The Use of the Marines in Europe for Deterrence

Marine COL William Nemeth has an intriguing article in this month’s Proceedings about how the Marines could contribute to deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Nemeth suggests the existing Black Sea Rotational Force could be expanded to a “full battalion combat team” he dubs “Rotational Force Europe” that could be deployed anywhere in Eastern Europe as needed. This combined arms force would consist of a reinforced infantry battalion with supporting combined arms attachments such as a reconnaissance platoon, light armored vehicle platoon/company, tank platoon, amphibious assault vehicle platoon, artillery battery, aviation combat element, and logistics combat element. I’m not going to do the approximate manpower counts for each of these components, but I’ll wager that their collective size would be more than double the Black Sea Rotational Force’s recent size.

Using Robert Rubel’s hierarchy of presence as a reference, my instinct is that Rotational Force Europe’s inherent capabilities when deployed as a aggregated group would fall somewhere between a tripwire force and a force capable of delaying/disrupting a notional Russian ground offensive (at least for a short time). If it functioned as part of a larger NATO standing forward combined arms conventional deterrent, the likelihood of bogging down a Russian thrust would probably be even greater.

But Nemeth also talks about splitting this Rotational Force Europe up into reinforced companies for deployment in widely-separated locations from the Baltics to Romania to even Georgia. He notes that the additional equipment needed to reinforce these companies could be pulled from the Marines’ prepositioned stockpiles in Norway, with augmentation personnel flown in from the U.S. All this is fine for peacetime engagement, training, and showing the flag. In a crisis, though, it seems to me that these companies would still be nothing more than tripwires. That’s okay as long as we’re honest about how a tripwire gambit must be structured in order to be effective. First, the tripwire must be placed in a location where an aggressor’s conventional forces cannot avoid coming into direct contact with it. Second, it must be latently backed by larger and heavier combat-credible forces positioned further back in the theater that can immediately provide it with combined arms support, begin deploying forward to reinforce it, and begin inflicting countervailing damage on the aggressor. Third, it must be able to latently back the host nation’s constabulary forces responding to an aggressor’s “salami tactic” incursions; the constabularies in turn must be able to provide physical security support for the tripwire’s emplacements and lines of communication/maneuver. Lastly, it must be accepted that losses in the tripwire force will likely be horrendous. That’s the price of being on the frontline at the beginning of a major war.

Nemeth goes into commendable detail regarding the air and naval assets that would be needed to support his Rotational Force Europe. It’s worth noting that he calls for there to be a standing presence in theater of two to three amphibious warships to perform transport, force insertion, or afloat staging base tasks. Given that the amphibious fleet is already overtaxed, something would almost certainly have to give in terms of presence in other theaters in order to restore that kind of presence in 6^th Fleet. The same is true for his call for a standing presence of two to four additional DDGs on top of the four now permanently deployed in Rota, Spain, plus four to five Littoral Combat Ships. He also calls for a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to be assigned to 6^th Fleet at all times; it is not clear whether this is the same as the amphibious warships he listed for transport or an additional set of such ships carrying their own Marines. While I don't disagree with him in terms of the need to reestablish a more sizable standing U.S. Navy forward presence in the European theater, note that CS-21R all but declares our existing force structure is insufficient to do so and also achieve all the other prioritized strategic tasks in other theaters assigned by our political leadership. CS-21R makes clear the burden for naval presence in Europe therefore falls on our NATO allies' fleets.

COL Nemeth briefly discusses how a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) might be used to quickly reinforce Europe in the event of a conflict with Russia. He suggests that a standing MEB headquarters element should be attached to European Command to plan for and command the flying-in of Marines from the U.S. to marry up with the prepositioned equipment stockpiles in Norway, and then deploy where needed in northeastern Europe—including the Baltics. He also implies that equipment could be prepositioned on NATO’s Black Sea members’ territories for contingencies in that portion of the theater. While I strongly agree with the use of a MEB for these purposes, I would point out that any use of the Baltic or Black Seas for transporting the MEB’s units towards frontal areas would be risky as a crisis peaked and nearly impossible if it had to occur after a war had already started. Russian sea denial capabilities in those waters will be too dense, at least during a conventional conflict’s first few weeks. This means gear must be prepositioned closer to where it might actually be needed. Norway is probably fine for Scandinavian operations. Prepositioning in Poland is probably necessary for operations in that country or the Baltics. Prepositioning in Romania and possibly also Bulgaria is unquestionably necessary for operations in those countries. Nemeth suggests that Rotational Force Europe might be used to enable the MEB’s theater entry and then movement to action; this could be a very important role for the former that deserves further analysis.

To make Rotational Force Europe, standing 6^th Fleet presence by a MEU, and the contingency MEB possible, Nemeth asserts that the Corps will have to stop rotationally deploying East Coast Marine units to augment Marine forces in Japan. While this is contrary to the Defense Department’s strategic prioritization of East Asia, it does make sense given the comparatively far higher military tensions with Russia than China at present. It also offers further evidence that our Navy-Marine Corps team is undersized (and budget levels being what they are, underprepared) for the strategic tasks it is assigned.

All in all, Nemeth has laid out an excellent and provocative article. Future analysis ought to look at how his ideas might pair up with Terrence Kelly’s ideas on how army forces (both U.S. and allied) ought to be used for conventional deterrence in Poland and the Baltics. More attention also needs to be paid with respect to how air and naval forces (whether U.S. or allied) ought to be used, especially in support of U.S. and allied ground forces fighting on the continent. And of course, the means for protecting the flow of reinforcements and logistical support into Europe and then onward towards frontal areas still requires much focused thought.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Strategic Raids... From the Sea

LCDR Benjamin Armstrong, one of the up and coming naval officers who truly gets irregular warfare, has written a fine article on maritime raids for this month's Proceedings. His recommendation to expand the utility of carriers by adding small Marine landing teams and MV-22s makes a lot of sense. CVNs can easily augment our amphibious capacity and provide significant flexibility to conduct raids and other ground-centric missions when gators are not around. This move could be compared to the addition of F-35Bs to large deck amphibious ships to augment our CSGs striking power. In other words, our CSGs should become more ARG-like and our ESGs/ARGs can become more CSG-like. If our gator fleet shrinks further, we’ll need to get creative in how we employ all ships in support of objectives ashore, and implementation of BJ’s suggestions would be a smart step in that direction.

On a related note: MARSOC, approaching its sixth anniversary, has operated almost exclusively in land-locked in Afghanistan until recently, when teams were utilized in an amphibious capacity in the Bold Alligator exercise. MSOR elements have excelled ashore in direct action and foreign internal defense missions, but their potential for maritime use has yet to be fully realized. Their role in Bold Alligator provides some clues as to how they might be used to prep the environment for their larger MEU brothers conducting an amphibious raid.

“Those forces were used for "shaping" operations, or for missions designed to prepare the shoreline and areas inland for the arriving Marine Corps. Those troops also provided intelligence for a planned deep insert air assault against an enemy encampment at Ft. Pickett, VA, Aiken said.”

