Developing Realistic Security and Assistance Squadrons

For nearly 20 years none has challenged the supremacy of the United States in the open-ocean, blue-water environment. Increasingly, the contest of ideas is being waged in niche arenas, in the littorals, the near-shore green-water areas, and up and down contested riverine estuaries that provide concealment and cover for terrorists, pirates, and warlords. It is in these areas that the slow erosion of law and order is an accepted fact of life, and it is in these areas that the U.S. Navy must go if it is sincere in its strategic premise that preventing wars is at least as important as winning them. This is the environment of the Influence Squadron.

It is a naval force tailored to missions both new and old. Harking back to the founding of the republic, Influence Squadrons will be numerous enough to combat piracy-the only naval mission actually enshrined within the U.S. Constitution-and strong enough to take on terrorists who smuggle weapons across the seas as well as interdict the drug lords whose products kill more Americans per month than al Qaeda has in its history. Larger numbers of platforms will also enable Influence Squadrons to both provide local medical assistance in the form of vaccinations and respond swiftly to natural disasters and thus prevent epidemics of such diseases as dysentery and cholera.

In addition, the simplified characteristics of the Influence Squadron's platforms will help the Navy to build partnership capacity and perform security force assistance missions without over-awing local coalition partners with Aegis-level technology. These missions will extend and solidify the continuing U.S. role of defining and administering the global political-economic system. To perform these missions, Influence Squadron commodores will need a strong and varied complement of platforms to cover low-end missions. Function, in this case, will follow form.

More Henderson, Less Bonds, Proceedings, April 2010, Commander Henry J. Hendrix, U.S. Navy

In his April 2009 groundbreaking Proceedings article Buy Fords, Not Ferraris, CDR Jerry Hendrix advocated that in order to meet the broad requirements of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the US Navy needs to realign force structure to better manage steady state engagement operations with regional partners. Among observers of the US Navy, this strategic concept resonated as a responsible function of US naval power, but in the form advocated (the article suggested reducing the number of carriers in the fleet) it was met with visceral objection within the big blue Navy. In his second Proceedings article discussing Influence Squadrons, CDR Hendrix expanded the role of Influence Squadrons while also describing in specifics the form an Influence Squadron would take as an operational squadron supporting sustained presence in various regions globally.

Full disclosure. When I first read Buy Fords, Not Ferraris, it became my objective to get to know Jerry Hendrix, and over time we have become very good friends. My thought process was - this fool is about to get thrown out of the Navy for writing this article, because as I saw the environment in the Navy; I did not believe the Navy would be very accommodating of any Commander who writes an article that challenges the status quo via Proceedings. Time has proven my assumptions in 2009 both regarding Jerry's career and the resilience of the Navy leadership to take criticism completely inaccurate. However, you might ask, if Jerry and I have become such good friends - why haven't I ever written about More Henderson, Less Bonds until now?

The answer is - I believe the Influence Squadron represents an incomplete concept that 1) needs to be tested before any serious investments are made and 2) better developed as a Joint concept more than it has been described to date in the two Proceedings articles. I see one specific issue completely absent from the Influence Squadron as produced to date that I believe must be addressed.

The Selective Engagement Problem

In December of 2009 I was shocked when Bryan McGrath posted that he believed a serious review of the Navy's maritime strategy was necessary, as CS-21 represents a document he was personally intimately involved in developing. He noted legitimately a concern that allies "will quickly grow disenchanted with us as the operational realities of declining budgets drive us away from cooperative security arrangements and toward selective engagement and offshore balancing." We are already seeing policy decisions during a time of difficult budgets force the Navy to primarily focus on high end naval requirements, but even more remarkable on the point of selective engagement - 3 years after the release of CS-21, Task Force 151 represents the only example where the US Navy has attempted to develop a force towards addressing a low end spectrum security threat. With all due respect to the US Navy, if results matter - Task Force 151 has been a feeble effort, at best.

