MQ-4C Triton Takes Flight

ALMDALE, Calif. (May 21, 2024) Two Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicles are seen on the tarmac at a Northrop Grumman test facility in Palmdale, Calif. Triton is undergoing flight testing as an unmanned maritime surveillance vehicle. (U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman by Chad Slattery/Released)

From Danger Room.

The MQ-4C Triton took off today for the first time from a Palmdale, California airfield, a major step in the Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program. Northrop Grumman, which manufactured the 130.9-foot-wingspan drone, said the maiden voyage lasted an hour and a half. The Navy even announced it via Twitter.

“First flight represents a critical step in maturing Triton’s systems before operationally supporting the Navy’s maritime surveillance mission around the world,” Capt. James Hoke, Triton’s program manager, said in a statement.

If the Triton looks familiar, it should. It’s a souped-up version of the Air Force’s old reliable spy drone, Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk. The Navy’s made some modifications to the airframe and the sensors it carries to ensure it can spy on vast swaths of ocean, from great height. (It’s unarmed, if you were wondering.)

The idea is for the Triton to achieve altitudes of nearly 53,000 feet — that’s 10 miles up — where it will scan 2,000 nautical miles at a single robotic blink. (Notice that wingspan is bigger than a 737's.) Its sensors, Northrop boasts, will “detect and automatically classify” ships, giving captains a much broader view of what’s on the water than radar, sonar and manned aircraft provide. Not only that, Triton is a flying communications relay station, bouncing “airborne communications and information sharing capabilities” between ships. And it can fly about 11,500 miles without refueling.

Read the rest at Danger Room.

The Navy has taken a very patient approach to large unmanned systems, too slow for some. With the MQ-4C Triton the Navy decided to go with a mature hardware design and take on the risk with the software. Despite the June 2012 crash in Maryland of a Global Hawk used for developing the Triton, I think everyone can agree the Navy has done a great job with the BAMS program.

Some will cite how the US Air Force has stepped back from the Global Hawk in favor of the U-2. That makes sense when the vast majority of US Air Force Global Hawk missions were being flown in dedicated missions to monitor specific targets, something the U-2 has been doing effectively for decades - and is still capable of doing at less cost. But over vast oceans, that 11,500 mile range at ten miles up role is much better suited for an unmanned aircraft because the platform's role is constant surveillance of a broad area, not dedicated surveillance of a specific area.

Thus the name: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS).

Between X-47B carrier launch and MQ-4C Triton, the US Navy has achieved major successes with two of the most important new Navy programs being worked on today in a span of just over a week. Northrop Grumman is having a good month.

When you count the first vertical takeoff of the F-35B earlier this week, the Department of the Navy is having a good month too.

Observing Modern MSO Squadron Operations

This is an interesting update on the anti-piracy activities of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2). I see this as representing the other side of what Chris was discussing last night. I'm posting the news release in full (PDF).

NATO Operation Delivers Severe Blow Against Armed Pirates

Earlier this month, NATO counter-piracy forces delivered a severe blow against armed pirates off the coast of Somalia by arresting 34 suspected pirates. The suspected pirates had previously been observed loading up their mother ships and skiffs with fuel and weapons in order to attack merchant ships further out to sea. In a well-planned operation, NATO warships conducted a night-time strike on the known pirate lairs at sea, close to the coast. As well as detaining the 34 suspected pirates, 34 innocent hostages, who had been held by the pirates, were freed unharmed by the NATO forces.

Recent months have seen an increase in pirate attacks, particularly in the northern Arabian Sea, and with the monsoon season coming to an end, and the weather improving, it was seen as crucial for counter-piracy forces to strike to help prevent pirates getting out to sea to prey on merchant shipping transiting the area.

Over an extended period NATO warships HNLMS Tromp, HDMS Esbern Snare and USS Halyburton, observed the known pirate camps, supported by Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts from the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) and various other counter piracy forces.

On Friday, as part of the focussed operation, crew from NATO warship HDMS Esbern Snare boarded a suspicious whaler and found it to be packed with fuel, AK47 machine guns, a ladder and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and 3 suspected pirates. The whaler and weaponry were seized by the warship, and after being questioned, the suspected pirates were taken to a nearby beach.

On Saturday HDMS Esbern Snare then approached a dhow that was suspected to be involved in pirate activity. As the Danish boarding team investigated, the pirates started firing at them, who then fired back in self defence. In the fire-fight several pirates were wounded and as a result, a medical team from NATO flag ship HNLMS Tromp was quickly sent to the scene to render medical assistance.

Shortly afterwards HNLMS Tromp spotted another suspect dhow heading for a known pirate camp and as she closed in to investigate, her boarding team was also fired upon. Gunners on board Tromp and the boarding team returned fire, setting fire to the dhow. Ten pirates tried to escape in a skiff, but were quickly captured. When a team from HNLMS Tromp went to the dhow to assist the innocent crew, they found 2 fatally wounded pirates on board. At the same time, a previously pirated merchant vessel - MV Albedo, lifted anchor and headed straight for the NATO flagship.

