checked him out and talked to their superiors, who talked to their superiors. Then they took a deep breath and decided to go. As the day wore on, the Marines said the bust in recruiting had been made up for in media exposure and public relations. Sergeant Henry and his public affairs officer, Capt. Abraham Sipe, gave interviews at the center with five local television stations, three print reporters and one correspondent for National Public Radio. In between, gay rights supporters stopped by to shake their hands.

This story may be in the context of DADT, or #newgayday as it went by some on Twitter, but this is also a great New York Times story about the US Marnie Corps.

Ms. Pratt, 20, asked Sergeant Henry what he liked about the Marines.

“It’s like a little family,” he said. “We get mad at each other, we joke with each other, but we don’t let anybody else make fun of us.”

“That’s pretty cool,” she said.

and

The Marines were the service most opposed to ending the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, but they were the only one of five invited branches of the military to turn up with their recruiting table and chin-up bar at the center Tuesday morning. Although Marines pride themselves on being the most testosterone-fueled of the services, they also ferociously promote their view of themselves as the best. With the law now changed, the Marines appear determined to prove that they will be better than the Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard in recruiting gay, lesbian and bisexual service members.

and

Not that getting into the Marines is easy for anyone right now. As the Marines tell it, only one in 10 applicants qualify for service, with most turned away for a variety of afflictions: asthma, attention deficit disorder, overweight (a 5-foot, 8-inch, 18-year-old male can’t weigh more than 180 pounds before boot camp), excessive tattoos, joint injuries, lack of a high school diploma and a history of drugs beyond infrequent marijuana use.

The NYTs article may have been in the context of DADT, but the story became one of the individual professionalism, professional expectations, and professional community that is the United States Marine Corps. That's a story the services can tell in any context, when their people are enabled to tell it.

It is my opinion enlisted Marines are perhaps the best in the DoD at STRATCOM, and I think there is room for some intellectual rigor to determine the reasons why and how that can be used in other areas. I am reminded how the Marines in this story makes a better case for green energy than the SECNAV makes in his stump speeches. Why? Because it's personal.

At Patrol Base Sparks, an outpost of Forward Operating Base Jackson, Staff Sgt. David Doty has become the resident expert of the solar-powered gear and is very pleased with this new asset.

“Our generators typically use more than 20 gallons of fuel a day. We are down to 2.5 gallons a day,” said Doty, 3rd Squad Leader, with1st Platoon, ‘I’ Company, and Fulton, Mo., native. “The system works amazing. By saving fuel for generators, it has cut back on the number of convoys, meaning less opportunity for one of our vehicles to hit an IED.”

His platoon commander, 1st Lt. Daric Kleppe, agrees, the less convoys, the better. “The enemy will exploit every soft target we have,” said the Vista, Calif., native. “A refueling vehicle becomes a screaming [easy] target.”

The Marines, sailors and the Afghan national army soldiers with ‘I’ Company are also using solar energy to recharge their batteries.

“As a platoon commander, if I don’t have ‘comm’ with my troops and my higher-ups, I am lost,” said 1st Lt. Josef Patterson, 2nd Platoon commander, and Owasso, Okla., native. “On the longer patrols we pack the solar blankets and can continuously charge our radio batteries. This also allows more room to pack things like ammunition.”

The Marines are also able to conserve their energy during the day, to light up their command operation centers and their tents at night. According to Staff Sgt. Greg Wenzel, 1st Plt., platoon sergeant, this has helped PB Sparks’ security when the sun goes down. “It’s way more tactical not running the generators at night,” said the Altoona, Pa., native. “At night the noise of a generator can carry a long way, become a calling card for insurgents.”

Compare that to these Remarks by the Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, at the National Clean Energy Summit 4.0 in Las Vegas, NV on Tuesday, 30 August 2024 (PDF).

There are great strategic reasons for moving away from fossil fuels. The main one is the one I just said - where we buy these supplies of fossil fuels. There’s also the matter of price shock and supply shock. Every time the cost of a barrel of oil goes up a dollar, it costs the United States Navy $31 million in extra fuel costs. When the Libya crisis began and the price of oil went up, the Navy faced a fuel bill increase of over $1.5 billion.

There are really sound tactical reasons, too. Just think of the difficulty of getting a gallon of gasoline to a Marine front-line unit in Helmand province in Afghanistan. You have to take that gallon of gasoline across one ocean - either the Atlantic or the Pacific. Then you take it over land, either north through Pakistan or south through the Northern Distribution Network by convoy, and then either across the Hindu Kush mountain range or across the Amu Darya River until you reach that Forward Operating Base.

And it’s costly, but it’s costly in more ways than just money. We import gasoline more than anything else - gasoline and water - more than anything else into Afghanistan. For every 50 convoys of gasoline we bring in, we lose a Marine. We lose a Marine, killed or wounded. That is too high a price to pay for fuel.

So because of those reasons; because of those compelling strategic and tactical reasons; because it is frankly a vulnerability for our military - when you’re a military force, you look at vulnerabilities of your actual or potential adversaries, but you had better look at your own vulnerabilities, as well. And one of our most glaring vulnerabilities is how we get and how we use energy, and it’s a vulnerability we have to address.

The problem here is that the SECNAV's strategic argument is valid, but dismissive. The Navy is buying biofuels for as much as $50 per gallon in preparation for their Green Strike Group, so suggesting that there is some money savings is still a theory, and isn't justified yet by budget reality. It's the difference between hope and reality. The tactical argument is obviously better, but tactical arguments made by politicians in a business suit never hit as hard as those made by someone in the field that says - 'look, this green tech shit is savings lives, like mine.'

The SECNAV and the Marines in this press statement are making the same argument, but the Marines make it better because they are detailed, specific, and they make it personal. The SECNAV isn't doing that, and I believe he would be better served adjusting his speeches so he tells the story through the eyes of the men and women in the services. I think both of these stories highlight a theme I've touched on within these blog pages for awhile - it isn't that the maritime services don't have a story to tell, it is that more often than not, they don't know how to tell a good story.