It has been said that these types of tactical operations - even those using only a handful of troops, can have strategic effects. Counter-terrorism operations the past several years have borne this proposition out to a degree, and some of these operations have been supported or even conducted entirely from the sea. Yet CT is only one of many types of raids that the sea services conduct. The list includes NEO, personnel recovery, port seizure, and punitive expeditions, to name just a few. Another timely article here discusses strategic versus tactical raids in relation to the IDF.

Regardless, discussion of the maritime raid is important if for no other reason that we seem to have forgotten why we do these “hit and run” sort of operations. It’s worth remembering the value of short term military interventions with finite objectives as we consider the myriad of negative impacts to the force from long term deployments for stability operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Philippines, and Horn of Africa.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Rethinking Amphibious Assault

For USNI subscription members only (behind the paywall), this article by Noel Williams titled The Next Wave: Assault Operations for a New Era is a really interesting read. Here is a sample:

Perhaps the most promising technology area is unmanned systems. In the 2020s and beyond there will simply be no reason to place 20 Marines in a steel box and drive them through mined waters to land on an area-denied beach. An unmanned breacher vehicle (UBV), or family of unmanned systems, could clear and mark the assault lanes ahead of any manned surface movement. These UBVs could be launched from surface, subsurface, or airborne delivery means—overtly or covertly. UBVs could be given large magnetic and acoustic signatures to trigger influence mines and could be equipped with cameras, remote gun systems, plows, cutters, and/or line charges to clear beach obstacles. Additionally, it would be possible to transition the UBV to convoy reconnaissance and clearing missions once manned vehicles are ashore.

Introducing an unmanned system breaks the tyranny of the hybrid vehicle that we have found to be so costly and that inevitably results in compromises in both operating domains—afloat and ashore. Since current plans call for landing existing manned breacher vehicles roughly 30 minutes after the first amphibious tractor landing, the time frame requiring a vehicle that transitions seamlessly from sea to shore is roughly 30 minutes. If the joint force is able to achieve beach superiority for this brief period, there is no need for a hybrid vehicle at all. Introducing an unmanned initial assault wave completely eliminates the requirement.

Unmanned systems can provide improved operational capability and enhanced force-protection at significantly reduced cost. Unmanned breachers allow the introduction of ground-fighting vehicles to shore via surface-effect and displacement connectors. By thus avoiding the requirement for a hybrid vehicle, the Marine Corps can focus its limited resources on producing a new fighting vehicle optimized for operations ashore.

This combination of unmanned systems for the initial surface wave and non-hybrid wheeled fighting vehicles for ashore provides a real opportunity to lighten the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), while drawing a clear distinction between Marine Corps and heavy Army units. Additional savings might be realized by participating in a joint venture with the Army to produce a next-generation fighting vehicle (a Stryker successor) with riverine capability. The latest generation of light armored vehicle, or its commercially available equivalent, would provide operational flexibility, training, maintenance, sustainment, and affordability benefits. Determining the actual material solution should be facilitated by additional wargaming and analysis based on threat and operational-concept considerations.

If the USMC did something like this - going unmanned with their breach vehicle from the sea - that would have a trickle down impact on several things including the MPC (Marine Personnel Carrier) requirements, because the MPC would become more important as the primary mover of Marines. There are a lot of things you can do when you remove the EFV/AAAV role and replace that with an unmanned system, but it is also obvious it adds additional impacts to other areas of the USMC ground vehicle force that would require additional study.

I like this idea a lot, but need more time to consider the degree to which it impacts other things.

Because Marines Don't Know How to Fail in Any Context

This article was on the front page of the New York Times print edition today.

The Marines were at the gay rights center at the invitation of Toby Jenkins, the center’s executive director, who said he saw no better way to celebrate the end of “don’t ask, don’t tell” in a conservative state that strongly supports the military.

“If we’ve been fighting for 15 years for the right to be in the military, we said, ‘Let’s just ask military recruiters if they’d be available,’ ” he said. “But no one was prepared for that question. It was like I was talking to people like they were deer in the headlights.”

The Marines did in fact think that Mr. Jenkins’s invitation might be a hoax, so they checked him out and talked to their superiors, who talked to their superiors. Then they took a deep breath and decided to go. As the day wore on, the Marines said the bust in recruiting had been made up for in media exposure and public relations. Sergeant Henry and his public affairs officer, Capt. Abraham Sipe, gave interviews at the center with five local television stations, three print reporters and one correspondent for National Public Radio. In between, gay rights supporters stopped by to shake their hands.

This story may be in the context of DADT, or #newgayday as it went by some on Twitter, but this is also a great New York Times story about the US Marnie Corps.

Ms. Pratt, 20, asked Sergeant Henry what he liked about the Marines.

“It’s like a little family,” he said. “We get mad at each other, we joke with each other, but we don’t let anybody else make fun of us.”

“That’s pretty cool,” she said.

and

The Marines were the service most opposed to ending the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, but they were the only one of five invited branches of the military to turn up with their recruiting table and chin-up bar at the center Tuesday morning. Although Marines pride themselves on being the most testosterone-fueled of the services, they also ferociously promote their view of themselves as the best. With the law now changed, the Marines appear determined to prove that they will be better than the Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard in recruiting gay, lesbian and bisexual service members.

and

Not that getting into the Marines is easy for anyone right now. As the Marines tell it, only one in 10 applicants qualify for service, with most turned away for a variety of afflictions: asthma, attention deficit disorder, overweight (a 5-foot, 8-inch, 18-year-old male can’t weigh more than 180 pounds before boot camp), excessive tattoos, joint injuries, lack of a high school diploma and a history of drugs beyond infrequent marijuana use.

The NYTs article may have been in the context of DADT, but the story became one of the individual professionalism, professional expectations, and professional community that is the United States Marine Corps. That's a story the services can tell in any context, when their people are enabled to tell it.

It is my opinion enlisted Marines are perhaps the best in the DoD at STRATCOM, and I think there is room for some intellectual rigor to determine the reasons why and how that can be used in other areas. I am reminded how the Marines in this story makes a better case for green energy than the SECNAV makes in his stump speeches. Why? Because it's personal.

At Patrol Base Sparks, an outpost of Forward Operating Base Jackson, Staff Sgt. David Doty has become the resident expert of the solar-powered gear and is very pleased with this new asset.

“Our generators typically use more than 20 gallons of fuel a day. We are down to 2.5 gallons a day,” said Doty, 3rd Squad Leader, with1st Platoon, ‘I’ Company, and Fulton, Mo., native. “The system works amazing. By saving fuel for generators, it has cut back on the number of convoys, meaning less opportunity for one of our vehicles to hit an IED.”

His platoon commander, 1st Lt. Daric Kleppe, agrees, the less convoys, the better. “The enemy will exploit every soft target we have,” said the Vista, Calif., native. “A refueling vehicle becomes a screaming [easy] target.”

The Marines, sailors and the Afghan national army soldiers with ‘I’ Company are also using solar energy to recharge their batteries.