After some well-aimed warning shots across her bow, Albedo returned to her anchorage. HNLMS Tromp then escorted the freed dhow and crew to safer waters.

On several occasions during the operation, the NATO warships surveyed the anchorages and the pirate beaches. They will continue to do so for the next few months.

Speaking after the operation, Rear Admiral Hank Ort, Chief of Staff at NATO’s Maritime HQ in Northwood said, “This operation has shown the pirates that we mean business and will not tolerate their criminal activities. By conducting this operation close to the shore we have been able to deprive some pirates of a safe passage back to their anchorages and deprive others of the opportunity to go out and attack innocent merchant ships. We are pleased with the success of this operation but we are not complacent as we know there is still much work to be done.”

As per the release:

NATO Forces currently in Operation Ocean Shield:

HNLMS TROMP (Flagship) - Netherlands
HDMS ESBERN SNARE - Denmark
USS BAINBRIDGE - United States of America
USS HALYBURTON - Unites States of America
TCG GIRESUN - Turkey

As a press release, we aren't really getting some of the key operational details, but it does sound to me that NATO has been conducting some form of shore blockade on a specific pirate group.

When I think about the three ships involved in this activity, HNLMS Tromp (F803), HDMS Esbern Snare (L17), USS Halyburton (FFG 40); I see the future of how the Littoral Combat Ship could be used operationally when fielded in numbers. Basically one large ship supports two (or more) motherships that are conducting MSO and harassment operations against the bad guys in the littorals.

This type of operational scenario extends beyond just piracy to potentially include scenarios like current operations off Libya, offshore infrastructure protection, narcotics and anti-smuggling operations, and counter terrorism operations in the South Pacific. It is also very possible in the future we will see NGO operations at sea that require operations not unlike what Israel faces with protest flotilla's. Just about anywhere maritime forces will be utilized for some form of blockade or maritime defense operation, the organization of a single large ship supporting several Littoral Combat Ships focused on sea control in an ungoverned area will be very useful.

An LCS Model Adds Logistics Requirements

Potentially more so for Esbern Snare (L17) and perhaps similar to the way USS Halyburton (FFG 40) is functioning today, there are a lot of moving parts in the mission modules of the Littoral Combat Ship. Stuff breaks, and when (not if) they break, where is the service depot for repairing the equipment?

The Navy is currently building 24 Littoral Combat Ships. As I have said many times, I do not support building more than these 24 Littoral Combat Ships until the concept behind the LCS is rigorously tested and experimented with in operational conditions. The problem is, after 2015, existing Navy plans suggests they simply continue to evolve the LCS and build more. It strikes me this plan has several flaws and is not an optimal use of money, particularly because the Navy will begin the second block of ships before the first block has been thoroughly tested.

I'd like to see the Navy take a different approach towards the years FY16-FY18, and consider slowing the LCS down to 2 ships per year (one of each instead of 2 of each) for that three year period and think about how to build support platforms that enhance the operational capability of the LCS.

One idea would be to build 1 T-AKE type ship per year as a LCS mothership capable of fueling and repairing the Littoral Combat Ship and her modules. For the same cost of two Littoral Combat Ships, the Navy can add that LCS support element that helps keep the hard driving LCS with its rotational crew and forward deployed posture supported effectively forward - adding more time on station instead of in transit to and from port.

Another approach might be to build 2 extra JHSVs per year for three years to serve as an support platform for module repairs and module augmentation in a forward theater. JHSVs may not be able to deploy modules like the LCS, but they can act as additional storage capacity and be designed as a mobile module repair ship for these new unmanned systems that are being distributed to virtually every level in the fleet. While this approach would not add to supporting the extra fuel requirements that can be expected with the LCS, it would add depth to the forward maintenance capability that extends beyond the LCS to the cruisers, destroyers, and submarines - all of which are and will in the future deploy unmanned systems.

The Right Large Ship

Another question that comes to my mind when examining the NATO organization scenario above in a LCS context is what ship would you want to play the role of HNLMS Tromp (F803)? HNLMS Tromp (F803) is an air defense warship with command and control capabilities - a fantastic warship for exactly this role in a NATO MSO operation. But the question I have is whether the DDG-51 would be the optimal ship for scenarios where the LCS would be used, or if the US Navy requires more flexibility due to the range of capabilities that the United States has in a relative comparison to the Dutch.

Lets face it, in war scenarios the AEGIS ships will be there anyway and there will be value added to any task group organization detaching a destroyer to support LCS operations if the LCS operations are what is required. The dirty secret upon close examination is that the AEGIS ship is not always needed, but combat power in the form of different capabilities is indeed needed.

The way military capabilities are used today is remarkable. Last month the United States basically blew through the entire fixed air defense infrastructure of Libya with the vast majority of combat power being provided by a single submarine: USS Florida (SSGN 728). If someone would have suggested to Ronald Reagan in 1986 that instead of a carrier air strike, "we'll defeat the vast majority of the Libyan defense infrastructure with a submarine," that person would have been laughed out of the room and called a clown. And yet, that was only 25 years ago.