When Marine recruiters show up to a gay community center on DADT day, that's a story worth telling because it is a public demonstration of what Marines are and the professionalism Marines expect - and by the simple merit of being a personal example of exactly what they say, the actions earn the Marines a page 1A article on the New York Times. When Marines detail why green energy helps them tactically in the field to avoid ambush, cut down vulnerable logistics convoys, and helps keep equipment functioning when away from their forward operating bases - that's a personal story, and it resonates much stronger than the summary given by the SECNAV.

It is often said Generals and Admirals can't do STRATCOM, it simply isn't possible. I would argue that the Marine General Officer who enabled these Marines to go to the Gay Community Center in the NYTs article did STRATCOM very well, because that officer enabled a personal story on a public issue to be told. Those uniformed leaders who fail to enable their people to do their jobs in public environments, IMO those are the leaders who can't do STRATCOM.

General Amos - Leading the Way For Seapower

The following memo dated September 12, 2024 is from General Amos to Secretary of Defense Panetta. A copy of the original letter can be found here as a Google Doc.

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Secretary Panetta, as we explore ways across the Department to adjust to a new period of considerable fiscal austerity, there emerges a clear imperative that our Nation retain a credible means of mitigating risk while we draw down the capabilities and capacities of our forces. Our Nation faces an uncertain future; we cannot predict where and when events may occur that might call us to respond to protect our citizens and our interests. There have always been times when events have compelled the United States to become involved, even when such involvement wasn't desired; there is little doubt that we will have do this again in the future. Complicating matters is the fact that since the 1990s, our nation has significantly reduced the number and size of our bases and stations around the world.

We are a maritime nation. Like so much of the world, we rely on the maritime commons for the exchange of commerce and ideas. Many depend on us to maintain freedom of movement on those commons; we continue to take that responsibility seriously. Your naval forces are the solution set to fulfilling our global maritime responsibilities.

Naval forces are not reliant on host nation support or permission; in the conduct of operations, they step lightly on our allies and host countries. With the increasing concentration of the world's population close to a coastline, the ability to operate simultaneously on the sea, ashore, and in the air, and to move seamlessly between these three domains represents the unique value of amphibious forces. Operating as a team, amphibious forces provide operational reach and agility, they "buy time" and decision space for our national leaders in time of crisis. They bolster diplomatic initiatives by means of their credible forward presence. Amphibious forces also provide the Nation with assured access for the joint force in a major contingency operation. Modem amphibious operations, like the TF-58 assault that seized Kandahar airport 450 miles inland in 2001 shortly after the 9/ 11 attacks, seek to avoid enemy strengths by exploiting gaps and weaknesses.

When the Nation pays the 'sticker price' for its Marines, it buys the ability to remain forward deployed and forward engaged to assure our partners, reinforce alliances, and build partner capacity. For 7.8% of the total DoD budget, our Nation gains the ability to respond to unexpected crises, from humanitarian disaster relief efforts, to non-combatant evacuation operations, to conduct counter-piracy operations, raids or strikes. That same force can quickly be reinforced to assure access anywhere in the world in the event of a major contingency; it can be dialed up or down like a rheostat to be relevant across the range of military operations. No other force possesses the flexibility to provide these capabilities and yet sustain itself logistically for significant periods of time, at a time and place of its choosing.

"Expeditionary" is not a bumper sticker to us, or a concept, it is a "state of conditioning" that Marines work hard to maintain. Given its mission to be the expeditionary force in readiness, a tiered readiness concept is not compatible with the Marine Corps' missions because its nondeployed units are often called upon to respond to unanticipated and varied crises on a moment's notice.

The Marine Corps fills a unique lane in the capability range of America's armed forces. A Middleweight Force, we are lighter than the Army, and heavier than SOF. The Corps is not a second land army. The Army is purpose-built for land campaigns and carries a heavier punch when it arrives, whereas the Marine Corps is an expeditionary force focused on coming from the sea with integrated aviation and logistics capabilities. The Marine Corps maintains the ability to contribute to land campaigns by leveraging or rapidly aggregating its capabilities and capacities. Similarly, Marine Corps and SOF roles are complementary, rather than redundant. Special Operation Forces contribute to the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts of the Combatant Commanders in numerous and specialized ways, but they are not a substitute for conventional forces with a broader range of capability and sustainability.

The Marine Corps was specifically directed by the 82nd Congress as the force intended to be "the most ready when the Nation is least ready." This expectation exists because of the costly lessons our nation learned during the Korean War when a lack of preparedness in the beginning stages of the conflict very nearly resulted in defeat. Because our Nation cannot afford to hold the entire joint force at such a high state of readiness, it has chosen to keep the Marines ready, and has often used them to plug the gaps during international crises, to respond when no other options were available.

Anecdotally, the American people believe that when a crisis emerges - Marines will be present and will "invariably tum in a performance that is dramatically and decisively successful - not most of the time, but always." They possess a heart-felt belief that the Marine Corps is good for the young men and women of our country. In their view, the Marines are extraordinarily adept at converting "un-oriented youths into proud, self-reliant stable citizens - citizens into whose hands the nation's affairs may be safely entrusted." An investment in the Marine Corps continues to be an investment in the character of the young people of our country.

Finally, in an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world, we must continue to provide the protection our Nation needs and to preserve our ability to do what we must as the world's only credible remaining super power. As we face inevitable difficult resource decisions, I believe that we must also consider how we can best mitigate the inherent risk of a reduced defense capacity...like an affordable insurance policy, Marine Corps and the Navy's amphibious forces, represent a very efficient and effective hedge against the Nation's most likely risks.