“As a platoon commander, if I don’t have ‘comm’ with my troops and my higher-ups, I am lost,” said 1st Lt. Josef Patterson, 2nd Platoon commander, and Owasso, Okla., native. “On the longer patrols we pack the solar blankets and can continuously charge our radio batteries. This also allows more room to pack things like ammunition.”

The Marines are also able to conserve their energy during the day, to light up their command operation centers and their tents at night. According to Staff Sgt. Greg Wenzel, 1st Plt., platoon sergeant, this has helped PB Sparks’ security when the sun goes down. “It’s way more tactical not running the generators at night,” said the Altoona, Pa., native. “At night the noise of a generator can carry a long way, become a calling card for insurgents.”

Compare that to these Remarks by the Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, at the National Clean Energy Summit 4.0 in Las Vegas, NV on Tuesday, 30 August 2024 (PDF).

There are great strategic reasons for moving away from fossil fuels. The main one is the one I just said - where we buy these supplies of fossil fuels. There’s also the matter of price shock and supply shock. Every time the cost of a barrel of oil goes up a dollar, it costs the United States Navy $31 million in extra fuel costs. When the Libya crisis began and the price of oil went up, the Navy faced a fuel bill increase of over $1.5 billion.

There are really sound tactical reasons, too. Just think of the difficulty of getting a gallon of gasoline to a Marine front-line unit in Helmand province in Afghanistan. You have to take that gallon of gasoline across one ocean - either the Atlantic or the Pacific. Then you take it over land, either north through Pakistan or south through the Northern Distribution Network by convoy, and then either across the Hindu Kush mountain range or across the Amu Darya River until you reach that Forward Operating Base.

And it’s costly, but it’s costly in more ways than just money. We import gasoline more than anything else - gasoline and water - more than anything else into Afghanistan. For every 50 convoys of gasoline we bring in, we lose a Marine. We lose a Marine, killed or wounded. That is too high a price to pay for fuel.

So because of those reasons; because of those compelling strategic and tactical reasons; because it is frankly a vulnerability for our military - when you’re a military force, you look at vulnerabilities of your actual or potential adversaries, but you had better look at your own vulnerabilities, as well. And one of our most glaring vulnerabilities is how we get and how we use energy, and it’s a vulnerability we have to address.

The problem here is that the SECNAV's strategic argument is valid, but dismissive. The Navy is buying biofuels for as much as $50 per gallon in preparation for their Green Strike Group, so suggesting that there is some money savings is still a theory, and isn't justified yet by budget reality. It's the difference between hope and reality. The tactical argument is obviously better, but tactical arguments made by politicians in a business suit never hit as hard as those made by someone in the field that says - 'look, this green tech shit is savings lives, like mine.'

The SECNAV and the Marines in this press statement are making the same argument, but the Marines make it better because they are detailed, specific, and they make it personal. The SECNAV isn't doing that, and I believe he would be better served adjusting his speeches so he tells the story through the eyes of the men and women in the services. I think both of these stories highlight a theme I've touched on within these blog pages for awhile - it isn't that the maritime services don't have a story to tell, it is that more often than not, they don't know how to tell a good story.

When Marine recruiters show up to a gay community center on DADT day, that's a story worth telling because it is a public demonstration of what Marines are and the professionalism Marines expect - and by the simple merit of being a personal example of exactly what they say, the actions earn the Marines a page 1A article on the New York Times. When Marines detail why green energy helps them tactically in the field to avoid ambush, cut down vulnerable logistics convoys, and helps keep equipment functioning when away from their forward operating bases - that's a personal story, and it resonates much stronger than the summary given by the SECNAV.

It is often said Generals and Admirals can't do STRATCOM, it simply isn't possible. I would argue that the Marine General Officer who enabled these Marines to go to the Gay Community Center in the NYTs article did STRATCOM very well, because that officer enabled a personal story on a public issue to be told. Those uniformed leaders who fail to enable their people to do their jobs in public environments, IMO those are the leaders who can't do STRATCOM.

The Corps is Shrinking!

What happened to my Corps?  Did anyone notice that we're shrinking? 

It was a tough winter for us.  First we lost the EFV in January, then in March of this year we released the Report of the 2010 Force Structure Review Group and in it the Corps did two big things, we'll see if they're both good.  Basically, we're going from 202k to 186k, reserves still stay roughly 40k. 

1.  We reshaped for the future (politically correct term for changed)....that's good.  Even though we were in Iraq for 8 years and we are still in Afghanistan after 10 years, we will eventually get back to ships and amphibious operations with relatively small (MEU/BLT/Squadron) units.

2.  We offered up 16,000 Marines to the evil forces of DoD shrinkage.  (I have a sneaky suspicion the evil forces of DoD shrinkage will want more eventually.)

If you pull up the link and look at the report, skip to the back for the real meat of what we will gain and what we will lose.  Here are some of the winners and losers:

1.  Artillery Battalions:  11 to 9
2.  Infantry Battalions:  27 to 24
3.  Flying Squadrons:  70 to 61
4.  Reduce Marine Wing Support Group HQ's: 3 to 0
5.  Increased Cyber structure (250 Marines)
6.  Inscreased Marine Special Ops (1,000 Marines)
7.  Reduced civilian structure (about 2,900)
8.  Increase civil affairs groups: 3 to 5
9.  Increase air and naval gunfire liaison companies: 2 to 3

There are others too...look at the report.  Some changes are already starting next FY. 

There are a couple themes in this:
1.  We need very capable, deployable battalion/squadon/MEU sized units, so we didn't take a big hit in training establishment we took a hit in the OpFor.
2.  War is changing, we need to be able to deploy quickly.  (less artillery and tanks)
3.  Integration, Liaison, and standing relationships are important.  (Standing MEB's oriented to geographic commands, standing Combat Logistics Battalions relationships with regiments and MEU's, more artillery/naval gunfire liaison companies)

But the potentially biggest deal is to build five standing Marine Expeditionary Brigade headquarters that are oriented to a geographic command.  These staffs will come from some MEF staff structure and some MARFOR staff structure.  I haven't seen yet how closely they'll work with the CoCOM's, if they will be the defacto MARFOR-fill-in-the-blank so the three stars don't have to wear four or five hats, or what.

The ink is still wet on this, (March this year) and we might have to revisit in light of budget talks.....who knows where that will go, at least we've put some marker down for our capabilities post-Afghanistan.

Observing Modern MSO Squadron Operations

This is an interesting update on the anti-piracy activities of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2). I see this as representing the other side of what Chris was discussing last night. I'm posting the news release in full (PDF).

NATO Operation Delivers Severe Blow Against Armed Pirates

Earlier this month, NATO counter-piracy forces delivered a severe blow against armed pirates off the coast of Somalia by arresting 34 suspected pirates. The suspected pirates had previously been observed loading up their mother ships and skiffs with fuel and weapons in order to attack merchant ships further out to sea. In a well-planned operation, NATO warships conducted a night-time strike on the known pirate lairs at sea, close to the coast. As well as detaining the 34 suspected pirates, 34 innocent hostages, who had been held by the pirates, were freed unharmed by the NATO forces.