So tell me what MSO looks like in 25 years when a Littoral Combat ship squadron is running around conducting maritime interdiction operations, or defending offshore infrastructure. There will be an enormous number of moving parts in sustained operations, and that is going to keep the crews of the LCS very busy. In many ways, MSO is about killing flies, not shooting birds, so having combat power in the context of the sharpest sword is much less useful than having combat power in the context of a mallet.

When augmenting an LCS force in these operations, the capabilities desired the most for these operations will involve manpower. They will be in the form of Blue-Green cooperation like Enhanced Company Operations, brown water capabilities like Riverine, Naval Expeditionary Security, Special Warfare capabilities, EOD, and even Seabees. These are capabilities that suggest a ship will be needed with capabilities very different than the way we think about traditional surface combatants which today come with combat power almost exclusively focused on air defense.

Just as there was the SSGN represents a hybrid between the SSN and the large missile carrying cruiser, I believe in the future we are going to need a surface ship that is a hybrid between today's modern warships and an amphibious ship - and that hybrid will be a large mothership for manned capabilities.

The LCS enables tremendous opportunity for flexible action in the littorals, but sustained operations on the LCS with the small crew suggests the necessity for augmentation, and when discussing any small ship there are always be several areas where augmentation is required. The Navy and Marines are looking to replace 12 LSDs with 11 LSD(X). Whether the Navy reuses the existing LSDs (like the Navy did with SSGN reusing retiring SSBNs) or simply thinks differently about the design of the LSD(X), there is a lot of room for innovation in the configuration of the future large surface combatant towards increasing combat power in areas other than air defense - where the US Navy fleet today is already strongest.

Defending Iraq’s OPLATs - End of an Era

The final British patrol has departed Iraq’s Khawr Al Amaya and Al Basrah Oil Terminals (KAAOT and ABOT) in the North Arabian Gulf. American Sailors are still engaged but will join the Brits later this year as the Iraq withdrawal progresses. From the time of their initial capture by NSW operators in March 2003, to the rapid hand off of security to USMC FAST, USCG Port Security Units, and the establishment of a long term presence by (then) Naval Coastal Warfare and MESF forces, thousands of active and reserve American and British Sailors, Marines, and Coasties have played a key role in defending the lifeblood of the Iraqi economy. A few even gave their lives.

Some observations on this mission:

- MSO is an enduring sort of mission - once started, it’s hard to stop. Aside from the oplats, a significant portion of the NECC’s security forces have been tied down since 911 protecting SPODs and friendly shipping in CENTCOM. Even as some of these missions draw-down, these capabilities should remain intact, as they are versatile and difficult to reconstitute in the event of a crisis. MESF is an economy of force capability, and with a little imagination, the squadrons bring utility outside of force protection such as support to HADR operations and FID.

- A related lesson is that cutting the umbilical and turning over operations (completely) to a foreign partner can be challenging. The complete withdrawal from the OPLAT has been delayed several times. It's time for the Iraqis to sink or swim.

- Although numerous CRUDES and Gators supported the defense of the OPLATs and the Sailors on them, the work horses of this mission were the USN PCs and USCG WPBs. The OPLATs are situated amidst a complex environment of shoal water, heavy small boat traffic, and international sea boundaries. Some missions were made for smaller, more nimble, shallow draft vessels, and putting a multi-billion dollar capital vessel at risk is a misuse of assets at best. The PCs have been rode hard and put away wet, and are beyond the end of their service lives. A replacement is nowhere to be found in USN acquisition plans.

- ISR over-watch is a critical component of MSO. For a variety of reasons, UAVs were chosen for this mission in the NAG. However, other systems should be considered to maintain persistent surveillance over ports and offshore platforms, including fixed aerostats, like those made by this company or this one. These tactical aerostats (unlike those currently in use for base protection in Afghanistan) are affordable for smaller navies.

- At the strategic level - putting all of one’s eggs in the same critical infrastructure basket is a recipe for disaster. The Iraqis (and consequently the US) were very lucky that there was only one viable attack attempted on the platforms over the past 8 years. Systems disruption attacks, especially against oil infrastructure, have become widely understood by insurgents and terrorists globally as a low risk/high return tactic. Given growing global offshore oil infrastructure, it’s likely the US Navy will find itself involved in MSO again sometime in the future, whether in a lead or supporting (train/equip/advise) role.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Oil Spill and Maritime Domain Awareness

Most folks think of tracking bad guys--terrorists, criminals, WMD, slavers--etc, as the ends of Maritime Domain Awareness, but that is an incomplete understanding. MDA is "...the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United States". This spill hits three of those conditions, and from the looks of this story, multiple agencies are working together to share and coordinate information in order to mitigate this looming threat. Maritime Domain Awareness is at the heart of that coordination and sharing.

Bryan McGrath

An Unaffordable Peacetime Capability

Professor Derek Reveron has an article up at the Atlantic Council's New Atlanticist blog titled Beyond Piracy: Maritime Security and Safety Challenges.