James F. Amos

I think this letter is fantastic, and might be the best case for Seapower made this year by someone in uniform. This letter is effective because it states the case for the Marine Corps by covering every base. When I read this letter I see two primary themes; value in the always austere Marine Corps and purpose of the ready Marine Corps.

Value in the Marine Corps

I think it's great how General Amos highlights the tremendous value of the Marine Corps in this letter. The letter makes a solid case that I believe the Marine Corps should do more often and with a great deal of pride - emphasize the Marine Corps as a valuable contributing service that has always been on an austere budget. OSD - which is made up almost entirely of joint staffs who combined as a joint fighting force is probably about as combat effective as the Libyan Rebel Army - has a budget about 1.5x the size of the Marine Corps, and outside their black budget the biggest thing they probably buy is a SAN farm. OK, maybe I'm exaggerating an analogy... a little, but most folks don't realize how much bang the nation gets for the buck with the Marine Corps today.

There is a growing perception in the public that somehow the Marine Corps is as messed up in acquisition as the rest of DoD, but I greatly admire the way the Marine Corps historically made acquisition choices. Today, after more than 5 decades, the Marines are still buying and flying the UH-1 Huey which was first introduced in 1959. After more than 4 decades, the Marines are still buying and flying an evolved version of the AH-1 Cobra which was first introduced in 1967. Next year the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) is going to be 40 years old, with no known replacement in sight. The CH-46 was first flown in 1964 - 47 years ago - and are still deploying the helicopter in Afghanistan and to sea. The AV-8 goes back to 1969, over 40 years ago, and yet today that's the VSTOL aircraft of the Marine Corps. Finally, the CH-53, which is being upgraded yet again to a new variant, has been in service for the USMC since 1966 - 45 years.

Think for a moment about these six major programs of the USMC; UH-1s, AH-1s, AAVs, CH-46s, AV-8s, and CH-53s; and look at what the Marines have done as the always austere force. Half (3) of the programs are currently undergoing modernization and will continue to operate for the Marine Corps well into the future - UH-1s, AH-1s, and CH-53s. These aircraft have histories well over 4 decades with at least a couple more decades of service in their future. There is no greater example of evolutionary approach to acquisition and getting the best value for investment than how the Marines continue to favor functional over revolutionary with these Vietnam era legends that still form the backbone of the vertical lift force in the Marine Corps in the 21st century.

But with the AAV, AV-8 and CH-46; all of which will serve more than half a century, the Marine Corps decided to evolve into the 21st century with intent to enhance those capabilities. Lets look at each of them one at a time.

The AAV was to be replaced by the EFV. In order to be an amphibious force, Marines have to get to shore with vehicles in order to move from the beach to their objective on land. The Marine Corps can do this today with LCUs or LCACs, but both ship-to-shore connectors require large amphibious ships which the Navy doesn't like to build. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps have an agreed requirement today for 38 amphibious ships, but both services also agreed to work with a fiscally restrained requirement of 33 amphibious ships. However, when the USS Cleveland (LPD 7) is retired later this month, there will only 28 amphibious ships - 5 less than the agreed to total. Furthermore, the Navy has told the Marine Corps they won't take their ships closer than 25nm of the shore because of threats in the 21st century littoral environment. That means it will take the 11 knot (on a good day) LCUs over 2 hours to get from ship to shore with Marines and equipment - which is plenty of time for the enemy to prepare to defend the beach. LCACs are better, but they can't carry as much as LCUs, so it takes more LCACs to deliver the same force or the LCACs have to make more trips in order to fully deliver a Marine Corps unit intact.

That means you have to have an Amphibious Assault Vehicle that can organically deploy from the ship to deliver Marine Corps combat power in a vehicle that can immediately move to an objective. Under the 25nm requirement imposed by the Navy on the Marine Corps, a company of Marines is expected to deploy by AAV which does a bit over 8 knots on a good day. That would mean that in an AAV, Marines can reliably expect to make it from ship-to-shore in a small box getting rocked by the seas somewhere between 2.5-4 hours, during which time the entire company of Marines would get sea sick and barf their breakfast, and once reaching the beach the Marines would then be expected to roll in with their limited combat power and no armor AAV and kick ass at top combat effectiveness. That meant the AAV replacement needed to be fast at sea, carry decent combat power, have better armor protection than the AAV, and meet a new requirement for IEDs. The result of those requirements is what today is called the EFV, which meets all of these requirements and more, but at somewhere near $16 million each to the only military service that has ever fully operated on a austere budget - the EFV became too expensive. The EFV is canceled, and no replacement has been found, yet.

The CH-46 replacement is a little different. The CH-46 is a medium lift helicopter and the backbone of the Marine Corps ship-to-shore air capability. The Marine Corps medium lift platform is expected to lift small vehicles, a decent number of Marines, and provide logistical support to Marines well inshore once Marines go ashore. The replacement chosen for CH-46 is the MV-22, which has a storied history that doesn't need to be relived in this space, but needless to say the MV-22 has had and is still jumping hurdles although after a few years of combat experience in Afghanistan - Marines seem to genuinely love the MV-22. The big capability upgrades the USMC was looking for with MV-22 were speed and range which allows the Navy to operate well offshore while Marines are rapidly moved to targets from greater range - including objectives well inland from the beach. Despite being a dumpster fire early in the programs development, the MV-22 is a huge success today and is only getting better with incremental improvements - and given the track record of the Marine Corps when it comes to incremental improvements - we can expect the MV-22 to evolve and get better and better for the next many decades. It is noteworthy that as recently as yesterday, the Senate Appropriations Committee fully funded the MV-22 in the FY12 mark - which in this budget climate is a major sign of the support the Marines must have for the MV-22 and the political support the Senate has for the MV-22.