Recent months have seen an increase in pirate attacks, particularly in the northern Arabian Sea, and with the monsoon season coming to an end, and the weather improving, it was seen as crucial for counter-piracy forces to strike to help prevent pirates getting out to sea to prey on merchant shipping transiting the area.

Over an extended period NATO warships HNLMS Tromp, HDMS Esbern Snare and USS Halyburton, observed the known pirate camps, supported by Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts from the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) and various other counter piracy forces.

On Friday, as part of the focussed operation, crew from NATO warship HDMS Esbern Snare boarded a suspicious whaler and found it to be packed with fuel, AK47 machine guns, a ladder and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and 3 suspected pirates. The whaler and weaponry were seized by the warship, and after being questioned, the suspected pirates were taken to a nearby beach.

On Saturday HDMS Esbern Snare then approached a dhow that was suspected to be involved in pirate activity. As the Danish boarding team investigated, the pirates started firing at them, who then fired back in self defence. In the fire-fight several pirates were wounded and as a result, a medical team from NATO flag ship HNLMS Tromp was quickly sent to the scene to render medical assistance.

Shortly afterwards HNLMS Tromp spotted another suspect dhow heading for a known pirate camp and as she closed in to investigate, her boarding team was also fired upon. Gunners on board Tromp and the boarding team returned fire, setting fire to the dhow. Ten pirates tried to escape in a skiff, but were quickly captured. When a team from HNLMS Tromp went to the dhow to assist the innocent crew, they found 2 fatally wounded pirates on board. At the same time, a previously pirated merchant vessel - MV Albedo, lifted anchor and headed straight for the NATO flagship.

After some well-aimed warning shots across her bow, Albedo returned to her anchorage. HNLMS Tromp then escorted the freed dhow and crew to safer waters.

On several occasions during the operation, the NATO warships surveyed the anchorages and the pirate beaches. They will continue to do so for the next few months.

Speaking after the operation, Rear Admiral Hank Ort, Chief of Staff at NATO’s Maritime HQ in Northwood said, “This operation has shown the pirates that we mean business and will not tolerate their criminal activities. By conducting this operation close to the shore we have been able to deprive some pirates of a safe passage back to their anchorages and deprive others of the opportunity to go out and attack innocent merchant ships. We are pleased with the success of this operation but we are not complacent as we know there is still much work to be done.”

As per the release:

NATO Forces currently in Operation Ocean Shield:

HNLMS TROMP (Flagship) - Netherlands
HDMS ESBERN SNARE - Denmark
USS BAINBRIDGE - United States of America
USS HALYBURTON - Unites States of America
TCG GIRESUN - Turkey

As a press release, we aren't really getting some of the key operational details, but it does sound to me that NATO has been conducting some form of shore blockade on a specific pirate group.

When I think about the three ships involved in this activity, HNLMS Tromp (F803), HDMS Esbern Snare (L17), USS Halyburton (FFG 40); I see the future of how the Littoral Combat Ship could be used operationally when fielded in numbers. Basically one large ship supports two (or more) motherships that are conducting MSO and harassment operations against the bad guys in the littorals.

This type of operational scenario extends beyond just piracy to potentially include scenarios like current operations off Libya, offshore infrastructure protection, narcotics and anti-smuggling operations, and counter terrorism operations in the South Pacific. It is also very possible in the future we will see NGO operations at sea that require operations not unlike what Israel faces with protest flotilla's. Just about anywhere maritime forces will be utilized for some form of blockade or maritime defense operation, the organization of a single large ship supporting several Littoral Combat Ships focused on sea control in an ungoverned area will be very useful.

An LCS Model Adds Logistics Requirements

Potentially more so for Esbern Snare (L17) and perhaps similar to the way USS Halyburton (FFG 40) is functioning today, there are a lot of moving parts in the mission modules of the Littoral Combat Ship. Stuff breaks, and when (not if) they break, where is the service depot for repairing the equipment?

The Navy is currently building 24 Littoral Combat Ships. As I have said many times, I do not support building more than these 24 Littoral Combat Ships until the concept behind the LCS is rigorously tested and experimented with in operational conditions. The problem is, after 2015, existing Navy plans suggests they simply continue to evolve the LCS and build more. It strikes me this plan has several flaws and is not an optimal use of money, particularly because the Navy will begin the second block of ships before the first block has been thoroughly tested.

I'd like to see the Navy take a different approach towards the years FY16-FY18, and consider slowing the LCS down to 2 ships per year (one of each instead of 2 of each) for that three year period and think about how to build support platforms that enhance the operational capability of the LCS.

One idea would be to build 1 T-AKE type ship per year as a LCS mothership capable of fueling and repairing the Littoral Combat Ship and her modules. For the same cost of two Littoral Combat Ships, the Navy can add that LCS support element that helps keep the hard driving LCS with its rotational crew and forward deployed posture supported effectively forward - adding more time on station instead of in transit to and from port.

Another approach might be to build 2 extra JHSVs per year for three years to serve as an support platform for module repairs and module augmentation in a forward theater. JHSVs may not be able to deploy modules like the LCS, but they can act as additional storage capacity and be designed as a mobile module repair ship for these new unmanned systems that are being distributed to virtually every level in the fleet. While this approach would not add to supporting the extra fuel requirements that can be expected with the LCS, it would add depth to the forward maintenance capability that extends beyond the LCS to the cruisers, destroyers, and submarines - all of which are and will in the future deploy unmanned systems.

The Right Large Ship

Another question that comes to my mind when examining the NATO organization scenario above in a LCS context is what ship would you want to play the role of HNLMS Tromp (F803)? HNLMS Tromp (F803) is an air defense warship with command and control capabilities - a fantastic warship for exactly this role in a NATO MSO operation. But the question I have is whether the DDG-51 would be the optimal ship for scenarios where the LCS would be used, or if the US Navy requires more flexibility due to the range of capabilities that the United States has in a relative comparison to the Dutch.

Lets face it, in war scenarios the AEGIS ships will be there anyway and there will be value added to any task group organization detaching a destroyer to support LCS operations if the LCS operations are what is required. The dirty secret upon close examination is that the AEGIS ship is not always needed, but combat power in the form of different capabilities is indeed needed.

The way military capabilities are used today is remarkable. Last month the United States basically blew through the entire fixed air defense infrastructure of Libya with the vast majority of combat power being provided by a single submarine: USS Florida (SSGN 728). If someone would have suggested to Ronald Reagan in 1986 that instead of a carrier air strike, "we'll defeat the vast majority of the Libyan defense infrastructure with a submarine," that person would have been laughed out of the room and called a clown. And yet, that was only 25 years ago.

So tell me what MSO looks like in 25 years when a Littoral Combat ship squadron is running around conducting maritime interdiction operations, or defending offshore infrastructure. There will be an enormous number of moving parts in sustained operations, and that is going to keep the crews of the LCS very busy. In many ways, MSO is about killing flies, not shooting birds, so having combat power in the context of the sharpest sword is much less useful than having combat power in the context of a mallet.