The rise of piracy and the limits of naval power underscore that maritime challenges often begin ashore where security deficits exist. Yet, this should not lead to underlying condition paralysis when thinking about transnational challenges like piracy. As discussed during a joint maritime security workshop between the Atlantic Council and the Naval War College, the international community can generate local maritime forces through capacity building; encourage more prosecutions in Europe and the United States; support judicial systems in Kenya, the Seychelles, and Yemen; reduce the financial flows making piracy profitable; and support stabilizing efforts in Somalia.

Can someone show me what it looks like to "generate local maritime forces" in a weak or failed state? What is the example, Iraq? Doesn't Rhode Island have a longer Coast Guard than Iraq, and aren't we still building that countries Coast Guard capacity?

Standing up a Coast Guards is a great idea, particularly in Somalia - so much so that Somalia claims to have recently stood a Coast Guard up. Ironically, the Somali Coast Guard operate from trucks, not boats; and they are limited to operating in Mogadishu despite suggestions they will actually operate in other places (supposedly including Somaliland and Puntland btw, which is politically not going to happen).

Fishing, piracy, environmental issues... these are problems that Coast Guards deal with every day. Should the US have the capability to stand up a Coast Guard in failed states like Somalia? Sure, it would be nice, but who pays for it? The Navy can barely afford to do the work asked of it by our government, and now they need to be able to build capacity of others? The idea of maritime cooperation is excellent, but it only works where cooperation already exists. It does not work where it is non-existent, and it never will until it is funded properly and elevated significantly in priority.

As it happens, we really have very little to offer failed states like Somalia looking towards the future. If you checked out the Atlantic Council conference, you'll see the problem. The US Navy's primary focus is on Maritime Domain Awareness as an information sharing mechanism towards building a better understanding of regional security problems. How exactly does MDA help the Coast Guard of a failed state that is likely to have massive corruption? Are we likely to share MDA information, even basic ship location information, with the Coast Guard of Somalia? Uhm, not without the shipping industry giving the US Navy the vocal middle finger objection.

Here is the bottom line. When it comes to strategic theory of naval soft power and diplomacy, the US Navy is really good at coming up with operational concepts for engaging existing partners. Global Fleet Stations, 1000-Ship Navy, Maritime Domain Awareness, etc... begin with a starting point of sharing responsibilities and pooling resources with existing, responsible states to achieve the same objectives. What we don't see are strategic theories that address building capacity where capacity doesn't exist, nor do we see strategic theories that address building partnership with countries that we lack partnership agreements with.

The US Navy has just as many "cooperative" options with the PLA Navy in the South China Sea as they do with the Somali Coast Guard in the Indian Ocean. Should the Chinese significantly contribute to a US/Japan sponsored East Asian MDA network with ship tracking information in the Yellow Sea and South China Sea, I'll stand corrected.

I do not believe the US Navy will be worth a darn building capacity with failed states or even cooperation with competitors without leadership supporting completely new strategic theories that focus on peacetime activity. Even then, we can't afford it anyway, because the Navy also needs completely new strategic theories that focus on wartime activity given the trend lines for money and resources. If the new administration wants to prevent war, then they need to add funding towards a fleet suited to meet the demands of a peacetime engagement. Based on the budget numbers I have seen for the future Navy under this administration, the future US Navy will be built solely to fight because there is not enough money to build anything else and meet the obligations that are being shifted to the US Navy. That is the political choice this administration is making, and only people who unrealistically believe that $2 billion, 9,000 ton warships can both be everywhere and do everything all the time will suggest otherwise. In the real world, it doesn't work like that.

Maritime Domain Awareness With Rear Adm. M. Stewart O’Bryan

Last Thursday I participated in a bloggers roundtable with the Director of the U.S. Navy’s maritime domain awareness program, U.S. Navy Rear Adm. M. Stewart O’Bryan.

It turned out, not a lot of interest in this subject besides me. It is still early in the process for developing MDA, but I thought I would post all the questions I was able to ask (a bunch of them), and you can see the answers for yourself. From the transcript (PDF).

Galrahn: Q Hi, this is Raymond Pritchett from Information Dissemination. Thanks for putting this roundtable together.

I have a few questions, but the big one, I think, that I see pop up when people are talking about Maritime Domain Awareness is, what is the expectations and what is the level of buy-in that you're seeing from the commercial sector, not just in the United States, but globally, and among those naval partners that you guys are developing? I mean, is there some expectation for AIS systems?

Or what is -- how do you approach the commercial sector with this, as Maritime Domain Awareness is certainly in part monitoring their activities as well and identifying what is not among the normal activities at sea?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Right.

I mean, the commercial entities and flagging nations have a keen interest in it, because they operate on these seas. And illicit activities and bad actors have found ways to work into the systems and hide themselves, amongst legal entities that are doing work.

One of the things is that our efforts will eventually reduce potential delays, streamlining port operations and increasing port safety and security, which I think is a benefit to the commercial entities that are in this business of shipping goods. Ninety percent of the commerce and the cargo trans across the oceans and seas, in the effort to move commerce and cargo.

You had mentioned AIS. AIS is an automatic information system which shares databases about vessels and has been mandated by the International Maritime Organization for 300 gross tons and above.