Finally there is the F-35B. The Marines do need to replace the now dead line of AV-8Bs and I do agree with the Marine Corps that they need a VSTOL aircraft, even if I would like to see them experiment with larger UAVs on their big deck amphibious ships. Even on the global market, the choices for a VSTOL combat aircraft are slim - and today nothing comes close to matching the AV-8B as a VSTOL combat aircraft. In my opinion, the biggest problem for the F-35B is that it is a compromised design simply by being part of the dumpster fire we call the Joint Strike Fighter program. With that said, if* the Joint Strike Fighter ever does finally work in all three versions (* that is an enormous, ugly, and nearly unbelievable if), the same international flavored, compromised design for purposes of similarity to F-35A and F-35C of the F-35B does still have potential to be a huge success. It isn't that I am betting on the F-35B per se, rather that the Marine Corps has a track record of being a good bet to get the very most out of their platforms.

My main point is that the Marine Corps has a long history of being a great value for investment as well as getting the most value out of their investments - both in people and stuff. The reasons the Marine Corps went about upgrading towards the EFV, MV-22, and F-35B were valid reasons that can be articulated thus justified, and the Marines articulate and justify those reasons 100x better than I do. The ability to publicly state validity in program justification is very rare in the DoD these days, so for me anyway, it is hard for me to associate the legitimate perception of DoD waste with the Marine Corps even though they have three programs that do fit the description well - and in the case of the EFV - well enough to cancel the program.

Even as a point in time assessment though, I don't believe the value of the Marine Corps is diminished in any way with the acquisition problems represented by these three programs that upgrade three major core capabilities of the Marine Corps. After nearly half a century of evolution practices with the same equipment, the Marine Corps does have a legitimate case that they do need to evolve with new capabilities found in new equipment.

Purpose of the Marine Corps

The memo states out loud - We are a maritime nation - and immediately, but in this case briefly, discusses why the United States is a maritime nation. The memo makes the case why maritime forces are the legitimate solution to global, complicated problems. I truly believe this is an argument the maritime services can win right now if they were trying, but this is the first evidence I have seen that a uniformed leader in any of the maritime services is publicly making the case for seapower.

Unlike the Army and the Air Force, maritime forces are the one conventional military force in the DoD that also acts as an extension and force multiplier for all levels diplomacy. Whether it is humanitarian assistance and disaster response in peacetime or deterrence, escalation control, or non-combat evacuations in periods of contention; as a forward deployed always present force the maritime services provide political leaders with a comprehensive list of options for diplomatic action to various levels of crisis. The USN/USMC team has become particularly proficient in that regard with their medical diplomacy / soft power functions now fully integrated into ship rotations which allows the United States government to exercise national influence with maritime forces leveraging useful cooperation with allies towards providing access to immunization and other services to regions that otherwise lack access to or funding for such things. This type of soft power groundwork that builds goodwill in peacetime lays the foundation for advancing US interests in a specific region at a later time if necessary.

General Amos describes the Marine Corps as a Middleweight Force that is lighter than the Army but heavier than SOF. Amos describes the Marine Corps in the context of contributing to the Army or complimentary to SOF, but also makes the Marines case for the broader range of capabilities that the Marines provide in the service of our nations many missions and interests. The unique capability of the Marine Corps to logistically sustain a conventional military force for a range of operations as a first responder to an emergency is emphasized several times, something the Navy would also be wise to emphasize as well. Sustained forward presence allows maritime forces to be agile for operations during the early moments of crisis, and is a capability unique to seapower. The Marines have long described themselves as the nations 911 force, and while that slogan isn't used specifically in this letter, that message is outlined very well in detail.

Finally, the second to last paragraph of the letter is a brilliantly articulated, concise paragraph where the purpose of the Marine Corps as a national function translates into a benefit for American society. I spent some time yesterday reading about Dakota Meyer, the first living Marine since Vietnam to be awarded the Medal of Honor. This picture at the Small Wars Journal, where the now retired Marine Sgt is drinking a beer with the President is really a fantastic photograph. The article listed with the picture at the SWJ has a paragraph that says:

Because of Meyer’s humble example, children all across America will know that “no matter who you are or where you come from, you can do great things as a citizen and a member of the American family,” the president said.

When I first started writing this blog, some of my old veteran readers might recall that I used the third person plural a lot in posts. At that time I had the great pleasure of working side by side everyday with a retired Chief Petty Officer First Class and retired Sargent of the Marine Corps, both of whom were major contributors behind the scenes to the content in those early days. As a now former small business owner, I really can't stress enough the value of employment one finds in successful military veterans. My business is IT, and in my experience I found that the discipline and work ethic both men had as a product of their military service insured that no matter how complicated the problem or how stressful the crisis of the moment, both were reliable and had the necessary dedication to completion of the task at hand to always get the job done. Reliability is a value in business, and I find it is one of the most common work related attributes of successful military veterans in the private sector.

That second to last paragraph rings with a lot of truth to me, a civilian, because I have seen it in retired Marines I have worked with and have worked for me. As someone who works in a field with a lot of people of the younger generations, I think General Amos is spot on to emphasize the personal values that military service passes on to young people - because it is self-evident in the private sector when comparing civilian workers of similar age but very different backgrounds. As the military downsizes and a large number of people in military service transition to the civilian workforce, I think the emphasis of the values argument does nothing but help those coming from military service as they go out looking for a new career, but also helps educate those in the private sector regarding what to look for that distinguishes a retired member of the military from someone of similar age without that experience. In many ways that second to last paragraph is a small but clever way to associate the Marine Corps with the base of support for all military services - the American people.

This letter is a breath of fresh air, and represents the first real argument by any uniformed member of the military services of the purpose and value of a military service during the defense budget debate that really started with the Budget Control Act of August 2nd. I can't help but read this letter and wonder why Ray Mabus, Bob Work, or Admiral Roughead isn't out saying these same things. Ray Mabus is still out promoting green energy, which would be great if he was Secretary of Energy. Bob Work's only real public discussion recently described this budget period as "an exciting time" - which is a remarkably neutral statement given the context of the moment. After 10 years of war and at a time when ~50 OMB accountants are deciding the division budget for the next 10 years of national defense strategy with their add machine, it seems to me this is the time the military services should be making their case to the American people regarding their value to the nation - and how each service will contribute to the national defense of the nation. It is frustrating to watch the Navy avoid doing this necessary public argument with excuses like it's too early, but next year these people will avoid making that case with the excuse it's too late.