When augmenting an LCS force in these operations, the capabilities desired the most for these operations will involve manpower. They will be in the form of Blue-Green cooperation like Enhanced Company Operations, brown water capabilities like Riverine, Naval Expeditionary Security, Special Warfare capabilities, EOD, and even Seabees. These are capabilities that suggest a ship will be needed with capabilities very different than the way we think about traditional surface combatants which today come with combat power almost exclusively focused on air defense.

Just as there was the SSGN represents a hybrid between the SSN and the large missile carrying cruiser, I believe in the future we are going to need a surface ship that is a hybrid between today's modern warships and an amphibious ship - and that hybrid will be a large mothership for manned capabilities.

The LCS enables tremendous opportunity for flexible action in the littorals, but sustained operations on the LCS with the small crew suggests the necessity for augmentation, and when discussing any small ship there are always be several areas where augmentation is required. The Navy and Marines are looking to replace 12 LSDs with 11 LSD(X). Whether the Navy reuses the existing LSDs (like the Navy did with SSGN reusing retiring SSBNs) or simply thinks differently about the design of the LSD(X), there is a lot of room for innovation in the configuration of the future large surface combatant towards increasing combat power in areas other than air defense - where the US Navy fleet today is already strongest.

Feedback on Recent Discussions

A Marine Colonel submits by email to recent posts, posted with permission.

Remember When the Navy/Marine Corps Did NEO? Yes, I hope no one is forgetting that in 2006 USN/USMC evacuated 16,000 from Lebanon. To date, it does not appear that there have been any requests from DoS for NEOs in the region. Unless there is an actual shooting war, the Mediterranean area offers a robust commercial shipping and aviation infrastructure, which combined with a strong NATO maritime presence, is the preferred option for NEOs. This is the optimal way to evacuate large numbers of people out of harm's way as safe a manner as possible.

Much preferred, especially where safeguarding US lives is concerned, to trying to jam a whole lot of evacuees into military naval vessels. Italy is currently leaning forward, or may be conducting an aircraft centric NEO. Does the author really doubt Gen Ward, Adm Stavridis, or Gen Mattis are not leaning into this to look at military capabilities to support to our frontline diplomats? Just doesn't seem the author is applying strategic and critical thinking to this issue. More emotion is seems than pragmatic problem solving.

The author is on to a larger strategic thread however: current Navy orientation seems to either want a world in which it can hand out medical supplies and food, OR, go after the Chinese as part of the AirSea Battle (Beltway speak for "acquisition program"). Reality of course for the foreseeable years ahead, the real world that the rest of us live in, is that large range of operations in the middle, between these two bookends (and where China is concerned, unlikely), that many senior Navy leaders seem reluctant to want invest in for needed capabilities.

He nails me. A ferry sailed a few hours ago is loaded and ready to sail, waiting on weather, with many American citizens looking to leave Libya. With that said, I have done a fair bit of research into NEO (see here and here, for example) and I note that in most cases where Marines are called for NEO, not all, we usually leaned well forward with the presence of an amphibious ship as an option. We have done nothing like that yet on the North African coast. Because we have not done so, I do legitimately wonder if we have enough amphibious ships, and if the lack of amphibious ships available limits our options. I think it is a legitimate question for Congress to ask.

From the same Marine.

Somali Pirates Murder All 4 American Hostages: the growing perception in the trenches is that the military has long since ceded pragmatic enforcement of anti-piracy efforts to the lawyers. The author places blame on the Administration, however, I'd like to hear what our military commanders are advising. Who in the chain of command has advised civilian leadership that at minimum, we must kill the pirates and destroy their vessels at sea whenever an act of piracy occurs?

Based on these comments last month by Vice Admiral Fox, my impression is that depending upon where in the chain of command one might look, you'll find a different opinion. I could be wrong, but my assumption going in is that Mattis/Fox are ready to take back operational initiative in the region, but the civilians are pushing back. The Colonels questions and comments are on target.

CTF-151 Rescues Pirated Vessel

You could see this coming a mile away, or at least I did. It wasn't difficult - like Babe Ruth calling his home runs, my fellow blogger over at the US Naval Institute blog Captain Alexander Martin set expectations with his July 2010 Proceedings article Pirates Beware: Force Recon Has Your Number.

Well, as the USNI Blog put it better, Pirates Beware: Force Recon Really Does Have Your Number. (<-- insider gouge there)

Here is the official announcement by the US Navy.

At approximately 5 a.m. local time, Sept. 9, 24 U.S. Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit's Maritime Raid Force (MRF) aboard USS Dubuque (LPD 8) operating under Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), boarded and seized control of Antigua-Barbuda-flagged, German-owned vessel M/V Magellan Star from pirates who attacked and boarded the vessel early Sept 8.

This successful mission by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) secured the safety of the ship's crew and returned control of the ship to the civilian mariners. Nine pirates are currently under control of CTF 151, pending further disposition. This ship's crew has not reported any injuries or casualties. There were no reported injuries from the U.S. Maritime Raid Force.

The CTF-151 flagship, TCG Gökçeada, a Turkish frigate, was the first ship on scene, responding to a distress call received from Magellan Star, Sept. 8. Two additional warships assigned to CTF-151, USS Dubuque (LPD 8) and USS Princeton (CG 59) arrived in the vicinity of the attack to provide support to Gökçeada.

Well done. There are many things we can observe here that must be noted and recognized.

1) The crew of the M/V Magellan Star had a plan. As Barbara Starr at CNN reported, "Members of the ship's crew had locked themselves in a safe room, so the military felt it was a good time to board the ship, the spokesman said." That means the ship owners, ships captain, and ships crew deserves a lot of credit for having a plan and sticking too it. The prevented themselves from being captured after opening communications with CTF-151 and were able to successfully hold out for 8-10 hours until coalition forces arrived to retake the vessel.

This is part of the lessons learned process the industry had following the Maersk Alabama capture last year, where the crew was able to secure themselves away from the pirates, which was the essential element in ultimately foiling that successful hijacking. The latest incident reinforces the importance of the industries role in anti-piracy.

2) The Marines executed a mission they trained for, and apparently were able to prepare and accomplish the mission with a turn around of around 6-8 hours. The M/V Magellan Star was hijacked on the night of September 8th, but the Navy announcement says the rescue attempt was conducted at 5:00am local on September 9th. It cannot be understated how hard the Marines at Camp Pendleton have been working to address the piracy issue with their forward deploying MEUs.

It really dates back to 2008 when the 13th MEU under Col David Coffman deployed. Before the USS New Orleans (LPD 18) was rammed by one of our submarines, the ship supported Marines of the 13 MEU who tested several operational concepts in anti-piracy. I ran into Col Coffman again at USNI WEST in February of this year, and on the piracy panel he captured the attention of the room with his first statement, which I wrote about at the time:

"KILL THE PIRATES."

It was noteworthy about half the crowd began clapping and cheering, and the double take Dr. Lunsford gave the Col added to the effect. It was a clear ploy though, the Col appeared to me to use the red meat to get the crowds attention so he could articulate the range of capabilities on both sides of the spectrum the MEU brings to the fight. He touted the ARG solution but noted there was “no appetite at the policy level for kinetic solutions in Washington.” He then highlighted several problems including the division of organizational labor regarding Somalia. While CENTCOM has operational control over ships off Somalia, Somalia falls under AFRICOM, and the challenges in coordinating activities at sea onto land - at any level for anything - are enormous. I was left with the impression the division of labor was a problem of rigid control, which prevents any warfighter at sea from adapting quickly to situations.