And it provides various data about a ship -- its location, its course and things of that nature -- which helps start as a baseline for having an understanding of the ships and vessels that are in operation off of anybody's coast.

Galrahn: Because early discussions of MDA revolved around the examination of, say, the airline industry where you know where every plane is for the most part. They follow a standard protocol, whereas the sea has been ungoverned by these protocols for millenniums.

And I'm just trying to figure out, where does -- where does the connection go for what the Navy's efforts are, in terms of developing international buy-in?

What is -- what is the response that you're seeing from the industry side, for private-sector buy-in?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Yeah, the model that you're referring to is like the FAA model. And so industry, navies and nations are in agreement that we need to have this understanding, not only for just security reasons but also for safety, to avoid collisions at sea and to facilitate legitimate practice and shares of goods. So there is an agreed upon and a common appreciation for this awareness in the maritime domain. As a good example, piracy levels have decreased in the Straits of Malacca, because of this kind of sharing of information and security.

It provides the ship safe and free navigation across chokepoints and things, as is -- it has -- we've recently seen some improvement in the Gulf of Aden.

So I think industry and the whole government agencies are starting to come together and start to discuss these common threats and common desire to have this understanding and work together.

Galrahn: Ladies, I can ask questions all day. If you guys want to ask others --

LT. CRAGG: Raymond, go ahead and then --

Beth: Definitely go ahead. (Laughter.)

Galrahn: Well, I have another question about -- what is the intent of maritime domain awareness? Are you monitoring the environment, or are you monitoring the threat?

ADM. O'BRYAN: It's -- it is effective understanding of anything associated with maritime domain. That can impact the safety, the security, the economy or the environment of the -- you know, in the United States, and that understanding is widely recognized, I think, by most nations and navies, that that's -- it's just not limited to security. It's also environmental.

Galrahn: So say the United States government, through the -- I'm assuming it's multi-agency from our perspective --

ADM. O'BRYAN: Yes.

Galrahn: -- is monitoring the coast of Florida, and you're watching all of the fishermen out there, are you worried about running into any sort of privacy rights as you're watching 20,000 fishing boats?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, it's not that we have detailed information on each one of those fishing vessels. It's just that -- the awareness that there are fishing vessels out there.

And what you look for is not who or an individual or things of that nature; you look for anomalies. If you know that the common fisheries are in a certain body of water and you start detecting vessels in another area that's not common, that in itself is an anomaly, and the Coast Guard or the Navy or Customs or some other entity may want to go out and either query the vessels in that area or send someone out to look at it.

Galrahn: So it's almost you're monitoring patterns for behavior. It's like a behavioral science type project.

ADM. O'BRYAN: Yeah, it -- that's one approach. It's not the only approach. It's very -- it's a layered building of an understanding of this area. As you said, it was ungoverned. I'd say that it's not necessarily ungoverned, but it's very free and open, and because of that, illegal activities find value in exploiting that openness.

Galrahn: When you're talking about maritime domain awareness in development, does the -- how do you determine intent?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, that's a difficult question, even in -- can you elaborate a little bit more on that? What do you mean?
Galrahn: Well, does this capability will allow you to determine the intent? Is there any sort of -- I don't know, I mean, maritime domain awareness is huge. It's got this -- it's enormous, and it's global. And thankfully, there's a lot of people who are interested in it. But when you're looking for patterns, behavioral patterns that are -- anonamal (sic) -- I'm not even sure of the word you're using, but basically an anonymy (sic) -- anol -- I can't say it -- (laughs).

ADM. O'BRYAN: Anolamy (sic) -- anolamy -- it's anolamous (sic) -- you've got me doing it. (Laughs, laughter.)

LT. CRAGG: Anomaly?

Galrahn: Okay.

ADM. O'BRYAN: Yes. Very good. Thank you.

Galrahn: Thank you. Yeah, when you have these situations where they're unique, it's different, looks a little strange, how do you determine the intent? I mean, is that when you dispatch a ship, a plane?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, I mean --

Galrahn: I mean, what are we looking to gain here, other than a behavior pattern recognition process?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, that in itself is -- it's vital to understand what behavior is normal, in order to identify behavior that is inconsistent, or maybe intent. So by acknowledging the behavior that's outside of the norm, the Navy is better -- the Navy and the Coast Guard, for that fact, are better able to identify a threat before it is, you know, able to cause harm.

And so I guess in a way that's kind of intent. But as you go out to explore a vessel that is acting abnormally, you can then ascertain more information and maybe be able to better understand whether the intent is to do harm or not. I mean, that's a tough one, you know.

Galrahn: Sure. Is maritime domain awareness seen as a technological-enabled capability, or is there a human element to developing this information?

ADM. O'BRYAN: I think at the onset there is a lot of human interaction and -- and equity that is -- has been required. But the goal is to try to find -- when you start trying to gather huge amounts of information, you're basically upon an information explosion, and you probably could not have enough human interaction to go through this.

So technology we see as the answer to be able to sort through the disparate types of information and try to build linkages and point us to those anomalies or things that would be of interest. So they'll still require some human assessment or evaluation, but technology should be able to help us do this at a more rapid pace.