The naval forces have done a much better job with cooperative assistance. Global Fleet Stations and Medical Diplomacy and Engagement activities have been impressive activities of the maritime services over the last few years. The Southern Partnership Station, the African Partnership Station, and the Pacific Partnership deployments all represent forward thinking engagements where maritime forces can and have made a significant impact in developing partnerships in various regions. It is important to note however that while these are very important and useful activities, at a time when security problems in the maritime domain are expanding and the nation is fighting enemies in a global war on multiple maritime fronts - these engagement activities provide no direct warfighting contribution to the global war effort. Ultimately the success of promoting security with these deployments depend almost entirely on secondary effects by training other nations to make a contribution towards maritime security.

I find it frustrating that three years after the release of maritime strategy the Navy cannot point to a single major activity, whether experimental or traditional, where the entire range of low spectrum threats are addressed as a dedicated naval solution to a specific regional problem - the very quiet Philippines operations being an "almost" example. While the Navy is clearly globally distributed, as a naval observer I would argue that the Navy's version of "mission tailored maritime forces" is in reality either 'whatever can be spared from high end requirements' or 'mission tailored engagement only' activities. Where is the intellectual rigor within the COCOMS towards deploying naval capabilities that aligns "mission tailored maritime forces" to a region specific to the strategic objective of "preventing war?" The absence of a single example, and compounded by the feeble results of Task Force 151 in the context of expanding problems off Somalia, explains why Influence Squadrons resonates as a starting point, or strategic foundation, for how to leverage naval power along the broad range of capabilities short of major war at sea.

Evolve the Influence Squadrons Capability

We are seeing serious negative trends is Somalia. In an AP interview last week, Interpol's secretary general Ronald K. Noble said "we believe that 'the Afghanistan' in the next five to 10 years will be Somalia and those parts of Africa (countries in the north and west)." That is a serious warning, and in the context of all the counter-terrorism activities across Europe over the last week, it is a warning that goes to the heart of CS-21 regarding preventing future war. As the US prepares to potentially draw down forces in Afghanistan, will events unfold that will make Somalia the next land war against terrorist extremists? If that scenario is possible (and I believe we are trending towards probable), then it should be the strategic purpose of naval forces to prevent such a war from occuring - as it is the specifically stated strategic purpose of naval forces as spelled out in the US Navy's own maritime strategy.

I completely understand this is a policy issue, but this is the case that Navy leadership must be able to make at the policy level if the Navy is to justify its role as a military capability intended to prevent future war.

One of my biggest complaints with the US Navy today is how discussions regarding the rise of al-Shabab in Somalia immediately trends towards a conversation of a problem on land. The same is true of conversations surrounding Somali piracy - very smart people stand up to sound smart describing piracy as a problem on land. These are factual statements, but it is also a factual statement that throughout the history of the United States, naval power formed the foundation by which our nation has successfully influenced events on land.

My issue with Influence Squadrons as described is that it is an organization of capabilities that addresses functions of naval power specific to the maritime domain. In public policy debates of the 21st century, even Navy advocates often refer to the shore line as a great wall that seemingly prevents naval power to be influential to problems that originate in ungoverned spaces on land - short of recommending major combat activities. The shore is not a wall; it is a Maginot line waiting for military power from the sea to blitzkrieg across selectively for purposes of positively influencing local conditions. In ungoverned spaces like Somalia where security threats like terrorism and piracy are on the rise; where narcotics, human migration, weapons proliferation, human trafficking, and other illicit activities are prevalent primarily due to the conditions on land - it is critical that naval forces develop and deploy mission tailored maritime forces with the capabilities to influence this entire range of challenges. I believe the US Navy is capable of fielding "Influence Squadrons" with the ability to make positive regional influence, and I include regions like Somalia that are ungoverned and extremely complicated.