But during that conversation Col Coffman used the attention of the audience he had gained to make clear the US Marine Corps has a range of capabilities that opens up a recipe of options for dealing with piracy - both at sea or on land. He discussed how the US Navy - US Marine Corps team will train and will be prepared when their number is called to deal with the any pirate problem. His words from that panel resonated today as we see the Navy/Marine Maritime Raid Force execute a perfect anti-piracy operation.

3) It is not a trivial point that the commander of CTF-151 is Turkish Navy Rear Adm. Sinan Ertugrul. The United States Navy is committed globally, and the cooperative nature of international task forces that work as a coalition to solve mutual problems is critical to the United States in being able to maintain our global presence as the US Navy is able to deploy fewer and fewer ships. Piracy is a problem, but it is an international problem and not something the US Navy should be attempting to solve alone. The international framework is critical to anti-piracy operations.

More importantly, the international approach is working. The turkish frigate TCG Gökçeada (F 494) was the first warship to respond to the M/V Magellan Star after it had been captured. In most cased of piracy, it is a coalition ship and not a US Navy ship that is the first responder to pirate hijackings. In the ~20 months of CTF-151 the command and coordination function of the coalition has evolved into a genuine capability that shows no signs of problems that coordination between different nations can often reveal. Now when something happens, military forces from multiple countries can take action, coordinate, and execute a highly complicated mission in less than half a day.

Try doing that with some of your business clients, or folks in the same organization but different department at work.

The benefits over time of coalition approaches to complicated problems around the world have the potential to create unique opportunities in the security environment not seen in the modern age. If a major terrorist attack (9/11 scale) against Paris or Beijing killing thousands was performed by Al Shabab, the response looks a lot different than it did when we responded to 9/11 in Afghanistan - because both China, Russia, India, NATO, and the EU are already involved with Somalia.

4) Observe the capabilities necessary to be successful in MSO.

Specifically trained manpower
Persistent forward presence
Capabilities including Helicopters and Small Boats

More red flags for the LCS if you ask me, because the ship isn't built to manage the specialized manpower necessary for these necessary activities associated with MSO, and the ship is not built for endurance, rather hull speed (which has yet to make a difference in any successful anti-piracy action to date). However, when you look at #3 it reinforces how the concept of the LCS is right even if the execution is a dumpster fire.

Well job 15th MEU.

A Most Interesting Debate

The Germans are talking about military reform and to be honest, it is actually a very interesting issue to follow. This article can bring you up to speed on some of the issues if you are interested, but for more depth to the debate you'll need to look elsewhere (and most of it is in German). There are two main points that I think are worth noting.

First, Germany is ready to discard their conscripts.

The rationale behind this bold yet highly controversial push to suspend the draft is two-fold. First, the Bundeswehr needs far less conscripts than are theoretically required to serve in the armed forces, thus raising serious concerns about a lack of “Wehrgerechtigkeit” (“draft equity”). After all, how can the government justify drafting tens of thousands of young men for a nine-month military service while simply letting many of their friends off the hook? Second, the Bundeswehr’s conscription-based system is not only more expensive than a purely professional/volunteer force, but has also proven to be ill-equipped to deal with the growing demand for expeditionary military action in countries ranging from Afghanistan and Sudan to the coast of Lebanon.

Second is the idea that Germany would become more expeditionary in structure than its current cold war era territorial defense structure.

The proposed Bundeswehr reforms (including a suspension of the draft) are not only better suited to deal with today’s complex security threats, ranging from terrorism and WMD/missile technology proliferation to global crime networks and piracy. They would also be welcome news for Berlin’s allies, who could, in principle, count on the support of a militarily more capable Germany, both within NATO and within the EU context (the required parliamentary approval for each Bundeswehr deployment abroad notwithstanding). In the wake of the recent economic crisis, huge fiscal deficits are putting severe pressures on defense budgets across Europe, especially France, Germany, and the UK (London might be forced to cut its annual defense spending by up to 20 percent). If Germany can lead the way in terms of adopting politically controversial yet ultimately indispensable military reforms - thus generating more bang for fewer bucks - there is indeed at least some hope that European/NATO members in general can create much-needed synergies in defense procurement and force restructuring based on the notion that not all allies require the full spectrum of defense (industrial) capabilities.

The United States is too interconnected to the global security environment to ignore military reform debates in other countries, and this debate in particular represents one of the few reforms in Europe where a military power is expanding its capabilities to forward deploy, even as the total number of military personnel would be reduced. Regardless of country however, the trends for 21st century military reform seem to take on the same character: expeditionary.

We will have to wait and see what Germany ultimately decides to do, but in reading military reform arguments from various nations across Europe, including Russia, the 21st century Army models of expeditionary forces most often include discussions regarding amphibious lift capacity and numbers of medium and heavy lift helicopters. In other words, the capabilities that most mimic the US Marines are more desired by the rest of the world than the capabilities of a large standing Army.

It is a noteworthy contrast of strategic thinking how in the US, we seem to have this in complete reverse as we debate what the US Marines will be in the future while speaking of the enormous challenges towards recapitalizing the Army in DoD budget discussions. With Iraq combat operations now over, it is time to keep an eye on what narrative emerges in Washington.

How long before think tanks start talking about recapitalizing the Army, and how long before those think tanks that have been Army focused due primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan are ready to examine broader strategic alternatives for the future that include an emphasis on airpower and seapower? These will be interesting time tables, because the think tank community in Washington is packed with Army strategic thinkers right now - and if the conversation stops being about the Army, their job might be in jeopardy.

Yep, it is parochial, but it needs not be. I consider the 101st Airborne Division as an airpower capability in dire need of a maritime enabling component, and the US Marines represents both an airpower and seapower capability that needs better options for forward deployment. On this blog we cannot limit our viewpoints to the parochial traditions of inter-service rivalry (even if they do in Washington).

Anti-Piracy 2.0 Deploys to Somalia

Do Motherships + Submarines + Force Recon = Davy Jones Locker? Lets find out.

As the monsoon season hits the coast of Somalia, nations are in a period of naval rotation and planning for the next round of piracy expected to begin when the monsoon season ends. Through the first 6 months of 2010 there have been 29 vessels hijackings, compared to 52 for the entire 2009 year. While the pace of hijackings through the first 6 months of 2010 is slower than in 2009, the rate of hijackings in the second half of 2008 was much higher than in 2009, so the possibility for another record year of modern piracy certainly still exists.

What we have not seen much to date is a shift in tactics. However, that may be about to change. As Feng noted on Thursday night, China's sixth naval escort flotilla departed Wednesday for the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. What makes this noteworthy is that the composition of the sixth naval escort flotilla is different than the previous five.