Galrahn: Yeah, I was going to ask about data-sharing. I assume that nobody's going to own the data, everybody's going to own the data, it's for a common picture. How are you looking at the data-sharing side -- (audio break) -- accountability perspective when integrating all of these regional coast guards and naval forces?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, there are some existing networks that are out there, and they have got inside them already approved and signed agreements. So we have to work with those regions on how we share and get information assurances. One of the discussion topics here was the possibility of federating these regions and how we would go about it. And some of the discussion revolved around developing a model, developing a technical standard and some of those things here. So the discussions will need to continue on how we start to continue to share, and where that baseline is, and how many layers of information is it that we'll be able to share, depending on the members of the various regional networks and global networks.

Galrahn: So we're looking at a pretty massive and global application development here. I mean, this is -- you're -- this sounds like you're looking for technology, presumably Web-based, for a public network that's secured. I would -- I'm just assuming.

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, it would have -- it would be accessed (in RAN/and ran ?) and managed by the various regionals. But it's more federating the regions because of their common interests and needs vice a global -- but eventually the effect you achieve is awareness of things around the globe, as it applies to your region.

A global single network is something that's -- could be envisioned way out in the future, but not at this point, as far as I'm aware of.

Comment: I didn't ask all of the questions in the roundtable, you can read the transcript to see the other questions asked, but I do enjoy it when I get to ask a bunch of questions like that specific roundtable.

OK, I'll ask the question that wasn't asked, where is MDA going?

It looks to me like the Navy has settled on what might be a technologically driven human behavior at sea monitoring system. Apparently there is an expectation that they will be able to see everything moving at sea, and the data will reveal patterns that can be capitalized on. Maybe, but I don't think anyone knows for sure.

MDA will apparently be a real-time operational picture capability, in other words a tool for monitoring the environment. This will be useful, although I am not convinced MDA is the significant leap forward in capability it was once promised to be, and I think it will ultimately be very expensive. I also did not get the impression there is much complexity in concept or depth to what MDA could be. It sounded to me like a very operational level capability, and not much more.

I can imagine a lot of contractors will want to compete for this project though.

The Debate to Arm Merchant Ships

The AP has an article discussing the debate to arm merchant ships. It begins by noting that France has put soldiers on Tuna boats in the Indian Ocean, and Belgium is offering soldiers for its ships moving through the Horn of Africa region. There is already some concern that these moves will increase the level of violence off the Horn of Africa, which is a legitimate debate. While piracy is at the highest point in recorded 'modern' history off the coast of Somalia, very few people are killed by the actions of pirates. Given all the ammo used against merchant ships before pirates actually get on board a ship, it is hard to tell if this is in large part due to sheer luck or not. After all, it isn't like one can pretend a bridge that has been shot, of which several merchant ships have had, is done in hopes no one is hurt. There are also several injuries and deaths associated with piracy, and can never be claimed to be nonviolent.

Following Maersk Alabama, Congress is trying to take action but there are still several concerns what to do. First the AP report.

In June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an amendment that would require the Department of Defense to put armed teams on U.S.-flagged ships passing through high-risk waters, specifically around the Horn of Africa where Somali pirates have become a scourge of world shipping.

The amendment now goes to the Senate. A separate bill introduced last month would grant immunity from prosecution in American courts to any "owner, operator, time charterer, master, or mariner who uses force, or authorizes the use of force, to defend a vessel of the United States against an act of piracy."

Both measures face tough debate — U.S. military resources are spread thin and onboard weapons, especially in the hands of civilian crew, are seen as an extreme option.

Last month I had the pleasure of chatting with Captain Gordan Van Hook, U.S. Navy (Retired), who now works with Maersk Line, and several Navy officers who are involved in the discussions surrounding these various concepts in Congress. The only thing that emerges in discussing the issues involved with the various people involved is that there is no clear consensus.

Of all the various issues though, what strikes me as wrong headed thinking is that the Navy is trying to disconnect themselves from the responsibility of putting their people on merchant ships in the guardian role. Of all the various possibilities that could result from the debate, that the Navy doesn't want their people engaged seems first and foremost, wrong headed.

It seems to me that if you start from the position the US Navy assumes the responsibility of protecting ships, then it becomes much easier to articulate the level of legal protection necessary to be articulated by Congress in laws passed. Just as Congress has had to manage legal issues surrounding Air Marshall's, it seems to me that Congress should also be able to manage the legal framework for Sea Marshall's.

But the real reason I believe the US Navy should get involved, probably in conjuction with the other maritime services, is because I see this as an opportunity to collect intelligence and expand the picture of the operating environment. Interestingly enough, Captain Gordan Van Hook, U.S. Navy (Retired) discusses one such possibility in the latest issue of Proceedings.