Developing Realistic Security and Assistance Squadrons

It is said that rising powers like China prevent the US Navy from adequately providing the forces necessary to address regional security problems in places like Somalia. I would argue that the rise of China is why addressing problems in other regions is critical to overall US strategy that emphasizes positive sum arrangements among allies. With that said I completely understand why the shipbuilding budget cannot be adjusted at this time to meet regional security challenges in places like Somalia. I also do not believe the funding must come from the shipbuilding budget to address the range of threats in places like Somalia.

Whether one calls it an Influence Squadron or African Partnership Station - East, I believe the US Navy should deploy a realistic security and assistance squadron to the Horn of Africa scheduled to arrive in October of 2011. This squadron would be developed with existing platforms the Navy already has access to and would consist of:

The most reliable LPD in inventory whether 2 years old or 42 years old. The LPD will support a company sized SOF capable force of Marines tailored to meet the requirements of anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and regional security assistance training. The well deck will support the M80 Stiletto and small boats, and a 2 helicopter UH-1 detachment is a requirement. The LPD will act as flagship for the squadron and primarily focus on influencing activity ashore.

A dedicated T-AKE to provide logistics support for the squadron.

FSF-1 Sea Fighter. Sea Figher will primarily be used as a UAV launch, recovery, and maintenance platform for the squadron, but will also function in regional maritime security operations and as a security training and assistance platform for regional security engagement and exchange.

ALAKAI and HUAKAI (both PDF), which for the record MARAD purchased at auction for $25 mil each on September 30, 2024 (so the rumor goes). These ships will function as UAV platforms in addition to transporting riverine squadron equipment and other detachments from the NECC. Supporting small boats and participating in regional training exchanges, the high speed vessels will be expected to do a lot of everything.

Two Perry class frigates. These ships will be outfitted with both lethal and non-lethal weapons of many types, and also serve as platforms for helicopter detachments. These are my primary pirate hunters.

Sea SLICE is my primary inshore platform that would be utilized to support disruption operations against both terrorist and pirate related activities.

The USCGC Bertholf (WMSL 750), which will work in cooperation with regional Coast Guards to establish fishery protection operations and training around Somalia.

Other assets will include Coast Guard LEDET and DOG detachments, a Riverine detachment, a SEABEE det, and a Navy medical det with at least 4 doctors.

This force would be sent with a mandate to kill terrorist, hunt pirates, assist the various United Nation operations in the region, train local security, and generally establish a proactive American presence off the Horn of Africa leveraging less restrictive rules of engagement for the purposes of preventing a future war that could potentially require western ground forces in Somalia. The squadrons mandate includes building security capacity and information exchange with the regional Coast Guards including regional nations but specifically the Coast Guard and maritime security forces of Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland. Disruption of terrorist activity and pirate activity is a primary function of this squadron. Any nation willing to join this security and assistance squadron would be required to commit forces for training and workups by February 1, 2011.

To me, that is what an Influence Squadron would be. It would operate both at sea and selectively on land. It would be designed to meet the entire range of challenges in a region suffering from maritime security and governance instability issues. It would consist of enough vessels that it can support security operations and regional engagement concurrently. It would be constructed using existing assets readily available for purchase or charter. It would provide opportunity for buy-in from allies willing to conform to established ROE, or allow for logistical support from allies wanting to contribute but politically unwilling to commit at the warfighter level. It combines joint maritime service capabilities into a single force, tailored to the mission, globally distributed while regionally concentrated to meet specific emerging security problems with the intent of preventing war. The squadron sustains presence for 6 months, October 2011 until March 2012 - with Sea Fighter and Sea SLICE remaining permanently deployed to the region as operational assets for future operational experimentation.

The US Navy doesn't need to invest major shipbuilding budget money to deploy Influence Squadrons, but should indeed leverage GWOT operational funding to invest a small amount towards preventing a future war in Somalia using existing vessels readily available, and letting loose a few highly creative Navy and Marine officers ready to prove that US naval power can influence the global war on terror in ungoverned regions at a much lower cost than land military power can.