The flotilla with more than 1,000 personnel, including Navy special forces troops, is to relieve the fifth flotilla, which has been cruising the waters off the Somalia coast for more than three months.

The amphibious landing ship Kunlunshan, destroyer Lanzhou, and supply ship Weishanhu of the fifth fleet, will escort vessels sailing through the region.

What is noteworthy about the Chinese approach to anti-piracy is how to date the activities by the PLA Navy has been escorting convoys. The Chinese have essentially forced much of their flagged merchant traffic to participate in a convoy system through the internationally agreed transit area. That isn't a bad thing, the PLA Navy has a perfect record of successfully escorting vessels in these convoys.

What I will be interested in watching is how the PLA Navy will use the Kunlunshan as an escort. The addition of the LPD is certainly the centerpiece of attention on the domestic front for China, the news reporting surrounding the Kunlunshan deployment almost looks like a state sponsored technology presentation in the newspapers - indeed I believe that is a fair and accurate description. Yes, the ship is interesting and it is something new to look at when observing the PLA Navy - but that isn't what has my attention.

Feng's post includes several of the popular images being circulated with this story. Note the small attack boats, which interesting enough are featured in every article including video I have seen of the deployment. As the sixth escort flotilla, China has now gained valuable experience in convoy escort responsibilities - something that will no doubt prove invaluable in wartime. What is noteworthy about the latest deployment however is that there also appears to be some tactical evolution taking place.

Not only will the sixth escort flotilla support more helicopters than any previous flotilla (7 total), but they will also have at their disposal several small, fast boats capable of dispatching towards threatening scenarios. As Mr. Boyko noted, China has observed the environment of indigenous vessels and has brought different capabilities to address the challenges being faced. That swarm of boats, which may or may not be pirates (but we see all the precautions being taken as if they are) represents an unknown that can be addressed by heavily armed fast, small boats through inspection. In many cases pirates will dump their weapons, ammunition, and pirate equipment before being boarded so as to avoid being arrested. Physical presence at sea with fast boats will give the PLA Navy capabilities for dealing with potential pirates that they previously did not have.

NATO Goes Hunting

This is an official NATO press release from earlier this week.

On the Alliance’s request, the Netherlands has agreed to deploy a submarine as part of multinational efforts to combat piracy off the east coast of Africa, from the Gulf of Aden - one of the busiest global shipping routes - to the Indian Ocean. The submarine will be used to monitor communication between pirate vessels and their warlords on shore, helping to curtail the hijacking of commercial ships for ransoms worth millions in US dollars.

This will be the first submarine to contribute to NATO’s anti-piracy mission “Operation Ocean Shield” off the horn of Africa. As one of four Walrus-class submarines belonging to the Royal Netherlands Navy, it is one of the most modern non-nuclear submarines. Built with stealth technologies, it is very difficult to detect - even by other submarines - and can remain submerged for long periods.

The submarine will be deployed from the end of September to the end of November 2010.

NATO recently extended Operation Ocean Shield for a further three years. Its current mandate will end in December 2012.

Now why would NATO request a Walrus class submarine? Lewis Page over at the Register is mostly correct, but he doesn't focus in on the details and gets a bit generic. All the rave these days when it comes to submarines is the advantages of AIP. On this blog we have to be more specific when focusing on propulsion systems - because propulsion systems on a submarine isn't only about sound and speed - it is also about power for systems.

The reason the silent service is so - silent, is primarily because submarines serve in the intelligence gathering role more than any other major piece of military hardware in the world. Submarines do amazing things that nobody likes to talk about in public, but lets just say you can buy a submariner a T-Shirt that says "I read your email" or "I listen to your cell phone" and you'd be keeping it real. You see, the advantage the Walrus has over every other conventional submarine in Europe (including all the AIP submarines) is that it has more power - thus is able to exploit more sophisticated electronic devices for eavesdropping purposes. By calling in the Walrus for anti-piracy, NATO is taking piracy surveillance to a whole new level.

The Walrus will be able to park itself unseen in these clusters of idle hijacked vessels and essentially watch and listen to everything taking place. Want to use your cell phone or a laptop from a hijacked ship? NATO will officially support that activity beginning this September! It is very likely that the US Navy has been doing similar things with nuclear powered submarines for a long time, and it is also possible that specific intelligence has been obtained that necessitates an expansion of eavesdropping capabilities - and the Dutch are being called in for an assist.

The bottom line here is that NATO is about to really know the pirate business, and that knowledge may be enough to shut down current operations. But how exactly might that happen?

We Trained For This

I would like to direct our professional reading audience to the July 2010 Proceedings article titled Pirates Beware: Force Recon Has Your Number (subscription only) written by Captain Alexander Martin, U.S. Marine Corps.

Hunting pirates with the U.S. Navy is what the 15th MEU—a wide array of ships and aircraft and even more Marines and Sailors—has just set sail to do.

The 15th MEU is a distinctive and historic Marine air-ground task force. This armada steams toward Africa more capable and ready for maritime contingency operations than any MEU in a number of years. It has among its numerous traditional capabilities and missions a trained, validated, capable, and lethal instrument now called the unit's Maritime Raid Force Capability (MRFC), a fully integrated Navy-Marine Corps team with the capacity to conduct visit-board-search-seizure (VBSS), kinetic strikes on non-compliant targets, maritime infrastructure seizure and reinforcement, host-nation training, and other maritime raid and interdiction operations as directed.

Its execution packages come complete with supporting air, medical and trauma units, sniper teams, shadowing ships, Navy VBSS and ship-control teams, small-boat units, and a direct-action assault unit with an integrated infantry trailer platoon for support. That second-to-last part—the assault unit—is our piece of the pie.

This article is great because it is real - indeed I may have quoted one of the few parts of the entire article that took itself seriously. It actually reads like a diary entry of a Marine Captain who has been training for over a year with an understanding his number is likely to be called. It is most likely the story of every Marine Captain in his position deploying as part of a MEU - except not every Marine Captain writes their thoughts down in Proceedings.

Leading up to the deployment of the Peliliu ARG - as I was following the news and articles covering the workup I took note of a stated focus on piracy in every article discussing training and exercises. I recall reading an article on the Harrier detachment that discussed piracy. There has clearly been some intense focus on anti-piracy integrated into this MEUs training. I knew something was different and was about to happen, and in passing I mentioned this a friend who works at the US Naval Institute. It was at that time I heard about this article being in the pipeline for Proceedings.

We don't know exactly what the 15th MEU intends to do differently that others have not done previous, but in making inquiries over the past month I have been assured by several people that the 15th MEU is different. Is the RoE going to be different? Are there already operations planned we don't know about? Can anyone provide any new information? So far.. nothing, but as the Proceedings article makes clear - the training and preparation of the Peliliu ARG does represent a new integrated Navy/Marine Corps approach to anti-piracy and at least one Marine Captain in the MEU thinks it will pay off.

Whatever happens we do know a few things.