The Department of Transportation's Volpe Center, a developer of marine traffic management systems, saw the potential for AIS to comply with recent U.S. government direction to achieve maritime domain awareness. Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe (CNE) had been linking the surveillance systems of NATO allies to provide an unclassified common operational picture of the Mediterranean Sea. Using AIS to complete this picture, CNE and Volpe developed an unclassified network to share AIS data, known as the Maritime Safety and Security Information System that quickly enhanced awareness for maritime security forces. However, AIS has limitations, as it can be easily spoofed or altered or can malfunction to provide erroneous information. Professional mariners treat AIS as only one fallible piece of data, and they constantly scan the horizon visually and electronically to confirm their surface picture.

What if maritime security forces could access this correlation and comparison of a ship's AIS with shipboard sensors? Recent experiments by Maersk Line, Limited and Lockheed Martin used a prototype AIS and radar correlator known as "Neptune" that sent data via satellite to a network that could conceivably be used by a maritime operations center. This system revealed thousands of contacts outside the range of shore-based AIS, as well as anomalies that did not match AIS. Such information could greatly enhance regional maritime awareness for commercial vessels and maritime security forces in unstable regions.

These systems could gain widest acceptance if they become available with minimal technical and financial investment. Built on IMO-sanctioned standards, they should not be considered intelligence or surveillance systems, but rather safety systems providing vital situational awareness, greater coordination of efforts, reduced risk of collisions, and identification of high-traffic and congestion solutions through analysis and simulation.

Maersk seems to be a great place to start, and by putting some sailors on the ship, the US Navy can help develop this type of system in real world operations off the coast of Somalia with people to test, manage, verify, and maintain as necessary the new system and integrate it into CTF 151. Even better, we secure the system by placing armed naval personnel on the ship to do exactly that. This type of system, in theory, would allow every US flagged ship (beginning with the Maersk Line ships) be a connected node of the MDA network off Somalia.

The idea that the US Navy is against using US Navy personnel to protect US flagged ships screams wasted opportunity, and quite honestly suggests the US Navy does not take its role for the protection of US shipping very seriously. A US flagged ship with US Navy personnel on board represents an opportunity, and quite frankly I have a hard time believing Maersk Line would be against the US Navy adding not only this type of AIS network, but also allowing the Navy to use UAV systems to give better maritime domain awareness to their ships. It doesn't have to be a big UAV like a ScanEagle, although the way Boeing has touted the latest ScanEagle launch and recovery system as lightweight and mobile, there is no reason it couldn't be either.

When the US Navy is, with its right hand, using the argument they don't have enough ships to effectively manage the piracy problem off Somalia, then with the left hand refuse to provide any additional operational support to protect US ships from piracy except deploying their biggest or newest ships, I think it can legitimately be claimed the problem is attitude, not capability.

The political support to protect US shipping should be, from the US Navy perspective, seized as an opportunity, but I don't see the US Navy trying to exploit this opportunity at all. Part of the suggestion may leave the impression that Congress is trying to militarize US shipping, but the analogy is like saying the Mayor of Chicago should not support the Chicago Police Dept. We know piracy is active in that region, the insurance premiums for shipping through that region reflects that reality, so why not add protection.

And if the US taxpayer is going to add protection, why not explore as per Captain Van Hook's suggestion adding capabilities to that protection that assist US Navy operations instead of just being a burden on resources? I think there is opportunity here just waiting for some clear eyed and resourceful Navy officer to commit some intellectual rigor towards, because I think once that starts... good things will happen.

Regardless, tactical evolution from the other side is just weeks away, the Monsoon season is about to end. I hope our tactical evolutions are ready too...

Introduction: Data and Decisions - The Rising Cost of Useful Information

This morning after a late breakfast, I was strolling down Cannery Row in Monterey, California browsing the shops, and I happened into a modern art gallery. I am not a fan of modern art, I prefer classical styles if art must be visual, and I prefer dance and music to other types of art. In an effort to hit every shop I stopped in anyway. As I entered I found myself struck by a painting on the wall. There was something familiar about this painting, although I had never seen it before.

I kept browsing the gallery and came across another painting, similar and familiar, but I had never seen it before. This time I looked at the tag, and the artists name was Eyvind Earle. I walked back to other painting and sure enough, Eyvind Earle was the artist of that painting as well. After admiring both pieces of art, I continued through the gallery until I came across yet another painting that I really liked. Again, Eyvind Earle was the artist. These were all original paintings, and well outside my price range, but there was something very familiar about the art, a feeling of comfort and familiarity. I began to think, who is Evyind Earle?

I asked the gallery shop keeper who Evyind Earle is and it turned out, Evyind Earle is an artist who worked for Walt Disney, and he drew the background for several movies, including my youngest daughters favorite movie that I have seen 1,000 times (it seems) lately Sleeping Beauty. Was this the reason that of the hundreds of paintings and dozen or so gallery's I walked though this morning, I kept getting pulled back to paintings by Eyvind Earle? Is my unfortunate attachment, as a father of a 4-year-old princess lover, to the never-ending Sleeping Beauty DVD the subconscious reason why Eyvind Earle was 'familiar' to me?