CTF-151 Rescues Pirated Vessel

You could see this coming a mile away, or at least I did. It wasn't difficult - like Babe Ruth calling his home runs, my fellow blogger over at the US Naval Institute blog Captain Alexander Martin set expectations with his July 2010 Proceedings article Pirates Beware: Force Recon Has Your Number.

Well, as the USNI Blog put it better, Pirates Beware: Force Recon Really Does Have Your Number. (<-- insider gouge there)

Here is the official announcement by the US Navy.

At approximately 5 a.m. local time, Sept. 9, 24 U.S. Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit's Maritime Raid Force (MRF) aboard USS Dubuque (LPD 8) operating under Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), boarded and seized control of Antigua-Barbuda-flagged, German-owned vessel M/V Magellan Star from pirates who attacked and boarded the vessel early Sept 8.

This successful mission by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) secured the safety of the ship's crew and returned control of the ship to the civilian mariners. Nine pirates are currently under control of CTF 151, pending further disposition. This ship's crew has not reported any injuries or casualties. There were no reported injuries from the U.S. Maritime Raid Force.

The CTF-151 flagship, TCG Gökçeada, a Turkish frigate, was the first ship on scene, responding to a distress call received from Magellan Star, Sept. 8. Two additional warships assigned to CTF-151, USS Dubuque (LPD 8) and USS Princeton (CG 59) arrived in the vicinity of the attack to provide support to Gökçeada.

Well done. There are many things we can observe here that must be noted and recognized.

1) The crew of the M/V Magellan Star had a plan. As Barbara Starr at CNN reported, "Members of the ship's crew had locked themselves in a safe room, so the military felt it was a good time to board the ship, the spokesman said." That means the ship owners, ships captain, and ships crew deserves a lot of credit for having a plan and sticking too it. The prevented themselves from being captured after opening communications with CTF-151 and were able to successfully hold out for 8-10 hours until coalition forces arrived to retake the vessel.

This is part of the lessons learned process the industry had following the Maersk Alabama capture last year, where the crew was able to secure themselves away from the pirates, which was the essential element in ultimately foiling that successful hijacking. The latest incident reinforces the importance of the industries role in anti-piracy.

2) The Marines executed a mission they trained for, and apparently were able to prepare and accomplish the mission with a turn around of around 6-8 hours. The M/V Magellan Star was hijacked on the night of September 8th, but the Navy announcement says the rescue attempt was conducted at 5:00am local on September 9th. It cannot be understated how hard the Marines at Camp Pendleton have been working to address the piracy issue with their forward deploying MEUs.

It really dates back to 2008 when the 13th MEU under Col David Coffman deployed. Before the USS New Orleans (LPD 18) was rammed by one of our submarines, the ship supported Marines of the 13 MEU who tested several operational concepts in anti-piracy. I ran into Col Coffman again at USNI WEST in February of this year, and on the piracy panel he captured the attention of the room with his first statement, which I wrote about at the time:

"KILL THE PIRATES."

It was noteworthy about half the crowd began clapping and cheering, and the double take Dr. Lunsford gave the Col added to the effect. It was a clear ploy though, the Col appeared to me to use the red meat to get the crowds attention so he could articulate the range of capabilities on both sides of the spectrum the MEU brings to the fight. He touted the ARG solution but noted there was “no appetite at the policy level for kinetic solutions in Washington.” He then highlighted several problems including the division of organizational labor regarding Somalia. While CENTCOM has operational control over ships off Somalia, Somalia falls under AFRICOM, and the challenges in coordinating activities at sea onto land - at any level for anything - are enormous. I was left with the impression the division of labor was a problem of rigid control, which prevents any warfighter at sea from adapting quickly to situations.

