Finding Stability with Somalia's Nascent Navy

Here's a good article from the Somalia Report on the TFG's underfunded, underequipped Navy. The littorals play no small part in Somalia's instability. Piracy from Somalia's shores continues to threaten the Indian Ocean, despite a dropping success rate due to a greater acceptance of embarked armed security teams. Al Shabaab has begun to exercise its own crude maritime force, skirmishing with the Kenyans at sea in November and December. Al Shabaab also receives funding, weapons, and fighters from the sea. Finally, some combination of Somali pirates/criminals/al Shabaabers continues attempts to kidnap tourists from Kenyan coastal areas.

Building indigenous naval capacity is one of the ways that the international community can help stabilize Somalia. As we know from recent experience trying to stand up Iraq's Navy, building a nascent navy is not easy, inexpensive, or fast. US legislation on security force assistance doesn't facilitate multiyear funding mechanisms optimal for these sorts of efforts, and Navy culture and force structure (outside of MCAST) are not conducive to working with smaller navies. However, there may be a role for US and allied support to the African Union in training, equipping, and deploying an AMISOM maritime capability. The US State Department's ACOTA program has supported training Ugandan Defense Forces which are the bulwark of the AMISOM mission. A program to deploy willing West African navies to Somalia under the auspices of the AU, train and equip them with patrol boats that they might retain following mission completion, might be enough to bolster the tiny Somali Navy and reduce the impact of maritime crime, insurgency, and terrorists who ply the coast of Somalia. In turn, these navies would redeploy more capable, interoperable, and experienced to defend their own shores.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

NECC Focus: MCAST

Last post here for a while as I'm deploying shortly...

This article demonstratives the power and initiative of small, cohesive teams of forward-deployed Sailors. Over the past few years, Maritime Civil Affairs Teams (MCATs) have done some great work in shaping and stability operations, primarily in support of CJSOTF-P and CJTF-HOA. I was a bit surprised by last year's consolidation of two units with somewhat different roles: NECC's MCAG and ETG. Civil Affairs is primarily a population-centric mission, while ETG's focus was on developing partner navies (SFA/FID). I'm sure there was some measure of cost savings and efficiencies factored into the decision. But there are also some overlaps in training and complementary skill sets for these missions including the ability to operate on the ground independently and language, regional, and cultural expertise. Unfortunately, it is still difficult for these trained and experienced Sailors to re-tour with NECC.

It will be interesting watch how the Navy and NECC integrate MCAST capabilities into combatant commanders' theater engagement strategies over the next few years. MCAST units have an additional bit of flexibility over similar joint capabilities -- they can deploy rapidly by air (as in Haiti), deploy persistently (CJTF HOA), but unlike their Army brethren, they also embark on afloat partnership stations. Hopefully, MCAST is here to stay. But unfortunately, history shows that non-standard (meaning not ships, aircraft, or subs) units tend to be the first to face the Navy's budget knife.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.