Wouldn't it be great if Admiral Roughead - who as a lame duck CNO can go out and say whatever he wants at this critical moment and not have to worry about career consequence - would go out an advocate the value of Seapower? What the CNO is not doing right now shines bright in stark contrast to what the SECDEF did when he was lame duck.

What do we make of the Navy leadership's apparent public surrender to unfolding current budget events in the context of General Amos's letter? The Navy's silence looks like quiet compliance to the process of 50 accountants writing the next decade of national security strategy for the DoD. Until this letter by General Amos, nobody in defense had made a cost/value defense for defense since the Budget Control Act was passed - nobody. Silent consent to the process gives the impression the nation has a super bloated Navy that can presumably absorb the budget cuts without any problem, after all, nobody in the Navy has actually publicly said at any point that budget cuts represent a problem.

The Marine Corps is always on an austere budget and doesn't have as much budget flexibility without taking a deep cut. I think that explains why a private letter to the SECDEF from General Amos gets out in the public - a clever way for the General to make the case for his Marines. Refreshing. Who would have thought it would be this hard for defense to make a public defense of defense? I have a theory...

In many ways, I believe this budget crisis for the DoD is going to distinguish the leaders from the managers. It is clear to me which description applies to General Amos.

Amos: "Changes to the Navy and Marine Corps Force Structure Were Certain"

Carlo Munoz appears to have missed something. This is the how this AOL Defense article ends.

When asked if more amphibious ships could compensate for a potential cut to the carrier fleet, Amos said changes to the Navy and Marine Corps force structure were certain, but it was too early in the process to talk details.

Same old song.

What same old song is he talking about? When did General Amos admitting with certainty that the Navy and Marine Corps force structure would change become an old song? Seems to me, that paragraph is the story - and the last sentence doesn't belong.

In Admiral Greenert's confirmation yesterday, there were no statements that suggested a force structure change, only that the budget situation could force one. I tend to believe Amos, that we are already at the point of change, but if that is true it is disappointing that Admiral Greenert didn't take the moment that included absolute certainty of his confirmation and use the hearings to describe in detail to the Senate what the future of the Navy looks like under certain scenarios.

"Worried about the industrial base" isn't good enough if the Navy wants to discuss aircraft carriers, admitting the Navy will lose the ability to build these big deck carriers forever is important.

The Navy needs to be more like the Marines, and tell folks how it is without all the cryptic language that just adds more uncertainty and zero clarity.

A Naval Special Warfare Ship

Proceedings subscribers (USNI members) have won again. The rest of you need to become a USNI member so you stop missing out on excellent content like the June issue of Proceedings Nobody Asked Me But... section by Rear Admiral George Worthington, U.S. Navy (Retired).

Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces need to operate from the sea. For long-range open-water transits they depend on the Navy. But they rarely practice with blue-water ships, which are not outfitted to support U.S. special operations forces (SOF) with space for staff planning; troops; stowage for ammunition, small arms, and demolitions; a diving-recompression chamber; or dedicated communications terminals. Worst of all, amphibious ships are earmarked full time for Marine embarkation and not available to SEALs, especially with the 2006 establishment of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. SEALs and Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC) need dedicated open-ocean ships.

NSW comprises several SEAL teams, a single SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV) team, and special boat teams. These commands are blended together for deployments as a squadron, and all report to the commander, U.S. Special Operations Command through the NSW Command headquartered in Coronado, California. Overseas, they report to the geographical combatant commanders.

The teams—supported by various units and U.S.-based groups—catch rides in whatever surface ships or submarines are allotted for a given operation. But, as noted previously, the surface ships are not oriented to special operations forces that could be Army Special Forces, Marine Special Operations, or (most usually) Navy SEAL and SDV teams.

NSW craft include the 82-foot MK V special-operations craft, now approaching 20 years’ service. This has an aluminum hull, water-jet drive, some crew-served weapons, and is capable of 50-plus knots and a 600 nautical-mile range. Next down, the 36-foot rigid-hull inflatable boat, a workhorse capable of 40 knots, has a crew of three SWCC and can transport eight SEALs. At the bottom of the list is the 15-foot combat rubber raiding craft, made by Zodiac of North America. This carries nine passengers at 30 knots for 60 nautical miles. SDVs are specialized, free-flooding underwater insertion vehicles.

So why do SEALs need a dedicated blue-water support craft?

Rear Admiral Worthington goes on to answer the question in quality detail. I thought it was particularly interesting that he rejects the LCS and suggests the old Newport class is closer to the mark. I'm not sure I either agree or disagree with his points, but I think it goes to the heart of a serious limitation of LCS in that the platform lacks the endurance to be a credible afloat forward staging base.

The MLP might actually a good fit, but with only 3 planned there will never be enough MLPs to meet the demand.

By the way, last week at GenNext Rear Admiral Worthington discussed this topic among others, and below is listed the key takeaways from his presentation:

• The SEALs have come a long way since their formation in the 60’s. Vietnam was the trigger—they became an instrumental part of the armed forces for covert action. After Vietnam funding dried up until the 80’s and the SEALs had a revamp
• In Rear Admiral Worthington’s opinion, too much has been leaked already regarding the killing of Osama Bin Laden. Identifying the SEALs at the Special Forces team responsible for the raid only puts them in more danger. The SEALs are responsible for the most elusive and dangerous jobs in the world, their privacy and ability to execute can potentially be affected by too much exposure.
• The OBL operation was a complicated one but something the SEALs could “do in their sleep”. Rear Admiral Worthington noted, “I bet their heart rate didn’t go above 92 when they stepped in that compound. “
• Mobility issues for the SEALs remain. They need dedicated helicopter squadrons for special operations and dedicated surface ships. He also touched on the shortfalls of the current Newport Class LST/Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

That last key point is covered broadly in generic detail in the Proceedings article, but I admit to liking the idea of comparing the Newport Class LST/Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in the context of a dedicated special operations surface ship design starting place.