But during that conversation Col Coffman used the attention of the audience he had gained to make clear the US Marine Corps has a range of capabilities that opens up a recipe of options for dealing with piracy - both at sea or on land. He discussed how the US Navy - US Marine Corps team will train and will be prepared when their number is called to deal with the any pirate problem. His words from that panel resonated today as we see the Navy/Marine Maritime Raid Force execute a perfect anti-piracy operation.

3) It is not a trivial point that the commander of CTF-151 is Turkish Navy Rear Adm. Sinan Ertugrul. The United States Navy is committed globally, and the cooperative nature of international task forces that work as a coalition to solve mutual problems is critical to the United States in being able to maintain our global presence as the US Navy is able to deploy fewer and fewer ships. Piracy is a problem, but it is an international problem and not something the US Navy should be attempting to solve alone. The international framework is critical to anti-piracy operations.

More importantly, the international approach is working. The turkish frigate TCG Gökçeada (F 494) was the first warship to respond to the M/V Magellan Star after it had been captured. In most cased of piracy, it is a coalition ship and not a US Navy ship that is the first responder to pirate hijackings. In the ~20 months of CTF-151 the command and coordination function of the coalition has evolved into a genuine capability that shows no signs of problems that coordination between different nations can often reveal. Now when something happens, military forces from multiple countries can take action, coordinate, and execute a highly complicated mission in less than half a day.

Try doing that with some of your business clients, or folks in the same organization but different department at work.

The benefits over time of coalition approaches to complicated problems around the world have the potential to create unique opportunities in the security environment not seen in the modern age. If a major terrorist attack (9/11 scale) against Paris or Beijing killing thousands was performed by Al Shabab, the response looks a lot different than it did when we responded to 9/11 in Afghanistan - because both China, Russia, India, NATO, and the EU are already involved with Somalia.

4) Observe the capabilities necessary to be successful in MSO.

Specifically trained manpower
Persistent forward presence
Capabilities including Helicopters and Small Boats

More red flags for the LCS if you ask me, because the ship isn't built to manage the specialized manpower necessary for these necessary activities associated with MSO, and the ship is not built for endurance, rather hull speed (which has yet to make a difference in any successful anti-piracy action to date). However, when you look at #3 it reinforces how the concept of the LCS is right even if the execution is a dumpster fire.

Well job 15th MEU.

Marine Corps Operating Concepts Released Tuesday

Where it has not been possible to set in motion initiatives to meet certain future operational needs, the Secretary has identified vectors for the evolution of the force, calling on DoD components to devote sustained efforts toward developing new concepts and capabilities to address those needs. Assessments of future operating environments will continue, with an eye toward refining our understanding of future needs. At the same time, the Department will continue to look assiduously for savings in underperforming programs and activities, divestiture, technology substitution, less-pressing mission and program areas, and other accounts so that more resources can be devoted to filling these gaps.

In some capability areas, meeting emerging challenges will call for the development of wholly new concepts of operation. Confronting sophisticated anti-access challenges and threats posed by nuclear-armed regional adversaries will pose particularly difficult problems. In recognition of the dynamism of the threat environment and advances in unmanned technologies, the Department will be examining future operational needs in several capability areas, including ISR, fighters and long-range strike aircraft, joint forcible entry, and information networks and communications. Assessments of programmed forces in these areas will center on iterative, interactive war games, in which force planners, operators, and technical experts can explore alternative strategies and operational concepts in an environment that tests forces against an intelligent, adaptive adversary. Insights gained from these efforts will inform future investments in research and development and, over time, will help decision makers to further rebalance future forces.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) pg 40-41

As I was reading through the Marine Corps Operating Concepts third edition, this section of the QDR came to mind. The Marine Corps Operating Concepts third edition document to be released publicly on Tuesday is one of the best documents I have read from a maritime service since I began the blog. If you are frustrated by the lack of specifics and generic speak that often characterizes US Navy documents like the recently released NOC, you will find the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (MOC) document a breath of fresh air. Detailed? You betcha. This document works on the Company CO's chalkboard, or PowerPoint - if you prefer.