• The Chinese have just deployed three ships that brings with them more capabilities for anti-piracy than the PLA Navy has ever sent to the Gulf of Aden previously.
• The Dutch are sending a submarine for anti-piracy operations at the specific request of NATO.
• The US has deployed an ARG specifically trained in a new way to deal with pirates, and one of the MEUs Captains is so excited about it he basically teased the entire national security establishment (all of whom are readers of Proceedings) with a hint that good things are to come.

It sounds like a tactical evolution in dealing with piracy is taking place across the board. The next few months could prove to be very interesting.

Marine Corps Operating Concepts Released Tuesday

Where it has not been possible to set in motion initiatives to meet certain future operational needs, the Secretary has identified vectors for the evolution of the force, calling on DoD components to devote sustained efforts toward developing new concepts and capabilities to address those needs. Assessments of future operating environments will continue, with an eye toward refining our understanding of future needs. At the same time, the Department will continue to look assiduously for savings in underperforming programs and activities, divestiture, technology substitution, less-pressing mission and program areas, and other accounts so that more resources can be devoted to filling these gaps.

In some capability areas, meeting emerging challenges will call for the development of wholly new concepts of operation. Confronting sophisticated anti-access challenges and threats posed by nuclear-armed regional adversaries will pose particularly difficult problems. In recognition of the dynamism of the threat environment and advances in unmanned technologies, the Department will be examining future operational needs in several capability areas, including ISR, fighters and long-range strike aircraft, joint forcible entry, and information networks and communications. Assessments of programmed forces in these areas will center on iterative, interactive war games, in which force planners, operators, and technical experts can explore alternative strategies and operational concepts in an environment that tests forces against an intelligent, adaptive adversary. Insights gained from these efforts will inform future investments in research and development and, over time, will help decision makers to further rebalance future forces.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) pg 40-41

As I was reading through the Marine Corps Operating Concepts third edition, this section of the QDR came to mind. The Marine Corps Operating Concepts third edition document to be released publicly on Tuesday is one of the best documents I have read from a maritime service since I began the blog. If you are frustrated by the lack of specifics and generic speak that often characterizes US Navy documents like the recently released NOC, you will find the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (MOC) document a breath of fresh air. Detailed? You betcha. This document works on the Company CO's chalkboard, or PowerPoint - if you prefer.

The reason this section of the QDR came to mind is because there are still many questions about what Joint Forcible Entry means today - phrase that seems to have direct connotation for the Marine Corps. I think it is interesting that Information Dissemination author LtCol Roger S. Galbraith has been out fighting the perception war on this topic. His recent LA Times op-ed was akin to a rebuttal for the arguments against the Marines in another LA Times article. The discussion point that forcible entry amphibious assault is no longer feasible in the 21st century is becoming a popular meme, but it is also a distraction.

As the QDR stresses in the section quoted - the question isn't whether the nation needs the capability of forcible entry, rather how the capability is executed in the context of the emerging environment. When I read the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (3rd edition), I was very pleased to read that the Marines are taking seriously the necessity to tactically adapt amphibious assault as part of the requirement to retain the tactical necessity for such a capability. Forcible entry in the 1940s and 1950s may have indeed been a large scale beach amphibious assault, but that isn't what it might look like in 2010 and beyond. The Marines seem to understand this, while those outside the Marines are framing the forcible entry discussion in historically accurate but otherwise irrelevant terms within the modern context.

The Marines come out swinging early and often with a focus on two mission areas - assuring littoral access and winning small wars. If first impressions mean anything - my first impression was that the focus on these two mission areas reads like a slap in the face of the Navy who I believe is actively retreating from the littorals at flank speed, and a slap at the Army as a reminder that it is Marines who own the small wars history of the United States. The document reads as a slap to neither in truth, but the Marine brand is strong enough that the first perception existed for me nonetheless.

But as I read the document I immediately found it one of the most insightful operational concept document produced by a maritime service I can ever recall reading. I was engaged with the specific guidance towards a general direction one finds in the issues framed by the contents, and when I finished reading I came away as a reader impressed by the depth and detail. This document is instructive to every Marine, and yet informative to broader defense establishment as well - indeed one could even note how the document gives guidance directly to the defense industry without doing the program centric cheerleading we used to see in the 90s in these types of documents.

For example, when reading through the section discussing the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) I was surprised to see the comment "there may be a requirement for a light-attack platform to add to the ACE inventory" being made as a comment of speculation - the implication being a recognition that the Marines must be open to examining alternatives. How refreshing - read a Navy document and you will never find a discussion of force structure of any kind whatsoever - nevermind a discussion that includes speculation regarding alternatives.

Briefly - a few points. A good portion of the document discusses Small Wars as the core of the Corps. Leveraging the 'small wars' meme (in no small part popularized by brand names) is a pretty smart way to introduce Enhanced MAGTF operations across a broad range of missions and relate it at a generic level with the reader. The detail of size, shape, and guidance towards operational requirements and capabilities is done very well.

But what caught my attention in the document is how the Marines emphasized themselves as a critical piece of assuring littoral access across a range of access environments; permissive, uncertain, and restricted. From a detail perspective I think one could argue the Marine Corps made a better case for US Navy 'joint forcible entry' capabilities at sea and in the air than the US Navy did with their own NOC. There are several pages dedicated to discussing a range of naval capabilities from mine warfare to carrier aviation to strike from the sea - indeed there might be more words dedicated to discussing the value of the aircraft carrier in the MOC than the NOC - and I'm not kidding - the word count will be close.

The MOC does an interesting thing to the reader - or at least this reader - by raising serious questions regarding whether or not the US Navy is capable of having a blunt discussion on forcible entry. That discussion would include topics like technologies and tactics, operational requirements and force metrics necessary to achieve access. The Marines appear willing to have a public discussion on the topic; but if AirSea Battle is any indication - the Navy is not prepared for that discussion publicly.

The open communication approach of the Marines in the MOC leads directly to Annex A - which for me is a critical discussion of Strategic Communications. I believe N3/N5 would do well to copy Annex A from the MOC, change a bit of text to 'navalize' the wording, and directly insert the section into the NOC. Annex A represents the single best discussion of integrating strategic communications into operations in any military document released by any of the maritime services to date, and one of the most important sections missing from the Naval Operations Concept. I highly encourage every US Navy officer, even if they don't give a shit about the MOC, to read carefully Annex A because there is no question that section belongs in every command at sea today.

I want to stress this point. The single most important lesson we can learn from the Israeli maritime blockade of Gaza incident that occurred recently is the role that YouTube played for the Israeli Navy. Without those YouTube videos that highlighted the events from the Israeli Navy perspective, Israel was left absent context and without weapons in an information war being waged against them. With YouTube videos, Israel had ammunition in their fight. Understanding the information and communication context of every operational decision will be critical to Navy leaders who will often find themselves in very difficult situations all alone in distant seas. Annex A emphasizes the role of these communication efforts to operations, and the discussion in the MOC is useful not only to Marines, but to the Navy as well.

I'll post a link to the MOC as soon as I find one, and I encourage everyone to read it. For once, I can recommend a document produced by the maritime services that won't make your eyes bleed, because the MOC is highly informative and a lot more thought stimulating (thanks to detail and depth) than the documents I typically link to from the blog.