Bataan ARG Sails in the Wake of History

As told by Kennedy Hickman here.

In 1804, during the fourth year of the First Barbary War, the former American consul to Tunis, William Eaton returned to the Mediterranean. Titled "Naval Agent to the Barbary States," Eaton had received support from the US government for a plan to overthrow the pasha of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli. After meeting with the commander of US naval forces in the area, Commodore Samuel Barron, Eaton traveled to Alexandria, Egypt with $20,000 to seek out Yusuf's brother Hamet. The former pasha of Tripoli, Hamet had been deposed in 1793, and then exiled by his brother in 1795.

After contacting Hamet, Eaton explained that he wished to raise a mercenary army to help the former pasha regain his throne. Eager to retake power, Hamet agreed and work began to build a small army. Eaton was aided in this process by First Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon and eight US Marines, as well as Midshipman Pascal Peck. Assembling a ragtag group of around 500 men, mostly Arab, Greek, and Levantine mercenaries, Eaton and O'Bannon set off across the desert to capture the Tripolitan port of Derna.

Departing Alexandria on March 8, 1805, the column moved along the coast pausing at El Alamein and Tobruk. Their march was supported from the sea by the warships USS Argus, USS Hornet, and USS Nautilus under the command of Master Commandant Isaac Hull. Shortly after the march began, Eaton, now referring to himself as General Eaton, was forced to deal with a growing rift between the Christian and Muslim elements in his army. This was made worse by the fact that his $20,000 had been used and money to fund the expedition was growing scarce.

On at least two occasions, Eaton was forced to contend with near mutinies. The first involved his Arab cavalry and was put down at bayonet-point by O'Bannon's Marines. A second occurred when the column lost contact with Argus and food became scarce. Convincing his men to eat a pack camel, Eaton was able to stall until the ships reappeared. Pressing on through heat and sand storms, Eaton's force arrived near Derna on April 25 and was resupplied by Hull. After his demand for the city's surrender was refused, Eaton maneuvered for two days before initiating his attack.

Dividing his force in two, he sent Hamet southwest to severe the road to Tripoli and then attack the western side of the city. Moving forward with the Marines and the other mercenaries, Eaton planned to assault the harbor fortress. Attacking on the afternoon of April 27, Eaton's force, supported by naval gunfire, met determined resistance as the city's commander, Hassan Bey, had reinforced the harbor defenses. This permitted Hamet to sweep into the western side of the city and capture the governor's palace.

Grabbing a musket, Eaton personally led his men forward and was wounded in the wrist as they drove the defenders back. By the end of the day, the city had been secured and O'Bannon hoisted the US flag over the harbor defenses. It was the first time the flag had flown over a foreign battlefield. In Tripoli, Yusuf had been aware of the approach of Eaton's column and had dispatched reinforcements to Derna. Arriving after Eaton had taken the city, they briefly laid siege before assaulting it on May 13. Though they pushed Eaton's men back, the attack was defeated by fire from the harbor batteries and Hull's ships.

I find it appropriate that on this day, April 27, the 206th anniversary of the first major battle conducted overseas by the United States of America, the Bataan ARG and Marines of the 22nd MEU take station off the shores of Tripoli.

The United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps have been in these waters before, and just like 206 years ago the maritime services find themselves fighting a tyrant in Tripoli while supporting an insurgency movement across Libya. One wonders if the outcome in 2011 will be similar to 1805.

Aftermath:

The Battle of Derna cost Eaton a total of fourteen dead and several wounded. Of his force of Marines, two were killed and two wounded. O'Bannon and his Marines' role has been commemorated by the line "to the shores of Tripoli" in the Marine Corps Hymn as well as the adoption of the Mamaluke sword by the Corps. Following the battle, Eaton began planning a second march with the goal of taking Tripoli. Concerned about Eaton's success, Yusuf began suing for peace. Much to Eaton's displeasure, Consul Tobias Lear concluded a peace treaty with Yusuf on June 4, 1805, which ended the conflict. As a result, Hamet was sent back to Egypt, while Eaton and O'Bannon returned to the United States as heroes.

Is it possible in 2011 that landing Marines ashore is the next step towards pushing Libya towards a negotiated settlement? In 1805, it was the presence of an Army near Tripoli, not the use of an Army in Tripoli, that let to a negotiated solution. It is sad how our political leaders no longer think of military power in the context of limited objectives, rather only in context of limited use - the distinction being very important.

The Rest of the Story

In 1815, Stephen Decatur delivered swift and decisive blows against Algiers that forced a settlement with all three Barbary states and the United States. Algiers backed out of the treaty the day after it was signed, but with no American hostages held the United States observed the activities of Algiers without involvement.

It wasn't until August of 1816 that a combined British and Dutch fleet crushed Algiers and finally removed the piracy threat represented by the Barbary states. Algiers and Tunis became protectorates of France, while Tripoli fell under the domain of the Ottoman Empire until September of 1911, when Italy declared war on Tripoli and later assumed control of the colony.

In January of 1943, Tripoli was conquered once again by the British under Montgomery with allied support from New Zealand. Tripoli was administrated under British rule until declaring independence in 1951.

The Answer is Always the Marine Corps, Now What Was the Question?

"With or without the LCS, when asked what capability is required to fight in the Littorals - the right answer will always be the Marine Corps."