The reason this section of the QDR came to mind is because there are still many questions about what Joint Forcible Entry means today - phrase that seems to have direct connotation for the Marine Corps. I think it is interesting that Information Dissemination author LtCol Roger S. Galbraith has been out fighting the perception war on this topic. His recent LA Times op-ed was akin to a rebuttal for the arguments against the Marines in another LA Times article. The discussion point that forcible entry amphibious assault is no longer feasible in the 21st century is becoming a popular meme, but it is also a distraction.

As the QDR stresses in the section quoted - the question isn't whether the nation needs the capability of forcible entry, rather how the capability is executed in the context of the emerging environment. When I read the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (3rd edition), I was very pleased to read that the Marines are taking seriously the necessity to tactically adapt amphibious assault as part of the requirement to retain the tactical necessity for such a capability. Forcible entry in the 1940s and 1950s may have indeed been a large scale beach amphibious assault, but that isn't what it might look like in 2010 and beyond. The Marines seem to understand this, while those outside the Marines are framing the forcible entry discussion in historically accurate but otherwise irrelevant terms within the modern context.

The Marines come out swinging early and often with a focus on two mission areas - assuring littoral access and winning small wars. If first impressions mean anything - my first impression was that the focus on these two mission areas reads like a slap in the face of the Navy who I believe is actively retreating from the littorals at flank speed, and a slap at the Army as a reminder that it is Marines who own the small wars history of the United States. The document reads as a slap to neither in truth, but the Marine brand is strong enough that the first perception existed for me nonetheless.

But as I read the document I immediately found it one of the most insightful operational concept document produced by a maritime service I can ever recall reading. I was engaged with the specific guidance towards a general direction one finds in the issues framed by the contents, and when I finished reading I came away as a reader impressed by the depth and detail. This document is instructive to every Marine, and yet informative to broader defense establishment as well - indeed one could even note how the document gives guidance directly to the defense industry without doing the program centric cheerleading we used to see in the 90s in these types of documents.

For example, when reading through the section discussing the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) I was surprised to see the comment "there may be a requirement for a light-attack platform to add to the ACE inventory" being made as a comment of speculation - the implication being a recognition that the Marines must be open to examining alternatives. How refreshing - read a Navy document and you will never find a discussion of force structure of any kind whatsoever - nevermind a discussion that includes speculation regarding alternatives.

Briefly - a few points. A good portion of the document discusses Small Wars as the core of the Corps. Leveraging the 'small wars' meme (in no small part popularized by brand names) is a pretty smart way to introduce Enhanced MAGTF operations across a broad range of missions and relate it at a generic level with the reader. The detail of size, shape, and guidance towards operational requirements and capabilities is done very well.

But what caught my attention in the document is how the Marines emphasized themselves as a critical piece of assuring littoral access across a range of access environments; permissive, uncertain, and restricted. From a detail perspective I think one could argue the Marine Corps made a better case for US Navy 'joint forcible entry' capabilities at sea and in the air than the US Navy did with their own NOC. There are several pages dedicated to discussing a range of naval capabilities from mine warfare to carrier aviation to strike from the sea - indeed there might be more words dedicated to discussing the value of the aircraft carrier in the MOC than the NOC - and I'm not kidding - the word count will be close.

The MOC does an interesting thing to the reader - or at least this reader - by raising serious questions regarding whether or not the US Navy is capable of having a blunt discussion on forcible entry. That discussion would include topics like technologies and tactics, operational requirements and force metrics necessary to achieve access. The Marines appear willing to have a public discussion on the topic; but if AirSea Battle is any indication - the Navy is not prepared for that discussion publicly.