The question I kept asking myself, as I attempted to drown out my thoughts at the Scheid Vineyards wine tasting store a few doors down was whether my subconscious knew the painting before I did, after all, in one of the early scenes of the Sleeping Beauty DVD we own, there is a short story about the background and making of the movie. I have seen that introduction before, and without seeing it again I'd place a $1000 right now Eyvind Earle's name is mentioned.

As I do before all long plane flights, I loaded several books onto my iPod for this trip just in case the stereotypical Manhattan mom is taking her kids on a trip. You know the type, the parents whose reliance on the nanny becomes obvious, because they have no connection or authority over their own young children, and forgot to pack the "essential tools of the traveling trade" that regular parents and grandparents get gold stars for having readily available.

(Tip for parents and grandparents, always bring Ring Suckers to help with the ear popping and lack of entertainment after 3 hours of flight, and you too can be a gold star parent or grandparent of kids 2-5 years old on a plane. I happily gave out 8 ring suckers yesterday to one such parental couple behind me on the plane, and between becoming the most popular person in my section of the flight and the iPod books, I enjoyed my proverbial 'nanny' gold star in peace on the 4+ hour flight from Chicago to San Jose.)

One of the books I added this time was Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking by Malcolm Gladwell. Blink is a great book, and includes a very interesting analysis regarding Millennium Challenge 2002 btw, but covers two topics that I have been thinking about lately. The first is the subconscious reaction to information, and the other is rapid "thin-slicing" of data into useful information. Both subjects are beginning to get a lot of attention in the military lately, but should get more.

There is a steady drumbeat in military circles of the opinion that data is becoming more and more costly, and by that as we accumulate more, it is becoming less valuable because it is so expensive for the military to turn massive amounts of data into the useful chunks of information needed for an efficient decision process at all levels. I don't know if the problem indeed exists, but given the immaturity of the tools for data dissemination in the private sector, and known interoperability problems across military services with data, I imagine there is probably some truth to the issue. For 9/11 the data was there to prevent the attack, but dissemination of the data into useful information didn't exist.

But I have a feeling, and I note theory, that this is a generational problem and would resolve itself over time even if nothing was done proactively. My problem has been, I can't explain why I have this theory, what makes mass data dissemination generational and why do I believe future generations will have a better grasp on managing the problems? In Blink, I think I found part of the justification for my theory.

In describing the process of 'thin slicing' data in Blink, Malcolm Gladwell notes that thin slicing is skill, not art, and can be trained. Web 2.0 has created an internet data flow too massive for many to keep up, even organizing data via RSS and making information search capable doesn't resolve the issues with data dissemination, because dissemination of data requires a decision process that turns data into useful information. I believe that because Generation Y has grown up, evolved and trained in massive data flows they have developed natural skills for thin slicing data with available tools, be it cell phones, computer software, or simply how they how they follow streaming data. I liken it as similar to how code breakers in WWII were able to naturally, and with a high degree of success, follow specific units around Europe based on the communication habits of coders in the German Army.

I don't want to give the impression that thin slicing could ever replace research, we are talking about two very different types of information dissemination of large amounts of data, but I believe it will be the natural thin slicing skill of Generation Y that will demand, thus force the evolution of data dissemination tools to resolve some of the costing issues of data today.

This is just an primer on the topic, if I get a chance this week I want to open the discussion up and apply what I am trying to say to a specific example, which is the topic of Maritime Domain Awareness. For those who want to get ahead of the discussion, consider this July 2009 article in Proceedings by LT Mark Munson. There are a lot of great points made in this article I very much agree with. There are also some gaps in the argument, small but critical in my opinion. I think Lt Munson is both right and wrong at the same time, and I hope to tie in where thin slicing applies to my thoughts on that Maritime Domain Awareness article later this week, time permitting.

The Small Stuff: Under the Radar and Slipping Through the Cracks

The Washington Post had an article on smuggling submersibles from South America back on June 6th. While the small boat pirate activity off Africa gets a lot of attention, this is another area of small vessel activity that signals how the US is poorly prepared to deal with small vessel activity.

The subs are powered by ordinary diesel engines and built of simple fiberglass in clandestine shipyards in the Colombian jungle. U.S. officials expect 70 or more to be launched this year with a potential cargo capacity of 380 tons of cocaine, worth billions of dollars in the United States.

"This is definitely the next generation of smuggling conveyance," said Joseph Ruddy, an assistant U.S. attorney in Tampa who prosecutes narco-mariners.
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The submersibles are equipped with technologies that make them difficult to intercept, even though U.S. forces use state-of-the-art submarine warfare strategies against them. Authorities say most slip through their net.

"You try finding a floating log in the middle of the Pacific," one DEA agent said.

Two thoughts. First, there might be a place for a system like this for supporting Marine Corps operations ashore. Second, we need to find ways to be more successful against small platforms. I think it is interesting how small vessels force our Navy and Coast Guard to be purely reactive, because we are unable to consistently, reliably identify the small vessel threats effectively.

This is where the Navy needs to be able to set up Maritime Domain Awareness at sea in a specific area as a requirement. Basically, the ability to blockade blue water on demand over the length of 250nm in a way that absolutely nothing can get through without being seen, and searched if necessary.

H/T Mark Nolan