I try to save all my email, and that is a quote from an email sent to me in early November 2008, before I was embarked on FREEDOM, from a Marine LtCol who insisted that is the most important lesson I would learn by riding on FREEDOM a few days. I thought of that quote when I read this article over at DoD Buzz discussing Chris Rawley's swarming boat scenario from earlier this morning.

Phil Ewing concludes implying the right answer to swarming threats might be the Marine Corps Cobra gunships. That suggests me that in 2011:

• The LCS is still a Powerpoint capability
• RW Squadrons need more articulate advocates
• Navy ships can never have enough guns, particularly on the bigger warships

The point is valid though. Of the three scenarios presented by Chris, none of them include a Marine Corps perspective. Back when the EFV was in its infancy, I distinctly remember suggestions the EFV and it's 30mm gun could blow up swarming boats as it moved from ship-to-shore. When I was at the EFV shop in San Diego earlier this year, I asked about that. When asked, the Marine SSgt looked at me and said (and I am quoting),

"The EFV is as fast as the LCS, shorter than a Boston Whaler, and surrounded in armor. Tell me how creative the Colonel is and I'll tell you what we can do."

So as I think about the question Chris proposed, I'm thinking that the price of 1 DDG-51 I'll take a LPD-17 with Romeos, Cobras, EFVs, and instead of LCACs or LCUs, I'll take CB-90s and the blue green team that makes this capability a blue/green/brown water nightmare for the enemy.

USMC Unmanned Cargo Demo: Maritime Implications

The Marines’ urgent needs program for unmanned cargo delivery was initiated to reduce the number of convoys and the risk to ground forces from IEDs while speeding resupply to remote forward operating bases in Afghanistan. The Boeing A160 and Kaman K-Max were both contracted for an operational assessment, which if successful, could also provide a number of operational benefits for naval forces. Although K-Max has a higher payload weight, the Hummingbird’s max range, speed, and altitude provide a capability not resident in current Navy rotorcraft, manned or unmanned. Possible operational logistics benefits (ISR/strike potential notwithstanding) of a more permanent naval acquisition program for RW UAS include:

- A160 is faster, cheaper, and significantly longer range than the MH-60s performing VERTREP and other “ash and trash” missions, freeing up the Navy's manned RW force for higher value operations such as ASW, ASUW, AMCM, VBSS over-watch, and air assault.
- With a dwindling afloat logistics force, a det of one or more cargo UAVs greatly expands the reach of every logistics ship in the inventory and all ships with a flight deck. Although the current Afghanistan assessment is designed to work a daily throughput of 6,000 lbs of cargo for about a 50 mile radius, with a range of more than 2000 nm, theoretically one A160 could support afloat logistics runs over 3 million square miles of ocean/land. How many CASREPs have persisted for want of a single small circuit card or widget awaiting the next COD, rotator flight, or scheduled RAS?
- A capability of this sort is absolutely critical to distributed operations in the littorals. Unmanned UAS are ideal for supporting low visibility, long range resupply to remote teams of SOF or USMC personnel well ashore.
- RW UAVs can provide spare parts, dry goods, and ammunition resupply for LCS and green water platforms operating independently in remote areas.

Navy requirements folks should follow this demonstration closely and consider jumping on the RW cargo bandwagon.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Americans in Egypt

As Egypt unfolds, and I presume everyone is watching the civilian protests in some way (I recommend Al Jazeera over the web, but Twitter is great too). It is worth remembering there are some 90,000 Americans in Egypt. Nothing has been decided, but preparations are being made just in case.

The U.S. Marines have a pair of warships -- the USS Kearsarge and the USS Ponce -- just hanging around the southern end of the Red Sea waiting to see if they're needed to rescue U.S. diplomats and citizens from Cairo. They're half of the Marines' 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, a mini-armada that recently dispatched 1,400 of its 2,000 Marines into Afghanistan. But they've got a "fair number" of helicopters, and Marines, still aboard.

Something to keep an eye on.

There have been some folks who have commented on the Suez Canal uncertainty. I'm not sure it is as big of a concern in the long run as people have made it out to be, although disruption is certainly possible. Ultimately, the Suez Canal is an important economic enabler for Egypt - and it doesn't make much sense that the Egyptian people would protest over the poor economic situation only to see the government turn off the economy of the Suez Canal. That's like suggesting that someone who laments being poor will burn a wallet full of money. Not likely.

As the actions unfold in Egypt it does not appear that an evacuation of US citizens will be necessary, but that won't stop the planning process just in case.

Pirate Takedown - Force Recon Style

The statistics of the blog suggest around 8,000 people spend about 5 minutes a day reading the content every day. Today I offer almost 5 minutes of video to think about. Best played with sound up.

While in San Diego this week I met a lot of great people, but the person I had never met whom I spent the most time with this week was Captain Alexander Martin, USMC. Alex has a presentation on the take down of Magellan Star that by all accounts is absolutely brilliant, and I believe this video is part of that presentation.

When I think about recent events involving the South Korean raid and contrast it with the USMC action on Magellan Star, the first thing that comes to mind is that the Marines didn't kill anyone - while the South Koreans killed a bunch of folks. The Marines certainly could have killed them all, but didn't. That is a tremendously important point that should not be overlooked or dismissed. The close quarters discipline was developed in the training and workups prior to the deployment. As Captain Martin explains, "my guys were trained for that mission... and our training was good."

Captain Martin only has a few more weeks before he retires from active duty in the Marine Corps, and I would encourage folks who are in this business to contact Captain Martin and have him give his presentation to your organization - then more importantly talk to him. That guy is an idea factory with experience that goes well beyond a single ship rescue or Force Recon platoon commander.

If I was to use one word to describe Captain Martin it would be "creative." Look, there are a bunch of words that describe Marines, particularly the type who lead Force Recon platoons, but the word "creative" is usually not one of the first words anyone would use. Not true with Captain Martin, "creative" works with him. I don't know if it is the touch of humanities in his private life (the guy really gets the art world), his family background, or he simply never really had his creativity beat out of him by the Marine Corps but my time with Captain Martin ended up being some of the best thought provoking debate/discussion in San Diego.