The open communication approach of the Marines in the MOC leads directly to Annex A - which for me is a critical discussion of Strategic Communications. I believe N3/N5 would do well to copy Annex A from the MOC, change a bit of text to 'navalize' the wording, and directly insert the section into the NOC. Annex A represents the single best discussion of integrating strategic communications into operations in any military document released by any of the maritime services to date, and one of the most important sections missing from the Naval Operations Concept. I highly encourage every US Navy officer, even if they don't give a shit about the MOC, to read carefully Annex A because there is no question that section belongs in every command at sea today.

I want to stress this point. The single most important lesson we can learn from the Israeli maritime blockade of Gaza incident that occurred recently is the role that YouTube played for the Israeli Navy. Without those YouTube videos that highlighted the events from the Israeli Navy perspective, Israel was left absent context and without weapons in an information war being waged against them. With YouTube videos, Israel had ammunition in their fight. Understanding the information and communication context of every operational decision will be critical to Navy leaders who will often find themselves in very difficult situations all alone in distant seas. Annex A emphasizes the role of these communication efforts to operations, and the discussion in the MOC is useful not only to Marines, but to the Navy as well.

I'll post a link to the MOC as soon as I find one, and I encourage everyone to read it. For once, I can recommend a document produced by the maritime services that won't make your eyes bleed, because the MOC is highly informative and a lot more thought stimulating (thanks to detail and depth) than the documents I typically link to from the blog.

The Future of the Corps: Thoughts by LtGen George J. Flynn, USMC

The Future of the Corps

So I’ve sat in on a couple media interviews with LtGen George J. Flynn, USMC. He is the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, i.e…..the future. Of course you don’t make general by throwing out bold, radical statements to the media, but there were a few interesting nuggets in what he has been saying.

On the Future of the Corps

“In eight years of a land war, where the Corps has been acting as if we are a second land army, we need to get back to our amphibious, expeditionary roots.” Nothing new here, but it at least shows a priority of where we want to go. Evidenced by a recent amphibious training exercise Dawn Blitz in Camp Pendleton, CA, and one coming up this summer on the east coast. Dawn Blitz was the largest amphibious training exercise in the past four years.

[The Corps] “is the nation’s sea-based crisis-response force.” Watch this flavor….if a new widget doesn’t help us do this, it’s not as valuable.

On Ground (or sea) Vehicles

In the design of a ground vehicle, LtGen frequently refers to an iron triangle, “Performance, Payload and Protection.” You can protect the heck out of vehicles, but then they don’t move as well [MRAP’s], or you can move faster with little protection [LAV’s]. “We think mobility provides some level of protection” said the general as he was asked for a response to the development of the new (50 - 70 ton) Army combat vehicle. That explains the Corps’ proposed vehicles, why we like the idea of a HMMWV with more protection (search for HMMWV Capsule), and lighter JLTV variants.

On Amphibious Ops

The SecDef has publicly questioned amphibious operations in this day of cheap anti-ship missiles, LtGen Flynn’s comments on amphibious ops, “We’ll need to use the sea as maneuver space (from the NOC) and be able to move from ship to shore fast enough to confuse the enemy. The enemy won’t be able to defend everywhere. Now the Navy says we’ll have to come from over the horizon, well the EFV supports that. We will have to disperse our forces. The enemy will get precision [meaning precision-guided weapons], and we can’t let them have a target.”

That phrase “the enemy will get precision” puts a whole new light on the type of military operations that collect a large amount of forces or materiel, essentially creating a target for the enemy. So as we go forward, will we keep forces small and dispersed, or will we create targets then create the layers of protection required to protect those targets? LtGen Flynn only talked about dispersion.

The NSS stresses engagement as a key tool to work in peacetime with partner nations. LtGen Flynn said, “Engagement is the seam between diplomacy and defense. We see a vital need for the Corps to be engaged in the areas of the world where future security will be uncertain and challenging. Seventy percent of those areas can be reached by sea.” And then he of course went to list the advantage of an amphibious force for engagement, no basing rights, no overflight required, etc. Of course those are easy things to say when you don’t have to eat chow on ship!