I have a bunch of video from the week of both Marines and the conference itself. Once my teenage daughter shows me how to convert it and format it for YouTube, I'll post links.

Thinking About the Future of the Marine Corps

I had an opportunity to spend yesterday at Camp Pendleton talking about topics such as the short term future and long term future of the Marine Corps. As you might imagine there were a number of areas I am very interested in including: the future of amphibious operations, the future of Force Recon, manpower retention, and having honest discussions about cyber warfare from the perspective of the Marine Corps.

The highlight of the day was the tour of the latest EFV, a weapon system that has apparently jumped the remaining hurdles and interestingly enough, has nearly finished development (as in will do so in a few days...). I thought two things were interesting: first, for all the discussion in Washington, DC on the program it appears that nobody has actually come out to see the system nor talk to the Marines who have been working on the EFV. I encourage it - understanding the difference between the EFV and the AAVs from the perspective of Marines with 20+ years of combat experience in the AAV is a good idea. The other interesting thing to me is that the EFV has only a single sin - cost. Basically the Marines have ultimately developed a platform that meets or exceeds every requirement but at a price too high to afford.

It was a quark of timing that we were discussing cyber warfare as we drove by a battalion marching. The point was well made. The first and second company were in formation by platoon marching together within the context of clockwork discipline. Then trailing behind the first and second company was the march of misfit toys - otherwise known as the haphazard collection of pencil pushers in H&S company that had a formation akin to a mob. The cyber challenge for the Marines is to get the super talented guy who can do amazing stuff with technology, and take those skills not to the level physical fitness level of H&S, or even the trigger pullers in the company, but ready to meet the capabilities demanded of Marines in Force Recon. Hacking cell phones on Monday and walking 26 miles on Tuesday? Not likely. I've worked in IT for 16 years, and it is almost an oxymoron to find nerds with a commitment to physical fitness, but that is the cyber challenge of the Marine Corps in a nutshell.

Finally a question that has been on my mind lately while I've been reading various books and articles. How many major battles in the littorals have been fought in the last 50 years without a ground force? How many have been fought in the last 200 years? 500 years? 200o years? The interesting thing about littoral warfare is the constant, ever present force on land that preps the battlefield at sea. My point is, I believe any concept of littoral warfare operations that doesn't start with Force Recon is little more than a shit stained piece of paper. I like the LCS, but that ship has a very dumb name. For all the talk about littoral warfare we've seen over the last 15 years, it seems odd to me that the discussion has divided the Navy and Marines instead of done what seems more natural - synergized an understanding the roles of each service in support of the other.

The inadequate approach by the Navy with naval fires is just one of many examples of the growing division. I'll just say it - the Navy isn't simply lost at sea without a blue/green model for littoral warfare, the Navy becomes irrelevant without that model. Naval power either controls the sea at the 'nowhere abyss' or the 'vital atoll.' The BMD emphasis is shaping the force towards the 'nowhere abyss' because it is leaving the fleet without the capabilities to control the 'vital atoll' - and yes those are the trade offs in capabilities.

Comment: Special thanks to Mary Ripley for making arrangements for me yesterday. I think somewhere along the way Marine sergeants are trained to give a 1.5 second assessment of civilians at which point they decide whether they will tolerate you or whether you're a piece of shit. Funny thing about Marines, they know a lot about their own history, and while I was probably giving the 'piece of shit' vibe as the big dorky dude with a silly grin - I found that standing next to the daughter of Col John Ripley was remarkably disarming. The transition from foe to friend in those seconds was almost magical, and it made the day very educational.

Change Is Always Hard

Timeless wisdom.

It is evident, also, that we must not too lightly assume the methods of former days, however admirably they may have been adapted to the ends then in view, as mere precedents, to be followed unquestioningly in our modern practice. We can only safely reason upon the experiences of the past when we have penetrated to, and laid firm hold upon, the principle, or principles, which received recognition and interpretation in our predecessors' methods. When the latter have stood the searching criticism of experience and analysis, we can confidently assert that they were a valid application, under the conditions of one age, of principles that are probably true at all times, and which we may hope to detect by patient study. But when we have correctly stated the principles, it by no means necessarily follows that the application of them will be the same, or superficially even much like those of previous generations.

There is another caution which I think may wisely be observed, namely, not to assume too easily that our forefathers hit upon methods absolutely certain of success in practice—not liable at times to failure. There are few, if any, characteristics of the utterances which I from time to time hear, or read, on the subject of actual warfare, which impress me more strongly than the constantly recurring tendency to reject any solution of a problem which does not wholly eliminate the element of doubt, of uncertainty, or risk. Instead of frankly recognizing that almost all warlike undertakings present at best but a choice of difficulties that absolute certainty is unattainable—that the "art" consists, not in stacking the cards, but, as Napoleon phrased it, in getting the most of the chances on your side—that some risk, not merely of death but of failure, must be undergone—instead of this, people wish so to arrange their programme as to have a perfectly sure thing of it; and when some critic points out, as can so easily be done, that this may happen or that may happen, and it is seen undeniably that it may, then the plan stands condemned. " War," said Napoleon again, "cannot be made without running risks, and it is because my admirals have found out that it can, everything attempted by them has failed."

Blockade In Relation to Naval Strategy, By Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. Navy, Proceedings Magazine 1895

Worth thinking as we ponder the topic of this November 2010 Proceedings article Hitting the Beach in the 21st Century by Under Secretary of the Navy Robert O. Work and Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired).

I imagine both men ran into a storm of criticism when they suggested to replace "forcible entry" and "amphibious assault" with "theater entry" and "littoral maneuver."

It is, in my opinion, a good way to begin the conversation though.